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Rebecca Copenhaver: Curriculum Vitae Rebecca Copenhaver Washington University in St. Louis Phone: (314) 935-5834 Department of Philosophy Email: [email protected] 1 Brookings Drive Email: [email protected] St. Louis, MO 63130 Website: philosophy.wustl.edu/people/becko-copenhaver Employment Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, 2020 ongoing Professor of Philosophy, Lewis &Clark College, 2012 to 2020 Department Chair, 2019 to 2020 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Lewis & Clark College, 2007 – 2012 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Lewis & Clark College, 2001 – 2007 Education Ph.D. Philosophy, Cornell University, 2002. Dissertation: The Doors of Perception: Anti-Sensationalism and Direct Realism in Kant and Reid. Committee: Zoltán Gendler Szabó, Sydney Shoemaker, Allen Wood Visitor, University of Aberdeen, July 2000. Visitor, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Philosophie, 1998–1999. Visitor, Yale University, 1997–1998. M.A. Philosophy, Cornell University, 1998. B.A. Philosophy, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994. Phi Beta Kappa Departmental Honors Thesis Honors Areas Modern Philosophy Philosophy of Mind Rebecca Copenhaver 2 Publications Books In preparation. Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense:A Guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press. In preparation. A Natural Kind of Magic: Thomas Reid and Acquired Perception. In preparation. Modern Memory. 2018. Philosophy of Mind in the Early Modern and Modern Ages, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver. In A History of the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields. 6 volumes. London and New York: Routledge. 2015. With Todd Buras. Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value, edited by Todd Buras and Rebecca Copenhaver. Mind Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012. With Brian P. Copenhaver. From Kant to Croce: Modern Philosophy in Italy, 1800–1950. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Articles In preparation. “Memory: the Acquaintance View." Acta Scientiarum . Special Issue: Philosophy of Mem- ory.Lady Mary Shepherd. In preparation. “In Memories Begin Responsibility." In Dreaming and Memory, edited by Daniel Gregory and Kourken Michaelian, Synthese Library. In preparation. “Shepherd and Reid." Oxford New Narratives in the History of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. In preparation. “Experiencing Things: Berkeley on Perception by Suggestion." In Perceptual Learning, edited by Kevin Connolly and Adrienne Prettyman. Forthcoming. “Berkeley and Reid." In Oxford Handbook of Berkeley, edited by Samuel Rickless. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. With Patrick Rysiew. “Reid on Memory and Testimony." In Memory and Testimony, edited by Stephen Wright and Sanford C. Goldberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2020. “Reid on Language and the Culture of Mind.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1753086 2020. With Jay Odenbaugh. “Experiencing Emotions: Aesthetics, Representationalism, and Expres- sion.” In The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception, edited by Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia. Ox- ford: Oxford University Press. 2020. “The Idealisms of Bishop Berkeley and Abate Rosmini.” In La Filosofia Italiana, edited by Fabrizio Meroi and Sophia Catalano. Olschki Press. 2018. “Introduction to Volume Four of the History of the Philosophy of Mind: Philosophy of Mind in the Early Modern and Modern Ages.” In A History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 4, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields. 6 volumes. London and New York: Routledge. Rebecca Copenhaver 3 2018. With Christopher Shields. “General Introduction.” In A History of the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields. 6 volumes. London and New York: Routledge. 2017. “Locke and Reid on Remembering.” In Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, edited by Sven Ber- necker and Kourken Michaelian. London and New York: Routledge. 2016. "Additional Perceptive Powers: Comments on Van Cleve’s Problems from Reid.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1): 208–211. 2015. “Thomas Reid on Aesthetic Perception.” In Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value, edited by Todd Buras and Rebecca Copenhaver. Mind Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. With Todd Buras. “Editor’s Introduction.” In Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value, edited by Todd Buras and Rebecca Copenhaver. Mind Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. “Reid on the Moral Sense.” reprinted from Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41 (sup1): 80–101, in New Essays on Reid, edited by Patrick Rysiew. London and New York: Routledge. 2014. “Reid on the Moral Sense.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (sup1): 80–101 (backdated publica- tion date: 2011). 