VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2 (2017) Winner of the 2017 CNMT Essay Competition How to Sink the Hermit Kingdom Naval Occupations and the RCN: A Complex Yet Necessary Restructuring The Kriegsmarine’s Black Flag of Surrender and the Royal Canadian Navy Our Sponsors and Supporters Canadian Naval Review (CNR) is a ‘not-for-profi t’ Without that corporate support CNR would not be able publication depending for funding upon its subscription to maintain its content diversity and its high quality. base, the generosity of a small number of corporate Corporate and institutional support also makes it sponsors, and support from the Department of National possible to put copies of CNR in the hands of Canadian Defence and the Centre for the Study of Security and political decision-makers. Th e help of all our supporters Development at Dalhousie University. In addition, CNR allows CNR to continue the extensive outreach program is helped in meeting its objectives through the support established to further public awareness of naval and of several professional and charitable organizations. maritime security and oceans issues in Canada. (www.navalassoc.ca) (www.canadasnavalmemorial.ca) (www.navyleague.ca) To receive more information about the corporate sponsorship plan or to fi nd out more about supporting CNR in other ways, such as through subscription donations and bulk institutional subscriptions, please contact us at [email protected]. i CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2 (2017) Shearwater, NS Shearwater, VOLUME 13, NO. 2 (2017) Editorial Board Dr. Brian Bow, Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) Gary Garnett, Dr. Rob Huebert, Dr. Danford W. Middlemiss, Dr. Marc Milner, Colo- nel (Ret’d) John Orr, Hugh Segal, Mark Sloan, Dr. Denis Stairs, Michael Young Editor: Dr. Ann L. Griffi ths Assistant Editor: Douglas S. Th omas Credit: Leading Seaman Brad Upshall, 12 Wing Photo Editor: Timothy Hiu-Tung Choi Subscriptions/Administration: Shannon Langton Graphic Design: Kim Squared Inc. NATO warships, led by HMCS Fredericton, depart Halifax for Exercise Cutlass Fury on Printing: Advocate Printing and Publishing 12 September 2016. Th e editorial offi ces of CNR are located at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (CFPS)/Centre for the Study of Security and Development (CSSD), Hicks Building, Dalhousie University. Th e mailing address is 1699 South Contents Street, PO Box 15000, Halifax, NS, B3H 4R2. EDITORIAL: INVISIBLE PIRATES AND THE MARINE INDUSTRY 2 ANN GRIFFITHS Phone: (902) 494-3769 Fax: (902) 494-3825 WINNER OF THE 2017 CNMT ESSAY COMPETITION: 5 Email: [email protected] HOW TO SINK THE HERMIT KINGDOM Website: www.navalreview.ca ROBERT HUISH Canadian Naval Review is published by the CFPS/CSSD at Dalhousie Uni- versity. It is a professional journal examining a wide range of maritime NAVAL OCCUPATIONS AND THE RCN: A COMPLEX YET 11 security issues from a Canadian perspective. In particular it focuses on NECESSARY RESTRUCTURING strategic concepts, policies, operations, history and procurement of the COMMANDER LUC TREMBLAY Canadian Navy, plus national security in general and marine/ocean af- fairs. Th is initiative brings together members of the Canadian defence and THE KRIEGSMARINE’S BLACK FLAG OF SURRENDER 17 academic communities and is a component of the Centre’s Maritime Se- AND THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY curity Program. SUB-LIEUTENANT WARREN O. BUSH Canadian Naval Review has three primary objectives: MAKING WAVES • provide a public forum for the discussion of the maritime di- 2% IS NOT A CREDIBLE POLICY ... OR EVEN A POLICY 22 mension of Canada’s national security; VICE-ADMIRAL (RET’D) SIR JEREMY BLACKHAM • provide a public forum for the discussion of Canada’s naval and NEW WINGS FOR THE FLEET 24 maritime policies; and COLONEL PETER C. ALLAN • provide a source for the public examination of Canadian naval THE INTERIM FAST ATTACK TANKER 26 and maritime history and for the development of lessons learned. COLONEL (RET’D) JOHN ORR STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED IN ATLANTIC AFRICA 28 Th e material included in CNR is presented for the professional and general BRIAN K. WENTZELL education of the readers. Articles, commentaries and opinion pieces are THE HEART OF THE FLEET: THE JOINT SUPPORT 30 invited from the widest possible spectrum for the purpose of informing, SHIP PROGRAM stimulating debate and generally challenging readers. Th e opinions ex- BRIAN CARTER pressed by the authors do not necessarily refl ect the opinions of the Editor, POLICY DEBATES 100 YEARS LATER 32 Editorial Board, CFPS/CSSD, the Department of National Defence, or the COLONEL (RET’D) JOHN ORR Canadian Navy. COMMENT ON THE McCOY/TULLOCH ARTICLE ON 33 A CANADIAN HA/DR SHIP Articles, opinion pieces, book reviews and letters may be submitted via PATRICK AMBROSE email or mailed (with an electronic copy) to the address given above. Send to the attention of the Editor, Dr. Ann Griffi ths. Articles are to be in