DEMOGRAPHIC AND LABOUR MARKET TRENDS IN YEMEN
A BACKGROUND PAPER TO FRAME THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE YOUTH EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGE AND THE NATIONAL MIGRATION POLICY
Michele Bruni Andrea Salvini Lara Uhlenhaut
International Labour Organization Regional Office for Arab Sates Copyright © International Labour Organization 2014 First published 2014 Publications of the International Labour Office enjoy copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, short excerpts from them may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to ILO Publications (Rights and Permissions), International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland, or by email: [email protected]. The International Labour Office welcomes such applications. Libraries, institutions and other users registered with reproduction rights organizations may make copies in accordance with the licences issued to them for this purpose. Visit www.ifrro.org to find the reproduction rights organization in your country.
ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data
Bruni, Michele; Salvini, Andrea; Uhlenhaut, Lara
Demographic and labour market trends in Yemen : a background paper to frame the interface between the youth employment challenge and the national migration policy / Michele Bruni, Andrea Salvini, Lara Uhlenhaut ; International Labour Organization, ILO Regional Office for the Arab States. - Beirut: ILO, 2014
ISBN: 9789221291046; 9789221291053 (web pdf)
International Labour Organization; ILO Regional Office for the Arab States employment / migration policy / labour market analysis / trend / projection / demographic aspect / Yemen
13.01.3
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4 PREFACE
Since the popular uprisings started in late 2010, many countries in the Arab region have entered a period of political transition. Following the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen’s mass protests erupted in 2011 uniting people from different segments of society. Yemeni protesters called for the improvement of economic and socio-political conditions. Lack of job opportunities, especially among women and the youth, has forced Yemenis into the informal economic sector, which constitutes the main engine of job creation, although it is characterized by poor quality of employment, as well as absence of stability and protection.
Yemen’s development depends on the government’s ability to generate employment, promote education and skills development, and provide decent employment conditions for its young generation and women. This, in turn, requires a strong commitment to social and economic reform, and the transformation of state institutions. This paper offers an analysis of demographic and labour market trends in Yemen that may prove important to inform policy makers on the magnitude of the employment and migration challenge for the years to come. The paper also emphasizes the importance of the protection of Yemeni workers in GCC countries and the advancement of women’s economic empowerment.
Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) funded the ILO project “Migration and Governance Network (MAGNET)”, which provided input to the development of the National Youth Employment Plan approved by the Prime Minister’s Office on 20 November 2013.
We extend our gratitude to the Government of Switzerland for the financial support it provided to implement this project. Special thanks go to the staff of the ILO DWT/CO in Beirut, in particular Ms. Mary Kawar, Senior
5 Specialist on Employment Policy, Mr. Azfar Khan, Senior Specialist on Labour Migration, Mr. Anwar Fahran, Senior Statistician, as well as Mr. Patrick Daru, Senior Specialist on Skills Development and Employability, for their technical contributions. The work benefitted from the peer review of Ms. Maria Gallotti (ILO Geneva), Mr. George Ksaifi (former Head of Socio Economic Department at ESCWA Beirut) and Mr. Adam Coutts (University of Cambridge, UK).
6 CONTENTS
Preface 5 Executive Summary 15
Chapter 1: Long-run Demographic Trends 1. The Demographic Transition: Timing and Impact 19 2. Challenges Due to Demographic Changes 19 2.1 The Education Challenge 24 2.1.1 Yemen’s Education System 24 2.1.2 Training Age Population 25 2.1.3 Enrolment and Key Obstacles 27 2.2 The Employment Challenge 29 3. Future Demographic Trends 32
Chapter 2: Labour Market Analysis 1. Main Labour Market Variables 2004-2010 35 2. Population Age Structure 36 3. Main Labour Market Indicators: 2010 37 4. Labour Market Indicators by Age Group 38 5. Labour Force by Sex, Age and Educational Level 41 6. Employment by Sector 43 7. Status in Employment 44 8. Employment by Occupation 47 9. Unemployment 49 10. The Inactive 53
Chapter 3: Policy Recommendations Ways Forward 56 Promoting Yemeni Workers in GCC Countries 57 Towards Women’s Economic Empowerment 58 A Labour Market that Fosters Youth Employment 59
7 Beyond More Jobs to Better Jobs 60 An Alternative Development Paradigm: Investment in Education and Data Monitoring Systems 60
Bibliography 63
8 LIST OF ACRONYMS
CBR Crude Birth Rate CDR Crude Death Rate DT Demographic Transition GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GOY Government of Yemen ILO International Labour Organization IMR Infant Mortality Rate LEB Life Expectancy at Birth LMIS Labour Market Information System MB Migration Balance MOE Ministry of Education MOTEVT Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training MOSAL Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour NB Natural Balance TAP Training Age Population TB Total Balance TEVT Technical Education and Vocational Training UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children Fund UNDP United Nations Development Programme WAP Working Age Population
9 TABLES
Table 1.1 Total fertility rate, Infant mortality rate and Life 20 expectancy at birth; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 Table 1.2 Demographic accounting; from 1950-1955 to 2005- 23 2010 Table 1.3 Population by main age groups; absolute values, 23 percentage composition, absolute changes, percentage changes; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 Table 1.4 Population in training age by sex; absolute values in 25 thousand; estimates from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 and projections to 2055-2060 Table 2.1 Main labour market variables by sex; 2004-2010; 35 absolute values (thousand); absolute change and percentage change Table 2.2 Main labour market indicators by sex; 2004-2010; 35 absolute values and absolute changes Table 2.3 Population by main age groups; absolute values and 35 percentage composition; 2010 Table 2.4 Population by sex and urban- rural; absolute values 37 and percentage composition; 2010 Table 2.5 Main labour market indicators by sex and main age 38 groups; 2010 Table 2.6 Labour force and participation rates by sex and five 40 year age group, and percentage of women; 2010 Table 2.7 Employment and employment to population by sex, and 40 five year age group, and percentage of women; 2010 Table 2.8 Labour force by sex and educational level; absolute 42 values; 2010
10 Table 2.9 Labour force by sex and educational level; percentage 43 distribution; 2010 Table 2.10 Employed by sex and sector; absolute values and 44 percentage composition; 2010 Table 2.11 Employed by sex, five year age group and status 44 in employment; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010 Table 2.12 Employed by sex, sector and status in employment; 46 absolute values and percentage composition; 2010 Table 2.13 Employed by sex and occupation; absolute values and 47 percentage composition; 2010 Table 2.14 Employed by sector and occupation; absolute values 49 and percentage composition; 2010 Table 2.15 Unemployed by sex and ten year age group; absolute 50 values and percentage composition; 2010 Table 2.16 Economically inactive by reason for inactivity and sex; 53 2010
11 GRAPHS
Graph 1.1 Crude Birth Rate (CBR), Crude Death Rate (CDR) 21 and population Growth Rate (GR), in thousand; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 Graph 1.2 Births, death rate and absolute change in total 22 population; five years values (in thousand); from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 Graph 1.3 Population in Compulsory school age and Secondary 26 school age; yearly rates of growth; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 Graph 1.4 Population in Compulsory school age and Secondary 26 school age; absolute values; 1950-2010 Graph 1.5 Population 15-24, Working age population 15+ and 30 15-64; Absolute yearly change (thousand); from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 Graph 1.6 Population 15-24, Working age population 15+ and 31 15-64; percentage yearly changes; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 Graph 1.7 WAP 15+; Generational entries, generational exits 31 and total balance; from 1950-1955 to 2055-2060 Graph 1.8 WAP 15-64; Generational entries, generational exits 33 and total balance; from 1950-1955 to 2055-2060 Graph 1.9 Working age population 15-64; absolute level; 1950- 33 2060 Graph 1.10 Number of additional jobs needed to keep the 34 employment to population ratio constant at the 2005- 10 level; from 2000-2005 to 2055-2060 Graph 2.1 Men, women and total; rates of participation by five- 39 year age group; 2010
12 Graph 2.2 Men and women; rates of participation and 39 employment to population ratio by ten-year age group; 2010 Graph 2.3 Men and women; rates of unemployment by ten-year 41 age group; 2010 Graph 2.4 Employed by sex and ten year age group; percentage 45 composition by status in employment; 2010 Graph 2.5 Employed by sex; percentage composition by sector; 47 2010 Graph 2.6 Employed by sex and occupation; percentage of wage 48 and salaried workers; 2010 Graph 2.7 Unemployment rates by sex and age group; 2010 50 Graph 2.8 Men and women; Unemployment by educational 51 level and age group; 2010 Graph 2.9 Women; Percentage of unemployed by age and 51 educational level; 2010 Graph 2.10 Women; Percentage of unemployed by age and 52 educational level; 2010 Graph 2.11 Men, women and total; rate of unemployment by 52 educational level; 2010
13 14 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Yemen, like many other transition countries, is experiencing huge social and economic changes. The country will have arguably undergone its biggest test since the 2011 uprisings: the National Dialogue Conference.1 This aims to bring together all of Yemen’s minorities and factions, women alongside men, youth and other marginalized groups to determine the country’s future. The challenges ahead include growing numbers of internally displaced people, increased malnutrition and food insecurity, and a series of political crises being fought in various locations around the country. The long term development of Yemen is, however, challenged by the rapidly growing number of young people with no employment opportunities. At the same time, Yemen’s foremost development challenge constitutes its biggest opportunity. The country’s growing labour force represents its most valuable natural resource, and is fundamental to successful transition. Relying on a number of different sources and the most recent statistics emerging from the ILO 2010 Child Labour Survey, this paper offers insights into Yemen’s current demographic and labour market trends and their future implications.
Estimated at 22.8 million, Yemen’s population has witnessed a fivefold increase in the last 50 years, making demographic pressure the dominant feature of Yemen’s labour market. The population is predominantly young, with 43 per cent below 15 years of age and over 65 per cent below 25. Of these, almost half (48 per cent) are not in education, employment, or training systems. Even if high fertility rates in Yemen are decreasing, as is the rate of 1 Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference involved a series of talks for a period of six months, since March 2013. The conference engaged 565 participants, representing various sectors and classes of Yemeni society and including most political and social actors as well as parties that previously were not considered part of the political scene, such as civil society organizations, youth, women, Jews, and marginalized sectors of society. The participants were divided into nine groups that discussed a variety of themes, namely: the southern issue, the Houthi rebellion, transitional justice, state- building, good governance, rebuilding the army and security apparatuses, independence of the institutions, freedom and rights and overall development.
15 population growth, demographic pressure on Yemen’s labour market is likely to continue due to the palpable increase in the training age population (6-17) and Yemen’s working age population (15-64). In the past decade, the number of children in compulsory education age in Yemen has increased by around 750,000 and the working age population by 4.1 million.
Yemen has accomplished significant education gains in the past 30 years; however, the high proportion of children and youth poses a continued challenge for education coverage. Also, despite remarkable strides in literacy levels, Yemen’s young workforce still shows noticeable deficits in educational levels. More than half of Yemen’s labour force (54.8 per cent) has not completed compulsory education and those with at least secondary education represent less than 30 per cent. Rapid population growth in Yemen, coupled with a difficult geographic terrain, undeniably present difficulties in education coverage. Education deficits are also the result of a lack of an overarching unified vision for the development of Yemen’s education, training and skills sectors. A skills gap or deficit continues to be the most widely reported problem by employers in Yemen. This is particularly relevant at a time when Yemeni labour in the GCC features as a top priority on the government’s agenda.
