Copyright by

Karl Frederick Richards

1956 NON-DESCRIPTIVE PAINTING:

AN ARTIST'S POINT OF VIEW

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

KARL FREDERICK RICHARDS, B. S., M. A.

«*««

The Ohio State University 1956

Approved by:

Adviser School of Fine and Applied Arts

Bureau of Educational Research ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It would be impossible to acknowledge all the sources of my ideas or to recognize here all those who have influenced my thinking, but I should es­ pecially like to thank the members of my committee for their friendship, understanding, and help —

Dr. James W. Grimes, Dr. Ross L. Mooney, Mr. Robert

M. Gatrell, Dr. John R. Kinzer, and Mr. Hoyt L. Sher­ man. I should also like to thank Dr. Virgil Hinshaw for his criticisms on portions of this manuscript.

I am particularly indebted to my advisers, Dr. Mooney and Dr. Grimes, not only for the time with which they have been so generous but also for the significant influence they have had on my creative development.

I am deeply indebted to Dean N. Paul Hudson and the members of the Graduate Faculty who have made this work financially possible.

iii CONTENTS

Frontispiece...... ii

Acknowledgements ...... iii

Introduction: Statement of Purpose ...... 1

Position: Contrast and Conflict ...... 8

Purpose: Descriptive and Non-descriptive ...... 22

Motivation: Self and Environment...... 33

Structure: Aesthetic andExpressive ...... , 44-

Craftsmanship: Aesthetic and Technical ...... 50

Meaning: Cognitive and Aesthetic ...... 56

Conclusion ...... 84

Paintings by the A u t h o r...... 85

Appendix: Kinds of Mean i n g...... 101

Bibliography...... 105

iv INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF PURPOSE1

To an artist it seems relatively useless to verbal­ ize about the visual arts. The visual arts are con­ structed with physical materials having certain sensuous qualities which must be directly perceived for adequate comprehension.2 Sensuous qualities are immediately com­ prehensible to those familiar with them, but words can­ not communicate the quality of sound to the deaf ear nor the quality of sight to the blind eye. Moreover, mem­ ories of sensuous qualities would seem to lack both the precision and intensity of sensuous qualities perceptual­ ly apprehended. Words are wholly inadequate to the task

-'-Many of the ideas expressed herein are obviously derived from external sources, but the interest in them is proportionate to their usefulness rather than to their sources. The ideas are integrated into a personal, at- titudinal position as a basis for action rather than eru­ dition. Should the reader care to interrupt his reading to examine the footnotes, he will find evidence of in­ debtedness to the ideas and researches of other men, and he is invited to evaluate for himself the relationships between the manuscript and the references. The manu­ script itself represents a pause or tentative position in the personal creative development of the author. "And I've never quite cottoned to the acrobatic kind of scholarship involved in forcing a reader to pop his eyes up and down the page, like a man trying to watch a tennis match while lying on his side." Fred Rodell, "Ah, Scholarship," The Progressive. April, 1956, p. 12. "... how hard it is to translate into intelligible language what is perceived within." C. G. Jung, Psy­ chological Types. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com­ pany, 1923), p. 512.

1 ; ^cff qpmmunicatLng the precise sensuous properties of even

# ‘.''‘i5j^[email protected] perceptual phenomena.3 ■ o * J-'' I • * > • .*l«rT <> . $by, .then, should an artist choose to write about . v» O qualities which, admittedly, cannot be verbally

ated with any significant‘degree* of precision? .*.. • . * * • * . , ., J P f ■^gj&wer is pimple. The non-descriptive.sartist, in

* • -■ h f f c S t t f r is continuously sumeora^ttd?questions con-

, meaning of his .arti^' ^s^heVm’edting his so-. nBg^TTF • «. * . . •• - f : K . ^^""Mp^^tifsibility -if he merely. work in . -•1 ZJmL'y'fr.-' g||gp jfetb such questions? Perjiaps|;he|^g.:‘ Questions con-

St&j-uzvi-'-'.'..: * • 3" • • ft ® • if ^ }. *•—■.■. ■ 3^.' meaning of non-descripM-ve“'art- are, after all, ""!« * ’ ’•••v priate as questions conce^nin^;..the meaning of m m ■ •' *-v' . Cleaning of a tree, or the -mepgiinjg of any other fcs*a&8«^ qjiality or perceived ®b^ect‘|‘l>-Ney^rtheless,

5, f|*pectations in regard;-tcel?af>tvfafe sheh that,

^SSF&’SSbI^^-8 O'Keefe says, «1 f^ridi'ith^t I could say colors, and shapes, t h ^ I couldn' t say in any things I had no wqpds Jor.11 Daniel Cotton fv ^ CT^ ifglfeeSom of the Brush.11 ^t^^i^c^onthly, v. 181, ^ ^ ^ llbruary, 194-8), p. 4 8 . + ^ 4 o o ^ o !• ° % * i'Cpn't answer your quest’ipn^;abOut the 'abrupt and _ tt?Q; A^cooV _2*gharacter of the non^e^ripj^Jve; emergence in the our century,1 esj^MaiiaySas: mpst of the men ig|i^'pnrt. in it are now d#^^;'4Mojwiyer:,the extra- renascence of this impTiTse^a^ng; iiving painters ^TO^feingthat perhaps Vou*c^ui‘d»_eMwpr.::as an able i s f A ^■Jbitoner. *1 would- welcome Alfred H. t ^ ~ ‘in a letter to the aut.hdl?;^;,^,h-.: ^ Jung says, nPerhapsf arVi-,;.^fs£like nature, .1,1 ^ ut v , * r pimply is,, without intention >tp ' signify Jolande ^ ♦ M r t o r , Psychological "Reflections (New York: Softs. 1953)» p. 174. 3 today, the artist is expected to explain, so to speak, the inexplainable.6

The teaching artist, particularly, is called upon to speak and write about the meaning of art, and his ex­ aminers feel cheated if he "dodges'1 their questions by merely pointing to the object or objects in question.

For professional if not for personal reasons, he is faced with the problem of verbally formulating his par­ ticular creative and educational objectives. This neces­ sity, unfortunately, places the artist at a distinct dis­ advantage. Ordinarily the artist is neither specifically trained nor particularly inclined to operate from a ver­ bal frame of reference.? Even should he find himself possessed of linguistic skills, that about which he is

6 As Andrew Cecil Bradley put it, "What Beethoven meant by his symphony, or Turner by his picture, was not something you can name, but the picture and the symphony. Meaning they have, but what meaning can be said in no language but their own: and we know this, though some strange delusion makes us think the meaning has less worth because we cannot put it into words." Melvin Rader, Editor, A Modern Book of Esthetics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), p. 354-. ^Georges Braque said, "The painter thinks in terms of form and color." Robert Goldwater and Mario Treves, Editors, Artists on Art (New York: Pantheon Books, 1945), p • 442. "I can't give you any particular dope on painting — it's too complicated, and meaningless in short snatches, and quite often in longer ones." James Brooks in a letter to the author. "You asked in your letter why I paint as I do. I think you can turn that around and ask yourself the same question." Louis Schanker in a letter to the author. able to speak or write differs considerably from that

towards which he normally directs his attention. At best, he can speak only of peripheral problems related to his major area of activity; at worst, he finds him­

self involved in a verbal discipline which, for him at

least, is wholly inadequate to the task it is expected

to perform.

Can the artist ignore social pressures towards verbal formulation, or must he risk the dangers and difficulties attending entry into this verbal environ­ ment where he is relatively inexperienced? In either instance he may expect criticism. The final choice of a course of action may therefore rest on the personal needs of the artist. The teaching artist is faced with the need for verbal communication, and to some degree, he must risk the attempt at linguistic expression. The writing of a manuscript therefore offers such a person the opportunity to examine his personal beliefs in re­ lation to his social environment and to present a more complete and precise statement of faith than might other­ wise be possible.®

® "... it is important that one challenge oneself from time to time to a statement of the beliefs on which he is acting." Ross L. Mooney, "Groundwork for Creative Research," The American Psychologist, v. 9, no. 9 (Sep­ tember, 1954), p. 544. C. G. Jung says, "Upon one’s own philosophy, con­ scious or unconscious, depends one's ultimate interpre- 5

The self-examination necessary to conceptual inte­

gration has, in this instance, altered considerably the

original intentions in regard to this manuscript. The

initial effort to identify and explain non-descriptive

objectives has been significantly affected by the effort

to express deeply personal, emotional and conceptual re­

sponses to a particular kind of creative activity in re­

lation to its complex and sometimes unsympathetic social

environment.9 Ways had to be found to explicate the

tation of facts. Therefore it is wise to be as clear as possible about one's subjective principles. As the man is, so will be his ultimate truth." Jacobi, op. cit.. pp. 112-113. ' Although contemporary society tends to look with suspicion upon that which is not objective, factual, and dispassionately impartial, this manuscript is nevertheless intended to reveal the importance of subjective and emo­ tional factors in the development of a conceptual position. It is a recognition of the inescapable interdependence of conceptual and emotional attitudes. Understandably then, the footnoted quotations have been primarily chosen as evidence for the significance of personal beliefs, and they are not expected to serve as proof or authority for the validity of the beliefs here presented. "If he (the artist) seeks to mix himself up with the passions of the crowd, if his work shows the desire to prove anything, he thereby neglects the creation of beau­ ty." Havelock Ellis, The Dance of Life (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.), p. 348. The quotations selected for inclusion are not al­ ways in agreement with the manuscript itself. The non- descriptive artist, having dared to question and reject certain traditional assumptions, does not feel the need for the documentation of academic precedent and authori­ ty upon which to base his actions and beliefs. Assent, after all, can say nothing either for or against an assumption, for in matters of belief, no amount of au­ thoritative documentation can reveal anything more than attitudes and assumptions which make non-descriptive objectives meaningful and important to a non-descriptive artist. This effort has implications which reach much farther into the experiential conditions of existence than might be superficially apparent. Problems and ques­ tions have been introduced which are of great concern to philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, historians and others, but they have been considered by an artist from the point of view of their potentialities for the ex­ pression of a specific, non-descriptive attitude.10 it is recognized that these problems have numerous and profound implications which lie outside the purpose and scope of this manuscript and that the particular con­ cepts expressed here by no means exhaust the implicar- that others have held similar opinions and beliefs. "... if the impression is that of a man whose at­ tainments I admire, it is authoritative for me..." Albert R. Chandler, Beauty and Human Nature (New York: D. Apij>leton-Century Company, 1934)» p. 351. "What we are interested in is what sticks in our consciousness; everything else we get rid of as quickly as we can." William James, Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923), p. 420. "It is, for instance, an immediately intelligible fact to an ordinary human intelligence that every philo­ sophy, that is not just a mere history of philosophy, depends upon a personal psychological pre-condition." C. G. Jung, op. cit.. p. 619. "Our way of looking at things is conditioned by what we are. And since other people are differently constituted, they see things differently and express themselves differently." C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of A Soul (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com­ pany, 1934), p. 134. tions of the problems introduced. The attempt to deal with them here is tentative and positional and is con­ sidered neither conclusive nor inclusive in character or scope. POSITION: CONTRAST AND CONFLICT

Contrast, it would seem, is a necessary ingredient of consciousness as we know it, and if this be granted, identification of one's position involves the problem of understanding it in relation to other positions which may or may not be compatible with it.l Thus it is that the non-descriptive artist finds it necessary to ques­ tion and reject some of the assumptions consistent with the descriptive tradition, because they are incompatible with the non-descriptive position.? It is perhaps wise, therefore, that some cognizance be made of the conflict which has sometimes arisen between the descriptive and non-descriptive schools of thought. The conflict would

1 The concept of necessary contrast is of extreme importance to the thesis adopted here, because it is as­ sumed that consciousness, as we know it, would not and could not exist in its absence. The very words on this page are perceived and apprehended by virtue of contrast. "There is no balance, no system of self-regulation, without opposition." C. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analyti­ cal Psychology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), p. 60. ^ "... l'origine de 1'oeuvre de tout grand artiste, est disaccord, elle n'est pas ne'cessairement accusation..." Andre' Malraux, Les Voix du Silence (Paris: La Galerie de la Pleiade, L'Imprimerie Georges Lang, 1952), p. 399. "Admittedly modern art involves a disintegration of the cultural values of the past — so does the original art of every fertile age." Herbert Read, Art Now (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), p. 13. There is "... a real benefit in the cutting down and clearing away of traditional and non-vital beliefs." Ellis, op. cit.. p. 213.

8 o

seem to be primarily derived' frofii assbmpti^e M^sWenses, and although it is beyond the scope of this manusoript to try to settle these differences,, the attempt is made to open up questions which seem not to have been conclu­ sively answered but which seem, instead, to be matters of belief or opinion.3

Contrasts among viewpoints constitute the very es­ sence of our interest in these viewpoints. Without the intellectual and emotional stimulation derived from op­ position, one might find life very dull indeed.4- Our

' Alfred North Whitehead says that there can be no real dispute about non-doubtful things and no real agree­ ment about doubtful things. Religion in the Making (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 14. "In regard to the afts, it is hard to find any ... agreementj disagreement permeates the whole field. This fact is evidenced by the perennial disputes among critics and experts. Psychologists in their experiments have encountered it." Chandler, op. cit.. p. 350. "If men can be educated to see ... their nature clearly, it may be hoped that they will also learn to understand and love their fellow men better. A little less hypocrisy and a little more self-knowledge can only have good results in respect for our neighbor ... But how comes it that each investigator sees only one side, and why does each maintain that he has the only valid view? It must come from the fact that, Swing to his psychological peculiarity, each investigator most readily sees that factor ... which corresponds to his peculiarity." Jung, Two Essays, on Analytical Psycholo­ gy (o p . cit.), pp. 25, 40. Apparent disagreement may be in reality a lack of understanding. "Intellectual activity is stimulated, not by certainty, but by doubt." F. G. S. Schiller, Problems of Belief (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), p. 29. " ... every process is a phenomenon of energy, and ... all energy "can only proceed from the tensions of 10 goal, assuredly, is one of reason over passion in order that we may utilize this stimulation in a constructive rather than a destructive manner. Should passion gain supremacy over reason, this stimulation may become bru­ talized instead of utilized, and our great need to as­ sert our superiority may betray us into asserting logi­ cal absurdities. A truth may be mistaken for the whole truth, and instead of asserting that a circle is not a triangle, we may find ourselves asserting that if tri­ angles are true, circles are false.5

Although this manuscript presents a non-descriptive opposites ... The problem of opposites, as an inherent principle of human nature, forms a further stage in our process of realization. As a rule it is one of the problems of maturity ...'* Jung, op. cit.. pp. 28, 58. "There are those who profess the loftiest principles and display the noblest sentiments and the correctest judgement in considering the acts of others. But the moment their own interests are affected, all their principles and morals appear to evaporate and to be for­ gotten." Schiller, op. cit.. p. 125. "It is a fact, which is constantly and over whelm­ ing ly apparent in one’s practical work, that a man is well-nigh incapable of comprehending and giving full sanction to any other standpoint than his own." Jung, Psychological Types (op. cit.). p. 620. "The fundamental cause of ... rigidity is fear of the problem of opposites ... Therefore there must be only one truth and one guiding principle of action, and that must be absolute..." Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (op. cit.). p. 75. Incompatibilities among viewpoints prove nothing one way or the other about the truth of any position, and so far as this manuscript is concerned, there has been no concern whatsoever with truth or falsity in any final sense. The effort is one of communication and not one of legislation. 11 viewpoint which cannot lay claim to a dispassionate ob­ jectivity, it should not be misconstrued as an attack on the descriptive tradition.2 Favoritism towards one point of view does not necessarily imply disrespect towards other points of view; differences of viewpoint do not ordinarily cause violent dispute except where the advo­ cates of one point of view deny others the right to ad­ vocate a different one.&

The non-descriptive artist is nevertheless, on occasion, subjected to vituperation and ridicule.?

