US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

2 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Table of Contents

Forward by Morton Abramowitz 3

Introduction 4

I. The First Chechen War 6

II. The Second Chechen War 11

III. The Bush Response(s) to Chechnya 22

IV. Conclusion 29

Epilogue 31

Endnotes 32

About the Author 41

Euro-Atlantic Initiatives 42

The Century Foundation 43

The Stanley Foundation 44 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 3

Forward

h e ch nya has been and remains one of the greatest stains in Ru s s i a’s efforts to move t ow a rd a more open and democratic sys t e m . The Chechen wars, as Pro fessor Mich ae l CM c Faul of St a n f o rd Unive r s i ty reminds us in this important essay, “rank as the most s e rious scars of Ru s s i a’s troubled tra n s i t i on . ” Since 1994 these wars, with their vast destru c t i on and terrible human ri g h ts abuses, h a ve also posed an enormous policy (and moral) pro bl e m f o r Am e ri can administra t i ons intent on trying to better integrate Russia into the We s t e rn c om mu n i ty of nation s . Dealing with Chech nya has aroused mu ch debate in and out of the US gove rnment—a debate that over the years has sadly decl i n e d.

In 2001 the Stanley Foundation and the Century Foundation established a task force to look at the broad question of the impact of American domestic political forces on US-Russia relations. (A report was issued in October 2002.) The first subject the task force discussed was Chechnya, which we labeled “the dog that did not bark.” Professor McFaul made an impressive oral pres- entation on US policy on Chechnya, which we asked him to expand and bring up to date. This essay is the result, a detailed analysis of US policy from the Clinton to Bush administrations and the impact on that policy from forces within Con g ress and from the NGO com mu n i ty who tried to generate greater public debate and secure a tougher Am e ri can re s p onse tow a rd Ru s s i a’s actions in Chech ny a .

McFaul’s tale is a sad one. Its bottom line is that US policy has had little impact on Russia’s behavior in Chechnya. Similarly, while many like Senator Jesse Helms fought very hard to toughen policy, domestic political forces had little impact on changing it.

Successive administrations were willing to offer up on ly rh e t o ri c . As McFaul succinctly puts it “ C l i n t on I was not ve ry cri t i ca l . C l i n t on II was ve ry cri t i ca l . Candidate Bush was ve ry cri t i ca l as well. President Bush has dropped the issue.” In the end no administra t i on was willing to take tougher measures against a huge country where we had so many other interests at stake and where policymakers felt they could not affect the conduct of the war. The war on terro ri s m s t ru ck the final nail into any serious Am e ri can action on Chech ny a , although I am told that senior administra t i on officials at least bring it up re g u l a rly but quietly. D omestic politics produced some partisan debate over Chech ny a , but it never went mu ch beyond the Beltw ay. An d , u n f o rt u n a t e ly for the Chech e n s , t h e re are too few of them in the United States to effe c t i ve ly lobby the gove rnment to affect ch a n g e . Over time dissenting voices have died dow n . “The terrible tragedy that is Chech ny a , ” M c Faul con cludes from his study, “is a sobering reminder of the limits of Am e ri can powe r. ”

Morton Abramowitz Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation December 27, 2002 4 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Introduction

US Foreign Policy and Chechnya1 ince the end of the Cold Wa r,Am e ri can foreign policymakers have made integra t i on of Russia into the West a principal objective . M o s t , though not all , h a ve assumed that SRussian integra t i on can take place on ly after Russia has successfully consolidated demo- c ratic and market institutions at hom e . Promoting the deve l o pment of these institutions in Ru s s i a , t h e re f o re, has remained a central com p onent of US policy tow a rd Russia since the c o llapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Presidents and their staffs have defined the stra t e gy of pursuing these objective s . President George H. W. Bush wanted to see Russia move closer to the We s t , but did not believe that the United States should get intimately inv o lved with the t ra n s f o rm a t i on process in Ru s s i a . So on after becoming pre s i d e n t , Wi lliam J. C l i n t on adopted a more activist stra t e gy for guiding and influencing Russian re f o rm . In his term of office, President George W. Bush has re t u rned to a more hands-off appro a ch to promoting intern a l Russian re f o rm but has adopted a more aggre s s i ve policy of integrating Russia into We s t e rn i n s t i t u t i on s , i n cluding the No rth Atlantic Tre a ty Organiza t i on (NATO) and the Wo rld Tra d e O r g a n i za t i on (WTO ) . Although the accents of policy have varied among administra t i on s , t h e basic goals have remained the same: p romote democra cy and capitalism in Russia and inte- g rate Russia into the We s t e rn com mu n i ty of democratic states.

More than a decade after the Soviet collapse, the progress toward these goals is more striking than the setbacks. Ten years ago, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his newly minted government launched a set of changes on a revolutionary scale. Like earlier social revolutions, Yeltsin and his allies sought to transform the fundamental organization of the polity and economy in Ru s s i a . T h ey aimed to destroy the Soviet command econ omy and replace it with a mark e t e c onomy. They also wanted to crush the Soviet dictatorship and replace it with a democratic polity. Unlike their counterparts in France in 1789 or Russia in 1917, Russia’s anticommunist revolutionaries added an additional task: the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Yeltsin’s agenda was also fundamentally different from that of the Jacobins or Bolsheviks in its approach to the other leading powers in the international system. Whereas these earlier revolutionaries sought to challenge the existing Western community of states, Yeltsin aspired to join this club.

A decade ago few predicted that “the reformers” would be successful in implementing their enormous agenda. At the time,Russia’s elite and society were deeply divided on every issue of this agenda. As demonstrated by the overwhelming majority who voted in favor of preserving the Union in a March 1991 referendum, Soviet dissolution was very unpopular. The resistance to acting Prime Minister Ye gor Gaidar and his re f o rms in the Russian con g ress underscore d the weak support for market re f o rm s . If many post-Com munist countries debated what mark e t re f o rms to pursue after the fall of com mu n i s m , Russia debated whether to pursue mark e t re f o rms at all . In 1992 it seemed that the democratic re f o rms had been successful. Yeltsin and his allies believed that the political struggle was over and that the democratic side had won . I n J a n u a ry 1992, t h e re f o re, the focus had to be on the other two agenda items—con f i rm i n g Ru s s i a’s new borders and creating new market institution s . US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 5

A decade later, one has to be impressed with the scale of change. Well into the 1990s, it remained unclear (1) if boundaries between new states would become permanent and peaceful, (2) if capitalism would ever take hold, (3) if Russia could integrate into the West, and (4) if democracy would ever consolidate. Russia has made some amazing progress.

The Soviet empire is gone and will never be reconstituted. Belarus may join Russia again, but the coercive subjugation of states and people adjacent to Russia’s borders appears very unlikely. Though thousands of lives have been lost as a result of this empire’s dissolution, Russian decol- onization has been relatively peaceful when compared to the collapse of other empires.

The Soviet command econo my is extinct. Russia today has a market econom y . This market system is severe l y flawed, but the fundamental institutions of the Russian econo my today look more like other capitalist econo mies around the world and less like the Soviet command econom y . In ad d i t i on , even former counterrevo l u t i on a r ies such as the Comm unist Par ty of the Rus s i a n Fed e ra t i o n now endorse the basic tenets of cap i t a l i s m .

Also,Russia is much more connected to the West today than it was a decade ago. Russia still has not penetrated many important institutions, such as the WTO. Memberships into clubs such as the European Union still seem decades into the future, if not impossible. Yet Russia has moved decisively in a Western direction despite serious disagreements between Russia and the West over issues such as NATO expansion and the NATO war with Serbia over Kosovo. September 11 has helped to accelerate Russia’s Westward leanings.

Russian democra cy is the major agenda item still unre s o lve d . The autocratic institutions of the Soviet ancien reg i m e h a ve coll a p s e d . Yet it is still too early to decl a re that democra t i c i n s t i t u t i ons will perm a n e n t ly replace the old ord e r.Po s t - C om munist Russia most cert a i n ly has experimented with democratic pra c t i c e s . That eve ry major political leader in post- C om munist Russia has come to power through the ballot box is a real accomplishment for a c o u n t ry with a history of autocratic ru l e . That the con s t i t u t i on adopted in 1993 has remained the highest law in the land is also a good sign. In addition , eve ry serious poll con- ducted in Russia within the last five years shows that a solid majori ty of Russian citize n s s u p p o rt democratic ideas and pra c t i c e s .2 Yet com p a red to the deeper roots of Russian independence and Russian ca p i t a l i s m , Russian democra cy remains the unfinished agenda item of the rev o l u t i on launched a decade ago.

The flaws of Russian democra cy, as well as the impediments to democratic con s o l i d a t i on , a re many.3 The Chechen wars, h ow eve r, rank as the most serious scars of Ru s s i a’s tro u b l e d t ra n s i t i on . Other democracies fight wars and use force against their own citize n s . For many o b s e rvers in the We s t , h ow eve r, the scale of human rights abuses observed in these two wars raise serious questions about Ru s s i a’s commitment to democratic norm s . Others have argued that the wars have served to undermine other already fragile democratic institution s , i n cl u d- ing a free press and free and fair election s . Within the Am e ri can policy com mu n i ty, t h e C h e chen war has ignited one of the most heated debates about Russia in the 1990s. Wh i l e 6 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya s ome have com p a red the Chechen wars to the Am e ri can Civil War—a necessary evil to p res e rve the integri ty of the Russian Fe d e ra t i on—others have labeled these Russian military i n t e rve n t i ons genocide.

H ow have US policymakers re s p onded to Chech nya? How have the Chechen wars influenced the broader goals of Russian internal re f o rm and Russian integra t i on in the West? The bottom line answer is “not mu ch . ” The rh e t o ric about Chech nya has changed over time. The Clinton a d m i n i s t ra t i on was apologetic in its re fe rences to the first Chechen war, but used mu ch more c ri t i cal language to describe the second Chechen war. Candidate and President Bush has also changed his language about Chech ny a . As a presidential ca n d i d a t e, Bush was ve ry cri t i cal of the second Chechen war and Clinton’s tepid criticism of the Russian interve n t i on . A ft e r September 11, h ow eve r, the discourse used by Bush to describe the conflict was mu ch more s ympathetic to the Russian ca u s e .

Policy, however, never changed commensurately with rhetorical fluctuations. On the contrary, what is striking about the American response to the Chechen wars is continuity, not change. Throughout the 1990s, US officials have done little to affect the Chechen wars. Some argue that the United States had tools at its disposal that could have influenced the wars in a significant and positive way. US officials, they contend, were simply unwilling to use these tools.4 American unwillingness to use coercive policies against the Russians is part of the explanation, but only a part. The other major factor that promoted continuity in US policy was the lack of American power to influence the situation in Chechnya. Critics also recognize this limitation. Even if US policymakers wanted to be more interventionist, they had few tools to do so. Obviously, the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world’s only superpower.Yet this super-superpower proved unable to influence domestic policy in Russia and was certainly unwilling to try, given their dim expectations of success.

To explain the changing rh e t o ric about Chech nya as well as the unchanging policy tow a rd C h e ch nya and the domestic political re a c t i on in the United St a t e s , this paper proceeds in four part s . Se c t i on I looks at the Clinton administra t i on’s re s p onse to the first war. Se c t i on II examines the diffe rent re s p onse from the Clinton administra t i on to the second war. Se c t i on III focuses on the language and policies of candidate and President Bush re g a rding Chech ny a , c on t rasting the tough stance of Bush the candidate with the softer language used in his first meeting with President Vladimir Putin in the summer of 2001—language that became eve n s o fter after September 11. Se c t i on IV con cludes with some observ a t i ons about US policy.

I. The First Chechen War President Clinton believed the United States had a national securi ty interest in prom o t i n g Ru s s i a’s political and econ omic tra n s f o rm a t i on . If Russia consolidated a market econ omy at h om e, then Russia would be more coopera t i ve with capitalist countries abroad as well as more l i k e ly to turn democra t i c . If Russia consolidated democra cy, then Russia could become a partner and maybe even an ally of other democra c i e s . To assist this tra n s f o rm a t i on pro c e s s , t h e C l i n t on administra t i on foll owed a stra t e gy of providing mora l , e c on om i c , and some politica l US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 7 assistance to those in Russia they believed to be re f o rm e r s . At the top of the list was Bori s Ye l t s i n . From Clinton’s perspective, Yeltsin was unequivoca lly Ru s s i a’s chief re f o rm e r, t h e indispensable general of Ru s s i a’s market and democratic rev o l u t i on .5 If Yeltsin fe ll , C l i n t on b e l i eve d , re f o rm would fail as well.6

Already in the first year of Clinton’s presidency, this hypothesis about the positive causal relationship between democracy and Yeltsin came into question. In September 1993, Yeltsin declared the Parliament disbanded, and then used armed force to oust the recalcitrant Parliament from power the following month. The invasion of Chechnya presented an even greater challenge. On December 2, 1994, Russian forces began what was to be a full-scale attack on the breakaway republic of Chechnya in the Northern Caucasus. Both in Washington and Moscow, one-time supporters of Yeltsin began to doubt their original assumptions about the man and his regime. Russian “reform” looked neither progressive nor stable.

The Chechen crisis had simmered for years. In August 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev and his government in Chechnya declared Chechnya’s independence. For three years the Russian state was too weak to exercise sovereignty over the breakaway republic and Chechnya enjoyed de facto independence.7 After solidifying his power,Yeltsin committed to a military solution following a series of insults from Dudayev regarding Russian sovereignty during negotiations over the federal treaty in the spring and a spate of bus highjackings in the region that summer.8 A failed coup attempt orchestrated by Russia’s Federal Security Service was followed by a full- scale air attack and ground invasion. On the eve of attack, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev predicted that the military action would be over within hours. By the time Russia finally sued for peace in the summer of 1996,9 an estimated 100,000 Russian citizens had lost their lives.10

The Clinton Administration’s Response Yel t s i n ’s decision to invade Chechn ya surpr ised Clinton’s Russia team. Be f o r e the military interven t i on , the Clinton administrat i o n had no C h e ch nya policy. The on ly time senior Clinton officials had discussed Chech nya was in Ap ril 1993 when intelligence sources passed alon g Du d ayev’s claim of possessing a nuclear bom b. The boast turned out to be false, but the eve n t c on f i rmed for seve ral Clinton officials that Du d ayev was a dangerou s , unstable leader. Cl i n t o n officials had begun to worry about Rus s i a ’s proj e c t i o n of force in the Caucasus in 1994 when in t e l ligence rep o r ts revealed a heavy Russian invo l vement in the Abkhaz independence movem e n t in Georgia. The Clinton team, how e ver , was totally surpr ised by Moscow’s decision to launch a ma s s i v e military operat i o n against one of Rus s i a ’s own rep u b l i c s .