Likewise, the increase in labour market entrants means that the number of additional jobs the Yemeni economy would have to create on a yearly average to maintain an employment-to-population ratio of 75 per cent equates to 150,000 jobs a year. In this situation, Yemen’s economy is evidently struggling to absorb the increasing number of new entrants into the labour market.
Fueling Yemen’s 2011 protests was widespread unemployment and Yemeni students and youth demanding political and economic inclusion. Yemen’s labour force participation rate currently stands at just 33.5 per cent. Almost 18 per cent of people in the labour force are unemployed, primarily among the 15-24 age group. Youth unemployment rates in Yemen are three times higher than adult employment rates—only 1 out of 5 young people in Yemen is employed, with 1 out of 3 for young men and 1 out of 40 for young women. The sizeable number of people who are young, unemployed, and dissatisfied warrants immediate attention since it this group that is likely to be at the core of popular unrest in the country.
Poor job growth has led to a situation where the informal economy, characterized by irregularities and a lack of social protection (contracts, health insurance, and benefits) makes up a large part of the economy, where women are the majority. Yemeni women feature some of the lowest labour participation rates in the region and the world. According to this analysis women constitute 12.7 per cent of the country’s labour force, but only 7 per cent of the employed and 73.7 per cent of the inactive. It is also
16 methodologically challenging to measure female labour market participation. Though Yemeni women might be invisible in the formal labour market, they constitute the backbone of Yemen’s agriculture where their work may not be formally recognized. Data also points to more women gradually entering the labour market, but for the most part women’s presence remains most prevalent among unpaid family workers, part time, low wage earners, the unemployed and the inactive.
17
CHAPTER 1: LONG-RUN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
1. The Demographic Transition: Timing and Impact
Yemen’s population has increased almost five times over the past sixty years, from 4.7 million in 1950 to around 22.8 million in 2012. This rapid growth is the result of the so-called Demographic Transition (DT), a process that is now in full swing in Yemen.1 A look into Yemen’s fertility and mortality patterns in the past fifty years (Table 1.1) exemplifies the trends behind Yemen’s rapid population growth.
In the 1950s more than 1 child out of 3 died during the first year of life. Life expectancy at birth was only 25 years.2 The average fertility rate was 7 children per woman, a rate that ensured population growth despite such high mortality rates. The next 30 years saw the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) drop to 117.0 per thousand, while Life Expectancy at Birth (LEB) increased to 53 years. However, this period also saw the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) grow to one of the highest in the world: 9.2 children per woman. In the following 30 years the negative trend of IMR and the positive one of LEB continued with the first indicator now being down to 61.3 per thousand and LEB up to 62 years. Fertility rates in Yemen are showing signs of decreasing, with the current rate standing at 4.9 births per woman, a decrease of almost 50 percent.
Fertility rates in Yemen are higher amongst illiterate women than they are amongst educated women and conversely they are also higher in the rural areas than urban areas. High fertility rates tend to be intrinsically (though
1 The Demographic Transition: The DT has been defined as the passage from a traditional demographic regime characterized by high fertility and high mortality, to a modern demographic regime characterized by low fertility and low mortality. DT brings countries through three consecutive phases. In the first population increases at an increasing rate, in the second at a decreasing rate, in the third population declines. Yemen is one of the last countries to 2 See table 1.1.
19 not exclusively) linked to low educational levels, for girls staying in school generally leads to the postponement of child bearing as well as better chances to enter the labor market. Early marriage in Yemen, though abating, is still prevalent, particularly in the rural areas, shortening the time girls spend at school and limiting their participation into the labor force.3
Table 1.1 - Total fertility rate, Infant mortality rate and Life expectancy at birth ; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 TFR IMR LEB 1950-1955 7.3 350.2 25.3 1955-1960 7.3 297.3 30.0 1960-1965 7.3 251.3 34.7 1965-1970 7.5 212.9 39.1 1970-1975 7.7 180.1 43.3 1975-1980 8.6 147.3 48.1 1980-1985 9.2 117.0 53.0 1985-1990 8.9 95.4 56.8 1990-1995 8.2 84.0 58.8 1995-2000 6.9 75.4 59.8 2000-2005 5.9 68.0 61.0 2005-2010 4.9 61.3 62.0 Source: UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
Yemen completed phase one of the DT at the end of the 1990s, a decade during which the rate of population growth peaked at 4 per cent (Graph 1.1). This first phase was dominated by the decline in the crude mortality rate (CMR) that compensated for the increase in the crude birth rate (CBR). In the following 20 years the decline in CBR has been paralleled by a decline in CMR leading to the current estimated population growth that has come down to 2.6 per cent per annum. While the trends suggest a progressive reduction in labor market pressure, demographic dynamics however are likely to continue.
3 Education and Labor force participation alone however present a simplistic framework in explaining high fertility rates. Other studies have pointed out that countries such as Sudan and Iraq, both have high levels of labor force participation in parallel with high birth rates. See Jennifer Olmsted “Reexamining the fertility puzzle in the MENA” in Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East 2003.
20 Graph 1.1 – Crude Birth Rate (CBR), Crude Death Rate (CDR) and population Growth Rate (GR), in thousand; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10 1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025 2025-2030 2030-2035 2035-2040 2040-2045 2045-2050 2050-2055 2055-2060 2060-2065 2065-2070 2070-2075 2075-2080 2080-2085 2085-2090 2090-2095 2095-2100
GR CBR CDR Source: UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
Yemen’s yearly births currently stand at 750,000 and are projected to reach the figure of around 800,000 (maximum) in 2020, when the yearly absolute change in total population will also peak at around 600,000. The number of deaths in Yemen declined up to 1985 but then progressively increased to a yearly present value of around 175,000.
The total change registered by total population has been generated mainly by births that between 1950 and 2010 have numbered more than 28 million, largely exceeding the 9.4 million deaths (Table 1.2). According to the UNDESA estimates, migration has played a minor role, the negative balances of the 1950-90 period having being almost completely offset by the return of migrants, estimated at around 1 million, from Saudi Arabia between 1990 and 1995. In the following periods, the migration balance has always been negative averaging around 20,000 per year, a value that most certainly underestimates the – mostly irregular – outflow of Yemen citizens during 1995-2010.
21 Graph 1.2 –Births, death rate and absolute change in total population; five years values (in thousand); from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 -1000
-2000 NB Births Deaths Source: Elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
The figures above also stand in contrast with Yemen’s migration legacy. Historically Yemen has always been a country of emigration, immigration and transit, with Yemeni migrants scattered throughout the world, in the Gulf, Asia, Africa, United States and Europe. Migration out of Yemen has dwindled in the past two decades, as oil producing countries such as Saudi and the UAE have become largely closed to Yemenis. Yemen’s proximity to the Horn of Africa has also given rise to an influx of refugees hitting Yemen’s shores mainly from Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia. Estimates on the number of refugees vary. The UNHCR is currently providing for approximately 230,000 recognized refugees; the transitional government of Yemen, however, has recently estimated its refugee population at around 600,000 to 800,000 with the majority being illegal4. Added to this is the large scale internal displacement that has increased since 2000, a result of the Saada war in the North (2004), the southern insurrection since 2007 and the 2011 uprisings. Again a variety of estimates have been given on internal displacement in 2012, with figures ranging from 310,000 to 543,318.5
4 See Helene Thiollet, From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis: The Changing Dynamics of Contemporary Migration in Yemen, in Why Yemen Matters, pub. Saqi 2014 5 The government of Yemen gives the figure of 545,318 while OCHA gives 430,000 and UNHCR 310,000. See From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis: The Changing Dynamics of Contemporary Migration in Yemen, in Why Yemen Matters, Saqi, 2014.
22 Table 1.2 – Demographic accounting; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010
POP(t) Births Deaths NB MB TB POP(t+5) 1950 4,665 1,150 975 175 -50 125 4,790 1955 1955 4,700 1,250 865 385 -75 310 5,100 1960 1960 5,100 1,390 815 575 -100 475 5,575 1965 1965 5,575 1,540 775 765 -245 520 6,095 1970 1970 6,095 1,655 720 935 -355 580 6,675 1975 1975 6,675 2,000 695 1,305 -75 1,230 7,905 1980 1980 7,905 2,475 680 1,795 -50 1,745 9,650 1985 1985 9,650 2,855 665 2,190 -50 2,140 11,790 1990 1990 11,790 3,305 750 2,555 675 3,230 15,020 1995 1995 15,020 3,410 805 2,605 -100 2,505 17,525 2000 2000 17,525 3,535 815 2,720 -100 2,620 20,145 2005 2005 20,145 3,595 835 2,760 -135 2,625 22,770 2010 28,160 9,395 18,765 -660 18,105 Source: Elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
Yemen’s rapid population growth has been paralleled by relevant changes in the age structure. Typically, in its first phase, a Demographic Transition generates waves of newborn children of increasing magnitude, followed by decreasing waves. The passage of time makes each cohort move along the path of life, determining first a huge expansion of the proportion of the young, then of the population in working age, and then of the elderly. Yemen has completed the first step and the share of the first major age group has reached a maximum of 52.1 per cent in 1990. The second step started in the same period bringing the share of Working Age Population (WAP) from a 45.3 to a present still very low value of 55.4 per cent (Table 1.3).
Table 1.3 – Population by main age groups; absolute values, percentage composition, absolute changes, percentage changes; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010
0-14 15-64 65 e + Total 0-14 15-64 65 e +Total Absolute values Percentage ccomposition 1950 1972 2508 185 4665 42.3 53.8 4.0 100.0 1955 1949 2665 175 4789 40.7 55.6 3.7 100.0 1960 2042 2888 170 5100 40.0 56.6 3.3 100.0 1965 2252 3146 176 5574 40.4 56.4 3.2 100.0 1970 2700 3208 189 6097 44.3 52.6 3.1 100.0 1975 3169 3303 206 6678 47.5 49.5 3.1 100.0 1980 3878 3796 232 7906 49.1 48.0 2.9 100.0 1985 4891 4492 267 9650 50.7 46.5 2.8 100.0 1990 6143 5338 299 11780 52.1 45.3 2.5 100.0 1995 7564 6954 477 14995 50.4 46.4 3.2 100.0 2000 8511 8502 482 17495 48.6 48.6 2.8 100.0 2005 9198 10410 507 20115 45.7 51.8 2.5 100.0 2010 9549 12594 596 22739 42.0 55.4 2.6 100.0 Absolute change Percentage change 1950-55 -23 157 -10 124 -1.2 6.3 -5.4 2.7 1955-60 93 223 -5 311 4.8 8.4 -2.9 6.5 1960-65 210 258 6 474 10.3 8.9 3.5 9.3 1965-70 448 62 13 523 19.9 2.0 7.4 9.4 1970-75 469 95 17 581 17.4 3.0 9.0 9.5 1975-80 709 493 26 1228 22.4 14.9 12.6 18.4 1980-85 1013 696 35 1744 26.1 18.3 15.1 22.1 1985-90 1252 846 32 2130 25.6 18.8 12.0 22.1 1990-95 1421 1616 178 3215 23.1 30.3 59.5 27.3 1995-00 947 1548 5 2500 12.5 22.3 1.0 16.7 2000-05 687 1908 25 2620 8.1 22.4 5.2 15.0 2005-10 351 2184 89 2624 3.8 21.0 17.6 13.0 Source: Elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
23 2. Challenges Due to the Demographic Changes
The Demographic Transition has presented Yemen with two major and interlinked challenges: the increase in Training Age Population (TAP), defined as people aged 6 to 17, and the surge of Working Age Population (WAP). In both cases, the impact has been so extreme that it would have been impossible not only for Yemen, but also for the fastest developing countries to successfully face them.