6 "We proclaim them (our beliefs) from the housetops in order to keep up our confidence in them. And they not only demand support, but get it ... We profess willing­ ness to die for our beliefs, and certainly show willing­ ness to kill." Schiller, op. cit.. p. 41. C. G. Jung says, "... only opinions that have shaky foundations require the prop of dogmatizing. Fanaticism is the ever-present brother of doubt." Jacobi, op. cit.. p. 172. ' "Violence and nihilism: the death of the human personality. This is the message that modern art brings to us ... art ... shows signs of becoming more neurotic and self-destructive, regressing into primitive or in­ fantile symbolism, to babble and mud pies and formless scrawls." Lewis Mumford, Art and Technics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 7, 32. "We are human because we have meanings, and symbols of those meanings. Therefore, the 'retreat from mean­ ing' which is apparently the only object of non-object tive art is to me a denial of the most essential charac­ teristic of man. Non-objective art can contain nothing of the intelligence, the wit or the beauty which I ven­ erate in my fellow humans, thus, it simply bores me." Ben Shahn in a letter to the author. "When art seems to be empty of meaning, as no doubt some of the abstract painting of our own day actually does seem, what the painting says, indeed what the artist is shrieking at the top of his voice, is that life has 12

The non-descriptive rejection of certain traditional assumptions and objectives is perhaps viewed as an attack on the "truth" as guaranteed by mass assent to habitual assumptions^ and documented precedents.9 But become empty of all rational content or coherence.*1 Mumford, op. cit.. p. 21, "... it is possible to regard such art ... as an act of dispair — • an art merely of escape from the com­ plexity and confusion of m o d e m life.** Read, op. cit.. p. 117. **... the non-objective and abstract .. is at present arid, decadent, without depth, social importance, or universal meaning.** George Biddle, "Modern Art and Muddled Thinking," Atlantic Monthly, v. 180, no. 6 (Decem­ ber, 194-7), p. 61. "Little wonder ... that it is precisely our epoch, and particularly those movements which are somewhat ahead of the time, that reveal the subjective factor is every kind of exaggerated, crude and grotesque form of expres­ sion. I refer to the art of the present day." Jung, Psychological Types (op. cit.). p. 497. According to Jose* Ortega Y Gasset, "... the point will be reached when the human element of the work of art will be so scanty that it will be hardly visible ... It will be an art for artists and not for the masses of the people. It will be an art of caste and not a demo­ cratic art." Rader, op. cit.. p. 432. These kinds of reactions to non-descriptive art may, of course, merely indicate an undeveloped aesthetic attitude on the part of the observer. The "empty and decadent" theory of non-descriptive art probably bears a closer relationship to the aesthetic poverty and pessimistic character of the interpreter than it does to the character of non-descriptive art. "The charge that modern art or abstraction or surrealism is a mirror of decadence is generally an a priori argument which first establishes its pessi­ mistic view of our civilization and then relates an art which it dislikes and misunderstands to the un­ happy state of the world." John I. H. Baur, Revolution and Tradition in Modern American Art (Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, 1951), p. 143« ° "Rationalists have for ages endeavoured to per- 13 mere rejection should not be considered an attack. The

non-descriptive position is not necessarily an anti-

descriptive position, nor is the descriptive position

necessarily intolerant of the non-descriptive position.

Either position may be appreciative or intolerant of the

other.-*-®

suade themselves and others that belief is wholly an affair of the intellect, in which desires and volitions play no part. They have loved to represent belief as involuntary, forced upon us from without, as a 'neces­ sity of thought,' by the objective nature of things, and themselves as humbly submissive to the dictates of a reality which determined all their beliefs for them ... the doctrine that our beliefs are wholly forced upon us by an external necessity is wholly false, and not quite honest." Schiller, op. cit.. pp. 107, 112-113. C. G. Jung says, "One could almost say that no­ thing is more hateful to man than to give up even a particle of his unconscious. Ask those who have tried to introduce a new ideal" Jacobi, op. cit.. p. 61. ° "Men are always apt to bow down before the superi­ or might of their ancestors. It has been so always and everywhere." Ellis, op. cit., p. 142. One need only visit our great museums to become aware that they are shrines to the past more than they are patrons of contemporaries. "Those people who only love the styles of past epochs are not giving style and importance to their own period. Afraid to create, they are unimportant, already forgotten while still alive." Hilla Rebay, Art of Tomorrow (New York: Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1939), p. 9. "And apropos of a critic who claims to understand art only up to the 'old masters' — what about a physi­ cist who cannot get beyond the physics of Newton?" Wolfgang Paalen, Form and Sense (New York: Wittenborn and Company, 1945), p. 39. The authoritarian demand for conformity may block appreciation. One is more likely to respect and appre­ ciate opposing opinions when they are not pronounced with the voice of authority. H

Intolerance makes that which should be a stimula­ ting argument become a distasteful dispute leaving each faction disturbed, suspicious, and frustrated.H The non-descriptive artist feels the need for a mutual ap­ preciation and respect which, he believes, can be satis­ factorily achieved only at the expense of authoritarian attitudes. The typical nonr'descriptive artist re-

__— ------"Intolerance is natural to man. If, as a matter of fact, men are not always intolerant in practice, it is only because they are prevented by conditions born of reason and wisdom. Respect for the opinion of others supposes a temper of mind which takes years to acquire." E. Vacandard, The Inquisition (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1915), p. 155. "... he who feels that his way is the only way is bound to be coercive in many ways, subtle or otherwise ..." Floyd H. Ross, Addressed to Christians (New York: Har­ per and Brothers, 1950) p. 139. "... the individual is reacting to constant chal­ lenges to conform." Ross L. Mooney, "Cultural and Emo­ tional Blocks to Creative Activity," (Unpublished manu­ script) . "The instinct for self-preservation as well as the demands of ambition dictate that a man conform to the powers that be and seek promotion through their favor, rather than cross them and court ruin." Joseph Harou- tunian, Lust for Power (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 31. But the creative person is not content with con­ formity and imitation. He must be free to question the validity of traditional assumptions and methods before he is free to investigate and initiate a personal way of structuring experience. 12 «he process of creed-making, like the process of education itself, would go on indefinitely in normal exploratory fashion were it not for the fact that in every historically conscious movement, administratively- minded persons step forward to 'jell' the process, to determine what the conditions of membership shall be and 15 spects and admires the more traditional art forms — particularly the historical examples. In numerous in­ stances, traditionalists demonstrate a similar respect for non-descriptive art. Preference towards a particu­ lar avenue of expression does not necessarily entail a lack of appreciation for other avenues of expression; the possibility of mutual respect is not dependent on the position one takes so much as on the attitude with which that position is held.13 what the ’faith1 shall be.” Ross, op. cit.. p. 55. "... all the great systems of authoritative belief, by which the world is controlled, are supported and per­ vaded by dishonesty, and perverted to serve the interests of those who manipulate them." Schiller, op. cit.. p. 78. ^ "... once the conscious mind admits at least the relative validity of all human opinion, then the opposi­ tion loses something of its irreconcilable character." Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (op. cit.). p. 77. The value of an assumption, belief, or viewpoint would seem to lie in its usefulness to the person who holds it, and unless it can be conclusively demonstrated false, it would seem unnecessarily presumptuous to deny its validity as a useful basis for action. "It is my conviction that a basis for the adjust­ ment of conflicting views could be found in the recog­ nition of types of attitude, not however of the mere existence of such types but also of the fact that every man is so imprisoned in his type that he is simply in­ capable of a complete understanding of another stand­ point." Jung, Psychological Types (op. cit.). p. 621. In the view of the author there are at least two basically different attitudes which, at the risk of over simplification, may be broadly designated as the conceptual and perceptual types. Such a designation is of course merely an abstraction recognizing the ex­ istence of extreme differences of attitude which may give rise to misunderstandings. These types are mu­ tually complementary and dependent in the sense that 16

The non-descriptive artist, like other men, is in- vo2.ved in the daily problems of living which demand of him actions and behavior which lie outside the province of his specialized activity as an artist. In the course of daily living, which involves social intercourse with men of diverse opinions, conflicting desires, and varied interests, he finds it both expedient and necessary to effect compromises, to alter goals, and to submit to the will of others. But as an artist, he finds his freedom limited only by his own ability to understand and master his chosen means of expression. And he finds non-de­ scriptive objectives less restricting than those of the descriptive tradition.14 The limitations are freely each possesses what the other so obviously lacks. They are mutually stimulating in the sense that their con­ trast strengthens and emphasizes their individual iden­ tities. As a basic means of differentiation, it may be said that the conceptual type is more likely to deal in conceptual abstractions whereas the perceptual per­ son is more likely to immerse himself in objective data. Unfortunately, the mental processes of either type appear to be hidden from the other; neither, as a rule, possesses much insight into the other’s atti­ tudes and purposes. There would seem to be a propor­ tionate consistency of perceptual and conceptual quali­ ties throughout the attitudes, purposes, and processes of individuals, and where the proportion is weighted towards one quality or the other, misunderstandings between the two types seem to increase in proportion to the degree of contrast. 14 Fernand Leger said, "In painting, the strongest restraint has been that of subject-matter upon compo­ sition, imposed by the Italian Renaissance." Goldwater 17 chosen and accepted as consistent with his own tempera­ ment and as the best avenue through which to achieve self-realization and aesthetic freedom, ^

Freedom in the arts is of course a relative condi­ tion, for there is no art form without its limitations} but those who would insist that the non-descriptive artist compromise with cognitive traditions are asking him to relinquish his right to choose his own limita- and Treves, op. cit.. p. 424« James McNeil Whistler said, "Art should be inde­ pendent of all clap-trap — should stand alone, and appeal to the artistic sense of eye or ear, without con­ founding this with emotions entirely foreign to it, as devotion, pity, love, patriotism, and the like. All these have no kind of concern with it , Goldwater and Treves, Ibid.. p. 347. "Far from emptying a work of the artist's person­ ality, this process of abstraction, by removing the sentimental mask of actuality, leaves that personality free to shine out clearly." Read, op. cit.. p. 109. n... persons who create are required to turn their attention inward during that critical phase of creating when the only place to get the new is from something inside: a certain self-centeredness is re­ quired and yet often objected to by others." Mooney, "Cultural and Emotional Blocks to Creative Activity" (Unpublished manuscript). "The superior position of the subjective factor in consciousness involves an inferiority of the objective factor." Jung, Psychological Types (op. cit.). p. 477. "We know that a man can never be everything at once, never complete; he always develops certain qualities at the expense of others, and wholeness is never at­ tained." Jung, Modern Man in Search of A Soul (op. cit.), p. 106, "... different characters may conceivably at the outset of life be alike possible to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed." James, op. cit.. p. 186. 18 tions.16 There are those who feel that the non-descrip­ tive position is a narrow position, rebellious and bel­ ligerent towards the cognitive purposes of the descrip­ tive tradition. But the non-descriptive focus of atten­ tion on the sensuous qualities of aesthetic integration cannot be properly considered narrow and rebellious so long as the limitations are consciously recognized and accepted as necessary to the specific nature of the chosen goal. ^

The exclusion of cognitive concerns from the non- descriptive goal is merely an instance of concentrated effort demanding the elimination of factors inconsistent with that goal.-L® The aim of the non-descriptive artist

1 " IT...... ■LO "The essence of democracy lies in individualism, variety, and organic differentiation." Herbert Read, Education Through Art (London: Faber and Faber, 194-7), p. 4. "... one becomes typical by being to the utmost degree one's self." Ellis, op. cit.. p. xi. "Uniqueness is a frightening thing.Ross L. Mooney, "Teaching Material for Recurring Problems in Research" (Unpublished manuscript). "The importance of individual life may always be denied by the 'educator' whose pride it is to breed mass-men. But any other person will sooner or later be driven to find this meaning for himself." Jung, Modern Man in Search of A Soul (op. cit.). p. 79. -L7 "Art of this kind is narrow, but it is also deep. It has sacrificed associative values to try to speak the language of pure form ..." Baur, op. cit.. p. 139. "I am ilnique, yes, but I am also universal." Mooney, "Teaching Material for Recurring Problems in Research" (Unpublished manuscript) "Our conscious certainly is narrow, when con­ 19

is solely that of aesthetic integration, and there is no

room for conflicting viewpoints to confuse the man in

his role as an artist.19 As an artist his attention is

trasted with the breadth of our sensory surface and the mass of incoming currents which are at all times pouring in.1* James, op. cit.. p. 217. "At the height of rational tension, the 'focus' of consciousness is narrow and well defined; it can deal only with one subject at a time ... the very narrowness of our mental focus warrants the acuity of our thinking." Anton Ehrenzweig, The Psycho-Analysis of Artistic Vision and Hearing (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Limited, 1953), pp. 206, 210. "... only a few contents can attain the highest grade of consciousness at the same time, and only a limited number of contents can be held at the same time in the conscious field. The activity of the conscious is selective. Selection demands direction. But direc­ tion requires the exclusion of everything irrelevant." Jung, Psychological Types (op. cit.). p. 532. iy "The creative person seeks to focus his experi­ encing through self-differentiation and self-realization. This is evidenced by a willingness to be different in things that make a difference, an honoring of his own fulfillment even when it runs counter to common expecta­ tions of others, a persistent inquiry into the meaning of his own life, a feeling that his individual life has independent roots, an insistence on expression for self­ clarification, a feeling that the world is, in important part, his own creation. "The creative person seeks to manage his actions during his experiencing through disciplining himself to serve the extension and focusing of his experience. This is evidenced by an insistence on mastering his materials and tools of work so well that these become a part of his own way of living, an insistence on the privilege of controlling his own work schedule, a will­ ingness to stick with baffling problems over an extend­ ed period of time, a capacity to be consumed by his work, a seriousness in selecting work to do which is personally and deeply valuable to him." Mooney, "Ground­ work for Creative Research" (op. cit.) p. 545. To the non-descriptive artist, creative differen­ tiation demands the suppression or elimination of cogni­ tive concerns. In the words of William Pepperell Monta^- 20 focused on s delimited and specific goal which he knows cannot completely fulfill his potentialities as a human being. The man accepts his role as an artist as a de­ limited role subject to the limitations and restrictions inherent in his aesthetic medium and his specific atti­ tude. That which is expressed by this means is natural­ ly restricted by the aesthetic potentialities of the visual medium and style employed. There can be no ques­ tion as to whether or not non-descriptive art can com­ pletely fulfill one's potentialities as a man but only one as to whether or not the man has completely ful­ filled his potentialities as a non-descriptive artist.

