transnational institute Policy Briefing Nr 14 April 2015

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar: The Need for Clarity and Achievement

The clock is running down on a critical of a nationwide ceasefire. In response, but uncertain time in national politics in Western sanctions have been reduced and Burma/Myanmar1. There can be no doubt international leaders are now frequent that the country has enjoyed a period of visitors. Certainly, compared to the previous rare optimism and reform-oriented change decades of military isolationism, these have since the quasi-civilian government of been unprecedented times of potential and President assumed office in hope. March 2011. Among hopeful developments, a parliamentary system has been introduced, For many citizens, however, this is where many political prisoners have been released, the good news ends. For as the countdown economic reform has begun, and peace talks begins to a crucial general election later this between government and ethnic nationality year, warnings are accelerating of a halt in leaders have moved towards the prospect reform momentum and a more troubling

Recommendations

Important progress has been started in Inequitable distribution of political and national politics under the government of economic rights between the Burman- President Thein Sein. But as the countdown majority centre of the country and the ethnic accelerates towards a general election later minority borderlands continues to drive this year, there is a risk that political reform conflict. Despite ceasefires in some regions, and ethnic peace are faltering. To avoid this, fighting continues in others, furthering clear markers must be agreed of processes of mistrust and humanitarian suffering. democratic reform that guarantee the rights Military solutions cannot be imposed. If and involvement of all peoples and parties. ethnic grievances and aspirations are to be addressed, political and economic reforms Constitutional reform and nationwide must be the cornerstone of peace. peace will be essential, and it is vital that the conduct of the general election is free and fair International aid is welcomed as a to ensure momentum in political reform. An support for socio-political reform. But as inclusive political dialogue must be fostered programmes diversify, it is essential that at the national level to move beyond the aid is targeted at the key political issues and practice of different parliamentary processes most vulnerable communities. Solutions will and ethnic ceasefire talks that do not provide not be found by only engaging, or building a political roadmap for all citizens. It is vital up, a dominant government and military that reform accords promote justice and system that does not represent the people; cooperation, not exclusion and new divisions rather, it will perpetuate conflict and state in society and politics. failure.

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 1 reality behind many of the socio-political The concern is that many actions of the changes in the country. Four years into the central government have become a mixture life of the Thein Sein government, the same of public relations and coercion, masking the military-business elite remains in power, determination of a military-backed elite to land-grabbing and other forms of economic remain in power. If this trend continues, the exploitation are widespread, and ethnic best opportunity for democratic reform and conflict continues in several parts of the nationwide peace in many decades could be country. Fuelling these concerns, there has lost. Rather than the Thein Sein government been an increase in incidents suggesting being the springboard for an era of political the country’s military leaders are reverting inclusion, human rights and national to their old hard-line ways: the murder of a progress, it could come to mark a further journalist,2 the “unintentional” killing of 23 extension in the failure of military-dominated ethnic army cadets,3 the continued exodus governments in the country – albeit in new of minority Muslims from their homes,4 form. the fatal shooting of a woman protestor at a Chinese-backed copper mine,5 and As the general election approaches, it is vital the blocking by vested interests of deeper that action is begun to build confidence reforms.6 and ensure that the country’s path towards nationwide peace and democratic Hopes continue that these are momentary governance continues. This will mean setbacks that must be understood in a clear markers of political agreement, peace bigger picture of national transition.7 But for achievement and reform guarantees that communities in the front-line of political involve all ethnic nationalities. Such essential change, the consequences are deeply steps must not be postponed through troubling. As prospects recede of broader another year of obfuscation or delay that change before this year’s general election, simply returns the same government and urgent questions are being asked about the unrepresentative elite to power. A forward- real nature and inclusiveness of Myanmar’s looking narrative of hope and inclusion new political system – and whether it can has to be built. In a fast-changing world, deliver the peace and democratic reform Myanmar’s peoples and the international sought by the country’s peoples. Such community expect democratic reform that concerns increased rapidly during February sustains a real and lasting peace. and March when student protests for educational change were ended by force in central Myanmar.8 Meanwhile over 70,000 The political landscape civilians fled their homes during fighting that broke out between government and ethnic As in previous times of state transformation, opposition troops in the Kokang region of a major obstacle to national agreement and Shan state.9 cohesion is the complexity of the political landscape. After decades of military The opening chapter in Myanmar’s new rule, the Thein Sein government has not political era is coming to an end. Leaders on heralded a new era of simplification and all sides continue to proclaim good intentions resolution in national politics. Instead, to seek solutions through reconciliation and the political environment is presently at dialogue, and this is a positive asset that can its most changeable and uncertain in over be built upon. But mistrust has been growing. half a century. With the 2011 handover of Uncertainties and confusion permeate the government by the military State Peace and political landscape, and this is undermining Development Council (SPDC: originally the ability of citizens and communities across State Law and Order Restoration Council the country to work together in common [SLORC]), a Pandora’s box of old crises and cause. new challenges has been opened.

2 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar In many respects, such an array of momentum are continuing to develop transitional difficulties could be anticipated rapidly – and often disaffectedly – in in one of the most ethnically diverse and response to the urgent challenges of the conflict-torn countries in Asia. As the day. Transnational Institute wrote in February 2011, “An inclusive endgame has long been • Finally, relations between Buddhist and needed to achieve national reconciliation.”10 Muslim communities remain strained But recognition of these challenges has not and potentially volatile, and holders of made efforts towards national peace and temporary identity cards, a majority of reform any easier. Four years after the SPDC whom are Muslims, will not be allowed stepped down, the prospect of a new general to vote in the polls.13 In the new political election has brought many of the underlying era, the rise of Buddhist nationalism has challenges to the fore. Six key areas stand out. become a significant, if unpredictable, socio-political force. • First, despite President Thein Sein’s recent pledge of pro-federal change,11 there is still The result of these differing tensions and no nationwide agreement or guarantee dynamics is a contentious, and often that involves all nationalities and parties divergent, political stage. For while important about the future direction and processes socio-political energies have been released for political reform in the country. since the SPDC’s departure, political change continues to be an essentially top-down • Second, there are no certainties about affair under the new governmental system, the future positions or roles of the three with and related business or main groupings in national politics: family interests often as privileged as they the pro-military Union Solidarity were before. In contrast, pro-democracy and and Development Party (USDP) and ethnic nationality groups are still excluded Tatmadaw (Defence Services); pro- from many aspects of governance and democracy parties spearheaded by the national decision-making. This, in turn, is National League for Democracy (NLD); feeding popular concerns about the direction and ethnic-based organisations – whether of both political reforms and the ethnic peace armed, electoral or community-based – process. that are currently at their most numerous since the country’s independence in 1948. Clearly, much can happen in the coming months, and every day brings new headlines • Third, although discussions about charter as different actors add their voices to the amendments are continuing, there are still gathering debate. In his New Year’s Day no assurances as to how, or if, the 2008 speech, for example, President Thein Sein constitution will be changed or reformed. lauded Myanmar’s “new political culture”, pledging that the “2015 elections will mark • Fourth, as long as fighting continues in the first time since our independence any part of the country, the achievement where elections will be contested by all the or maintenance of a nationwide ceasefire political stakeholders freely and fairly”.14 will always be doubtful before the polls. , in contrast, is hesitating Meanwhile humanitarian needs remain before committing the NLD to the polls, serious in many borderland areas where arguing that reform has been “stalling” for over 800,000 civilians are displaced from two years.15 Meanwhile, as armed conflict their homes.12 continues in the borderlands, Nai Hong Sar of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination • Fifth, the social environment is by no Team (NCCT) has warned of a “decrease means moribund, and community in trust” between ethnic groups and the activism, social media and civil society government.16 In this reform vacuum, it is

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 3 often community-based organisations that dominance of national politics. On New are the most vocal about developments in the Year’s Day, Kyaw Zwa Moe of country on issues ranging from peace talks Magazine captured the sentiment of many and election monitoring to women’s rights citizens when he described “Burma’s and the environment (see “Civil Society” democracy” as “just what the generals below). ordered”.19

Such different perspectives are reflected in In the long run of history, it may be possible a political arena that is often fragmented that the 2008 constitution can be reformed in the field. Officially, Myanmar is still in by political procedures that will answer the seventh and final stage of the SPDC’s many of the present criticisms and demands. roadmap17 towards “disciplined democracy”. This, though, is not yet certain. Over the For this reason, government leaders have past year ever more complicated processes been very reluctant to allow significant have developed as government leaders have changes to the 2008 constitution that sought to keep opposition demands at bay. A currently empowers a pro-Tatmadaw status general election date of late October or early quo. Most obviously, 25 per cent of all seats November has been set by the Union Election in the legislatures are reserved for military Commission. But for many citizens, the candidates, and the key security ministries challenge is no longer about who will win the – Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs 2015 general election but whether processes – are also reserved for military personnel can develop by which demands for deeper appointed by the commander-in-chief. In political and ethnic reforms can be resolved, addition, article 6(f) reserves the “national whether before the polls or beyond. political leadership role of the State” for the Tatmadaw; article 20(f) affirms that During March, the NLD suggested that the the Tatmadaw “is mainly responsible for party will stand in the 2015 polls, while safeguarding the Constitution”; and article ethnic armed groups moved closer to signing 436 ring-fences Tatmadaw control by an official nationwide ceasefire with the stipulating that more than 75 per cent of government. But such decisions were not parliamentary representatives have to approve based upon accepting the present political any charter change.18 system, but rather to change it. Until such change happens, Myanmar’s new era of The difficulties with such a politically-loaded democratic constitutionalism will appear a constitution are many, and they have become mirage. ever more apparent during the past four years. The new constitution has not resolved countrywide demands for democratic rights The structures of political dialogue and representation, and calls for alternative processes of dialogue have failed to accelerate A plethora of controversial issues cloud the pace of peace and reform. Rather, serving arguments about Myanmar’s political future and retired Tatmadaw officers have once that require constitutional change. Vital again demonstrated their ability to remain at subjects include federalism, nationwide the centre of national politics by managing peace, economic and educational reforms, a landscape of conflict and diversity. Indeed, the role of the Tatmadaw, and land rights since President Thein Sein assumed office, that protect the livelihoods of the peoples.20 there has been an unheralded expansion In the meantime, two main inter-faces have in the numbers of non-state organisations developed for dialogue in national politics: within the country, including electoral, ethnic, business and community-based. • First, in electoral politics, the lower and But, for the moment, this dynamic does not upper houses of the new legislatures in appear to have threatened the Tatmadaw’s Nay Pyi Taw have proven quite open for

