Civil-Military Operations in Kenya's Rift Valley
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U.S. military convoy rolls through Rift Valley, taking part in exercise that consists of military-to-military training, as well as medical, veterinary, and engineering civic affairs programs U.S. Navy (Roger S. Duncan) Civil-Military Operations in Kenya’s Rift Valley Sociocultural Impacts at the Local Level BY JESSICA LEE AND MAUREEN FARRELL n the aftermath of Kenya’s December 2007 to January 2008 postelection violence, U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) teams began a series of school rehabilitation projects in the Rift IValley. This area was still reeling from a period of significant trauma and instability. Life in the Rift Valley had been completely disrupted. Most of the residents were displaced, markets and public places were destroyed, and schools were burned to the ground. Families’ lives were turned upside down. Based on tensions over land tenure, the violence was generally described as focused on particular ethnic groups, including the Kikuyu and Kalenjin. Jessica Lee is a Member of the Social Science Research Center in U.S. Africa Command (Knowledge Development). Maureen Farrell is a Member of the Sociocultural Research and Advisory Team in Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa. PRISM 2, no. 2 LESSONS LEARNED | 159 LEE & FarrELL The U.S. and Kenyan governments rec- Background ognized that getting children back into school, Kenya has a history of election-related vio- particularly where multiple ethnic communities lence beginning with the advent of multiparty attended the same schools, would provide an elections in 1992. Following the contentious important step for community healing. The CA December 27, 2007, national elections, ethnic teams’ school rehabilitation projects from 2008 clashes broke out across the country. More than to 2010 in Kenya’s Rift Valley Province repre- 1,000 people died and approximately 300,000 sent an interesting case study of the application were displaced.1 Rift Valley Province was the of civil-military operations (CMO) in a tense location of the majority of the deaths and dis- environment where people had concerns for placements, though the capital of Nairobi and their personal security and a lack of confidence parts of Coast Province were also significantly in their government to adequately respond to affected. Kenyans and the international com- the crisis. munity watched in horror as neighboring eth- nic groups fought each other with brutal tactics after the announcement of a thin margin of while widely reported as ethnically victory for President Mwai Kibaki over Raila based, these tensions are based on issues Odinga.2 While these clashes have been widely of land tenure dating back to the early reported as ethnically based and catalyzed by a 20th century close election, at their core, these tensions are based on issues of land tenure dating back to the early 20th century.3 To investigate the sociocultural impact The international community, nongovern- of this series of projects, Rear Admiral Brian mental organizations (NGOs), and the govern- Losey, commander of Combined Joint Task ment of Kenya provided humanitarian assis- Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), requested tance for internally displaced persons (IDPs), a qualitative study of how host communities organized peace-building efforts, and began received the CA team in their villages and what the slow work of rebuilding infrastructure. In it meant to the recipients to have U.S. military– the spring of 2008, upon the request of U.S. supported construction projects in the period Ambassador to Kenya Michael Rannenberger, following such instability. In late August 2010, CJTF–HOA deployed a CA team to Eldoret we conducted a sociocultural impact evaluation town to assist in the reconstruction of destroyed of the schools in the Rift Valley. schools. Rehabilitating these schools repre- Based on 71 interviews with 135 partici- sented the synergistic efforts of multiple play- pants, this article is intended to inform those ers—those within the U.S. Government, as who plan, train, evaluate, design messages for, well as those between the United States and and conduct CMO. Our goal is to provide such its other partners, including the Kenyan gov- individuals with improved sociocultural infor- ernment, community-based organizations, and mation and guidance to more effectively tailor international aid agencies. Additionally, get- their activities and engagements in the local ting children back into school helped to restore context, as well as support the development of a certain modicum of normalcy to the lives CMO policy and strategic planning. of these traumatized communities. Over the 160 | LESSONS LEARNED PRISM 2, no. 2 Civil-MilitarY OPEratIONS course of approximately 2 years (April 2008– sample, the researchers selected participants July 2010), four different CA teams supported from a range of geographic distances from the rehabilitation or reconstruction of facili- school projects funded by CJTF–HOA; with ties at 14 schools, mostly in and around Burnt varying relationships to the school projects; Forest.4 Particularly when these efforts were just from both genders; and among a diversity of beginning in mid-2008, the Rift Valley was still representatives of local community members, highly insecure and relations among the differ- NGOs, and leadership positions. ent communities were still tense. We first notified and obtained the permis- Today, the communities surrounding these sion of the Provincial Administration and com- schools are still recovering. Estimates from com- munity leadership to carry out field interviews munity leadership interviewed for this article before engaging with local community mem- indicate that approximately 20 to 35 percent bers. We walked into villages instead of driving of the families who send their children to these to provide people greater latitude in deciding schools still live in IDP camps, and on average whether to participate in the study. That is, 70 percent of the student body has returned to because we were on foot, community mem- class. Interestingly, the student body increased bers had more time to decide if they wanted at some schools, a change that locals attri- to interact with us. Thus, villagers could make bute to the improvement of these facilities. themselves available by sitting outside their Participants expect these numbers to rise since homes, or move away into their gardens or the August 4, 2010, referendum passed without homes to passively show their disinterest in additional violence, though some community talking. Conversely, arriving by car does not members are thought to be waiting until after allow enough time for word to spread within the the 2012 elections to rebuild permanent struc- village and can catch some community mem- tures for their homes. bers off guard. Interviews were conducted in Kiswahili or English, depending on participants’ Methods preferences, with the majority of conversations Though land tenure issues were and are in Kiswahili. Men and women were interviewed the root of tensions in Kenya’s Rift Valley, on separately to ensure maximum participation. the surface, much of the focus during the post- There were several limitations to this election violence was on ethnicity. With the research plan, including seasonal rains and intention to focus interview discussions on the working in agriculture-based villages where schools and the work of the U.S. military in the people spend most of the daylight hours on their area, we deliberately did not ask about or seek farms tending to crops. However, given the time information that may have been considered and seasonal constraints, this research project ethnically sensitive. resulted in a comprehensive data set of 71 inter- We used anthropological field research views with 135 participants at 10 locations. methods for data collection, including semi- structured interviews and chain referral sam- Coordination pling. The interview population was major- According to U.S. Agency for ity Christian, and most livelihoods revolved International Development (USAID) imple- around farming. To balance the research menting partners, church leadership, and NGO PRISM 2, no. 2 LESSONS LEARNED | 161 LEE & FarrELL personnel working near and with the U.S. mili- secure storage for 11 school compounds.5 These tary, Civil Affairs efforts were well coordinated efforts were an important step in preparing local with the Provincial Administration and other schools—shared public institutions—to reopen. local key personnel. Groups such as the Kenya By extension, the CA teamwork also encour- Red Cross and the International Organization aged displaced persons to return to their home on Migration provided basic humanitarian communities and farms and get their children assistance, including temporary housing and back into school. food. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) additionally provided education A Warm Reception in the camps and smaller NGOs engaged in Almost unanimously, local community peace-building activities among communities. members, NGO personnel, and the Provincial The first CA team to arrive in Eldoret in spring Administration leadership welcomed the 2008 was instrumental in repairing schools in U.S. military in the Rift Valley. Our fieldwork the most devastated areas of the Rift Valley, revealed that this welcome can be attributed since no other group or organization had com- to several dynamics. First, the community was mitted to support this work. still recovering from trauma and had acute needs related to certain events;