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Relativism About Truth Relativism About Truth by Peter Davson-Galle, B.A.(Hons.) (Adel.), M.A. (La T.) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Tasmania, July, 1996. ,1,( I. lopky This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University of Tasmania or any other institution and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis. II This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. Abstract Broadly put, the thesis is an investigation of the possibility of articulating a coherent thesis of truth relativism within first, a host correspondence theory of truth and second, a host coherence theory of truth. The type of relativism addressed in the thesis is what is sometimes called 'framework relativism', that where truth is relativised to a framework of belief, conceptual scheme or something of that sort. A further restraint is that it is a global relativistic thesis which is sought, one that is relativistic about all truths. The thesis does not set itself the task of defending relativism but just that of seeking a coherent articulation of it. The work is in two sections. In the first, the host theory is the correspondence theory of truth. The result of that section's analysis is that, although what Chris Swoyer calls 'strong truth relativism' is not able to be given coherent articulation, what he calls 'weak truth relativism' is. The conception of weak correspondence relative truth that is explicated here is a three place relation of proposition, world (without "joints at which to carve") and categorial repertoire (of a type suggested by Jack Meiland). A global thesis in its terms proves coherently articulable and does not suffer from problems of self-inclusion. In the second section, the host theory is the coherence theory. Promising looking host though it seems, neither propositional nor doxastic web versions of the coherence theory prove to be able to permit either weak or strong global truth relativistic theses to be coherently articulated. The most promising looking coherence relativist candidate of those examined is a strong doxastic thesis developed by James Young. Like other coherence relativisms examined, Young's succumbs to the reflexitivity demands of a global thesis. Strong coherence theses also prove to have difficulty in having the same proposition true relative to one propositional/doxastic web and false relative to another. Weak variants have difficulty explicating the "appropriate alternativeness" of the categorial repertoire in terms of which some target proposition is to be ineffable. The results of investigation are contrary to conventional wisdom concerning relativism in that it proves to be the correspondence theory, not the coherence theory, within which it is easier to articulate global (though only weak) framework truth relativism. iv I wish to acknowledge the advice given to me by my supervisors, Dr. Edgar Sleinis and Prof. Bill Joske, and the helpful correspondence and conversations concerning various parts of the work that I have had with Jack Meiland, Jim Young, Steve Rappaport, Steve Edwards, Jack Smart, Howard Sankey, Henry Krips, Brian Ellis, Kathy Bohsted, Frank White and Harvey Siegel. I also wish to acknowledge the emotional support and forbearance of my spouse Chrissy and my daughters Jenny and Kathleen. V Table of Contents Page Introduction 1 SECTION ONE - CORRESPONDENCE TRUTH RELATIVISM Chapter One - The Correspondence Theory and Relativism 1 1 - Correspondence Truth 11 - Relative Truth and Reality 17 Chapter Two - Framework Relativisms with One World Realism 32 - Introduction 32 - Framework Relativisms 33 Chapter Three - Categorial Repertoire Weak Truth Relativism 46 - Introduction 46 - The Concept of Categorial repertoire Weak Truth Relativism 46 - The Thesis of Global Correspondence Weak Truth Relativism 56 Chapter Four - The Truth Status of Truth Relativism Itself 59 - Introduction 59 - Truth Relativism as Not Relatively True 60 - Truth Relativism as Relatively True 67 Chapter Five - Totally Incommensurable Conceptual Schemes 73 - Introduction 73 - The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 74 - Davidson's First Argument 76 - Davidson's Second Argument 81 Chapter Six - Alternative Categorial Webs 88 - Introduction 88 - Holism and Discretism 88 - Discretist Truth vehicle and Relativiser 91 - Appropriately Alternative W*s 92 vi Page - Discretist Truth vehicle and Holist Relativiser 99 - Holist Truth vehicle 107 - Summary 108 SECTION TWO - COHERENCE TRUTH RELATIVISM Chapter Seven - Truth Relativism within Non-realist Theories 109 - Introduction 109 - The Coherence Theory of Truth 110 - Global Coherentist Truth Relativism 113 - Global Strong