4 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar discussion – if not rapid reform. In con- come to focus on the more fundamental trast, the third tier of the legislatures – the question as to how to “rewrite” or “amend” 14 regional and ethnic state assemblies the 2008 constitution.23 In particular, – has generally failed to make a similar two sections are regarded as especially mark.21 obstructive of progressive change: article 59(f) which bars candidates with foreign • Second, in the conflict-zones, a variety relatives from becoming president (i.e. Aung of peace talks have evolved in different San Suu Kyi), and the constitution “master- formats and groupings that have slowly key”, article 436, which effectively allows moved towards the goal of a nationwide the Tatmadaw political control over charter ceasefire between ethnic armed groups amendments.24 and the government. Faced with these stumbling blocks, In support of these developments, many opposition groups have tried a number of restrictions on freedom of movement and extra-parliamentary methods to promote the media from the SPDC era have been reform. Last year, for example, the NLD lifted, and the trend towards dialogue was and 88 Generation Peace and Open Society reinforced by the NLD’s 2012 by-election circulated a petition that gathered nearly five entry into parliament and the spread of million signatures calling for article 436 to ceasefires to include the majority of ethnic be amended. The NLD then followed this opposition forces. Meetings are commonplace with a demand for “four-way” talks between in the country today between different President Thein Sein, lower house speaker representatives and sectors of society that (both ex-generals), commander- were previously restricted. Without doubt, in-chief Sen. Gen. and these steps towards inclusive dialogue mark Aung San Suu Kyi to begin negotiations in one of the most progressive changes from detail.25 As Aung San Suu Kyi has explained, the previous decades of military rule when “I don’t accept the idea that only parliament repression rather than representation was too has the responsibility to amend the often the norm in state-society relations. constitution. Everybody has a responsibility to do this.”26 Despite these advances, there have been no tangible moments of national reform To date, however, the amendment campaign agreement and, for the moment, the has not brought new processes of dialogue parliamentary and ethnic peace processes any closer; rather, it appears to have triggered remain on different tracks. In response, a train of government responses of increasing various avenues and forums have opened up complexity. Last October, President Thein as different interest groups seek to overcome Sein called a brief “high-level” roundtable of the political obstacles in the way. A voting 14 participants, including Aung San Suu Kyi, system of “proportional representation”, for on the eve of President Barack Obama’s visit.27 example, has been proposed – and opposed This was then superseded by a proposal, – by different parties as a means to secure endorsed by the Union parliament, for better political and ethnic balance in the “six-way” talks on charter reform, with the legislatures, and there has been increasing addition of the upper house speaker, ex-Gen. promotion of “federalism” which had been a , and an ethnic nationality taboo subject ever since the 1962 coup that representative.28 But this also appeared to brought Gen. Ne Win and the Tatmadaw to hit the buffers when on 12 January President power.22 To date, however, such ideas have Thein Sein convened an extraordinary not had reform impact. “48-party” meeting of selected invitees. And uncertainty deepened even further when a Against this backdrop, most discussions committee of MPs unexpectedly agreed that on political change in electoral circles have a proposal for a constitutional amendment

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 5 bill could go ahead, although it will still need was that, whether government leaders were to pass the over 75 per cent “master-key” of stalling or not, polling day continued to voting MPs.29 move closer without any agreements on the shape or timetable for constitutional reform. Eventually, with opposition groups Instead, for many citizens it appeared that, complaining of tactical delays,30 the just as in 2010, the government’s election government appeared to clarify its way campaign was beginning early, based around forward with statements from its three control of the national landscape and the key leaders, all of whom have military promotion of the USDP-Tatmadaw as the backgrounds. Commander-in-chief Snr-Gen. guardians of both the country and political Min Aung Hlaing warned that the country reform. was not ready for a “reduced military role” in parliament because “we are still a young These perceptions deepened when, in an democracy”.31 Union speaker Shwe Mann unusual decision, President Thein Sein stated that “six-party” talks would go ahead declared martial law in response to a since they had been approved by the Union resumption of fighting in the Chinese- Assembly, the “most powerful organization speaking Kokang region, a draconian move making the laws for Myanmar”.32 And that won rare praise for the Tatmadaw on President Thein Sein affirmed that charter social media platforms in the country.37 In reforms could only be carried out through the first use of emergency legislation under parliament, but they must also be approved the 2008 constitution, Snr-Gen. Min Aung by a national referendum.33 In essence, the Hlaing claimed that the Tatmadaw was primacy of parliamentary procedures was waging a “just war” in defence of national being reinforced under the terms of the 2008 sovereignty.38 constitution. Equally ominous, concerns about a regression These announcements, however, did not in the political climate were also gathering mark the end of reform uncertainty, and pace in central Myanmar where student calls within days the likelihood of a constitutional for educational reform spread to several referendum was called into question when towns. As all sides are aware, students have Buddhist monks threatened mass protests often been a catalyst for political protest following a parliamentary decision to allow in the country. In an echo of the past, the voting rights to the holders of temporary Minister of Home Affairs Lt-Gen. Ko Ko national identification cards, a majority accused the students of being the “puppets” of whom are Muslims in the northern of political parties and “foreign organisations” .34 The plight of this population, and of being manipulated by “extremists”.39 many of whom self-identify as Rohingya, In response, Ye Yint Kyaw, a leader of the is among the most contentious issues in Committee for Democracy Education Myanmar politics,35 and the leader of the Movement, said such language showed that Buddhist nationalist movement, the monk the “quasi-civilian government still has the U Wirathu, released a public statement same attitude as its former self: the military asking the president, parliament and election regime, who always tried to smear public commission to rescind such cards.36 In movements, political parties and students”.40 response, the government quickly gave way, Subsequently, the police physically cracked announcing that temporary cards will be down on student marchers at Letpadan in withdrawn altogether by the end of May. scenes that shocked the world while civilian In effect, over one million people will be auxiliaries, reminiscent of the Swan Arr Shin disenfranchised. from the SPDC era, re-appeared to break up protests on the streets of .41 President With the election clock ticking, the Thein Sein, however, was unapologetic, consequence of so many different actions telling the BBC that it is the Tatmadaw that

6 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar has initiated reforms and “is assisting in the peace dialogue is only the third major cycle of flourishing of democracy in our country”.42 national peace negotiations since Myanmar’s independence in 1948.44 Nevertheless some The stage is delicately set. For the moment, fundamental flaws have remained in the the general election seems certain to go way. No linkage, for example, has been made ahead. In early March, President Thein Sein between the structures of political reform and met with Aung San Suu Kyi for just the sixth peace talks in the country; historic tactics time during the past four years, and the NLD of “divide and rule” have continued; there subsequently said that it is considering to have been obvious differences of opinion stand for election in this year’s polls. Many between President Thein Sein and Tatmadaw challenges, however, lie ahead that could yet commanders in the field; and the handling of determine the outcome of this year’s voting. the peace talks has been largely delegated to Parliamentary by-elections were cancelled a government-affiliated body, the Myanmar by the Union Election Commission last Peace Center (MPC), which is majority year,43 and the NLD and allied ethnic parties Burman and, as a technical team, has no boycotted the 2010 polls. But on present powers to negotiate. trends, a more open contest appears likely and, providing that balloting is free and The result has been a conflict paradox. For fair, there is every chance that the NLD and while Tatmadaw commanders have pursued allied parties will win. Against this backdrop, “military first” strategies in the resource- political tensions are set to increase in the rich northeast of the country, government coming months as all sides seek to position officials appear to have gone out of their way themselves for advantage. Myanmar’s to make peace agreements with ethnic forces democratic future is at stake. elsewhere, some of which – notably the (KNU) – had never made real ceasefires with any central government The structures of ethnic dialogue before. Indeed a reverse symmetry has developed during the past four years, with Similar uncertainties over procedures the northeast borderlands changing from have continued to undermine progress on a region of relative peace to a conflict-zone ethnic peace talks, and, initially, they also while the southeast borderlands have made appeared to be losing momentum during the the first tentative steps towards national early months of 2015. In a change from the reconciliation since independence in 1948. individual negotiations that characterised In consequence, despite the signing of new peace talks under the SPDC regime, the ceasefires, it has been difficult for many Thein Sein government has concentrated on communities to build trust in government the achievement of a “nationwide ceasefire peace initiatives, a concern heightened agreement” (NCA) to mark the new political because there has been little progress era. To date, however, a defining process of in addressing the essential political and inclusion and implementation has proven economic challenges in the interim.45 difficult, despite considerable international support and the apparent willingness of all At the same time, it is important to sides to talk. In the coming months, events in emphasise that obstacles and delays have the ethnic borderlands could well become as not only occurred on the government side. important in determining Myanmar’s reform In particular, there have been differences of path as the general election itself. opinion – as well as capacity – between the more than 20 ethnic opposition forces in the Given the long history of ethnic conflict, field. Since 2011, for example, the 12-party rapid change was never expected. As in United Nationalities Federal Council any struggle with many fronts, it is hard to (UNFC), which includes both ceasefire and construct a single narrative. The current non-ceasefire groups, has emerged as the

