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Barry Hashimoto Date Doctor of Philosophy The Power and Politicized Expansion of the International Criminal Court

By,

Barry M. Hashimoto Doctor of Philosophy

Dan Reiter Advisor

Eric R. Reinhardt Committee Member

Jeffrey K. Staton Committee Member

David R. Davis Committee Member

Allan C. Stam Committee Member

Accepted:

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D. Dean of Laney Graduate School

Date The Power and Politicized Expansion of the International Criminal Court

By,

Barry M. Hashimoto A.B., Dartmouth College, 2006 M.A., Emory University, 2010

Advisor: Dan Reiter, Ph.D.

An Abstract of a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

2012 Abstract

This dissertation contributes to an understanding of why national leaders voluntarily accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), granting it the authority to prosecute them.

It theorizes that leaders trade off the risk of unwanted prosecutions against the deterrent threat that prosecutions pose to political rivals and patrons of domestic enemies, who may conspire to violently oust leaders. The risk of unwanted prosecutions and the ICC’s deterrent threat both arise because the court’s prosecutions credibly communicate guilt for atrocities and may trigger leader- specific sanctions by wealthy donor states that prefer to keep politicians who commit atrocities out of office. Three qualities explain the ICC’s credibility: a legitimacy quality, an investment quality, and a reputational quality. Empirical analysis of panel data on leaders and all modern international criminal courts supports the theory. National leaders accept the ICC’s jurisdiction when it can deter their rivals from anti-regime violence—when the state depends heavily on development capital disbursed by wealthy democracies—and when the leaders can limit their own exposure to prosecution. The protection leaders obtain under the ICC’s jurisdiction gives them longer and more peaceful terms in office. If an international criminal court—including, but not limited to, the ICC—indicts them, however, their chance of losing office increases greatly. If they insist on remaining in power, both the state’s receipt of development capital and its domestic production tumble. These courts’ indictments prove to be more consequential than other public reports about prosecutable human-rights abuses ostensibly committed by the leader’s administration. The ICC’s power is real, but it has gaps, politicizing the expansion of its jurisdiction. The Power and Politicized Expansion of the International Criminal Court

By,

Barry M. Hashimoto A.B., Dartmouth College, 2006 M.A., Emory University, 2010

Advisor: Dan Reiter, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

2012 Acknowledgements

I wish, first, to thank Dan Reiter, my advisor and the chair of my doctoral committee. Dan’s dedication to political science and his doctoral students is amazing. He was indispensable in my education and in this particular project. I was also fortunate to have a committee of great scholars:

Eric Reinhardt, Jeffrey Staton, David Davis, and Allan Stam. I profited from their brainpower, resourcefulness, attention to detail, compass for the truth, and patience. Dan, Eric, Jeffrey, David, and Allan read and commented on many drafts of this dissertation, improving each one. Any omissions and remaining errors in what follows are my fault alone.

The Department of Political Science of Emory University provided me with a superb graduate experience. In addition to my committee members, I thank Clifford Carrubba, Kyle Beardsley,

Drew Linzer, Michael Giles, Alan Abramowitz, and Hubert Tworzecki for teaching me much of what I know about political science. Each, along with Jennifer Gandhi, Thomas Walker,

James Larry Taulbee, Courtney Brown, and Tom Clark commented on presentations of earlier versions of this dissertation. I especially wish to thank Clifford and Kyle for giving me detailed feedback on the dissertation’s prospectus and on a paper incorporating parts of chapters 3 and 4.

Dominique Tremblay, Kathy Malanoski, and Denise Brubaker provided valuable administrative help. I acknowledge four training, conference, and research grants (2009–2010) from the James

T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University.

Emory’s doctoral students also deserve thanks. Ora John Reuter has been a good friend and sounding board over the years. Adrienne Smith, Jun Koga, Joshua Strayhorn, John Walson, Nigel

Lo, and Nathan Danneman gave helpful feedback on the project. I am grateful to have learned from a group of elder doctoral candidates specializing in international relations at Emory: Amy Yuen,

Terrence Chapman, Scott Wolford, Maryann Gallagher, Philipp Fuerst, Jesse Hamner, Andrew Kerner, Emily Hencken Ritter, Jeff Kucik, and Amanda Murdie. I owe Terrence extra thanks for his feedback on extant empirical work on international courts, and for his encouragement.

I presented parts of this dissertation at Emory, Centro de Investigación y Docencia

Económicas, and Middle Tennessee State University. For reading drafts and giving me their feedback in those seminars and elsewhere, I wish to thank Michael Gilligan, Alastair Smith, Bernd

Beber, George Downs, Shanker Satyanath, Neal Beck, Michael Laver, Stephen Morris, Stephen

Livingston, Kim Nolan Garcia, Brian Phillips, Lorena Ruano, Álvaro Morcillo, Jorge Chabat,

David Crow, Gerardo Maldonado Hernández, Ximena María Medellín Urquiaga, and Sharon

Wolchik. In New York, Sonali Chitre read drafts, provided her perspective as an international lawyer, and offered the second-hand feedback of her peers on a précis of the dissertation. For feedback they gave me during their visits to Emory, I thank David Anderson, Andrew Gelman,

Stathis Kalyvas, Susan Hyde, and Kimuli Kasara. Beth Simmons, Judith Kelley, and Jay Goodliffe were helpful in answering my questions about their work.

I thank Lucrecia Garcia Iommi, Medlir Mema, Yvonne Dutton for helping brainstorm a future conference panel on international criminal courts, and I thank Diana Kapiszewski, Monika Nalepa, and Gretchen Helmke for agreeing to help us organize it. I thank the organizers and participants of a conference panel at the 2012 European Political Science Association in Berlin for the opportunity to present a version of chapter 5 there.

Ketevan Nozadze, Andrew Varnum, and Sharon Wolchik helped me conduct preliminary

fieldwork in Washington, D.C. I thank each of them. Christine Wallich and a group of professionals from the Independent Evaluation Group and International Finance Corporation of

The World Bank provided valuable insights over a hike and lunch together in McLean, Virginia in May 2012. In Washington, I conducted four interviews with an anonymous consultant hired by political parties in several new democracies faci