2.1 The Education Challenge
2.1.1 Yemen’s Education System
Following non-compulsory pre-school education program for children aged 3-6, Yemen’s education system6 is structured into three levels: Compulsory, Secondary and Higher education. Compulsory education lasts nine-years and is free; it is organized into two cycles, a six-year primary education cycle (grades 1 to 6)7 and a three-year preparatory cycle (grades 7 to 9). Secondary education lasts 3 years; after the first year common for all, students can then choose either the science or the humanities track. Higher education programs include: i) two years programs leading to an intermediate diploma, a technical diploma, a technician certificate and a teacher’s certificate (preschool and primary education teacher); ii) three-year programs offered by Community colleges and leading to an associate degree; iii) bachelor’s degree programs that normally last four years (five years in the case of engineering; six years in the case of medicine); at the postgraduate level, there are one-year programs leading to a postgraduate diploma (higher, specialist, graduate or preparatory diploma); Master’s programs generally lasting two years to complete, while doctorate programs least three to four years after the master’s degree8. Yemen’s Technical Education and Vocational Training sector also offers students two- and three-year programs in vocational sectors, absorbing approximately 23.000 students a year.
6 Before the 1990 unification of the country North Yemen had a 6+3+3 system while South Yemen followed an 8+4 model. Education in Yemen is a government priority, yet the poorest still struggle to benefit fully from it. 7 Although entry to grade 1 is at the age of 6, only 20% of children begin school at this age. This low figure quite possibly is linked to children’s poor nutritional status such that, especially in rural areas, they are considered too young to attend school even at ages 7 and 8; United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization and International Bureau of Education, 2012. 8 Western style tertiary education really only began in the 1970’s when Sana›a University was established. Today, there are 9 state-funded ones and a variety of private universities and colleges too. The Yemen University of Science and Technology was established in 1994 and has 4 faculties, namely medical sciences, science and engineering, sciences and humanities, and an international college that specializes in business, information technology, arts and design.
24 2.1.2 Training Age Population
Table 1.4 shows the level of Training Age Population, here defined between 6 and 17, divided into 3 age groups that correspond to the two cycles of compulsory education [Primary school (6-11) and Preparatory cycle (12- 14)] and Secondary education9, leaving aside High education that is still frequented by a limited number of students.
Table 1.4 – Population in training age by sex; absolute values in thousand; estimates from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010 and projections to 2055-2060
Boys Girls Total 6-11 12-14 Compulsory 15-17 TotalT6-11 12-14 Compulsory 15-17 otal 6-11 12-14 Compulsory 15-17 Total 1950 362 163 525 142 667 349 158 507 137 644 711 321 1,032 279 1,311 1955 393 182 575 157 732 381 176 557 151 708 774 358 1,132 307 1,439 1960 363 197 560 175 735 361 191 552 160 720 724 388 1,112 343 1,455 1965 399 169 567 190 757 398 169 568 184 751 797 338 1,135 373 1,508 1970 488 206 693 157 850 483 205 687 158 846 970 410 1,381 315 1,696 1975 589 253 842 191 1,033 580 250 830 192 1,022 1,169 502 1,671 383 2,054 1980 694 310 1,004 247 1,251 681 305 986 244 1,230 1,375 614 1,990 491 2,480 1985 878 361 1,239 305 1,544 855 353 1,208 300 1,508 1,732 715 2,447 605 3,052 1990 1,150 472 1,622 356 1,979 1,115 460 1,575 349 1,924 2,265 932 3,197 706 3,903 1995 1,436 631 2,067 483 2,550 1,388 609 1,997 448 2,444 2,824 1,240 4,064 931 4,994 2000 1,694 755 2,449 623 3,072 1,634 230 2,364 602 2,966 3,329 1,484 4,813 1,225 6,038 2005 1,831 886 2,717 746 3,463 1,763 854 2,617 722 3,338 3,594 1,739 5,333 1,468 6,802 2010 1,918 923 2,840 875 3,716 1,842 888 2,730 845 3,575 3,760 1,811 5,571 1,720 7,291
2015 1,585 970 2,954 913 3,867 1,906 931 2,837 880 3,716 3,890 1,906 5,791 1,792 1,906 2020 2,086 597 3,084 960 4,044 2,002 958 2,960 923 3,883 4,099 2,002 6,044 1,883 2,002 2025 2,190 1,000 3,250 988 4,238 2,102 1,017 3,119 950 4,069 4,292 2,102 6,369 1,939 2,102 2030 2,243 1,106 3,350 1,051 4,400 2,153 1,002 3,315 1,010 4,225 4,396 2,153 6,564 2,060 2,153 2035 2,237 1,123 3,360 1,097 4,457 2,146 1,078 3,224 1,055 4,280 4,383 2,146 6,584 2,153 2,146 2040 2,190 1,110 3,300 1,082 4,383 2,102 1,066 3,167 1,072 4,239 2,102 2,176 6,468 2,155 2,102 2045 2,130 1,082 3,213 1,100 4,313 2,043 1,039 3,082 1,060 4,142 2,043 2,122 6,295 2,159 2,043 2050 2,059 1,053 3,121 1,088 4,300 1,982 1,009 2,991 1,034 4,024 1,982 2,060 6,112 2,122 1,982 2055 2,007 1,023 3,029 1,062 4,091 1,920 979 2,899 1,025 3,924 1,920 2,000 5,928 2,087 1,920 2060 1,932 990 2,922 1,033 3,955 1,848 948 2,796 996 3,792 1,848 1,938 5,718 2,029 1,848
Source: Elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
After 1965, the surge in births registered in the previous years reverted back to: first, an explosion in the number of boys and girls in compulsory education age; second, in the second half of the 1970s, in the number of those in secondary education age. The yearly growth rate of the first group peaks at more than 6 per cent in 1985-9 to then decline below 1 per cent between 2005 and 2010. The second group peaks in 1990-95 to then decline to a present value just above 3 per cent. As a consequence, the number of children in compulsory age education has increased in the last 40 years from around 1,4 million to 5.6 million and those in secondary education-age by more than 5 times, from 315,00 to 1,720,000 (Graph 1.4).
9 The values of each age group have been obtained by re-proportioning the 5 five years age group estimated by UNDESA.
25 Graph 1.3 –Population in Compulsory school age and Secondary school age; yearly rates of growth; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 CE 0.4 4.3 4.2 3.8 4.6 6.1 5.4 3.7 2.2 0.9 TE 0.7 2.5 4.2 4.1 4.6 5.6 5.6 4.2 2.5 1.4 Source: Elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
Graph 1.4–Population in Compulsory school age and Secondary school age; absolute values; 1950-2010 6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
PCE PSE Source: elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
26 2.1.3 Enrolment and Key Obstacles
Relying on data from the 2007-08 school year, when the population in compulsory education age was approximately 5.3 million and that on secondary school age 1.65 million – total enrolment in basic education was 4,190,719 and in secondary education 560,907, totaling 4,751,626. This implies that only 2/3 of children between 6 and 17 were in school. More specifically the gross enrolment ratio was estimated at 85.4 per cent for grades 1-6 (94.5 per cent for boy and 76 per cent for girls) and 74.3 per cent for basic education (84.5 per cent for boys and 63.7 per cent for girls), while that in secondary education was estimated at 33.8 per cent (43.3 per cent for boys and 22.9 per cent for girls).10
If we consider out-of-school children, girls constitute approximately 60 per cent. The situation is worse in rural areas where 87 per cent of the out-of- school children are concentrated. Repetition rates are high, particularly for boys (consistently above 5 per cent in all grades), peaking at 9 per cent in grade 12. Dropout rates are also high, higher for girls than for boys, in rural than in urban areas. As a consequence only 50 per cent of those who enter grade 1 reach the last grade of basic education, and an even lower 38 per cent reach the last grade of secondary education. Boys perform better than girls. The percentage of the former reaching grade 6 is 89 per cent versus a 56 per cent for the latter. By grade 9, the completion rates are 57 per cent for boys and 40 per cent for girls. The obstacles inhibiting Yemeni girls’ access and completion of education are many and closely interlinked with early marriage and household labour needs. One frequently cited obstacle however is the lack of female teachers in rural areas. In a society where segregation is still prevalent, studies have indicated that Yemeni families would be keen to see their girls continue schooling beyond the age of 11, provided there are female teachers.11
Aside from the clear demographic challenge, education in Yemen is no easy feat. Outside of the capital, Yemen’s population is scattered over difficult rural terrain limiting access to schools, with children sometimes having to walk up to an hour or more to reach the nearest school. The quantity and accessibility of schools, however, is one area in which the country has made remarkable strides.
Against serious challenges Yemen has halved its illiteracy rate and significantly increased the enrolment of children in both basic and secondary education. Quantity has come at the expense of quality, with the entire education system 10 Republic of Yemen and World Bank, Republic of Yemen Education Status Report, Challenges and Opportunities, 2010. 11 See Accelerating Girls’ Education in Yemen: Rethinking Policies in Teacher Recruitment and School Distribution. UNICEF 2007.
27 being set back by poorly trained teachers, their ineffective deployment, lack of textbooks and teacher’s guides and curriculums that fall short of preparing Yemen’s youth for the labor market.
More pertinently, Yemen’s education system is predominantly constrained by inadequate funding, ineffective management and lack of governance. Poor governance over the years has had implications on all processes including planning and fiscal management of social sectors and allocation resources, the reluctance and lack of political will to decentralize government functions and the low technical and absorption capacity of line ministries, which leads to limited effectiveness and investment in education. Up until 2011 Yemen’s education sector was managed by three line ministries12 and framed by no less than five strategies.13 Yemen nonetheless lacks a unified and coordinated vision for education.14 The education sector has also suffered enormously from the crises afflicting Yemen since 2011 and the increasing numbers of internally displaced people, many of which used schools as makeshift centers.15
More recently, the recognition of a serious skill deficit in Yemen’s labor market has turned the attention to Yemen’s Technical Education and Vocational Training sector, a sector that absorbs roughly 0.2 per cent of the annual cohort in upper secondary education, and where women’s participation is particularly low standing at 13 percent (MOTEVT 2007).16 The TEVT sector
12 Pre-basic, basic and general secondary education is managed by the Ministry of Education (MOE). Post basic TVET and post-secondary TVET are managed by the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (MOTEVT). University education is under the mandate of the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHESR). 13 These include the National Basic Education Development Strategy (2013-2015); the National General Secondary Education Strategy (2007-2015); the National Strategy for the development of Technical Education and Vocational Training (2004-2014); the National Strategy for the development of Higher Education in Yemen (2006); and the National Children and Youth strategy. This in addition to an ongoing Strategy for Literacy and Education. 14 In 2010, the Government of Yemen asked the World Bank to assist its efforts to forge a holistic approach to developing its Education sector. See Republic of Yemen: Education Status Report, Challenges and Opportunities, 2010, the World Bank 15 An assessment examining the effect of the 2011 crisis on Yemen suggested that 390,000 newly displaced people added to the stock of 214,000 internationally displaced people (IDP) resulting from previous conflicts. About 30% of the IDP’s were estimated to be within the school age range (6-18). See Joint Socio Economic Assessment for the Republic of Yemen, 2012. Vulnerable children’s access to education is highly questionable against an overall backdrop of general insecurity. According to UNICEF in its Yemen PBEA Annual Report 2012 some of the overarching conflict drivers in Yemen are actually education deficits indicating that the basic nature of the education provided – and its lack of emphasis on critical thinking skills – has led a portion of the population to uncritically accept the ideologies and rationalizations put forward by armed groups in Yemen. 16 For an analysis of constraints facing young women entering technical education and vocational training institutes in Yemen see ILO Policy Brief 5, Women in Technical
28 is largely supply driven and has notoriously weak linkages with the labor market. Overall, a recent assessment of Yemen’s education sector conducted by the World Bank concluded that TEVT needs to be more privately funded, demand driven and institutionally managed by employers if it is to prepare Yemen’s youth for the labor market. This is particularly relevant in light of Yemen’s strive to prepare its labour force to work in GCC countries. Re- establishing links with the Gulf has always been a foreign policy priority for Yemen, alongside support for Yemeni labour abroad. Such an endeavor would need to go hand in hand with improving the competitiveness of Yemeni workers on the market, entailing more investment in this sector.