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 7 main ethnic alliance. But the UNFC does for peace and national reconciliation” was not include such important groups as the promoted, promising a form of federalism country’s strongest ethnic force, the United for the country. Intermediaries privately Wa State Army (UWSA) nor the Restoration urged ethnic leaders to make a nationwide Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (also agreement while Thein Sein is president, known as Shan State Army-South: RCSS/ the impression being left that the next SSA-S).46 government might not be as amenable to dialogue after the general election. Such To try and address these differences, a pressures, however, did not go down well Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team with ethnic opposition leaders. In the event, (NCCT) was set up in November 2013 just four nationality forces signed with the by 16 ethnic organisations to negotiate government on Union Day, and only from the with a government Union Peace Working southeast borderlands.53 Committee (UPWC), headed by ex-Maj- Gen. Aung Min, a minister in the president’s Opposition caution was underpinned by office. Subsequently, the NCCT and UPWC disquiet on a number of issues. First, the set up a joint working committee to draft a notion that any treaty needs to be made with nationwide ceasefire pact, with the intention President Thein Sein not only suggested of bringing in parliamentary and Tatmadaw that it will be better to wait until the next representatives – a key ethnic demand government to finalise any agreement but – during the next stage of discussions.47 it also seemed to confirm a suspicion that Tatmadaw officers initially proposed a date UPWC-MPC meetings are not representative of 1 August 2014 for final agreement,48 but of the real USDP-Tatmadaw powers behind the timetable continued to be pushed back. the scenes. As such, few ethnic leaders saw Meanwhile discussions continued through the need for an interim or separate deed seven rounds and several ceasefire drafts, which was regarded as a distraction, and even narrowing down from an initial 112 to “eight” division, that could halt progress towards and then “four points of disagreement”49 the achievement of a nationwide agreement before the conclusion on 31 March this year with all groups. Second, only certain of an NCA “draft” that needs the approval by UNFC members were invited to the Union the leaderships of the different organisations Day ceremony, raising questions over the prior to official signing, provisionally in May government’s real motives. It was also noted or June.50 Careful scrutiny is now underway that commander-in-chief Snr-Gen. Min Aung before a summit of ethnic nationality Hlaing was absent on the day. leaders. “There has been an opening, not a breakthrough,” cautioned an NCCT Third, the resumption of fighting in representative.51 Kachin, Kokang, Palaung (Ta-ang) and Shan territories during the Thein Sein As these detours exemplify, there have been government has caused great suffering many hurdles along the way, prompting and mistrust, despite the peace progress in a number of alternative approaches to other parts of the country. For this reason, try and hasten a formal ceasefire signing. achieving a lasting solution is regarded more Government officials, especially, have been important than signing documents in haste.54 keen on an official NCA in place before Fourth, since the killing of 23 allied cadets the polls. Most obviously, at his “48-party” in unprovoked Tatmadaw shelling in the meeting in January President Thein Sein Kachin state last November, reports of army spoke of bringing in a “third force group” operations and human rights abuses have in addition to the UPWC and NCCT.52 accelerated in northeast Myanmar, including Then, in the run-up to Union Day on 12 the alleged rape and brutal murder of two February, the concept of a new six-point Christian teachers in January.55 Indeed, “interim agreement” or “deed of commitment Union Day was superseded by news of heavy

8 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar casualties and thousands of refugees fleeing signatories, with the government recognizing from conflict after hostilities revived in 16 groups and the NCCT advocating another the Kokang region.56 Such negative reports six more.58 Delays could also occur if any only deepened concerns that, while the of the different sides promote amendments government is promising peace talks on the before a formal signing. Nevertheless NCA one hand, the Tatmadaw is pursuing a “war of supporters believe that three historic targets attrition” on the other. have been achieved through the draft NCA – the goal of federalism, an end to Finally, the greatest cause of ethnic doubt armed ethnic organisations who sign being is that, after many decades of struggle and considered “unlawful associations”, and numerous peace meetings, there are still political dialogue, and it is intended that no guarantees on the table over political structures will develop to broaden the scope dialogue and the shape of political reform of dialogue to include political parties and in the country. As a result, a ceasefire other representative groups. “A milestone for agreement without political commitments is the president, one step forward for Burma’s not regarded as a reliable step forward but a ethnic armed groups,” commented the Chin potential trap that could become the cover activist Cheery Zahau.59 for ever greater intrusion by outside political and economic interests into ethnic minority With an NCA draft and a general election lands. In particular, acceptance of the present scheduled for later this year, Myanmar political system could mean envelopment in could therefore be standing on the brink of a constitutional straitjacket that will make historic change. The road ahead, however, meaningful dialogue impossible. is very uncharted. Although it is recognised that the Thein Sein government has made In this respect, ethnic leaders have been important steps in national reconciliation, disconcerted by a Tatmadaw insistence ethnic leaders are very aware from previous on the realisation of “six-point peace ceasefire experiences that agreements can be principles”, including respect for the 2008 called off at any time or have caused further constitution, that nationality parties believe political division without leading to the could undermine the scope for political achievement of the autonomy and nationality negotiations in the future.57 Already it is rights that were promised at independence noted that the NLD and other electoral in 1948. Indeed one of the most fundamental parties are struggling against a constitutional issues was among the last to be addressed squeeze. Equally problematical, the during the current peace process: whether Tatmadaw has been reluctant to allow political dialogue should start “before” independent monitoring following ceasefire or “after” the agreement of a nationwide signing, and progress has been slow in ceasefire. In essence, it will be after, with only establishing transparent and guaranteed the structures of political dialogue currently security arrangements in a transitional being framed. process from military ceasefires to political dialogue and reform after a nationwide This failure means that, on present trends, ceasefire accord. the 2015 general election will go ahead without political agreement and political For the moment, such controversial issues do dialogue unlikely to begin before 2016 when not appear to have been resolved in the draft a new government is in office.60 Meanwhile, NCA. Running to seven chapters, 33 sections as fighting continues in the Kachin and and 86 points, Tatmadaw representatives Shan state borderlands, there are also have continued to insist on adherence to some ethnic parties that could be excluded their “six point” principles, and there remain from any “national” agreement. As Gen. differences of opinion over which armed Gun Maw, chief negotiator of the Kachin ethnic organisations should be represented as Independence Organisation (KIO), recently

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 9 warned, “signing the ceasefire does not mean groupings existed at the SPDC’s handover achieving peace”.61 Work on the difficult of office; all have been galvanised into new issues, he said, is only just beginning. forms and directions during the past four years of political change; and it will be the Amidst the present difficulties, therefore, it relationships and dynamics of these groups is important not to lose sight of how much and organisations that do much to determine the political landscape has changed during the country’s reform path during the next the past four years. After five decades of decade. censorship and isolation under military government, discussion on ethnic reform is no longer forbidden, ceasefires have spread USDP-Tatmadaw government to many conflict-zones, and recognition is widespread that ethnic peace and reform In a major shift in foreign perceptions, a are central to future stability and socio- great deal of credit has been given by the political progress. This is also understood by international community to the Myanmar international donors and governments that government during the past four years as have begun to invest heavily in supporting socio-political reform has begun. Even when the achievement of peace and democracy. Yet obvious crises have occurred, they tend to many dilemmas still remain. On Union Day, be regarded by the international community Thein Sein publicly stated his commitment to as exceptions that should not be allowed to federalism and peace: upset the bigger picture of national change. Yet, despite several years of increased “The government has been relentless in openness in Nay Pyi Taw, the inner workings its efforts to sign a nationwide ceasefire of the government are often as little-known agreement and has been holding all- today as they were during the SPDC era. inclusive political dialogue with all national political forces with the aim of In the absence of information, a general developing a union based on a federal narrative has developed in diplomatic and system and a genuine peace that puts media circles of there being four elements in an end to the armed conflicts that have the USDP-Tatmadaw leadership: a reformist raged for over six decades, ever since presidency, a USDP-led parliament that independence was regained.”62 shows some independence, a counterbalance of Tatmadaw hardliners, and a complexity In the coming years, the citizens of Myanmar of business interests whose activities are will hope that these bold words become true. difficult for government reformers to control. Meanwhile public relations engagement on key policy issues often appears to have been The main socio-political groupings subcontracted to civilian experts, including former political exiles, in such new bodies After decades of ethnic conflict and political advising the president as the Myanmar Peace malaise, it should not be surprising that Center and the Myanmar Development the national landscape presently reflects an Resource Institute. often conflicting picture of socio-political momentum within the country. But, in Although these changes were unprecedented general, most social and political activities at their inception, many aspects of this new fall into just four main groupings as different system of governance have worked generally parties seek to gain space within the new well. This has underpinned confidence political environment: the USDP-Tatmadaw that, under President Thein Sein, the government; pro-democracy parties; country is embarked on the road towards ethnic-based parties; and civil society or peace and democracy. By any international community-based organisations. All four standards, the modernising changes in such

10 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar conurbations as Yangon during the past Burman, dominant in many walks of life, and four years are remarkable. Last November, presently finding new form in the USDP as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon once well as such powerful economic bodies as the again praised President Thein Sein for Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings and "the momentous changes taking place in Myanmar Economic Corporation. Financial Myanmar as the country progresses on the transparency in the country remains low path of democracy and reform."63 and, during the Thein Sein government, military-backed interests have continued to Uncertainties, however, are rising as a expand their ascendancy in many economic general election approaches that is supposed spheres.65 to determine the country’s reform path for another five years. The present national The dilemma, then, is how such continuity in workings of government are hardly inclusive Tatmadaw authority will develop in the new or fit-for-purpose if sustainable progress era of multi-party democracy. At present, is to continue into the new political era. Snr-Gen. remains behind the Such concerns are felt as much within the scenes in Nay Pyi Taw and, although he USDP-Tatmadaw leaderships as the general is retired, the current leaderships of the population. Many fundamental questions USDP, Tatmadaw and National Defence and remain. After decades of military-controlled Security Council are all former or serving government, will the Tatmadaw allow polls officers who were very much his appointees. to go ahead that, as in 1990, could be won As the influence of Than Shwe recedes, by the NLD and pro-democracy parties that however, speculation is widespread over the challenge the existing status quo? Are other identities and policies of the next generation USDP-Tatmadaw leaders as committed to of Tatmadaw leaders who face the task of pro-federal change as President Thein Sein? taking constitutional government forward. How will USDP and Tatmadaw officials It is generally agreed that Thein Sein has align themselves in months ahead? And, achieved the first task of ushering in the new as President Thein Sein has himself hinted, political system, but whether he will continue can the general election take place without as leader after the general election is less clear. the maintenance of an inclusive nationwide For this reason, three other former or serving ceasefire?64 generals are often mooted as faction leaders or presidents for the future:66 Shwe Mann, The scale of the challenges cannot be under- the lower house speaker and present USDP estimated. Since the 1962 coup that brought chairman, who has shown commitment the Tatmadaw to power, the military-political to parliamentary reform; Aung Thaung, a leadership has been notably unchanging, veteran hardliner with political and economic being dominated by just two commanders- influence;67 and the present commander- in-chief, Gen. Ne Win (1962-88) and Snr- in-chief Min Aung Hlaing who has not Gen. Than Shwe (1992-2011). From time to ruled out becoming president after military time, there have been purges or shake-ups, retirement.68 most recently in 2004 when the military intelligence chief and then prime minister, Such personalities, however, provide few Gen. , was arrested and removed clues as to how the USDP-Tatmadaw from office. But for the most part, while there leaderships will position themselves in the have often been differences of opinion among coming months. Having halted parliamentary military leaders, a key element in national by-elections last year, it is generally assumed control is that they have been careful not to in opposition circles that the government let them develop into conflicts of interest. will postpone this year’s polls if instability or In the meantime, Tatmadaw personnel political loss threaten. Many citizens have and their families have developed into a been heartened by President Thein Sein’s significant sector of society that is majority recent words of commitment to federalism