Cli n t o n’s team on Rus s i a , headed by Str obe Ta l b o t t , had no soft spot for Chech ny a’s nation a l l i b e ra t i on stru g g l e . C h e ch ny a , in their view, was an anarch i s t’s utopia that all ow e d for kidnap- pi n g , dr ug traf f i ck i n g , and mone y launderin g . The Chechen ruler (or nonr uler) over this anarchy wa s considered especially unsavory and unstable. As Talbott reports in his memoir,“What little we did know about Chechnya and Dudayev inclined us to accept Moscow’s version that it was dealing with an ugly mixture of secessionism and criminality.”11 In addition, US intelligence sources suggested that international supporters of Chechens were enemies of the United States. 8 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

C on s e q u e n t ly, C l i n t on’s administra t i on did not ra lly to Du d ayev’s defense when Ru s s i a n f o rces inv a d e d . Unlike the near-unanimous support for Ye l t s i n’s bombing of the Pa rliament in October 1993, i n t e rnal debate on Chech nya within the Clinton administra t i on was more pro- n o u n c e d . E ve ryone agreed that the United States had to respect Ru s s i a’s terri t o rial integri ty; no one advocated re c o g n i t i on of Chech ny a . But some wanted to send a signal of discon t e n t about Ye l t s i n’s methods for pre s e rving the Russian Fe d e ra t i on . Se c re t a ry of State Wa r re n C h ri s t o pher had become wary of Ru s s i a’s re f o rm process and articulated these views in a May 1995 speech in Bloom i n g t on , I n d i a n a . But his ca u t i on was a general re a c t i on to deve l o pm e n t s in Russia and not a re s p onse to Chech ny a . An t h ony La k e, C l i n t on’s national securi ty advisor, was the senior official in the administra t i on most con c e rned about the conflict and least e n a m o red with Yeltsin person a lly. A fter Chech ny a , he became incre a s i n g ly suspicious of his a d m i n i s t ra t i on’s pro -Yeltsin stance.

Tre a s u ry officials ve h e m e n t ly opposed the interru p t i on of econ omic assistance because of C h e ch ny a . L i k ew is e, D e p a rtment of Defense officials did not want their Coopera t i ve T h re a t R e d u c t i on (CTR) pro g rams and military - t o - m i l i t a ry contacts to be altered in any w ay as a result of the war, even though these pro g rams indire c t ly subsidized the Ru s s i a n m i l i t a ry. Bigger securi ty issues, in their view, had to be addressed even if it made for awk- w a rd mom e n t s . The United States also was developing a larger foreign policy agenda with Russia that State Department officials did not want derailed by Chech ny a . In January 1995, C h ri s t o pher ca lled US plans with the Russians “the most ambitious arms con t rol agenda in our history. ”1 2 Some US officials believed Chech nya actually enhanced Am e ri can leve rage in other issue are a s — s u ch as NATO enlargement, C T R, and Bosnia—because Yeltsin needed C l i n t on’s support more than ever.

Talbott argued that they should not “ z i g za g” in their policy, since Ru s s i a’s rev o l u t i on would be l ong and difficult and full of ups and dow n s . US support for re f o rm , t h e re f o re, had to act as a b a llast to help keep Russia on tra ck . No one liked what Russia was doing, but no one had a good idea for an altern a t i ve policy. Most believed that Chech nya should not interfe re with other more important agenda items in the bilateral re l a t i on s h i p. And even if these other issues w e re derailed for the sake of Chech ny a , no one could make a coh e rent argument for how a m o re coerc i ve re s p onse to the war could have a positive impact on the situation in Chech ny a .

In addressing the Chechen pro b l e m , C l i n t on administra t i on officials con s t ructed their policy by first affirming US respect for Russia’s territorial integrity. In his first reaction to the Russian military intervention, Clinton emphasized, “It is an internal Russian affair.And we hope that order can be restored with a minimum amount of bloodshed and violence. And that’s what we have counseled and encouraged.”13 Even after several months of fighting, Clinton accepted the definition of the “problem” as an “internal affair,” which implied that the United States lacked the moral authority to try to influence either side.14

C l i n t on officials also accepted Ye l t s in’s “d om i n o” a r g u m e n t . If Chech nya quit the fe d e ra t i on , Yeltsin explained, other republics would foll ow. In explaining their lack of criticism of Ye l t s i n’s US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 9 m i l i t a ry action , US gove rnment officials echoed Russian fears about disintegra t i on , an out- c ome that would not be in the securi ty interests of the United St a t e s . As one anonym o u s senior official explained to Washington Po s t c o r re s p ondent Jeffrey Sm i t h , “I accept Ye l t s i n’s argument that if Chech nya is able to break away from Moscow, other republics may be tempted to do the same.”15

C l i n t on , how e ve r, did not confine his policy on Chech nya to respect for Ru s s i a’s sove re i g n ty. The Am e ri can president went out of his way to ra t i on a l i ze and defend Ye l t s i n’s military ca m- p a i g n , c om p a ring Ru s s i a’s struggles with So u t h e rn defectors to the Am e ri can Civil War and t h e reby suggesting that Ye l t s i n’s quest to keep the fe d e ra t i on together was com p a rable to what Lincoln did in the United States when Am e ri can terri t o rial integri ty was thre a t e n e d . I n J a n u a ry 1995, p residential spok e s p e r s on Mike McCurry made the first public all u s i on to the Am e ri can Civil Wa r : “We have a long history as a democra cy that includes an episode in the h i s t o ry of our own country where we dealt with a secessionist movement through armed conflict ca lled the Civil War. ” 1 6 Having tra veled to Moscow in Ap ril 1996 pri m a ri ly to assist Ye l t s i n’s re e l e c t i on ca m p a i g n , C l i n t on offe red a short Am e ri can history lesson to the journ a l i s t s attending their joint press con fe re n c e :

I would remind you that we once had a civil war in our country in which we lost, on a per capita basis, far more people than we lost in any of the wars of the 20th century, over the proposition that Abraham Lincoln gave his life for, that no state had a right to withdraw from our union.17

Some within the administration tried to counter their boss’s endorsement of Yeltsin’s Chechen war.Lake called on Russia to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict and generously praised Yeltsin when he announced a cease-fire in the spring of 1996, even while criticizing his conduct of the war. As he argued months before the Russian presidential vote,“We oppose terrorism in all forms. But we also oppose strongly the means the Russians have been using.Widespread and indiscriminate use of force has spilled far too much innocent blood and eroded support for Russia. The cycle of violence must end.”18 Talbott also stated that the invasion violated international standards on human rights spelled out in the Helsinki Act and other Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN documents.19 Christopher noted that a prolonged conflict in the Caucasus would delay Russia’s reform process at home and therefore its progress toward Western integration.

At the same time, US officials, including Christopher and Talbott, argued that the Chechen conflict did not signal the end of reform in Russia:

We believe that Russia must end the violence and killi n g , ur g e n t l y seek a peaceful solution, and reach out for reconciliation with people of Chechnya. At the same time, we believe it is premature to interpret the debacle in Chechnya as the death of democracy, freedom, and reform all across Russia.20 10 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

In the early stages of the war, C h ri s t o pher even praised the Russian armed forces for show i n g re s t ra i n t .2 1 A b ove all else, the Clinton team remained determined to not let Chech nya define their Russia policy or derail the linchpin of their policy in Moscow, B o ris Ye l t s i n . C h e ch ny a was a hiccup in a difficult and long tra n s i t i on , but the tra n s i t i on was still moving in the ri g h t d i re c t i on . Sp ok e s p e r s on McCurry also underscored that “ [ C h e ch nya] by no means defines this ve ry important bilateral re l a t i on s h i p. It is a bro a d , e x p a n s i ve re l a t i onship that has many elements on the agenda, of which this is no doubt one but is by no means the most significa n t.”22

C l i n t on foll owed up his rh e t o ri cal support for Ye l t s i n’s military campaign with policy support . When the Russians violated the Tre a ty on Conve n t i onal Fo rces in Europe by moving more m i l i t a ry equipment near the conflict in the Cauca s u s , the United States did not com p l a i n . An d despite Ta l b o t t’s citation of possible human rights atrocities that might violate intern a t i on a l t re a t i e s , the Clinton administra t i on never ca lled on the intern a t i onal com mu n i ty to hold Russia accountable. C l i n t on officials also rejected the idea of expelling Russia from intern a- t i onal organiza t i ons as punishment for the Chechen war. I n s t e a d , C l i n t on’s administra t i on pushed forw a rd with plans for tra n s f o rming the Group of Seven (G-7) into the Group of Eight (G-8). Nor did the Clinton administra t i on cut assistance to Russia at any point durin g the first Chechen war or propose that the Interna t i o nal Mone t a r y Fund (IMF) of the Wo rl d Bank cut their funding. The Ame ri c an res p o nse to the first Chechen war was muc h more mut e d in its criticisms of Russia than European countries and the Council of Europe in parti c u l a r .

The Greater Foreign Policy Community Voices outside the administra t i on were quite cri t i cal of Clinton’s support for Ye l t s i n’s war in C h e ch ny a . R e p u b l i can critics on the Hill , i n cluding most voca lly Con g ressman Frank Wo l f, t h reatened to cut aid to Ru s s i a .2 3 Some Democratic voices joined the ch o ru s . Tim Roemer ( D - I N ) , for instance, urged Clinton to boycott his trip to Moscow in May 1995 to celebra t e the 50th annive r s a ry of the collapse of Nazi Germ a ny: “We think that it is bad policy, s ym- b o l i ca lly and substantive ly, for the president to meet and be seen in Moscow with the Ru s s i a n m i l i t a ry at a time when the Russians are bru t a lly killing Chechens in their terrible war. ”2 4 Not surp ri s i n g ly, Senate Majori ty Leader and presidential candidate Robert Dole re p e a t e dly c ri t i c i zed Clinton’s re s p onse to the Chechen war, s aying that he would not have extended IMF assistance to Russia in the spring of 1996 and would not have com p a red the con f l i c t b e tween Russia and Chech nya to the Am e ri can Civil Wa r.2 5 Non gove rnmental organiza t i on s s u ch as Am n e s ty Intern a t i on a l , Human Rights Wa t ch , Physicians for Human Rights, a n d Doctors Without Borders also were animated by the Chechen war. O p p onents of the war in Russia bolstered the voice of these Am e ri can-based cri t i c s . Du ring the first war, Z b i g n i ew B rzez i n s k i , the former national securi ty advisor to President Cart e r, emerged as the most v o cal critic of Clinton inaction on Chech ny a . Yet even Brzez i n s k i , while underscoring the need to cri t i c i ze the Russian atro c i t i e s , also emph a s i zed the importance of supporting Ye l t s i n :

I do feel that the administrat i on , while correct in helping him and supporting him, has been too timid in not criticizing him when he does things which he shouldn’t ha v e done . I have parti c u l a r ly in mind the massive killings of the Cheche n s . Th a t ’s in e xc u s a b l e . It ’s immoral . It ’s politically bad because it weakens the forces of democracy in Russia.26 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 11

The first Chechen war never became a major foreign policy problem for the Clinton adminis- trati on . Cl i n t o n officials admit that cong re s s i o nal pres s u r e helped change their language about Ch e ch n ya and moved the issue higher up the list during public brie f i n g s . But this was the extent of domestic influences on policy. The Chechens had no important backers in Washington. There is only a miniscule Chechen diaspora in the United States. Chechnya did not have oil or diamonds or some major economic interest that might attract American business support. On the contrary, the American business community supported Russia in this conflict.

Seve ral NGOs took an interest in the war, but they never articulated a united policy altern a t i ve to the Clinton administra t i on’s appro a ch or argued for strong con c rete measure s . H u m a n Rights Wa t ch focused pri m a ri ly on gathering data on atrocities in Chech nya and did not lobby d i re c t ly to change policy. Other democra cy promoting organiza t i ons working in Russia did not focus on Chech ny a . T h ey wanted to continue their work in other areas such party building, rule of law, t rade union deve l o pm e n t , and prom o t i on of civil society more genera lly. To stay in b u s i n e s s , these groups needed to maintain a fri e n dly re l a t i onship with the Yeltsin gove rn m e n t and continue to re c e i ve funds from Capitol Hill .2 7 C on g re s s i onal threats to cut aid to Ru s s i a n ever gained steam since most members of Con g ress accepted Clinton’s argument that the U S - Russia re l a t i onship was too big and important to be held hostage to one issue. C h e ch ny a n ever became a campaign issue in the 1996 presidential election despite Dole’s cri t i c i s m s . I n t e rn a t i onal press access to the conflict was limited, and Dole never was able to make the C l i n t on foreign policy re c o rd a major campaign topic. At this stage in US-Russia re l a t i on s , keeping the Com munists out of the Kremlin trumped other con c e rn s . E ven Clinton’s cri t i c s accepted this set of pri o ri t i e s .

II. The Second Chechen War C l i n t on officials celebrated the peace accord negotiated by Ye l t s i n’s env oy, G e n e ral Alexander Le b e d , in the summer of 1996. The accord did not offer a permanent solution to the terri t o ri a l c on f l i c t , but instead pushed that problem five years into the future . Non e t h e l e s s , the end of the w a r, c oming soon after Ye l t s i n’s 1996 re e l e c t i on victory, fueled optimism in Wa s h i n g t on that Russia might be consolidating a more stable, p re d i c t a b l e, and democratic polity.