2.2 The Employment Challenge
Rapid demographic growth has also given rise to an increase in Yemen’s Working Age Population (WAP).17 The growth in WAP was relatively contained until 1975, but was enough to increase the WAP from 2.7 to 3.5 million. The following 35 years saw the WAP dynamic enter a new phase. The yearly absolute change climbed from 22,000 to 360,000 in 1990-1995 and then to 455,000 between 2005 and 2010. As a result, in 2010 WAP (15+) reached 13.2 million from the 3.5 million of 1975. It should be underlined that the 15-24 age group has reached its maximum yearly growth (188.000 equal to 7.2 per cent) between 1995 and 2000 and then started to progressively decline.
Education and Vocational Training in Yemen, 2009. http://www.ilo.org/gender/ Informationresources/WCMS_114217/lang--en/index.htm 17 WAP is normally defined between 5 and 64. This definition presents numerous shortcomings in developing countries. In the first place, very often the legal retirement age in the formal sector is lower than 64 (in Yemen for instance at present it is 60). Moreover legal retirement affects a marginal share of workers, mainly those who work in the public sector or eventually in the formal part of the private economy. Finally, the distinction between WAP and post-WAP is blurred by the fact that in agriculture, the predominant sector in developing countries, a high percentage of people remain in the labour force also in very old age, since in traditional rural families living and working are two sides of the same coin. For purpose of this report we will define the WAP as inclusive of the elderly, but when relevant and for the sake of completeness we will also provide separate indicators for the 15-64 and the 65+ age groups.
29 Graph 1.5 – Population 15-24, Working age population 15+ and 15-64; Absolute yearly change (thousand); from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010
500
400
300
200
100
0
-100 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 15-24 16 21 21 -13 0 68 75 71 91 188 178 163
15-64 31 45 52 12 19 99 139 169 323 310 382 437 15+ 29 44 53 15 22 104 146 176 359 311 387 455
Source: Elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
Graph 1.6 translates the absolute yearly changes in percentage yearly changes, which are characterized by a positive trend until 2005,18 the 2005-10 period having registered a slight decline down to 4.2 per cent from 4.5 per cent. This percentage change did correspond to a yearly increase of 450,000 people.
The impact of the DT on the WAP is similar to that on Total Population. Similarly, the WAP is pushed through three consecutive phases: in the first WAP increases, in the second it decreases pace and plateaus in third phase. While in the case of total population entries are represented by births and exits by deaths, for the Working Age Population generational entries are represented by the people who become 15, and generational exits by the people 15 years or older who die or migrate to other countries.19
18 WAP with an intermediate peak due to migration in the 90s. 19 If WAP is defined between 15 and 64 years of age then generational exits include the people who became 65, die or migrate between 15 and 64.
30 Graph 1.6 – Population 15-24, Working age population 15+ and 15-64; percentage yearly changes; from 1950-1955 to 2005-2010
8.0
7.0
6.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10
15-24 1.9 2.2 2.0 -1.1 0.0 6.2 5.2 3.9 4.2 7.2 5.0 3.7
15-64 1.3 1.7 1.8 0.4 0.6 3.0 3.7 3.8 6.1 4.5 4.5 4.2 15+ 1.1 1.5 1.7 0.5 0.7 3.0 3.6 3.7 6.4 4.2 4.3 4.2
Source: elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
Graph 1.7 outlines the evolution of WAP (15+) and its main flows showing that Yemen is still in the first phase of the DT, a phase dominated by a massive increase in generational entries determined by the births that took place 15 years earlier.
Graph 1.7 – WAP 15+; Generational entries, generational exits and total balance; from 1950-1955 to 2055-2060
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20 2020-25 2025-30 2030-35 2035-40 2040-45 2045-50 2050-55 2055-60
Balance Entries Exit
Source: elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
31 In this period generational entries have increased from around 100,000 to almost 600,000 while exits declined to the end of the 80s and then begun to increase to a present value of 125,000.
The end results of these demographic trends is that the employment to population ratio (15-64) registered by Yemen is as low as 34 per cent while the presence of women in the labour market remains one of the lowest in the world.
3. Future Demographic Trends
The demographic challenges for Yemen are far from over. The Training Age Population (6-17) will continue to increase, although at yearly rates below 1 per cent, until 2035 when it will peak at 8.7 million (Table 1.4). In fact, in the next 20 years the number of children in compulsory education age will still increase by almost one million and those in secondary school-age by almost half a million. The obvious implication is that the education system of Yemen will continue to need additional infrastructure investments in buildings and human resources just to keep the present standards, while poverty could make it extremely difficult for children, especially those of the more disadvantaged areas, to attend school. Increased poverty is also reflected in a recent ILO backed child labour survey where an estimated 1,309,000 children are thought to be child labourers.
Equally challenging is the demographic perspective for the labour market even if we consider WAP 15-64 that is less affected by ageing than WAP 15+. As shown in Graph 8, yearly generational entries will continue to grow until 2040 up to a maximum value of almost 750,000. Also exits - inclusive of the present level of net migration - will continue to grow. However their growth will not be sufficient to allow Yemen to enter the second phase of the DT until after 2030-35. In that period the yearly absolute growth in WAP will peak at almost 490,000 and Yemen’s Working Age Population will pass the 24 million mark, almost double of the present value.
32 Graph 1.8 – WAP 15-64; Generational entries, generational exits and total balance; from 1950-1955 to 2055-2060
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
-100 1950- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 2020- 2025- 2030- 2035- 2040- 2045- 2050- 2055- 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 Balance 30 42 48 -4 0 98 141 173 688 305 381 436 444 471 466 493 498 461 371 273 184 97 Entries 104 117 126 104 127 164 203 238 764 415 498 584 608 640 659 700 732 743 735 717 696 677 Exits 74 74 78 109 127 67 62 65 76 110 117 147 165 169 192 207 234 282 364 444 513 580
Source: elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
Only then will Yemen’s Working Age Population enter the second phase of the DT during which population will continue to increase but at a declining pace due both to the decrease in entries and the increase in exits. According to available projections by UNDESA and their assumptions, Yemen’s WAP would however continue to increase well beyond 2060. Graph 9 tries to capture the astounding size of this phenomenon.
Graph 1. 9 – Working age population 15-64; absolute level; 1950-2060
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Source: elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
33 In order to quantify the impact of these demographic trends on the labour market, Graph 10 reports the number of additional jobs that the Yemen economy has to create on average, every year, to keep its employment to population ratio constant at 75 per cent. These numbered 128,000 at the beginning of the century; the number is now around 150,000 and it will have to remain around this level until 2040.
Graph 1.10 – Number of additional jobs needed to keep the employment to population ratio constant at the 2005-2010 level; from 2000-2005 to 2055-2060 180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20 2020-25 2025-30 2030-35 2035-40 2040-45 2435-50 2050-55 2055-60
Add. Jobs per year 128 146149 158156 165167 155124 91 62 33
Source: elaboration on UNDESA data; UNDESA, 2013
34 CHAPTER 2: LABOUR MARKET ANALYSIS
1. Main Labour Market Variables 2004-2010
The demographic trends affecting Yemen are mirrored in available labour market data for 2004 and 2010. In this six-year period the WAP 15+ has increased by 3 million, from 9.8 million to 12.8 million. Active population has registered an even more pronounced percentage growth particularly when it comes to women. In contrast, employment growth has been slightly lower than that of WAP due to an above average performance of the male component, while the growth in female employment has been extremely modest. The level of unemployment has increased by 44 per cent (88.9 per cent for women, 25.6 per cent for men).
Table 2.1 – Main labour market variables by sex; 2004-2010; absolute values (thousand); absolute change and percentage change
Males Females Total Males Females Total 2004 Abs.change WAP 4,899 4,924 4,899 WAP 1,574 1,445 3,020 LF 3,353 470 3,353 LF 1,078 172 1,227 EMPL 2,914 285 3,219 EMPL 966 7 952 UNEMPL 438 186 625 UNEMPL 112 165 275 INACTIVE 1,547 4,454 5,979 INACTIVE 496 1,274 1,792 2010 % change WAP 6,473 6,373 12,843 WAP 32.1 29.4 30.7 LF 4,430 642 5,072 LF 32.2 36.5 31.9 EMPL 3,880 291 4,171 EMPL 33.1 2.4 29.6 UNEMPL 550 351 901 UNEMPL 25.6 88.9 44.0 INACTIVE 2,043 5,728 7,771 INACTIVE 32.1 28.6 30.3
Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
The main labour market indicators reflect the trends outlined above. The rate of participation registered a slight increase, the employment to population ratio declined modestly from 32.8 per cent to 32.5 per cent, while the rate of unemployment climbs from 16.3 per cent to 17.8 per cent. Men’s labour
35 market indicators do not register major changes, while women’s indicators show an increasing willingness to enter the labour market that does not find a sufficient response on the demand side, the employment to population ratio declining from 5.8 per cent to 4.6 per cent. The increase of women’s employment is accompanied by an increase in their unemployment rate, indicative of the growing demand among women, especially young women, to enter the labour market.
Table 2.2 – Main labour market indicators by sex; 2004-2010; absolute values and absolute changes
Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total 2004 2010 Absolute change RoA 68.4 9.5 39.1 68.4 10.1 39.5 0.0 0.5 0.4 RoE 59.5 5.8 32.8 39.9 4.6 32.5 0.4 -1.2 -0.3 RoU 13.1 39.5 16.3 12.4 54.6 17.8 -0.6 15.1 1.5 RoI 31.6 90.5 60.9 31.6 89.9 60.5 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
2. Population Age Structure
Yemen’s population is predominantly young with 43 per cent below 15 and almost two/thirds (64.5) below 25. The presence of old people is still marginal 3.4 per cent. Women represent less than 50 per cent in each of the three major age groups.
Table 2.3 – Population by main age groups; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010
Male Female Both sexes Male Female Both sexes 0-14 4,974.5 4,974.5 9,649.1 43.5 42.3 42.9 15-24 2,509.1 2,509.1 4,848.7 21.9 21.2 21.6 25-64 3,555.1 3,555.1 7,229.7 31.1 33.3 32.1 15-64 6,064.2 6,064.2 12,078.5 53.0 54.5 53.7 65+ 408.7 408.7 764.3 3.6 3.2 3.4 Total 11,447.5 11,447.5 22,491.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
Three fourth of Yemen’s population lives in rural areas, women having a slightly higher presence in urban than rural areas.
36 Table 2.4 – Population by sex and urban- rural; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010
Urban Rural Total Absolute values Male 3,029.4 8,418.1 11,447.5 Female 3,019.2 8,025.2 11,044.4 Both sexes 6,048.6 16,443.3 22,491.9 Percentage distribution Male 26.5 73.5 100.0 Female 27.3 72.7 100.0 Both sexes 26.9 73.1 100.0 F/Tot 49.9 48.8 49.1
Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
3. Main Labour Market Indicators: 2010
Two main factors are striking when looking at Yemen’s formal labour market. The first is that the rate of participation is lower than the rate of inactivity: only 40.8 per cent of the WAP aged 15-64 is in fact present in the labour market. The second is that men represent 87 per cent of the labour force.