The non-descriptive artist is aware of himself as an individual among other individuals; he feels the need for social acceptance as well as self-expression. 20 His rejection of cognitive purposes may reflect a lack of interest in the pursuit of such objectives, but this gue, "Realism seeks to imitate nature and to arouse in the spectator the pleasure of recognizing and identify­ ing what is familiar. This pleasure is pardonable and even innocent, but it is not esthetic, though it is often thought to be ... And as attention to form must compete with attention to content, the significance of the one requires the insignificance of the other." Rader, op. cit.. pp. 223-224-. 20 "Each of us wants to be uniquely different and individual, while at the same time we also want to be one among all men, having qualities which assure us that we belong to and are like our fellow men." Mooney, "Teaching Materials for Recurring Problems in Research" (Unpublished manuscript) 21

does not necessarily imply antagonism or rebellion to­

wards cultural traditions. There has certainly been a

traditional concern for sensuous aesthetic integration

in the arts, and the non-descriptive position is a

positive affirmation of this aesthetic tradition.21

The non-descriptive attitude cannot, of course, make

any claims to inclusiveness; non-descriptive objectives

are admittedly exclusive and specific. But the freedom

to select his own limitations is one of the freedoms upon which the non-descriptive artist insists. If the freedom desired is the freedom from a rigid adherence

to tradition, then perhaps this freedom should be grant­ ed. 22

21 Piet Mondrian said, "All painting — the paint­ ing of the past as well as of the present shows us that its essential plastic means are only line and color.'* Go Id water and Treves, op. cit.. p. 4.26. 22 nj (3 0 n0-fc See any other way for a person to live his own epoch other than to paint non-objactively. Space beautification and the rythmic form idea of our age has a far deeper meaning and far greater influence than most people can understand because great things are always extremely simple and yet simplicity seems to be the most difficult thing for people to understand." Hilla Rebay in a letter to the author. PURPOSE: DESCRIPTIVE AND NOIi-DESCRIPTIVE1

It is commonly assumed that aesthetic structure is merely the vehicle through which is expressed some de­ scriptive, philosophical, literary, or other cognitive meaning.2 It is this assumption which prevents so many

The position is taken here that our culture does not now possess a sufficient number of constant, conven­ tional symbols to make possible a visual art through which non-viaual conceptual or emotive meanings can be successfully communicated. In the absence of such an "aesthetic alphabet," the visual arts serve as a vehicle through which visual meanings alone may be clearly ex­ pressed. The idea of an aesthetic, non-descriptive sym­ bolism has therefore been rejected as representing an undeveloped or non-existent condition at this time. As a consequence, all visual art of cognitive intent has herein been broadly classified as descriptive art. The descriptive arts are those which represent, illusionistically or symbolically, the visually per­ ceptible aspects of the environment. In other words, descriptive art symbolizes or imitates the appearances of visual perceptions. Inasmuch as descriptive or representational symbols need not be illusionistic in form, not all descriptive art can properly be designated as illusionistic or realistic. In order to avoid con­ fusion, therefore, the more precise term "symbolic art" has been introduced where it has been felt necessary to differentiate between symbolically descriptive art and realistically descriptive art. The descriptive arts may be illusionistic, realistic, naturalistic, representational, or symbolic. Non-descriptive art is that kind of art through which is sought an aesthetically integrated unity with­ out symbolism or description of any kind. A non-de- scriptive work represents or symbolizes nothing beyond itself. It la aesthetically or sensuously meaningful but contains no cognitive content of a symbolic or de­ scriptive nature. Non-descriptive art has been known variously as non-objective, non-figurative, abstract, or purely abstract art. "Of course my work is abstract ... Non-objective

22 23

people, artists and public alike, from appreciating the

aesthetic integration of non-descriptive art.3 In mul­

titudinous instances, the expectation of a cognitive

message prevents people from being aware of the power

and necessity of aesthetic structure in descriptive as

well as in non-descriptive art. It should be plain to

the thoughtful observer that aesthetic structure is an

important factor, if not the major factor, in all truly

great art of our culture.4 To casual observers, how­

ever, descriptive and narrative factors have so dis­

guised the aesthetic that art has come to mean, to them,

description and literary communication. Many people

it isn’t. Human life has meanings only because symbols have been created having meaning, and transferring that meaning on to others. The idea of compassion, for in­ stance, is a common value because we have a wealth of common symbols fixing that idea in our consciousness. Without symbols, the idea of compassion could not be passed on from one person to another, or from one genera­ tion to another.” Ben Shahn in a letter to the author. ”It is beauty that humanity needs and wants in all actions, surroundings and relations to others, and beauty it is which Non-objective painting is bringing to those who can feel it.” Rebay, op. cit.. p. 6. ^ Clive Bell says, ”... relations and combinations of lines and colours, these aesthetically moving forms, I call 'Significant Form’; and ’Significant Form' is the one quality common to all works of visual art ...” E. F. Carritt, Editor, Philosophies of Beauty (New York, London and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 264. ”0f course my work is abstract, as is any painting that can be called a painting at all.” Ben Shahn in a letter to the author. 24 judge the excellence of a work of art by its reproduc­ tive skill and narrative clarity as though the sole function of the artist were didactic.5

* “In traditional art, what has caused the observer to look mistakenly to painting for values which belong to literature? Representation: the painter's use of ob­ jects associated with remembered facts and feelings which distract attention from what is distinctively plastic. Painting can fulfill its special function only if the artist gives up representation." Frances Bradshaw Blanshard, Retreat from Likeness in the Theory of Painting (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 117. "... I am quite willing to admit, that if we could separate the symbolic content of a picture ... from its formal content, then our reaction to the symbolism would not be strictly speaking aesthetic." Read, Art Now (op. cit.). p. 133. Herbert Read also says, "But in certain ages society has made the artist an exponent of the moral and ideal emanations of the super-ego, and art has thus become the handmaid of religion or morality or social ideology. In that further process art, as art, has always suffered — simply because in such a case the message will always appear more important, more insistent, than the mode of conveyance, and men will forget that in art it is only the mode which matters." Rader, op. cit.. p. 155. "To ask a painting or statue to tell a story or convey a sentiment by association of ideas is a perver­ sion of the function of those works of art ... the heart of creative work really lies beyond subject-interest, beyond picturesqueness, sentiment and slices of life." Sheldon Cheney, A Primer of Modern Art (New York: Tu­ dor Publishing Company, 1949), p. 9. "Do you sincerely think (no offense meant) that painting is a practical means of propoganda in this dqy of tons of newspulp, thousands of miles of celluloid film strips, and billions of radio waves? ... It seems to me that painting as propoganda is very small fry." Hilaire Hiler, Henry Miller, and William Saroyan, Why Abstract? (New York: New Directions, 1945)» p. 14. If non-descriptive art serves no other purpose, it will have served a valuable function if it succeeds in creating a greater awareness of the aesthetic value of a work of art and thereby helps to overcome the aes­ thetic indifference of those who have confused art with 25

Western art, of course, has been traditionally em­

bodies in cognitive or descriptive terms which, being

immediately and obviously comprehensible, have tended

to place emphasis on cognitive communication.^ Un­

propoganda. A popular belief which may be greatly responsible for the common expectation of a message from art is that which assumes that the work of art is prompted by a prior inspirational experience. It would indeed be presumptuous to assume that no work of art was ever initiated under such conditions, but it would be equally presumptuous to assume that all works of art were ini­ tiated in this manner. Perhaps those works so inspired do intend to communicate prior inspirational experience of some specific emotional or intellectual nature, but it is certainly debatable as to whether or not such a purpose can be non-descriptively accomplished with any great degree of success. Although it would be unfair to assert that no non- descriptive artist desires to communicate prior inspira­ tional experiences, it would be unrealistic to expect such intentions as a general rule. It is not the habit of artists to passively await inspirational experiences before starting to work. Artists may, like other men, place more faith in perspiration than in inspiration. "... with us in the west, long tradition has es­ tablished 'natural beauty and truth to Nature' as the criterion of beauty in art, since it is also the cri­ terion and essential character of Graeco-Roman and oc­ cidental art in general." Jung. Psychological Types (op. cit.). p. 360. "Since the 13th century, the main tradition of European painting had been intimately bound up with a desire to reproduce in some way exactly what the eye saw." James Johnson Sweeney, Plastic Redirections in 20th Century Painting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 45. But prior to the emergence of contemporary non- descriptive art, man was surely aware that aesthetic appeal could be experienced in the absence of symbolic awareness. Witness the many ancient examples of non- descriptive expression on artifacts, textiles, archi­ tecture, monuments, and other objects lending them­ selves to decoration. It is of course difficult to know whether or not ancient examples of abstract de­ 26 fortunately, cognitive concomitants to art possess the capacity for distracting one from the discrete enjoy­ ment of the sensuous qualities of aesthetic integra­ tion.^ Can it be that our cognitive traditions in art sign were created with symbolic intent, but to modern man nevertheless, it is the aesthetic and not the sym­ bolic meaning which is most readily apparent. 7 "In recognition we fall back, as upon a stereo­ type, upon some previously formed scheme." John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Minton, Balch and Com­ pany, 1934), P. 52. "The circle observed on the oblique plane does not become an ellipse; it seems to remain a circle ... The white object in shadpw.remains white, the black paper remains black in full light ... the physical ob­ ject as such remaining constant, while actual stimula­ tion varies ..." Wolfgang KShler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: Horace Live right, 1929)> p. 80. "Knowledge so characteristically consists of items we have comfortably filed away in their proper pigeon­ holes as finished business." C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1950), p. 10. According to Roger Fry, "In actual life the normal person really only reads the labels as it were on the objects around him and troubles no further. Almost all the things which are useful in any way put on more or less this cap of invisibility.” Rader, op. cit.. p. 51. "Resemblance to natural objects, while it does not necessarily destroy ... esthetic values, may easily adulterate their purity. Therefore, since resemblance to nature is at best superfluous and at worst distract­ ing, it might as well be eliminated." Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Cubism and Abstract Art (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1936), p. 13. Obviously, the relatively fixed, conceptual mean­ ing we bring to the cognitive fragments in descriptive art may detract from aesthetic appreciation of the work as a whole. May it not be said that cognitive fragments, to some degree at least, tend to prevent the unhindered focus of attention on aesthetic integration? At best, attention would be divided between cognitive meaning and aesthetic integration, and at worst, full attention would 27

have so dominated our attention that the sensuous rela­

tionships of art have been commonly misapprehended or

only subconsciously apprehended?® The widespread lack

of appreciation for non-descriptive art may well be an

indication of a widespread lack of appreciation for

aesthetic integration itself.9

The apprehension of beauty is one of the most com­

mon and pleasant experiences of mankind, and yet it is

quite difficult to explain the aesthetic purpose of non-

descriptive art to those whose aesthetic sensibilities

have been dulled by cognitive preoccupations. The non-

descriptive artist, of course, finds it difficult to

be focused on cognitive meaning. It is doubtful that there are many, if any, people who are able, in the pre­ sence of cognitive fragments, to direct full attention towards aesthetic integration. The aesthetic response is frequently accompanied by cognitive meanings which serve to adulterate, if not weaken, the aesthetic response. It is probable that, to many people, the aesthetic response serves only to enhance cognitive meaning and that seldom, if ever, do they experience the aesthetic response in its absence. Such people, for example, might be unresponsive to the aesthetic beauty of music except when accompanied by the cognitive meaning found in opera, cinematography, or such. The all too common rejection of non-descrip­ tive art makes it obvious that many people are seeking from art a cognitive meaning in addition to or instead of the aesthetic response. 9 "So extensive and subtly pervasive are the ideas that set art upon a remote pedestal that many a person would be repelled rather than pleased if told that he enjoyed his casual recreations, in part at least, be­ cause of their esthetic quality." Dewey, op. cit.. p. 5. 28 understand rejection of the universal "language" which he employs. There is nothing mysterious about colors, lines, shapes, and the other aesthetic properties; aes­ thetic qualities are universally experienced.1(1 Aesthe­ tic harmony is not the exclusive concern of specialized connoisseurs. It is community property.1!

The popular appeal of aesthetic harmony is repeated­ ly demonstrated through its common usage to enhance the necessities and conveniences of our daily existence. But this use of aesthetic appeal relegates it to a subordi­ nate position and does not especially encourage the en­ joyment of aesthetic quality for its own sake.12 Per-

1(1 Ben Nicholson says, "After all, every moment of human life is affected by form and color, everything we see, touch, think and feel is linked up with it, so that when an artist can use these elements freely and crea­ tively it can be a tremendously potent influence in our lives." Peggy Guggenheim, Editor, Art of This Century (New York: Art of This Century, 194-2), p. 14-3. Stuart Davis says, "There is nothing private about experience with the relations of Size, Shape and Color, because consideration of them is essential in the most elementary routing day-to-day activities. Since every­ body is keenly aware of these relations, and since they are the language of Abstract Art, it is clear that no question of private language is present." Ralph M. Pear­ son, "The Modern Artist Speaks," Art Digest, v. 22, no. 16 (May 15, 1948), p. 31. 11 "However ... although connoisseurship commands its due respect, we must insist that esthetic judgement is not a matter of professional authority but the common prerogative of us all." Lewis, op. cit.. p. 452. ^ "... a civilization that attempts to put art to one side or to make it a mere servant of practical needs ... is actually setting aside and degrading an essential part of the nature of man." Mumford, op. cit.. p. 34-. 29

haps our apprehension of beauty has been adulterated

and our capacity for the detached enjoyment of aesthetic

quality allowed to atrophy through disuse. 13

The kind, the quantity, and the quality of aesthe­

tic experience is extremely important to the develop­

ment of aesthetic habits.14- A conscious aesthetic at­

titude is necessary to the appreciation of aesthetic

quality for its own sake as distinct from its function

as a background to the cognitive or utilitarian aspects

of experience. The appreciation of non-descriptive art

demands such attention to aesthetic quality.15 Unless

13 «jf the moral man, bent upon good works, and the active man, bent upon solid achievement, should be heed­ less of the esthetic or even a little disdainful, that surely is to be accounted a blindness in them and one which must result in a serious and unnecessary depri­ vation." Lewis, op. cit.. p. 455. "... the aesthetic sense often seems to be ... decreasing, rather than increasing, in the masses of the population." Ellis, op. cit.. p. 351. 14- "... music which I enjoyed twenty years ago may not please me today, even without the unfortunate in­ fluence of frequent repetition. What I call my self has changed its properties considerably in the mean­ time. Why, then, should the music produce the same effects upon this changed self?" Kbhler, op. cit.. p. 361. Franz Kline says that young people are not ex­ posed to good taste in America but must search and find it on their own. (in a conversation with the author) "Attentive observation is certainly one essen­ tial factor in all genuine perception including the es­ thetic." Dewey, op. cit.. p. 252. " ... works of art ... demand our fullest atten­ tion, our fullest participation, our most individualized and re-creative response." Mumford, op. cit.. p. 99. 30

the observer brings with him cognizance of the pleasures derivable from aesthetic integration, the artist’s in­

tentions may be misapprehended.^ If aesthetic integra­

tion is not valued or is unexpected, it may be rejected or go unrecognized. Non-descriptive art may then seem meaningless.

But the subjective conditions necessary for the appreciation of non-descriptive art are quite easily

and commonly achieved; one need only focus attention on the sensuous harmonies of color, texture, tone, shape,

and line.17 Once this aesthetic attitude is achieved, there is found a considerable community of taste for the harmonious qualities of aesthetic relationships.