This optimism was misplaced. On June 17, 19 9 9 , Ch e c hen rebels crossed into the Russian rep u b l i c of Dagestan with the stated purpose of liberating the republic from the Russian empire. Less than two months later, on August 10, 19 9 9 , Russian armed forces launched a major counterof fe n s i v e against the Chechen and Arab units in Da g e s t a n . 28 Officials in the United Sta t e s , as in most co u n tri e s , co ndemned the attacks against Russian sovere i g n t y. By the end of the mont h , th e y had pushed Shamil Basayev—a terror ist from Saudi Arabia with ties to Osama bin Lad e n — b a c k into Ch e ch ny a . On August 27, 19 9 9 , Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Dagestan and pledged 300 mi ll i o n rubles for reh a b i l i t a t i o n work. Ma n y hoped that this might be the end of the conf l i c t .

It was not. The following week, on September 1, the war came to Moscow when an explosion in downtown Moscow wounded 41 people.29 Further attacks in Moscow and elsewhere killed more than 300 Russian civilians in one month. Russians believed the terrorist attacks to be acts 12 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya of war committed by Chechnya and its foreign supporters. Society demanded a response and the Russian government responded.30 In September 1999 Putin emphasized that the new conflict “is not a civil war, but a war declared against Russia by international terrorism with the aim to seize some territories with rich natural resources…[the] terrorists are prepared, financed, and sent abroad.”31 Putin and official government news sources emphasized in particular the role of Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia in these latest attacks.

In October Russian troops crossed into Chechen terri t o ry for the second time in a deca d e .3 2 Some had hoped the Russian armed forces might occupy the nort h e rn half of Chech ny a , stopping at the Te rek Rive r.Pu t i n , h ow eve r, pursued a maximalist stra t e gy using maximu m f o rc e . C h e ch nya was to be liberated from the rebels by any means necessary. M o re than 100,000 troops were sent to the theater to accomplish this objective, m o re than double the amount deployed in the first war.

Russian armed forces initially appeared to be more successful in this second war.3 3 M o re m e t h o d i cal and re lying to a greater extent on air pow e r, Russian forces eve n t u a lly re ca p t u re d G ro z ny and most of Chech ny a’s cities by the beginning of 2000, while the Chechen fighters remained in the mountains. The seve ri ty and extent of human rights violations against non - c ombatants in this second war also increased dra m a t i ca lly (or were better documented). Human Rights Wa t ch titled its re p o rt on the war Welcome To Hel l.3 4 We s t e rn experts estimate that 400,000 people have been displaced.3 5 But final victory has proved elusive . T h ree ye a r s l a t e r, at the time of this wri t i n g, Russian troops are still in Chech nya fighting Chechen re b e l s .

The Clinton Administration’s Response The ve t e rans of Clinton’s Russia team could not re c over from “ C h e ch nya Two. ” Ru s s i a’s financial crisis in August 1998 foll owed by the Bank of New Yo rk scandal and the ensuing “w h o lost Ru s s i a” debate combined to dampen optimism about Ru s s i a’s prospects of becoming a n o rmal country and stable partner of the United St a t e s . Just months after the financial melt- d own and what seemed then to be the end of market re f o rm in Ru s s i a , C l i n t on officials had to muster all their diplomatic talents to avoid a major blowup in US-Russia re l a t i ons as a con s e- quence of the NATO campaign against Se rb i a . T h ey were exhausted by the feat and tro u b l e d by Ru s s i a’s erratic behavior, but still hoped that the positive results of coopera t i on on Kosov o might give the bilateral re l a t i onship a jump-start .3 6 A b ove all else, C l i n t on officials wanted to use their final two years in office to secure a major arms con t rol agreement with Ru s s i a , a n o b j e c t i ve that had eluded them their first six years in power.

Ru s s i a’s inv a s i on of Chech nya in the summer of 1999 extinguished any optimism about a STA R T III accord or a deal on the An t i - B a llistic Missile (ABM) Tre a ty. The w a y t h e Russians fought the second war was especially fru s t rating to US officials, who might have o t h e rwise been more sympathetic to Ru s s i a’s defense of the hom e l a n d . As one senior St a t e D e p a rtment official lamented, “Instead of fighting the war in a smart way, the Red Arm y went in like a sledgehammer. ” This extreme disappointment colored the Am e ri can re s p on s e to the second Chechen war. US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 13

Complementing these changes in attitude were other changes in the Clinton administration that shaped the policy response to Chechnya. In 1999 aiding the transformation of Russia was no longer the top foreign policy agenda item it had been in 1994. Clinton was fully engaged in his Russia policy during his first term. He was not during his second term. Monica Lewinsky and impeachment proceedings had pushed all other concerns to the sidelines. Both Clinton and Yeltsin were at the end of their long tenures in power. In contrast to 1994, they needed each other less in 1999. Investments in Russia policy seemed unlikely to produce dividends.

The personnel working on Russia issues also had changed between wars. Madeleine Albri g h t , the new secre t a ry of state, had a re p u t a t i on for being mu ch more con c e rned about human rights than her pre d e c e s s o r. The ambassador-at-large for the New ly Independent States duri n g the second war, St e phen Se s t a n ov i ch , also adopted a mu ch more cri t i cal view of the Ru s s i a n i n t e rve n t i on than did his pre d e c e s s o r s . Se s t a n ov i ch’s re p u t a t i on as a Russia expert sym p a t h e t i c to Ru s s i a’s re f o rmers amplified his voice within the administra t i on . This “p ro - Russia guy” w a s n onetheless cri t i cal of Ru s s i a’s new military mission . In addition , those groups in the adminis- t ra t i on that had opposed a tough line on Chech nya during the first war were now weakened or absent. The depart u re of Se c re t a ry of Defense Wi lliam Pe r ry meant that the Pe n t a gon’s v i ews on Russia were mu ch less re l ev a n t . L i k ew i s e, Tre a s u ry’s voice on Russia was vastly weakened after the August 1998 debacl e . T h ey had been burned by their Russian counter- p a rt s , saw no prospects for re f o rm in the immediate future, and there f o re played no role in muting criticism of Russia on Chech ny a .

Finally, there was learning. Some on the Clinton team had deep regrets about their soft response to the first Chechen war. They did not want to make the same mistake twice. Even if their tools to influence Russian behavior were as limited in 1999 as they were in 1994, those Clinton officials still in the government for the second Chechen war were determined to at least say the right things. They believed that words matter.

Russia also had changed between wars. Most importa n t l y, Yeltsin was not fighting for his political li f e during this second inva s i on . The threat of a comm unist come b a c k ended with the 1996 pres i - dential election. 37 In power after the August 1998 financial meltdown , Com m unist leaders had de m on s t r ated that they had no intention of trying to res u r r ect Sovi e t - s t yle commu n i s m . Sec on d , Russian ref o r m was not tied to Yel t s i n ’s survi v a l . This was true partl y because econo mic ref o r m at the time was stalled and partl y because the threat of a real reversal was no longer cred i b l e . Rus s i a at the time was not lobbying for new IMF loans or increased bilateral assistance, thus limiting US le vera g e . Th i rd , the threat of fed e r al dissolution, if ever rea l , had seriously faded by 1999. Fourth, in contrast to 1994, this military action was popular.Russian society saw the second intervention as self-defense. Until the end of the Clinton administration, solid majorities supported the war effort. Even some of America’s closest friends in Russia, including Anatoly Chubais and his new coalition of liberals, the Union of Right Forces, supported the war.38 Only liberal Grigory Yavlinsky and his Yabloko party publicly criticized the second war, a stance for which he paid dearly at the polls in December 1999. This new set of circumstances in Russia made devising a policy response to the Chechen war even more difficult. 14 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Despite these changes in both Moscow and Was h i n g t on , the US policy res p o nse to the second war changed onl y in the margins. The Clinton administrat i o n continued to respect the territ o ri a l in t e g ri t y of Rus s i a . As Talbott explained, “C h e ch ny a , Da g e s t a n , Ingushetia—these are all republics on the territ o r y of the Russian Fed e ra t i on . We rec o g n i z e Rus s i a ’s interna t i o nal bound- ar ies and its obligations to protect all of its citizens against separatism and attacks on lawful au t h o ri t i e s . We also ackn o wledge that the current outbr eak of violence began when insurgents, based in Chechny a , la u n c hed an offen s i v e in Dagestan. Russia also has been roc ked by lethal bo mbings of apartment buildings deep in the Russian heartl a n d , in c luding in Moscow itself.” 39 The Chechen inva s i o n of Dagestan made it impossible for the United States or any other coun- tr y to adopt a differ ent position reg a r ding sovere i g n t y. Russian territ o r y had been inva d e d ; Rus s i a had the right to defend its borde r s . 40

Once again the Chechens had no friends in the administrat i on . To be sure, those that follow e d th e co nflict clo s e l y rec o g n i z ed that differ ent Chechen fighters had differ ent agendas. Some had sym p a t h y for Aslan Maskhadov, the elected president of Chechny a , while ever yone in the adminis t ra t i o n despised Shamil Basayev and his alli e s . Pub l i c ly for the Clinton administrat i on , how e ver , Ba s a yev’s nefarious activities tainted the entire Chechen cau s e . Ev en Maskhadov’s statements and ac t i o ns comp l i c ated support. For instance, Ma s k h a d o v’s gover nment had condemned the US co u n t e ra t t a c ks against bin Laden camps in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, while Cheche n De p u t y Prime Minister Vaha Arsanov decla r ed war against the United States in res p o nse to the United States counterat t a ck s . 41 In testimony before Cong re s s , Ses t a n ov i c h asserted that “C h e ch e n rebels are receiving help from rad i c al groups in other countrie s , in c luding Osama bin Lad e n ’s net- wo r k and others who have attacked or threatened Ame ri c ans and Ame ri c an interes t s . ” 42 Suc h al lies—coupled with the alleged attacks against Russian civilians in Dagestan, Mo s c o w, and else- wh e r e—made it difficult for anyone in the administrat i o n to cha m p i o n the Chechen cau s e .

R h etorical Changes. In affirming Russia’s sovereignty in Chechnya, Clinton officials reversed their previous policy and refrained from calling the Chechen war an “internal affair.” Clinton undermined the premise about “internal affairs” most dramatically in a speech at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul in November 1999. Speaking to Yeltsin directly across the table in front of dozens of European leaders, Clinton argued that he would not have wanted the international com mu n i t y to sit by idly if Yeltsin had been arrested in August 1991.43 Yeltsin hated the analogy, but Clinton made clear his intention of internationalizing the discussion about Chechnya. More bluntly, Albright also affirmed, “Russia could not consider this war simply an internal affair.”44 While attending a multilateral conference on the Middle East peace process in Moscow, Albright hinted at a similar kind of multilateral intervention in Chechnya: “Conflicts within states, as well as those between states, threaten our common security.... I believe there is a very important role that the OSCE can play in helping to resolve a variety of conflicts within countries.”45 In his initial dealings with Putin, Clinton also emphasized the international consequences of the Chechen war, a framing of the problem that Putin categorically rejected. When Clinton brought up Chechnya, the Russian president’s manner became extremely annoyed. Putin was unwilling to listen to Clinton’s criticisms. In part because of Chechnya, the two men never hit it off and endured a frosty relationship until the end of Clinton’s second term. US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 15

R h e t o ri ca lly, C l i n t on officials were also more cri t i cal of Ru s s i a’s conduct during the secon d war even though its tactics were not that diffe rent from the first war.4 6 Officials highlighted c on t i n u a lly that the “i n d i s c riminate use of forc e” was a big problem that invited intern a t i ona l a t t e n t i on and action . As Se s t a n ov i ch descri b e d , “A relentless bombing and art i ll e ry ca m p a i g n has been ca r ried out in nearly all parts of the re p u b l i c . This use of indiscriminate use of f o rce against innocent civilians is indefe n s i b l e, and we condemn it.”4 7 In real con t rast to his statements about the first Chechen war, Talbott was also mu ch more cri t i cal of Ru s s i a’s behavior this time:

We don’t dispute Rus s i a ’s rig h t s , or indeed its res p on s i b i l i t y, to fight terror ism on its soil. But none of that begins to justify the Russian govern m e n t ’s decision to use massive force against civilians inside Chechny a . The numbers speak for them- se l ves : 285,000 people displaced, thousands of innocent civilians dead or wounded , and thousands of homes and businesses destroyed since last Sep t e m b e r .48

Su ch language was never used to describe the first war. As an altern a t i ve, C l i n t on officials said “ t h e re must be a vigo rous and conscientious effort to engage re g i onal leaders in a political dia- l o g u e . ”4 9 The pleas for nego t i a t i ons were aimed at both Russian and Chechen leaders.5 0

Cl i n t o n officials also developed a new theory about the rel a t i o nship between Chechn ya and de m o c ra c y. Some cited debate in Russia on the first war as a sign that democrac y was worki n g . But too muc h criticism of Yeltsin was cons i d e r ed detrimental to democrac y’s long - t e r m pro s p e c t s . Now the argument was the opposite: the war in Chechn ya threatened to undermi n e de m o c ra c y.51 Cl i n t o n officials also empha s i z ed that the war damaged Rus s i a ’s interna t i o nal rep u - ta t i o n and threatened Russian integrat i o n into the Wes t . As Talbott conc luded in cong re s s i on a l te s t i m o ny, “no other devel o p ment in the nine years since the collapse of the Soviet Union has raised such serious questions about Rus s i a ’s commitments to interna t i o nal norms as the war in Ch e ch ny a . ” 52 All u s i o ns to Lincoln and the Ame ri c an Civil War ceased. Rather than pre s e rv i n g de m o c ra c y in the spirit of Lincoln, Yeltsin was charged with undermining it.