Underlying the significantly low rate of participation is the lack of job opportunities offered by Yemen’s productive system. Growth in Yemen has until recently primarily stemmed from oil revenues, though this sector employed a minimal number of national workforce. The private sector in Yemen is weak, investment is poor due to the country’s volatility, and the public sector is struggling to keep pace with an expanding workforce. Yemen’s labor market is also largely informal. Using social protection coverage (health care, insurance, paid leave) as the criterion of informality, informality and irregularity becomes deeply embedded in Yemen even within formal sectors. Yemen’s employment to population ratio is equal to 33.5 per cent. Almost 18 per cent of the people in the labour force are unemployed. Entries in the labour market appear extremely problematic. Only 30 per cent of the young are present in the labour market, the percentage being 49.1 per cent for men and 10 per cent for women. Even more distressing is the employment situation: only one out 5 young people being employed, the values being one out of three for young men and one out of forty for young women.
Adopting a standard approach to employment, the difference between men and women is very pronounced, the rate of unemployment of women being 54.9 per cent versus a value of 12.4 for men. The data provided is weighted
37 average between the situation of the first age group (15-24) and that of the following age groups (25-64). Women in Yemen are underrepresented in the formal labour market but are overrepresented among informal workers, unpaid family workers, part time, low wage earners, unemployed and inactive, leading to Yemen having one of the lowest labour participation rates of women in the MENA region and in the world. Despite Yemen’s social and political landscape rapidly changing, with more women willing to enter the labor market, Yemen remains a patriarchal and tribal society where gender roles are clearly defined and where women are strongly linked to their reproductive roles and roles as family and community carers.1 Measuring women’s work, particularly in the Yemen, also presents one with methodological challenges. Activities such as fetching water from the home may not be recognized as standard economic activities, despite their importance in a country where two thirds of the population lives in rural areas and three quarters of rural households lack a fixed connection to a water network.2
Table 2.5 - Main labour market indicators by sex and main age groups; 2010 Male Female Both sexes Male Female Both sexes 15-24 15-64 RoA 49.1 10.0 30.3 70.9 10.5 40.8 RoE 36.4 2.6 20.1 62.1 4.7 33.5 RoU 26.0 74.0 33.7 12.4 54.9 17.9 RoI 50.9 90.0 69.7 29.1 89.5 59.2 25-64 15+ RoA 86.3 10.8 47.9 68.4 10.1 39.5 RoE 80.2 6.1 42.5 59.9 4.6 32.5 RoU 7.0 43.5 11.2 12.4 54.6 17.8 RoI 13.7 89.2 52.1 31.6 89.9 60.5 Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
4. Labour Market Indicators by Age Group
The high rate of participation registered by men is reflected in the classical box shape taken by their specific rates by age, with values above 90 per cent for the 30-to 44 age bracket, increasing values up to the age group 25-29 and
1 Intrinsic to these roles are clear challenges inhibiting Yemeni women from entering the labour market including early marriage, high birth rates, their roles as community carers, social ceremonies embedded in Yemen’s traditions that entirely rely on women (mawlids, weddings, deaths) and more prominently a negative stigma, still prevalent, attached to women who work outside the home. 2 As highlighted in a recent ILO Policy Brief on Yemen, a more comprehensive labour picture takes into account the work that people perform even when not counted as employment, particularly unpaid household services, which include unpaid care work and unpaid housework. A recognition that people reported as home-makers are workers leads to an entirely different statistical picture where women become the majority of working people. See From Informality to Decent Work in Yemen, 2013.
38 declining values after the age group 45-49. The lowest participation rates for women peak in the 25-29 age group, which was 12.7 per cent. The percentage of women in the labour force, however, increases with age
Graph 2.1 – Men, women and total; rates of participation by five-year intervals; 2010
100.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 11-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ Male 35.4 67.5 84.1 90.7 94.9 94.0 88.4 82.0 73.5 61.3 31.8 Female 9.7 10.4 12.7 12.1 11.6 9.9 9.2 7.9 8.4 6.8 3.4 Both sexes 23.3 39.0 46.7 52.3 515 49.4 47.7 46.1 40.5 37.6 18.6
For both men and women the rates of participation parallel the employment to population ratios, the difference progressively declining with age.
Graph 2.2 – Men and women; rates of participation and employment to population ratio by ten-year age group; 2010
14.0 100.0 90.0 12.0 80.0 10.0 70.0 60.0 8.0 50.0 6.0 40.0 30.0 4.0 20.0 2.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Di 12.8 8.5 4.3 4.2 4.8 3.6 Di 7.4 6.4 3.9 3.1 3.1 1.4 RoA 49.1 86.8 94.6 85.5 67.3 31.8 RoA 100 12.4 10.9 8.7 7.7 3.4 RoE 36.4 78.3 90.3 81.3 62.4 28.2 RoE 1.6 6.0 7.1 5.6 4.7 2.0
39 Table 2.6 - Labour force and participation rates by sex and five year age group, and percentage of women; 2010
Labour force ('00s) Male Female Both sexes Male Female Both sexes F/Tot 15-19 509.7 509.7 633.3 35.4 9.7 23.3 24.2 20-20 722.9 722.9 833.8 67.5 10.4 39.0 15.3 25-29 715.1 715.1 833.3 84.1 12.7 46.7 16.5 30-34 547.3 547.3 617.1 90.7 12.1 52.3 12.8 35-39 530.5 530.5 601.2 94.9 11.6 51.5 13.3 40-44 363.1 363.1 406.5 94.0 9.9 49.4 12.0 45-49 355.8 355.8 395.0 88.4 9.2 47.7 11.0 50-54 270.9 270.9 295.5 82.0 7.9 46.1 9.1 55-59 152.2 152.2 170.2 73.5 8.4 40.5 11.8 60-64 132.8 132.8 144.1 61.3 6.8 37.6 8.5 15-64 4,300.2 4,300.2 4,930.0 70.9 10.5 40.8 14.6 65+ 129.9 129.9 142.0 31.8 3.4 18.6 93 Total 4,430.0 4,430.0 5,072.0 68.4 10.1 39.5 14.5
Table 2.7 – Employment and employment to population by sex, and five year age group, and percentage of women; 2010
Male Female Both sexes Male Female Both sexes F/T Absolute values Employment to population ratio 1,233 234 1,467 36.4 2.6 20.1 16.0 1,262 188 1,450 78.3 6.0 41.5 13.0 894 114 1,008 90.3 7.1 46.6 11.3 627 64 691 81.3 5.6 43.3 9.2 285 29 314 62.4 4.7 35.1 9.3 4,300 630 4,930 62.1 4.7 33.5 12.8 1300 12 142 28.2 2.0 16.0 8.5 4,430 642 5,072 59.9 4.6 32.5 12.7
To put this into context, one out of six people in Yemen’s labour force is unemployed, one in two women and one out of eight for men. Both for men and women, unemployment is concentrated in the 15-24 age group, the percentage being 60 per cent for the former and 50 per cent for the latter. Unemployment rates decline with age as well as the gender differential, which is, however, always larger than 30 percentage points.
40 Graph 2.3 – Men and women; rates of unemployment by ten-year age group; 2010
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
-20.0
-40.0
-60.0 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 Men 26.0 9.8 4.5 4.9 7.2 Women 74.0 51.6 35.4 35.9 39.6 Di . -48.0 -41.9 -30.9 -31.0 -32.4
5. Labour Force by Sex, Age and Educational Level
Yemen’s labour market possesses poor educational levels. In general, educational attainment is lower for women and is inversely related to age, both for men and women. Only 8.2 per cent of the labour force (15 and above) has completed tertiary education, while 54.8 per cent has no schooling or less than primary education; 15.8 per cent completed compulsory education and 21 per cent secondary education. If we consider the 25-34 age group, the percentage of those that have not completed compulsory education is still quite high, 42.3 per cent, while the percentages of those that have completed secondary and tertiary is slightly higher (28 per cent and 12.9 per cent respectively).
Data clearly shows that the educational attainment of women is more polarized than that of men. While almost 40 per cent of women in the labour force have no schooling, the percentage of men in the same situation is 25 per cent. At the same time the percentage of women with at least a secondary diploma is 31.5 per cent versus a percentage of 28.8 for men. This situation is even more pronounced in the 25-34 age group. Women with no schooling are 29.2 per cent and those with at least a secondary diploma 51 per cent. The corresponding values for men are 10.6 per cent and 39.5 per cent.
41 Table 2.8 – Labour force by sex and educational level; absolute values; 2010
No Less than schooling primary Primary Secondary TertiaryNot stated Total Absolute values Males 15-24 117 494 336 273 7 4 1,233 25-34 134 401 222 359 139 7 1,262 35-44 190 235 123 222 123 1 894 45-54 332 137 36 72 50 0 627 55-64 217 32 6 17 13 0 285 65+ 118 9 0 2 1 0 130 25-64 990 814 388 672 325 8 3,197 15+ 1,107 1,308 724 945 333 12 4,430 Females 15-24 54 67 54 49 9 1 234 25-34 55 23 15 48 48 0 188 35-44 59 13 7 18 17 0 114 45-54 49 2 1 6 6 0 64 55-64 27 1 0 0 1 0 29 65+ 12 0 0 0 0 0 12 25-64 202 39 22 72 72 0 407 15+ 256 106 76 121 82 1 642 Total 15-24 171 561 390 322 17 5 1,467 25-34 189 424 236 407 187 7 1,450 35-44 249 249 129 240 140 1 1,008 45-54 381 139 38 78 55 0 691 55-64 244 33 6 17 13 0 314 65+ 130 9 0 2 1 142 25-64 1,192 853 410 744 398 8 3,605 15+ 1,363 1,414 800 1,066 414 13 5,072
42 Table 2.9 - Labour force by sex and educational level; percentage distribution; 2010
No Less than schooling primary Primary Secondary TertiaryNot stated Total Percentage composition Males 15-24 9.5 40.1 27.3 22.2 0.6 0.4 100.0 25-34 10.6 31.8 17.6 28.5 11.0 0.6 100.0 35-44 21.2 26.3 13.7 24.8 13.8 0.1 100.0 45-54 52.9 21.9 5.8 11.5 7.9 0.0 100.0 55-64 76.0 11.1 2.2 6.1 4.4 0.1 100.0 65+ 90.7 7.0 0.4 1.2 0.8 0.0 100.0 25-64 31.0 25.5 12.1 21.0 10.2 0.3 100.0 15+ 25.0 29.5 16.3 21.3 7.5 0.3 100.0 Females 15-24 23.0 28.7 23.1 20.9 4.0 0.4 100.0 25-34 29.2 12.1 7.7 25.3 25.7 0.0 100.0 35-44 51.6 11.7 5.8 15.7 15.2 0.0 100.0 45-54 76.8 2.8 1.7 9.6 9.0 0.1 100.0 55-64 93.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.6 100.0 65+ 97.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 100.0 25-64 49.5 9.6 5.4 17.6 17.8 0.1 100.0 15+ 39.8 16.6 11.9 18.8 12.7 0.2 100.0 Total 15-24 11.7 38.2 26.6 22.0 1.1 0.4 100.0 25-34 13.1 29.2 16.3 28.0 12.9 0.5 100.0 35-44 24.7 24.7 12.8 23.8 13.9 0.1 100.0 45-54 55.1 20.1 5.4 11.3 8.0 0.0 100.0 55-64 77.6 10.5 2.0 5.5 4.2 0.1 100.0 65+ 91.3 6.4 0.3 1.1 1.0 0.0 100.0 25-64 33.1 23.7 11.4 20.6 11.0 0.2 100.0 15+ 26.9 27.9 15.8 21.0 8.2 0.3 100.0
6. Employment by Sector
Services make up the bulk of the labour market at 56.4 per cent, followed by agriculture with 24.8 per cent, with industry at 18.9 per cent. Moreover, more than half of the employed in industry are in construction, with manufacturing representing only 6.6 per cent of total employment. In the service sector, public services (31.4 per cent of the total) are more relevant than the privately owned that accounts for 25 per cent. The distribution of women by sector differs from that of men for a higher share in the public services and also, quite surprisingly, in manufacturing.