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 11 and a nationwide ceasefire. But the USDP occurred in the UK over taxpayer funding is yet to promote a clear manifesto and, for Tatmadaw training courses.76 As the during the past few months, optimism has US military analyst Col. Tim Heinemann been undermined by a series of disquieting warned, those who seek to concentrate on events, including Tatmadaw offensives in the the Tatmadaw as the “center of gravity for northeast of the country, a crackdown on reform” fail to understand the need for a student and protest groups,69 and apparent very different kind of armed forces in such support for discriminatory race and religion a multi-ethnic country as Myanmar.77 In his laws promoted by Buddhist nationalists.70 view, “professionalization of the Tatmadaw alone” is likely to ensure the “continued Such ambiguities in government behaviour exploitation” of ethnic minorities, assuring are prompting concerns that the USDP- “more conflict in the future”.78 Tatmadaw leadership have already decided to face the general election on the basis In summary, four years after the SPDC of a national security agenda that could stepped down, a return to the days of the see reform momentum curtailed. “What military strongmen who ruled the country for significant reform steps have been taken half a century presently seems unlikely, but a in the last 24 months?” Aung San Suu Kyi clear vision for the next generation of USDP- recently asked.71 Similarly, the Shan political Tatmadaw leadership is yet to be revealed. analyst, Sai Wansai has wondered whether the With a general election approaching, it is contradiction between ceasefire agreements a vacuum that is unlikely to last very long. and Tatmadaw offensives is not so much Government officials continue to assure that differences between “reform” and “hard- the Tatmadaw will retreat from national line” factions as government and military politics in pace with the success and stability groups “playing good-cop, bad-cop”.72 In this of political reform. But there are no clear sense, the government is enjoying a win- procedures for such handover or transition win situation: gaining from crackdowns on and, in the coming year, there appears a very internal critics but also winning international real chance that Myanmar’s military leaders praise when it promises reform. At root, the could lose the political prop of the USDP in KIO’s Gen. Gun Maw believes that there is a the legislatures. Like Gen. Ne Win’s Burma particular challenge in achieving Tatmadaw Socialist Programme Party before it, Than reform. “Because it is an institution in itself Shwe’s USDP is expected to face a real test for and not a political party,” he said, “it cannot popular survival when put to the public vote. let go of its political power and change like a A year from now, the complexion of USDP- political party.”73 Tatmadaw-government relations could look very different. Foreign analysts are also charting some very different views on government intentions. The International Crisis Group, for example, Pro-democracy groups has argued that, since 2011, the Tatmadaw has genuinely embarked on democratic In many respects, the NLD played its most transition to cede political and economic important trump card when, in 2012, control, while the Euro-Burma Office it agreed to stand in by-elections to the warns that “any attempts to remove its role legislatures, winning 43 of the available in the running of the country could prove 45 seats. At a stroke, the NLD provided to be counter-productive”.74 In contrast, legitimacy to the 2008 constitution and 2010 the International Human Rights Clinic at general election, both of which it had rejected Harvard Law School recently concluded until then. This, in turn, paved the way for an that three Tatmadaw generals could be held amelioration in the political environment and responsible for “war crimes and crimes reduction in Western sanctions. Whether, against humanity”,75 and controversy has however, the NLD is poised to win the 2015

12 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar general election or lead the next government seats in the 1990 general election, agreeing is more problematical. On a free and fair a three-point goal of amending the 2008 vote, it is generally assumed that, as in 1990 constitution, ensuring free and fair elections, and 2012, the NLD will again win majorities and convening “genuine” political dialogue to the legislatures. But the USDP-Tatmadaw among the country’s political stakeholders are likely to be determined in trying to to revive political reform.82 But this has not control the outcome of voting; pro-Tatmadaw quietened criticisms that, for a party with a articles in the 2008 constitution will limit strong human rights reputation, the NLD has any electoral win; and, after two decades in not been sufficiently vocal in condemning the political shadows, the NLD is itself facing Tatmadaw operations in the Kachin and Shan significant problems in developing into a states nor anti-Muslim discrimination and modern national party. Aung San Suu Kyi violence in the Rakhine state.83 very much remains its figurehead leader. In their defence, NLD officials point out In response to these challenges, the NLD that, with little power in their hands, they has revived elements of its earlier strategy have been walking a political tight-rope for as a “mass movement for democracy”. Aung the past four years, seeking compromise San Suu Kyi and other party leaders have from the USDP-Tatmadaw government on continued to tour the country, while the the one hand while seeking to represent campaign for constitutional amendments popular aspirations on the other. Only with with the 88 Generation Peace and Open an NLD election victory, they argue, can the Society has become the cornerstone of its party begin negotiation on the real issues of reform strategy. But the transition from a political and ethnic reform. In the meantime, protest movement to a party potentially Aung San Suu Kyi has urged promotion of the preparing for government has not been “rule of law”.84 But, in private, NLD leaders without its difficulties. Aung San Suu Kyi has also admit to concerns that speaking up for been criticised for recommending that the minority rights could be detrimental for the Chinese-backed copper mine at Letpadaung party. Already the leader of the anti-Muslim be allowed to continue; the rift with the “969” movement, the Buddhist monk U breakaway National Democratic Force has Wirathu, has warned that an Aung San Suu not been mended; and the party has appeared Kyi presidency could bring “chaos”.85 The reluctant to support student protests for deaths of over 250 people (mostly Muslims) educational reform.79 This political hesitation and internal displacement of 140,000 civilians has raised questions as to whether a more (also predominantly Muslims) during the radical reform movement could emerge if the past three years are a stark reminder of NLD does not succeed in its parliamentary the dangers of communal violence.86 In goals. A frequent complaint is that party consequence, after 25 years of hardship and leaders have become “isolated” from civil struggle, the NLD is having to consider society.80 According to the former student whether taking a tough public stand on these activist Min Zin, “Many Burmese worry issues could cost the party victory at the polls. that the current mainstream opposition, represented mainly by the NLD, is failing to A difficult time lies ahead for the NLD. capture broader public discontent.”81 Victory could be tantalisingly close, but there have been too many disappointments Perhaps, then, the most ominous challenge in the past for naïve optimism now. Given is a perception that party leaders have the uncertainties in the political landscape, become too cautious about speaking up the NLD took a long time before preparing for the rights of ethnic minority peoples. to commit to the 2015 polls, preferring to In recent months, the NLD has resumed concentrate on the push for constitutional relations with the eight-party United amendments – and a boycott is still not ruled Nationalities Alliance (UNA) that won out if constitutional change is not certain.87

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 13 But party leaders always knew that another Nationalities Brotherhood Federation boycott will be a high-risk strategy that its (NBF) that consists mostly of ethnic parties opponents would want it to take. In effect, the that won seats in the 2010 polls and are party would find itself back in the political planning an additional Federal Union wilderness while national transition goes on Party in this year’s election; and a smaller without it. Depending on reform progress, Federal Democratic Alliance that includes the NLD now intends to stand in the polls the National Democratic Force and other with the goal of reforming the constitution, Burman-majority parties as well as two ethnic but the party will need great skill and vision minority parties. to drive political momentum forward in the coming months. As Aung San Suu Kyi said on The situation, however, is not set in stone, Independence Day this year, the NLD needs and there have been frequent re-alignments, “to grow wiser in order to implement peace founding of new parties, and differences of and development”, but achieving this, she opinion in reform detail. UNA members, warned, will be “a harder task than fighting”.88 for example, want to see an eight state demarcation in a new federal system (i.e. Burman, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah Ethnic-based groups [Karenni], Mon, Rakhine and Shan), while the NBF calls for a federal system of 14 states, At present, the ethnic political landscape using the territorial delineations of the 1974 is at its most potent and unpredictable in and 2008 constitutions. More controversially, many decades. It is a time of upheaval for the Rakhine National Party, which is a political and ethnic movements that can be merger of two Arakan parties, has become compared with previous eras of national the leading voice in promoting the Buddhist transition during 1948-53, 1962-68 and cause in the Rakhine state and strongly 1988-93. Over 100 electoral or armed ethnic lobbied against citizenship rights for Muslims groups presently exist,89 and there has been a who identify themselves as Rohingya.90 But, significant rise in community-based activism. in general, most electoral parties are focusing Meetings have accelerated between different on the need for a federal or “union” political groups and parties, and there is generally a system as opposed to the centralised or common focus on the goals of federalism “unitary” constitution that exists at present. and nationwide peace. But for the moment, “We believe in federalism, we fought for it, organisational activities can largely be we've been to jail for it,” said Khun Tun Oo, divided between parliamentary and peace UNA spokesperson and chairman of the Shan talk avenues for promoting constitutional Nationalities League for Democracy.91 reform, and this is an unhelpful division that nationality leaders believe is holding back Importantly, too, support for pro-federal political progress. Underpinning this concern reform has notably increased during the life is the view that ethnic minority peoples, who of Myanmar’s new parliament. Presently, constitute an estimated third of Myanmar’s twenty nationality groups are represented population, missed out during previous in one form or another on the political eras of political transition, and there is a map, whether by states, “self-administered” determination that this should not happen territories or reserved electoral seats.92 But again. with the USDP-Tatmadaw dominant in the legislatures, disquiet has been growing at Among electoral parties, three main the lack of empowerment for local peoples coalitions have developed during the at both the national and state/region levels past four years: the eight-party United of government. There has, for example, Nationalities Alliance of parties from the been little progress on language rights for 1990 general election that boycotted the 2010 non-Burman peoples;93 unpopular land polls and is close to the NLD; the 15-party laws were written into place in 2012 that