Despite the new critical edge to American statements, the Clinton administration still did not want to go too far.53 They did not want to make Chechnya the only issue in US-Russia relations. Albright argued “The last thing that we should be doing is trying to turn Russia back into an enemy. ”5 4 And the one official who hated discussing Chech nya was Clinton himself. H e obliged his staff by adding Chechnya to the talking points during phone calls and meetings with Yeltsin and then Putin, and Clinton was prepared to confront Yeltsin about Chechnya, as he did in Istanbul. But Clinton disliked the issue because he did not think it was a major problem and because his leverage for changing Russian behavior was extremely limited. In Clinton’s mind, howeve r, h a rping over a “s m a ll” issue like Chech nya should not be the central focus of US foreign policy toward Russia. In his farewell ode to Yeltsin published soon after the Russian president resigned, Clinton used the phrase “to liberate Grozny” as a euphemism for Yeltsin’s war against Chechnya.55 After years of discussing Chechnya, Clinton’s phraseology revealed that his sympathies laid with Moscow all along. 16 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Policy Changes. In response to the second Chechen war, the Clinton administration did make some policy changes, exercising what little leverage the United States believed it had. In the first war, the Clinton administration worked hard to keep Chechnya from dominating discussion at international forums. This time around the United States pushed to have Chechnya at the top of the agenda. The United States, not Europe, wanted Chechnya to be the focus of the OSCE meeting in Istanbul.56 More generally, State Department officials repeatedly sent out talking points to American allies in Europe in hopes that the West could adopt a common approach to the conflict. Putin worked hard to develop special relationships with European leaders and pull them away from the US position on Chechnya. In the end, State Department officials conceded that Putin achieved partial success. At the OSCE meeting, for instance, a joint communiqué on Chechnya was not released.

The Clinton administration refrained once again from cutting bilateral assistance programs to Russia in the second war. The Nunn-Lugar Act remained a national security interest no matter what the recipients of this program—the Russian military—did in other arenas. Nor was the US Agency for International Development eager to cut its programs. By the fall of 1999, most other forms of Am e ri can assistance to Russia did not go to the Russian fe d e ral gove rn m e n t , b u t were channeled instead to nongovernmental organizations and regional governments. Clinton officials argued that cutting this assistance would therefore only punish those not directly responsible for the war.

Two aid pro g ra m s , h ow eve r, did suffe r : IMF assistance to Russia and Export - I m p o rt Bank p rojects with Russian com p a n i e s . Tre a s u ry officials opposed any public linkage betw e e n C h e ch nya and IMF pro g ra m s , as formal and public linkage would set a dangerous pre c e d e n t and destroy the integri ty of the IMF. But Clinton officials made it known to the fund that t h ey wanted to see the IMF’s pro g ram with Russia re c e i ve mu ch greater scru t i ny aft e r Russia invaded Chech ny a . At the same time, D e p u ty Se c re t a ry of Tre a s u ry La wre n c e Summers opposed any new IMF mon ey to Russia for both econ omic and moral re a s on s . Summers had become so disappointed with Russia that he had become a major anti-Ru s s i a voice in the administra t i on after 1998. Su b s e q u e n t ly, the IMF delayed a second tra n che in 1999 and did not initiate any new discussions on a bigger pro g ra m . When the Ru s s i a n s c omplained that the IMF was linking its financial decisions to Chech ny a , no one in the a d m i n i s t ra t i on denied it.5 7

The postp onement of Ex-Im Bank loans was ove rt ly linked to Chech ny a . A fter months of d e l ay and nego t i a t i on , the Ex-Im Bank was pre p a ring to make a $500 mill i on loan to the Tyumen Oil Com p a ny. T h ey hoped that the Tyumen Oil loan might help to instill re n ew e d c onfidence among Am e ri can investors after August 1998 and the Bank of New Yo rk sca n- d a l . Se c re t a ry of State Albri g h t , h ow eve r, had a diffe rent set of con c e rn s . Most import a n t ly, she wanted to do something to re s p ond to the Russian inv a s i on in Chech ny a , and delayi n g this loan was something she could do. When the Ex-Im Bank board refused to delay the l o a n , A l b right sent a letter to them outlining why it was “in the national intere s t” to post- p one the loan.5 8 Ac c o rding to a ra re ly inv oked law, s u ch a letter from the secre t a ry of state US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 17 ove r rode any Ex-Im board decision. Harmon was furious, arguing with some merit that Tyumen Oil was not fighting the war in Chechnya. Over time Harmon convinced others and the loans were allowed to move forward in March 2000.

C l i n t on administra t i on officials also did more to help alter con d i t i ons in Chech ny a . T h e United States provided $10 mill i on to help address the needs of displaced person s .5 9 C l i n t on officials also pushed incessantly for intern a t i onal monitors to be all owed into C h e ch ny a .6 0 At the OSCE summit in Istanbul, Prime Minister Putin agreed to all ow the ch a i rman of the OSCE, No rwegian Fo reign Minister Knut Vo ll e b ae k , to visit Chech ny a . Putin also agreed to meet with UN Human Rights Com m i s s i oner Mary Robinson , t h o u g h the results of the encounter were incon cl u s i ve . Se s t a n ov i ch summed up the successes of these lobbying effort s : “In re s p onse to persistent pre s s u re from the United States and other We s t e rn nation s , Russia has agreed to grant ICRC [Intern a t i onal Committee of the Red C ross] access to detainees, a g reed to establish an OSCE assistance group in Chech ny a , a n d a greed to add Council of Europe experts to the staff of Ru s s i a’s new human ri g h t s om b u dsman for Chech ny a .”6 1

The Clinton administration also increased its assistance program to Georgia aimed at beefing up security at the Georgian-Russian border in order to deny Russia an excuse to intervene in Georgia in “hot pursuit of terrorists.”62

When all these policies are added up, the effort was still a minimal on e . The rh e t o ri ca l rebukes were sharper and IMF and Ex-Im loans were delaye d , but little else ch a n g e d . C l i n t on did not postp one planned bilateral meetings with his Russian counterp a rt , Ru s s i a was not kicked out of any major intern a t i onal cl u b, and business in other arenas con t i n u e d without interru p t i on . Like they had during the first war, C l i n t on administra t i on officials fe l t h e l p l e s s , b e l i eving that they lacked the tools to influence positive ch a n g e . Unlike they had d one during the first war, h ow eve r, t h ey con fessed to a greater sense of fru s t ra t i on with their impotence and with the stupidity of both the Russians and Chechens for all owing this war to re k i n dl e . This time aro u n d , t h ey actually wanted to do more to try to stop the war, b u t s t i ll did not have the means to do so. As Talbott lamented:

…The West had neither the desire nor the means to engage diplom a t i- ca lly in the Chechen con f l i c t , mu ch less intervene militari ly. The US and its allies had no leve rage on the real leaders, nor did we have sym- p a t hy either with their goal of independence or the raids in Dagestan that had precipitated the con f l i c t . T h ey had indisputably — a n d , i t s e e m e d , d e l i b e ra t e ly — b rought down the wrath of the Russian arm e d fo rces on their people. That meant there was little we could do but cite Ru s s i a’s obligations under various intern a t i onal covenants to protect civilian life and ca ll on Moscow to let re p re s e n t a t i ves of the OSCE into Chech nya to help deal with the refugee crisis or mon i t o r the behavior of Russian tro o p s .63 18 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Voices Outside of the Administration C ritics of Clinton’s Chech nya policy were mu ch more active and vocal during the secon d w a r. The ra t i onale for Ru s s i a’s second military interve n t i on was arguably more plausible than the re a s ons for the first move against Chech ny a . M o s c ow launched the first war with little or no prodding from the Chechen leadership, w h e reas Basayev’s inv a s i on of Dagestan ca s t Russia as the victim, at least in the beginning stages of the con f l i c t . It was the bru t a l i ty of Ru s s i a’s military campaign in the second war, h ow eve r, not w h o p recipitated it, that critics o f the war highlighted. By 1999 general disdain for both Clinton and Yeltsin fueled the fire s of cri t i c i s m . For Republicans the 2000 presidential election added an additional incentive to a t t a ck the policy.

R e p u b l i ca n s in Con g ress led the ch a r g e . Senator Jesse Helms, ch a i rman of the Se n a t e Fo reign Relations Com m i t t e e, and his staff were the most focused, d o g g e d , and outspok e n c ritics on Capitol Hill .6 4 Helms convened dozens of hearings on the issue. He ridiculed the a d m i n i s t ra t i on for its implicit support of genocide in Chech ny a . He ca lled on the United States to push for Ru s s i a’s expulsion from the G-8. He tied up ambassadorial con f i rm a t i on s to punish the Clinton administra t i on for inaction . C l i n t on officials believed that Helms and his staff had a rom a n t i c i zed view of the fre e d om struggle in Chech ny a . It was odd, t h ey t h o u g h t , that a con s e rv a t i ve senator should be sympathetic to a movement allied with bin La d e n . Non e t h e l e s s , t h ey dreaded the prospect of appearing before his committee and did a ll they could to appease Helms.

Helms did not work alone. Senator Mitch McConnell, an influential Republican from Kentucky, shared Helms’s disdain for Clinton’s Chechnya policy. His documented dislike of Clinton amplified his virulent indictment of the administration’s response to the second Chechen war.Senator McConnell bluntly said to Talbott:

Now you [Talbott] and I can spend the next hour parsing syntax over the re a l intent behind US policy pron o u n c e m e n t s . Le t’s just stipulate that we disagre e : you believe the administra t i on has been clear in objecting to the course Ru s s i a has pursued in Chech ny a . I believe your message has been mu d dl e d , at best. At its worst, your failure to take decisive action invited contempt and a war against the Chechen people, w h i ch reminded many local witnesses of the round-ups and forced deport a t i on s , f a m i n e, and dev a s t a t i on of the Stalin era . Fra n k ly, it reminds me of what Milos˘ev ic´ d i d to Kosova, only with more fire- power and speed. What I can’t understand is why we supported war crimes indictments for ethnic cleansing in Kosova, yet turn a blind eye to identical sav- agery against civilians in Chechnya.65

House Republicans tried to bring even greater attention to Clinton’s failures on Chech ny a by framing the problem in terms of a general policy failure re g a rding Ru s s i a . Sp e a k e r Dennis Hastert com m i s s i oned a study of US policy tow a rd Russia ch a i red by Republica n C on g ressman Chri s t o pher Cox . The Cox Report looked like a campaign document—slick , US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 19 lots of picture s , a prov o ca t i ve title—and was published just before the November election .6 6 Though funded by Con g ress and distributed as a con g re s s i onal study, the com m i s s i on i n cluded no Democra t s . These factors combined to limit the attention given to the study. The con cl u s i ons were damning:

The conduct of the first and second wars in Chechn ya and the US administrat i o n’s lo ng quiescence conc e r ning it reveal the tragic cost of the overp e r s on a l i z ed Clinton Russia policy. Rather than acting force f u l ly to advance US values and interes t s , th e Cl i n t o n administrat i o n tacitly accepted Rus s i a ’s agenda in Chechny a . 67

Like McConnell, the Cox Report blamed the Clinton administration for the war itself.

De m o c r ats never went this far, but they too crit i c i z ed the Clinton policy as weak, in e f fe c t i v e, an d im m o ra l . In Feb ru a r y 2000, the Senate passed a res o l u t i o n cal ling upon the president to “pr omo t e peace negot i a t i o ns between the Gover nment of the Russian Fed e ra t i o n and the leadership of the Ch e ch n ya Govern m e n t , in c luding President Aslan Maskhadov, th r ough third party mediations by the OSCE, United Nat i on s , or other approp r iate parti e s . 68 ” The same res o l u t i o n also urged Clinton to endorse the rec om m e n d a t i o n of the UN High Comm i s s i o ner for Human Rights, wh i c h call e d for an inves t i g a t i o n into alleged war crim e s . The res o l u t i o n also denounced the detention of Rad i o Free Europ e / R adio Liberty (RFE/RL) corres p o ndent And r ei Babitsky, who was being held by Russian military authorities because of his alleged sympathetic rep o r ting about the plight of the Ch e ch e n s . The late liberal Democratic Senator Paul Well s t o ne introduced this res o l u t i on , wh i c h in Feb ru a r y 2000 won a majorit y in the Sen a t e . Con g r essman Tom Lantos (D-CA) was the author of the House res o l u t i o n that cal led for Rus s i a ’s expulsion from the G-8.69

Congressional leaders backed up these rhetorical flurries and nonbinding resolutions with con- crete actions. In the 2000 appropriations bill, US legislators cut 30 percent from the president’s Freedom Support Act budget. Talbott claimed that this was one of the many reasons why Clinton vetoed the bill: “The funding levels proposed by the Congress would force us to make unacceptable trade-offs between our core economic and democracy programs and programs that prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The president believes such cuts would be dangerously short-sighted, because the purposes of this assistance—from building an independent media to promoting small business—are fundamentally in our interests.”70

Chechnya even emerged, however briefly and marginally, as a presidential election campaign issue. During the Democratic primaries, candidate Bill Bradley called for del ays in Ex-Im Bank loans (a policy the Clinton administra t i on eve n t u a lly pursued) saying that “it is inappro p ri a t e t o give assistance to Russia while it is engaged in the brutal war in Chechnya.”71 R e p u b l i ca n candidate George W. Bush went even furt h e r, ca lling for an end to both the Ex-Im Bank loans and IMF assistance to Russia.72 Of course, other issues dominated the 2000 presidential campaign and allowed Clinton critics a bye in defining an alternative policy. What was clear, however, was how little enthusiasm there was for his Chechnya policy. This criticism of his Chechen policy negatively shaped assessments of his Russia policy as a whole. 20 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Bu s h , B ra dl ey, H e l m s , M c C on n e ll , We ll s t on e, C ox , and Lantos made for a stra n g e a ll i a n c e . T h e coalition of critics in the policy community was even more strange. Brzezinski, the former national security advisor to President Carter, constituted the most important lobby for the Chechen cause in and of himself. Although retired for almost 20 years, Brzezinski has remained one of Washington’s most important voices on foreign policy. He put the full force of his reputation, intellect, and acerbic tongue behind a campaign of pressure and ridicule of Clinton over Chechnya. He defended the Chechens as freedom fighters and lambasted the Clinton administration for accepting the Russian interpretation of events in Chechnya:

What should be done? To start with, the US should not fall for Rus s i a ’s entrea t y that “we are allies against Osama bin Lad e n . ” Reminiscent of the earlier Rus s i a n pi t c h that “Yel t s i n , like Lincoln, is saving the union, ” wh i c h the Clinton administra t i o n bought hook, li n e , and sinker, this is a marginal issue intended as a distrac - ti on . Ter ro r ism is neither the central geopolitical nor moral cha l lenge here. 7 3

Br zezinski suggested that Clinton and his foreign policy team were guilty of supporting genocide. As he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,“It is tragically the case that the administration’s indifference to what has been happening in Chechnya has probably contributed to the scale of the genocide inflicted on the Chechens.”74 Brzezinski also argued that Clinton had the wrong priorities in dealing with Russia:

The administrat i o n’s one-sided approa c h reflects not onl y a continuing misrea d i n g of the Russian situation but, ab o ve all, a political ly driv en desire to strike some so r t of spectacular agreement with the Russians reg a r ding rat i f i ca t i o n of STAR T and some comp r omise reg a r ding the ABM Trea t y, th e r eby enabling the administra t i o n to claim that it has obtained a green light from Russia for the deployme n t of the national missile defense syst e m .75

To increase attention to the Chechen cau s e , Br zezinski formed the Ame ri c an Committee for C h e ch ny a , w h i ch he coch a i red with Alexander Haig and Max Ka m p e l m a n . In its founding d e cl arat i on , the committee echoed the cha ra c t e ri za t i o n of the war as “ge n o c i d e ” and argued, “Th e r e is no excu s e for inaction . The United States should immediately announce a com p re- h e n s i ve plan to deter Russian aggre s s i on , p rovide humanitarian relief to the Chechen people, and begin a process of bringing the war to a negotiated end.”76 Unlike many others, Br zezi n s k i suggested a set of policy alterna t i ve s , in c luding a discont i n u a t i o n of high-level contacts betwe e n Russian and Ame ri c an officials and an eleva t i o n of Ame ri ca n - C h e c hen interac t i on s . 77 Th e Ame ri c an Committee for Chechn ya also made specific policy rec om m e n d a t i on s : oppose the release of Wor ld Bank and IMF loans to Rus s i a , initiate talks on Russian G-8 suspension , ca ll on the UN High Com m i s s i oner for Refugees to appoint a special env oy on Chech ny a , take the lead in providing humanitarian re l i e f, and ca ll upon the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechny a to “act upon its mandate…to negotiate a political solution to the present cri s i s . ”7 8 B rzez i n s k i also promoted direct Am e ri can deve l o pment assistance to Chech nya and the regi on . 79 Fin a l ly, Br zezinski helped establish and finance Chechen rep re s e n t a t i o n in Was h i n g t o n. US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 21

No one devoted energy and re s o u rces to the Chechen issue like Brzez i n s k i . Yet many share d his view on the war. Human Rights Wa t ch once again devoted serious attention to docu- menting human rights violations inside Chech ny a . The title of its re p o rt Welcome to Hel l, s u m m a ri zed their perspective .8 0 The Na t i onal Endowment for Democra cy by law could not adopt a policy position on the war, but the foundation went out of its way to financially sup- p o rt critics of the war in Ru s s i a , i n cluding Lev Pon om a rev, Sergei Gri go ry a n t s , and Elena B on n e r. The Jamestown Fo u n d a t i on also tried to attract attention to the conflict by publishi n g a weekly digest of events in Chech nya written and edited by Hoover Institution Se n i o r Fe ll ow John Du n l o p, one of the closest foll owers of the first war. The Web site k av k a z . o r g p ropagated the Chechen perspective in the English language. Under the leadership of Fre d H i a t t , The Washington Po s t e d i t o rial page gave sustained attention to the war. Hiatt himself and editorial page deputy editor Jack s on Diehl made the war one of their signature issues. Su ch editorial focus did not exist in any newspaper during the first Chechen war. E ven ana- lysts sympathetic to the objectives of Clinton’s Russia policy questioned the muted re s p on s e to Chech ny a .8 1 Am e ri can silence, s ome of these critics assert e d , was not on ly mora lly re p re- hensible but also weakened civil society leaders in Russia who sought a peaceful solution .82

The ch a t t e ring class was not unanimous in its con d e m n a t i on of Russia and Clinton’s support of Russia. Anatol Lieven, a former journalist who had covered the first war and wrote a book about it, adopted a very different perspective on the second war, calling the Russian response justified and American moralizing about the intervention unwarranted.83 Similarly, Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center, called Clinton’s criticism of Russia unjustified:

Cl i n t o n should get an award for hypo c ri s y . In 1994/96, he talked about Rus s i a n “civil war” and he comp a r ed Yeltsin to Lincoln. It was ridiculous and prep o s t e r - ou s . Now he is talking about the Russian war in Chechn ya after the Rus s i a n s we r e attacked by the Chechens and he tells them how they should [not] kill innocent civilians. Do we remember Kosovo? Do we remember the Branch Davidians? Can you imagine a major nation which allows a territory with fifty or sixty thousand people, un a rm e d , no cont ro l , no central gover nment.… And the tr uth is that the Russians are learning from what the United States and NATO ha v e done in Kosovo , but they do not have prec i s i o n-guided mun i t i on s . 84

The impact of these forces on Capitol Hill and outside government is difficult to measure. Without question, the Clinton administration felt under siege on its Russia policy during the second Chechen war. They were defending a policy that they no longer believed in with the same level of conviction that they held when entering government in 1993. After countless hearings, op-ed pieces, and threats of further actions, the policy changed only in the margins. The policy changed so slightly because Clinton officials believed there were no more obvious p o l i cy altern a t i ves that would be effe c t i ve . Unlike some other issues, the Clinton team had d i a gnosed this problem correctly. They understood the situation and sympathized with the arguments advanced by some of the critics. Their own rhetoric about the war began to resemble the opinion pieces of their greatest detractors. 22 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

B eyond deploying the right word s , the Clinton team believed it had few other policy option s that might influence the war in a positive dire c t i on . C l i n t on administra t i on officials re j e c t e d f u ll - s cale sanction s , w h i ch in their view might make people in the United States feel better but would not help the plight of the Chechens at all . Ru s s i a , in their estimation , was too big to be influenced by sanctions from the outside. E ven in its seventh year in pow e r, t h e C l i n t on team remained pro p onents of engagement. T h ey were unw i lling to re t u rn to a con- f ron t a t i onal policy on Ru s s i a . C l i n t on himself was the most vocal advocate of staying the c o u r s e . By 1999, h ow eve r, the United States had few ca r rots left to influence change thro u g h i n c e n t i ves rather than punishment. The Clinton team’s inability to change Ru s s i a’s behavior in Chech nya stood as an unfortunate example of how difficult it was to promote intern a l change from outside a country as large and complex as Ru s s i a.

Th e r e were policy alterna t i ve s . Br zezi n s k i , as outlined above, of fe r ed some . Others might have in c luded cutting all assistance to the state (including Nun n - L ugar) and providing more financial su p p o r t to human rights activists inside Rus s i a . If the United States had adopted all of the alterna t i v e measures together—changing aid policy, su p p o r ting devel o p ment in Chechny a , an d ex clu d ing Russia from the G-8—would Russia have adopted a different policy? Probably not. At the end of the day, Russian leaders believed they were fighting to defend their securit y and pre s e r ve their territ o r ial integrit y. Al l other interes t s , in c luding positive rel a t i o ns with the United Sta t e s , we r e vastly subordi n a t e . The United States had the opposite prob l e m : the Chechen war was cons i d e r ed a less important issue comp a r ed to other agenda items in US-Russia rel a t i on s . These asymm e t r ies of interes t s , co mbined with a nearly empty Ame ri c an tool kit for influencing in t e r nal politics in Rus s i a , pr oduced policy inertia which satisfied no one—not the Clinton team, not the Rus s i a n s , and not the outsiders watching and trying to influence the policy.

III. The Bush Response(s) to Chechnya The group of foreign policy officials that advised Gover nor George W. Bush during the 2000 pr esidential campaign decla r ed the Clinton- G o r e approa c h to Russia a total failure. Their central cri t i c i s m , es p e c i a l ly expressed priv a t e l y, was not that Clinton had done too little to stop the war in Chechny a . Rat h e r , their central charge was that Clinton and his team had devoted too muc h time and too many res o u r ces in trying to change Russia interna l ly.85 Bu s h ’s foreign policy team, headed by Sta n f o r d provost Cond o l e ez z a Rice and cal led the “Vul ca n s , ” be l i e ved that the best wa y to repair US-Russia rel a t i o ns was to treat Russia like an interna t i o nal powe r . Th e y advocat e d gr eater focus on the great powers in the world , su c h as Russia and China, and less attention to “hu m a n i t a r ian conc e rn s ” su c h as Haiti, Soma l i a , Bo s n i a , and Kosovo .86 Gr eater attention did not mean a softer line. On the cont ra r y, in refe r ence to both Russia and China, Bush campaign officials promised to depart from the Clinton soft-line strat e g y and adhere to a more conf r ont a t i on a l ap p ro a ch . 87 With Rus s i a , Bush advisors promised to end the “happy talk” and discontinue the overp e r s on a l i z ed approa c h that they claimed Clinton practiced with Yel t s i n .

Be c ause the Bush foreign policy team were “rea l i s t s , ” th e y tended to down p l a y the importance of regime type general ly and instead focused on the external behavior of states, wh i c h they believed we r e influenced first and foremost by the balance of power in the interna t i o nal syst e m . Ge n e ra l ly, US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 23 th e y pledged a similar approa c h to Rus s i a . This said, two internal problems in Rus s i a — c o r ru p t i o n and Chechny a — w e r e simply too juicy political ly to ignore. Candidate Bush and his advisors rep e a t - ed ly refe r enced these issues of Russian domestic politics and blamed the Clinton administrat i o n for not doing enough in res p o nse to these tran s g re s s i on s . As the follo wing exchange between can d i d a t e Bush and news anchor Jim Leh r er in Feb ru a r y 2000 demons t ra t e d , Bush promised to do more.

LEHRER: On Chechnya and Russia, the US and the rest of the Western world had been raising Cain with Russia from the beginning, saying ‘You are killing innocent civilians.’ The Russians have said essentially “We’re fighting terrorism, and, by the way, mind your own business.” What else—what else, if anything, could be done by the United States?

BUSH: Well, we could cut off IMF aid and Export-Import loans to Russia until they heard the message loud and clear, and we should do that. It’s going to be a very interesting issue to see how Russia merges [sic], Jim. This guy,Putin, who is now the temporary president, has come to power as a result of Chechnya. He kind of rode the great wave of popularity as the Russian military looked like they were gaining strength in kind of handling the Chechnya situation in a way that’s not acceptable to peaceful nations….

LEHRER: But on Chechnya, specifically, you think we should not—we should hold up International Monetary Fund aid. Anything else we should do?

BUSH: Export-Import loans.

LEHRER: And just cut them off?

BUSH: Yes, sir, I think we should.

LEHRER: Until they do what?

BUSH: Until they understand they need to resolve the dispute peacefully and not be bombing women and children and causing huge numbers of refugees to flee Chechnya.

LEHRER: And do you think that would work?

BUSH: Well, it certainly worked better than what the Clinton administration has tried.

LEHRER: You mean, just using words, you mean?

BUSH: Yes.88 24 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

In the first weeks of his administration, President Bush and his new foreign policy team sig- naled their intent to maintain a tough line on Russia and Chechnya in particular. After being named national security advisor but before taking office, Condoleezza Rice wrote a hard-hitting opinion piece for the Chicago Tribune warning the Russians of things to come. In this essay, Rice emphasized again that “the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power,” and therefore “US policy must con c e n t rate on the important securi ty agenda with Ru s s i a . ”8 9 At the same time, she also reiterated many of Russia’s domestic ills, including weak democratic institutions, halfhearted economic reforms, and corruption. She devoted special attention to the ill effects of the Chechen war and Putin’s role in it:

As prime minister, Vladimir Putin used the Chech nya war to stir nation a l i s m at home while fueling his political fort u n e s . The Russian military has been u n ch a ra c t e ri s t i ca lly blunt and vocal in asserting its duty to defend the i n t e g ri ty of the Russian Fe d e ra t i on—an unw e l c ome deve l o pment in civil- m i l i t a ry re l a t i on s . The lon g - t e rm effect of the war on Ru s s i a’s political cult u re should not be undere s t i m a t e d . This war has affected the re l a t i ons betw e e n Russia and its neighbors in the Cauca s u s , as the Kremlin has been hurl i n g charges of harb o ring and abetting Chechen terro rists against states as dive r s e as Saudi Ara b i a , G e o r g i a , and Aze rb a i j a n . The war is a reminder of the vul- n e ra b i l i ty of the small , n ew states around Russia and of Am e ri ca’s interest in their independence.9 0

Rice hoped that this blunt statement about Russia’s problems and its impact on US interests would stand in contrast to the sugarcoated rhetoric of the Clinton years, which, in her opinion, did great damage to US national security:

The United States should not be faulted for trying to help [with Ru s s i a n re f o rm ] . B u t , as the Russian re f o rmer Gri go ry Ya vlinsky has said, the United States should have “told the tru t h” about what was happening. We now have a dual cre d i b i l i ty problem—with Russians and with Am e ri ca n s … . T h e re is no l onger a consensus in Am e ri ca or Europe on what to do next with Ru s s i a . Fru s t rated expectations and “Russia fatigue” a re direct consequences of the “happy talk” in which the Clinton administra t i on engaged.9 1