43 Table 2.10 - Employed by sex and sector; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010
Male Female Both sexes Male Female Both sexes Fem/Tot Agriculture 949.3 81.6 1,030.9 24.5 28.0 24.8 7.9 Manufacturing 233.9 40.9 274.8 6.0 14.1 6.6 14.9 Other industrial sectors 68.1 0.8 68.8 1.8 0.3 1.7 1.1 Construction 440.4 0.9 441.2 11.4 0.3 10.6 0.2 Industry 742.3 42.5 784.8 19.2 14.6 18.9 5.4 Private services 1,255.3 49.9 1,305.2 32.4 17.1 31.4 3.8 Public sector 923.2 117.3 1,040.4 23.9 40.3 25.0 11.3 Services 2,178.4 167.2 2,345.6 56.3 57.4 56.4 7.1 Total 3,870.0 291.3 4,161.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 7.0 Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
7. Status in Employment
Almost two third of the employed are wage and salaried workers; employers constitute less than 5 per cent, and self-employed workers 30 per cent. Given their predominant share in employment, the male proportions are similar to those of the total with slightly higher values for wage and salaried workers and employers. Only 57.5 per cent of women are wage and salaried workers, and 2 per cent employers, while own account workers weight for more than 40 per cent.
Table 2.11 – Employed by sex, five year age group and status in employment; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010
Wage and Wage and Wage and own-account own-account own-account salaried Employers salaried Employers salaried Employers workers workers workers workers workers workers Men Women Total 15-24 15-24 2.1 24.4 50.2 0.7 49.1 72.1 2.0 25.9 25-34 25-34 3.5 25.4 68.1 3.0 29.0 70.8 3.5 25.7 35-44 35-44 5.1 26.5 65.6 1.5 32.9 68.1 4.8 27.0 45-54 45-54 8.0 34.2 46.2 3.9 49.9 57.1 7.7 35.2 55-64 55-64 9.4 49.1 30.1 0.0 69.9 40.7 8.8 50.4 65+ 65+ 7.3 60.1 33.1 1.6 65.3 32.6 7.0 60.4 15+ 15+ 4.7 29.4 57.5 2.0 40.5 65.3 4.6 30.2
Source: Central Statistical Organization,
An indication of the beginnings of the modernization of the Yemen labour market could be deduced from the fact that the percentage of employees declines with age, while that of the self-employed increases, the former from 72.1 per cent to 40.7 per cent, the latter from 27.9 to 59.3 per cent. The trend isthe same for men and women but it is much more pronounced for the former than for the latter.
44 Graph 2.4 – Employed by sex and ten year age group; percentage composition by status in employment; 2010
80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 WSW 72.1 70.8 68.1 57.1 40.7 OAW 27.9 29.2 31.9 42.9 59.3
Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
The percentage of employees reaches its maximum in public services (96.7 per cent), in the non-manufacturing industrial sectors (96.1 per cent) and construction 88.9 per cent), followed by manufacturing, the last two sectors being private services and agriculture. This trend is apparent for men, but not for women who register a very low percentage in manufacturing (14.7 per cent), an indication of the prevailing typology of enterprises of the sector.
45 Table 2.12 - Employed by sex, sector and status in employment; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010
Wage and Own- Wage and Own- salaried Employers account Total salaried Employers account workers workers workers workers Men Agriculture 420.4 62.7 466.2 949.3 44.3 6.6 49.1 Manufacturing 180.8 20.3 32.8 233.9 77.3 8.7 14.0 Other I.S. 65.3 0.1 2.6 68.1 96.0 0.2 3.8 Construction 391.6 13.3 35.4 440.4 88.9 3.0 8.0 Industry 637.8 33.7 70.8 742.3 85.9 4.5 9.5
Private services 593.5 81.7 580.0 1,255.3 47.3 6.5 46.2 Public services 895.8 6.0 21.4 923.2 97.0 0.7 2.3 Services 1,489.3 87.7 601.4 2,178.4 68.4 4.0 27.6 Total 2,2,547.5 184.2 1,138.4 3,870.0 65.8 4.8 29.4 Women Agriculture 28.4 3.5 49.7 81.6 34.9 4.2 60.9 Manufacturing 6.0 0.6 34.3 40.9 14.7 1.5 83.9 Other I.S. 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 100.0 0.0 0.0 Construction 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.9 75.1 0.0 24.9
Industry 7.4 0.6 34.5 42.5 17.4 1.4 81.1 Private services 21.1 1.1 27.8 49.9 42.2 2.2 55.6 Public services 110.5 0.8 5.9 117.3 94.3 0.7 5.1 Services 131.6 1.9 33.7 167.2 78.7 1.1 20.2 Total 167.4 5.9 117.9 291.3 57.5 2.0 40.5 Men and Women Agriculture 448.9 66.2 515.9 1,030.9 43.5 6.4 50.0 Manufacturing 186.8 20.9 67.1 274.8 68.0 7.6 24.4 Other I.S. 66.1 0.1 2.6 68.8 96.1 0.2 3.7 Construction 392.3 13.3 35.6 441.2 88.9 3.0 8.1
Industry 645.2 34.3 105.3 784.8 82.2 4.4 13.4 Private services 614.6 82.8 607.8 1,305.2 47.1 6.3 46.6 Public services 1,006.3 6.8 27.3 1,040.4 96.7 0.7 2.6 Services 1,620.9 89.6 635.1 2,345.6 69.1 3.8 27.1 Total 2,714.9 190.1 1,256.3 4,161.3 65.2 4.6 30.2 Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
Wage and salaried workers are more concentrated in the case of women: 78.6 per cent are in services and 17 per cent in agriculture. This figure, however, masks the fact that women form the agriculture backbone of Yemen, but their work remains unpaid and mostly conducted on their own family’s land. For men, only 58.5 per cent are in services (35.2 per cent in the public services and 23.3 per cent in private services), 16.5 per cent are in agriculture, 15,4 in construction and 7.1 in manufacturing. To be underlined also the minor role that the private service sector has for women than for men (12.3 per cent versus 24.3 per cent). To many employers employing women in Yemen is a costly endeavor. High fertility coupled with early age of marriage entails higher expenditures for establishments (recruiting replacements, investing in new employees etc.), which leads to the likelihood of there being more discriminatory practices in the private sector3.
3 See ILO, “Employment Trends for Women in Yemen,” 2004.
46 Graph 2.5 – Employed by sex; percentage composition by sector; 2010
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0 Private Agriculture Manufacturing Other I.S. Construction services Public services
Men 16.5 7.1 2.6 15.4 23.3 35.2 Women 17.0 3.6 0.5 0.4 12.6 66.0
Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
8. Employment by Occupation
Around 55 per cent of the employed are concentrated in three occupations: in the following order, skilled agricultural workers (21.9 per cent), Service and sale workers (17.68 per cent), Craftsmen and related workers (14.7 per cent). The ranking for women is slightly different with Technician and assistant professionals ranking second (18.5 per cent) and Services and sale workers fourth (11.8 per cent). This could reflect or parallel the fact that women educational attainment is more polarized.
Table 2.13 - Employed by sex and occupation; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010
Male Female Both sexes Male Female Both sexes F/T Security and armed forces 350.8 1.9 352.7 9.0 0.6 8.5 0.5 Legislators, senior ocials and managers 93.3 5.5 98.9 2.4 1.9 2.4 5.6 Professionals 93.3 34.5 214.6 4.6 11.8 5.1 16.1 Technicians and assistant professionals 250.6 53.9 304.5 6.5 18.5 7.3 17.7 Clerks 112.1 16.8 128.9 2.9 5.8 3.1 13.1 Services and sales workers at shops and markets 705.4 35.8 741.1 18.2 12.3 17.8 4.8 Skilled agricultural and shery workers 845.9 68.5 914.4 21.8 23.5 21.9 7.5 Craftsmen and related workers 575.1 38.7 613.9 14.8 13.3 14.7 6.3 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 323.7 3.6 327.4 8.3 1.2 7.8 1.1 Simple occupations 442.9 32.1 475.0 11.4 11.0 11.4 6.8 Total 3,880.1 291.3 4,171.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 7.0
47 The status of wage and salaried workers is largely predominant for white- collar occupations and simple occupations. This is true especially for women, while this status is predominant for men also in craftsmen occupations.
Graph 2.6 - Employed by sex and occupation; percentage of wage and salaried workers; 2010
100.0
90.0 MenWomen
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0 Legislators, Professionals Technicians and Clerks Services and Skilled Craftsmen and Plant and Simple senio o cials assistant sales workers at agricultural and related workers machine occupations and managers professionals shops and shery workers operators nd markets assemblers
The majority of agricultural employees are skilled workers (81.2 per cent) and 13.4 per cent belong to elementary occupations, which do not require any educational attainment. In industry 62.4 per cent are craftsmen, 17.4 per cent non-qualified workers and only 8.2 per cent machine operators. However, craftsmen represent 71.2 per cent in construction where 19.9 per cent are non-qualified workers, 58.5 per cent in manufacturing where 16.5 per cent are plant and machine operators, and only 21.3 per cent in other Industry where 45.4 per cent are non-qualified workers.
Employment in services is much more spread over different occupations; in fact only 28.8 per cent are services and sale workers, 14.9 per cent security workers, 12.2 per cent technicians, and 10.8 per cent plant and machine operators; this structure is explained by a) the relevance of Security and Armed Forces that represents 32 per cent of the public sector and 7.9 per cent of total employment, b) while technician and professional represent respectively 23 and 15 per cent of the public service sector; c) at the same time in the private service sector 46 per cent of the employees are service and sale workers and 18.6 Plant operator.
From the occupation perspective, more than 80 per cent of the employed in the first 6 occupations are in the service sector, while 80 per cent of the craftsmen are in Industry and rather surprisingly almost 80 per cent of the plant and machine operators work in the service sectors. Non-qualified workers are present in all three main sectors: 41.9 per cent in Services, 29.2 in Agriculture and 28.9 per cent in Industry, mainly in Construction.
