Field Marshal Von Rundstedt Was Generally Unaware of the Situ- Egate His Authority to His Subordinate Commander Possessed “Outstanding Soldier for 52 Years

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Field Marshal Von Rundstedt Was Generally Unaware of the Situ- Egate His Authority to His Subordinate Commander Possessed “Outstanding Soldier for 52 Years Field Marshal Le Mérite, Prussia’s highest decoration. Von Rundstedt not only survived marshal and placed in command of without comment, Hitler’s order for von Rundstedt After the war he was retained in the the purge of March 1938, he was the ground force being assembled the extermination of commissars and Reichswehr, the armed forces of the promoted. Allowed to retire following for the invasion of the England. After other “undesirables” inside Russia. By Gilberto Villahermosa Weimar Republic, where he’d attained the conclusion of the Sudetenland that operation’s cancellation, he was In November 1941 Hitler dismissed in Normandy the rank of lieutenant general by the crisis in September, he was recalled made Commander-in-Chief West until von Rundstedt, who’d just suffered time Hitler came to power in 1933. in May 1939 to lead the planning March 1941, when he was ordered to a mild heart attack, for withdrawing Background offi cer. A graduate of the prestigious Though he constantly disparaged team for the Polish campaign. take charge of Army Group South for against orders from Rostov in the Kriegsakademie (War Academy), he the Fuehrer privately, von Rundstedt During that invasion, von Rundstedt the invasion of the Soviet Union. face of Red Army counterattacks. The orn in 1875 and commis- served as a staff offi cer on both the displayed unwavering support and commanded Army Group South. Though von Rundstedt later Fuehrer later forgave the fi eld marshal sioned into the infantry eastern and western fronts, and he loyalty to him in the professional sense The next year he commanded Army claimed to have been against the inva- and awarded him a large cash benefi t. B in 1892, Karl Rudolf Gerd rose to the rank of chief of staff of a and, indeed, came to be considered Group A, which played the leading sion of Russia, he made no protest His retirement was again short- von Rundstedt came from the corps during the First World War. He by the dictator as being one of his role in the invasion of France. In at the time. He also allowed to be lived. In March 1942 the title of Prussian aristocracy and was a model was twice recommended for the Pour most trustworthy generals. July 1940 he was promoted to fi eld implemented within his command, Oberste Befehlshaber West (Supreme 20 WORLD at WAR 42 | JUN – JUL 2015 WORLD at WAR 42 | JUN – JUL 2015 21 Von Rundstedt talking with Hitler, something the fi eld marshal claimed he never enjoyed doing. “no longer quite so agile as formerly,” adding “he traveled to the front only if he had to do so. He did not like to leave his staff, even for a few days”. Blumentritt went on to note von Rundstedt’s arteriosclerosis had a “lim- iting effect on his activity,” and that “nicotine does not do him any good.” Blumentritt also wrote that it For a time, it was mistakenly believed by the Allies that von Rundstedt had masterminded the Ardennes counteroffensive. was afterward diffi cult to ascertain from the fi eld marshal what had Commander West) was vested by fi eld marshals of the army.…His name While giving von Rundstedt transpired at conferences with Hitler in the aging fi eld marshal. infl uenced the morale and behavior credit for sound strategic thinking, Hitler, as von Rundstedt “did not In that position, Von Rundstedt of the troops as did no other.” Speidel also wrote: “He appeared to like to talk at all,” and “wrote and oversaw the occupation of Vichy The American editors of the lack creative drive as well as a mental telephoned only when he had to. He France in November. Thus, by the postwar US Army Foreign Military clarity in his attitude toward people…. never telephoned the Fuehrer, and time of the 1944 Allied invasion of Studies Program—who were respon- The power of decision was lacking. the Fuehrer never telephoned him.” France, von Rundstedt had served as sible for interrogating more than 300 Thus he failed as a commander, as In comparison, Rommel, von OB West for more than two years. senior German commanders and well as a personality, at a moment Kluge and the other fi eld marshals Rommel in a colorized photo from the same period. producing some 2,500 manuscripts that required the last, utmost effort.” spoke frequently on the phone with Confl icting Evaluations on every aspect of the war—took a After the war, Speidel wrote that Hitler at great length. Indeed, it was “Do not misunderstand me, A commander who absents more cynical view of Zimmermann’s von Rundstedt always thought along every fi eld marshal’s prerogative to however,” Geyr added, “I have the himself from the presence of his Lt. Gen. Bodo Zimmermann, OB