In the spring of 2001, Bush and his foreign policy team did seem determined to end the “happy talk.” In March 2001, his administra t i on ord e red the expulsion of nearly 50 Ru s s i a n di p l omats from the United States who were accused of being spies.9 2 Bush person a lly did not make any statements about Chech nya during his first months in pow e r, but his St a t e D e p a rtment did send a loud signal of support for the Chechen cause by arranging a meeting b e tween the Chechen foreign minister in exile, Ilyas Akhmadov, and the acting deputy assistant secre t a ry of state, J ohn Beyrle—the highest-level meeting ever with a Chechen gove rnment official.9 3 In this early peri o d , Bush officials also seemed poised to maintain a tough line on Ru s s i a’s re l a t i ons with rogue states. Se c re t a ry of Defense Donald Ru m s feld ca ll e d US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 25

Russia “an active pro l i fe ra t o r”9 4 while his deputy, D e p u ty Se c re t a ry of Defense Pa u l Wo l f ow i t z , d e s c ribed the Russians as immoral pro l i fe rators who “seem to be willing to sell a nything to anyone for mon ey. ”9 5 Leaks from the White House suggested that assistance to Russia would be cut, i n cluding even $100 mill i on from Nu n n - Lu g a r, a pro g ram that som e Bush officials viewed as a subsidy for Ru s s i a’s military - i n d u s t rial com p l e x .9 6 A new, m o re c on f ron t a t i onal appro a ch to re l a t i ons with Russia seemed to be emerging. As New Yo rk Ti m e s re p o rter Jane Pe rl ez con cluded in her rev i ew of Russia policy at the time, “The Bush admin- i s t ra t i on has not articulated a broad policy tow a rd Ru s s i a , but in thoughts and deeds it has taken a sharp depart u re from the engagement policies of its pre d e c e s s o r, m oving tow a rd iso- lating Russia and its pre s i d e n t , Vladimir V. Pu t i n . ”9 7

O n ly after Am e ri can allies in Europe insisted did Bush agree to schedule a meeting with Putin as a final stop on his first trip to Europe in the summer of 2001. As the meeting with Putin in Sl ovenia appro a ch e d , Bush began to get person a lly inv o lved with his Russia policy for the first time. That spri n g, he made a strategic decision not to con f ront Putin with a laun- d ry list of Am e ri can con c e rns in their first meeting. I n s t e a d , he wanted to establish a person a l ra p p o rt with the Russian leader as a necessary first step in developing a partnership with his Russian counterp a rt . It was a businessman’s appro a ch to foreign policy. In making this deci- s i on , Bush especially wanted to avoid any long discussion or argument about internal Ru s s i a n politics such as Chech ny a . In a sense, n ow that the presidential campaign was ove r, Bush was re t u rning to the realist pro clivities of his closest foreign policy advisors—pro clivities also s h a red by his father.

At their first meeting in Slovenia in June 2001, Bush went out of his way to praise Putin. Instead of depersonalizing rel a t i o ns with Rus s i a , Bush delibera t e ly tried to forge a person a l b ond with his Russian counterp a rt during their ve ry first encounter. At this meeting Bush re p o rte d , “I looked the man in the eye . I found him to be ve ry stra i g h t f o rw a rd and tru s t- w o rt hy … . I was able to get a sense of his soul,” and he liked what he saw and sensed.9 8 Ac c o rding to White House staffe r s , Bush and Putin did discuss Chech nya pri v a t e ly, b u t t h e re was almost no mention of the issue publicly.

The bond between Bush and Putin grew stronger after September 11. Putin was one of the first foreign leaders to ca ll Bush that day to com mu n i cate his full support for the United States and the Am e ri can people. Putin expressed sym p a t hy as a leader of a country that had also suffe red from acts of terrorism against civilians in the capital. Eventually, Putin followed his words of support with policies of assistance. On September 24, Putin announced a five- point plan to support the American war against terrorism. He pledged that his government would (1) share intell i g e n c e, (2) open Russian air space for flights providing humanitari a n a s s i stance, (3) cooperate with Ru s s i a’s Central Asian allies to provide air space access to Am e ri can flights, (4) participate in intern a t i onal search and rescue effort s , and (5) incre a s e d i rect assistance—both humanitarian and military—to the No rt h e rn Alliance in Afg h a n i s t a n . Pu t i n’s agreement to an Am e ri can military presence in Central Asia re p resented a histori c change in Russian foreign policy. 26 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Bush immediately rew a rded Pu t i n’s support i ve turn by changing the way he spoke about Ru s s i a’s “war against terro ri s m . ” On September 26, White House press spok e s p e r s on Ari Fl e i s cher com mu n i cated Bush’s appre c i a t i on for Pu t i n’s statement. Fl e i s cher also stated that “ C h e ch nya leadership, like all re s p onsible political leaders in the worl d , must immediately and con d i t i on a lly cut all contacts with intern a t i onal terro rist gro u p s , s u ch as Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organiza t i on . ”9 9 The Clinton administra t i on had prev i o u s ly connected some Chechen fighters to bin La d e n’s netw o rk ; the Bush administra t i on had not. Subsequent meetings between the Bush administra t i on and the Chechen gove rnment in exile were fewer and at lower leve l s . President Bush’s statement did not give Putin a gre e n light to do what he wanted in Chech ny a . T h roughout the second war, the Russian arm e d f o rces had already done whatever they wanted in Chech nya with little or no re g a rd to Am e ri can opinion s .

The statement of support, however, did underscore the notion that the United States and Russia faced a common enemy.Putin had been pushing this theme for two years with his American counterparts. Putin was pleased to hear that President Bush finally recognized publicly their common cause. In subsequent meetings between Bush and Putin, the war in Chechnya has not been a major agenda item. As one journalist summed up,“Bush has shown remarkable discipline in ignoring Ru s s i a’s incre a s i n g ly brutal campaign against separatists in t h e rebel republic—a campaign dubbed by Yelena Bonner, widow of Nobel Prize-winning human rights activist Andrei Sakharov, as the “political genocide of the Chechen people.”100

Bush administra t i on officials had re p e a t e dly stressed that the issue of Chech nya was cove re d at length behind closed doors in previous meetings between the Russian and Am e ri ca n p re si d e n t s .1 0 1 When Bush has alluded to the Chechen situation publicly, h ow eve r, he and the senior officials in his gove rnment have often adopted Pu t i n’s port rayal of the Ru s s i a n m i l i t a ry opera t i on as part of the war on terro ri s m .1 0 2 As he re a f f i rmed at the G-8 meeting in Canada in the summer of 2002, “President Putin has been a stalw a rt in the fight against t e rro r. He understands the threat of terro r, b e cause he has lived through terro r. H e’s seen t e r ror firsthand and he knows the threat of terro ri s m … . He understands what I understand, that there won’t be peace if terro rists are all owed to kill and take innocent life . An d , t h e re- f o re, I v i ew President Putin as an ally—a strong ally—in the war against terro ri s m . ”1 0 3 E ven Se c ret a ry of State Colin Pow e ll changed his descri p t i on of the Chechen con f l i c t , stating bluntly soon after the Moscow 2002 summit that “Russia is fighting terro rists in C h e ch ny a , t he re is no question about tha t , and we understand that.”1 0 4 Su ch uttera n c e s s u ggest that the re fe re n ces to Chech nya behind closed doors may not have been as hard - h i tting as US officials have cl a i m e d.

The Bush administra t i on has not alw ays spoken with a unified voice about Chech ny a . Although the president himself has not spoken cri t i ca lly about the Chechen war since the 2000 presidential ca m p a i g n , members of his administra t i on have condemned the conduct of the Russian military ca m p a i g n . When pressed to talk about Chech ny a , C on d o l e ez za Rice h a s c ontinued to express a more complex view of the war: US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 27

… We cl e a rly have diffe rences with the Russian gove rnment about Chech ny a . We’ve said to them that we fully agree that the Chechen leadership should not inv o lve itself with terro rist elements in the re g i on , and there are terro ri s t elements in the re g i on . But that not eve ry Chechen is a terro rist and that the C h e ch e n s ’ legitimate aspira t i on for political solution should be pursued by the Russian gove rn m e n t . And we have been ve ry active ly pressing the Ru s s i a n gove rnment to move on the political front with Chech ny a .105

The US ambassador to Ru s s i a , Alexander Ve r s h b ow, has been part i c u l a rly vocal in con- demning the methods of the ca m p a i g n , urging a political solution and distinguishing b e tween i n t e rn a t i onal terro rists fighting in Chech nya and local Chechen fighters whose aim is independence.106 In public statements, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and E u rasian Affairs St even Pi fer also has stressed the need to distinguish between fre e d om fighters and intern a t i onal terro rists and has ca lled on Maskhadov and other modera t e C h e chens to disassociate themselves with terro ri s t s .1 0 7 Pi fer also has stated bluntly that “ t h e danger to civilians in Chech nya remains our greatest con c e rn . The human rights situation is p o o r, with a history of abuses by all sides….”108

If the rh e t o ric of the Bush administra t i on has changed con s i d e ra b ly over its first years in o f f i c e — f rom the ve ry cri t i cal to the ve ry support i ve, but with dissident voices continuing to highlight the negative—actual policy has changed ve ry little from the Clinton era . Wh e n asked during his con f i rm a t i on hearings how the Bush appro a ch to Chech nya would diffe r f rom the Clinton policy, Pow e ll answere d , “I don’t know that I can answer that….”1 0 9 Subsequent statements by Bush administra t i on officials suggest that the actual policy on C h e ch nya has changed ve ry little.1 1 0 On the basic issues con c e rning Chech ny a , St a t e D e p a rtment spok e s p e r s on Rich a rd Boucher said, “To re i t e ra t e, our policy has not ch a n g e d . We re c o g n i ze Chech nya as part of Ru s s i a . ”1 1 1 He also added, “ t h ey need to take steps to b ring the violence to an end, that there is no military solution to the pro b l e m , and they need—both sides need—to find ways to begin a dialogue and re a ch a political settlement.”1 1 2 Under Bush, the United States has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to the re g i on . I m p o rt a n t ly, the Bush administra t i on also has increased tech n i cal assistance to the Georgian military to help President Sh ev a rd n a d ze con t rol his country’s border with C h e ch nya so as to prevent a Russian military opera t i on against alleged Chechen rebel ca m p s based in Georgia.1 1 3 At the same time, Bush administra t i on officials have re f rained from pursuing new policy initiatives re g a rding Chech ny a . T h ey have not embraced a more activist ro l e in the re g i on such as those proposed by Brzezinski nor offe red Am e ri can mediating serv i c e s to the Russians and Chech e n s .

Though little in the conduct of the war has changed since candidate Bush pledged to sanction Russia until they stop bombing “w omen and ch i l d re n” and causing “huge numbers of re f u g e e s to flee Chech ny a , ” no sanctions have been applied. The on ly significant policy change is rh e t o ri ca l . If Clinton begru d g i n g ly added statements cri t i cal of the Chechen war to his talking points on Ru s s i a , Bush has eliminated them. 28 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Outside Voices Since the change of administra t i ons in Wa s h i n g t on , c on c e rn about Chech nya has quieted c on s i d e ra b ly on Capitol Hill . In 1999 senior Republican senators accused the Clinton a d m i n i s t ra t i on of supporting genocide. Since 1999 the methods of war used by the Ru s s i a n a rmed forces in Chech nya have not ch a n g e d , yet no one is accusing President Bush of aiding genocide through his warm embrace of Pu t i n . Fo rmer con g re s s i onal critics such as M c C on n e ll and Cox have become noticeably quiet on Chech ny a .

Ther e are notable exce p t i on s . Senator Helms has remained true to his earlier conc e r ns by rai s ing the issue of Chechnya during confirmation hearings for Secretary of State Powell. Helms continued to express ca u t i on about Bush’s unqualified embrace of Pu t i n . T h ree days before the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001, Helms called on G-8 leaders not to forget to raise the Chechnya issue with Putin and to remember that “Mr.Putin’s unjustified war against the Chechen people has been far more savage and devastating than the destruction M i l os˘ev ic´ has wreaked upon Kosovo.” Helms urged that the United States “should apply all the political and economic leverage that can be mustered to encourage, and if necessary leverage, President Putin to peacefully and immediately end the war in Chechnya.”114 Helms and his staff also pushed for passage of Senate Resolution 60 submitted concurrently by Senators Helms, Smith, Lott, and Allen on July 17, 2001, which called for the expulsion of Russia from the G-8.

On the House side, C on g ressman Tom Lantos has continued to ca ll attention to the Chech e n w a r. He submitted his own re s o l u t i on (HR 128) ca lling for the expulsion of Russia from the G - 8 . Lantos also has introduced legislation aimed at providing more assistance to gra s s ro o t s d e m o c ra cy groups in Ru s s i a , w h i ch in October 2002 passed through both houses of Con g re s s . These legislative initiative s , h ow eve r, h a ve had on ly a marginal impact on the administra t i on’s p o l i cy tow a rd Ru s s i a .

In the wider policy com mu n i ty, the issue of Chech nya has faded as a secon d a ry or tert i a ry c oncern. NGOs such as Human Rights Watch continue to publish reports about human rights violations in Chechnya, but the new attention on the “war on terrorism” has limited the recep- tivity for this kind of information. The Washington Post editorial page also has kept a vigilant focus on Chechnya and democratic backsliding in Russia more generally. By contrast, the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya has adopted a less critical stance toward the Bush administration regarding its policy on Chechnya. The committee has refrained from accusing Bush of supporting genocide and instead has cautiously prodded the new administration to push for a political settlement.115 After September 11, Brzezinski also recognized the presence of terrorist elements in Chechnya and applauded the Bush administration for “urging Mr.Putin to seek a political solution. And I think we’ll probably move towards i t … . ”1 1 6 Replacing the Am e ri can C ommittee for Peace in Chech nya as the most vocal pro p onents for a greater focus on Chech nya are former Clinton administra t i on officials. Fo rmer Deputy Se c re t a ry of St a t e St robe Talbott has become one of the more vocal critics of the Bush administra t i on for not doing enough about Chech ny a . Reflecting change and con t i n u i ty in policy between adminis- t ra t i on s , Talbott wro t e, “One of my con c e rns about our successors in the exe c u t i ve bra n ch is US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 29 t h a t , while they’ve come around to a lot of con t i n u i ty with us on the external agenda, t h ey seem to have dow n g raded the internal one con s i d e ra b ly by com p a ri s on with us. T h ey’ve let C h e ch nya (especially since 9/11) become largely a non i s s u e, while I think it should have remained front and center from Inaugura t i on Day forw a rd . ”1 1 7

IV. Conclusion US policy reg a r ding Chechn ya exposes the limits of Ame ri c an power even in an age of unbridled US power.Russia’s military interventions in Chechnya were policies that US foreign policy leaders would have liked to stop. In the end, however, policies pursued by both the Clinton and Bush administrations have had little impact on the course of the war in Chechnya.