48 Table 2.14 - Employed by sector and occupation; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010
Industry Services M Construction anufacturing I ndustries Se Se P P O T T rivate ublic rv rv otal otal ther ices Agriculture ices Total
Security and armed forces 2.9 0.7 0.0 0.5 1.2 15.3 333.2 348.6 352.7 Legislators, senior o cials and managers 1.0 6.2 2.5 8.5 17.2 18.9 61.7 80.6 98.8 Professionals 0.8 7.9 4.1 6.3 18.3 39.0 156.0 195.0 214.1 Technicians and assistant professionals 0.2 10.7 2.9 3.8 17.4 47.2 239.2 286.4 304.0 Clerks 0.6 4.0 4.6 3.0 11.6 32.9 83.8 116.7 128.9 Services and sales workers at shops and marks 37.0 19.7 1.9 1.7 23.4 603.3 73.3 676.6 737.0 Skilled agricultural and sishery workers 837.4 1.5 2.5 0.4 4.5 69.9 2.5 72.5 914.4 Craftsman and related workers 4.9 160.7 14.6 314.3 489.7 102.6 15.6 118.1 612.7 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 7.7 45.4 4.3 15.0 64.6 243.2 9.3 252.5 324.8 Simple occupations 138.4 18.1 31.3 87.6 136.9 132.7 65.8 198.5 473.8 Total 1030.9 274.8 68.8 441.2 784.8 1305.2 1040.4 2345.6 4161.3
Security and armed forces 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.2 32.0 14.9 8.5 Legislators, senior o cials and managers 0.1 2.3 3.7 1.6 2.2 1.5 5.9 3.4 2.4 Professionals 0.1 2.9 6.0 1.4 2.3 3.0 15.0 8.3 5.1 Technicians and assistant professionals 0.0 3.9 4.2 0.9 2.2 3.6 23.0 12.2 7.3 Clerks 0.1 1.5 6.7 0.7 1.5 2.5 8.1 5.0 3.1 Services and sales workers at shops and marks 3.6 7.2 2.8 0.4 3.0 46.2 7.0 28.8 17.1 Skilled agricultural and sishery workers 81.2 0.6 3.7 0.1 0.6 5.4 0.2 3.1 22.0 Craftsman and related workers 0.5 58.5 21.3 71.2 62.4 7.9 1.5 5.0 14.7 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.7 16.5 6.2 3.4 8.2 18.6 0.9 10.8 7.8 Simple occupations 13.4 6.6 45.4 19.9 17.4 10.2 6.3 8.5 11.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Security and armed forces 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 4.3 94.5 98.8 100.0 Legislators, senior o cials and managers 1.0 6.3 2.6 8.6 17.4 19.2 62.4 81.6 100.0 Professionals 0.4 3.7 1.9 2.9 8.5 18.2 72.9 91.1 100.0 Technicians and assistant professionals 0.1 3.5 1.0 1.3 5.7 15.5 78.7 94.2 100.0 Clerks 0.5 3.1 3.6 2.3 9.0 25.6 65.0 90.6 100.0 Services and sales workers at shops and marks 5.0 2.7 0.3 0.2 3.2 81.9 9.9 91.8 100.0 Skilled agricultural and sishery workers 91.6 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.5 7.6 0.3 7.9 100.0 Craftsman and related workers 0.8 26.2 2.4 51.3 79.9 16.7 2.5 19.3 100.0 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 2.4 14.0 1.3 4.6 19.9 74.9 2.9 77.7 100.0 Simple occupations 29.2 3.8 6.6 18.5 28.9 28.0 13.9 41.9 100.0 Total 24.8 6.6 1.7 10.6 18.9 31.4 25.0 56.4 100.0
9. Unemployment
Almost 18 per cent of Yemen’s labour force is unemployed, a very high percentage that still does not fully account for the lack of job opportunities that afflicts Yemen. Unemployment is concentrated in the youngest age groups: 54.8 per cent in the 15-24 age group and 79.3 per cent in the 15-34 age group. The concentration is slightly less pronounced for women than for men.
49 Table 2.15 - Unemployed by sex and ten year age group; absolute values and percentage composition; 2010
Male Female Both sexes Male Female Both sexes Fem/Tot 15-24 320.2 173.5 493.8 58.2 49.5 54.8 35.1 25-34 123.5 97.2 220.7 22.5 27.7 24.5 44.0 35-44 40.3 40.3 80.6 7.3 11.5 9.0 50.0 45-54 30.8 22.9 53.7 5.6 6.5 6.0 42.7 55-64 20.4 11.6 32.1 3.7 3.3 3.6 36.2 65+ 14.7 5.1 19.8 2.7 1.4 2.2 25.7 25-64 229.7 177.1 406.8 41.8 50.5 45.2 43.5 15+ 550.0 350.6 900.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 38.9 Source: Central Statistical Organization, 2010, www.cso-yemen.org
Women represent only 12.7 per cent of the labour force, but 38.9 per cent of the unemployed. The percentage is 35.1 per cent for the first age group, reaching a maximum of 50 per cent for the 35-44 age group. The total unemployment rate by age group presents an unusual shape with a maximum of 33.7 per cent for the first age group and a minimum of 7.8 per cent in correspondence of the 45-54 age group. The unemployment rate increases up to 13.9 per cent for the elderly. Both men and women present a similar shape but at very different levels. Men’s rates start at 26 per cent, reach a minimum of 4.5 per cent in correspondence of the 35-44 age group to then increase to 11.3 per cent. Women rates start at 74 per cent declines to 35.4 per cent to then increase to 42 per cent.
Graph 2.7 – Unemployment rates by sex and age group; 2010
40.0 80.0 35.0 70.0 30.0 60.0 25.0 50.0 20.0 40.0 30.0 15.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 15+ 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Male 26.0 9.8 4.5 4.9 7.2. 11.3 12.4 Both sexes 33.7 15.2 8.0 7.8 10.2 13.9 Female 74.0 51.6 35.4 35.9 39.6 42.0 54.6
The large majority of unemployed have a low educational level, more than 50 percent having not compleyed primary education. The phenomenon is less pronounced for the young: in the 15-24 age group the unemployed with less than primary education represent 47.1 per cent, in the age group 25 and above 60.5 per cent.
50 Graph 2.8 – Men and women; Unemployment by educational level and age group; 2010
45.0 40.0 35.9 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 Less than No schooling PrimarySecondaryTertiary primary
15-24 15.5 31.6 26.2 25.0 1.6 25+ 42.0 18.5 8.9 20.1 10.5 15+ 27.0 25.7 18.4 22.8 5.6
The phenomenon is present both for men and women, but is more pronounced for the latter. Moreover the distribution of women unemployed by educational level differs for a much larger weight, in both age group considered, of those with no schooling, the values being 25.1 and 55.3 per cent for women and 10.4 and 31.8 per cent for men
Graph 2.9 - Women; Percentage of unemployed by age and educational level; 2010
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0 Less than No schooling PrimarySecondaryTertiary primary
15-24 25.1 28.7 24.2 19.1 2.9
25+ 55.3 13.0 4.6 14.8 12.4
15+ 40.3 20.7 14.3 17.0 7.7
51 Graph 2.10 – Men; Percentage of unemployed by age and educational level; 2010
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0 Less than No schooling PrimarySecondary Tertiary primary
15-24 10.4 33.2 27.2 28.1 0.8
25+ 31.8 22.7 12.2 24.2 9.0
15+ 19.3 28.9 21.0 26.5 4.2
Previous data reflect the distribution of WAP by educational level. A better perspective of the influence of education on the probability to find a job is offered by the rate of unemployment. For men the probability to be unemployed is below average for those with no schooling and with tertiary education, and also but in a marginal way for those with less than primary education. For women, on the contrary, it is below average only for those with secondary education and in a much more pronounced way for those with tertiary education.
Graph 2.11 – Men, women and total; rate of unemployment by educational level; 2010 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0
0.0 No Less than PrimarySecondaryTertiaryTotal schooling primary
Men 9.6 12.1 15.9 15.4 7.0 12.4
Women 55.3 68.4 65.6 49.2 33.1 54.6
Total 18.2 16.4 20.7 19.2 12.2 17.8
52 10. The Inactive
The economically inactive4 represent 60.5 per cent of WAP, the percentage reaching a value of 89.9 for women and 31.6 for men. Women therefore represent almost three fourths of the inactive population. For men the main reason of inactivity is being engaged in schooling -50 per cent. For women the main reason (76.9 per cent) is to be engaged in household chores while schooling explains only 9.3 per cent.
Table 2.16 - Economically inactive by reason for inactivity and sex; 2010
Male Female Both sexes Male Female Both sexes Fem/Tot Student (studying) 955.3 534.9 1,490.2 46.8 9.3 19.2 35.9 Family/parents/ 7.7 144.8 152.4 0.4 2.5 2.0 95.0 spouse does not allow Engaged in household chores 454.8 4,407.3 4,862.1 22.3 76.9 62.6 90.6 On retirement, no need to work 108.9 24.5 133.4 5.3 0.4 1.7 18.3 Too young/ old/ retired 480.1 598.6 1,078.7 23.5 10.5 13.9 55.5 Other 36.1 17.9 53.9 1.8 0.3 0.7 33.1 Total 2,042.9 5,727.9 7,770.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 73.7
4 Individuals are considered to be inactive, or outside the labour force, if they are neither employed nor unemployed, that is not actively seeking work. There are a variety of reasons why some individuals may choose not to participate in the labour force, this many include reasons such as caring for the family members and the elderly, retired, sick, disabled or attending schools.
53
CHAPTER 3: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The first dominant trait of Yemen’s labour market is its high demographic pressure. In the last ten years this has increased the total population by 5.2 million: the number of children in compulsory education age has increased by around 750,000 and Yemen’s Working Age Population (15-64) by 4.1 million. The average yearly increase in Yemen’s WAP has in the past decade consistently exceeded 4 per cent per year. Since similar trends have dominated in the past 30 years employment growth has not been able to keep pace with the country’s growing workforce leading to an overall labour force participation rate of just 33.5 per cent. The informal economy characterized by irregularities and lack of social protection (lack of contracts, health insurance, retirement plans) thus remains the actual economy of Yemen, and one in which women form the majority.1
A second trait of Yemen’s labour market is its low educational level. With an economy that was highly dependent on oil revenues, Yemen’s institutions and infrastructures have long been neglected, a factor that has been clearly mirrored in the country’s educational system. Rough estimates based on UNDESA demographic data and school indicators by MOE and World Bank suggest that out of the approximately 600,000 boys and girls exiting at present from the schools system less than half actually complete compulsory education and of these only 180,00 continue secondary education. Data also reveals that Yemen’s education system falls short of adequately preparing its youth for a competitive labour market. Almost half of Yemen’s labour force (54.8 per cent) has not completed compulsory education and members with at least secondary education represent less than 30 per cent. Skills also
1 The international definition of the informal sector refers to the unincorporated nature of the enterprise, its employment size and the non-registration of the enterprise under specific forms of national legislations. Using these criteria, nearly all private establishments employing less than 5 workers, amounting to at least 94% of the total establishments in Yemen according to the LDS OF 2002-2003 are part of the informal sector. See ILO, Policy Brief – From Informality to Decent Work in Yemen, 2013.
55 constitute a serious deficit. In Yemen’s last labour force survey (2003) almost 90 per cent of the establishments identified reported difficulties in finding skilled Yemeni labour, particularly in speaking a foreign-language, accounting skills, management skills, leadership skills, computer skills, equipment operation skills, and electronic skills. Graduates from Technical Education and Vocational Training institutes reported their own difficulties in operating electrical and mechanical tools and equipment.
The most prominent factor characterizing the Yemeni labour market is the absence of Yemeni women from the formal market. An analysis of data between 2004 and 2010 best exemplifies this predicament. In this six-year period men in working age have increased by 262,000 per year. In order to keep the employment to population ratio constant at the 2004 level, the number of men employed should have increased on average by 156,000 per year. In fact men’s employment increased by 161,000, allowing for a marginal increase in their employment to population ratio. To reach the same goal, women employment should have increased by just 14,000 per year. But even this very modest result was not achieved, women employment having increased by only 1,000 per year. As a consequence their employment to population ratio has declined to 4.6 per cent.