comments. They concluded he and the strategic lines of the “old school,” speak directly to the Fuehrer when he greatest respect for von Rundstedt, soldiers in the fi eld is normally also West chief of staff from October 1940 other German offi cers deliberately without taking account the lessons needed to do so. For example, prior but he was too old for this war.” absent from their hearts and minds to V-E Day, would have us believe von exaggerated von Rundstedt’s status provided by recent military experience. to the Normandy invasion, Rommel We are thus left with a picture, in battle. That von Rundstedt rarely Rundstedt was considered by his peers and prowess in order to shield him “He proposed to hold his small reserve spoke with Hitler almost every day. painted by von Rundstedt’s close visited the front was a glaring anomaly, to be one of the fi nest commanders from prosecution for war crimes. [a panzer corps of six divisions] south Even Lt. Gen. Hans Eberbach von associates in Normandy, of a com- even for a fi eld marshal of Hitler’s of World War II and possessed “a It’s often been said war is a young and east of Paris, from where it would Geyr, one of the most experienced mander beyond his prime, in generally Wehrmacht, where the most senior superior personality.” Zimmermann man’s game, and at the time of the be brought up after an enemy landing. panzer commanders and the senior poor health, who preferred to hold commander’s prided themselves on described him as “unpretentious,” Normandy invasion von Rundstedt He thought he could thus retain free- armor commander at Normandy, and himself aloof from his soldiers and being in touch with their soldiers “uncompromising,” “deeply religious,” was far from his prime, both physically dom of action and make full use of the a good friend of von Rundstedt, was offi cers, who didn’t visit the front and the situation on the battlefi eld. and “personally above reproach.” and intellectually. He was 69-years-old former German superiority in mobile critical of his chief. “Of all the German as he should have and, as a result, Von Rundstedt preferred to del- Zimmermann also noted his former in June 1944, and had been a serving warfare. That strategy would have been generals, Field Marshal von Rundstedt was generally unaware of the situ- egate his authority to his subordinate commander possessed “outstanding soldier for 52 years. Lt. Gen. Hans correct, had the German naval and knew the least of panzer tactics,” he ation there. Further, he understood commanders, while spending most strategic judgment,” and favored “bold Speidel, Army Group B chief of staff air forces been equal, or nearly equal, recalled critically. “He was an infantry- little about the use of tanks. of his time in a comfortable French concepts.” He concluded his praise of from 15 April to 1 September 1944, in strength to those of the enemy.” man of the last generation. He and his All that is far from the laudatory home he’d commandeered from its the fi eld marshal by labeling him one called his former commander a “disap- Lt. Gen. Guenther Blumentritt, staff were armchair strategists, who description provided by Zimmermann, owners, located near his headquarters of Germany’s “truly great captains” pointment for the soldiers,” and noted another former chief of staff of OB didn’t like dirt, noise and tanks in gen- and it’s therefore hard to believe that, in the suburbs of St. Germain-en-Lay and remarking: “Taken all in all, as a the fi eld marshal was often “embittered West who knew and worked closely eral—as far as I know, Field Marshal as he asserted, von Rundstedt name’s in the northwest of Paris. There he man, and as a great soldier and expert, and exhausted” during that period. with von Rundstedt for many years, von Rundstedt was never in a tank.” “infl uenced the morale and behavior usually rose in mid-morning and he was the phenomenon among the described the fi eld marshal in 1944 as of the troops as did no other.” never worked beyond 8:00 p.m. 22 WORLD at WAR 42 | JUN – JUL 2015 WORLD at WAR 42 | JUN – JUL 2015 23 A scene from the beach landing at Normandy. existent. Yet an even more insidious invasion, realistic and robust training steadily deteriorated as more and more Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commander of Army Group B. weakness infected the Germans in was almost altogether lacking. untrained recruits fi lled their ranks. Normandy. Like the line from the After the war a number of senior The responsibility for that lack of There he was also content to isolate poem broadcast by the Allies to give German commanders highlighted that training lies not only with the unit himself amid a copious supply of the French underground a coded alert lack as one of the most serious weak- commanders, but with the most senior cigarettes, brandy, Cognac and the invasion was at hand, the German nesses of the defense of Normandy.
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