A Crucible of South American Nationalism?
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Hendrik Kraay, Thomas Whigham, eds. I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864-1870. Studies in War, Society and the Military. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004. xi + 258 pp. $69.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8032-2762-0. Reviewed by Bruce A. Castleman (Department of History, San Diego State University) Published on H-War (December, 2005) A Crucible of South American Nationalism? In 1865, Paraguayan President Francisco So‐ In the first chapter, editors Kraay and lano Lopez attempted to meddle in Uruguayan Whigham provide a brief, excellent summary of politics and ended up at war against Argentina, the historical background and context of the Brazil, and Uruguay. The conflict is known vari‐ Paraguayan War. They also establish a histori‐ ously as the War of the Triple Alliance or the ographical context in which to set each of the es‐ Paraguayan War. The roots of the conflict are says that follows. many, but principal among them stand Paraguay‐ Jerry W. Cooney's chapter examines economy an concern about Brazilian expansionism, and manpower on the Paraguayan side. President Paraguay's desire to be an important political Francisco Solano Lopez fancied himself a military force in the River Plate region, and the rivalries genius and so took personal command at the bat‐ between Argentina and Brazil in Uruguayan polit‐ tlefront. It fell to Vice President Domingo Suarez ics. The Paraguayan War may be little known out‐ to handle administrative responsibilities and run side of Latin America (or Latin Americanist aca‐ the country during most of the war years. demic circles), but it was the largest international Paraguay's economy was tightly controlled by the war in nineteenth-century Latin America. This state which also maintained an army with reason‐ volume grew out of a panel at the 2001 conference ably effective infantry and cavalry branches. The of the Society of Military History. artillery was a hodgepodge of old and new pieces, and most small arms were obsolescent, muzzle- loading flintlocks. Paraguay's weak industrial base was capable of supporting the old muzzle-loaders which were still adequate in a defensive role, and because the country's geographic position isolated it from delivery of any state-of-the-art weapons it H-Net Reviews may have purchased abroad, the situation was as parties and balls to support the war effort, donat‐ good as it could be. This is not to say that the situ‐ ing jewelry and other valuables, but some records ation was good, because both sides had great diffi‐ suggest that, especially as the war went on, they culty supplying forces along tenuous lines of com‐ were careful to preserve their most prized baubles munication to the battlefront throughout the war. for themselves. Legends about existence of organ‐ Paraguay's greatest vulnerability was its limited ized combat units of women continue to be popu‐ population resources. For Paraguay, this was a lar in Paraguay, but Potthast states that propa‐ war of total mobilization. As early as December ganda to the contrary, no evidence of such units 1864, fully half of military-eligible Paraguayan has been found. males had been conscripted, and in early 1867, Gender issues influenced more than simply conscription was extended to males between thir‐ the practical participation of women. Paraguayan teen and sixteen years of age. Women were con‐ government propaganda motivated women of all scripted for all types of agricultural work and also classes with the threat of rape by black Brazilian to work in Paraguay's nascent industries. Younger soldiers. One historian has argued that women children performed corvee labor. For that effort, were more courageous and outspoken in their cri‐ Cooney contends, Paraguay managed to hold off ticism of the war, but Potthast suggests that wo‐ the allies for two years before the fall of Humaita-- men were more likely to be formally accused of the fortress on the Paraguay River protecting treason because men could be easily transferred Asuncion from invasion--led to the evacuation of to a post where death almost certainly awaited the Paraguayan capital. But by that time, the casu‐ them. Convicted women were sent to remote labor alties had forced pre-pubescent boys and women camps and suffered an identical fate. Revisions to join the Paraguayan colors under arms. and clarifications aside, women undeniably bore a Given that, Cooney argues that Paraguay large brunt of the war effort in all areas, even in‐ should have negotiated a peace as early as Decem‐ cluding filling bureaucratic posts in the govern‐ ber 1865. No less than Sebastapol, Vicksburg, and ment. Even though war casualties reduced the the 1870 siege of Paris, the siege of Humaita shows population to four females for each male, few sub‐ the impact of the industrial revolution on nine‐ stantive changes to women's position resulted teenth-century warfare. Its valiant efforts futile, from the war. Politics did remain contested, but