The aesthetic attitude, it should be noted, differs

lfc> "Confronting an art object of any kind, one may and possibly should, seek to penetrate beyond the actual incorporation to the intent of its creator ... Insofar as he fails to bring this associated context, or brings some other, the esthetic object presented fails to be apprehended in its factual esthetic character — is ei­ ther misapprehended or not apprehended at all.” Lewis, op. cit.. pp. 4-71» 4-7A. The mystery surrounding non-descriptive art is a mystery projected into it by observers whose expectations lead them to seek characteristics which non-descriptive art does not possess and which it is not intended to possess. 17 "... the subjective conditions for apprehending the beautiful are somewhat more commonly satisfied than are those for the appreciation of truth in quantum me­ chanics." Lewis, op. cit., p. 4 6 0 . 31 from the critical attitude in which one self-conscious­ ly evaluates and cognitively analyzes aesthetic inte­ gration. The critical attitude is perhaps appropriate to the artist engaged in the creative process or to the critic or teacher concerned with the ways in which aes­ thetic integration is achieved. But the critical atti­ tude is inappropriate to the aesthetic attitude of un­ constrained surrender to the sensuous enjoyment of aes­ thetic quality.18 Where cognitive habits have repressed the aesthetic attitude however, some conscious effort to pause and apprehend aesthetic quality may be neces­ sary before aesthetic indifference is overcome and the aesthetic attitude is able to function unhindered by cognitive restraints.

Cognizance of the specific aesthetic purpose of non-descriptive art does not, of course, guarantee en­ thusiasm and appreciation. The aesthetic purpose may seem insufficient or even insignificant to those whose aesthetic habits have been effectively circumscribed by

------"And perhaps there are those who confuse esthe­ tic apprehension with critical discrimination, and would think such deliberateness of appreciation the more truly esthetic attitude. But this deliberate intent, charac­ teristic of the esthete, must always dilute a little the immediately realized value it would enforce. It is always in danger of tainting the purity of esthetic experience with sentiment or with the avidity of per­ sonal desire, or of displacing it in measure by the conceit of one's own discernment." Lewis, Ibid.. p. 442. 32 cognitive traditions.19 Nevertheless, enthusiasm for non-descriptive art has greatly increased in recent years, for there are countless individuals whose love of the old masters has not precluded an interest in non-descriptive art.20

19 Where illusionistic ideals gain precedence over aesthetic ideals, even artists may forget or sacrifice aesthetic ideals in order to achieve more illusionistic results. "The sentiment of aversion to what is foreign is early and strongly developed in most persons ... Many persons form their taste, in the impressionable period of youth, on the basis of the reigning fashion, and then cling to it the remainder of their lives. This narrow outlook leaves them unappreciative of much that was good in earlier periods, and renders them, in their later years, hostile to new movements." Chandler, op. cit.. pp. 29, 354. 20 "... if a work has one kind of merit we should not condemn it for lack of some other, unless that other kind is clearly required by the circumstances." Chandler, Ibid., p. 23. It is quite meaningless to censor an artist for not being or doing what he does not want to be or do. "Appreciation rests on the expectations, and novel­ ties require time to train their own audience. In the aesthetic field as in others we must learn to expect the unexpected." Chandler, op. cit., p. 356. "A new great period style is never recognized as such while it slowly develops. To the contemporaries the cultural output of their period appears as a chao­ tic expression of so many contradictory and conflicting personalities." Ehrenzweig, op. cit.. p. 51. MOTIVATION: SELF AND ENVIRONMENT

The subjective conditions affecting artistic pro­ duction have been widely recognized and perhaps even overestimated in recent years. It is generally con­ ceded that there is a great involvement of the per­ sonality in artistic production, and it is commonly stated that art is self-expressive as well as cultural­ ly expressive.^ Perhaps, however, perceptually oriented observers have tended to overlook the fact that the artist's mental and emotional life is not conditioned by visual perceptions alone. The aesthetic structures visually presented in non-descriptive art are certainly not wholly derived from visual experiences. One of the major frustrations experienced by the non-descriptive artist lies in his inability to communicate with those who assume that the artist, because he is working in a visual medium, must limit himself to visual patterns

! "We are endowed, that is to say, with a free will, and in virtue of this freedom we strive rather to avoid the fixed and regular features of the laws of nature, and to express instead a world of our own — a world which is a reflection of our feelings and emotions, of that complex of instincts and thoughts which we call the personality." Read, Education Through Art (op. cit.), pp. 30-31. "The twin feelings of Reality and Truth, as well as the aesthetic feeling of Beauty ... would be deter­ mined not so much by objective stimuli from the external world, but by dynamic processes occurring within our un­ conscious mind and thus would be controlled by its sub­ jective needs." Ehrenzweig, op. cit.. p. 254-.

33 34 directly perceived in nature. Although his creations are specifically visual in form, the non-descriptive artist wants freedom to draw inspiration from his to­ tal perceptual and conceptual experience, both past and present.2

The non-descriptive urge to aesthetic organization is subjective and introspective, but when aesthetic integration is visually objectified, perception enters into the creative process. Perceptual apprehension of the work in process is necessary to the conceptual

2 "..". nous re'fusons la soumission a l'apparence avec autant de force que la refusa Byzance." Malraux, op. cit.. p. 601. ’’Within the individual are two 'interior courts' or existential states which can be externalized by the aid of aesthetic faculties. One is somatic, and exists even in blind mutes: it is a store of imagery derived, not from external perception, but from mus­ cular and nervous tensions which are internal in ori­ gin." Read, Education Through Arti (op. cit.). p. 8. To the "haptic" person, "... the importance of the environment diminishes and experience is more and more confined to the processes that go on in the body as a whole, bodily sensations, muscular innervations, deep sensibilities, and their various emotional ef­ fects ...” Victor Lowenfeld, The Nature of Creative Activity (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939)> p. 82. "In order to explain the apparent organization of visual experience by accompanying kinesthetic experi­ ences, one must assume spatial as well as temporal or­ ganization of motor phenomena. I do not see any reason why such organization should be excluded from optics and acoustics ... the processes of learning, of reproduction, of striving, of emotional attitude, of thinking, acting, and so forth may be included as subject matter of ges- talt-theorie insofar as they do not consist of independ­ ent elements, but are determined in a situation as a whole." Kohler, op. cit.. pp. 169, 193* 35 utilization of emergent suggestions for aesthetic de­ velopment. This emergent inspiration of the creative process consists primarily of conceptual predictions

of possibilities for further visual integration. Em­ pirical generalizations concerning perceptual phenomena

are aesthetically valuable, but it is their conceptual utilization which makes them instrumental to creative manipulation.3 Aesthetic integration is a rational process utilizing but transcending the immediate perception of existing conditions in the creative product. Conception and perception are interdepen­ dent functions of the creative process.

The non-descriptive artist utilizes perception primarily in the considered observation of the aesthe­ tic product in progress. This focus of attention on the creative process intentionally excludes or subor­ dinates the kinds of cognitive perceptions appropriate

^ However, "Without knowing the principles of sen­ sory organization in an abstract form, man works in conformity with them..." Ktfhler, op. cit.. p. 172. MThe painters whose works have been selected through the ages and called great are painters who were able to achieve perceptual unity ... Perceptual unity fits into a stream of progressive developments, starting with Masaccio in the 15th Century, and de­ veloping, spiral-like, ever since. Skilled artists have drawn with perceptual unity, but without full awareness of what they were doing.n Hoyt L. Sherman, Drawing By Seeing (New York and Philadelphia: Hinds, Hayden and Eldredgg, 194-7), pp. 53 , 59. w ... one does not have to study physiology in order to walk down stairs. n Lewis, op. cit.. p. 173. 36

only to adaptive behavior. 4- Non-descriptive art is of

course indirectly influenced by the perceived environ­ ment, and it is undoubtedly the case that visual know­

ledge is primarily if not wholly derived from external

sources.5 But this knowledge is subjectively accumu­

lated and distilled from a variety of visual impres­

sions rather than directly sought in the immediate per­

ception of external stimuli.^ Moreover, it is the sen-

^"... the suppression of 'object1 is requisite to aesthetic integration." Hoyt L. Sherman, The Visual Demonstration Center (Columbus: The Ohio State Universi­ ty, 1951), p. 107. 5 But "It is now coming to be recognized that the process of perception, in order to be fully understood, must be studied in the context of the overall psycho­ logical organization of the individual perceiver ... The finding that people do have characteristic ways of per­ ceiving makes it necessary to modify the Gestalt con­ cept of perception." H. A. Witken and Others, Per­ sonality Through Perception (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954-), pp. 2, 4-96. "... the attitude of an observer may definitely determine what he does and does not perceive." Paul Thomas Young, Emotion in Man and Animal (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Incorporated, 194-8), p. 111. "... the perceptual world contains features which are purely subjective, however external and independent of the observer they seem to be." W. Russell Brain, Mind. Perception and Science (Oxford: Blackwell Scien­ tific Publications, 195l), p. 68. "All the evidence of psycho-analysis testifies to the complexity and wealth of unconscious mental proces­ ses, and points to an equal wealth in unconscious per­ ceptions of which we know next to nothing." Ehrenzweig, op. cit.. p. 21. "... sense-perceptions which, either because of their slight intensity or because of ths deviation of attention, do not attain to conscious apperception, none the less become psychic contents through uncon- 37 suous more than the cognitive aspects of perception upon which the non-descriptive artist depends. And he does not rely wholly on perception. Perception alone cannot supply the numerous conceptual predictions neces­ sary to aesthetic development.

Subjectively accumulated visual knowledge is by no means wholly derived from perceptions of nature. Artists are especially interested in the perceptual apprehension of objects of art, and they are more likely to be influ­ enced by these experiences than by others.^ Such influ­ ences may be derived from objects historically remote or immediately contemporary and may definitely affect the subjective conditions of ordinary perception.® The non- scious apperception, which again may be demonstrated by hypnosis, for example „.. But, in addition to these personal unconscious contents, there exist other con­ tents which do not originate in personal acquisitions but in the inherited possibility of psychic functioning in general, viz. in the inherited brain-structure." Jung. Psychological Types (op. cit.). pp. 615-616. / rtL'homme qui deviendra un grand peintre com­ mence par de'couvrir qu'il est plus sensible a un monde particulier, celui de l ’art, qu’au monde commun a tous." Malraux, op. cit.. p. 342. Evidence that artists are significantly influenced by art may be found in the common tendency of art his­ torians to trace such influences with meticulous care. For such evolutionary treatments of the contemporary scene, the reader is referred to: Cubism and Abstract Art by Alfred H. Barr, Jr.j Revolution and Tradition in Modern American Art by John I. H. Baur; and Plastic Re­ directions in 20th Century Painting by James Johnson • "Even in the case of objects found in nature, the 38 descriptive artist, however is probably more influenced by the art of the recent past and of his contemporaries than he is by that of the remote past. Although con­ temporary artists utilize some very ancient organiza­ tional principles, contemporary art is, so to speak, a strong influence on itself.

The non-descriptive emphasis on introspection and cultural influences does not mean that the direct per­ ceptual study of nature is necessarily rejected by the non-descriptive artist. He may feel that the direct study of nature will widen his perceptual experience and provide a greater storehouse of material from which to build a more comprehensive visual knowledge.9 For al- esthetic orientation may be directed upon an ideality not physically present ..." Lewis, op. cit.. p. 4-70. "... the brilliant researches of Adelbert Ames have experimentally established the fact that sensations are no more primary than any other element in experi­ ence: that they do not impinge upon us directly, but are always being linked up with the meanings and purposes of the organism ..." Mumford, op. cit.. p. 21. "Our evidence shows that the past experiences that proved relevant to the individual's perception in the situations in which we placed him were the general life experiences that had made him the kind of person he was. Being a 'given kind of person' entailed relating him­ self in specific preferred ways to the present field, so that his manner of perceiving it was different from that of other people." Witkin, op. cit.. p. U97. "... confusion between imagination and perception can be demonstrated in the laboratory, without hypno­ sis ..." Young, op. cit.. p. 71. But habitual cognitive responses to environmental conditions may interfere with non-cognitive purposes, and the non-descriptive srtist may therefore reject the 39

though the non-descriptive artist makes no attempt to

describe or reproduce specific perceptions of the ex­

ternal environment, his aesthetic structures are never­

theless perceptually apprehended. Although he rejects

illusionism and description, he does not and cannot dis­

pute the communicative and creative values of perception.

His direct study of nature, however, need not be bound

by the rigid academic standards of the descriptive tra­

dition but may be freely undertaken with a wide range

of inquiry towards aesthetic possibilities.

Artists, to be sure, differ one from the other in

their sources of inspiration, but one may be assured

that many of them manufacture their own inspiration

through diligent application of their talents to the physical and mental processes of the creative act. It

is common for the non-descriptive artist to begin work

in the absence of specific inspiration and to find the direct study of nature. n... our knowledge of the 'real' size, the 'real' form, the 'real' brightness, has become so intimately connected with what we see, that ... we seem to see those constant 'real' properties instead of the ever changing ones corresponding to varying stimulation." Kohler, op. cit.. p. 81. "Cezanne's struggle to suppress PAST EXPERIENCE at a subject-matter level at times proved amusing ... There were moments when even Cezanne had to yield to PAST EXPERIENCE ... The 'classical worry' is the 'sta­ tistical average* of PAST EXPERIENCE, which makes the stereotype difficult to avoid." Hoyt L. Sherman, Ce­ zanne and Visual Form (Columbus: The Institute for Research in Vision, The Ohio State University, 1952), pp. L43-144. 40 process itself generating aesthetic clues which inspire further aesthetic involvement. This kind of inspira­ tion, it should be noted, does not exist prior to the creative act but is an emergent out of the creative pro­ cess.^ Emergent inspiration is particularly adaptable to the non-descriptive position, for it avoids the crea­ tive inhibitions of the preconceived message. It is probable that most non-descriptive artists depend heavi­ ly on just such emergent inspiration.

Emergent inspiration, of course, can evolve into descriptive or symbolic form as well as into non-de­ scriptive form, but emergent inspiration, to the non- descriptive artist, is aesthetic in character and has to do with emergent possibilities for aesthetic inte­ gration. Such possibilities as emerge in process are suggestive rather than determinate in character. Free­ dom of choice among alternate courses of action makes of the process an accumulation of active choices which, once having been made, affect the possibilities but do not determine the course of future actions. Such a process ordinarily terminates when the artist concludes

------In the words of Charles W. Morris, "... the artist is one who molds some medium so that it takes on the value of some significant experience (an experience... which may of course arise in the process of molding the medium and need not antedate this process)." Rader, op. cit., p. 307. that further action might be detrimental rather than beneficial to aesthetic integration. The creative pro­ cess is accumulative and self-generating, so to speak, and suffers only from those limitations imposed by the artist and by the physical conditions under which he works.

Material limitations are seldom of great concern to the experienced artist. His great struggle is with those limitations which he feels within himself. The neophyte, to be sure, experiences technical struggles through which he discovers the possibilities and limi­ tations of his mediums, but the experienced artist re­ cognizes his major struggle to be one of understanding his own creative process.H The material struggle, while it never completely disappears, is essentially displaced by the great internal struggle for a con­ ceptual grasp of the creative problem.

The artist's products may suggest but they can never fully reveal these mental processes. The artist acts in private, and that which he publicly displays is neither the problem nor its solving but only its reso-

"The secret of creation lies not so much in a medium as in the way the artist, using his medium, manages himself so as to allow his experience to be­ come distilled into forms of deepest felt-significance.” Ross L. Mooney, "The Artist and Our Human Need," Jour­ nal of Human Relations (Wilberforce, Ohio: Central State College Quarterly Summer Issue, 1955), p. 10. 42

lution. In a manner of speaking, the artist's hypothe­

ses remain private, and although his techniques may

imply his hypotheses, only his conclusions can become

fully public. But public products are available for

acceptance or rejection and, if accepted, can be in­

terpreted and utilized in a manner consistent with one's

personal attitudes. Ideally, one might expect to a-

chieve a greater appreciation and understanding through

the communication of purpose and process than one might

expect to achieve through the mere presentation of the

product.12 But the communication of purpose and pro­

cess almost demands a student-teacher relationship which

the artist, as an exhibitor, seldom attains.