T h e re were and are policy altern a t i ve s . C l i n t on and Bush could have sanctioned Russia by cutting off direct assistance to the Russian gove rn m e n t . T h ey could have suspended Russia from membership in the G-8. T h ey could have postp oned presidential summits. T h ey could have o f fe red more humanitarian assistance to the re g i on . E ven more dra m a t i ca lly, t h ey could have o f fe red their services as a mediator. T h e o re t i ca lly, C h e chen and Russian officials could have met at Camp David in 1995 or 2001 to hammer out a political settlement. H yp o t h e t i ca lly, t h ey even could have re c o g n i zed the legitimacy of the elected gove rnment of Chech nya and p rovided direct assistance to the gove rnment in exile.

The Clinton and Bush administra t i ons failed to pursue these more ambitious interve n t i on s for seve ral re a s on s . Fi r s t , eve ry senior foreign policy official in the first and second Clinton a d m i n i s t ra t i on s , as well as the Bush administra t i on , b e l i eved that other issues in US-Ru s s i a re l a t i ons were more important than Chech nya and could not be sacrificed or jeopard i ze d for Chech ny a . For Clinton in 1994, it was keeping Yeltsin in pow e r. For Bush in 2001, i t was obtaining Russian acquiescence to Am e ri can withdrawal from the ABM Tre a ty. A ft e r September 11, of course, B u s h’s new foreign policy focus made coopera t i on with Ru s s i a even more import a n t.

Se c on d , even while deploring Ru s s i a’s methods, eve ry major foreign policy official support e d Ru s s i a’s war aims. No one in either the Clinton or Bush administra t i ons ever re c om m e n d e d that the United States should re c o g n i ze Chech nya as an independent state. And no other c o u n t ry in the worl d , i n cluding in the Muslim worl d , re c o g n i zed Chechen independence.1 1 8 E s p e c i a lly after the military incursion into Dagestan in 1999 by Chechen rebel forc e s , U S officials re c o g n i zed Ru s s i a’s right to defend its terri t o rial integri ty. E x p ressing sym p a t hy for Ru s s i a’s objectives made it difficult for Am e ri can officials to make credible criticisms of the Russian means for ach i eving these objective s .

Third, US leaders believed they had few policy tools at their disposal to affect the conduct of the war in Chechnya. They believed that the alternative policies outlined above would not have been effective. Whether they were right in that assessment is debatable. That this assessment shaped their policy toward Chechnya is clear. 30 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Over the course of three presidential terms (Clinton I, Clinton II, and Bush), the one policy on Chechnya that did change dramatically was the language used to describe the war. Clinton I was not very critical. Clinton II was extremely critical. Candidate Bush was very critical as well. President Bush has dropped the issue. The causes of these rhetorical zigzags were American domestic politics and changes in the overall US-Russia relationship and had very little to do with changes in the conduct of the wars themselves.

Did these zigzags matter? Do words play any meaningful role in foreign policy? In the margins and over time, t h ey ca n . E ven when US officials do not have the means to stop injustices, t h ey can at least speak cl e a rly, h on e s t ly, and con s i s t e n t ly about them. Most dire c t ly, the US failure to speak cri t i ca lly about the war—during the first Clinton term and now again—has undermined the legitimacy of Russian opponents of the war. M o re indire c t ly, i n c onsistent rh e t o ri c u n d e rmines Am e ri can cre d i b i l i ty when speaking about human rights issues. The suffe ring of the people of Chech nya has remained consistent while Am e ri can rh e t o ric about their plight h a d fluctuated. The disconnect between facts on the ground and American portrayals of these facts suggests that US leaders have ulterior motives for expressing outrage. People in Russia and elsewhere become cynical and dismissive of American moral claims. Rice was correct when she wrote that the “United States should have ‘told the tru t h’ about what was happening” and what is happening in Ru s s i a .1 1 9 By failing to ack n owledge the truth when it is inconve n i e n t , U S p o l i cymakers undermine the moral power of their words and their country.

The domestic debate about US policy reg a r ding Chechn ya also exposes the limits of efforts to influence administrat i o n policy from without in the absence of a strong and electoral ly importa n t con s t i t u e n c y. Par tisan politics did help draw attention to the Chechen issue. Republican control of the Senate and House with a Democrat in the White House created the permi s s i v e cond i t i on s for stimulating criticism of the Clinton administrat i o n’s policy on Chechny a . The debate never mo ved beyond an elite circle of people within the Beltwa y, how e ver , be c ause no voters gave mon e y to candidates or formed electoral prefe r ences because of Chechny a . Th e r e is no major Ch e c hen diaspora in the United Sta t e s . Nor does any major econo mic interest group in the United States have a stake in Chechny a . Some human rights organizat i o ns have devoted serio u s at t e n t i o n to the Chechen cau s e , but most of these organizat i o ns are nonp a r tisan and do not take po s i t i o ns on or make cont ri b u t i o ns to electoral can d i d a t e s . Be c ause the Chechen issue has almost no conn e c t i o n to electoral politics, talk about Chechn ya is che a p . Politicians and policymakers can adopt and abandon positions on the issue without facing electoral sanction. At the same time, th e r e is no electoral rewa r d for cha m p i o ning the Chechen cau s e , es p e c i a l ly after September 11.

The com b i n a t i on of weak tools for influencing the situation in Chech ny a , an ill - d e f i n e d p roposal for “s o lv i n g” the con f l i c t , and the absence of a con s t i t u e n cy of electoral import a n c e ch a m p i oning the Chechen cause has produced an ineffe c t i ve and inactive US policy tow a rd C h e ch ny a . In an era when the United States is unequivoca lly the most pow e rful country in the worl d , and maybe the most pow e rful country of all time, US policymakers have prove n unable to re s o lve or even positive ly influence this pro t racted con f l i c t . The terrible tra g e d y that is Chech nya is a sobering reminder of the limits of Am e ri can pow e r. US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 31

Epilogue On October 23, 2002, dozens of Chechen terrorists seized several hundred hostages in downtown Moscow. They had one demand: the end of the Chechen war. After a prolonged standoff, Putin decided to end the crisis by authorizing the use of gas to kill the terrorists—a move which left 118 of the hostages dead. While many commentators criticized Putin’s method, President Bush defended his “good friend” in the fight against terrorists. As Bush explained, “People tried to blame Vladimir. They ought to blame the terrorists.... Eight hundred people were going to lose their lives. These people were killers, just like the killers that came to America.”120 After the hostage crisis, American officials even began to express disdain for Maskhadov, disparaging him as a spent force (not unlike their new negative view of Arafat in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). US officials still ca lled for a political solution to the con f l i c t , but without stating more exactly who was supposed to be invited to the negotiating table.

Of course, Bush was right to label the Chechens who seized the Moscow theater terro ri s t s . T h ey used the same means as those who attacked the United States on September 11, 2 0 0 1 . The aims of their action s , h ow eve r, w e re ve ry diffe re n t . T h ey did not ca ll for the destru c t i on of We s t e rn civiliza t i on . Ra t h e r, t h ey ca lled for the end of the war in Chech ny a . In deployi n g i llegitimate means to seek legitimate ends, h ow eve r, the Chechen attackers further postp on e d the likelihood of peaceful settlement and further alienated those in the West support i ve of their ca u s e . Most dra m a t i ca lly, Bush unambiguously framed his “war on terro ri s m” and Pu t i n’s “war in Chech ny a” as part of one com m on stru g g l e . The real losers of this united front are the people of Chech ny a. 32 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Endnotes

1This report is adapted from a forthcoming book on US policy toward Russia by James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul to be published by Brookings Institution Press next year.

2Timothy Colton and McFaul, “Are Russians Undemocratic?” Post-Soviet Affairs,Vol. 18, No. 2, April-June 2002, pp. 91-121.

3They are cataloged in Chap. 9 of McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

4These voices, including most importantly the arguments expressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, are discussed below. See also Sarah E. Mendelson, “Russians’ Rights Imperiled: Has Anybody Noticed?” International Security,Vol. 26, No. 4 (spring 2002), pp. 39-69.

5Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Personal Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002).

6There were some on the team suspicious of Yeltsin’s true orientation. Among the top policymakers in Clinton’s first term, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake was most suspicious of the Russian president and especially his democratic proclivities.

7On the near anarchic condition of Chechnya under Dudayev during the period of de facto independence, see Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 74-84, and John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 1998), Chap. 4.

8For a fuller discussion of the decision to interve n e, see Lieve n , C h e ch n y a : Tombstone of Ru s s i a n Po wer, and Du n l o p, Russia Confronts Chech n y a : Roots of a Separatist Conflict.

9A fter his electoral victory, Yeltsin appointed General Alexander Lebed to negotiate a form a l peace settlement with Chech ny a , as Lebed placed a strong third in the first round of the p residential election as an antiwar ca n d i d a t e . Although Lebed eve n t u a lly clashed with Ye l t s i n and was re m oved from office, he successfully completed his nego t i a t i ons with the Chech e n s on August 31, 1 9 9 6 , b u oyed by his electoral mandate of 11 mill i on voters to end the war.

10The number 100,000 comes from Grigory Yavlinsky,“Where Is Russia Headed? An Uncertain Prognosis,” Journal of Democracy,Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1997, p. 4.

11Talbott, The Russia Hand, p. 149.

12Secretary of State Warren Christopher,“The United States and Russia: A Maturing Partnership,” US Department of State Dispatch, January 23, 1995. US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 33

13President Clinton , final press con fe rence at the Summit of the Am e ri ca s , Fl o ri d a , December 11, 1 9 9 4.

14CNN, May 11, 1995, Transcript No. 1020-3.

15Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Interests Seen Allied with Russian in Chechnya,” The Washington Post, December 25, 1994, p. A27.

16Mike McCurry, State Department Briefing, January 3, 1995.

17Quoted in David Hoffman and John Harri s , “ C l i n t on , Yeltsin Gloss Over Chechen War, ” The Washington Po s t,Ap ril 22, 1 9 9 6 , p. A 1.

18Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for national security affairs, “The Challenge of Change in Russia,” remarks before the US-Russia Business Council, April 1, 1996 (Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 3, 1996), p. 2.

19See Talbott, statement before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, February 5, 1995, (transcript provided by the Federal News Service,Washington, DC), p. 3.

20Talbott, “Supporting Democracy and Economic Reform in the New Independent States,” statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee,Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Fe b ru a ry 9, 1 9 9 5 , in U. S . D e p a rtment of Sta t e Dispatch,Vo l . 6 , No. 8 , Fe b ru a ry 20, 1 9 9 5 , p. 1 2 1 . See also Chri s t o pher interv i ew on the M ac Ne i l / L e h rer New s Ho u r, December 13, 1 9 9 4.

21Christopher interview on the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, December 13, 1994.

22McCurry, State Department Briefing, January 3, 1994.

23National Public Radio, Morning Edition, March 30, 1995, Transcript No. 1574-5, p. 2.

24Ibid.

25Wendy Ross, “The Role of Foreign Policy Advisors in Dole, Clinton Campaigns, U.S.Foreign Policy Agenda,” USIA Electronic Journals,Vol. 1, No. 14, October 1996. Dole also called the May 1995 summit a failure because Clinton failed to secure any concessions on Chechnya. See CNN, May 11, 1995, Transcript No. 1020-3.

26Z. Brzezinski on CNN International, June 15, 1996, Transcript No. 1549-3.

27Am ong these democratic assistance organiza t i on s , on ly the Na t i onal Endowment for D e m o c ra cy spoke out openly against the war and active ly supported those groups in Ru s s i a that opposed the war. 34 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

28ITA R -TA S S, " O p e ratsiya nach a l a s , G o ri a ch aya Chron i k a , ” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, August 14, 1 9 9 9 , p. 3.

29Vladimir Zainetdinov, Aleksei Siviv, Maria Belocklova. “Vchera v schkolakh ot Chokhotki do Kaliningrada prozvenel pervii zvonok. A v Ohotnom riyadu poslednii zvonok,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta,September 2, 1999, p. 1.

30H o f f m a n , “Russian Premier Pins Bombing on Chech e n s , ” The Washington Po s t, September 16, 1 9 9 9 , p. A 2 6 .

31Putin, as quoted in “Na voine kak na voine,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta,September 25, 1999, p. 1.

32“Goriachia Chronoka: Konechnaya tsel unichtozhit banditov,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 6, 1999, p. 1.

33M a rk Kra m e r, “ C i v i l - M i l i t a ry Relations in Russia and the Chech nya Con f l i c t , ” Po l i cy Memo Seri e s, No. 99 (Cambri d g e : Pro g ram on New Ap p ro a ches to Russian Se c u ri ty, December 1999), and Dmitri Tre n i n , “ C h e ch ny a : E f fects of the War and Prospects for Pe a c e, ” unpublished manuscri p t , 2 0 0 0 .