as Paraguay was eventually overwhelmed by the Potthast notes, neither men nor women had much combined forces of Brazil, Argentina, and Ur‐ in the way of political rights in Paraguay at all. uguay. After the war's end, pre-war gender subordination Barbara Potthast analyzes the effect of the remained in place. war on Paraguayan women. She considers their Besides co-editing the book, Hendrik Kraay motivation for participating in the war effort, also contributes the fourth essay, which analyzes their importance to the Paraguayan economy, and the effects of the war on racial politics in the di‐ the impact of the war on gender relations in verse society of nineteenth-century Brazil. Black Paraguay after the war. Even before the war, wo‐ men predominated in the ranks and files sent to men performed more than half of the subsistence fight against Paraguay, and the enemy govern‐ agriculture, and the fraction rose much higher as ment never missed an opportunity to portray the war continued. Camp followers did most of the Brazilian soldiers as monkeys and rapists who cooking and cleaning at the front, and families threatened the virtue of Paraguayan women. were required to send one daughter to the front to Troops seemed little more than cannon fodder, serve as nurses. Elite women held "spontaneous" and one school of historical thought contends that 2 H-Net Reviews the imperial government's war policy amounted that of the imperial government. Never a fervent to genocide. patriot, Benjamin Constant was an ambitious of‐ Kraay contends that the reality is more com‐ ficer who sharply criticized his superiors from the plex. All-black companies of Zuavos and Couracas safety of private correspondence. He complained were recruited in Salvador and Recife, cities in bitterly about the execrable medical service of his northeast Brazil which had been the center of sug‐ own army. Echoing a frequent complaint among ar cane production for centuries. Kraay finds that Brazilians, Benjamin Constant complained about like the rest of the Brazilian Army, these troops their Argentine allies, especially that Brazilian were a mix of volunteers and draftees. In many troops had to play a major role in putting down a cases the volunteers sought to escape slavery, to rebellion in Corrientes province against the the chagrin of their masters. By 1867, the Brazilian Buenos Aires government. He felt that Marshal government began to form Sapador companies by Caxias, the overall Brazilian commander, person‐ purchasing slaves and then emancipating them. ally exemplified everything that was wrong with The Brazilian First Corps commander considered Brazilian society at the time. A serious rivalry exis‐ these independent companies problematic in an ted at the time between combat officers and staff army organized around battalions, and so tended officers of the Brazilian Army. Many of the former to use black companies as service troops. The came from the ranks and had little formal educa‐ Second Corps commander frequently dissolved tion, viewing scientifically educated officers such black units when they reported for duty, and re-in‐ as Benjamin Constant more as bureaucrats than as tegrated the soldiers as combat replacements. That soldiers. Junior officers in all areas railed against process had not been completed, however, when the perceived incompetence of their seniors. (This one black Zuavo unit led a charge and carried the reviewer contends that for centuries, such atti‐ day at the battle of Curuzu in September, 1866. tudes have been common among armed forces Despite this heroism, however, black veterans re‐ around the world. The Brazilian Army was hardly turned to the poor population of Brazil after the unique in this regard.) Benjamin Constant dis‐ war and black soldiers were once again excluded dained uneducated people as easily manipulated. from service in the Brazilian Army, as they had Lemos concludes that his war experience intensi‐ first been in 1831. When wartime urgency no fied Benjamin Constant's positivist attitudes and longer existed, Brazil abandoned the short-term his admiration of August Comte, and contributed measure of Afro-Brazilian recruitment. Kraay in no small way to Constant's major role in the finds that as a result, no long-term changes in eventual overthrow of the imperial regime that Brazilian racial and social structure resulted from created the Paraguayan fiasco. the Paraguayan War. Roger Kittleson discusses the impact of the Renato Lemos provides a look at Benjamin Paraguayan War on the Brazilian state of Rio Constant Botelho de Magalhaes, who became a Grande do Sul. This southernmost state is geo‐ leading apostle of positivism and Social Darwin‐ graphically isolated from the rest of Brazil, and its ism in South America. Rising to the rank of lieu‐ economy centered on livestock. Its proximity to tenant colonel, Benjamin Constant (as he was gen‐ the war zone of course meant that Rio Grande do erally known) served first as a quartermaster of‐ Sul would feel a different impact than other parts ficer, and then as an engineer in the Brazilian of Brazil.