Whether or not it is felt that the product can

achieve effective communication, it should be realized

that the product is the goal which makes the process

significant.1^ Or to be more precise, it would be

12 £rt works are necessarily interpreted by obser­ vers on the basis of their own attitudes and experiences, and the observer may project so much of himself into a work that the resulting interpretation may be far re­ moved from the meaning intended by the artist. "... in common life something like sympathetic pro­ jection and attribution seems to be a frequent occur­ rence, and may be regarded as fundamental for social psychology.* Kohler, op. cit.. p. 234* ^ "Action — at least action of the sort called rational and sensible — is for the sake of realizing something to which positive value is ascribed or of avoiding something to which disvalue is ascribed ... Honest work must be intent, unself-conscious, and bent 43 meaningless to speak of one as being separable from the other. Purposeful activity (process) seems al­ ways directed towards an objective (product). In any case, it would seem that the significance of the pro­ duct is proportionate to the significance of the pro­ cess. ~AA And significant products, if nothing else, are avenues through which the significance of the process may be s e n s e d . -*-5 upon the aim of it rather than on the act itself ... Immediate satisfaction found in the performance of acts whose ends commend themselves to us, is a character intrinsically belonging to the nature of human life as self-conscious and active. Any deed done is permeated with an immediate felt good or ill reflecting the con­ ceived goodness or badness of its anticipated conse­ quences} and by a satisfaction or dissatisfaction representing our sense of justification or the oppo­ site in the performance of it." Lewis, op. cit.. PP. 336, 454, 502. ^ William Bazoites says, "... to some of us the act of doing it becomes the experience; so that we are not quite clear why we are engaged on a particular work." Robert Motherwell and Ad Reinhardt, Editors, Modern Artists in America (New York: Wittenborn Schultz, Incorporated, 1951), p. 14. 15 it may be that many of those who reject non- descriptive art as meaningless are at present insensi­ tive to the meaningful nature of the creative process. Possibly some people will never develop any liking for this particular art form. However, it is probable that many who do not now sense the creative nature of non-descriptive art are not at all incapable of such sensitivity. "Of the various elements which may be involved in the appreciation of art, the most critical is that of experiencing the process of creating." Sherman, Drawing by Seeing (op. cit.). p. 51. "What people want is help in learning how to nour­ ish their creativity. It is not the artist's end pro­ ducts they deeply want, but the artist's process of creating." Mooney, "The Artist and Our Human Need" (loc. cit.) STRUCTURE: AESTHETIC AND EXPRESSIVE

It is frequently said that a work of art, to be worthy of the name, must be expressive. Too often, however, references to expression or the expressive tend to be somewhat vague, for so very often, any reference to what has been expressed is omitted. The

"expressive" label always implies that something has been expressed, and yet with increasing frequency, this term is being used as though it were definitive and complete in itself. The habitual failure to iden­ tify the expressed has made an empty and hollow gesture of a term ordinarily intended as a warm and friendly compliment. To call a work of art expressive is not a definitive and meaningful act but may be, instead, an evasive action avoiding complete involvement in the critical act. This unmodified term says nothing about the success or failure, form or formlessness, or any other achievement or lack of achievement to which a work may have attained. Each and every human action, after all, expresses something, because voluntary hu­ man actions would seem to be, at least, self-expressive.

In this sense, every work of art is in some way expres­ sive. It is therefore relatively meaningless to say, as is frequently said, that non-descriptive art is not

44 45 expressive but merely decorative.-^-

Just why, moreover, should decoration be consider­ ed an inexpressive and insignificant objective? It is quite probable that those who carelessly use this term to express disapproval have never troubled to consider why it should express disapproval or just how decora­ tion may or may not differ from its highly respected kinsman aesthetic structure. Is there a real or sig­ nificant difference between the objectives sought by means of decoration and those sought through aesthetic structure? Is it not the case that unified and har­ moniously integrated relationships might be considered the common objective of both? It may well be worth con­ sidering the possibility that these may be different terms for much the same thing.2

Should one so desire, it is quite possible to

w ... 'expression' may be too easily confused with 'communication.’" Ellis, op. cit., p. 324» To William Baziotes, expression is intuitive, automatic, and not directly sought. The painter reveals himself best when free of traditional re­ strictions. (Expressed in a conversation with the author) In the words of Benedetto Croce, "The difficult point to keep clear is that form is always expressive and yet the expression is always pure form ..." Carritt, op. cit.. p. 243. 2 Perhaps some of us find pleasure in moral or aesthetic snobbery, as the case may be, and therefore find it desirable to possess alternate terms which will provide us with connotations of vulgarity or acceptability for essentially the same thing. 4.6 assign somewhat different meanings to intimately re­ lated terms. This can be and has been done in the case of "b9sthetic structure" and "decoration." A common differentiation is that of applied versus organic structure, and the implication intended by this dis­ tinction is that decoration is applied (independence of the parts) whereas aesthetic structure is organic

(interdependence of the parts).3 But much decoration is so aesthetically integrated with the decorated ob­ ject or its function that it can in no way be consider­ ed an applied afterthought nor denied the organic inte­ gration of aesthetic structure. Just where, one may ask, does decoration end and aesthetic structure be­ gin? If it is to be considered a matter of degree, upon whom shall we bestow the honor of conferring the degrees?

^ As defined by DeWitt H. Parker, "First the long- established principle of organic unity. By this is meant the fact that each element in a work of art is necessary to its value, that it contains no elements that are not thus necessary, and that all that are needful are there." Rader, op. cit., p. 357. The idea or ideal of organic unity is a somewhat tenuous one upon which the artist nevertheless acts. He perceives that, in nature, "... houses have forms, but the sky has not." (Kohler, op. cit.. p. 202.) But in art this must not be so. Unless each important shape in his work can be positively perceived as in­ tegral and necessary, he may find "left-over" shapes merely serving as an unimportant, neutral, or negative background to which cognitive or decorative configura­ tions have been inorganically applied. There is yet another way in which we may distin­ guish between applied and organic structure and that

is on the basis of whether the surface of a work has

evolved as the result of structural necessity or has

been superficially embellished to disguise structural weaknesses.4 But this distinction is a subtle one which is rarely detected by those who malign non-de-

scriptive art as merely decorative. If the phrase

"merely decorative" is intended to indicate unneces­

sary embellishment or superficial application, it bears no necessary relationship to the non-descriptive arts; for the symbolic factors of traditional art can be and often are superficially applied for reasons other than structural necessity.

Successful non-descriptive works are as organi­ cally integrated as are successful descriptive works.5

In either case aesthetic harmony is achieved through the manipulation of aesthetic elements in such a way

4 The non-descriptive rejection of cognitive frag­ ments is partially based on the knowledge that cogni­ tive distractions may disguise structural weaknesses. Any organization may contain fragments which, as iso­ lated parts, have cognitive meanings of their own which may direct attention towards themselves and away from the presence or lack of aesthetic integration. 5 Stuart Davis says that so-called non-objective painting, if concerned with shape and color relation­ ships, is just as objective as descriptive painting, for it is the relationships within the painting that is the object, (in a conversation with the author) 48 as to utilize their contrasting qualities to draw at­ tention to harmonious relationships. Similar or identi­ cal factors are integrated with dissimilar factors, and it is the degree of similarity as opposed to the degree of contrast which determines the characteristic dynamics and harmonics of a particular structure or experience.

The utilization of opposing factors in aesthetic struc­ ture necessitates the harmonious adaptation of one to the other. This adaptation may or may not respect the individuality of the opposing factors because the har­ monizing process may be destructive to the identity of the factors being forced into harmony. As every artist knows, the creative process is a destructive as well as a constructive process in the sense that every construc­ tive act changes and destroys the identity of existing factors.

Because of the destructive aspect of creation, the descriptive purpose can strongly inhibit the creative process.6 The destruction of essential symbolic or descriptive factors might defeat important cognitive purposes, whereas unwillingness to sacrifice them might easily hinder aesthetic integration.? The non-descrip-

-. . — . — — Franz Kline says that working from objects or a scene involves intellectual judgements and evaluations which are a hindrance to integration, (in a conversa­ tion with the author) ? William Pepperell Montague notes this problem 49 tive approach, however, allows for a greater freedom of the creative process because the parts have meaning only in relation to the total structure. Both the destruc­ tive and constructive aspects of the creative process are free from interference from predetermined symbols.

From the non-descriptive point of view, it is vital­ ly important that there be no interference with the aes­ thetic purpose, for although there may be many qualities present, aesthetic structure is probably the quality most universally expected of a work of art. And of all the experiences of mankind, the aesthetic response is most universally expected from the arts. The aesthetic response consists of that deeply satisfying sense of uni­ ty which is achieved when an experience has been drawn to an harmoniously organized conclusion, and although this response is by no means limited to experience with the arts, it is widely achieved there. Aesthetic struc­ ture, in the visual arts, consists of unified and har­ moniously integrated relationships designed to evoke the aesthetic response and, it is here proposed, any work not so designed does not deserve the name of art. when he says, "Moralism reduces art to a servile status, making it a means to some ethical or sociological end. In this process the truly esthetic values are in danger of being warped or destroyed." Rader, op. clt.. p. 223. CRAFTSMANSHIP: AESTHETIC AND TECHNICAL

The increasing audience for non-descriptive art may owe something to the fact that non-descriptive art

is becoming less and less obscure in the revelation of

the process through which the product is achieved. The

attempt to conceal process beneath technical virtuosity

is becoming more and more infrequent among contemporary

artist^ whereas frank revelations of technical methods

are becoming more common. Risking accusations of in­

competence, many contemporary artists reveal their tech­

nical processes with amazing bravado and candor.-*- Al­

though some people may question the sincerity of such

a revelation, it nevertheless provides another avenue

through which the creative process may be more easily

discovered, understood, and appreciated.

The unique visual impact of non-descriptive art

is greatly dependent on the frank revelation of the emergent inspiration so instrumental to the evolution

of aesthetic integration. But in traditional crafts­ manship, the evolutionary nature of creative activity

is largely obscured by careful planning which tends to

The characteristics of a medium may sometimes dominate the aesthetic expression, but the unique or novel use of a medium is not necessarily a non-descrip­ tive ideal.

50 51

disguise and eliminate the earlier and tentative steps

of aesthetic construction.2 The destructive aspects of

creation are effectively disguised so that the finished

product appears rigorously determinate rather than crea­

tively conditional. Effective communication of the cre­

ative process, however, demands that the surface evolve

without deliberate concealment of structural evolution.

Evolutionary changes are made freely and honestly with­

out the rigid and static "corrections11 of precise and

laborious craftsmanship.

But the absence of illusionistic craftsmanship is commonly misconstrued as a lack of artistic excellence.3

~ ~ - .... -n 1"...... "Poussin’s unity ... is explicit in his drawings where POSITION, SIZE (SHAPE), and CONTRAST are the es­ sence of his pictorial pattern. The Bacchanale ... is a classic example of Poussin’s unitary structure, the ’underneath, the underneath,’ of his glazed and detailed allegory." Sherman, Cezanne and Visual Form (op. cit.). p. 156. "... Rembrandt's chiaroscuro tends ... to be formu­ lated in terms of three modulations, dark, middle tone, and light ... This is most readily seen in Rembrandt's drawings where large brightness-contrast areas, or ’lo­ calities' are represented." Sherman, Ibid., p. 76. 3 "It is, perhaps, a rather common fallacy ... to confuse virtuosity, or the evident result of it, with primary esthetic quality." Lewis, op. cit., p. 452. "Many critics, unfortunately, have not realized the point about unity and, in their search for something to say, have gone off into long descriptions of tech­ niques, styles, ways of getting special effects, etc., which are misleading and dangerous. Such talk encourages readers to assume that the painter who is successful is the man who is smart in handling his techniques, that painting is just a technical problem." Sherman, Draw- 52

But what possible difference can it make whether or not the non-descriptive artist possesses illusionistic

skill? The non-descriptive artist is neither interest­ ed in nor needful of descriptive skill. The kinds of craftsmanship appropriate to non-descriptive integration differ considerably from the craftsmanship necessary to illusionism. The careful craftsmanship necessary and

ing by Seeing (op. cit.). p. 53. The magic of a well known name, moreover, can in­ timidate us and blind us to the true qualities of a work because we have been conditioned to consider su­ perior those works possessing the familiar and famous signatures. Thus it is that an inferior or even su­ perior forgery can possess great financial value only so long as the forgery is not detected. The moment the forgery is detected, the formerly valuable work becomes almost immediately worthless or greatly re­ duced in monetary value. Of course, such a revela­ tion in no way affects the artistic quality of such a work, and it may as well be admitted that artistic quality is not necessarily congruent with prestige or monetary values. It would indeed seem that many people have never fully apprehended either the presence or significance of aesthetic structure in the visual arts. And aesthe­ tic structure is by no means new nor should it be at all unfamiliar. The significance of aesthetic integration has long been recognized by astute observers who have been able to distinguish between technical virtuosity and artistic excellence. Among these, of course, there are those to whom the aesthetic purpose alone seems in­ sufficient for a work of art and to whom the cognitive or descriptive purpose seems indispensible. Such a considered opinion is of course perfectly understandable and legitimate, but it is unlikely that those who open­ ly ridicule non-descriptive art have truly arrived at a thoughtful and considered opinion in which the signifi­ cance of aesthetic structure has been fully apprehended. "Sans doute le processus de le crfeation artistique nous 4chappe-t-il surtout parce que l'id&e que notre civi­ lisation se fait de 1 'artiste est particulierement con­ cuss." Malraux, op. cit.. p. 34-0. 53 meaningful to the descriptive tradition may be utilized non-descriptively, but non-descriptive objectives do not necessarily demand these precise methods.4 Non-de­ scriptive objectives make possible a greater diversity of technical methods because the medium need describe or imitate nothing and may therefore be utilized in accord with its own inherent qualities.5 It is com­ monly assumed, nevertheless, that an artist must master the traditional skills before he has sufficient know­ ledge to break with tradition and to work non-descrip­ tively. It is somewhat unclear, however, as to just how or why descriptive skills are presumed necessary 4/•i — — ■»'» I m I I III I 4 James" Brooks says that contemporary painters do not have.-the sense of preciousness towards their paint­ ings, which painters formerly had. (In a conversation with the author) Non-descriptive artists, on the whole do not har­ bor the traditional concern for permanency. The con­ temporary artist is seldom commissioned to produce "heir­ looms" for wealthy patrons, and he is therefore free to enjoy the immediate urgency of the creative act. He is free to utilize the visual impact of emergent inspira­ tion without undue concern for the inhibitions of plan­ ned permanence. 5 Contemporary objectives and methods are not them­ selves achieved without considerable effort, and the non-descriptive artist need not be ashamed to reject traditional methods if they add no special vitality to his work. The process of aesthetic integration should itself be recognized as skill, because the effective use of a medium is just as dependent on the artist's aesthetic discernment as on his technical control. Craftsmanship should be evaluated not on the basis of its difficulty or virtuosity but on the basis of its appropriateness to the artist's objectives. 54 to the non-descriptive artist. Granted that any skill or knowledge may in some way be profitably utilized, it seems unreasonable to expect a man to expend great time and effort mastering material inconsistent with his goal.