14 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar undermine rather than protect the rights to the parliamentary era after independence of local citizens;94 and a controversial and have built up extensive administrative Population and Housing Census was carried systems in the borderlands. Ethnic politics out, in conjunction with the UNFPA and mostly developed in two blocks during the international donor support, on the flawed long years of struggle: the federal-seeking basis of 135 “national races”, a confusing National Democratic Front, formed in designation that is widely rejected.95 Of 1976, and a “people’s alliance” of forces, particular concern, even while conflict spearheaded by the United Wa State Army, continues in the borderlands, a draft National which broke away from the Communist Party Land Use Policy has been developed that of Burma in 1989.100 does not protect the rights of ethnic minority peoples nor prevent land-grabbing and In a historic change in strategy, a majority environmental destruction.96 of members in both groups agreed to ceasefires with the government during the In response, government ministries SLORC-SPDC era, and a number attended have begun to show willingness to allow the National Convention that drew up consultation on such issues as land rights, the 2008 constitution. Ceasefire delegates, drug reform and education legislation. But however, claimed that their demands were it remains uncertain how much officials marginalised or ignored.101 Meanwhile will listen, and this is spurring nationality the country’s oldest nationality force, the parties to campaign for more radical reform. KNU, never agreed a truce with the military Having boycotted the 2010 polls, in February government, preferring to ally with the the UNA decided to contest this year’s National Coalition Government Union general election in order to change the 2008 of Burma and other democracy activists constitution that members “do not like” or in exile. Ethnic distrust then deepened in “t r u s t ”. 97 “We compete in this election with 2009 when the SPDC ordered all ceasefire the objective of being able to amend the groups to transform into the newly-created constitution,” said the Mon National Party BGFs under Tatmadaw control. This was central executive member Nai Kyaw Win.98 followed by a military offensive, headed by Even so, some UNA members still consider a the then Lt-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing who boycott possible if the political environment subsequently became commander-in-chief, worsens during the coming months.99 to support the imposition of a BGF on the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance A similar focus on pro-federal solutions Army (MNDAA) in the Kokang region.102 exists among armed ethnic groups. At Such tactics only exacerbated the situation. present, there are over twenty armed The BGF strategy was widely regarded as opposition organisations in the borderlands, a “divide and rule” starting-point in the including non-ceasefire and ceasefire groups. SPDC’s campaign to ensure USDP-Tatmadaw In addition, there are 23 Border Guard dominance in the regime change about Force (BGF) battalions, some of which are to come, and the major ceasefire groups former ceasefire groups, as well as over 50 continued to refuse to transform. In essence, other government-backed militia, several accepting BGF status would have weakened of which are headed by elected members groups militarily without addressing their of the legislatures representing the USDP. political goals. Against this militarised backdrop, veteran armed opposition organisations, such as Expectations, therefore, were very low when the Kachin Independence Organisation, President Thein Sein assumed office in March Karen National Union and Shan State Army, 2011. As a result, it is important to stress continue to be widely regarded in many that Thein Sein’s personal commitment has communities as the “mother parties” of their been a highly critical element in supporting nationality movements. Several date back a national mood change during the past four

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 15 years and hopes that negotiated solutions ring in many communities. The question can be found. Promising an end to fighting, as to why this has been allowed to happen Thein Sein declared in London in July during a time that peace was being promoted 2013, “We are aiming for nothing less than elsewhere in the country is one that needs a transition from half a century of military serious answers. Equally important, even rule and authoritarianism to democracy.”103 in other areas of Myanmar where ceasefires Buoyed by such words, new ceasefires have have been sustained, the long-needed tasks spread since 2011 to the majority of armed of community rebuilding have scarcely ethnic groups; aid programmes have reached begun. Many peoples continue to struggle in to more conflict-zones with the backing of conditions of great poverty and hardship in international donors; and a new culture of the ethnic borderlands, with a steady flow of face-to-face meetings has taken root. migrants still seeking new lives abroad.

During the past year, however, peace Second, and related to this, the events of momentum has appeared to flag and, the past four years have reinforced the despite talks proceeding through various perception that the primary interest of the ceasefire drafts to a provisional “nationwide USDP-Tatmadaw elite, who are mostly ceasefire agreement”, no political conclusions ethnic Burmans, is more about the land and have been reached that are binding on the natural resource potential of the minority country’s constitutional future. Instead, a borderlands – not the rights of the local mutual blame game has surfaced that will peoples. Initially, President Thein Sein have serious consequences if left unresolved. gained great credit for his suspension of the On the government side, ethnic opposition -backed Myitsone dam in the Kachin groups are accused of inconsistency and state for the life of the current government. internal divisions.104 On the opposition side, But even before political agreements have there is a more basic issue of lack of trust, and been reached, a surge in land-grabbing and grievances have deepened on a number of key major projects is now underway around the issues during the past four years. With the borderlands that are attracting considerable 31 March signing of a draft NCA, optimism international attention and investment. has revived. But after decades of conflict, These include the oil and gas pipelines confidence-building will clearly be a long- from the Rakhine state through the Shan term task. state to China, the Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Tanintharyi region and Three main areas of grievance exist: social, Kyaukphyu SEZ in the Rakhine state, as well economic and political. First, the breakdown as a host of agricultural, hydro-electric and of ceasefires and resumption of fighting in other natural resource projects.105 Kachin, Shan, Palaung and Kokang regions in northeast Myanmar during the Thein As Myanmar reforms, economic progress Sein presidency have been a major setback that benefits the people is clearly welcomed. that has caused widespread resentment. Ethnic armed groups also raise taxes from If the Tatmadaw thought it could win a unregulated businesses such as logging, quick military victory, the plan has badly and there is particular controversy over the backfired. The Kachin and northern Shan narcotics trade, one of the world’s largest, states were regarded as among the most with different sides exchanging allegations successful ceasefire areas under the SLORC- over culpability for trafficking that includes SPDC government and were the territory pro-government groups.106 But, in general, from which broader peace and civil society the impression is widespread that the most initiatives emerged during the 1990s. Today, important economic initiatives during the with heavy loss of life, renewed human rights past few years have been driven by business abuses and over 150,000 new refugees and interests linked to the families of government IDPs, the pledges of peace have a very hollow and Tatmadaw leaders. In Myanmar today,

16 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar the Defence Services control the country’s so much reform-focused as delaying actions largest business conglomerates and most to support Tatmadaw entrenchment in the lucrative economic sectors.107 For this reason, new political era. Having been marginalised opinion has deepened that the government’s during previous times of political transition, “military first” policies in the northeast of the ethnic parties are struggling hard to prevent country are very often to provide security to this happening again. It is vital that reform business projects, including jade, agriculture accords promote justice and cooperation, not and energy development, in which USDP- new divisions and future discord. Tatmadaw leaders have a financial interest. Said one Kachin business leader, “the tree Thus while attention focuses on the is standing in our garden, but we are not technicalities of a “nationwide ceasefire allowed to eat the fruit.”108 agreement”, the need is now urgent to integrate the processes of reform dialogue Finally, as social and economic grievances between the different parliamentary and continue, sentiment has strengthened peace procedures. The outcomes of both will among ethnic leaders from all backgrounds determine Myanmar’s political destiny. But during the past four years – whether armed, as one ethnic representative in the UWPC- electoral or community-based – that only UNFC talks recently warned, “they are an agreement that guarantees inclusive already dividing up the pie, and by the time political reform for all nationality peoples we have finalised our political dialogue, it will can bring lasting peace and justice to the already be finished”.109 country. In the coming months, it is hoped that the final agreement of a nationwide ceasefire will mark an important first step, Civil society but real political dialogue has yet to begin and many controversies lie ahead. For One of the most notable aspects of socio- example, although talk of federalism is political transition during the past four now permissible, it is difficult to envisage years is the accelerating role of civil society Tatmadaw leaders agreeing to ethnic and community-based organisations. demands for a “federal army” at any time Little research has been conducted into the in the near future. Similarly, as fighting political impact of this issue. But evidence continues in northeast Myanmar, there are suggests that, while many groups want to still communities, notably in the Kokang keep a distance from political roles, they region, who appear excluded from any also believe that their activities are a key immediate prospect of peace. Nevertheless, element in supporting peace and political despite the obvious difficulties, there is reform.110 In consequence, civil society still a belief among leaders from all ethnic organisations (CSOs) have become among backgrounds that, if negotiations can take the most dynamic actors in addressing social place in the spirit of equality in the Panglong and humanitarian needs and reflecting the agreement back in 1947, solutions will popular concerns of the day. eventually be achieved. Never, it would seem, has there been a more opportune moment for As a multi-cultural land, Myanmar’s troubled national reconciliation. history has always reflected aspects of the socio-political paradigm: “weak state, strong There is, however, a growing warning. The societies”.111 It was never the case that civil more the present political system is imposed society went away under military rule; rather, without reform agreement, the more ethnic it was tightly controlled and repressed. leaders fear that their peoples will be left After independence, much community behind. Ceasefires have already existed for activism survived in cultural and faith- over two decades, so suspicions are deepening based groups and, in an anomaly during the that different government activities are not Ne Win era, faith-based groups were often