34Human Rights Wa t ch doggedly documented human atrocities ca r ried out in the secon d C h e chen war, i n cluding summary exe c u t i on s , b ombings of vill a g e s , and rape of Chech e n w om e n . Se e, for instance, their publica t i on s , “Now Happiness Remains: Civilian Kill i n g s , Pi ll a g e, and Rape in Alkhan-Yu rt , ” Ru s s i a / C h e ch n y a,Vo l . 1 2 , No. 5 (D), Ap ril 2000, p p. 1 - 3 3 ; “Fe b ru a ry 5: A Day of Slaughter in Nov ye Aldi,” Ru s s i a / C h e ch n y a,Vo l . 1 2 , No. 9 (D), J u n e 2 0 0 0 , p p. 1 - 4 3 ; “The ‘D i rty Wa r’ in Chech ny a : Fo rced Disappeara n c e s , To rt u re, and Su m m a ry E xe c u t i on s , ” Ru s s i a / C h e ch n y a,Vo l . 1 3 , No. 1 (D), M a rch 2001, p p. 1 - 4 2 ; and “B u rying the E v i d e n c e : The Botched Inve s t i g a t i on into a Mass Gra ve in Chech ny a , ” Ru s s i a / C h e ch n y a,Vo l . 1 3 , No. 3 (D), M ay 2001, p p. 1 - 2 6 . J ohn Du n l o p’s C h e chnya We e k l y, published by the J a m e s t own Fo u n d a t i on , also provides com p re h e n s i ve cove rage of events related to the war, i n cluding extensive re p o rting on human rights violation s.

35This figure is cited in Mendelson, “Russia, Chechnya, and International Norms: The Power and Paucity of Human Rights,” working paper,(Washington, DC: The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2001), p. 11.

36On Russia’s zigzags during the war and after, see McFaul, “Russia’s Many Foreign Policies,” Demokratizatsiya,Vol. 7, No. 3 (summer 1999), pp. 393-412, and “Russia’s Pyhrric ‘Pristina Victory,’” The Wall Street Journal (European Edition), June 17, 1999.

37See the final chapter of McFaul, Russia’s 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997). US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 35

38See the chapter on SPS in McFaul, Andrei Ryabov, and Nikolai Petrov, Primer on Russia’s 1999 Duma Elections (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

39Talbott, “Russia: Its Current Troubles and Its Ongoing Transformation,” prepared testimony before the House International Relations Committee, October 19, 1999, p. 1.

40Ta l b o t t , “Pursuing U. S. I n t e rests with Russia and with President-Elect Pu t i n , ” p re p a re d t e s t i m ony before the Senate Ap p ro p ri a t i ons Com m i t t e e,Su b c ommittee on Fo re i g n O p e ra t i on s , Ap ril 4, 2 0 0 0 , p. 6 .

41Aleksandr Koretskii, “Chechnya ob’yavila voinu SSHA,” Segodnya,August 24, 1999, p. 1.

42Stephen Sestanovich, special advisor to the secretary of state for the New Independent States, “The Conflict in Chechnya and its Implications for U.S. Relations with Russia,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 4, 1999, p. 2.

43Bill Powell, “Boris to Bill: Butt Out,” Newsweek, November 29, 1999, p. 60.

44Madeleine Albright, “Clear on Chechnya,” The Washington Post, March 8, 2000, p. A31.

45Remarks by Albright following statement by acting President Vladimir Putin at Multilateral Steering Committee Group Meeting, Moscow, Russia, State Department Briefing,February 1, 2000, reprinted on Federal News Service.

46In com p a ring tactics, Russian military expert Pa vel Baev wro t e, “ Some We s t e rn expert s h a ve con cluded that the Russians are foll owing the NATO model from Kosov o, but in fact it is quite difficult to find mu ch similari ty between the two opera t i on s : NATO used massive a i rp ower with high-pre c i s i on strikes in order to avoid a ground ca m p a i g n , while Russia has used limited airp ower (with ve ry little pre c i s i on to speak of) in support of a ground ca m- p a i g n , re lying pri m a ri ly on the massive and indiscriminate use of art i ll e ry. T h e re is nothing n ew about this ‘ f i rew a ll’ Russian tactic….” B aev, “Wi ll Russia Go for a Military Vi c t o ry in C h e ch ny a ? ” Po l i cy Memo Seri e s, No. 107 (Cambri d g e : Pro g ram on New Ap p ro a ches to Russian Se c u ri ty, Fe b ru a ry 2000) p. 1 .

47Sestanovich, “The Conflict in Chechnya and its Implications for U.S. Relations with Russia,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 4, 1999, p. 2.

48Ta l b o t t , “Pursuing U. S. I n t e rests with Russia and with President-Elect Pu t i n , ” p re p a re d t e s t i m ony before the Senate Ap p ro p ri a t i ons Com m i t t e e,Su b c ommittee on Fo re i g n O p e ra t i on s , Ap ril 4, 2 0 0 0 , p. 6 .

49Talbott, “Russia: Its Current Troubles and Its Ongoing Transformation,” prepared testimony before the House International Relations Committee, October 19, 1999, p. 2. 36 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

50Talbott, “Statement on Russian Attack on Grozny, Chechnya,” as released by the Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, October 22, 1999.

51Talbott, “Russia: Its Current Troubles and Its Ongoing Transformation,” prepared testimony before the House International Relations Committee, October 19, 1999, p. 2.

5 2Ta l b o t t , “Pursuing U. S. I n t e rests with Russia and with President-Elect Pu t i n , ” p re p a re d t e s t i m ony before the Senate Ap p ro p ri a t i ons Com m i t t e e,Su b c ommittee on Fo re i g n O p e ra t i on s , Ap ril 4, 2 0 0 0 , p p. 7 - 8 .

53On this point, however, they still remained sensitive. See McFaul, “Indifferent to Democracy,” The Washington Post, March 3, 2000, and Albright’s response, “Clear on Chechnya,” The Washington Post, March 8, 2000, p. A31.

54“Al b r ight War ns Against Remaking Russia a U.S . En e m y, ” Agence France Pres s , November 25, 19 9 9 .

55Clinton, “Remembering Yeltsin,” TIME, January 1, 2001, p. 94.

56Sestanovich, “Where Does Russia Belong?” The National Interest (winter 2000/2001), p. 15.

57Ibid.

58David Bris c o e , “US Gov’t Bank to Nix Russia Loa n s , ” The Associated Pres s , December 21, 19 9 9 .

59Press statement by Jamie Rubin, November 12, 1999.

60Clinton first pushed this issue with Putin in September 1999 in Auckland, New Zealand.

61Sestanovich, “Russia’s Elections and American Policy,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,April 12, 2000, p. 3.

62Sestanovich, “Where Does Russia Belong?” The National Interest (winter 2000/2001), p. 15.

63Talbott manuscript.

64Helms staff members Steven Biegun and Ian Brzezinski were the two staffers that sustained the campaign concerning Chechnya.

65Prepared statement of US Senator Mitch McConnell before the Senate Appropriations Committee,Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, April 4, 2000.

66Even the title sounded partisan. The document is called “Russia’s Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People”(Washington, DC: US House of Representatives, September 2000). US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 37

67“Russia’s Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People”(Washington, DC: US House of Representatives, September 2000), p. 57.

68Senate Resolution 262.

69This resolution never won a majority in either the Senate or House.

70Talbott, “Russia: Its Current Troubles and Its Ongoing Transformation,” prepared testimony before the House International Relations Committee, October 19, 1999, p. 5.

71Briscoe,“US Gov’t Bank to Nix Russia Loans,” The Associated Press, December 21, 1999.

72Interview with George W. Bush on The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer,February 16, 2000. Available at www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/jan-june00/bush_2-16.html.

73Z. Brzezinski, “Why the West Should Care About Chechnya,” The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 1999. He made a similar argument in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,April 12, 2000.

74Z. Brzezinski, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,April 12, 2000.

75Ibid.

76 Am e ri can Committee for Chech ny a , “Founding Decl a ra t i on , ” sent to the author Fe b ru a ry 10, 2 0 0 0 .

77Z. Brzezinski, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,April 12, 2000.

78Am e ri can Committee for Chech ny a , “Founding Decl a ra t i on , ” sent to the author Fe b ru a ry 10, 2 0 0 0 .

79Z. Brzezinski, “Why the West Should Care About Chechnya,” The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 1999.

80Welcome to Hell: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Extortion in Chechnya (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 2000).

81Se e, for instance, Mc Fa u l , “I n d i f fe rence to Democra cy, ” The Washington Po s t, M a rch 3, 2 0 0 0 , and the re s p onse by Albri g h t , “Clear on Chech ny a , ” The Washington Po s t, M a rch 8, 2 0 0 0.

82Mendelson, “Russia, Chechnya, and International Norms,” working paper,(Washington, DC: The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2001), p. 3. 38 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

83See Lieven, “Through a Distorted Lens: Chechnya and the Western Media,” Current History, October 2000, pp. 321-328.

84Dimitri Simes, from transcript of The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, November 18, 1999, p. 5.

85In this respect, Bush’s foreign policy advisors came to a very different conclusion about Russia than the Cox Report, which urged more assistance for reform, not less.

86Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs,Vol. 79, No. 1 (January/February 2000), pp. 45-62.

87This impression is based on the author’s conversations with several Vulcans during the 2000 campaign.

88Interview with Bush on The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer,February 16, 2000. Available at www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/jan-june00/bush 2-16.html.

89Rice,“Exercising Power Without Arrogance,” The Chicago Tribune, December 31, 2000.

90Ibid.

91Ibid.

92Vernon Loeb and Susan Glaser,“Bush Backs Expulsion of 50 Russians,” The Washington Post, March 23, 2001, p. A1.

93In 1997 Sestanovich had met with Maskhadov in Washington, but that was during a period when Moscow recognized him as the elected president of Chechnya. In 1999 the Russian government considered Maskhadov a “terrorist.”

94D onald Ru m s fe l d , i n t e rv i ewed by Wi n s t on Church i ll , posted March 18, 2 0 0 1 , on w w w. tel egrac p h . c o. u k.

95Quoted in James Risen and James Perlez, “Russian Diplomats Ordered Expelled in a Countermove,” The New York Times, March 21, 2001, p. A1.

96McFaul, “A Step Backward on Nuclear Cooperation,” The New York Times,April 11, 2001.

97Perlez, “Tougher on Russia,” The New York Times, March 23, 2001, p. A4.

98 Press Confe r ence by President Bush and Russian President Put i n , Br do Castle, Br do Pri Kran j u , Slo ven i a , June 16, 20 0 1 , at ww w. w h i te h o u s e. go v / n ew s / r ele a s e s / 2 0 0 1 / 0 6 / 2 0 0 1 0 6 1 8 . h t m l , p. 6. US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 39

99Ari Fleischer,White House Briefing,September 26, 2001.

100 Jamie Dettmer, “Bush Woos Putin but Ignores Chechny a , ” Insight on the News , August 27, 20 0 2 .

101Dana Milibank and Peter Baker,“Bush Wary of Confronting Putin,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2002, p. A22.

102“President Bush, President Putin Discuss Joint Efforts Against Terrorism,” remarks by President Bush and President Putin at photo opportunity,” Kananaskis, Canada, June 27, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020627-3.html, p. 3.

103Ibid.

104Chechnya Weekly,Vol. 3, No. 16, June 4, 2002, p. 1.

105Rice, in an answer to a question after her remarks to the Conservative Political Action Conference, Arlington, Virginia, February 1, 2002. See www.whitehouse.gov/news /releases/2002/02/20020201-6.html, p. 5.

106“U.S. Envoy Hails Ties, Chides Russia on Chechnya,” Reuters, December 28, 2001; “Vershbow Cites Some Progress,” Chechnya Weekly,Vol. 3, No. 1, January 4, 2002, p. 2; Francesca Mereu, “Russia: U.S.Ambassador Discusses Bilateral Ties, Press Freedom, Chechnya,” RFE/RL, May 31, 2002.

107St even Pi fe r, d e p u ty assistant secre t a ry for European and Eurasian affairs, s t a t e m e n t , “H e a ri n g : D eve l o pments in the Chechen Con f l i c t , C om m i s s i on on Se c u ri ty and C o o p e ra t i on in Euro p e, ” US Con g re s s , M ay 9, 2 0 0 2 , p. 2 . Pi fer also stressed that “ C on t ra ry to some media re p o rt i n g, we have not seen evidence of extensive ties between Chechens and Al Qaeda in Chech ny a … . ”

108Ibid, p. 3.

109Colin Powell, testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 20, 2001.

110Pifer statement, p. 1.

111Richard Boucher,State Department Briefing, March 27, 2001, p. 4.

112Ibid, p. 7.

11 3Putin has cl eve rly adopted the same rh e t o ric and logic used by President Bush to assert that Russia has a right to attack terro rists even if this means violating the sove re i g n ty of the host country. 40 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

114Helms statement before hearing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 18, 2001.

11 5See Z. B rzez i n s k i , Max Ka m p e l m a n , and Alexander Haig, “An Opening on Chech ny a , ” The Washington Po s t, J u ly 4, 2 0 0 1 , p. A 1 9 .

116Z. Brzezinski, on The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, November 15, 2001, available at www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/july-dec01/bush-putin_11-15.html.

117Talbott, e-mail exchange with Anne Applebaum on Slate.com, June 12, 2002.

11 8The Taliban re c o g n i zed Chechen independence, but on ly three states re c o g n i zed the Taliban re g i m e .

119Rice,“Exercising Power Without Arrogance,” The Chicago Tribune, December 31, 2000.

120 Bush, as quoted in Mike Allen, “Bush Defends Putin in Handling of Siege,” The Washington Post, November 19, 2002. US Foreign Policy and Chechnya 41

About the Author

ichael McFaul, a member of the Joint Task Force on Domestic Politics and America’s Russia Policy, is a Helen and Peter Bing Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution Mand an associate professor of political science at Stanford University. He is also a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His latest book is Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Cornell University Press, 2001). 42 US Foreign Policy and Chechnya

Euro-Atlantic Initiatives

he Euro - Atlantic Initiatives pro g ram seeks to build and foster com munities in the United States and Europe committed to com p re h e n s i ve Euro - Atlantic securi ty Tt h ro u g h res e a r ch and analysis by policy profe s s i o nals and the convening of open dial o g u e f o rums among political and opinion leaders.

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