The long struggle with tradition may prove meaningless and fruitless, if not confusing, unless there is exer­ cised a careful selectivity in which relevance to the goal is thoughtfully considered.^

Descriptive traditions, moreover, have tended to discourage the non-cognitive conditions conducive to the sensuous aesthetic response? and may therefore be great­ ly responsible for the common confusion between craft and art. Although the aesthetic response is a common human experience, it would appear that many men neither expect nor experience aesthetic pleasure in response to the aesthetic unity of the visual arts. Rather than a response to aesthetic unity as such, aesthetic response to the visual arts is typically a response to the beau-

k "We have been content to define the good human being as the one who fits to the social norm; we think of a man as 'adjusted' when he doesn't cause other peo­ ple trouble; a creative man needs more than a social norm to guide him into lines of productive development." Mooney, "Cultural and Emotional Blocks to Creative Activi­ ty" (Unpublished manuscript) ' "It is inimical to esthetic apprehension that in our confrontation with the thing we should be distracted by the thought of something else or something further." Lewis, op. cit.. p. 438. 55

ty of natural objects skillfully interpreted or faith­

fully reproduced. There is, of course, nothing whatso­

ever wrong with aesthetic response to cognitive frag­ ments. 8 It may even be that the contemporary tendency

to insist on aesthetic unity in the arts constitutes an unnecessarily restrictive criterion by which to dis-

tinquish between craft and art. Aesthetic response to

cognitive fragments cannot, after all, be abolished by definition.9 But when aesthetic response to cognitive

fragments blocks aesthetic response to integrated unity,

a vital source of aesthetic experience has been misap­ prehended.

8 "For me, non-objective is not the issue, I make many pictures that are not, but more it is a question of daring.*1' (Robert Motherwell in a letter to the author.) ° Arthur Schopenhaur said, "Aesthetic pleasure is one and the same whether it is called forth by a work of art or directly by the contemplation of nature and life." Carritt, op. cit.. p. 14-0. MEANING: COGNITIVE AND AESTHETIC1

The view is adopted here that non-descriptive art

is essentially dependent on conceptually formulated or

intuitively grasped organizational principles which are related to the mental processes from which they are derived. This view, of course, is an assumptive view which, for obvious reasons, is not based on direct knowledge of how the mind functions. The use of the mind to examine and explain its own processes places great limitations on the reliability of the informa­ tion thus gathered.2 Knowledge of immediate experience, however, is relatively direct and reliable, and under normal conditions, immediate experience is organized.3

Little is known about the nature of thought, but traditionally, it has been conceptualized as being something like weak sensory experience — particularly visual imagery or sub-vocal behavior. Although it

1 For reference purposes, definitions of types of meaning have been catalogued in the appendix. 2 «We know very little about the unconscious mental processes which provide the basis for the creative, imaginative, and inventive faculties. Like many other organic processes they work, and perhaps even work best, without our knowing how." Lancelot Law Whyte, Accent on Form (New fork: Harper and Brothers, 1954)> p. 9. elementary organization is an original sen­ sory fact ... the segregation of wholes occurs in the nervous system ...rt Ktfhler, op. cit.. pp. 163, 175.

56 57 would seem reasonable to assume that sensory experi­ ence necessarily precedes conceptual experience, does this necessarily imply that thoughts consist only of representations of sensory experience?^ Perhaps it would be more correct to say that sensory experience serves to stimulate the emergence of a mental process which, once aroused, constructs, according to its own peculiar nature, conceptual patterns which include but are not limited to patterns of a sensory nature.5 Such an organizational function would seem to be necessary to the act of perception itself. For perception is not merely sensory experience, it is organized sensory ex­ perience integrated with past experience.6

^ "And has the reader never asked himself what kind of a mental fact is his intention of saying a thing be­ fore he has said it? ... how much of it consists of de­ finite sensorial images, either of words or of things? Hardly anything! Linger, and the words and things come into mind; the anticipatory intention, the divination is there no more ... Some people undoubtedly have no images at all worthy of the name ...n James, op. cit.. pp. 164, 305. * *... whence this capacity of the psyche to gain a standpoint outside sense-perception? Whence its ca­ pacity for achieving something beyond or different from the verdict of the senses? We are forced to assume ... that the given brain structure does not owe its particu­ lar nature to the effect of surrounding conditions, but also and just as much to the peculiar and autonomous quality of living matter, i.e., to a fundamental law of life." Jung, Psychological Types (op. cit.). p. 556. 6 "You have to have 'something in mind,’ 'memories,' 'recollections,' 'purposes,' 'values,' etc. that help to pull into focus those particular things from past ex- 58

In relation to this problem, let us direct our attention for a moment to the emergent character of a melody. A melody is an emergent from an organization of notes; it is not one note or another nor is it ex­ actly the sum of its notes. The melody retains its identity under conditions which are destructive to the specific identity of its parts, i.e., when the melody is shifted from one key to another or from one instru­ ment to another.^ And the identity of a melody may be­ come lost under conditions in which the identity of its individual parts has been retained, just as the identity of a word is lost when it is spelled backwards.® Wow perience which have most relevance to present experi­ encing." Ross L. Mooney, "Journal Notes from the Semi­ nar on Perception Theory" (Unpublished manuscript) "... sensory organization is as natural and primi­ tive a fact as any other side of sensory dynamics." K'dhler, op. cit.. p. 216. ^ "... temporal form behaves like spatial form since a melody may be rendered in different keys and still remain the same, so far as its musical form is concerned ... A melody is recognized in a key which may not contain a single tone of its first presentation." K8hleg, Ibid.. pp. 214-215, 275. "Whoever is slightly acquainted with musical theory will recognize at once that a tone cannot have the character of 'tonic’ without belonging to a larger musical whole, in which it plays a definite role; of course, the same is true of the leading-tone, which has its strong dynamical properties in the definite key of a sequence of tones, and not independently ... after being associated, the members of a series have definite properties which depend upon their position in the sur­ rounding whole, as tones do in an organized melody." Kohler, Ibid., pp. 222, 290. if we can think of a melody as an emergent form which is different from any of its parts and from the sum of its parts, why cannot we think of thought as an emergent process which is different from specific sensory ex­ perience or the sum of sensory experience? Must we conceive of thought as only sensory in nature? The concept of thought as a process which emerges from sensory experience but which is not exactly like sen­ sory experience should be no more difficult to accept than the concept of an emergent melody. Do we under­ stand either of them? Do we not experience both of them? To call thought an emergent process, of course, does not explain it — it merely labels it. But it is also true that to call a melody an emergent form only labels and does not explain.

Whether or not thought itself is an emergent pro­ cess, it seems relatively certain that the conceptual awareness of abstract relationships emerges from ex­ perience without specific environmental connections in any representational sense.9 As the reader knows, the

^ "What is associated now with one thing and now with another tends to become dissociated from either, and grow into an ob.iect of abstract contemplation by the mind." James, op. cit.. p. 251. "We may take it as experimentally established that in the most abstract kind of thinking (that concerned with the relations of universals) imagery has no use­ ful function, and may indeed impede the economy and efficiency of such thinking." Read, Education Through 60 npn-descriptive artist is not concerned with traditional descriptive organization but with principles of organi­ zation abstracted from the relationships which give con­ tinuity and meaning to all experience.^0 Abstract prin­ ciples of organization have long been utilized in mathe­ matics, logic, and music where structure has been crea­ ted independently of specific external or: physical re­ ferents. But although organization has long been con­ sidered important to art, it is only in limited circles today that abstract principles of organization are con­ sidered sufficient for the creation of a visual art

Art (op. cit.). p. 53. "... you under-rate the wonderful achievements of previous experience if you restrict its effects to par­ ticularTO cases." Kbhler, ' op." *.... cit., 9 p. 153. Empirical generalizations concerning perceptual phenomena, for example. "... we treat as units and even believe we see as units all groups of adjacent sensations which are more or less homogeneously colored and sufficiently different from their surroundings ... "Groups consisting of separate members have a spe­ cial interest for theory insofar as they also prove that one unit segregated in the field may at the same time belong to a larger unit ... "In dynamical distribution, as we have seen, the functional 1interwovenness' of a field is altogether compatible with dynamical segregation. "... a form can be 'transposed,' i.e. will remain the same as a visual property, after its brightness, color, size and place are changed. "... it is evident that the equilibrium is not dis­ turbed if the intensity of all those forces decreases or increases in the same proportion." Kohler, Ibid., pp. 153, 156, 183, 214, 218. 61 form.^-

It is the apprehension of relationships which gives continuity and meaning to experience.12 On the basis of experienced relationships, the mind appears to establish conceptual abstractions according to which the contents of immediate experience are classified and identified. These conceptual abstractions may undergo alteration as a result of new experiences, but essen­ tially they remain constant conceptual referents by which immediate experience can be interpreted and under­ stood. Meaning is dependent upon the perceptual or con­ ceptual association or correspondence of immediately apprehended relationships and existing mental con-

Herbert Read says, "We must admit, of course, that in a certain sense, order Itself appeals toithe imagination, and it is even possible to maintain that the highest type of imagination is precisely the one whidh occupies itself with the creation of abstract pro­ portions and harmonies. This is the kind of imagination which expresses itself in music ... and in abstract or non-figurative painting." Rader, op. cit.. pp. 37-38. "... the artist who works with the classical forms of abstraction is attempting to establish order out of chaos, to build new values in a troubled world, to re­ affirm the dignity of man as a rational creature..." Baur, op. cit.. p. 139. 1* "Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its re­ lations." James, op. cit., p. 167. "There is only one thing we cannot change too much without influencing form itself, viz., that special set of relations of stimulation which seem to be decisive for the segregation of a definite whole and for the spe­ cific dynamical structure underlying form." K'dhler, op. cit., p. 215o 62 structs.13 Meaning is dependent on the conceptual or perceptual utilization of past experience.

It is important to the non-descriptive position, however, that we distinguish between cognitive meaning and aesthetic meaning. In the strictest sense, all meaning has both cognitive and aesthetic aspects, but for purposes of discussion, aesthetic meaning is being considered here as a distinct kind of meaning which may be apprehended apart from or to the virtual exclusion of cognitive meaning. Cognitive meaning is dependent on conceptual referents or mental constructs in re­ spect to which the immediate meaning is recognized as representative of a class or as derived from known classes.Meaning is cognitive when it is composed

n ' " 1 1 'i"'1 ' '' m , ‘ J "... the 'thing' which we perceive always re­ sembles ... the object of some absent sensation, usually another ... figure which in our mind has come to be a standard bit of reality ... whilst part of what we per­ ceive comes through our senses from the object before u s . another part (and it may be the larger part) always comes out of our own mind." James, op. cit.. pp. 325, 329. "... we really see the composite memory image.” Ehrenzweig, op. cit.. p. 196. ”The determination of the significance of the forms in the potential space field about you cannot be done without reference to a standard of some kind. That standard is the past experiences you have had with 'things like that,' and from referral of light ray patterns coming into these forms in past experience, you can get 'the significance' of the forms out there for you." Mooney, "Journal Notes from The Seminar on Perception Theory” (Unpublished manuscript) "For practical purposes we think in terms of classes, as we concretely experience in terms of indi- 63 of elements so commonly known that It can be symbolical­ ly represented and communicated. Cognitive meaning is useful knowledge.15 Aesthetic meaning, as here defined, is the simple awareness of relationships.^

The awareness of relationships (aesthetic meaning) is present throughout all conscious experience and is a necessary factor in cognitive meaning.17 But in the absence of predominantly cognitive (classifiable) mean­ ing, one may still be aware of relationships. Admit- viduals.” Dewey, op. cit., p. 217. "Survival ... often depends upon the ability of the organism to react to all objects of a class in the same way." Brain, op. cit., p. 38. 15 "Knowledge typically is imbued with the interests of action and serves them ... Thus the cognitive atti­ tude which subserves activity, is directed upon what is immediately before us, not in consideration of the value- quality it contains in itself but as significant of some­ thing further having value or disvalue, which may be realijgd." Lewis, op. cit.. p. 44-1. "Thus the cognitive attitude ... typically looks at the given only momentarily and in order to look away from it and forward. It does not appreciate but inter­ prets what is present to us. Esthetic apprehension, by contrast, is appreciation of the given in its native quality, and does not look beyond this ..." Lewis, Ibid.. p. 441. "In a broad and literal sense, all direct appre­ hensions are esthetic — until they are qualified by that context of interpretations which thought would add." Lewis, Ibid.. p. 439. "... esthetic cannot be sharply marked off from intellectual experience since the latter must bear an esthetic stamp to be itself complete." Dewey, op. cit.. p. 38. tedly, the apprehension of relationships is itself cog­ nitive in the sense that, although the relationships may be unique, the qualities of relatedness are familiar qualities present in all conscious experience. But the simple apprehension of relationships is somewhat dif­ ferent from the apprehension of known relationships.

Predominantly aesthetic meanings are those in which the relationships are primarily unique; predominantly cog­ nitive meanings are those in which the relationships are primarily ordinary. Aesthetic meaning is derived from the apprehension of relationships; cognitive mean­ ing is derived from the apprehension of relationships structured into commonly known patterns.

Admittedly, this definition of aesthetic meaning places aesthetic quality at the very source of con­ sciousness. Because of this, aesthetic meaning must be differentiated from the more specific character of aesthetic pleasure. Aesthetic meaning, as considered here, may be either discordant and unpleasant or har­ monious and pleasant. The aesthetic response, however, is a specifically pleasurable response to harmonious relationships — especially unified relationships. It is impossible to know exactly what kinds of relation­ ships are likely to evoke the aesthetic response in a particular person, and even if it were not, the aesthe- 65 tic response is possible only when it is not blocked by dominating distractions. It would seem that the aesthetic response can be experienced under any condi­ tions which permit one to direct discriminating atten­ tion towards harmonious qualities of relatedness. Just as the mind is able to focus attention on those aspects of experience relevant to adaptive behavior, it is able to focus attention on those aspects of experience rele­ vant to aesthetic pleasure. Perceptual and conceptual differentiation is essential to both adaptive behavior and aesthetic pleasure.

Meaning depends upon the awareness of relation­ ships (aesthetic meaning), but our cognitive concerns are generally so dominant that the aesthetic qualities of experience are seldom brought to the focus of at­ tention. Many people therefore find non-descriptive art meaningless because, to them, meaning must be de­ liberately and obviously achieved through cognitive means. But on the basis of an essentially non-cogni- tive, aesthetic view of meaning, meaning may clearly be ascribed to non-descriptive art. If meaning is de­ rived from organization, does it necessarily follow that meaning be ascribed only to the organization of cognitive fragments (symbolic or descriptive factors)?

The apprehension of relationships is itself meaningful; 66 the apprehension of aesthetic integration is signifi­ cantly meaningful.

A further clarification of this point may be forth­ coming if we consider once again the emergent proper­ ties of a melody. The meaning of a melody lies in the aesthetic meaning of its organization and not in any cognitive meanings attached to the individual notes which supply the content of the melody.^ If each note of a melody suggested some complex, cognitive meaning, the aesthetic meaning of the melody might very likely be obscured by the cognitive meanings of its parts. It is precisely because individual notes do not carry cogni­ tive meanings that the aesthetic meaning of music is so easily accessible and so universally appreciated.

