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Operation Enduring Freedom.Pdf U.S. Army Military History Institute Afghanistan 950 Soldiers Drive Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5021 31 Jan 2012 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM A Working Bibliography of MHI Sources CONTENTS General Sources…..p.1 Specific Locales…..p.4 Special Aspects…..p.6 -Lessons Learned…..p.8 -Artillery…..p.9 -Logistics…..p.9 -Media…..p.10 -Medical Aspects…..p.11 -Insurgency/Counterinsurgency…..p.11 -Special Forces…..p.12 -The Taliban…..p.13 Personal Narratives/Experiences…..p.14 Allied Forces…..p.15 Training/Rebuilding/Civil Aid…..p.16 Home Front…..p.19 GENERAL SOURCES Biddle, Stephen. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy. Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC/SSI, 2002. 58 p. U413.R32.B48. Bonin, John A. U.S. Army Forces Central Command in Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf during Operation Enduring Freedom: 11 September 2001-11 March 2003. Carlisle, PA: Army Heritage Center, 2003. 77 p. DS371.4.B66. Byrom, Jonathan. “Training the New Afghan Tank Force: A Multi-national Advisory Mission, 2 June 2003 to 3 December 2003.” In Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007. NY: Routledge, 2008. pp. 192-209. UA12.M535. Caraccilo, Dominic J. Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2011. U153.C36. Operation Enduring Freedom p.2 Carlton-Ford, Steven, & Ender, Morten G., editors. The Routledge Handbook of War and Society: Iraq and Afghanistan. NY: Routledge, 2011. 324 p. DS79.76.R68. Clements, Frank A. Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2003. 376 p. DS356.C54. Collins, Joseph J. Understanding War in Afghanistan. Wash, DC: NDU, 2011. 137 p. DS371.412.C65. Cooley, John K. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism. Sterling, VA: Pluto , 2000. 299 p. JZ.1480.A57.A35. Crile, George. Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History. NY: Atlantic Monthly, 2003. 550 p. DS371.2.C75. The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts. 5 vols. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010. DS63.1.E43. Filkins, Dexter. The Forever War. NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008. 368 p. DS79.76.F545. Foley, Michael S., & O’Malley, Brendan P., editors. Home Fronts: A Wartime America Reader. NY: Norton, 2008. 635 p. E742.H66. See Chaps. 12-13. Friedman, Norman. Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Inst, 2003. 327 p. HV6432.F75. Gannon, James. Obama's War: Avoiding a Quagmire in Afghanistan. Wash, DC: Potomac Books, 2011. 191 p. DS371.412.C36. Grau, Lester W., & Rillingsley, Dodge. Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan. Lawrence, KS: U KS, 2011. 459 p. DS371.4123.O64.G73. Isby, David C. Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires: A New History of the Borderlands. NY: Pegasus, 2010. 440 p. DS357.5.I83. Jalali, Ali A. “Afghanistan: Regaining the Momentum.” Parameters (Winter 2007/08): pp. 5-19. Per. _____. “Winning in Afghanistan.” Parameters (Spring 2009): pp. 5-21. Per. Johnson, Thomas H., & Mason, M. Chris. “Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template.” Military Review (Nov/Dec 2009): pp. 2-14. Per. Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. NY: W. W. Norton & Co, 2009. 414 p. DS371.412.J66. Operation Enduring Freedom p.3 Kugler, Richard L., et. al. Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations. Wash, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU, 2009. 59 p. DS371.4123.O64.K84. Maloney, Sean M. “Afghanistan Four Years on: An Assessment.” Parameters (Autumn 2005): pp. 21-32. Per. _____. “Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?” Parameters (Spring 2004): pp. 4-15. Per. Melton, Stephen L. The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward). Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2009. 306 p. UA23.M46. Naylor, Sean. “The ‘Afghan Model’: War’s Future?” Army Times (18 Nov 02): p. 8. Per. Report of Army War College study by Prof. Stephen Biddle, advocating mix of precision fire and ground maneuvers as key to operations in the region. _____. “An Act of Courage.” Army Times (29 Apr 02): pp. 14-16 & 18. Per. 4 Mar 2002 Battle of Roberts Ridge, named for first of seven American fatalities, in first two days of Operation ANACONDA. _____. “It’s Not Over.” Army Times (4 Feb 2002): pp. 12-14. Per. Articles & photos of div deployment around Kandahar. _____. Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda. NY: Berkley, 2005. 425 p. DS371.4123.O64.N39. Neumann, Ronald E. The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan. Wash, DC: Potomac, 2009. 245 p. DS371.413.N48. Paschall, Rod. “The 27-Day War.” MHQ (Spring 2012): pp. 54-65. Per. Joint CIA-Special Forces intervention commences 19 Sep 2001. Ricks, Charles W. “Telling the Afghan Military Story…Their Way!” Military Review (Mar/Apr 2006): pp. 88-94. Per. Ripley, Tim. Operation Enduring Freedom: America’s Afghan War 2001 to 2002. Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword, 2011. 252 p. DS371.412.R56. Robertson, William G., editor. In Contact! Case Studies from the Long War. Volume I. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2006. 158 p. DS79.76.I5. Semple, Michael. Reconciliation in Afghanistan. Wash, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2009. 110 p. DS371.4.S46. Shaikh, Riaz Ahmed. “The Pakistan and Afghan Crisis.” In The Routledge Handbook of War and Society: Iraq and Afghanistan, cited above. pp. 200-10. DS79.76.R68. Operation Enduring Freedom p.4 Steele, Dennis. “Afghanistan: America’s Main Effort Redux.” Army (Mar 2009): pp. 24-26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36 & 38. Per. _____. “The U.S. Army in Afghanistan.” Army (Apr 2002): much of the issue is devoted to a pictorial essay on division & elements in Afghanistan. Per. Tripathi, Deepak. Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wash, DC: Potomac Books, 2010. 183 p. E902.T75. Ulrich, Marybeth P. “The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations.” Parameters (Spring 2011): pp. 86-100. Per. Ussery, Easton H., editor. War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Congressional Issues. NY: Nova Science Pubs, 2010. 136 p. DS371.412.W37. deVillafranca, Richard. “Reconsidering Afghanistan: Time for an ‘Azimuth Check.’” Parameters (Winter 2008/09): pp. 77-94. Per. West, F.J. Bing. “American Military Performance in Iraq.” Military Review (Sep/Oct 2006): pp. 2-7. Per. Wright, Donald P., [et al.] A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), October 2001-September 2005. Ft Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2010. 399 p. DS371.412.D54. SPECIFIC LOCALES Burton, Janice. “Nightmare in the Shok Valley.” Soldiers (May 2009): pp. 4-9. Per. Detachment A, 3rd Special Forces Group, 6 Apr 2008, in eastern Afghanistan. Coss, Michael A. “Operation Mountain Lion: CJTF-76 in Afghanistan, Spring 2006.” Military Review (Jan/Feb 2008): pp. 22-29. Per. Donahue, Patrick, & Fenzel, Michael. “Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Tack Force Devil in Afghanistan.” Military Review (Mar/Apr 2008): pp. 25-40. Per. In OEF VI. Dyson, Neal C. “The 12 February 2011 Battle for the Afghan National Police Provincial Headquarters of Kandahar.” Military Police (Spring 2012): pp. 25-29. Per. Operation Enduring Freedom p.5 Finlayson, Kenneth. “Operation BAAZ TSUKA: Task Force 31 Returns to the Panjwai.” Veritas Vol. 4, No. 1 (2008): pp. 15-25. Per. Dec 2006. _____, & Meyer, Alan D. “Operation Medusa: Regaining Control of Afghanistan’s Panjwayi Valley.” Veritas Vol. 3, No. 4(2007): pp. 1-13. Per. Sep 2006. Flynn, David S. “Extreme Partnership in Afghanistan: Arghandab District, Kandahar Province, 2010-2011.” Military Review (Mar/Apr 2012): pp. 27-35. Per. Hackenbeck, Frank. “Battle of Takur Ghar.” On Point (Fall 2007): p. 17. Per. Brief narrative of 34- Mar 2002 operation. Hyde, Robert D., Kelly, Mark D., & Andrews, William F. “Operation BOA: A Counterfactual History of the Battle for Shah-i-Kot.” Military Review (Sep/Oct 2008): pp. 68-76. Per. Operation Anaconda. Johnson, Robert. Outnumbered, Outgunned, Undeterred: Twenty Battles against all Odds. NY: Thames & Hudson, 2011. 208 p. D25.J64. See Chap. 20-“The Defence of the Platoon Houses and the Battle of Wanat, Afghanistan, 2006-8” Jones, Robert W., Jr. “Afghan Ambush: ODA 744 in Afghanistan.” Veritas Vol. 1, No. 2 (2005): pp. 71-76. Per. Kemp, Robert. “Counterinsurgency in Nangarhar Province, Eastern Afghanistan, 2004-2008.” Military Review (Nov/Dec 2010): pp. 34-42. Per. Kennedy, John R., & Foley, Roger. “The 504th Military Police Battalion Surges into Full Spectrum Operations in Kandahar City.” Military Police (Spring 2012): pp. 9-16. Per. MacPherson, Malcolm. Roberts Ridge: A Story of Courage and Sacrifice on Takur Ghar Mountain, Afghanistan. NY: Delacorte, 2005. 338 p. DS371.4123.T35.M33. Ringenberg, Dirk D. “The Battle of Balūch Kalay.” Army History (Spring 2009): pp. 6-18. Per. May 2005. Sink, James A. “First Lethal FA Fires in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned at Firebase Shkin.” Field Artillery (Nov/Dec 2003): pp. 16-19. Per. Thomas, Paul A. “Ambush in Gumbad Valley.” Infantry (Jan/Feb 2008): pp. 26-31. Per. 1/598th Infantry, Aug 2005. Operation Enduring Freedom p.6 Trias-DeRyder, Carolyn. “Operation Mountain Thrust.” Army Logistician (Jan/Feb 2008): pp. 12-15. Per. Forward support company, summer, 2006. Weiss, Mitch, & Maurer, Kevin. No Way Out: A Story of Valor in the Mountains of Afghanistan. NY: Berkley Caliber, 2012. 328 p. DS371.4123.S556.W45. 3rd Special Forces Group, Shok Valley, 2008. Welch, Ryan. “Operation Anaconda: The Battle for Shah-I-Kot Valley.” Armor (Nov/Dec 2003): pp. 36-41. Per. Wright, Donald P., general editor. Vanguard of Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2012.
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