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Burma Policy Briefings Series transnational institute Myanmar Policy Briefing Nr 14 April 2015 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar: The Need for Clarity and Achievement The clock is running down on a critical of a nationwide ceasefire. In response, but uncertain time in national politics in Western sanctions have been reduced and Burma/Myanmar1. There can be no doubt international leaders are now frequent that the country has enjoyed a period of visitors. Certainly, compared to the previous rare optimism and reform-oriented change decades of military isolationism, these have since the quasi-civilian government of been unprecedented times of potential and President Thein Sein assumed office in hope. March 2011. Among hopeful developments, a parliamentary system has been introduced, For many citizens, however, this is where many political prisoners have been released, the good news ends. For as the countdown economic reform has begun, and peace talks begins to a crucial general election later this between government and ethnic nationality year, warnings are accelerating of a halt in leaders have moved towards the prospect reform momentum and a more troubling Recommendations Important progress has been started in Inequitable distribution of political and national politics under the government of economic rights between the Burman- President Thein Sein. But as the countdown majority centre of the country and the ethnic accelerates towards a general election later minority borderlands continues to drive this year, there is a risk that political reform conflict. Despite ceasefires in some regions, and ethnic peace are faltering. To avoid this, fighting continues in others, furthering clear markers must be agreed of processes of mistrust and humanitarian suffering. democratic reform that guarantee the rights Military solutions cannot be imposed. If and involvement of all peoples and parties. ethnic grievances and aspirations are to be addressed, political and economic reforms Constitutional reform and nationwide must be the cornerstone of peace. peace will be essential, and it is vital that the conduct of the general election is free and fair International aid is welcomed as a to ensure momentum in political reform. An support for socio-political reform. But as inclusive political dialogue must be fostered programmes diversify, it is essential that at the national level to move beyond the aid is targeted at the key political issues and practice of different parliamentary processes most vulnerable communities. Solutions will and ethnic ceasefire talks that do not provide not be found by only engaging, or building a political roadmap for all citizens. It is vital up, a dominant government and military that reform accords promote justice and system that does not represent the people; cooperation, not exclusion and new divisions rather, it will perpetuate conflict and state in society and politics. failure. Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar 1 reality behind many of the socio-political The concern is that many actions of the changes in the country. Four years into the central government have become a mixture life of the Thein Sein government, the same of public relations and coercion, masking the military-business elite remains in power, determination of a military-backed elite to land-grabbing and other forms of economic remain in power. If this trend continues, the exploitation are widespread, and ethnic best opportunity for democratic reform and conflict continues in several parts of the nationwide peace in many decades could be country. Fuelling these concerns, there has lost. Rather than the Thein Sein government been an increase in incidents suggesting being the springboard for an era of political the country’s military leaders are reverting inclusion, human rights and national to their old hard-line ways: the murder of a progress, it could come to mark a further journalist,2 the “unintentional” killing of 23 extension in the failure of military-dominated ethnic army cadets,3 the continued exodus governments in the country – albeit in new of minority Muslims from their homes,4 form. the fatal shooting of a woman protestor at a Chinese-backed copper mine,5 and As the general election approaches, it is vital the blocking by vested interests of deeper that action is begun to build confidence reforms.6 and ensure that the country’s path towards nationwide peace and democratic Hopes continue that these are momentary governance continues. This will mean setbacks that must be understood in a clear markers of political agreement, peace bigger picture of national transition.7 But for achievement and reform guarantees that communities in the front-line of political involve all ethnic nationalities. Such essential change, the consequences are deeply steps must not be postponed through troubling. As prospects recede of broader another year of obfuscation or delay that change before this year’s general election, simply returns the same government and urgent questions are being asked about the unrepresentative elite to power. A forward- real nature and inclusiveness of Myanmar’s looking narrative of hope and inclusion new political system – and whether it can has to be built. In a fast-changing world, deliver the peace and democratic reform Myanmar’s peoples and the international sought by the country’s peoples. Such community expect democratic reform that concerns increased rapidly during February sustains a real and lasting peace. and March when student protests for educational change were ended by force in central Myanmar.8 Meanwhile over 70,000 The political landscape civilians fled their homes during fighting that broke out between government and ethnic As in previous times of state transformation, opposition troops in the Kokang region of a major obstacle to national agreement and Shan state.9 cohesion is the complexity of the political landscape. After decades of military The opening chapter in Myanmar’s new rule, the Thein Sein government has not political era is coming to an end. Leaders on heralded a new era of simplification and all sides continue to proclaim good intentions resolution in national politics. Instead, to seek solutions through reconciliation and the political environment is presently at dialogue, and this is a positive asset that can its most changeable and uncertain in over be built upon. But mistrust has been growing. half a century. With the 2011 handover of Uncertainties and confusion permeate the government by the military State Peace and political landscape, and this is undermining Development Council (SPDC: originally the ability of citizens and communities across State Law and Order Restoration Council the country to work together in common [SLORC]), a Pandora’s box of old crises and cause. new challenges has been opened. 2 Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in Burma/Myanmar In many respects, such an array of momentum are continuing to develop transitional difficulties could be anticipated rapidly – and often disaffectedly – in in one of the most ethnically diverse and response to the urgent challenges of the conflict-torn countries in Asia. As the day. Transnational Institute wrote in February 2011, “An inclusive endgame has long been • Finally, relations between Buddhist and needed to achieve national reconciliation.”10 Muslim communities remain strained But recognition of these challenges has not and potentially volatile, and holders of made efforts towards national peace and temporary identity cards, a majority of reform any easier. Four years after the SPDC whom are Muslims, will not be allowed stepped down, the prospect of a new general to vote in the polls.13 In the new political election has brought many of the underlying era, the rise of Buddhist nationalism has challenges to the fore. Six key areas stand out. become a significant, if unpredictable, socio-political force. • First, despite President Thein Sein’s recent pledge of pro-federal change,11 there is still The result of these differing tensions and no nationwide agreement or guarantee dynamics is a contentious, and often that involves all nationalities and parties divergent, political stage. For while important about the future direction and processes socio-political energies have been released for political reform in the country. since the SPDC’s departure, political change continues to be an essentially top-down • Second, there are no certainties about affair under the new governmental system, the future positions or roles of the three with Tatmadaw and related business or main groupings in national politics: family interests often as privileged as they the pro-military Union Solidarity were before. In contrast, pro-democracy and and Development Party (USDP) and ethnic nationality groups are still excluded Tatmadaw (Defence Services); pro- from many aspects of governance and democracy parties spearheaded by the national decision-making. This, in turn, is National League for Democracy (NLD); feeding popular concerns about the direction and ethnic-based organisations – whether of both political reforms and the ethnic peace armed, electoral or community-based – process. that are currently at their most numerous since the country’s independence in 1948. Clearly, much can happen in the coming months, and every day brings new headlines • Third, although discussions about charter as different actors add their voices to the amendments are continuing, there are still gathering debate. In his New Year’s Day no assurances as to how, or if, the 2008
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