Word DOLLARS AND SENSE: STRONG SECURE ENGAGED 34 or WordPerfect format and no longer than 3,000 words. Articles must not DAVE PERRY have been published elsewhere. Citations should be kept to a minimum and articles must be accompanied by a 100-120 word abstract. Opinion A VIEW FROM THE WEST: SEA TRIALS: THE BENEFITS OF 36 pieces are to be 1,000-1,500 words. Book reviews are to be 500-750 words. USING UNCLOS TO SETTLE MARITIME DISPUTES Photos may be submitted with articles or commentaries but they must JOCELYN SANDHU be at least 300 dpi, at an equivalent size to 5 by 7 inches, and internet im- ages cannot be used. Intellectual copyright will remain the property of WARSHIP DEVELOPMENTS: THE CANADIAN SURFACE 39 the author, however, the right to re-publish articles initially published in COMBATANT Canadian Naval Review remains with the Editorial Board. Articles and DOUG THOMAS commentaries written in French are welcome and, if accepted, will be published in French. BOOK REVIEWS 41 Copyright © 2017. ISSN 1715-0213 Canadian Naval Review VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2 (2017) CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW 1 Editorial Invisible Pirates and the Marine Industry As anyone who follows the news knows, cyber-attacks are [i]t’s an industry revolving around high value as- on the increase.1 Perpetrators can be individuals, organ- sets, moving valuable cargoes, that is transition- izations or states, and they can have varying motives. ing to an increased reliance on digital systems. Cyber-attacks could be by a state-sponsored actor for Th ese technologies – ranging from automatic political reasons, a non-state actor for political reasons, a identifi cation systems (AIS), to GPS, electronic criminal actor for criminal reasons, a corporation for eco- chart displays and information systems (EC- nomic reasons, or a disgruntled individual for personal DIS), and complex cargo and energy manage- reasons – the possibilities are endless, cyber-warriors, cy- ment systems – are all vulnerable to attack and ber-activists, cyber-criminals, cyber-terrorists, and now exploitation.4 cyber-pirates. Th e European Transport Workers’ Federation and the Eu- Europol estimates that more money is now made via cy- ropean Community Shipowners’ Association are pushing ber-crime than through the narcotics trade.2 Cyber-crime the European Commission to streamline and digitalize is estimated to cost billions of dollars a year to govern- regulations for cargo, crews and ship data. Instead of com- ments, businesses and individuals – some predict it will pleting the information separately for national authori- be trillions of dollars soon.3 ties, they want to have one single European data source – the ‘reporting once’ principle – that can be located in a We take our computers and personal devices for granted. ‘cloud’ which European national authorities can access. We are always connected to the internet and obsessively check our smartphones and social media. We have our Th is is part of a trend towards ‘big data’ in the marine phones and houses connected so we can unlock the door, sector to tie information from a variety of sources to- turn on the lights, and tell the robot to vacuum the living- gether into one accessible database. Big data is enabled by room – all while we’re in a meeting at the offi ce. It’s not advanced sensor technology that allows, for example, en- likely that someone will bother to hack into our vacuum gine, propulsion, ballasting, positioning, damage control, cleaner, but with personal and fi nancial data stored on fuel, traffi c, cargo, port and weather data to be collected our smartphones and increased reliance on a networked and monitored on board ships. ‘Smart ship’ applications ‘internet of things,’ we become vulnerable on a person- can include the following: al level to breaches of data confi dentiality, integrity and • remote sensing which can continuously monitor availability. But we are also all vulnerable to attacks on ship locations from remote locations; fi nancial institutions, energy supply lines, railways, traffi c • voyage planning which allows ships to plan their management systems, health systems and water treatment routes aft er looking at traffi c and weather data; facilities. • traffi c management which means port authorities But I don’t want to talk about hacking on every level, I can avoid congestion and improve cargo handling; want to talk about the marine industry and cyber-securi- • operations and maintenance management which ty, shipping and ports in particular. Th e marine industry monitors ship performance data and gives ad- is an attractive target for hackers – or what are increasing- vance warning of the need for maintenance; ly being called ‘invisible pirates.’ It is attractive because • energy management which looks at fuel use, energy Credit: MaerskCredit: Emma Maersk is the lead ship of Maersk’s E-class container ships which were the largest in the world when built in 2006 with a notional capacity of 15,550 20-ft containers.