Although familiar musical phrases sometimes acquire cognitive associations, the meaning of music is essen­ tially non-cognitive^ 0r aesthetic. The recognition

"... the distinction between form and content is relative: the content is the elements in relation, and the form is the relation among the elements; and the total work is both in irrefragible unity. ** Rader, op. cit.. p. xxii. -*■9 Non-Cognitive Meaning: Aesthetic meaning is de­ rived from the apprehension of qualities of relatedness. Although the apprehension of relationships is the basis of all meaning, reference to aesthetic meaning herein generally implies meaning apprehended apart from or to the virtual exclusion of cognitive meaning. Hence, aesthetic meaning is sometimes referred to as non-cog- nitive meaning. 07 of a familiar musical phrase, after all, is the recog­ nition of a previously apprehended aesthetic meaning more than anything else. Precise cognitive meanings in the arts are those derived from signs or symbols which signify something other than themselves. Where aesthe­ tic structures or aesthetic fragments are used for sym­ bolic purposes, they may, under these conditions, be considered cognitive. But let us not confuse the cog­ nitive meanings entertained for purposes of adaptation or symbolic communication with the aesthetic meanings intended by those structures created specifically for our aesthetic pleasure. Music is essentially aesthetic in purpose, and even the culturally conventional emo­ tive meanings^O are highly variable and unfixed rather than cognitively precise. Music is an aesthetic, not a cognitive, medium.21

The non-descriptive artist tends to feel that cognitive meaning belongs to the literary arts where the elements (words) already possess cognitive meanings

20 "Emotive Meaning: Emotive, as distinguished from the cognitive, meaning of a statement is its ability to communicate an attitude or emotion, to inspire an act of will without conveying the truth." Dagobert D. Runes, Editor, The Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Philo­ sophical Library, 194-2), p. 89. 21 To Jaques Maritain "... it is clear that if art were a means of knowledge, it would be wildly inferior to geometry." Rader, op. cit.. p. 15. 68 prior to their organization into an art form. The non- descriptive artist, in eliminating cognitive fragments from his work, is attempting to eliminate associative distractions so as to direct attention towards the

"melody'* of aesthetic integration. Traditionally, aes­ thetic structure has not been granted aesthetic meaning —fc- but has, instead, been considered merely the vehicle through which cognitive meaning has been expressed.

Aesthetic structure certainly does, however, possess or evoke meaning in the aesthetic s e n s e ; 22 or it may, when combined with symbolic or descriptive elements, emphasize both aesthetic and cognitive qualities. The non-descriptive artist feels that art may include but that it does not need cognitive meaning. He tends to feel, moreover, that cognitive distractions are best avoided.

A verbal medium consists of familiar symbols (words) and is therefore essentially cognitive in character. A visual medium, however, does not serve the same purpose nor is it subject to the same kinds of restrictions. A visual medium may utilize conventional cognitive mean­ ings much like those intended by words, but it may also

22 Hans Hofmann says, "One shape in relation to other shapes makes the 'expression'; not one shape or another, but the relationship between the two makes the 'meaning.'" Motherwell and Reinhardt, op. cit.. p. 19. 69 take advantage of its sensuous flexibility to express unique visual m e a n i n g s ^ which can be apprehended only through direct perception of the expressive object.

The meanings in non-descriptive art are non-cogni- tive (aesthetic) visual meanings which must be sensuous­ ly experienced for adequate comprehension. They have no verbal equivalents. No verbal description can pos­ sibly communicate the aesthetic meanings intended by complex and subtle visual relationships.24- Even the cognitive relationships of descriptive art cannot be adequately expressed in verbal terns. If this were not the case, the visual arts would not posses the unique appeal which they do in fact p o s s e s s . 25

The inadequacy of words for dealing with uniquely

^ Visual Meaning: This term is intended to desig­ nate meanings visually apprehended. Visual meanings may be cognitive (as in descriptive art) or non-cognitive (as in non-descriptive art). 24- Andrew Cecil Bradley has said, "... in painting there is not a meaning plus paint, but a meaning in paint, or significant paint, and no man can really ex­ press the meaning in any other way than in paint and in this paint..." Rader, op. cit.. p. 3 4 6 . Frank Lloyd Wright says, "... I believe that line,foim -:and color are a language in themselves. I think they can best express beauty independently of the physi­ ognomy of any object in nature by way of these very qualities. You can by means of them create amazing re­ freshment for the human soul and the human mind." Motherwell and Reinhardt, op. cit.. p. 37. 25 «if all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would not ex­ ist." Dewey, op. cit.. p. 74. 70 visual meanings is probably responsible for much of the obscurity and confusion surrounding discussions of non- descriptive art. Intended visual meanings are inevitab­ ly distorted or lost when verbal translations are at­ tempted. Verbal interpretations of a non-descriptive work usually consist of cognitive associations and psy­ chological projections which may reveal more of the sub­ jective reactions of the spectator than of the objec­ tive qualities inherent in the w o r k . 26 The aesthetic properties of non-descriptive art exist independently of individual interpretations of them, and these pro­ perties should not be confused with cognitive verbali­ zations describing subjective associations.27

The inability of words to express visual meanings places serious limitations on literature about the arts.

Writings on art may call attention to the uniquely visual meaning of the arts, but they cannot employ

' 04L ' ’lr_T" - ' " ^ C. I. Lewis says it is a, "... fallacious sup­ position that the aesthetic character of an object is somehow created by the nature of experience in the con­ templation of it ... and cannot be attributed to a pre­ sented thing in the same sense as color or shape or other properties." Lewis, op. cit.. p. 4 6 4 . 27 "Esthetic apprehension requires to be thus dis­ interested in order to be just, and to be free of sen­ timentalism and pathetic fallacy. In it, the subject must be assimilated to the object, not the object to the subject; and the empathic infusion of what is con­ templated with subjective inclinations spoils it." Lewis, Ibid., p. 441. the visual mediums through which the artist expresses his meanings. Neither writers nor artista can be ex­ pected to translate visual meanings into verbal terms.

It is particularly obvious that a cognitive language cannot cope with the non-cognitive meanings of non- descriptive art. But so long as it is recognized that the visual arts cannot be talked into being and that words cannot adequately express visual meanings, words can be very helpful in directing attention towards the direct perception necessary to the apprehension of visual meanings.

Although visual expressions may possess regional characteristics, the apprehension of visual meaning is not subject to the linguistic barriers of verbal languages. Both aesthetic and cognitive visual mean­ ings are international and timeless in the sense that they are subject only to the conceptual barriers im­ posed by the attitudes, experiences, and aesthetic ser>- sibilities of the observer. A visual medium is quite meaningful and versatile, and because of a considerable community of taste, one may properly speak of non-cog­ nitive visual expressions as being international in scope.28 The visual meanings of non-descriptive art

28 "Au fond, the esthetic quality is the same for Greek, Chinese and American." Dewey, op. cit.. p. 331. 72 are meaningful by virtue of this community of aesthetic taste which crosses and embraces temporal and geographic boundries.

The tendency towards universality of aesthetic taste is apparently based on the typical sense of satis­ faction experienced when harmonious integration is a- chieved. This aesthetic response to harmonious inte­ gration may be an ongoing process as when listening to music or observing the dance, but the aesthetic objective is ultimately conclusive and unitary.29 The aesthetic response is ordinarily defined as sensuous in origin, but the pleasurable response to harmoniously conclusive or unitary experience is not necessarily derived from sensory impressions alone.

A distinction might be made between the pleasurable responses derived from sensuous experiences and those derived from conceptual experiences. Since the satis­ faction experienced is much the same in both cases, per­ haps it would be suitable to speak of a sensuous aesthe­ tic response and a conceptual aesthetic response. In either instance the response is pleasantly conclusive or unitary except that the conceptual response tends to

29 «... with respect to the organization and segre­ gation of extended units, we find the same general prin­ ciples determining temporal order which are known to us from the visual field in a state or rest." Kohler, op. cit., p. Ib3* 73 be only temporarily conclusive. It is a pleasurable response to an harmoniously achieved insight which, once grasped and retained, soon loses aesthetic appeal to assume a functional purpose as an aid to further con­ ceptual realizations.It is an aesthetically pleasant mental pause which tends to be singular and momentary rather than persistently recurrent. Knowledge always has implications for action or prediction and does not, properly speaking, consist of persistent structures to be tenaciously grasped for recurrent aesthetic contem­ plation. 31 The sensuous aesthetic response to a work of art, on the other hand, is a response to the inherent and conclusive m e a n i n g ^ 2 of an enduring physical struc-

The aesthetic response to cognitive integration is valued for both aesthetic unity and cognitive content. The aesthetic quality lies in the immediately harmonious integration of the cognitive content, but the cognitive knowledge itself is based always on prior knowledge and always has implications for subsequent action or pre­ diction. The aesthetic response is a response to har­ monious integration experienced in the immediate present, and although this may consist of cognitive meaning, it has little or nothing to do with the utilitarian or pre­ dictive function of cognitive knowledge. 31 "Knowledge for its own sake, and the contempla­ tive life represent an esthetic or near esthetic ideal rather than one normally attributable to cognition ... He who is disinterestedly interested in finding out and knowing; who subordinates the desires and interests of action to discovery of the truth, and to the contemplar- tion of it; likewise divests knowledge of its natural and pragmatic significance ... The ivory tower is charac­ teristically the refuge of the practically defeated and of those who become disillusioned of the utilities of action.?* Lewis, op. cit., p. 442. n ture continuously available for recurrent aesthetic ap­ preciation. 33 The similarity between the two types of aesthetic response lies not in the manner of achieve­ ment but in the conclusive and unitary quality of the response.

In the descriptive and symbolic arts, cognitive meaning rarely achieves the conceptual integration of a singular and momentary insight. It provides, instead, a protective coloration of safe familiarity. In the sense that cognitive symbols always signify something beyond themselves, the safe familiarity is largely de­ pendent on meanings external to the work of art itself.

The cognitive meaning of descriptive art is in this sense neither inherent nor conclusive. The aesthetic

32 Inherent Meaning: Inherent meaning is unique, non-cognitive meaning apprehended through direct per­ ception. It is meaning wholly derived in immediate per­ ception and lacks external (symbolically evoked) mean­ ing. The meaning apprehended is a directly perceived non-cognitive meaning, and the perceived object is said to possess inherent meaning. Conclusive Meaning; A conclusive meaning is a meaning unified and complete within itself, a meaning independent of elements external to its own structure. The inherent meaning of an aesthetic structure would be a conclusive meaning. The external (symbolically e- voked) meanings of symbolic logic would also be con­ clusive. 33 "Only those values are distinctly esthetic which are resident in the quality of something as presented or presentable, and are explicitly enjoyable in the discern­ ment of them and by that pause of contemplative regard which suspends the active interests of further purposes." Lewis, op. cit.. p. U%, 75

and sensuous meaning34 of non-descriptive art, how­

ever, signifies nothing beyond itself, is inherent,

and serves only as a basis for the conclusive satis­

faction of the sensuous aesthetic response. The non-

descriptive point of view holds that the meaning of

art should be primarily conclusive and inherent and

that cognitive responses are a hindrance to the sen­

suous aesthetic response to these inherent meanings.35

Doubtless it is the recognition of the strong ap­

peal of sensuous properties which lies behind the choice

of a visual medium for the expression of cognitive mean­

ing. The sensuous appeal of visual meaning has been

traditionally pressed into the service of various areas

of human interest and has played some more or less func­

tional role in relation to these interests. Perhaps its most obvious purpose has been to glorify and strengthen man's ego, either collectively or individually. Wit­

ness, for example, the great volume of art glorifying man and his gods. But the combination of cognitive and

sensuous meanings tends to prevent the most effective

Sensuous Meaning: This term refers to meanings perceptually apprehended. However, the term denotes non-cognitive rather than cognitive perceptions. ^ rtThe directly apprehended is esthetic when we pause upon it; contemplate the quality of what is given in and for itself and in abstraction from that other significance which it has as cognitive signal ..." Lewis, op. cit.. p. 443. results from either.

One may admire descriptive art for either its sensuous or cognitive achievements, but the intention would seem to be the achievement of an emergent mean­ ing derived from the utilization of sensuous meaning for cognitive purposes. The emergent meaning sought through descriptive art presumably merges cognitive and aesthetic experience. The cognitive meaning is presumed to be intensified or enhanced through its concurrence with the sensuous aesthetic response. If achieved, this purpose would appear to possess great virtue, but the non-descriptive artist sees in it an aesthetic weakness. Should either the artist's or observer's attention be dominated by the cognitive meaning, the sensuous value of a visual medium would seem to have been largely negated. Moreover, the cog­ nitive potentialities of a visual medium are distinctly limited and quite incapable of communicating signifi­ cantly complex cognitive meanings. A visual medium is quite effective for descriptive purposes, but its descriptive effectiveness is also its major cognitive limitation. Cognitive meanings of a non-descriptive

(abstract)nature are immeasurably more effective when expressed through a verbal or symbolic medium.21

Confusion between sensuous and cognitive meanings 77 sometimes occurs in the semi-descriptive a r t s . 36 Where the dominant meaning is obviously sensuous, it is un­ clear why the artist has been unwilling or unable to relinquish the familiar security of cognitive communi­ cation. From a non-descriptive viewpoint it seems that a total sacrifice of cognitive meaning would fur­ ther strengthen the sensuous meaning and help avoid a confusion of meanings which might tend to weaken it.

The external meanings37 evoked by cognitive symbols serve to prevent the inherent conclusiveness intended by the aesthetic integration of sensuous meaning. Cog­ nitive symbols are inconsistent with the non-cognitive, aesthetically sensuous goal.

Where the dominant intention is cognitive, one wonders at the choice of a semi-descriptive visual means.

The greatest cognitive strength of a visual medium lies

3b Semi-descriptive art is that kind of art in which both descriptive and non-descriptive factors have been utilized. Inasmuch as almost any descriptive work can be said to contain some non-descriptive factors, semi-descriptive art, in the broadest sense, is a form of descriptive art. The tern has been introduced, how­ ever, to specifically designate that kind of art which has been known as semi-abstract or semi-representational art. 37 External Meaning; This term refers to meanings symbolically evoked rather than perceptually apprehended. External meaning differs from cognitive meaning in the sense that cognitive meaning can be perceptually appre­ hended in the absence of symbols. Moreover, aesthetic meanings can be symbolically evoked — musical notation, for example. 78 in its descriptive power, and when this is curtailed, the cognitive potential is distinctly weakened. Semi- descriptive art is not merely a stylish trend which can be successfully adapted to any purpose; it is a style which has deliberately sacrificed descriptive clarity in order to emphasize the sensuous qualities of aesthetic organization.

It is with emergent m e a n i n g 3 8 that semi-descrip­ tive art has sometimes achieved its greatest strength.

The semi-descriptive emphasis on aesthetic structure has often effectively transformed cognitive meaning into a truly expressive emergent meaning. Unfortunate­ ly, such is not always the case. The pleasures of cog­ nitive familiarity can be displaced by discomfort and disturbance in the presence of incongruous distortions.

Repellent distractions are conducive to neither cogni­ tive persuasion nor aesthetic enjoyment.39 Although one may have to sacrifice either cognitive or sensuous

^ Emergent Meaning: This term is used to designate the emergent meaning derived from the concurrent appre­ hension of cognitive meaning and harmoniously integrated aesthetic meaning. In other words, emergent meaning is cognitive meaning apprehended in conjunction with the aesthetic response. 39 "... when we are presented with the bizarre and monstrous in art, and begin to be told that there is no essential difference between the beautiful and the ugly or that art has no concern with this difference, then ... decadence is always to be suspected." Lewis, op. cit.. p. 452. 79 meaning to achieve the best results with either, a con­ fusion of purposes makes it possible to destroy both and achieve neither.