2014. “Berkeley on the Language of Nature and the Objects of Vision.” Res Philosophica 91 (1): 29–46. 2013. “Perception and the Language of Nature.” In The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, edited by James A. Harris, 107–127. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010. “Thomas Reid on Acquired Perception.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 91 (3): 285–312. 2009. ”Thomas Reid on Memory and Personal Identity.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/reid- memory-identity/> 2008. With Brian P. Copenhaver. “How Croce Became a Philosopher: to Logic from History by Way of Art.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (1): 75–94. 2007. “Reid on Consciousness: HOP, HOT or FOR?” Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229): 613–634. 2006. With Brian P. Copenhaver. “The Strange Italian Voyage of Thomas Reid, 1800–1860.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (4): 601–626. 2006. “Thomas Reid’s Theory of Memory.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (2): 171–189. 2006. “Thomas Reid: Consciousness and Intentionality.” Philosophy Compass 1 (3): 279–289. 2006. “Is Reid a Mysterian?” Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3): 449–466. 2004. “A Realism for Reid: Mediated but Direct.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (1): 61–74. 2001. “Perceptual Objectivity: The Representative Theory and Immanuel Kant.” In Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationaler Kant-Kongress Band 2, edited by Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter. 2000. “Reid’s Direct Realism.” Reid Studies 4 (1): 17–34. Rebecca Copenhaver 4 Editorial In preparation. Scottish Enlightenment Theories of Social and Cultural Development. Special Issue,Journal of Scottish Philosophy. 2019–ongoing. With Christopher Shields and Mark Timmons. Oxford Guides. Series editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2019 Anscombe’s Intention: A Guide, John Schwenkler. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2021 Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue: A Guide, Mark Timmons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2019. With Christopher Shields. A History of the Philosophy of Mind. 6 volumes. Series editor and volume editor for volume four. London and New York: Routledge. Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, edited by John Sisko. Volume 2: Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages, edited by Margaret Cameron. Volume 3: Philosophy of Mind in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance, edited by Stephan Schmid. Volume 4: Philosophy of Mind in the Early Modern and Modern Ages, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver. Volume 5: Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century, edited by Sandra Lapointe. Volume 6: Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries, edited by Amy Kind. 2014–2019. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online. Subject editor for entries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: 30 new and revised articles. 2010. Philosophical Studies: Special Issue for the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division 152 (3). 2004. Essays in Philosophy: The Philosophy of Perception 5 (1). Reviews 2018. Common Sense in the Scottish Enlightenment edited by Charles Bradford Bow. Notre Dame Philo- sophical Reviews. 2018. Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities Christopher A. Shrock. Journal of the History of Philosophy. 2018. Problems from Reid by James Van Cleve. Philosophical Review 127(1): 117–121. 2013. Origins of Objectivity by Tyler Burge. Mind 122 (488): 1065–1068. 2013. “Recent Anthologies of Modern Philosophy.” Teaching Philosophy 36 (2): 161–172. 2009. The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid edited by Terence Cuneo and René Van Woudenberg. The Philosophical Review 118 (1): 115–121. 2004. Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His Reliabilist Response by Philip de Bary. The Philosopical Review 113 (4): 574–577. 2003. The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3). Eighteenth Century Scotland 17. Rebecca Copenhaver 5 Teaching Experience Washington University in St. Louis Problems in Philosophy, Philosophy 120 Fall 2020 Descartes to Hume, Philosophy 349 Spring 2021 Graduate Seminar, Philosophy 580 Fall 2020 Independent Study, Philosophy 500 Spring 2021 Lewis & Clark College Logic, Philosophy 101 Spring 2002, Fall 2002, Spring 2003, Fall 2004 Introduction to Philosophy, Philosophy 102 Fall 2004, Fall 2005, Spring 2006, Spring 2007, Spring 2008, Fall 2012, Spring 2013, Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Ethics, Philosophy 103 Spring 2002, Fall 2002, Fall 2005, Spring 2005, Fall 2006, Fall 2012 Philosophical Methods, Philosophy 250 Fall 2007, Fall 2015, Fall 2016, Fall 2017, Fall 2018, Fall 2019 Early Modern Philosophy, Philosophy 302 Spring 2003, Fall 2004, Fall 2009, Fall 2011, Fall 2013, Fall 2015, Fall 2017, Fall 2019 Analytic
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