Coherence Truth Relativism 114 - Examination of These Versions 117 - Propositional Relativism 118 - Doxastic Relativism 120 - Actual-strong Belief Relativism 121 - Possible-strong Belief Relativism 122 - Summary 123 Chapter Eight - Propositional Relativism 124 - Introduction 124 - Elaboration 124 - A Problem for Strong Relativism 129 - Possible-strong Propositional Relativism 138 Chapter Nine - Possible-strong Actual-belief Relativism 142 - Introduction 142 - The Demands of Strong Relativism 143 - Sense Holism Revisited: Young's Views 145 - Truth, Belief and Coherence 151 - An Awkward Objection 160 vii Page Chapter Ten - Weak Truth Coherentism 163 - Introduction 163 - Weak Propositional Relativism 164 - Holistic Variation 164 - Experience as a Semantic Object 166 - Discretist Variation 171 - Weak Doxastic Relativism 172 - Summary 175 Chapter Eleven - Coherence Relativism and Standard Objections 177 - Introduction 177 - Self-refutation 179 - (a) Holistic Propositional Strong Relativism and Self-refutation 180 - (b) Doxastic Possible-strong Relativism and Self-refutation 184 - Weak Relativism 186 - The Meta-regress Objection 189 - Strong Relativism's Fate 191 - Weak Relativism 192 - Walker's Objection 193 - Summary 198 References 200 INTRODUCTION 'How Must Relativism Be Understood To Be Coherent?'.' Broadly put, and within some restraints, this thesis attempts to answer the question, a question which has not been answered totally in the literature and is one of continuing philosophical interest. Mark Okrent claims: Recently there has been a revival of philosophic interest in, and discussion of, "relativism". Debates concerning relativism, however, tend to have an odd air of unreality. It is odd that while most everyone wants to refute relativism, just about no one wants to be identified as a relativisit. There is even a tendency to use 'relativist' as an epithet of abuse. But, if relativism is universally acknowledged to be refuted, even self-refuting, then why is there so much discussion of it ...?' (1984, P. 341) Friedel Weinert puts it even more strongly: ...the modern age is marked by the renunciation of the possibility of the one true ontological statement about the world. The modern age has abandoned the search for Truth and has opened the door to the age of relativism. (1984, p382) Robert Nola remarks: Long an outcast from philosophy, relativism has, for most of this .century, found a home in the doctrines of most (but not all) sociologists of science, several historians of science and a handful of phiosophers of science. (1988, p.2) Yet, though he judges it to have only a handful of supporters and, remarks 'no matter how much philosophers are at odds with one another they seem, with only a few 1 I borrow the question's wording from the title of a recent paper by John Fox. (1992) 2 exceptions, to be united in their condemnation of relativism',2 Nola goes on to note that '... relativism exerts a strange fascination and a number of philosophers ... have found it instructive to come to terms with the ways they find it to be self-refuting or incoherent (if they find it so at all).' (1988, p. 1) Hilary Putnam is one such philosopher, remarking: I myself am fascinated by the different ways in which relativism is incoherent or self-contradictory. I think they are worth careful study by epistemologists ... because each of the refutations of relativism teaches us something important about knowledge. (1983, P. 288) Harvey Siegel remarks that his view was : ...relativism is an obvious non-starter, a position whose very statement requires logical contradiction and so self-refutation, and so a position not worthy of sustained philosophical attention ... But it became clear that such an out-of- hand rejection of relativism was too cavalier. For one thing, many highly regarded philosophers, working in a variety of areas 3 , embraced one or another form of relativism. For another, several philosophers took on the task of articulating and defending relativism, paying special attention to the problem of relativism's alleged incoherence. Most importantly, the last two- three decades have witnessed a striking emergence of relativism in the philosophy of science.4 (1987, p. xi) Olcrent complains: Contemporary discussions of relativism are confused ... (in part because) ... there is no clear understanding that there are a variety of senses in which one may talk of relativism and ... a theory which is relativist in one of these senses 2 Barry Barnes and David Bloor put the point even more extremely: '...in the academic world relativism is everywhere abominated...'. (1982, p. 21) 3 Though, if Nola is to be believed, not many in philosophy
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