According to analyzed data in 2010 women in Yemen represent 12.7 per cent of the country’s labour force, but only 7 per cent of the employed, and therefore 38.9 per cent of the unemployed and 73.7 per cent of the inactive. Only 10 per cent of women between 15 and 24 are in the labour force although the percentage of those still in school is as low as 24 per cent; moreover, only one out of four girls in the labour force in the same age group has been able to find a job.
Ways Forward
Unemployment, moreover lack of decent employment and under employment, and a labour market that lacks equity, security and human dignity, remain the biggest challenges facing Yemen’s transitional period; these undermine the political stability and future security of the country. In the next 20 years the demographic pressure on Yemen’s labour market is likely to continue and potentially become more pronounced. The first two phases of any demographic transition typically produce what is defined as an unlimited supply of labour that, in the presence of quantitatively and qualitatively coherent investments, can then foster economic growth and development. In the case of Yemen, entries in WAP will average around 650,000 per year while the absolute change of WAP will be of around 470,000. Whether Yemen will have enough resources to create the number of jobs sufficient for both its men and women remains questionable. Long term development will depend on a strong Yemeni state that will reignite economic growth, generate
56 decent employment by providing a social protection floor for all, and address equality in employment with focus on women’s economic empowerment and youth employment.
Promoting Yemeni Workers in GCC Countries
Reigniting domestic economic growth in Yemen will prove challenging. Migration will have to continue to play a major role since investment will not suffice to warrant full employment to the incoming generation. Historically Yemen has always been a country of emigration and remittances have always played a pivotal role in its economic well-being.2 The prevailing rate of poverty and relatively high population density in Yemen contrasted with the relative “emptiness” of the rest of the Arabian Peninsula and brings into question the issues of Yemeni labour in the Gulf. Over the years, one of the most cited means of improving Yemen’s economic well-being is for the GCC member states to make their labour markets more open to Yemeni workers. In the short and long term, remittances would help boost the country’s income, and contribute to the stability of Yemen which none more so than today is at the interest of all its neighbors in the region. The barriers for more Yemeni labour in the Gulf however are largely political.3 In 2010, Yemen’s western donors initiated a strategic partnership with the Gulf States to address security risks posed by the situation in Yemen. Their hopes of fostering regional leadership by the GCC were based on recognition that “these states have significant financial resources, strong cultural ties to Yemen and important connections in its informal power networks.”4 Today, labour migration remains a priority for Yemen’s transitional Government’s agenda and at policy level pressure must be exerted on the GCC countries to do more to relieve some of the problems of unemployment in Yemen. Were the GCC to ease their regulations framework and open the doors to Yemeni labour one key deficit however remains: skilled labour. The role of the Technical
2 Remittances from abroad continue to be a key source of income for many Yemeni families and are said to be equal to foreign direct investment in Yemen, and contribute more than official development assistance. Migrant remittances are considered less volatile than foreign investment. 3 Observations on why the GCC is hesitant to open its doors to more Yemeni labour are many including security concerns, suitability of Yemeni workers in light of skills deficits, the fear of “dilution” of GCC nationals in light of the domination of foreign labour, and also the advantages of having Asian labourers as opposed to Yemeni ones. Foreign Asian workers in the Gulf are thought to have little desire to settle in the Gulf and make little demands on the state. Yemeni workers by contrast are culturally closer to Gulf citizens and are linked to the tribal heritage of the Gulf, a factor that raises concerns of a different, more permanent type of migration in comparison to the Asian one, were they to open the doors to Yemen migration. 4 See Jessica Forsythe in Opportunities and obstacles for Yemeni workers in GCC Labour Markets, Chatham House, September 2011, p. 3
57 Education and Vocational Training here is pivotal as a building block for the preparation of skilled labour. Radical reform and investment in this sector is crucial, as is the involvement of Yemen’s employers. Labour Migration also needs sound Labour Migration Policy. To this end the ILO has already taken measures to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Department of Workers Abroad in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Yemen which aims to function as an advisory body, a repository of information and analysis and as a monitoring body to supervise the implementation of initiatives of out-migration from Yemen.
Towards Women’s Economic Empowerment
Yemen’s key to economic well-being primarily lies in the harnessing of the capabilities of its domestic labour force, and within that the economic independence and empowerment of women. At the heart of the low participation of women in Yemen’s labour market is the prevailing negative stigma attached to women working in the public sphere. Any development policy on women must therefore come with an overarching strategy to combat such perceptions through wide-scale national campaigns that addresses parents, employers and Yemeni society as a whole, and that challenge the traditional stereotypes of women. Such campaigns must capitalize on women’s participation in Yemen’s revolution and the increase of women in the public sphere ever since January 2011.5
On an institutional level preparing young Yemeni women for the labour market means radical wide-scale changes in the education system. This involves investment in female teachers in rural areas and the updating of school curriculums that reinforce gendered stereotypes of women. From a higher education perspective, Yemen’s Technical Education and Vocational Training sector could play a key role in equipping young Yemeni women with skills and enhance the absorption of more women in the Yemeni labour market. The logic is that such a sector could have a wider outreach in skills development, a role that to date has been mostly executed by select non- governmental organizations in Yemen, whose impact though successful is limited in coverage and scope. The impact of this sector however entirely depends on a) hefty coordinated donor support to make this sector more
5 During the uprisings Yemeni women, led marches and demonstrations, acted as lecturers and trainers, formed coalitions and movements and have since then played an unprecedented role in defining the country’s future during Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference. Increased participation in the public sphere and the recent emergence of a number of female role models such as Tawakkul Karman no doubt have positive consequences but should not be overstated. Women might be defying social conventions in urban areas but across most of Yemen traditional gender roles prevail and development efforts must urgently address the bulk of women workers in the agriculture sphere whose work remains unpaid and whose position is vulnerable.
58 relevant to Yemen’s labour market needs b) a successful nation-wide re- branding campaign of the TEVT sector that steers away from its association with manual labour dominated by men and c) wider outreach in Yemen’s rural governorates.
Underpinning any future endeavor towards promoting women’s employment is the urgent need for research that is based on the existing and emerging realities on the ground and that takes into account Yemeni customs. Inclusive in this would be a countrywide survey that assesses the market needs in Yemen and evaluates the potential role of women within these markets in accordance with Yemeni values. The uniqueness of the country’s social fabric means that any assumptions imported from abroad on how to improve women’s employability would largely fail against a context where segregation is largely prevalent and social structures complex. Yemen needs a gradual, sensitive strategy if aiming for a female labour force participation that goes beyond that of the privileged educated elite to also encompass women in rural areas and the formalization of their work.
To date, the ILO has had relevant successful experiences in supporting the Technical Education and Vocational Training Sector in initiating a campaign to attract more women to TEVT. Fostering Yemeni women’s entrepreneurial spirit has also been an ILO strategy in Yemen with women entrepreneurship programs piloted with TEVT institutes and other partner organizations in Yemen. None of these interventions can be expected to succeed without genuine political will and targeted job creation. To that end, since 2012 Yemeni activists have been fighting to pass a law requiring a 30 percent quota for women in all government decision-making posts in the country. Though skepticism is high on whether quotas actually help in creating more equity, on a short-term measure such a decision could greatly enhance the possibility of policy making that is sensitive to Yemeni women’s needs and that addresses their deficit in the labour market.
A Labour Market that Fosters Youth Employment
Yemen’s 2011 uprisings were framed by half of its young generation (48.1 per cent) being neither in the educational and training system nor in the job market. Forming the core of Yemen’s uprisings in 2011 were Yemeni students and youth demanding a better social contract that sees their political and economic inclusion. This analysis concurred that only 1 out 5 young people in Yemen is employed, 1 out of 3 for young men and one 1 of 40 for young women. Youth unemployment in Yemen is three times higher than adult unemployment. From a demographic perspective, the sizeable number of people who are young, unemployed and dissatisfied warrants immediate attention since it is this group that is likely to be at the core of popular unrest in the country. As of the end of 2013, the ILO in coordination with
59 UNDP has supported the government in developing the National Youth Employment Action Plan 2014/2016, a framework that is meant to direct all youth employment initiatives in Yemen. Support for Yemen’s transitional government and the elected future government to implement this action plan could help create a labour market that is inclusive of and prioritizes the employment of young Yemenis. The impact of this endeavor however largely depends on young Yemenis actual inclusion in policy making, an inclusion that goes beyond “token gestures” toward genuine involvement in Yemen’s political life.
Beyond More Jobs to Better Jobs
Yemen does not only need more jobs but better jobs, in conditions of security and human dignity. Informal employment constitutes Yemen’s main economy which means the majority of Yemeni workers are working without contracts, health benefits, pension schemes, child benefits, occupational health and safety measures and mostly working irregular hours. Within the informal sector, women represent the largest share of “invisible workers” and are particularly vulnerable in rural areas where awareness of their rights is poor. In Yemen, the informal economy extends to the formal economy where such a protection floor is lacking in the majority of Yemen’s establishments, across both the public and private sector. The transition of Yemen from the prevalence of non-employment and informality towards a path of full employment and decent work will need a transformation of socio-economic thinking, policies and institutions. At the heart of this is a workforce that sees the government is working in their interest. A recent regional analysis conducted jointly by the ILO and UNDP stating the region’s greatest deficits in inclusive economic growth cited social protection and social dialogue as the biggest deficits impeding inclusive economic growth6. Capitalizing on the unprecedented social dialogue experienced throughout Yemen’s recent National Dialogue Conference, and the overall wave of transitional change that is gripping the region, this opportunity presents as good a time as ever to bring tripartite partners (Yemen’s government, workers and employers) to talk on a comprehensive social protection floor for Yemen.
An Alternative Development Paradigm: Investment in Education and Data Monitoring Systems
Such policies cannot be formulated and implemented without a reliable baseline of Yemen’s labour market and social and economic conditions. As apparent across the region there is a lack of systematic, comprehensive, and comparable data that is needed to build a reliable labour market information
6 ILO/UNDP, Rethinking Economic Growth: Towards Productive and Inclusive Arab Societies, 2012.
60 system. This system should be inclusive not only of labour market data, but also of all the information necessary to design, implement, monitor and evaluate employment and labour policies as well as industrial policies. The database and monitoring system should include a wide range of indicators, demographic, macroeconomic, education and health data. The system should contain both stock and flow information as well as software to produce labour market and demographic scenarios, a basic tool to simulate the impact of alternative labour and employment policies. Such a database should then form the basis of labour market policies. To this end the ILO with the support of UNDP and other agencies has been over the last years supporting the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in building the capacity of a Labour Market Information Analysis Unit and is currently in preparation for Yemen’s next Labour Force Survey last conducted in 1999. Future development endeavors are more likely to be efficient once interventions are designed on current labour data reflecting the country’s present reality.
Yemen needs to find a new development paradigm leading the country toward a sustainable development path that will overcome poverty, inequality, and insecurity. Economic growth is the result of a process of technological upgrading, of diversification and structural change driven by the accumulation of capabilities, on one hand, and the transformation of the production structure, on the other. It is the knowledge base of a country that defines and limits the technologies a country can adopt, the production structure that evolves, and therefore the possible paths to economic growth and social development. More specifically, speeding up economic growth and triggering successful catching up processes does require shifting production from low quality activities into “high quality activities”, that to jump into new knowledge clusters. In order to do so a country needs to drive its knowledge structure toward higher diversity and complexity; in other words, to endow its incoming labor force with the expertise and competences that will be required by the economic development triggered by industrial policies.
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