It is the aesthetic integration of sensuous rela­ tionships which distinguishes art from simple descrip­ tion and cognitive communication, and even when ex­ perienced in response to cognitively descriptive art, the aesthetic response is essentially a non-cognitive response to sensuous relationships.4-0 Non-descriptive ' artists have recognized and have tried to emphasize the non-cognitive conditions conducive to an unself­ conscious response to the pleasures of sensuous ex­ perience. Although the cognitive conditions typically attending the apprehension of descriptive or semi-de­ scriptive art may be necessary to the communication of emergent meaning, cognitive conditions are inappropriate to the non-cognitive attitude conducive to the sensuous aesthetic response.

The decision as to the relative importance of emergent meaning and sensuous meaning is one which each artist or observer must make for himself. On this point the non-descriptive position is clear. It is sensuous

4-0 «Thus the esthetic attitude is that orientation which peculiarly conduces to discernment of the quality of the given as such, and is distinct from that which prepares for action and from the prevailing attitude of prediction and cognition." Lewis, Ibid., p. 438. 80 and not emergent meaning which most clearly distinguish­ es art from other human endeavors, and it is the aesthe­ tic integration of sensuous relationships for which the artist should strive and towards which the observer should direct attention. If the non-cognitive or aes­ thetic meaning of sensuous relationships is displaced by cognitive concerns, the uniquely sensuous value of the arts has been negated.

A lack of interest in the non-cognitive meaning of sensuous relationships constitutes a lack of, interest in one of the most unitary and conclusive functions of a visual medium — its utilization for the establishment of inherent meanings which can be apprehended only through direct perception. These inherent meanings have a peculiarly direct and significant immediacy which sym­ bolically evoked meanings do not possess. In a certain sense, symbols are meaningless and are merely devices by which conceptually entertained meanings are evoked.

The symbolic arts, then, do not actually contain but merely evoke cognitive meaning. The inherent meaning of the arts is a sensuous meaning.

It is not intended to imply here that it is im­ possible for the descriptive arts to possess inherent meaning. But if this inherent meaning is to be appre­ hended, the external meanings of descriptive symbols 81 must be suppressed.4-1

Reluctance to accept non-cognitive relationships as meaningful may be due to a tendency to impose upon all types of meaning the requirements appropriate only to cognitive meaning. But the act of organization, cognitive or non-cognitive, is a rational activity to which some significance and meaning must be attributed.

The meaningful nature of organization is readily ap­ parent in many areas of human endeavor where man satis­ fies his rational nature through exercising his organi­ zational capacities.4-2 it would be unreasonable to sup­ pose that such satisfactions cannot be achieved through the organization of abstract, non-cognitive structures.

The very process of visual organization, for example, encourages aesthetic involvement with sensuous relation­ ships through which can be apprehended the meaningful nature of rational order. Unified relationships are apprehended as meaningful by virtue of their phenomenal interdependence rather than through the communication of cognitive meanings.4-3

4-1 "... cognitive interpretation normally 'does it­ self: to discern the given in its immediate quality often requires a suspension of and recovery from this cognitive activity ..." Lewis, Ibid.. p. 44-3* 42 i»This capacity for order, this interest in or­ der, seems to be the source of a particularly human value." Mumford, op. cit,, p. 43- The process of visual organization is primarily a mental process in which the nature of the visual problems and their solutions is largely determined by the characteristics of the visual medium employed.

The numerous visual mediums possess their own peculiar characteristics, vices and virtues, limitations and potentialities. Each medium may be used to express only its own particular kinds of sensuous or cognitive meanings. Charcoal cannot be used to communicate the sensuous meanings of color nor can stone be used to communicate the sensuous meanings of copper engraving.

The imitation of one medium by the use of another is rather pointless and usually results in the loss of the unique properties of both. Artists, on the whole, honor the character of the mediums with which they work.

The potentialities are exploited and the limitations accepted. The problems undertaken are consistent with the medium chosen, or the medium chosen is appropriate to the goal.

The interrelationship of cognitive and non-cogni-

^ "Such is the conception which gestalt psychology offers to defend. It even goes so far as to hold that it is precisely the original organization and segrega­ tion of circumscribed wholes which make it possible for the sensory world to appear so utterly imbued with mean­ ing to the adult, because, in its gradual entrance into the sensory field, meaning follows the lines drawn by natural organization. It usually enters into segrega­ ted wholes." KcJhler, op. cit.. pp. 151-152. tive mediums and purposes creates special problems which may prove detrimental to the integrity of the mediums

and purposes involved. Attention to one medium tends to

result in the neglect of other mediums so that the full

potentialities of each medium are somewhat neglected.

Such restrictions, however, are by no means fatal to the

arts. Certain art forms, particularly those of the thea­

ter, find it desirable to sacrifice the full potentiali­

ties of each medium in order to achieve emergent charac­

teristics which no single medium can attain. In such

art forms, however, no medium can contribute anything

outside the range of its particular properties. Each medium possesses its own kind of cognitive or ^sensuous potential which, although it may not always be fully utilized, cannot cross the barriers of its own cognitive

or sensuous meanings. The unity of purpose, which makes possible the combination of mediums, nevertheless in­ volves preconceptions which inhibit the utilization of

the emergent inspirations of individual mediums and

tend to prevent conclusive and inherent meanings. CONCLUSION

The foregoing pages are of course particularly vulnerable and defenseless in the sense that they are based on intimate personal experience more than on public records. And the attempt to ascribe meaning to a non-cognitive art form is probably a unique en­ deavor. But can a non-descriptive artist believe or do otherwise?^- The alternative to such action would seem to be to call non-descriptive art meaningless.

To the artist who depends heavily on the sensuous quali­ ties of his materials, sensuous qualities are themselves meaningful. And when these properties are rationally and expressively ordered, they are especially meaningful by virtue of their phenomenal interdependence. Sensuous qualities are cognitively meaningful, and when rational­ ly ordered, they have significant human value. There are no doubt those to whom aesthetic structure, unless cognitive, seems meaningless; but to the non-descriptive artist, rational structures and human values are not meaningless.

! "... a man is not likely to cultivate a growing discipline for creativity in areas of his life where he ... doesn't get a chance to fail at anything intrinsical­ ly important to him..." Mooney, "Cultural and Emotion­ al Blocks to Creative Activity" (Unpublished manuscript)

84 PAINTINGS BY THE AUTHOR

85

87

PLATE II PLA.TS III PLATE IV 90

PLATE V 91

PLATE VI

94

PLATE IX 95

PLATE X 96

PLATE XI 97

PLATE XII 98

PLATE XIII PLATE XIV 10D

PLATE XV APPENDIX: KINDS OF MEANING

111 meaning is derived from the apprehension of relationships among qualities of experience which must be in part or to some degree familiar. Immediate re­ lationships are apprehended as meaningful by virtue of their relationship to past experience. All meaning is in this sense of one kind, and the attempt to differen­ tiate among kinds of meaning would appear to be :an at­ tempt to separate the inseparable. But any attempt to consider the nature of meaning inevitably leads one in­ to a complex labyrinth of the qualities and characteris­ tics of meaning — a labyrinth so complex that one can hardly avoid focusing one's attention now here and now there in an attempt to differentiate among the different functions and aspects of meaning. The kinds of meaning, then, are not so much separate and distinct entities as they are different aspects and functions of meaning to­ wards which we may direct our attention in accord with our specific purposes at different times. Accordingly, the word "meaning'* has been modified in numerous ways in this manuscript in an effort to effect more or less subtle shifts of emphasis towards one or another quality of meaning consistent with the purposes of the moment.

There follows an alphabetical listing of the kinds

101 102 of meaning consistent with the purposes of this manu­ script.

Aesthetic Meaning: Aesthetic meaning is derived from the apprehension of qualities of relatedness. Al­ though the apprehension of relationships is the basis of all meaning, references to aesthetic meaning herein generally imply meaning apprehended apart from or to the virtual exclusion of cognitive meaning. Hence, aesthetic meaning is sometimes referred to as non-cognitive mean­ ing. One may, however, be specifically cognizant of aes­ thetic quality in cognitive or conceptual meaning. But the position has been taken here that it is difficult to focus attention on aesthetic meaning in the presence of emphatic cognitive meaning. Aesthetic meaning is most easily apprehended perceptually or sensuously and apart from predominantly cognitive relationships.

Aesthetic meaning may be either pleasant or un­ pleasant and should not be confused with.the specifi­ cally pleasant quality of the aesthetic response. It is only when aesthetic relationships have been harmoni­ ously integrated that one experiences this pleasant re­ sponse to aesthetic meaning.

Cognitive Meaning: Cognitive meaning is dependent on conceptual referents or mental constructs in respect to which immediate meaning is recognized as represents- 103 tive of a class or as derived from known, classes. Mean­ ing is cognitive when it is composed of elements so com­ monly known that it can be symbolically represented and communicated. Cognitive meaning is useful knowledge.

The awareness of relationships (aesthetic meaning) is present throughout all conscious experience and is a necessary factor in cognitive meaning. But precise cog­ nitive meanings in the arts are those derived from signs or symbols which signify something other than themselves.

Conclusive Meaning: A conclusive meaning is a meaning unified and complete within itself, a meaning independent of elements external to its own structure.

The inherent meaning of an aesthetic structure would be a conclusive meaning. The external (symbolically evoked) meanings of symbolic logic would also be conclusive.

Emergent Meaning: This term has been used to desig­ nate the emergent meaning derived from the concurrent ap­ prehension of cognitive meaning and harmoniously integra­ ted aesthetic meaning. In other words, emergent meaning is cognitive meaning apprehended in conjunction with the aesthetic response.

External Meaning; This term refers to meanings sym­ bolically evoked rather than perceptually apprehended.

External meaning differs from cognitive meaning in the sense that cognitive meaning can be perceptually appre- 104

headed in the absence of symbols. Moreover; aesthetic meanings can be symbolically evoked — musical notation,

for example.

Inherent Meaning: Inherent meaning is unique, non-

cognitive meaning apprehended through direct perception.

It is meaning wholly derived in immediate perception

and lacks external (symbolically evoked) meaning. The meaning apprehended is a directly perceived non-cogni­

tive meaning, and the perceived object is said to pos­ sess inherent meaning.

Non-cognitive Meaning: See aesthetic meaning.

Sensuous Meaning:. This term refers to meanings perceptually apprehended. However, the term denotes non-cognitive rather than cognitive perceptions.

Visual Meaning: This term is intended to designate meanings visually apprehended. Visual meanings may be cognitive (as in descriptive art) or non-cognitive (as in non-descriptive art). BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barr, Alfred H., Jr. Cubism and Abstract Art. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1936.

Baur, John I. H. Revolution and Tradition in Modern American Art. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Biddle, George. "Modern Art and Muddled Thinking," Atlantic Monthly, v. 180, no. 6 (December, 194-7)

Blanshard, Frances Bradshaw. Retreat from Likeness in the Theory of Painting. New York: Columbia Uni­ versity Press, 1949.

Brain, Russell W. Mind. Perception and Science. Ox­ ford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1951.

Carritt, E. F. Philosophies of Beauty. New York, Lon­ don and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1931.

Chandler, Albert R. Beauty and Human Nature. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934-

Cheney, Sheldon. A Primer of Modern Art. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1949.

Dewey, John. Art As Experience. New York: Minton Balch and Company, 1934.

Ellis, Havelock. The Dance of Life. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.

Ehrenzweig, Anton. The Psycho-Analysis of Artistic Vision and Hearing. London: Rcutledge and Kegan Paul, Limited, 1953.

Goldwater, Robert and Treves, Mario, Editors. Artists on Art. New York: Pantheon Books, 1945.

Guggenheim, Peggy, Editor. Art of This Century. New York: Art of This Century, 1942.

Haroutunian, Joseph. Lust for Power. New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949.

105 106

Hiler, Hilaire; Miller, Henry; and Saroyan, William. Why Abstract? New York: New Directions, 1945.

Jacobi, Jolande, Editor. Psychological Reflections. An Anthology of the Writings of C. G. Jung. New Yorks Pantheon Books, 1953.

James, William. Psychology. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923.

Jung, Carl Gustave. Modern Man in Search of a Soul. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934.

.------. Psychological Types. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923.

------. Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953.

Kohler, Wolfgang. Gestalt Psychology. New York: Horace Liverright, 1929.

Lewis, C. I. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1950.

Lowenfeld, Victor. The Nature of Creative Activity. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939.

Malraux, Andre*. Les Voix du Silence. Paris: La Galerie de la Pleiade, L'Imprimerie Georges Lang, 1952.

Mooney, Ross L. "Groundwork for Creative Research,*' The American Psychologist, v. 9, no. 9 (September, 1954)

------"The Artist and Our Human Need," Journal of Human Relations. Wilberforce, Ohio: Central State College Quarterly Summer Issue, 1955.

Motherwell, Robert and Reinhardt, Ad, Editors. Modern Artists in America. New York: Wittenborn Schultz, Incorporated, 1951.

Mumford, Lewis. Art and Technics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. 107

Paalen, Wolfgang. Form and Sense. New York: Witten- born and Company, 1945.

Pearson, Ralph M. "The Modem Artist Speaks," Art Digest, v. 22, no. 16 (May 15, 1948)

Rader, Melvin, Editor. A Modern Book of Esthetics. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952.

Read, Herbert. Art Now. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936.

------. Education Through Art. London: Faber and Faber, 1947.

Rebay, Hilla. Art of Tomorrow. New York: Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1939.

Rich, Daniel Cotton. "Freedom of the Brush," Atlantic Monthly, v. 181, no. 2 (February, 1948)

Rodell, Fred. "Ah, Scholarship," The Progressive. April, 1956.

Ross, Floyd H. Addressed to Christians. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.

Runes, Dagobert D., Editor. The Dictionary of Philoso­ phy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1942.

Schiller, F. C. S. Problems of Belief. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924.

Sherman, Hoyt L. Cezanne and Visual Form. Columbus: The Institute for Research in Vision, The Ohio State University, 1952.

Drawing by Seeing. New York and Philadelphia: Hinds, Hayden and Eldredge, 1947.

------. The Visual Demonstration Center. Columbus: The Ohio State University, 1951.

Sweeney, James Johnson. Plastic Redirections in 20th Century Painting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. 108

Vacandard, E. The Inquisition. New Yorks Longmans, Green, and Company, 1915.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Religion in the Making. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926.

Whyte, Lancelot Law. Accent on F o m . New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.

Witkin, H. A. J Lewis, H. BI, Hertzman, M.^ Machover, K.J Meissner, P.B.; and Wapner, S. Personality Through Perception. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.

Young, Paul Thomas. Emotion in Man and Animal. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Incorporated, 1948. AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I, Karl Frederick Richards, was born June 14, 1920, in Youngstown, Ohio, where I received my public school education. My undergraduate training was obtained in

Cleveland, Ohio, at The Cleveland Institute of Art and

Western Reserve University. I was graduated in 1943 with a Diploma from The Cleveland Institute of Art and the degree Bachelor of Science in Education from Western

Reserve University. In 1946 I was awarded a University

Scholarship at The State University of Iowa, Iowa City,

Iowa, and in 1947, I received the degree Master of Arts in Fine Arts with a major in painting.

In 1947 I was appointed Instructor in Art and, in

1949, Assistant Professor of Art at Bowling Green State

University, Bowling Green, Ohio. In June, 1954, I ob­ tained a leave of absence from Bowling Green State Uni­ versity to take up residence in the Graduate School of

The Ohio State University. At The Ohio State Universi­ ty, I was appointed University Fellow, January, 1955, and held this position until June, 1956, while completing the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Fine and Applied Arts.

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