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Indicative Conditionals, Strictly Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Outline Indicative Conditionals, Strictly 1 Monotonic Patterns William Starr 2 New Data 3 A Strict Analysis Department of Philosophy [email protected] http://williamstarr.net 4 Assorted Curiosities April 6, 2019 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 0 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Conditionals Monotonic Patterns And Indicative Conditionals Antecedent Strengthening (AS) Antecedent Strengthening (AS) A → C ⊧ (A ∧ B) → C (1) a. If James Earl Ray didn't kill MLK, someone else did. Example: Indicative (O) b. If James Earl Ray hadn't killed MLK, someone else (2) a. If Allie served tea, Chris came. would've. Subjunctive (X) b. So, if Allie served tea and cake, Chris came. Counterexample (Stalnaker 1968; Adams 1975): (3) a. If Allie served tea, Chris came. b. # So, if Allie served tea and didn't invite Chris, Chris came. William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 1 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 2 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns Monotonic Patterns Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents Meet the Family Antecedent Monotonicity Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA) If A → C ⊧ D and B ⊧ A, then B → C ⊧ D (A ∨ B) → C ⊧ (A → C) ∧ (B → C) • Conditional antecedents preserve consequence relations. Example: • Antecedent Monotonicity follows from Transitivity and the (4) a. If Allie served tea or cake, Chris came. assumption that if A ⊧ B then ⊧ A → B (Starr 2019: n22) b. So, if Allie served tea, Chris came; and, if Allie Transitivity served cake, Chris came. A → B; B → C ⊧ A → C Counterexample (Adams 1975; McKay & van Inwagen 1977): Antecedent Monotonicity follows from Contraposition and (5) a. If Allie served only tea or only cake, she served only • `Consequent Monotonicity' (Starr 2019: n23) cake. b. # So, if Allie served only tea, she served only cake. Contraposition A → B ⊧ ¬B → ¬A William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 3 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 4 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References What to Say... Monotonic Patterns About Monotonic Patterns? Returning to the Counterexamples in Light of Indicative Felicity Antecedent Strengthening (AS) • Why are they sometimes good and sometimes bad? A → C ⊧ (A ∧ B) → C • Current accounts begin with an observation about the felicity of indicative antecedents Example revisited: Indicative Felicity (7) a. Maybe Allie served tea and cake. If Allie served tea, Chris came. An indicative conditional is only felicitous in contexts where its b. So, if Allie served tea and cake, Chris came. antecedent is mutually supposed to be possible. (Stalnaker 1975; Adams 1975; Veltman 1986; Gillies 2010) Counterexample revisited: (8) a. Maybe Allie served tea and didn't invite Chris. # If (6) a. Allie definitely did not serve tea. Allie served tea, Chris came. b. # If Allie served tea, Chris came. b. # So, if Allie served tea and didn't invite Chris, Chris came. William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 5 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 6 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns The Generalization Returning to the Counterexamples in Light of Indicative Felicity About Monotonic Patterns Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA) (A ∨ B) → C ⊧ (A → C) ∧ (B → C) The Generalization Example revisited: Monotonic patterns sound compelling only when Indicative (9) a. Maybe Allie served tea, maybe she served cake. But, Felicity of conclusion is compatible with the truth (and if Allie served tea or cake, Chris came. Indicative Felicity) of the premises. b. So, if Allie served tea, Chris came; and, if Allie Terminology An argument pattern is said to satisfy Indicative served cake, Chris came. Felicity just in case the premises and conclusion Counterexample revisited: satisfy Indicative Felicity. (10) a. Maybe Allie served only tea. #But, if Allie served only tea or only cake, she served only cake. b. # So, if Allie served only tea, she served only cake. William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 7 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 8 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns Monotonic Patterns Two Explanations Two Explanations Variably-Strict Explanation (Stalnaker 1975) Strict Explanation 1 `Examples' are semantically invalid but pragmatically 1 `Examples' are compelling because monotonic patterns compelling (reasonable inference): any context which is are semantically valid. updated with a felicitous and true assertion of the 2 `Counterexamples' sound bad because violation of premise, is one where the conclusion is true if felicitous. Indicative Felicity for conclusion leads to: 2 `Counterexamples' exist because monotonic patterns are • Pragmatical infelicity (Veltman 1986, 1985) semantically invalid, and do not sound pragmatically • Semantic presupposition failure (Gillies 2004, 2009) compelling because Indicative Felicity is not satisfied. • Equivocation via accommodation (Warmbr¯od1981) • Key Prediction: any time Indicative Felicity is satisfied, • Key Prediction: any time Indicative Felicity is satisfied, a monotonic pattern will sound compelling. a monotonic pattern will sound compelling. William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 9 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 10 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Variably-Strict Analyses Basic Variably-Strict Analysis Of Conditionals Of Conditionals Basic Variably-Strict Analysis A → B is true in a world w, relative to f , just in case all f (A; w)-worlds are B-worlds. • f (A; w) are the A-worlds most similar to w. • Context Sensitivity: if w ′ is an A-world is the in context set c, w ′ ∈ f (A; w). (Stalnaker 1975) William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 11 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 12 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Basic Strict Analysis Basic Strict Analysis Of Conditionals Of Conditionals Basic Strict Analysis A → B is true in a world w, relative to a space of accessible worlds R(w), just in case all A-worlds in R(w) are B-worlds. • R(w) the information had by relevant agent's in w. • Context Sensitivity: R(w) is the information `had' by the conversationalists in w. William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 13 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 14 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References A Consensus? New Counterexamples If There is One... SDA and Epistemic Possibility (11) a. If the coin came up heads or tails, maybe it came up Variably-Strict vs. Strict Analyses heads. Debate between variably-strict and strict analyses comes to: b. # If the coin came up tails, maybe it came up heads. 1 Compelling monotonic patterns are better explained (12) pragmatically. (Variably-Strict) a. Maybe the coin came up tails. But, if the coin came up heads or tails, maybe it came up heads. 2 Compelling monotonic patterns are better explained b. # If the coin came up tails, maybe it came up heads. semantically. (Strict) • Unlike (10), premise is not infelicitous when conjoined • (Shared) Key Prediction: any time Indicative Felicity is w/conclusion's presupposition. satisfied, a monotonic pattern will sound compelling. • So (11) is a counterexample to the `Key Prediction' of both strict and variably-strict analyses. William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 15 William Starr S Indicative Conditionals, Strictly S UConn 16 Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References Monotonic Patterns New Data A Strict Analysis Assorted Curiosities References New Counterexamples New Counterexamples AS and Epistemic Possibility AS and Probably (15) a. If Allie served tea, Chris probably came. (13) a. If Allie served tea, maybe Chris came. b. # If Allie served tea and Chris didn't come, Chris b. # If Allie served tea and Chris didn't come, maybe probably came. Chris came. (16) a. Maybe Allie served tea and Chris didn't come. But, (14) a. Maybe Allie served tea and Chris didn't come. But, if Allie served tea, Chris probably came. if Allie served tea, maybe Chris came. b. # If Allie served tea and Chris didn't come, Chris b. # If Allie served tea and Chris didn't come, maybe probably came. Chris came. • Premise is not infelicitous when conjoined w/conclusion's • Unlike (8), premise is not infelicitous when conjoined presupposition. w/conclusion's presupposition. • So (15) is a counterexample to the `Key Prediction' of So (13) is a counterexample to the `Key Prediction' of
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