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 17 allowed to take part in social and welfare a statement that, due to the absence of laws activities, provided that they remained under protecting ethnic minority rights among evangelical auspices. Following the ceasefires others, this is not the time for an investment of the SLORC-SPDC era, local NGOs agreement with the European Union;117 123 were allowed to form and international CSOs called for the government to investigate NGOs to return. From a slow beginning, the disappearance of a Kachin woman, this saw a steady expansion in civil society Sumlut Roi Ja, at the hands of soldiers;118 54 activism that saw popular expression in the CSOs and nationality parties condemned the “” protests in 2007 and Tatmadaw shelling of the KIO training school the humanitarian response to the tragedy of in which 23 ethnic army cadets died;119 and the following year. Security more than 40 CSOs called for an investigation pressures and government regulation, into the death of the journalist Aung Naing however, remained problematical, and many Kyaw (Par Gyi) in Tatmadaw custody in Mon community networks and activists preferred state.120 to stay in low-profile. In summary, Myanmar’s political path may It was thus only after the Thein Sein be uncertain, but civil society momentum government took office that many civil has become a key factor in driving national society organisations began to proliferate change forward and is an important signpost so obviously and play a public role, and this for the future. As the 2013 Ramon Magsaysay has become an integral part of the reform Award winner Lahpai Seng Raw recently said: environment. Given their diversity, it is “Peace requires the people. It is a social state difficult to generalise about their goals and and cannot be developed by military men.”121 intentions across a broad social and political spectrum. But any understanding of the country today means engagement with their Conclusion interests, and this is a significant change in the political landscape that both domestic Myanmar is at a critical stage in political and international leaders have come to transition, and the events of the next recognise. few months will have defining impact in establishing the course of peace and political In the main, CSOs are primarily engaged in reform in the 21st century. There can be no social and welfare affairs, such as the nine- doubt that important steps in socio-political party Joint Strategy Team in the Kachin reform have started during the past few state. But, as political transition continues, years and, as long as a spirit of dialogue and many are also lobbying for needed reforms. reconciliation continues, a progressive future In recent months, for example, more than 50 will be achievable. There is, however, a long CSOs held a meeting with the Union Election way to go, and warning signs are appearing as Commission to agree a code of monitoring a general election approaches towards the end conduct for the general election;112 31 CSOs of this year. Modernising change is bringing met to express concern about the draft new social challenges, inclusive peace is yet to national land use policy;113 180 CSOs called be established, and political tensions are once on parliament to drop proposed race and again rising over the real path of reform in religion bills that they believe could “destroy the country. the stability” of society;114 25 CSOs met with the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team This uncertain picture of reform also to promote transitional justice and a truth presents challenges to the international commission;115 over 61,000 people and 131 community. International praise was swift CSOs and political parties signed a petition with the agreement of a draft nationwide demanding a halt to dam constructions on ceasefire accord in March.122 But as the UN the Salween river;116 over 200 CSOs signed High Commissioner for Human Rights

18 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein recently warned, Endnotes transition in Myanmar has been regarded 1. In 1989 the then military government changed as “a story of promise and hope” but now the official name from Burma to Myanmar. They are “seems headed in the wrong direction and alternative forms in the , but their use 123 has become a politicised issue. Myanmar is mostly used needs urgently to get back on track”. The within the country and in international diplomacy, but difficulty is that the international community, it is not always used in the English language abroad. For too, faces challenges in adapting to the new consistency, Myanmar will be used in this report. This is not meant as a political statement. For a discussion political environment. For two decades, of the difficulties in using “ethnic” or “nationality” Western governments and donors mostly terms in the country, see, “Ethnicity without Meaning, Data without Context: The 2014 Census, Identity and had a very simple plan to support reform: Citizenship in Burma/Myanmar”, TNI-BCN Burma boycott and sanctions. Since 2011, however, Policy Briefing Nr 13, February 2014. they have rapidly changed to new policies 2. “Wife: signs of torture on body of Myanmar of engagement, with a diversity of aid and reporter”, Associated Press, 6 November 2014. development programmes. But this does not 3. Hnin Yadana Zaw & Nyein Nyein, “Burma Army make playing an effective role any easier, Says Deadly Shelling of Rebels Was ‘Unintentional’”, The as experiences in other conflict-divided Irrawaddy, 20 November 2014; “Ethnic Youths Protest at MPC over Army Attack on KIO”, Khonumthung countries have shown. News, 26 November 2014.

In the final analysis, then, it must and will 4. Esther Htusan, “As Fears Rise in Burma, Rohingya Exodus Grows”, Associated Press, 17 be Myanmar’s peoples who determine their November 2014. political future. Selective evidence can 5. “Protests in Rangoon After Letpadaung be chosen to suggest some very different Shooting”, The Irrawaddy, 26 December 2014; Amnesty pictures of the country’s present condition. International, “Open for Business?: Corporate Crime The difficulty is that clear evidence is lacking and Abuses at Myanmar Copper Mine”, February 2015. of sustainable peace achievement and 6. See e.g., Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Constitution change reform agreement at this critical time, and delay creates confusion, concern”, Myanmar Times, 21 November 2014; Gabrielle Paluch, “Myanmar Myanmar’s troubled history does not provide Enters Election Year With Powerful Military Largely hopeful evidence for a forward-looking Unchanged”, Voice of America, 30 December 2014; Seamus Martov, “Jade Trade Bedevils Burma’s narrative that all sides can support and relate Transparency Aspirations”, The Irrawaddy, 16 February to. If, however, democratic transition and 2015; Global Witness, "Guns, Cronies and Crops: How conflict transformation are to succeed, this Military, Political and Business Cronies Have Conspired to Grab Land in Myanmar", March 2015. is precisely the challenge that the country’s leaders must address in the coming months. 7. See e.g., Jean-Marie Guehenno and Richard Horsey, “Despite the headlines, progress in Myanmar The prospect of a nationwide ceasefire isn’t slipping away”, Reuters, 19 November 2014; Robert agreement, political dialogue, constitutional Taylor, “The Armed Forces in Myanmar Politics : a amendments and a general election in the Terminating Role?”, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Trends in Southeast Asia, No.2, 2015. coming months all provide the opportunity for different parties to work constructively 8. Colin Hinshelwood, “International voices decry police crackdown on students”, DVB, 9 March 2015. together, but state failure and instability will continue if they are used to pursue conflict 9. Guy Dinmore & Kayleigh Long, “Refugees pour across border into China”, Myanmar Times, 20 February and self-interest by new means. Political 2015; Naw Noreen, “President’s Office denies Burmese solutions cannot be imposed by any party. army killed civilians in Laogai”, DVB, 23 February 2015; They can only be built by the participation UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin Myanmar Issue 2, 1-28 February, 2015; Bertil Lintner, “Kokang: The and representation of all the peoples of backstory”, The Irrawaddy, 10 March 2015. Myanmar. 10. “Ethnic Politics in Burma: the Time for Solutions”, TNI–BCN Burma Policy Briefing Nr 5, February 2011.

11. “President U Thein Sein meets armed ethnic groups, political parties”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 February 2015.

12. See e.g., UN OCHA, “Myanmar: A Call for

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 19 Humanitarian Aid: January-December 2015”, 6 paths to democracy”, Myanmar Times, 24 October February 2015; The Border Consortium (TBC), 2014; David Steinberg, “Myanmar grapples with “Protection and Security Concerns in South East federalism”, Nikkei Asian Review, 26 February 2015. Burma”, November 2014. UNOCHA counted 100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Kachin and 23. Sai Wansai, “Amendment or rewriting: 51 years northern Shan states and 140,000 (mostly Muslims) in on Burma still overwhelmed by constitutional crisis”, the Rakhine state, while TBC has calculated 400,000 S.H.A.N., 13 August 2013. IDPs – mostly Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan – in the southeast of the country. There are also around 120,000 24. Lemahieu, “Pre-election deadlock in Myanmar”. refugees in camps in Thailand, while over 70,000 civilians were displaced as IDPs or refugees fleeing 25. “Suu Kyi Insists on Four-Way Talks to End conflict in the Kokang region along the China border Myanmar Political Impasse”, RFA, 31 October 2014. during February-March this year. 26. “Myanmar’s Thein Sein Pushes Politicians to Sign 13. “Myanmar nullifies temporary ID cards after Cease-Fire Deal”, RFA, 1 December 2014. nationalist protest”, AFP, 11 February 2015; Andrew 27. Htet Naing Zaw, “Meeting of Burma’s Big Political Marshall, “In Rohingya camp, tensions mount over Players Yields Little”, The Irrawaddy, 31 October 2014. Myanmar plan to revoke ID cards”, Reuters, 17 February 2015. 28. Win Ko Ko Latt & Aung Thura Tun, “Parliament approves six-way talks for political reform process”, 14. “Full text of the monthly radio message by , 26 November 2014. The ethnic President U Thein Sein”, Global New Light of Myanmar, representative was later agreed to be the Rakhine 1 January 2015. National Party leader Dr Aye Maung.

15. Kyaw Phyo Tha, “Suu Kyi Says NLD Not Yet 29. Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Constitution bill proposes Committed to 2015 Election”, The Irrawaddy, 30 changes to 59(f) and 436”, Myanmar Times, 30 January December 2014; Paul Mooney, “Myanmar's Suu Kyi 2015. says reforms stalled, West too optimistic”, Reuters, 5 November 2014; Andrew R.C. Marshall & Simon Webb, 30. May Sitt Paing, “After Meeting of 48, Suu Kyi “Suu Kyi says boycott of Myanmar election an option”, Urges Narrowed Dialogue”, The Irrawaddy, 13 January Reuters, 3 April 2015. 2015; Nobel Zaw & Lawi Weng, “Suu Kyi, Ethnic Alliance Agree to Push 3-Point Agenda”, The Irrawaddy, 16. “NCCT proposes additional observers to ceasefire 19 January 2015; Shwe Aung, “Shwe Mann weighs in on talks”, Eleven Myanmar, 26 December 2014; Lawi Weng, constitutional reform”, DVB, 23 January 2015. “Rebels shun Union Day pledge ‘without concrete points’: ethnic leader”, The Irrawaddy, 13 February 31. May Wong, “Myanmar not ready for reduced 2015. military role in Parliament: Army chief”, Channel NewsAsia, 20 January 2015. 17. See speech of Prime Minister Gen. Khin Nyunt, “We believe we must give shape for emergence of 32. Soe Than Lin & Win Ko Ko Latt, “Opposing six- democratic State that corresponds with our country and party talks ‘violates the law,’ says Thura U Shwe Mann”, our people”, New Light of Myanmar, 31 August 2003. Mizzima News, 1 February 2015.

