CHAPTER 6 The Reckoning with Antigonus
While the diplomatic exchanges between Eumenes and Polyperchon resulted in Eumenes regaining his independence, they also put him again in conflict with Antigonus. After his release from Nora, Eumenes had been Antigonus’ ally. However, in the summer, as soon as Antigonus discovered Eumenes’ change of allegiance, he sent an army commanded by Menander to Cappadocia. Eumenes was forced to flee with only 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry. He did not have time to await the others who had promised to join him; until the agreement with Polyperchon there had been no reason to gather forces hastily. Now there was need for great haste. As it was, Menander missed intercepting Eumenes and his meager forces by only three days. Eumenes fled south over the Taurus moun- tains by forced marches into Cilicia. Menander followed to the mountains, but unable to overtake him, returned to Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 59. 1–2), where he may have remained as strategos (Billows 1990: 403). Fortunately for Eumenes, Antigonus was occupied in Asia Minor. In part, he was outfitting a fleet to seize control of the Hellespont (cf. Diod. 18. 72. 3–4; Polyaen. 4. 6. 8). Such control was necessary if he was to ensure that Polyperchon could not cross to Asia with an army of fresh Macedonians. In Cilicia, Antigenes and Teutamus, the commanders of the argyraspids, in obedience to the letters from the kings and Olympias, joined Eumenes (Diod. 18. 59. 3). It was these very same troops with the other Macedonians present in Egypt who had condemned Eumenes and the other Perdiccans (see Chapter 3). This willingness by the argyraspids to support Eumenes is, perhaps, the best argument against the proposition that there existed a traditional Macedonian army assembly with clear powers. Now, with the call from the kings and regent, they joined the very individual they had earlier condemned. Neither the regent, nor the king, issued a pardon; the sentence was simply ignored. It is difficult to believe that an assembly possessing the authority to arraign and convict could have its decisions so easily ignored by all parties, including many who had com- prised the very assembly that had issued the condemnation in the first place. These assemblies clearly had no constitutional authority (see Chapter 2). Eumenes with the forces that had come with him from Cappadocia and the argyraspids then moved on to Cyinda.1 Even though Antigenes and Teutamus
1 The actual site of Cyinda has not been identified, but it was somewhere between Soli and the mouth of the Cydnus (see Simpson 1957: 503; Bing 1973: 346, 348).
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004297173_008 164 CHAPTER 6 promised to cooperate fully with Eumenes, and the argyraspids had as a body greeted Eumenes with friendship and enthusiasm (Diod. 18. 59. 3; Plut. Eum. 13. 3–4), these troops and their commanders regarded themselves as an autono- mous force. The argyraspids represented a curious blend of Macedonian cus- tom and mercenary characteristics (Anson 1991: 230–47). They responded to the call from King Philip and his regent as loyal Macedonians, yet these troops often displayed a distinct lack of fidelity to any authority other than their own. Antigenes had participated in the assassination of Perdiccas in Egypt (Arr. Succ. 1. 35; Diod. 18. 39. 6; cf. Diod. 18. 36. 4),2 and the argyraspids as a body at Triparadeisus had been separated from the army given to Antigonus because of their mutinous behavior (cf. Arr. Succ. 1a. 35, 38).3 They were charged with transporting part of the royal treasury from Susa to Cyinda (Arr. Succ. 1a. 38). Since the completion of this task, the argyraspids had been operating in vir- tual independence in Cilicia (Arr. Succ. 1a. 38).4 Their commanders were not pleased with the subordinate role now ordered for them (Plut. Eum. 13. 4; Just. 14. 2. 8–9; cf. Diod. 18. 60). Plutarch (Eum. 13. 4) is especially clear that Eumenes’ subsequent difficulties with his new command came principally from the commanders of the argyraspids. Justin’s remark (14. 2. 7) that the argy- raspids regarded service under anyone other than Alexander as dishonorable and served others unwillingly is probably not short of the mark. Eumenes was, therefore, immediately faced with a serious threat to his authority. He needed these Macedonians, and, consequently, he had to placate both them and their commanders. This challenge to his authority was met in part by relying on a tactic which had worked well for him in Babylon. Eumenes told Antigenes and Teutamus, both Macedonian aristocrats,5 that as a Greek his only concern was the defense of the royal family, an interesting claim since he had for more than a year been resisting both the king’s regent and his general in Asia. Furthermore,
2 See Chapter 4. 3 Arrian (Succ. 1a. 38) refers to them as “the most rebellious of the Macedonians.” For the iden- tification of these “3000” with the argyraspids, see Chapter 4, Anson 1981:118–19. 4 In 320, Philoxenus (Berve 1973: 2:390–1 [#794]; Heckel 2006: 220 [#2]) was appointed satrap of Cilicia by the then regent Perdiccas (Arr. Succ. 24. 2); this appointment was confirmed at Triparadeisus (Arr. Succ. 1a. 34; Diod. 18. 39. 6; Just. 13. 6. 16). The argyraspids, however, saw themselves answerable only to the kings or their regent (cf. Diod. 18. 59. 3), as did the garrison commanders at Cyinda (Diod. 18. 62. 2). Indeed, except for the notice of his appointment and reconfirmation as satrap, Philoxenus disappears from the record. 5 While little is known concerning Teutamus, he was apparently a Macedonian aristocrat (see Heckel 1992: 316–19). When bribed to betray Eumenes to Antigonus in 318, he was dissuaded by Antigenes who emphasized Eumenes’ foreign birth (Diod. 18. 62. 7).