18. For analyses of government change, see e.g., 33. “President rejects constitutional reform dialogue”, International Crisis Group (ICG), “Myanmar’s Military: DVB, 20 January 2015. Back to the Barracks?”, Asia Briefing No.143, 22 April 2014; Herve Lemahieu, “Pre-election deadlock in 34. Yen Snaing, “Week of protests planned against Myanmar”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, suffrage for white card holders”, The Irrawaddy, 5 5 November 2014; Taylor, “The Armed Forces in February 2015; Jared Farrie, “Myanmar nationalists Myanmar Politics”. threaten protests over Rohingya vote change”, Reuters, 6 February 2015. 19. Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Burma’s Democracy: Just What the Generals Ordered”, The Irrawaddy, 1 January 2015. 35. See e.g., ICG, “The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar”, Asia Report 20. For TNI analyses on economic issues, see, No. 251, 1 October 2013; ICG, “Myanmar: The Politics John Buchanan, Tom Kramer and Kevin Woods, of Rakhine State”, Asia Report No. 261, 22 October “Developing Disparity: Regional Investment in Burma’s 2014; Fortify Rights, “Policies of Persecution: Ending Borderlands”, TNI-BCN, Amsterdam, 2013; TNI, Abusive State Policies Against Rohingya Muslims in “Linking Women and Land in Myanmar: Recognising Myanmar”, February 2014. Gender in the National Land Use Policy”, February 2015; TNI, “The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive 36. Snaing, “Week of protests planned”. The Land Policymaking in Myanmar: A Response to the background is complex. Protestors among Rakhine Draft National Land Use Policy”, February 2015. communities, who are mostly Buddhists, also believed that, as in the 2010 general election, the USDP wanted 21. See e.g., Asia Foundation and Myanmar to give voting rights to minority Muslims in return Development Resource Institute, “State and Region for support at the polls. See e.g., Hanna Hindstrom, Governments in Myanmar”, September 2013. “Burma’s Favorite Scapegoat”, Foreign Policy, 26 February 2015. 22. See e.g.; Richard Horsey, "Shifting to a Proportional Representation Electoral System in 37. Jared Ferrie, “Myanmar military wins rare praise Myanmar?”, SSRC Conflict Prevention and Peace in war with ethnic Chinese rebels”, Reuters, 26 February Forum, 31 January 2013; Htoo Thant, “MPs mull eight 2015.

20 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 38. Saga Wah, “Senior General Min Aung Hlaing 53. For full text, see, Global New Light of Myanmar, visits injured personnel and IDPs from Laukkai area”, 13 February 2015. The ethnic signatories were the Myawady News, 16 February 2015; Dateline Discussion, KNU and two breakaway groups from the KNU, “A Guerrilla War is Still Taking Place in Laukkai”, The the KNU/KNLA Peace Council and Democratic Irrawaddy, 23 February 2015. Karen Benevolent Army, and the RCSS/SSA-South. The background was controversial, and there were 39. “Students are ‘puppets’, says minister”, DVB, 9 uncertainties over who was really promoting the idea, February 2015. with both the MPC and Euro-Burma Office mentioned. See e.g., Sai Wansai, “Interim Solution: From 40. Ibid. Comprehensive Single Text Negotiation to Peace Pledge Agreement?”, S.H.A.N., 7 February 2015. Subsequently, 41. Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Police Baton- other KNU leaders rejected the deed signing: Naw Charge Student Protesters”, 11 March 2015. Noreen, “KNU rejects Union Day commitment”, DVB, 42. Jonah Fisher, “Thein Sein: to 17 February 2015. continue key transition role”, 20 March 2015; Kyaw 54. Sai Wansai, “Burma Peace Process: Hardened Phyo Tha, “In Thein Sein’s BBC interview, the apology military stance puts peace talks in jeopardy”, S.H.A.N., that never was”, The Irrawaddy, 24 March 2015. 7 October 2014. 43. Shwe Aung, “Burmese MPs react differently to 55. See e.g., Saw Yan Naing, “Attack on KIA a cancellation of by-elections”, DVB, 8 September 2014. Setback for Nationwide Ceasefire, Negotiators Say”, The 44. The previous rounds were the 1963-64 “peace Irrawaddy, 27 November 2014; Ye Mon, “Tatmadaw parley” under Gen. Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to issues warning against murder allegations”, The Socialism” military government and the post-1989 Myanmar Times, 2 February 2015. The cadets came ceasefires under the SLORC-SPDC. For earlier peace from three UNFC members, the Arakan Army, Chin talks, see e.g., Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the National Front and Ta-ang National Liberation Army, Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1999). and the All Burma Students Democratic Front.

45. For different accounts of peace events, see 56. Echo Hui, “Tens of thousands flee war, airstrikes e.g., Buchanan, Kramer and Woods, “Developing in Kokang region”, DVB, 12 February 2015. See also, Disparity”; Martin Smith, “Ethnic Politics in a Time n.9. of Change”, in David Steinberg (ed.), Myanmar: The 57. See e.g., Nyein Nyein, “Shan, Wa and Mongla Dynamics of an Evolving Polity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Leaders Meet Burmese President and Army Chief”, Publishers, 2015), pp.135-57, and Ashley South, in The Irrawaddy, 27 August 2014. The six points “call on Ibid., “Governance and Political Legitimacy in the ethnic groups to have a ‘genuine wish’ for peace, to keep Peace Process”, pp.159-90; MPSI, “Lessons learned promises they make in the peace process, to refrain from MPSI’s work supporting the peace process in from exploiting peace agreements, to avoid burdening Myanmar”, Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), the people, to follow the rule of law, and to respect the March 2014; Burma News International, Deciphering 2008 Constitution”. Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2014 (Chiang Mai: BNI, 2014); and for the MPC, http://www. 58. Joshua Carroll, “Analyst dismisses Myanmar’s myanmarpeace.org draft cease-fire deal“, Anadolu Agency, 3 April 2015; “UPWC and NCCT leaders talk about NCA final draft”, 46. For an example of UNFC differences, see e.g., Aye Independent Mon News Agency, 2 April 2015. Nai, “UNFC opens 2 top positions for KNU”, DVB, 3 September 2014. 59. Cheery Zahau, “A milestone for the president, one step forward for Burma’s ethnic armed groups”, The 47. The UPWC team should consist of nine Irrawaddy, 2 April 2015. members: three each from the Tatmadaw, parliament and government; “New Committee Formed to Draft 60. This concern was mentioned to TNI by a number Myanmar Nationwide Cease-Fire Pact”, RFA, 10 March of ethnic nationality and NCCT leaders in September 2014. 2014.

48. “Military calls for ceasefire deal to be signed by 61. Aung Zaw, “‘Signing the Ceasefire Does Not August 1”, Eleven Myanmar, 11 March 2014. Mean Achieving Peace’", The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2015.

49. Shwe Aung. “Four ceasefire points left to resolve, 62. “Thein Sein marks Union Day with call for says NCCT delegate”, DVB, 26 March 2015. The federalism”, DVB, 12 February 2015. critical areas were reported as: military affairs; political dialogue; the government’s request to appoint its 63. UN, “Readout of the Secretary-General’s meeting own ethnic representatives for political dialogue; and with H.E. U Thein Sein, President of the Republic of transitional arrangements during political dialogue. the Union of Myanmar”, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 13 November 2014. 50. Aung Hla Tun, "Myanmar government, rebels sign draft nationwide ceasefire accord", Reuters, 31 64. Yen Snaing, “President Criticized After Saying March 2015. Ceasefire Necessary for Successful Elections”, The Irrawaddy, 2 October 2014. 51. Interview, 2 April 2015. 65. See e.g., Global Witness, “The Shell Starts to 52. “Myanmar’s Thein Sein Pushes Politicians to Sign Crack: Real Owners of Myanmar's Oil and Gas Blocks Cease-Fire Deal”, RFA, 12 January 2015. Come Forward”, 9 October 2014; Aung Zaw, “Putting

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 21 a New Face on Myanmar’s Military”, The Irrawaddy, 12 80. See e.g., Joseph J. Schatz, “Burma’s Aung San Suu July 2013; Paul Vrieze, “Burma Public Sector Ranked Kyi, a human rights icon, is criticized on anti-Muslim Among Most Corrupt in Asia”, The Irrawaddy, 3 violence”, Washington Post, 23 December 2013. December 2014. See also, n.5 and n.6. 81. Min Zin, “A New Generation Takes to the Streets 66. See e.g., Larry Jagan, “How Do You Say ‘Gridlock’ in Burma”, Foreign Policy, 9 February 2015; see also, in Burmese?”, Foreign Policy, 10 November 2014; Tun Min Zin, “Can Burma's Civil Society Find Its Voice Tun Win, “Where is the USDP leading the country?”, Again?”, Foreign Policy, 26 November 2014. Eleven Myanmar, 16 December 2014; Interview by Tin Zar Aung, “Author Bertil Lintner: 'In Myanmar they 82. Nobel Zaw & Lawi Weng, “Suu Kyi, Ethnic are putting the cart before the horse'”, Mizzima News, 5 alliance agree to push 3-point agenda”, The Irrawaddy, January 2015. 19 January 2015.

67. Although not regarded a presidential candidate, 83. See e.g., Schatz, “Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi”; Eric Aung Thaung has long been a key government Randolph, “Aung San Suu Kyi has abandoned us, say actor and was blacklisted by the USA last year for Burmese rebels being bombed into submission”, The “perpetuating violence, oppression, and corruption”. Independent, 29 January 2013; Tim Hume, “Aung San See, Joel Schectman, “New blacklisting shows Myanmar Suu Kyi's 'silence' on the Rohingya: Has 'The Lady' lost business perilous”, Wall Street Journal, 31 October 2014. her voice?”, CNN, 1 June 2014.

68. Wong, “Myanmar not ready for reduced military 84. Shibani Mahtani, “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi: Strong role in Parliament”; Wai Phyo, “Exclusive interview Legal System Can Boost Economy”, Wall Street Journal, with the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services Min 15 February 2015. Aung Hlaing”, Eleven Myanmar, 16 February 2015. 85. Sanay Lin & Simon Roughneen, “A Suu Kyi 69. According to the Assistance Association for Presidency Would Bring ‘Chaos,’ Says Firebrand Monk”, Political Prisoners, in mid-February there were 213 The Irrawaddy, 28 November 2013. activists awaiting trial and 159 political prisoners. See also n.8. 86. See n.35.

70. Amnesty International & International 87. See n.15. Commission of Jurists, “Myanmar: Parliament must reject discriminatory ‘race and religion’ laws”, 3 March 88. Thanoe Wai, “Suu Kyi calls for NLD to ‘grow 2015. wiser’”, DVB, 5 January 2015.

71. Paul Mooney, “Myanmar's Suu Kyi says reforms 89. See e.g., charts in, Smith, “Ethnic Politics in a stalled, West too optimistic”, Reuters, 5 November 2014. Time of Change”.

72. Wansai, “Burma Peace Process: Hardened 90. “Arakan alliance”, DVB, 9 March 2014; Kay Zue, military stance”. “Rakhine National Party says it will break off relations with UN”, Mizzima News, 14 January 2015. 73. Interview, 11 September 2014. While optimistic that change will eventually come, Gun Maw believed 91. Portia Larlee, “We believe in federalism, we that Tatmadaw leaders will seek to maintain control of fought for it, we've been to jail for it”, Mizzima News, 30 national government for at least two more years after October 2014. the polls. 92. In addition to the seven ethnic states (Chin, 74. ICG, “Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine and Shan) for Barracks?”; Euro-Burma Office, Political Monitor, No.1, the largest nationalities delineated under the 1974 3–9 January 2015, p.5. constitution, under the 2008 constitution there are also “self-administered” territories for the Danu, Kokang, 75. International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Palaung, Pa-O and Wa in the Shan state and Naga in Law School, “Legal Memorandum: War Crimes and the , as well as reserved seats for certain Crimes against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar”, “national races”, according to population, that constitute November 2014. unrepresented minorities in different states and regions; the list and numbers are Burman (5), Karen (5), Chin 76. Ben Riley-Smith, “Burmese Army gets £130,000 (3), Shan (3), Pa-O (2), Rakhine (2), Lisu (2), Akha, of taxpayer-funded training despite using child Intha, Kachin, Kayan, Lahu, Mon, Rawang (1). soldiers”, Daily Telegraph, 15 February 2015. 93. See e.g., Hein Ko Soe, “Election commission tells 77. Tim Heinemann, “Misunderstanding Myanmar's UNA to stay out of student protest”, Mizzima News, military”, Asia Times, 11 February 2015. 24 February 2015; Samantha Michaels, “What Burma’s Rebel Educators Want From School Reform”, The 78. Ibid. Irrawaddy, 4 September 2014.

79. See e.g., Andrew Buncombe, “Aung San Suu Kyi 94. See e.g., TNI, “The Challenge of Democratic and urges support for controversial Chinese-backed copper Inclusive Land Policymaking”. mine”, The Independent, 13 March 2013; Aye Nai, “NLD ‘not invited’ to political conference”, DVB, 16 September 95. See e.g., TNI-BCN, “Ethnicity without Meaning”; 2014; Yu Wai, “Students rap NLD threat of legal action ICG, “Myanmar conflict alert: A risky census”, 12 against education activist”, Mizzima News, 3 February February 2014. 2015.

22 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 96. TNI, “The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive 115. Saw Yan Naing, “Civil Society Pushes for Land Policymaking”, pp.28-29. Transitional Justice”, The Irrawaddy, 24 November 2014.

97. “UNA members to contest 2015 elections”, 116. Yen Snaing, “Civil Society Organizations Call IMNA, 23 February 2015. for Halt to Salween Dam Projects”, The Irrawaddy, 19 January 2015. 98. Ibid. 117. http://www.tni.org/declaration/cso-statement- 99. Interview with UNA representative, 3 April 2015. myanmar-investment-treaties

100. For a background history, see e.g., Smith, “Burma; 118. “123 Organizations Demand Investigation on Insurgency”, passim. Disappearance While in Army Custody”, Kachinland News, 28 October 2014. 101. See e.g., Tom Kramer, “Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of the Ceasefire Agreements in Burma”, 119. Yen Snaing, “NGOs, political parties condemn TNI-BCN, July 2009. This view has been expressed to army shelling of KIA training school”, The Irrawaddy, 4 TNI by a number of ethnic delegates who attended the December 2014. National Convention. 120. Lun Min Mang, “CSOs condemn journalist 102. See e.g., Tom Kramer, “Burma’s Cease-fires at killing”, Myanmar Times, 27 October 2014. Risk: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy”, TNI-BCN Peace & Security Briefing Nr 1, 121. Lahpai Seng Raw, “Strengthening civil society in September 2009; Lintner, “Kokang: The backstory”. peace building: evolving perspectives from South East Myanmar”, Aid & International Development Forum, 103. “President Thein Sein's Speech at Chatham House 13 February 2105. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs)”, London, 15 July 2013. 122. Tun, "Myanmar government, rebels sign draft nationwide ceasefire”. 104. See e.g., Shwe Aung, “Govt-ethnic talks stall on federal union agreement”, DVB, 6 February 2015. 123. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Myanmar ‘needs urgently to get back on track’ 105. See e.g., n.20 and n.65. – Zeid”, Geneva, 25 February 2015. 106. For recent reports, see e.g., Thomas Fuller, “Myanmar Returns to What Sells: Heroin”, New York Times, 3 January 2015; Saw Yan Naing, “Wa Rebels Defy Govt Order, Reopen Drug-Linked Trade Hub in Shan State”, The Irrawaddy, 6 January 2015; Lawi Weng, “On Chinese Border, Local Activists Lead Fight Against Drug Crime”, The Irrawaddy, 21 January 2015; TNI, Bouncing Back – Relapse in the Golden Triangle, June 2014; Lintner, “Kokang: The backstory”.

107. See e.g., n. 65.

108. Mike Davis, “Will Myanmar’s Government walk its talk on extractive industries reform? Jade trade will be key test”, Global Witness, 2 December 2015.

109. Interview, 27 November 2014.

110. See e.g., Igor Blazevic, “Survey of opinions about the Role of Civil Society”, Educational Initiatives, January 2015; Tom Kramer, Civil Society Gaining Ground: Opportunities for Change and Development in Burma (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2011).

111. See e.g., Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton University Press, 1988).

112. Nobel Zaw, “Civil Society, UEC Bridge Election Monitoring Differences”, The Irrawaddy, 17 February 2015.

113. Saw Yan Naing, “Ethnic Civil Society Groups Voice Concern Over Draft Land Use Policy”, The Irrawaddy, 6 November 2014. This publication was made possible through the 114. “Groups urge Myanmar to drop controversial financial support of Sweden. The contents of this religion, marriage bills”, RFA, 30 January 2015; publication are the sole responsibility of TNI and can “Women’s groups slam Race Protection”, DVB, 30 under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the January 2015. position of the donor.

Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 23 TNI Myanmar programme Burma Policy Briefing series ISBN/ISSN: 2214-8957 The advent of a new quasi-civilian Burma in 2010: A Critical Year in Ethnic Politics, Burma government in Myanmar has raised hopes Policy Briefing Nr. 1, June 2010 for fundamental reforms and for an end Burma’s 2010 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities, to one of the longest running armed Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 2, June 2010 conflicts in the world. TNI’s Myanmar Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s Election Landscape, programme aims to strengthen (ethnic) Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 3, October 2010 civil society and political actors in dealing A Changing Ethnic Landscape: Analysis of Burma’s 2010 with the challenges brought about by the Polls, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 4, December 2010

rapid opening-up of the country, while Ethnic Politics in Burma: The Time for Solutions, Burma also working to bring about an inclusive Policy Briefing Nr. 5, February 2011 and sustainable peace. TNI has developed Burma’s New Government: Prospects for Governance and a unique expertise on Myanmar’s Peace in Ethnic States, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 6, May ethnic regions and it is in its Myanmar 2011 programme where its work on agrarian Conflict or Peace? Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma, justice, alternative development and a Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 7, June 2011 humane drugs policy comes together. Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle? Prospects for Ethnic Peace, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 8, February 2012

Burma at the Crossroads: Maintaining the Momentum Transnational Institute for Reform, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 9, June 2012

The Kachin Crisis: Peace Must Prevail, Burma Policy The Transnational Institute (TNI) is an Briefing Nr. 10, March 2013 international research and advocacy institute committed to building a just, Access Denied: Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Burma, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 11 May 2013 democratic and sustainable planet. For more than 40 years, TNI has served as a Burma’s Ethnic Challenge: From Aspirations to Solutions, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 12, October 2013 unique nexus between social movements, engaged scholars and policy makers. Ethnicity without Meaning, Data without Context: The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma/ Myanmar, Burma Policy Briefing Nr. 13, February 2014

Other reports

Assessing Burma/Myanmar’s New Government: Challenges and Opportunities for European Policy Responses, Conference Report, Amsterdam, 22 & 23 February 2012

Prospects for Ethnic Peace and Political Participation in Burma/ Myanmar, Seminar Report, Bangkok, 23 August 2012

Political Reform in Burma/Myanmar and Consequences Transnational Institute (TNI) for Ethnic Conflict, Seminar Report, Chiangmai, 20-21 February 2013

De Wittenstraat 25 Developing Disparity, Regional Investment in Burma’s 1052 AK Amsterdam Borderlands, February 2013 The Netherlands Linking Women and Land in Myanmar: Recognising Tel: +31-20-6626608 Gender in the National Land Use Policy, February 2015 Fax: +31-20-6757176 The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive Land E-mail: Policymaking in Myanmar: A Response to the Draft [email protected] National Land Use Policy, February 2015

See for all our work on Myanmar: Towards a Healthier Legal Environment: A Review of http://www.tni.org/work-area/burma-project Myanmar's Drug Laws, February 2015

24 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar