Edited by Murray Forman, Erlis Laçej, Frederick Reinprecht, and Kim Sawchuk

Radical (Dis)Engagement State – Society – Religion

Edited by Murray Forman, Erlis Laçej, Frederick Reinprecht, and Kim Sawchuk

Radical (Dis)Engagement State – Society – Religion

Off Campus: Seggau School of Thought 6

Graz 2020

Mit freundlicher Unterstützung von:

Impressum: © by Center for Inter-American Studies, University of Graz Doi:10.25364/25.6:2020.0

Cover and Layout: Frederick Reinprecht Cover photo courtesy of Julia Prochinig

Zentrum für Inter-Amerikanische Studien der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz Elisabethstraße 59/II A-8010 Graz Telefon: +43 (0)316 380 - 8213 Fax: +43 (0)316 380 - 9767 Email: [email protected]

Table of Contents Identity Statement ...... 7 Roberta Maierhofer

I Age & Ageing

Being too young, being too old: Human Agency in the Context of Intergenerational Ageing in Serbia ...... 15 Svetozar Matejašev

Digital (Dis)Engagement in Older Age: Determinants and Outcomes...... 29 Nuriiar Safarov

II Economics

Development and Inequalities: The Impact of Technological Advancement on Economic Inequality in Developed and Developing Countries ...... 45 Kurrisha Aberdeen

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Brief Analysis of Preliminary Impacts on the United States ...... 57 Joselle Ali

III History, Society & Culture

National Self-Determination and the Failure of International Institutions to Uphold Human Rights in the Twentieth Century ...... 75 John Mason

If You’re Into That, I Guess: Refiguring Male Patients in the Study of Hysterical Vibrators ...... 83 Lorraine Rumson

Besa: Grounded Honor in Altruism ...... 93 Besmir Shishko

IV Literature & Media

GUSEGG Encounters: An Auto-Ethnographic Account ...... 109 Lamiae Bouqentar

The Use of Technology in Education with the Main Focus on Teaching English as a Foreign Language (EFL): An Overview of Literature ...... 119 Staša Đokić

Virgil Gheorghiu’s Engagement with the Romanian State and Religion ...... 131 Iulia-Teodora Driscu

Repressed Culture and Otherness in “Yo Soy Joaquín” and “Puerto Rican Obituary” ...... 141 Monica Cristiana Irimia

Khaled Hosseini’s Sea Prayer: Virtual Storytelling and “User- Response” in Fictionalized Migrant Narrative ...... 149 Amanda Zilla

Information about Editors and Contributor...... 160

DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020.1 7

Roberta Maierhofer Identity Statement: Radical (Dis)Engagement: State – Society – Religion

With the first five volumes of the series “Off Campus: Seggau School of Thought,” a material outcome of the Graz International Summer School Seggau has been established, where students, teachers, and guest lecturers are invited to submit a contribution to the overall theme of the topic of that year. This volume is also the outcome of such an invitation and shows the breadth of scholarship of the Graz International Summer School Seggau that is not only present while the summer institute is in session, but has a more long-lasting effect in terms of continuing the discussions initiated in the Southern Styrian landscape, and presenting these ideas in a written text. This volume, therefore, is a voice of a wider collaboration within a strong research and teaching community that was initiated by the summer school, but is not confined to that moment in time. In addition, this publication can be seen as a manifestation of the core interests of the Center for Inter-American Studies (CIAS), a tangible and material expression, a mission statement in another form articulating intentions and goals of CIAS by presenting current research created within the context (and possibly because) of existing academic structures and institutionalized relationships. This book series is thus another way of re-defining academic cooperation by using existing structures to find new and challenging ways of producing and presenting scholarship in the humanities and social sciences. The Graz International Summer School Seggau was originally established as an innovative way of thinking outside the box, and was set up as a cooperation between the University of Graz, the Diocese Graz-Seckau, and the COMECE, the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community, in order to facilitate a shift in perspective by offering a platform of critical discussion and intellectual encounters, where in a comfortable setting of a castle in the South Eastern region of Austria near the Slovene border in the Styrian wine-growing region more than 80 students and about 10 faculty and staff members from more than 30 countries and even more institutions leave their comfort zone to find ways of expressing the global challenges of our times, to reach an understanding of the interconnectedness of global affairs through studying events as a text in order to reconsider the familiar and the known. The series Off Campus: Seggau School of Thought has the same intention of offering a platform of critical engagement and academic inquiry that allows us to address the challenges of our times through interdisciplinary engagement. This volume was developed by students and faculty and reflects some of the discussions, topics, and methods that were developed through the coming together of a diverse group of people at the Graz International Summer School Seggau 2019, where the topic of academic research as a pursuit that takes 8 time, focus, and dedication and its mediation in terms of the public are one of the challenges we as academics constantly face. The Center for Inter-American Studies at the University of Graz has provided a home for this summer school in European Studies, as the mission of the center is to offer platforms of interdisciplinary and international research. By defining not only the field of Inter-American Studies as a way of thinking, an approach, and a perspective in order to transcend boundaries on many different levels, it offers us the possibility of defining academia itself as a transformation process. Accepted boundaries of time and space but also of language and culture – both in Europe and the Americas – are put into question and open up the possibility of new structures of thought. Inter- American Studies has thus the potential to revolutionize not only how we think about the Americas (including their relationships with the world), but also the way in which we think about the various disciplines. In addition, we as scholar-teachers have to place ourselves into this context with a conscious decision concerning our own role in the construction and maintenance of academic methods, approaches, as well as disciplines. Within the European context, there has been a tradition of approaching the field of “America” on individual levels – in connection with the tradition of colonial ties, such as Europe-Canada, Europe-US, and Europe-Latin America. Re- conceptualization of the Americas can take different forms, but have one aspect in common: a thinking in networks and connections, an interdisciplinary, interregional, and intercultural approach. This redefinition of research areas away from national connotations towards regional (hemispheric) denotations allows for unexpected discoveries of similarities and differences. Through comparative research, traditional notions of research transcend linguistic, political, and geographical borders that divide the Americas, and thus its main contribution to research is the development of a new (Central and South-East) European perspective. At the same time, an outside view of Europe has also provided a starting point for a discussion of a common European identity. This new interest in Inter-American relationships is caused by processes such as globalization and transnational migration – developments that transform cultural identities and challenge conceptions of “self” and “other” – and has led to a reconsideration of the framing of regional investigations in terms of Area Studies. Especially in Europe, where this illusive “European identity” is in constant negotiation in terms of trans-national, national, and regional terms, the recognition of the “Americanness” of the continent America offers a new approach to – in the European context – unchartered territory: “America” as a whole. In addition to a more conventional understanding of scholarship in academia of presentations and publications, this has initiated a view of the whole in disparity. Research and teaching have thus gained a new narrative discourse, and an academic life well lived has contributed creatively to the field by questioning our assumptions. 9

When the contributions of this book were suggested, accepted, and written, we were talking mostly in abstract terms about change and uncertainty that we are confronted with in our lives. This book, however, will now be published and read after a very concrete and on-going global experience of a pandemic that has highlighted both commonalities as well as differences of such an experience. It has also in dramatic and persistent ways questioned not only our daily routines and our way of life, our interaction with others as well as our daily management of everyday needs, but has positioned all other challenges, such as constant political uncertainties, climate change, demographic transformation, continual re-thinking of societal coherence in times of diversity, in a new and unexpected context. In some cases, it has led to a tentative reassurance of trust in institutional structures, political procedures and information (re)sources, in others it has triggered as a push-back to governmental regulations, medical recommendations concerning Covid-19 measures, and social and physical distancing often aggressive expressions of mistrust and/or disengagement. Restricting movement, increasing surveillance and checks, as well as closing borders have also led to a general questioning of the values of an open and tolerant society and undermined notions of individual agency and hope for change. The topic of the Graz International Summer School, “Radical (Dis)Engagement: State – Society – Religion” now almost seems prophetic and the conclusions reached within the discussions and debates have provided us in these unexpected times with some guidance and suggestions, such as a stronger engagement in academic contemplation and interdisciplinary exchange as a strategy and method, vigorous intellectual investigation in order to counter the constant devaluing of humanities and social science research as a reaction to quick-fix solutions that obviously do not work, as well as the development of disruptive intellectual approaches and ideas as a radical act of resistance that our times demand. These measures can lead to an awareness that there are political, social, economic, and cultural forces that make us believe that the structures of our world are essential, natural, and inevitable and thus make us feel that change is impossible. The suggested thorough analyses, however, offer us the possibility of moving from a passive position to active involvement in transformation processes in order to become agents of change by an authentic reformulation of our identities. Focusing on the emphasis areas of the University of Graz – South Eastern Europe and North, Central and South America – the summer school as well as the publication offer a basis for discussing global and continued challenges as well as opportunities that change entails. In our interpretation, the contemplation of radical engagement as well as disengagement as an academic tool are part of taking on the responsibility of intellectuals to offer critical in-depth discussions in a world of babble. This is a radical commitment to academic pursuit not as abstract, but as concrete and necessary as an engagement with state, society, and religion, in order to understand the 10 dynamics and structures that govern us as individuals, but also determine the structures we are all governed by. Such an effort makes us understand the facts and figures, the material realities, and how they are culturally represented. The summer school often provides more questions than answers, and has allowed us, as this sixth volume of the series “Off Campus: Seggau School of Thought” impressively documents, to investigate the different approaches to the definitions of state, society, and religion, and their interconnectedness. In terms of the proclaimed “Seggau School of Thought,” the hope is more than ever that this publication is not seen simply as a product to be consumed, but as an invitation to engage in this process of dialogue, discussion, and connection. Readers are encouraged to accept their own role as empowered agents by seeking expression of both political and personal expression of radical definitions of concepts that shape our lives in order to map out changes that are necessary to make the world a better place. Textual representations of the status quo are never abstract, they are radical transformation tools.

I Age & Ageing

DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020.2 15

Svetozar Matejašev Being too young, being too old: Human Agency in the Context of Intergenerational Ageing in Serbia

“Donose novosti, Nasmejana lica sa velike reke. Bleda ljubomora U gradu od svetla gde počinjem.” Danilov Doživljaj Beča, Beč

Despite what popular psychology and life coaches are trying to tell us, people rarely make decisions based solely on their sheer power of determination. “Our actions are not always a continuation of our intentions” (Ankersmit 26), as there are certain exterior and interior events which negate previously imagined plans. However, whether those actions are considered to be planned or unplanned, they all “must contain a reference to some kind of background… a scene of human action” (Burke xvii). Therefore, human agency cannot be separated from the existing conditions. The decisions people make are shaped by the geo-political situation of the specific moment, by the existing power structures, economic fluctuations, social relations inside communities and families. Moreover, they are also shaped by the primordial factors. We do not choose the genetic inheritance nor the time and place of our birth. In other words, we cannot change the fact that we are biological beings born into the existing cultural environment. Regardless of how the first paragraph may appear, this paper is not based on the attempt to preach predestination. There is no inscribed goal waiting to be fulfilled. People are not controlled by divine forces. We are not helpless vessels unable to change the envisioned course of history and according set of circumstances. Hence, if the existence of a higher purpose is a starting point for confirming the dominance of global over the local elements, than any (historical) writing is a dangerous act, because it solely accuses the interconnection of global structures, while denying the importance of responsibility for individual actions. In that manner, Conrad is right that the issue of accountability should start from remembering that “global structures are as much as shaped by human activity as they are responsible for shaping it… As such, they help define the conditions under which people act, but they do not dictate their behavior” (232). Cited observation, founded on Giddens’ notion of human agency 1, not only confirms the complex relationship between

1 See: Giddens 1986. 16 individual actions and social structures, but also suggests how they are both constantly changing each other. The arising problem can be labelled as calculating the square footage of a circle. What is particularly intriguing is how the power relation between individual and social structures can actually be described, when the structures themselves are not structured, as “shaping them is easier than keeping them in shape’’ (Bauman 8). In a world dominated by technology, the power structures are almost untraceable, because “power can move with the speed of electronic signal’’ (10). The absence of defined, rigid forms, thus allows digital signal to become dissolved in the global market, and, vice versa. As a result, the responsibility moves with the speed of power. One of the consequences of this constant transpositions is the paucity of balance. More precisely, described inability to locate the sources of power allows neoliberal institutions2 to spread responsibility on individuals in a way that power is spread. Due to the burden of responsibility moving to another extreme, of being placed mostly on the individuals, the institutions are “passing the guilt’’ by creating a paradoxical playground of capital: when everyone is guilty, the true responsibility remains hidden. Along with the process of “passing the guilt’’, the neoliberal institutions are increasing the number of imposed conditions. The result is the expansion of choices that individual has to make on personal, social, political and financial level. Therefore, the growing number of interactions presents a notable challenge for human agency. While it shortens the period for performing actions, it also suggests the suitable time frame in which those actions should be performed. The combination of pressures put on the individual thus highlights the increasing complexity of decision making in the globally dominant neoliberal system. In the context of current global economy, Arjun Appadurai suggests that its complexity “has to do with certain fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture, and politics’’ (Appadurai 33). Furthermore, Appadurai proposes that “exploring such disjunctures is to look at the relationship among five dimensions of global cultural flows that can be termed as ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes’’ (33). On the basis of an explanation that these scapes “point to the fluid, irregular shapes… that characterize international capital’’ (33), Appadurai further develops Bauman’s idea of liquid modernity. By creating a suitable framework, he explains the global cultural flows as the complex interaction between scapes, which are based on different ethnicities, technologies, media, financial and ideological systems. Among other traits, this framework underlines two paradoxes which I find relevant for this paper: the paradox of science and the paradox of information.

2 Here, institutions are viewed as forms of socio - political structures 17

The first paradox is related to the ontological aspect of all sciences, and it is situated in their historical core. This paradox is the ability of sciences to solve problems through constructing a new set of issues. At the same time, the resulting expansion of information is closely connected to the global cultural flows. The interactions between different scapes, as described by Appadurai, can be compared to the ontological paradox of sciences. In the process of mutual interaction, the scapes participate in organizing and suppressing the freedom of human agency. Through the control and release of the specific imagery, they promote and destroy ideologies, hide and reveal the flow of the global market, confront states with nations, individuals with institutions, and, finally, individuals with themselves. In a similar manner to sciences, the co-dependency of the scapes depends on their primary function to produce more problems than solutions. The second paradox is related to the Dunning–Kruger effect. Apart from accompanying omniscient populism, the saturation of information also reinforces the opposing specter of insecurity inside academia. Even with their expanded knowledge and developed analytical tools, the researchers often admit of being unable to comprehend the vast space of representations. Therefore, it is the correlation between concealed and visible information that presents a challenge not only for the researchers, but also for the individuals outside of academia. Although not equipped with scientific methodology, they do realize how endless production of meaning leads to manipulation. As a result, the interaction between the media and other scapes impacts the human agency by erasing origin, hiding responsibility, altering decision making, and endorsing a lack of trust. Exploring the effects of these multiple scapes on the specific topic of intergenerational ageing will be the aim of this paper. Even more, the aim is to connect intergenerational ageing with questions of migration and unemployment in Serbia. For that reason, I have decided to confront the analysis of the global traits with the stories on the local level. In the attempt to reveal the local issues, the focus has been placed on selected personal experiences, which will be presented in the form of open interviews.

The Content of a Form During the interview sessions, my mother (‘M’) has repeated several times that understanding the context of one (life) story starts with acknowledging the importance of the specific moment and living space where it occurs. For that reason, it is worth noting that her whole life story has been intrinsically connected with the story of our hometown. Born in 1965, my mother has never lived outside of Novi Sad, where the selected conversations took place in July/August 2019. The word “selected” is used on purpose, since we had numerous discussions over the course of one week. However, the majority of the content presented here is a product of two taped conversations. Both 18 of them, one coffee break and one lunch in a restaurant, took place outside, near the Danube river. The intention from the start was to create a pleasant atmosphere which would allow my interviewee to talk more openly about various issues. Having in mind that the idea was to primarily focus on the personal experience, I (‘S’) have chosen a qualitative or open interview to be the main method of the research inquiry. The form of an open interview allowed my mother to freely explore her memories. Simultaneously, the implementation of this method has provided the interviewee with sufficient time to formulate her opinion, proving to be the most adequate “instrument of interpretive, biographical research” (Rosenthal 124). On the other hand, the lack of time restrictions produced hours of material. Based on the noticeable storyteller style, the original conversations included more personal accounts from the interviewee and relatively brief topic introductions from my end. Therefore, some of the questions in the paper were formed subsequently, while some digressions had to be omitted, all in order to compose a more coherent interview form. Even though my mother never stopped asking about the money fee she would be getting, I have to admit that she was an excellent interviewee. Often anticipating the interconnectedness of the topics, she demonstrated an ability to portray her accumulated memory. She truly cared about how certain details would be presented, which was manifested in the occasional remarks of what I should and should not write. Although we talked about some unpleasant experiences, her level of enthusiasm and excitement that someone would hear her story inspired me to thoroughly engage in the process of transcribing the interview sessions. The initial dilemma in that process was how to avoid misrepresentation. Those methodological insecurities were fundamentally entwined with the usage of language and creation of meaning. Hence, I decided to use English words which corresponded most precisely with the original ones in Serbian. Being aware of how translation is always a mediation of meaning, I have tried to construct a rhythm of language expression which would sound as natural as possible, thus empowering the interviewee to have a distinct, unique voice.

Empty passports M: If I had to choose one crucial moment which determined the course of my life, of our lives, then that has to be our failed departure to New Zealand in 1992. For me, that was a big personal defeat… I had prepared everything. I took out the passports for us and I wasn’t afraid of different language or working outside of my profession. Just wanted to find a job which could provide us with enough to have for a living… The political situation in 1992 was getting worse, and there were some visible signs of economic and social breakdown. I felt that I was ready for anything, for a 19 new beginning. At the same time, I was aware of how I will maybe never have another chance to make such a big decision. Unfortunately, it turned out that I was right. S: You never told me about this before. How did you decide to go to New Zealand, and where did you get the information that such trip would be possible? M: Yes… but now I feel it’s a good time to tell this story… We heard about a possibility of going there through our family friends. Serbian Orthodox Church was organizing trips to USA, Australia and New Zealand. Your father and I preferred going to New Zealand…. The trip was truly expensive. One part was refunded by the church, while the other part had to be paid from our end. It was still a large amount. I think that initial plan included investing almost all of our money into plane tickets… However, there were some conditions which needed to be fulfilled. Orthodox Church helped and organized this only for, how to say this… people who were registered to be Orthodox. For that reason, you and I had to become Orthodox and this is why both of us got baptized in 1992. S: So, this is how I got soaked into orthodoxy… Wait, if you had the motivation and a plan for leaving the country, then how come we did not go to New Zealand? M: When you are alone, it is much easier to make important decisions. When you have to calculate two families and their interests in the equation, it becomes much harder. It was so complicated… Your father and I were put under a lot of pressure by our parents, who were against that decision. They kept telling us that it is an extremely risky move. Eventually, your father stopped everything. I was absolutely disappointed and felt betrayed… And afterwards, even my worst doubts about the economic situation turned out to be too optimistic. As you know, Yugoslavia was hit by a record hyperinflation.3 It was an awful period to live in our country… Your father was not working when the inflation reached its peak, while I was only able to buy two soaps and a toothpaste from my salary. Raising a salary was a hectic race, because money was losing its value every minute. We were all multi-billionaires, unable to buy anything… I remember that checks did not have enough space for the number of zeros, so we had to write them outside of the box. You had to live it to believe it…

From Golden Age to Dark Age M: The generation of my parents was treated completely different when they were in the situation of losing or changing their job. They were treated as the most precious work force, because of their maturity and golden experience. When my mother was thinking about changing her job in the 1980’s, she was around 42 – 43. Nevertheless, she had numerous, good opportunities… My

3 Yugoslavia had been recording hyperinflation from 1992, which reached its absolute peak in the January of 1994. For more about Yugoslavia’s hyperinflation, please see: Petrović, Bogetić and Vujošević, June 1999. 20 alternative, when I got fired from an administrative job in the bank was to work either in a factory or in a bakery (write it down!). I cannot do that. I cannot work in a factory because of my hearing problems. And bakery… I remember going to one bakery where I talked to the manager and applied for a job. When I went there on the following day, they changed the ad on the shop window. Looking for a worker became looking for a girl to work in a bakery. That type of rejection happened to me often. Nobody wants someone of my age to sell goods, they want younger, nice looking girls. S: You were 46 when you lost the job. How do you look back at that period and what followed after? M: For a long time, I was in the state of shock and didn’t know what to do. I did not expect that getting any type of job required joining the ruling party. Guess I expected something different, maybe a chance for a new start… My mother was very angry at me, because she wanted me to join the ruling party in order to get any job… My parents had envisioned an ideal scenario for us, your uncle and me, to find a job which we will be working until we reach retirement age. They were not able to understand how hard it is now for a woman over 45 to find a job. S: From your experience, how are unemployed women, over 45 years of age, being treated in Serbia? M: Terrible. Like they don’t exist. They are treated as old and not needed. Women have almost no option… You know, what is particularly important is that I stayed here, in this space, in this country, where more workers are being fired than employed. The tendency of the companies who are actually hiring is to ask for a certain age, qualifications, experience. At the same time, they need younger work force prepared to work several jobs, so experience becomes less relevant… I never told you about this, but I have been thinking about creating a group for women who are in the similar age group and situation as me. Some kind of organization or union which will support unemployed women in their forties, fifties. S: What do you think about creating a Facebook group for that? You now have Facebook and know how to use it. I believe that is a really nice idea. M: That is possible? But what job can I offer them? S: You said you wanted to make an organization, maybe it would be best to first see how many are interested in that idea and what can actually be done for the mutual benefit. M: Listen, I will explain it now. When I wanted to turn that idea into reality with my friend, during the course for caregivers, it failed from the start (Don’t write that). Most of the women we talked to were skeptical. Some accused us of having some sort of financial interest, a developed scheme for making money. 21

S: It is nonetheless an excellent idea, because it shows a level of empathy and readiness for cooperation… The point is not to work as an employment agency. It is about support, and hearing about other needs, desires and possibilities. M: Hmm… I still do believe how that idea is very good… I have been going to National Employment Service for almost eight years. And I have realized (please write this!), and I completely stand by what I will say now, how the main function of the Service, which job is helping unemployed people, is not to help them. If they maintain the same number of unemployed workers, then Service can somehow justify the number of their own employees… I don’t know if people outside of this area will understand this. I am afraid they will not understand…

No Country for Ageing Women? S: I remember that you had a designated operator in charge of your case. What is your experience with Employment Service, did they help you at all? M: I do have a person who should sometimes call me. That is a rare event, maybe once in two years. I usually call them… And I need to go there four times per year, to confirm my status… The people in the Service change their position, so it is often someone new who is in charge of my case. They treat us as files, statistical data. I don’t know anyone who has found a permanent job through them. Actually, people I know mostly call them Unemployment Service. S: You mention going to the Service four times per year. What is the form of those visits? M: Obviously, first I have to confirm my unemployed status. Afterwards, I always ask about potential jobs. The answer is predictable in advance. It is more of a ritual… The first time I went there in 2011, they told me how I need to requalify, retrain for another profession, or I won’t be able to find a job. So, I started attending various courses which were proposed as the best ones by the National Employment Service… In the past few years, I have passed twelve exams for ECDL4, I finished a course to work in an exchange office, then four courses of German language, two courses of English, one course for beginner entrepreneurs, one for accountants, and finally, I finished a course for caregivers. S: Did those efforts help you to find a job? M: Not really. Everywhere I applied, they told me that I was either overqualified or too old. I was not able to get a permanent job in the previous eight years… To get any source of income, I had to start working as a caregiver, but that type of job is only temporary. You are employed for a short period of time by the families and, in the case of Serbia, you are underpaid and treated as a servant… Nobody I know works as a caregiver because they like it. They just do not have any other

4 ECDL is short from European Computer Driving License. 22 option… Listen (this is important!). In regards to the younger generation, mine has a lower capacity of adapting. The number of highly educated people is increasing, there are more private universities. The younger generation has better technological capabilities, while the elder generation just cannot keep track in the technological race. Age is a big issue.

Hiding as Revealing This was a state of mind of 54-year-old woman who has played by socially accepted rules, finished all levels of education on time, and worked continuously for 22 years before being fired as the surplus to the requirements, only to be replaced by two graduates who paid to get the job. However, the aim of these interview sessions is not to celebrate the concept of sinless poverty nor to present unemployed women as sacred martyrs. In fact, their purpose is to present voices that could not be heard otherwise. In the context of oral history, these interviews “can break down barriers between generations… and can give to the people who made and experienced history, through their own words, a central place’’ (Thompson 22). Although claiming a central place sounds a bit invasive, unemployed woman certainly need support, and they need to be respected. For that reason, these interview sessions can be viewed as a type of moral support for their willingness to keep on fighting through all negativity and numerous problems. Whether those problems are connected to unemployed women or other social groups, the fact remains that the biggest problems are the ones we do not see and the ones we do not talk about. In the case of Serbian public discourse, one of the biggest problems that is frequently avoided is intergenerational ageing. Even though this issue has a number of aspects similar to the number of personal stories, the aspects which are discussed here are the ones regarded to be the most relevant for this paper, and they are: unemployment and migration. The story of interviewee shows how Employment Service is mostly based on selling the statistical fairytale, with the emphasis placed more on hiding than on revealing. From their end, Employment Service is creating an image of doing a great job, by using statistical parameters to proclaim how the unemployment rate has never been lower. However, what that information does not tell is that people are being removed from the unemployment lists when they fail to confirm their status personally, which is, in most occasions, related to the growing number of citizens who are leaving the country. Therefore, the unemployment issues cannot be separated from the current exodus from the countries of Western Balkan. This process, which started in the 1990’s, has been primarily provoked by the political situation and worsening of life conditions, lack of freedom, corruption and negative selection. What is different than in the previous migration waves is that the majority 23 of people who are now leaving and want to leave Serbia are young, highly educated people.5 For that reason, I have decided to include a conversation with my friend, who has also left Serbia in order to start a PhD program in Slovenia. Our discussion happened in Ljubljana in August 2019, when we tried to talk about many issues during the course of one sunny coffee break. The entire conversation was based on unplanned dialogue, with only a handful of questions. Nevertheless, my friend (‘F’) has recognized the relevance of the topic, and was willing to share his personal and family experience. In doing so, he managed to provide a new, rather important angle, as he spent his childhood and adolescence in two villages. Physically distant from each other, they both shared a cultural distinction from the lives in the city areas. The following conversation was hence imagined to highlight the generation gaps, particularly the different experiences of human agency in the historically determined circumstances. Coming back to Ankersmit’s separation between actions and intentions can be viewed as a useful tool for examining the inheritance of choices which one generation imposes on the next one.

Leaving as Belonging F: When I was kid, my first experience of foreign was through an old Macedonian folk song. The first verse was: Oh Cveto, when I went to the foreign lands, how bitter tears you spilled. As I did not understand the meaning, my mother had to explain it for me. The perception of foreign in that song, based on nostalgic feel for home, implied that foreign is something almost terrifying. S: Did your parents ever think about leaving the country? F: No. They did not think about leaving and they did not have any conditions to leave... The peasant mentality, strongly rooted in my family, represented leaving the homeland as a very negative act, equal to an act of betrayal. The reasoning to support this attitude was that you have everything in your hometown or village… For example, my mother wanted to study German and she proposed that idea to her parents. The grandmother said no, only prostitutes go to big cities to study on faculties. And that was in the 1980’s... Sometimes I think my mother decided to marry my father only because he lived in the deep south of the country, 750 km from her place of birth. S: That sounds like an act of rebellion... In a similar manner, our decision to leave is a voyage into unknown. And when people ask me what is your plan, I can only say that I

5 EurActiv claims that one fifth of Serbs wanted to leave the country in 2018. Most of them are young people, who want to go to the West. The survey also included citizens from diaspora. Majority of them state that they either do not want to come back or want to come back to Serbia in their retirement, while “nine out of ten said they see their children’s future abroad’’. Taken from: https://www.euractiv.rs/english/13172-one-fifth-of-serbs-want-to-leave- serbia 24 don’t know. At the moment, I function on a month per month basis. We will see what happens. F: I have to say that the perspective of leaving is connected to the level of education and also with curiosity... Comparing his and our generation, my previous mentor said that the philosophy of Yugoslavia, while he was growing up, was to direct young people’ into folk dance... And what was funny for me thinking about that statement was that my mother was an excellent folk dancer... I do not want to end up like my parents. When I reached the point where my homeland felt like a foreign land, it was time to move on.

Ministry of Intergenerational Conflicts S: Speaking of our or the younger generation who stays in Serbia, do you feel that the failure to leave becomes a sort of foundation for growing anxiety and sense of insecurity? F: I think that is true. When remembering some moments from my life in the village, the pattern which often repeated was that famous line: ”If I had your age, I would have done much more than you have done. In your age, I already had a wife and children.” And now thinking of it, I can only laugh… In my opinion, that mantra “If I was your age...”, although being a very common, traditional saying, is also a dangerous proclamation, as it is sometimes a trigger for confrontations between younger and older generations. S: And yet that intergenerational gap is supported by institutions and their official policies… How do you see the confrontation between different generations in regards to the more general ability to adapt and plan for the future? F: Well, there is no focus on the present. We are constantly forced to plan in advance with no idea of what we are doing in the present moment. I don’t understand how system of education, governed by the members of older generation, is expecting someone to have the wisdom of the universe while being 23 years old… Then you realize that the whole purpose is not the quality, but the quantity. In our case, we are expected to go to conferences, publish papers, communicate with various people, do a thorough research and finish a PhD project. All that, but without money… To come back to your first point, I think that the purpose of institutions which are endorsing intergenerational confrontations is to primarily produce fear and anxiety. S: The issues of fear and anxiety bring us again to the mentioned sense of insecurity. In your opinion, what is the role of education system in implementing a sense of security? F: The education system is responsible for not telling us that most of the things we learn throughout all levels of education will never be used again. There is a huge gap when you look at the correlation between time invested in learning and acquisition of valuable information. On the other hand, from the moment we enrolled into faculty, the professors started telling us how the 25 market is very cruel toward social sciences. Than why is your department enrolling so many new students? Is the sole purpose of those academic institutions to award the ones close to the system, and treat all newcomers as customers? Also, I do fear that there is an evident tendency to invest as less as possible in social sciences. We will definitely have to fight in order to keep critical thinking relevant.

My Profit, Our Losses As I started to write this conclusion from a time distance, I managed to see the presented topic of intergenerational ageing via points of junction and disjunction. After re-reading the theoretical part and the interviews, it became more perspicuous how connecting points were related to the essentially existential questions, while the points of division were visible in the question of knowledge. To be more precise, what I feel is connecting both mine and the generation of my parents is the re-thinking of our belonging. On the other hand, the invisible line of demarcation goes through the land of technological development. The question of technology has redefined the identity of the ageing Other6. Even more, the technoscape has underlined ageing to be the one of the most important questions of neoliberalism. Regarded to be as liquid as the identity of society, the identity of the ageing Other has nevertheless been modified by technology in a cultural, emotional and political aspect. The general statement that “the number of decision-making opportunities depends on the age of the individual” refers only partially to the cultural aspect of ageing. When ageing is rightfully invoked to be culturally determined, what we are truly comparing, besides gender, race, and social class, is the number of opportunities in regards to the age and access to the technological tools. In that sense, we could speak of how technology is constructing behavior for specific age groups. Having in mind that all of them are constructed through a set of rules, the technoscape has its own disciplinary method, which poses cultural requirements to the ageing groups and individuals. Fulfilling cultural requirements, in that manner, is equal to belonging to a certain group. Similarly, not fulfilling technological expectations is equal to being culturally ostracized, put in the position where decision making does not correspond with personal intention. Thus, the technology is altering the decision-making process of all age groups through the key cultural component: knowledge. What is confirmed in neoliberal praxis is that the ability to learn and adapt to technological changes has become the most wanted aspect of knowledge acquisition. In that sense, the notion of “using the time wisely” becomes a peculiar obstacle, mainly for the

6 ’The Other’ is in most cases referred as the distant, outsider, foreign, incomprehensible. The introduction of ageing Other deepens the term, as it suggests that age is a distinctive phenomenon which joins the religion, nation and language in perceiving otherness. 26

Serbian citizens over 50 years of age. First of all, if they want to be competent on the job market, the time does not allow any mistakes. And, secondly, they start from a worse position, as they are trailing in the race for technological knowledge. Once regarded as the “golden generation”, they are now being culturally labelled as the “new old”. While the technology is reconstructing their age identity, their slower adaption to the changes inside technoscape also produce different emotional tensions. Although Todorov claims that being born inside one culture does not mean that human “is destined to remain its prisoner” (63), many people over 50 in Serbia, especially unemployed women, would not agree with that idea. Instead, as my mother stated, they do feel trapped, unable to find a good solution. As the retirement age is increasing, women are forced to compete in the job market, and even if they manage to find a job, the salary is often low enough to decrease the amount of monthly pension in the future. Their evident loss of control further leads to the rise of emotional guilt, whose strong pillar is the lost authority. In regards to authority, they feel guilty of not being able to financially contribute and also of not being able to fulfill the old notion “older – wiser’’, since the market and society treat their set of skills as obsolete. Apart from empowering the guilt, the lost authority becomes a fuel for political apathy as well. On a collective level, this state of apathy is being globally perpetuated by the correlation of “scapes’’, and locally manipulated through the work of state institutions. Supported by mobility of power relations, the neoliberal individualism endorses the alienation, even between members of the same community. At the same time, it diminishes the basic principles of solidarity. Feeling the lack of support and absence of help, the unemployed people over 50 in Serbia are annoyed by the institutions and mistrustful toward the other members of society. While being increasingly isolated, their political apathy is proving to be another obstacle in the clash with the institutions. In the eternal struggle for securing a better social position, the institutions and individuals are using different methods. While individuals can only rely on using a tactic, which is “always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized’’ (de Certeau 19), the institutions derive their actions from using the strategy. In that manner, proclaiming that some institutions do not have any strategy is dubious, as, in their case, not having a plan is also a plan. What is disturbing, however, is realizing how the dominant strategy relies on governing people through their insecurities and through the implementation of fear. Governing people in accordance with emotions has been historically one of the most prolific strategies. In the context of Europe, Moïsi claims how states and societies today are grounded on the culture of fear.7 Nonetheless, that culture needs to be constructed and organized, prior to being

7 See: Moïsi 2009. 27 represented as existing8. As “there is no liberalism without a culture of danger” (Foucault 67), the implementation of fear is devised on the strategy of creating external and internal enemies. In that sense, the correlation between discussed topics of ageing, unemployment and migration point to the more pernicious issue: the crisis of the social contract. Even though I was not certain what to expect upon starting this research, the question of intergenerational ageing has emerged to be crucial for understanding the endangered social contract. If we understand it as a (in)voluntary decision of citizens to relinquish certain rights in favor of the state, which should, from their end, organize, help and protect the existence of citizens, then we could say that the social contract in Serbia has been broken. Therefore, what I have tried to show in this paper is how the state is treating success as singular, and failure as plural, by expecting everything from its unemployed citizens, while providing them mostly with anxiety and sense of isolation. As the mentioned paucity of balance continues to deteriorate individual rights, the predictable conclusion would be preaching about the need for more intrinsic values, such as solidarity or empathy. However, living in Serbia has taught me that theorizing those concepts rarely has a genuine social impact. Regardless of what the existing conditions are proving to be, the empathy and solidarity between age groups are values which always need to be confirmed in praxis.

8 Similarly, Michel Foucault explained how the culture of danger was created and spread in Europe, starting from the XVIII century. See: Foucault 2008, particularly third lecture (24 January 1979), p. 51 - 73 28

Works Cited Ankersmit, Franklin. Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983. Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, University of Minnesota Press, 1996. Bauman, Zygmunt. Liquid Modernity. Polity Press, 2000. Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. University of California Press, 1969. Conrad, Sebastian. What Is Global History? Princeton University Press, 2016. de Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. University of California Press, 2002. Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978 – 1979. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Giddens, Anthony. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Polity Press, 1986. Moïsi, Dominique. The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope Are Reshaping the World. Bodley Head, 2009. Rosenthal, Gabriele. Interpretive Social Research: An Introduction. Göttingen University Press, 2018. Petrović, Bogetić, and Vujošević, “The Yugoslav Hyperinflation of 1992 – 1994: Causes, Dynamics and Money Supply Process.” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 27, no. 2, June 1999, pp. 335- 353. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.1999.1577 Thompson, Paul. “The voice of the past: oral history.” The Oral History Reader. Edited by Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, Routledge, 1998, pp. 21 – 28. Todorov, Tzvetan. The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations. University of Chicago Press, 2010.

DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020. 29

Nuriiar Safarov Digital (Dis)Engagement in Older Age: Determinants and Outcomes

Engagement in the Digitalization Framework The concept of engagement of older people has been approached from different angles, such as social, economic, political, or civic engagement (Serrat et al.; Hajek et al.; Loretto and Vickerstaff). During the last decade, various dimensions of this concept have been extensively studied concerning Internet and online participation (Damant et al.; Schreurs et al.). In the age of increasing digitalization, the Internet constitutes a medium that enables or limits the access to essential goods and services, either opens up new opportunities or narrows them down and hence makes people engage or disengage in one sense or another. Having a connection to the Internet and being able to use it may influence the ability to exercise the fundamental rights of a citizen. For example, online voting systems have been integrated by many governments across Europe and beyond (Manoharan). Various forms of electronic participation (or e-participation) including online discussion forums, electronic polls, and electronic juries, have also been adopted (Manoharan 124). Being able to use the Internet and information and communication technology more generally can determine the level of civic participation (Jamal et al.). Regarding the social aspect of engagement, interpersonal relationships and networks in the contemporary world are intertwined with digital technology in countless ways. For personal communication, people often use WhatsApp and other Internet-based video calling and instant messaging applications. In a broader sense, communication within the social communities, social groups or groups of interest increasingly happens through social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, Twitter etc. Thanks to the great penetration of technology and the Internet into social life, communication can happen across the distance, which is a substantial benefit for those engaged in ICT. It was studied, that involvement in information technology use enhances social engagement in both formal and informal settings (J. Kim et al.). Such an opportunity for higher social engagement is especially relevant for people in their pension age and other potentially vulnerable population groups such as minorities or those with limited mobility (Warschauer). The aforementioned aspects of older people’s engagement are highly related to the extent to which one is involved in ICT use. Differential inclusion of various population groups (including age groups) has been at the focus of attention in many studies on digital divides (van Deursen and Helsper; Ragnedda and Muschert; Friemel), digital inclusion (Matthews et al.), digital engagement (J. Kim et al.), technology and Internet usage and acceptance (Cotten et al.; Chou et al.), and so on. 30

In many of those studies, it was shown that the Internet and ICT use decreases with age (Matthews et al.; Friemel), which is the central topic of this chapter. The significance of such studies can be underlined by the global trend of ageing, in 2017 there were approximately 962 million of people aged 60 and over in developed as well as developing countries (United Nations). This figure has doubled since 1980 and is projected to continue growing steadily and reach the number of 2 billion by 2050 (United Nations). Older people engagement in a digital sense has a wide range of positive potentialities. Growing literature provides evidence that ICT use correlates with the better quality of life of older adults (Damant et al.; Chou et al.; Hajek et al.). The studies examining the intersection of quality of life and online participation do not provide univocal findings, however, the benefits of online engagement are noticeable. The positive impact of ICT use include better control over life, independence, reduced isolation and increased social connectedness to friends and relatives, higher access to electronic services (e-health, e-government), information and learning, positive physical and mental health outcomes, as well as better chances to find employment or volunteering opportunities (Damant et al.; Hajek et al.; Chou et al.). Considering all the positive impact that ICT can bring into the lives of older people, this chapter aims at distinguishing the factors of lower or higher Internet and technology use and their relation to age and ageing. In addition to that, it also aims at outlining the possible consequences of older adults’ digital (dis)engagement. To achieve that, the literature on digital divides and its determinants is reviewed. In what follows, the digital divide concept, its levels, and the diversity of its predictors will be delineated. After that, the potential vulnerabilities that the digital inequalities can produce for the group of older people will be discussed. The chapter is summed up in the discussion section where the possible directions for future research are stated.

Levels of Digital Divide In the research on older adults’ ICT use, different bottom lines have been included such as 50+ (Matthews et al.), 55+ (Gracia and Herrero), 60+ (Fernández-Ardèvol), and 65+ (Friemel). Categorizations of the generations of ICT users, such as digital immigrants vs digital natives (Prensky), or those born before the 1980s and after, proved to be inappropriate, because, similarly to distinguishing between the “old” and the “young”, the natives versus immigrants division “makes us overrate the difference between generations and overlook the diversity within them” (Taipale 83). Thus, this chapter does not differentiate between the generations of Internet more or less proficient users, nor it assumes that all older adults are necessarily inept Internet users. The argument in it is that many comparative studies have shown that the use of the Internet and technology decreases sharply with advancing age (Gracia and Herrero; Friemel) and that older 31 people are commonly characterized as late Internet and technology adopters (Fernández-Ardèvol; Gracia and Herrero). The gap between the benefits that the Internet can potentially bring into the lives of older adults and the actual level of their ICT use remains high even in the more recent studies (Damant et al.; Matthews et al.). This phenomenon is usually called the digital divide in age. Digital divides may be in age, education, income, employment status, which means that all those demographic variables can have a strong impact on the access to the Internet, information and communication technology. The digital divide is defined by Manuel Castells (2001) as inequalities in access and use of ICT, mostly the Internet. For example, the new electronic devices or paid computer software may be unavailable for those with low income (Friemel). The studies of digital divides used to examine just the physical access to ICT infrastructure, viewing the inequalities related to using or not using the Internet. Later on, when the access to the Internet has become almost universal and simply having a computer and Internet connection at home was no longer a problem (in most of the developed countries), this dichotomous understanding of the digital divide has changed (Dijk). It has become clear that merely having the device with Internet connection does not necessarily allow people to use them (Bakardjieva). Therefore, the digital divide was “divided” into two levels; the first, which is about the physical access to the Internet and computers, and the second, which concerns the ICT skills and different patterns of Internet and ICT use (Dijk). Research on the second level of the digital divide is focused on various levels and typologies of skills required for ICT and Internet use (van Deursen and van Dijk), different sorts of activities people perform online (Blank and Groselj) and how these aspects intersect with each other (van Deursen and Helsper). This brings a more nuanced view on the Internet and ICT adoption not merely as an absolute use or non-use, but rather as a gradation or a scale based on measurement of time spent online, considering its various usage purposes. The evolution of the research on digital divides did not stop at defining the two levels of it. Fairly recently, the third-level digital divide was introduced in the studies of ICT use (van Deursen and Helsper). This research draws attention to the disparities in outcomes that Internet users with similar usage habits have. People who exercise relatively autonomous and unlimited access to the Internet may have seemingly different offline returns of their Internet use. Thus, the third level of the digital divide concerns the capacity of an individual to transfer the ICT access into the outcomes that are valuable offline. Studying it may uncover who benefits in which ways from Internet use and why (van Deursen and Helsper). The previous section of the chapter (Engagement in the digitalization framework) included an example of the digital divide in the outcomes, regarding political and social participation. Having a 32 device at home and sufficient skills for using it does not mean that a user will acquire greater social capital or be politically active. The research connecting specific digital engagements with specific spheres of life should be done (van Deursen and Helsper), rather than taking for granted that Internet users who are richer, younger or more skilled in ICT will undoubtedly gain greater returns from it in their “real life”. This paper has a focus on older people and it will further elaborate mostly on the second and third levels of the digital divide determinants and outcomes in the following sections.

Determinants of Digital Divide A myriad of studies has been conducted to find the factors that determine the digital divide. To better understand why older people go online less than others (even having access to the Internet), diverse socio-demographic factors have been considered. In addition to age, other predictors such as gender, marital status, educational level, income, job experience, place of living (urbanized or rural, population density), social isolation, self-rated health, health literacy, migrant status and many other factors have been studied (Friemel; Scheerder et al.; Estacio et al.). Those determinants have been viewed in various contexts and were shown to be more or less strongly related to the use of the Internet. In an attempt to structure the determinants, the theories of technology acceptance and use were invented: Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT and UTAUT 2) (Venkatesh et al.), Model of Adoption of Technology in Households (MATH) (Brown and Venkatesh), Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), and many others. Other theories were applied to the research on digital divide determinants that proved to be relevant, essentially Pierre Bourdieu’s Practice Theory. The research conducted in Singapore, for instance, found that not all forms of capital have a similar impact on the access and use of ICT by older adults (Tan and Chan). Firstly, the cultural capital, that includes all the pre-existent knowledge of a person such as education, language skills, his manners and behavioral patterns, together with economic capital, which is income and employment background, play a significant role in the adoption and use of ICT and the Internet. For instance, low level of English language skills can create fear in front of new technology, since most of the ICT, as well as many websites, are in English by default (Tan and Chan). Similarly, employment in low-paid jobs (currently, or previously) can result in increasing concern about the cost of new technological devices that also produces an adverse effect on the ICT and Internet take-up (Friemel; Tan and Chan). Unlike the cultural and economic capital forms, the social capital has an ambivalent impact on the access and use of ICT and the Internet. Having a family member or friend at hand in one case would facilitate the learning process of older adults, provide information, social credentials, 33 reinforcements for ICT use (Warschauer; Tan and Chan). In another case, close ones can discourage the adoption of ICT and Internet deeming their ageing parents, counterparts or acquaintances incompetent and telling them that they “might end up damaging the ICT devices” (Tan and Chan 127).

Health-Related Determinants The growing literature on predictors of the digital divide in age focuses on health-related barriers. Parameters such as self-rated health (Estacio et al.; Gracia and Herrero) and various mental health indicators (Forsman and Nordmyr) have been studied in relation to different online services and electronic devices usage. According to Gracia and Herrera (2009), who conducted a nationally representative survey in Spain, those with poorer self-rated health used Internet much less; and this relationship remained statistically significant even after taking into account other factors, such as gender, age, and marital status. A similar tendency has been observed in relation to depression (Bauer et al.), social isolation, anxiety, and stress (Forsman and Nordmyr). Disability as a factor of digital disengagement has been less studied, as this social group is difficult-to-reach with large-scale surveys (Scholz et al.). Researching the digital engagement, it is especially important to consider those groups of population that are most vulnerable, and in need of social and health care. As mentioned before, the Internet provides tools for greater social inclusion, which can be crucial for those with physical or mental impairment, opening up not only the access to a wide range of boundless electronic services but also communication channels. However, existing studies on ICT use demonstrate that disability, especially visual and mobility impairments, constitute a strong predictor of lower Internet and technology use and non-use (E. J. Kim et al.; Lussier-Desrochers et al.; Scholz et al.).

Migrant Background, Race and Ethnicity Race, ethnicity, and migrant background can also be determinants of ICT and Internet adoption and use of ICT in general. According to Haight et al. (2014), people from a migrant background on average have lower education levels and lower income in comparison to the settled majority population, which together with poorer local language skills can put them at risk of the digital divide. In many other studies, language appears as a significant barrier of ICT access in regards to adoption of local digital services and information seeking (Gonzalez et al.; Ono and Zavodny; Mossberger et al.; Tan and Chan). Command of language of the country of settlement is decisive in determining the online participation, including economic and political participation, access to public goods, online activities related to health, education, housing, government services 34

(Mossberger et al.). Language can increase economic opportunities online and democratic participation that are essential parts of the integration process (Mossberger et al.). On the other hand, several US and Canada based studies have found that migration experience can be a strong motivator to Internet adoption (Acharya; Gonzalez and Katz). It was found that Internet use for communication purposes is higher in some contexts among the immigrant groups than among the local population (Gonzalez and Katz). In addition to that, migrants may use Internet more to compensate for the lack of social networks in the new society during the assimilation process. Furthermore, Khvorostianov et al. (2012), who studied Former Soviet Union older migrants in Israel, argue that Internet adoption was motivated by the desire to keep contact with the family and friends that were left behind, and by the willingness to maintain previously acquired identities. Internet was not only the means to keep their professional identity but it also helped migrants to develop new opportunities in Israel (Khvorostianov et al.). Migrants did not have previous experience using ICT back in their home countries, however, they were motivated to learn to use it in a wide variety of ways, e.g. for managing health or leisure activities (Khvorostianov et al.). Ethnic and national minorities studies demonstrate the existence of similar barriers to access the ICTs typical for migrant populations (Mesch; Mossberger et al.), e.g. lack of social networks and lower economic status. However, national minorities such as African Americans in the US would not experience language difficulties, as they constitute a settled community without recent migration experience (Mossberger et al.).

Motivation-Related Determinants Socio-demographic factors provide a broad picture of digital engagement determinants; however, they do not capture all sides of it. Grates et al. (2018) argue that ICT use may be a personal decision, based on one’s preference and motivation. For example, perceived usefulness and ease of use of the device or certain online service may motivate or demotivate older people to use them. Several studies have come to the conclusion that lack of awareness about the functions of and lack of interest towards the technology of one kind or another leads to lower acceptance and use of it by older people (Lee and Coughlin; Merkel and Enste). Studies from the field of social psychology define the issues of technophobia (fear of technology), computer self-efficacy (confidence in individual capability to use ICT), lack of trust in technology that can discourage people, especially older adults, from using the Internet (Beldad et al.; Vaportzis et al.). Proposing recommendations for developers, Merkel and Enste state that technology needs to focus more on the users’ characteristics, their needs, and preferences to enhance their acceptance.

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Digital Disengagement Producing Vulnerability In this article, age is viewed in relation to other determinants due to its particular importance. Many of the digital divide predictors are oftentimes accumulated in the group of older people producing multiple intersectional vulnerabilities. Commonly characterized as those who learned to use the technology at the later stage of their life, older people are generally considered to have lower computer skills (though it is not always true). Apart from that, an ageing population may experience a decline of income due to retirement and decline of health, regarding the higher probability of having a chronic disease and disability (Bauer et al.; Gracia and Herrero). All those factors, as discussed earlier, influence the Internet and technology use negatively. Given the increasing loneliness among older people (Cotten et al.), the problems of lacking social capital and social isolation add up to the risk of being digitally disengaged. Furthermore, insufficient trust, prevalent skepticism, and negative attitudes to technology peculiar to older generations (Vaportzis et al.) may also undermine the motivation to adopt new technologies. Thus, a great number of socio- demographic and socio-psychological risk factors of digital exclusion are accumulated together and amplified in the group of older people. Returning to the discussion of the third-level digital divide, increasing evidence suggests that lower participation of older adults in Internet-based services results in a wider problem of their social and economic exclusion (Neves and Amaro; Niehaves and Plattfaut) as well as the problem of their limited access to public services. EU eGovernment Action Plan sets the aim of making the public services in European states “digital-by-default” (European Commission). The new online forms of service delivery are replacing the traditional face-to-face services, for example, to claim the social benefit, one would need to fill the online application instead of physically meeting an authority. The intention to make the public services more accessible through Internet presupposes that the citizens have enough competence for and access to digital technologies’ use (Olsson and Viscovi). Therefore, older people might find themselves in a vulnerable state being unable to use, for example, health and care services. In the context of raising care needs by the ageing people, the question of their access to the health and care services has an increasing societal significance. In their systematic literature review, Chesser et al. (2016) state that many studies on underserved populations found older people to be among the most excluded groups regarding the e-health (for instance, patient-physician communication applications for smartphones, seeking health information online) services. Therefore, a sort of paradox emerges that those who are potentially most in need of public services – older people, are the most excluded from them in the age of digitalization.

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Discussion Reviewing the digital divide factors helped to recognize that ICT use is influenced by various predictors and that age is among the most significant ones. Ageing people, even though they do not constitute the homogenous group of people, might be at great risk of marginalization regarding the technology and Internet use and therefore, the electronic public services. The essence of this risk is also in the high probability to miss out on the benefits that ICTs may bring to older adults’ lives in contemporary digitalized society. Bringing up the problem of older people’s poor access to digital services draws attention to the lack of scholarly research on intersectional vulnerabilities that this group of population faces in using various Internet services. The questions of how older people use digital care, health, and governmental services, how do they manage to access the services by themselves, how do they get help with them and where from, are yet to be studied considering the multiple disadvantages that older people may have. Most of the factors described in the chapter (with few exceptions) have unambiguous effect on the Internet and technology adoption and use: similarly, to the lower education and health status that are generally considered to hamper it, lack of computer self-efficacy, trust in and knowledge about ICTs preclude the digital technology and the Internet effective use. However, more attention should be paid to the fact that many of the determinants are more complicated and may produce negative as well as positive outcomes. While describing the potentially most vulnerable groups or groups at risk of digital exclusion, the migrant population could be further discussed. Some large scale studies on migrants, racial and ethnic minorities regarding older age have been carried out (Mossberger et al.; Mesch; Jamal et al.), however, almost no nationally representative research is done on the older migrants’ access to the Internet and ICT and their use of electronic public services. It was not at the center of the interest of this chapter, however, it is a promising topic for future research. Migrants’ difficulties with the local language, lack of knowledge about the country of settlement and its welfare system, poorer social and economic capital can be significant disadvantages for them, especially combined with older age. This may create risks of lower digital and social inclusion as well as impede the integration process in the new country.

Acknowledgements The study was funded by the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland (grants 327145 and 327148) and the Centre of Excellence for Research on Ageing and Care (RG 3 Migration, Care and Ageing, Academy of Finland project number 312310).

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Tan, Kevin S. Y., and Calvin M. L. Chan. “Unequal Access: Applying Bourdieu’s Practice Theory to Illuminate the Challenges of ICT Use among Senior Citizens in Singapore.” Journal of Aging Studies, vol. 47, no. May, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 123–31, doi:10.1016/j.jaging.2018.04.002. United Nations. World Population Ageing 2017. 2017, p. 40, www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/theme/ageing/WPA2017.asp. van Deursen, Alexander J. A. M., and Ellen J. Helsper. The Third-Level Digital Divide: Who Benefits Most from Being Online? Vol. 10, 2015, pp. 29–52, doi:10.1108/s2050-206020150000010002. van Deursen, Alexander J. A. M., and Jan A. G. M. van Dijk. “Using the Internet: Skill Related Problems in Users’ Online Behavior.” Interacting with Computers, vol. 21, no. 5–6, No longer published by Elsevier, Dec. 2009, pp. 393–402, doi:10.1016/J.INTCOM.2009.06.005. Vaportzis, Eleftheria, et al. “Older Adults Perceptions of Technology and Barriers to Interacting with Tablet Computers: A Focus Group Study.” Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 8, Frontiers, Oct. 2017, p. 1687, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01687. Venkatesh, Viswanath, et al. “User Acceptance of Information Technology: Toward a Unified View.” MIS Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3, Management Information Systems Research Center, University of Minnesota, 2003, p. 425, doi:10.2307/30036540. Warschauer, Mark. Technology and Social Inclusion: Rethinking the Digital Divide. The MIT Press, 2004.

II Economics

DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020.4 45

Kurrisha Aberdeen Development and Inequalities: The Impact of Technological Advancement on Economic Inequality in Developed and Developing Countries

Concern about inequalities pervades every civilisation of mankind. In fact, many people fear that inequality can be caustic for communities regardless if you are rich or poor. If one is to peer through a historical lens, human civilisation is riddled with inequalities stemming from the systematic annihilation of races, the eagerness to resort to war and enslavement. While living conditions have improved in the present day and the influencing factors may have changed, the concept of inequalities continue to determine social interactions, socio-economic status and access to opportunities. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, inequality is the condition of not being equal, especially in rights, class and opportunities. Some authors may use the terminology to describe economic inequality (wealth and income) or inequality of living conditions while others prefer to use it to distinguish a rights-based legalistic approach (UN Development Issues 2015). The focal point of this paper is the economic inequality which contains two schools of thought. The first, inequality of outcomes, examines a concept where persons do not share the same level or amount of material wealth or have the same overall living conditions. Thus, for equality of outcomes to be achieved, persons would have to have similar economic conditions for the same achievement. Its concern lies with the finishing line and depends on circumstances and resources beyond one’s control such as talent, ability and effort. Secondly, equality of opportunity considers not equalising income but rather, giving everyone the same chance or access to opportunity regardless of individual characteristics such as age, gender and disability, climatic conditions and societal conditions such as health care and education systems. Understanding the causes and impacts of inequality is imperative as there are several grave consequences. According to the OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría, “the social compact is starting to unravel in many countries” (Kaasa 2005). It is further believed that socio economic inequality has a fundamental part to play in the occurrence of increased criminal activity since, the number of disadvantaged persons increases, who are more likely to violate the law and vice versa to become victims of criminal activity. Furthermore, British epidemiologists Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson posit that there is a special link between inequality and ‘all manner of social ills’ including greater infant mortality, obesity, shorter lives, increased teenage pregnancy, more against vulnerable groups and poverty. They suggest that there can also be medical effects if humans perceive themselves to be socially inferior such as high blood pressure and 46 elevated glucose levels. These effects can be summarised by the quote from Keeley (2015) which stated that “Overall well-being is positively associated with low socio-economic differences measured by income or educational inequality,” showing that there is a general correlation between overall well-being and inequality. Additionally, the connection between economic growth and inequality has been a long- standing controversy for economists with several influential theories emerging over the years. Growing inequality may indicate a lack of economic opportunity which can limit the growth potential of economies by reducing the ability of economic agents to exploit the opportunities created by globalisation and trade (Jaumotte 2013). Thus, understanding the causes of inequality is essential in order to devise policies which would favour the division of wealth equally to achieve a more equitable distribution of income, while addressing the welfare and societal concerns that widening gaps in income raise. Since the ending of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, human life has been revolutionised. This is primarily attributed to technological progress and innovation which led to the dissemination of novel ideas and the enhancement of efficiency and productivity. Pervasive data networks and devices are resulting in accelerated information flows from developed societies to developing ones. From biology to energy and food to transportation, unprecedented shifts in technology are redefining our future. In fact, technological development enables more effective use of resources in production and thus has become one of the most important mechanisms for increasing a country’s wealth and economic growth. Though technology and globalization are vital elements of exceptional growth of the world economy over the last 20 years, their distributional effects are still highly controversial (Jaumotte 2013). For instance, income inequality has soared throughout the years where surprisingly even developed nations are aligning with the predictions of the Kuznet’s hypothesis1. Among emerging economies, where the Gini2 coefficient has risen on average 0.27 percent a year, technology has been the main accelerator of inequality, with a 0.83 percent increase in the Gini (Jaumotte 2013). Though there are several important factors which contribute to income disparity such as globalisation, trade and foreign direct investment, they are either connected to technology or simply are not as significant as technology. In order to understand the pervasive nature of inequalities, one needs to understand the underlying forces and how they contribute to shape the political present. This requires radical engagement with the state and society. By an in-depth analysis of technological impacts and their effects on

1 The Kuznet’s hypothesis posits that when economies move further way from the agricultural industry ass their main form of GDP, inequality rises as gaps start to widen due to rising earnings of factory workers compared to those of farmers. 2 The Gini index or co-efficient measure the extent to which the distribution within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. 47 growth, standards of living and inequality, this paper will shed light on contemporary issues and manifestations of disengagement. This is necessary to ensure change in our behaviour and attitudes if we are to make a meaningful impact on our economic reality.

Figure 1: Evolution of Income Inequality 1978-20143 The purpose of this research paper is to evaluate, analyse and summarise existing literature to create a coherent and accurate view on whether technological development is the main contributor to income or economic inequality among developed and developing economies alike. Although there has been a considerable amount of research conducted on factors contributing to inequalities, technology is the aim of this study which seeks to provide recommendations to reduce the effects of technology on the economy.

Is technological development the new industrial revolution for economic disparity? The noted science fiction author William Gibson once wrote: “The future is here. It’s just not evenly distributed yet” (Davis 2016). This quote summarises the impacts of the rapid omnipresence of technological innovation as it suggests that there are advantages while acknowledging that there is a distributional disparity which may allow inequality to persist. The third industrial revolution saw the emergence of nuclear energy and resulted in the rise of electronics such as the transistor and the microprocessor, but also the rise of telecommunications and the computer. While some countries struggle to play catch up with the third, the fourth

3 Jaumotte 2013 48 revolution unfolds before our eyes. Sometimes called ‘Industry 4.0’4, its genesis relies on the emergence of the internet or the Internet of Things.5 It is rooted in digitalization and the creation of cyber physical systems, which is a novel technological phenomenon rather than the emergence of a new type of energy as seen in the other revolutions. While this revolution relies on the third, the fourth represents the new ways technology became embedded in societies resulting in new capabilities for people and machines (Davis 2016). Examples include artificial intelligence and genome editing. The relationship between technology and inequality is multi-faceted. The International Monetary Fund suggests that technological progress, measured as the share of ICT capital stock, has a statistically significant impact on inequality (Jaumotte 2013). Technological advancement has strengthened productivity, enhanced economic growth and allowed access to knowledge and basic services. Unfortunately, it is also the foundation of many types of inequality in a society. In order to first paint an accurate picture of the current state of inequality, we must look at empirical evidence. According to Credit Suisse’s Global Wealth Report 2015 (Kersley 2015), the richest 1% owns half of all household wealth. Additionally, Oxfam’s new report (2016) submits a more startling depiction, finding that 62 individuals controlled more assets than the poorer 3.6 billion people combined, around half of the world’s population. These highlight just how concerning the distributional disparity is. Indeed, there are many positive aspects of technology since its rise in the late 20th century. For instance, a direct result of ICT adoption is the continuous decline in absolute poverty across developing regions. The global extreme poverty rate6 dropped from 1.9 billion people in 1981 to 1.3 billion in 2010, according to the World Bank (Pepper 2015). Contrastingly, technological innovation has simultaneously resulted in an increase (and in some areas a decrease) in economic inequality especially in developing economies. This paper examines the impacts, both positive and negative, of technological advancement on economic inequality in the world today by exploring the effects on inequality of outcome and opportunities.

The Pervasiveness of Technology in the World Today Firstly, the relationship between the digital divide and inequality must be evaluated. Frontier and innovative technology are heavily dependent on the ability to transfer extensive amounts of real- time data. This requires high speed broadband Internet. This is where inequality based on

4 “The 4 industrial revolutions,” Sentryo, accessed August 15, 2019, https://www.sentryo.net/the-4-industrial- revolutions/ 5 the interconnection via the Internet of computing devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling them to send and receive data. 6 those individuals surviving on less than $1.25 per day 49 technology begins. If a country, for example Cambodia, extensively lacks broadband connectivity, the use and development of Artificial Intelligence and frontier technologies would be virtually non- existent, leading to uneven progress between them and a developed economy.

Figure 2: Percentage of Internet Penetration by Region7 This infographic shows that generally, the regions with greater economic development such as North America, Northern and Western Europe has a higher percentage of internet penetration. However, regions on the African continent, the Caribbean region and certain parts of Asia have the lowest internet penetration. This results in a wide digital divide. This digital divide amplifies the technological divide which enlarges inequalities between the two main dimensions of inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity. Noteworthy is the fact that a digital divide and thus a technological divide can also exist within countries. This is prevalent in rural and urban areas as well as between women and men especially where gender inequality is a ubiquitous issue and mostly occurs in developing countries. For example, in China, factoring the entire population 50% of the internet penetration are in urban areas, 18.5% in rural areas and 31% area is un-penetrated (Tait 2011). The drivers and conditions necessary for development demonstrate a positive co-relation between the capacity for technological absorption and investment in ICT services and the development of frontier technologies. Thus, a return on technological development is expected to be seen in countries with a high capability of technological absorption, which can be quantified with regards to access to broadband connectivity.

7 Simon Kemp, “Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark,” last Modified January 30, 2018, https://wearesocial.com/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018 50

Frontier technologies may increase economic disparities and expand development inequalities within a country and among countries by providing transformational opportunities to those with the essential infrastructure, access, investments and knowledge, while those who were unable to acquire the essential tools are left behind (UN 2018).

Technology’s effects on Inequalities of Outcome The part technology plays in economic disparity is rather complicated and controversial. There are two main relationships which must be explored. First and foremost is the relationship between technology and economic growth. Technology is said to be a main operator in aggregating economic growth through enhancements in productivity. Productivity can essentially be defined as the measure of the efficiency of production. An increase in technological capabilities, that is a country’s capacity to acquire, absorb, disseminate and apply modern technologies, results in economic growth.

Figure 3: Increase in GDP with reference to the technological revolutions8

The graph shows the GDP per capita growth with the evolution of technology for the world. It can be argued that the increase per capita GDP can be attributed to an increase in productivity levels because technological progress enables more efficient use of resources in production which results in an increase of output leading to greater financial gains. Yet, quantifying the exact contribution of technology to productivity and economic growth is extremely difficult. This is because technology is intertwined with other accelerators of productivity

8 (UN 2018) 51 such as globalisation and trade and therefore, to solely analyse the impact of the output of technology would be nearly impossible. At the same time, the value is approximate as the measure created by Solow called the Total Factor Productivity encounters difficulties in measuring inputs and outputs. Perhaps the most researched is the impact of technology on labour. It adopts a skill biased nature which can affect economic inequality. This can manifest itself in labour saving and labour- linking technology (Basu 2016). This is because it affects the nature and composition of jobs available and their wages. Although it is acknowledged that labour-saving technology has been around for a while, the momentum of creation and use has increased. Global sales of industrial robots, for example, reached 225,000 in 2014, up 27% year on year (Basu 2016). More astounding and possibly beneficial is labour linking technology. These are digital innovations which enable persons to work for employers in different countries. This is especially useful in for emerging economies, where the challenge of labour-saving innovation is mitigated by labour- linking technology. For instance, China and India, which provide cheap labour and are organised into a basic infrastructure can benefit greatly from this global structure due to outsourcing, showing a rise in their GDP. However, the opposite effect in GDP is seen in high income countries such as in the US and Canada which dropped to 57% of GDP and 55% respectively (Basu 2016). Furthermore, in 1990, just 5% of the Fortune 500 corporations were from emerging economies; now more than 26% are. These statistics prove that technological advancement can aid in bridging the divide between emerging and developed nations as it can lead to an increase in GDP for the developing nation. Conversely, the net effect is unambiguous since jobs are simultaneously created and destroyed. Though unemployment may increase in the short term, technological innovation may be positive for the long term. For example, there would be a reduction in the demand for manual work and the capability of taking over routine tasks which may reduce middle-skilled jobs. Nonetheless, this may increase highly skilled employment since using technology would require more knowledge and skill. Despite this, another view can be taken. The World Bank estimates that approximately two thirds of all jobs are exposed to mechanization in the developing world (UN 2018). Similarly, findings from the International Labour Organisation suggests that computerization may have an impact on the job security of salaried or permanent workers in major sectors such as electronics and textiles. According to Carl Benedict Frey from the Oxford Martin Programme on Technology and Employment, presently only 0.5% of the US workforce is employed in industries that did not exist before the 21st century, which is far lower than the approximate 8.2% of creating new jobs during the 1980s and the 4.4% of new jobs created during the 1990s. This view demonstrates that technology undoubtedly can lead to unemployment (Davis 2016). However, this effect is not felt 52 in most developing countries, since the mechanization effects are moderated by low wages and slow technological acceptance. Furthermore, the types of jobs that are left out would require higher levels of education and specialized study. It is also posited that there are two likely effects. According to Snower, with intensive changes in technology, the wages of skilled workers would increase while those of unskilled workers would remain untouched. With respect to extensive changes, skilled workers will acquire the jobs of unskilled workers resulting in the increase in both the demand for skilled workers and their respective wages while the reverse occurs for the unskilled (Kaasa 2005). This would exacerbate the ‘skills gap’ which can adversely affect the dissemination of income in both developing and advanced economies by reducing the demand for lower-skill activities while increasing the value for high-skill activities (Jaumotte 2013). This is epitomised in the manufacturing industry. Automation is transforming a mass employer of middle-class income into a smaller employer of persons who possess higher level education and skills (Wadhwa 2016). This therefore widens the gap between the skilled and unskilled culminating in greater economic inequality (Davis 2016). Lastly, another possible effect on economic inequality of outcomes is the phenomena of rent- seeking. Rent seeking is the practice of exploiting and influencing public policy or economic conditions to increase profits. This is as a result of regulatory capture. 9 It is contended that globalization, digitalization and technological innovation are environments which can enable rent- seeking which cause extreme, continuing and deep-rooted inequality. Globalization has emphasized the spread of digital companies as uncontrolled monopolies. These holdings influence the political landscape and create rules and policies for their benefit, allowing them access to an out of balance share of the national revenue. Wherever there is a regulatory capture, economic inequality is a direct outcome. The Relationship between Technology and Inequalities of Opportunities Within a fair policy environment, technology can reduce inequality. Technology has the potential to level the playing field by providing the less fortunate with access to basic services, for example electricity through solar photo-voltaic panels in Bangladesh, while simultaneously creating job opportunities. Similarly, there is increased access to training and education through universities which provide courses using Massive Open Online Courses. All these impacts can create a fair starting point for all and providing the freedom to choose a life. Moreover, online e-commerce also proves beneficial as it allows small business to thrive by providing worldwide exposure.

9 Regulatory capture is a form of government failure which occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or political concerns of special interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating. 53

Unfortunately, there are limitations or drawbacks when there is a lack of availability of ICT infrastructure, insufficient skills development and technology specifically geared towards the needs of the low-income groups. This would leave the uneducated and vulnerable groups behind for instance, in agriculture by a lack of information on the beneficial farming techniques. This would incidentally result in an increase in inequality of opportunities; leading to a greater level of economic inequality, especially between developed and developing countries (UN 2018).

Additional Impacts of Technology on Economic Inequality There is a growing perception that innovative technology can be used to ease disaster-induced poverty and inequalities. This is sometimes referred to as inequality by impact. For example, in Mongolia, large geospatial datasets about district levels are aiding authorities in forecasting droughts. Other technology can help in anticipating and responding to climate change risks. Another example, in Tamil Nadu, traditional water collecting techniques have been combined with biotechnologies to improve the resistance of crops to the impacts of climate change. The advancement of green technologies can limit the air pollution on the poor, to reduce inequalities of impact like in China which has experienced a tremendous expansion in the solar photovoltaic industry. However, in the ‘Tech’ world, the winner ‘takes all’. This essentially means that giant digital companies control most of the markets such as Facebook, Microsoft and Google. This results in a few huge companies competing to dominate the global industry. This then puts them in a position to keep a substantial part of the world’s wealth at the centre of their organisation, mostly benefiting a few shareholders, executives and a few employees (Wadhwa 2016). They would also then be allowed to employ how many persons they choose and decide their employment contracts and so on. This results in the ‘Gig Industry’ which is a free market system where temporary positions and contract employees are prevalent. This avoids the obligation for health insurance and longer-term benefits (Wadhwa 2016), which may have given some families access to basic services. The lack of the distributional wealth will result in economic inequality for employees as well as non-employees alike.

Conclusion Many of the greatest economists and philosophers throughout history were bold and outspoken about the injustices of inequalities. Even today, this topic is still controversial and heavily debated as the effects are of grave importance to society. There is surely a case for outspokenness, research and reflection today about the causes of inequalities, since it is at the highest it has ever been. Technology has had a major influence on inequality. It has improved access to basic services, 54 improved levels of education and has reduced poverty. However, at the same time, technology has broadened inequality due to the different technological capabilities, investments and policy support among countries. This paper demonstrated the effect technologies have on redefining work and perpetuating economic inequalities due to mistrust and disengagement. By analysing engagement as well as disengagement in terms of the relationship of the individual to social, political and economic structures help us to determine the elephant in the room; that is, the two-sided nature of technology. It can help those who understand it while leaving the rest behind. The extent of technological inequalities broadly depends on three main factors such as the amount of investment in technological development, the availability of ICT infrastructure and the overall national capacity to utilise and innovate using the technology. As noted above, the impacts of technology are country specific. Therefore, the following recommendations may not be applicable to all circumstances in every country. The capacity of technology to reduce inequality of opportunity is ample however, it is not automatic. It depends heavily on the capabilities of the poor to access and utilise the technology to respond to their specific needs. For example, technology plays a critical role in reducing the impacts of environmental degradation and disasters, which disproportionately affect those who live in poverty. Additionally, greater access to education can aid in reducing the impacts of inequality. Through training, individuals would now have the ability to use frontier technology to their advantage whether it is to improve their business, thereby increasing income or by gaining the necessary skills to be able to maintain relevance in their respective job arenas. For example, in the agricultural sector, if farmers are trained in new agricultural practices in biotechnology, they may have the ability to increase their crops, which would eventually result in increased income that may reduce inequality. Likewise, there should be education and training policies to address the needs of increasing the supply of skilled labour. Thomas Piketty proposes that there is also the need for active governmental intervention by means of progressive taxation and welfare (Meschi 2009). This is a tax which imposes a lower tax rate on low income earners and a higher one for those with higher incomes. Then, a welfare system can aid the redistribution of the acquired wealth to those who are in vulnerable situations, thereby reducing economic inequality by combating the disparity between the lower income and high- income earners. Indeed, this welfare system should be able to create safety nets and insurance schemes for the vulnerable. National policies, especially in developing countries may be necessary to enact these recommendations. However, it must be noted that they may be constrained by national budgets, and therefore, aid from international organizations may be necessary. 55

In order to ensure there is ICT adoption and penetration in all income groups, broad band availability and adoption must increase. This can be done through policy to achieve universal access, increase affordability and increase technological literacy (Pepper 2015). This may be achieved through: 1) focusing public resources for building internet access to rural or vulnerable communities, 2) ensuring educational institutions have access to broadband internet services, 3) removing taxes on devices or adding subsidies for certain populations and 4) creating robust ICT training and programmes. It is submitted that should these recommendations be implemented in countries with severe economic inequality, technology would no longer be a major factor in inequality. In fact, the Gini coefficient should decrease, thus, reflecting a reduction in inequality. However, if technology is allowed to remain uncontrolled and unsupervised, its impacts, especially on developing countries and economies is expected to be devastating. Just as the previous industrial revolutions, the effects on those who fail to keep up with the evolving world, will be left behind.

Works Cited Basu, Kaushik. “Is technology making inequality worse?” World Economic Forum, January 06, 2016. www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/is-technology-making-inequality-worse/. Davis, Nicholas. “What is the fourth industrial revolution?” World Economic Forum, January 19, 2016. www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/what-is-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/. Jaumotte, F., Lall, S. & Papageorgiou, C. “Rising Income Inequality: Technology, or Trade and Financial Globalization?” IMF Econ Rev, no. 61, p.271–309. doi:10.1057/imfer.2013.7. Kaasa, Anneli. Factors of Income Inequality and Their Influence Mechanisms: A Theoretical Overview, Tartu University Press, 2005. Keeley, Brian. “How does income inequality affect our lives? Income Inequality: The Gap between Rich and Poor.” OECD Publishing, 2015, pp. 64-70. doi:10.1787/9789264246010-6- en. Kersley, Richard, Markus Stierli, “Global Wealth in 2015: Underlying Trends Remain Positive,” Credit Suisse, October 13, 2015. www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/news-and- expertise/global-wealth-in-2015-underlying-trends-remain-positive-201510.html. Lawton, Tait. “Rural Internet Usage in China- Infographic and Interview.” Nanjing Marketing Group, October 27, 2011. www.nanjingmarketinggroup.com/blog/rural-chinese-internet-usage- 2011_10_27. 56

Meschi, Elena, Marco Vivarelli. “Trade and Income Inequality in Developing Countries.” University College London, 2009. www.discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10004526/1/Meshi2009Trade287.pdf. Oxfam. “An Economy for the 1%.” Oxfam International, January 18, 2016. www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp210-economy-one- percent-tax-havens-180116-en_0.pdf. Pepper, Robert. “The paradox of technology’s impact on inequality in Africa.” World Economic Forum, June 02, 2015. www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/06/the-paradox-of-technologys- impact-on-inequality-in-africa/. Kemp, Simon. “Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark.” We Are Social Inc., January 30, 2018, www.wearesocial.com/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018. United Nations. “Concepts of Inequality,” Developmental Issues No. 1. www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/ publication/no-1-concepts-of-inequality/. United Nations ESCAP. “Technology and Inequalities.” Inequality in Asia and the Pacific in the era of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 2018, pp. 63-75. Wadhwa, Vivek. “The urgent need for Silicon Valley to lead a smart and civil conversation on inequality” The Washington Post, February 10, 2016. www.washingtonpost.com/news/ innovations/wp/2016/02/10/the-urgent-need-for-silicon-valley-to-lead-a-smart-and-civil- conversation-on-inequality/?noredirect=on. DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020.5 57

Joselle Ali China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Brief Analysis of Preliminary Impacts on the United States

“China is a sleeping lion. Let her sleep for when she wakes, she will shake the world” -Napoleon Bonaparte

More than two centuries ago, Napoleon Bonaparte uttered these words and the present proceedings might finally bring this saying to fruition. Chinese president Xi Jinping said during a convention in Paris commemorating fifty years of diplomacy with France, that “today that lion has woken up, but it is peaceful, pleasant and civilized” (Chen). Many are skeptical about the validity of a ‘peaceful rise’ of the world’s second largest global economy, especially considering the many developments that China has been engaging in. One of such is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR). From its inception in 2013 by Xi Jinping following his election, it can be described as one of their, “most ambitious foreign and economic policies” (Cai 1). No one truly has an accurate idea of what the BRI is, but others have attributed it more to a brand due to the uncertainty of its influence and scope after its implementation. Regardless, the initiative comprises two divisions, the Silk and Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. A recent addition, to be considered as a subsection under the main initiative to deal with Artic affairs, is known as the Polar Silk Road. To be geographically specific, the land-based Belt comprises six economic corridors: New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELBEC) China – Mongolia – Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) China – Central Asia – West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC) China – Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC) Bangladesh – China – India – Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC) China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

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Figure 1: Geographical depiction of the Belt and Road Initiative routes and connectivity points1

To achieve this, reliance will be placed on major cities along the routes to, “serve as pillars and trade zones” where these corridors will be meticulously harmonized towards the goal of creating a new “Eurasian land bridge” (Huang 318). The Road portion of the BRI will rely on the main seaports to collectively build unhindered, safe and effective logistical routes (Cai). It will connect the hub, China, to “Southeast Asia, Indonesia, India, the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia, Egypt and Europe, while simultaneously gaining accessibility to the South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Bengal, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf and the Red Sea” (Belt and Road Initiative). These complementary sectors must be considered together to collectively complete the six geographically strategic points for trade advancements. This initiative is cause for concern due to the vast scope it intends to undertake. From a geographical perspective, it reaches at least 60 countries and accounts for 64% of the world population; approximately 4.4 billion. Economically, this region accounts for approximately 30-40% of global GDP; $21 trillion (Huang 318; Natapoff). Finally, from a developmental perspective it represents a geographically advantageous context, spanning in three continents, for strategic alliances between the underdeveloped and developing countries of Asia and Africa as well as the developed economies of Europe.

1 Retrieved from https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/belt-and-road/ 59

However, the BRI encompasses much more in its framework. It entails five priority areas and the aforementioned explanation depicts how China attempts to achieve its Infrastructure Connectivity and Unimpeded Trade goals. Other priority areas include Policy Dialogue, referring to an ‘intergovernmental mechanism for macro policy conversations and promotion of political trust’, Financial Support and lastly, People to People Exchange (Huang 315). Hence, one can see that the initiative spans more than economic capability. However, under that umbrella more opportunities can be provided to achieve the other dimensions, or vice versa. The dimensions of people to people exchange and financial support will be used as steppingstones to attain the overall economic dominance of the BRI brand. If significant progress is achieved within these five areas, then this initiative represents an alternative model for the international economy.

China’s Domestic Growth Concerns A primary motivator within the Belt and Road Initiative is China’s domestic growth concerns. China’s economic take off can be pegged to the year 1979. Several economic reforms were initiated that transformed China from a command, primarily agrarian economy, to the manufacturing and technological powerhouse it is presently. Such reforms took the form of coastal economic zones establishment to attract foreign investment, an increase in exports and imports of high-tech products, decentralization in trade decisions, further opening of coastal regions as developmental zones, but most importantly trade liberalization, would lay the foundation for its economic success (Morrison 4). The amalgamation of reform policies such as these propelled China’s growth to inconceivable heights. Between 1980 to 2018, China’s real annual GDP growth averaged 9.5% (Huang 315). However, over the years GDP growth has been declining due to several downturns. For instance, in the period 2008 to 2010, growth averaged 9.7%. For the next six successive years, it fell from, “10.6% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2016” and the IMF has predicted it will fall to 5.5% in 2024 (Morrison 5). Hence, the BRI is presented as the answer. Overall, China’s growth can be pegged to two main factors: “large scale capital investment and rapid productivity growth” (Morrison 7), leading to high efficiency gains, output and resources for further investment purposes. These factors founded the Chinese, “global manufacturing centre” (Huang 316). However, there is a performance disparity between the old and new industries. While many are new and have achieved global competitive competencies, such as internet services and machine equipment, they are not immense enough to offset the decline of the old industries. Additionally, total factor productivity had been steadily falling over the years. Based on these trends, the old model of, “exporting labor intensive manufacturing goods and investments in fixed assets” is no longer viable (Huang 316). Hence, it is high time for a new model. If China wants to achieve growth sustainability, higher levels of technological innovation and industrial 60 advancements, and financial system and state-owned enterprise reform, are necessary (Huang, 316). This is precisely the path that the BRI follows through the five priority areas. Another growth issue regards the large amounts of excess capacity in steel, coal and ship building. New export markets must be found and the BRI represents a blueprint for a potential solution to this problem as the accessibility of many new markets are guaranteed, especially in the lieu of U.S trade restrictions.

Calls for Greater International Participation An influential principle set by past Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was to keep a low profile when managing economic matters. Numerous Chinese leaders have followed this advice, but this has grown increasingly difficult, since according to China’s market-based GDP measure, it is the world’s 2nd largest economy contributing to one third of world GDP. Thus, due to its economy size, China can no longer be a passive player in the international community. As such, many international leaders have called multiple times for China to take greater responsibility. More importantly, it is driven by the “self-initiated retreat of American leadership” through U.S president Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ policy (Freeman). Faced with the unpredictability of his decisions, the desire for stability and security is peaking. China is presenting itself as the answer by ushering in a new age of globalization, that is hinged on this expansive initiative.

How are countries convinced to participate? China’s marketing strategies can be deconstructed and divided into four main levels. The first level is what the common public is intended to see; “a new age of adventure” that evokes a “cultural exchange and shared prosperity” (Chen). Politics aside, China presents a sophisticated brand and attractive business and economic model, which by design is an all-encompassing open platform initiative of developing infrastructural necessities of ports, pipelines, roads and railways (Chen). With this window dressing in place, as in the world of business, a value proposition must be offered to countries to convince them of the benefits of joining the initiative. This value can be found in the second level of infrastructural investment. This is an integral component, necessary to propel economic transformation (Chen). Once the recipient country is onboard, subsequent investments will be done to ensure persuasion is solid; also known as the third level. China’s vision transcends as one that intends to build sustainable longstanding markets by primarily focusing on infrastructural development, followed by subsequent engagements in education, technology and healthcare. These investments fruition cannot be attained without capital. Hence, the fourth and final level is simply loans; the foundation of China’s foreign policy. In April 2019, China hosted a Belt and Road Forum in Beijing where 37 world leaders attended and deals worth more than $49.5 billion dollars 61 were signed. Since this plan has been launched, BRI loans worth over 70 billion have been loaned to overseas countries exclusive of the forum (Fullerton). Moreover, prior to the forum there was already over 170 agreements with 125 countries in place. In this regard, it is often compared to the U.S Marshall Plan following the end of World War II. It entailed the transfer of $13 billion, presently worth $100-155 billion, to Western Europe for reconstruction. Compared to China from 2014-2018, over $440 billion in 64 partner countries were financed and it is estimated to involve $1 trillion (Fullerton; Natapoff). The key difference, however, is while the U.S’ was comprised of mostly grants, China offers exclusively loans. Beneath these levels of persuasion lies what many speculate about: China creating a new economic model with its original partners, but with the long-term intent of making this plan the “platform for international trade” (Chen). China’s policy dialogue will be the tool used to culminate all of this in an attractive package. In Davos, Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president to attend the World Economic Forum and decided to open with a quote used to describe the world after the Industrial Revolution. From Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.” Thereafter, references were made to two Chinese proverbs, “Honey melons hang on bitter vines” and “sweet dates grow on thistles and thorns” to philosophically mean that we live in an imperfect world (Murray). In other words, the world should turn to China. But with a model that encompasses both developing and developed, persuasion must be tailored to suit both. Regarding Europe, the strategy China is advancing is the concept of building a, “greater Eurasian market” and to, “revive European civilization” (Fasslabend 299). China likes to tug on past historical successes, using geopolitical analyst Halford Mackinder and his Heartland theory, that refers to Europe as the ‘world island’; the hub of economic, social, cultural and political prosperity. Hence, a picture is painted where resurrected from the recesses of history, Europe will have the chance to once again be at the center of human civilization, while simultaneously re-isolating the U.S to what it once was and reshaping the global landscape for the next level commerce and trade. With regard to the developing regions of Africa and India, the loans are already a substantial form of persuasion, but a pivotal point is the fact that this model has a developing led focus even though it is China at the helm; which has never been seen before. Therefore, the reason why this initiative is so ambitious is due to the unchartered territory that China is attempting to explore that provides an opportunity for a developing centered economic era, if successful. Furthermore, an important part of it is the dedicated attempt to continue making the initiative shared; which presently with the U.S, is not likely due to its affinity for protectionism.

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Geopolitical Impacts on the U.S “China’s BRI is the story of the power of multilateralism versus the glory of unilateralism” (Natapoff). An important and hotly debated topic is the rise of China and America’s response. Under the Obama administration a foreign policy decision called Pivot to Asia was formulated and implemented where it entails the relocation of U.S resources and efforts from the Middle East and Eastern Europe to Asia, to circumvent Chinese expansion. In November 2017, U.S president Trump had an Indo-Pacific strategy to continue that plan by countering China with the help of Japan, Australia and India, in collaboration with present U.S allies of South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam for instance. Russia is also a key player in this strategy but is impossible due to strained U.S – Russia relations as well as a budding China – Russia alliance. Ultimately, this prevents the formation of any meaningful agreement by the U.S to effectively block any large-scale Chinese project. Nevertheless, Russia can also be seen as being on board with the BRI initiative by attending the summit earlier this year. Furthermore, many countries have already broken diplomatic ties with Taiwan, such as Panama, in favor of reforming them with Beijing. Thus, this represents an achievement for China as it is the second largest user of the Panama Canal to the U.S and enables shipping accessibility between Asia and the Americas through Central America. This is just one example where China can reap the benefits of these opportunities such as the canal. But these outcomes are a result of the current U.S administration and how it is disengaging several agreements. One such trade agreement is the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP). Its goal was to create a cohesive economic era and, “establish consistent rules for global investment,” much like the BRI initiative, and would have raised the real income of its members by approximately U.S 500 billion dollars. Most importantly, it was a way to ensure that the U.S, and not countries like China, remains the one tasked with the role of writing this, “century’s rules for the world economy” (McBride and Chatzky). Altogether, the twelve TTP countries accounted for 40% of global GDP; a parallel with the BRI. However, once President Trump came into office, withdrawal from the TPP was one of his first policy decisions. As a result, a new deal was formed with the remaining eleven signatories, now called the TPP-11 or the CPTPP; Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans- Pacific Partnership Agreement. Deals that the U.S withdraws from leaves voids that can be filled by another power; China. Hence, while China may not be a part of this agreement presently, the opportunity exists. This is due to the current economic climate where the U.S is striving towards protectionism and bilateralism while China is doing the opposite with multilateralism and attempts to further increase and liberalize trading and investment. “With China as a member, CPTPP would increase the value of Japan’s exports by $283 billion by 2030, compared to only $97 billion without” (Jia et al). 63

Economic Impacts on the U.S It has long been known that the U.S has never been an avid supporter of China. As U.S administration changes overtime, the road to diplomacy has never been smooth. Stemming from ideological differences dating back to the 1950’s, it set the stage for future diplomatic relations as both would always be on opposing sides of the playing field whether it be on issues of human rights, trade or alliances. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, and improved economic trade relations form the foundation of many political leaders’ propositions, a pressing concern for all as well as the most recent economic turbulence that displays U.S-China tensions is the trade war; commonly referred to as the Cold War 2.0. It was instigated by the U.S in 2018 in response to allegations that China has been engaging in cybertheft of U.S technology and intellectual property rights. Within the parameters of trade, this was manifested in the form of tariffs on Chinese imports of mainly steel and aluminium possibly due to knowledge of their desire to get rid of excess capacities. However, it also included tariffs on clothing, shoes, electronics and even investment restrictions. No one wins in a trade war and it causes the investment climate to falter due to the uncertainty and the high-risk level. Both parties, imposed tariffs of $34 billion worth of goods in 2018, encompassing a range of products. Amidst technology squabbles, the trade war did not deescalate but rather intensified. In 2019 the U.S rose tariffs from 10 to 25% on, “$200 billion worth of Chinese goods” (“What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?”).

Presently continuing, as tariffs keep rising, how does this impact the BRI? The current trade war helps the BRI. Recently the BRI was facing uncertainty due to countries’ scepticism over a lack of transparency and debt trap. However, this scepticism is somewhat diminishing due to the rising uncertainties of the economic climate caused by US-China relations. A trade war is not beneficial to the participating parties; however, the rest of the observing countries stand to benefit because any imports that have now become expensive, forces the engaging countries to seek alternatives elsewhere. Such was the case with soybean production. China was the largest importer of U.S soybeans and the U.S is its largest exporter. In 2016, China, “imported a record of 36 million metric tonnes” of U. S soybeans (Boehm). With the trade war and the loss of this export market, excess supply has become an issue and prices have fallen by, “as much as 25%.” But this loss also translates into someone’s gain, namely Brazil and other U.S competitors (Boehm). There are many more similar illustrations, but the crux of the matter is that China’s affinity for liberalizing trade, propels them to source their traded goods from elsewhere, more specifically in the BRI counties of Africa and Latin America, who stand to benefit immensely. This is illustrated in the graph below: 64

Figure 2: Depiction of Chinese purchasing trend after U.S- imposed tariffs2

The trade war had the opposite intended effect as the U.S, "global trade deficit has expanded by 8% while the emerging market trade balance with China has moved toward a surplus" (Ellis). Thus, China’s open policy supplemented by the U.S closed approach, incentivizes other or emerging markets to accept trade relations with China, not solely for stability but also because currently, “Asia is more predictable and acts with more trade sustainability than Washington” (Ellis). The US has been the head of the world economy since the end of World War II. In other words, there was only one choice. Now there are two. This initiative is forcing countries to choose sides between China and the U.S. Given the material benefits on offer, traditional U.S allies such as Italy, Britain, Panama and more than half of the 28 EU members, have signed bilateral endorsements of the BRI. As previously stated, one of the five key policy areas of the BRI is financial support. The US being the one having the ability to make the rules that govern the international system means that it has financial institutions in place to oversee this responsibility. This takes two main forms, “the multilateral institutions of the Bretton Woods system: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank” (Liao 1). Recently, two new multilateral development banks (MDB) were established: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS Bank or New Development Bank (NDB). “These banks have arisen at a time of shifting powers in the international system from industrialized countries to emerging economies” (Wang 114).

2 Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/trumps-trade-war-puts-belt-and-road-first 65

The question that remains as a result of this policy move is why create new banks when these institutions are already established. Justification points to several issues, one such being underrepresentation. “As the economies of China and the less developed nations grew in the last 30 years, their voting powers within both organizations have remained flat” (Liao 1). In the IMF and World Bank, voting power is determined by one’s capital contribution and economy stability and size. “Since 2000, the BRICS countries share of world GDP has grown from 8 to 22%, while the G7 has declined from 65 to 45%” (Wang 114). “By 2013 emerging market economies accounted for more than half of global GDP on the basis of purchasing power” (Liao 2). Yet, voting power remained unequal. Washington’s voting bloc has remained constant at approximately 16-17% as the controlling economy in both institutions (Liao 2). However, reforms have been proposed to increase the voting power of developing nations to bring them closer to current economic realities; 6% of current shares would shift from developed to emerging (Liao 3). Nonetheless, those reforms cannot be implemented without U.S authorization. Another issue is austerity policies. These institutions, particularly the IMF, carries a negative stigmatization due to these conditionalities; where in exchange for financial support, the beneficiary would implement structural adjustment policies such as currency devaluation, reduction in government spending, increased privatization and cutting of welfare programs. However, as many critics have said overtime, ‘cookie-cutter’ policies and a standardized approach cannot be implemented to all economies and expect growth to be the outcome, when each have their respective differences. Furthermore, there is also the strong consensus that for developing countries to comprehend their growth potential, infrastructure is vital. The gap between current spending and necessary investment ranges from approximately $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion a year in developing countries. Moreover, these institutions used to prioritize this from their inception but lately there is a shift in attention to include social programs, climate change, poverty reduction and other issues that fall under ‘development’ (Wang 115). Another question that arises is why create new banks when the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB), a subsection of the World Bank, purpose is to provide funding for Asian infrastructural and developmental projects. However, a problem exists as Asia has a massive infrastructure funding gap the ADB has pegged at approximately “$8 trillion between 2010 and 2020” (S.R; Subacchi) and “$22.6 trillion by 2030” (Shepard). Therefore, these existing institutions cannot fulfil these demands as there is a capital base of just over $160 billion and $223 billion at the ADB and World Bank respectively (Shepard). Another issue presents itself as ADB is dominated by Japan, a U.S ally, even though China is the largest economy in Asia. Therefore, like the World Bank, it has the perception that it carries out Washington’s priorities. With so many grievances one can see why China chose to establish these banks, in addition to 66 being, “driven by the national interests of the emerging economies” (Wang 114). There are similarities to the AIIB and the World Bank where they seek to safeguard, “global financial stability, foster growth in the developing world and actively promote the national interests and world views of their most powerful members” (Liao 1). The probability that this is the reason for why scepticism is high, due to their apparent substitutability in replacing the current institutions. Many have called these institutions the Asian financial counterparts to those of the U.S dominated international system. Yet, a difference lies in the AIIB execution. Western aid tends to be provisionally based on the spread of ideology and their respective frameworks. However, China has chosen to remain removed from the domestic affairs of partner countries. Additionally, the bank has a regional nature allowing Asian nations to have a predominant voice and position. China will, understandably, remain its largest stakeholder and 70% of capital must originate from within Asia. China will retain veto power over all major decisions but will also need a 75% approval rate to pass (Liao 4). Therefore, other nations can have a greater voice, unlike in the IMF and World Bank. One can see that the AIIB is, “returning to bank fundamentals of judging a borrower based on pure economic considerations” as everyone is welcome to join (Liao 5). It does not give preference to liberal nations or political sides as the bank has vowed that the worth of a developmental project should not be influenced by political agendas (Liao 5).

What does this mean for the BRI? China is the head of an Asian bank that strongly resembles that of the U.S established system. Under the guise of the BRI, China has made, “infrastructural development a priority of overseas investments” manifested into, “construction of power plants, railways, highways, ports and airports in Asia, Africa and Latin America” (Wang 114). Hence, as the controlling nation, China has the authority to direct some of these institutions’ financial resources to chosen development projects. In June 2016, the AIIB and NDB approved the bank’s first four projects, all of which were along the BRI routes.

Concerns As mentioned, the BRI is the most ambitious foreign policy move in history. Through their marketing efforts it seems as though the impacts will be beneficial. Realistically, to developing nations they are because a solution to a lack of infrastructure and the inability to obtain investment financing, is being presented. Apart from the concerns regarding the U.S, there are others that arise in conjunction with the initiative. Firstly, it lacks, “a detailed coordination mechanism” (Huang 320). Without the establishment of a concrete implementation plan, difficulties will arise in guaranteeing equal, “standards of 67 procedure, efficiency and safety across all countries along the cross border high speed railroads” (Huang 320). The same issue applies to the five priority areas of the initiative. Moreover, problems of transparency and classification arise. It is difficult to classify what exactly constitutes a BRI project because while many have the idea of infrastructure, there have also been unrelated events such as art exhibitions (Hillman 3). Subsequently, transparency becomes an issue due to a lack of information particularly in the earliest stages of the projects. Therefore, how does one evaluate the viability of a project that cannot be found. Another concern is the clash of political ideals from country to country. All involved in the BRI, entertain a very diverse mix of, “political regimes and economic systems” (Huang 320). The Chinese have claimed that they are continuing to hold steadfast to their practice of noninterference in others’ domestic affairs (Huang 320). But seeing as one of the priority areas is people to people exchange, there is a question of if they will be able to remain exclusive, as it is, “difficult to run a project in a foreign country given different cultures, legal systems and policies” (Huang 321). Within the realm of politics, there is also the concern of a lack of political trust between China and several the BRI countries; hence the reason for bilateral deals but with a multilateral approach. China has a willingness to partner with any government regardless of their respective affinities. Case in point, Syria or Yemen, who constantly have active conflicts (Hillman 6). However, this willingness can present a hindrance to the initiative’s goals. For instance, this is the case with India. A part of the BRI route is the development of the China-Pakistan economic corridor and poses a major obstacle to India’s involvement due to the ongoing militia conflict between India and Pakistan. Additionally, within the sphere of partnering countries there is the issue of competition or favouritism. Within the Reconnecting Asia Database, 89% of the firms are Chinese companies, 7.6% are local and 3.4% are foreign companies (Hillman 3). Since it is a Chinese centric effort, despite being open, Chinese companies are winning more contracts for Chinese funded projects. Resentment can occur as a result in the coming years when projects are too dependent on Chinese labour in favour of local labour supply. Returning to the issue of political conflict, security risks also become an issue to Chinese companies and personnel depending on the place of operation, such as the case with Pakistan (Hillman 9). But this is a double-edged sword because if projects outright fail and disappoint due to this dilemma or for any other reason, then China stands to suffer reputational damage (Hillman 8). As previously mentioned, one of the drivers of the BRI is China’s excess capacity. This may cause tensions between partners as many may think that the initiative is a ploy to open up respective markets to allow dumping of this excess capacity. The result will be the disruption of local 68 economies when businesses close, unemployment rates increase, and a downward pressure is placed on the international price of goods (Huang 315). Lastly, the most pressing concern of experts is the issue of credit. “Credit is a powerful incentive” (Hillman 5) and China is known for its success in locking in higher rates because it agrees to take risks that other lenders will not. A prime example of is Sri Lanka in 2017. China granted a $1.3 billion loan for a new port after traditional MDB’s declined (Hillman 5). Unable to repay interest, China agreed to take the Hambantota port on the country’s South coast on a 99-year lease as equity, (Hillman 5; Fullerton) after Sri Lanka accrued debts of over 6 billion to Chinese state companies. Loans to Sri Lanka now exceed $8 billion as lenders find it too tempting to refuse, fostering the development of a dependency syndrome. The financial burden that developing economies are assuming is considerable. Many recipients are relying on the assurance that high GDP growth will be sustained in order to repay their loans and are, “setting ambitious targets that leave no room for error or unexpected events” (Hillman 10). Many current assumptions are based on China’s spectacular growth rates but fail to understand that circumstances are not the same in their respective cases. Events, “within and outside China could lead to these loans failing to impact that broader global economy” as they were originally intended to (Hillman 10). Rather than helping write the next chapter in regional integration, a failing BRI could set the region back, harming economic growth (Hillman 10).

Conclusion Xi Jinping quoted a small part of the Dickens statement, but other parts are also quite applicable. “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness” (Freeman). These lines closely resemble the actions of the world’s largest and second largest economies of the U.S and China. An adaptation of an African proverb exists claiming that the, “wise build bridges, while the foolish build barriers” (Canva). This sentiment echoes some of the realities of today as China is rapidly and steadily choosing to build bridges, integrating the world on a deeper level through this initiative, whereas the U.S, is quite literally, attempting to build a barrier, signaling isolation, protectionism and parochialism. As such, there is no reason to believe that China will be unsuccessful. On the other hand, their success rate seems rather high. Turbulence will continue to occur in the global economy; the trade war is just one battle in the non-traditional war within the BRI framework. The U.S will fight to maintain its seat of structural power. However, this model with its structured framework, irrespective of the multiple existing concerns, represents a new era for future trading and investment as it is the, “world’s largest emerging platform for international business collaboration” (Freeman). 69

However, without globalization this collaborative roadmap would not have been possible, due to the interdependent, symbiotic relationship that exists to engender and increase solidarity toward deeper integration. The concerns outlined above are but one example that illustrates the notion of ‘two steps forward and one step back’. Progress is always a feat to be celebrated, but it can be easily overshadowed by ignorance bred by conflict and strife. Hence, the occurrence of varying engagement and disengagement levels within society, cultures and politics for instance, on national and international platforms. However, one must consider whether engagement is always inherently good and what kind of engagement is needed. Being involved does not ensure productivity or progress because engaging with a lack of knowledge and tolerance can incite aggression and violence that replaces civic reflection and discussion. This paper took an economical perspective to illustrate that economies are one of the supportive, fundamental pillars responsible for a nation’s flourishment. This initiative has the potential for massive change on a level of restructuring. Being the two largest economies, harmony is imperative. However, change is a constant that many are rationally terrified of. One could postulate that perhaps it is the fear of status change from a developed led era to one that is developing. Perhaps it is a change of political ideals or values, or the risk of cultural erasure. With no definitive answers to these musings, the focus is placed on the leaders, yet time and time again those in power choose to squabble amongst competing interests and views of the best way to progress. A radical adjustment of thinking is needed to ensure the understanding that no society, culture, nation or lifestyle is perfect. China is not better than the U.S and vice versa, but each has noteworthy achievements that should be praised and shared. Judgement of the present should not be based on mistakes of the past as this only breeds a competitive mindset and attitude of division. An awakening is needed to enlighten the masses that competition is unnecessary accompanied by a revaluation to assess what is important and what is worth fighting for. When presented with a differing perspective, for some the instinct is to reject, not understand. The purpose of this theme ‘state, society and religion’ is to abolish the former and welcome the latter. They are simplistic words but rife with impact and meaning. They differ in representation and provisions but are similar in outcomes. This theme symbolizes a test of our abilities to think objectively from multiple angles toward the goal of attaining a holistic perspective. Only then will the promotion of acceptance, tolerance, understanding, respect and compassion with a collaborative rejection of anti- harmonic notions becomes the norm.

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Works Cited “All Roads Lead to China: The Belt and Road Initiative, Explained.” PBS, Public Broadcasting Service, www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/all-roads-lead-to-china-the-belt-androad- initiative-explained/. Bello, Walden. “China's Offering a World Bank Alternative - and U.S. Allies Are Signing Up - FPIF.” Foreign Policy In Focus, 23 Apr. 2015, www.fpif.org/chinas-offering-a-world- bankalternative-and-u-s-allies-are-signing-up/. Belt and Road Initiative, https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/belt-and-road/. “Belt and Road Initiative.” South China Morning Post, 22 Feb. 2019, www.scmp.com/week- asia/explained/article/2187162/explained-belt-and-road-initiative. “Belt and Road: China Showcases Initiative to World Leaders.” BBC News, BBC, 25 Apr. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/business-48047877. Boehm, Eric. “Trump's Trade War Continues To Crush Soybean Farmers.” Reason.com, Reason, 5 July 2019, www.reason.com/2019/07/05/trumps-trade-war-continues-to-crush- soybeanfarmers/. Cai, Peter. Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative. 22 March, 2017, www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-initiative. “China Makes Up US Trade War Deficit by Buying from ASEAN, Belt and Road Countries.” China Briefing News, 3 Sept. 2019, www.china-briefing.com/news/chinamakes-us- trade-war-trade-deficit-buying-asean-belt-road-countries/. Fasslabend, Werner. “The Silk Road: A political marketing concept for world dominance.” European View, vol. 14, no. 2, 2015, p. 293-302. Freeman, Chas W. “The Geoeconomic Implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative.” Middle East Policy Council, www.mepc.org/speeches/geoeconomic-implications-chinas-beltand-road- initiative. Fullerton, Jamie. “China's President Calls for More Countries to Join Belt and Road Initiative.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media Group, 27 April, 2019, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/04/27/chinas-president-calls-countries-join-beltroad- initiative/. Hermesauto. “China Has Good Reasons to Join Pacific Trade Pact, but Obstacles Remain.” The Straits Times, 10 April, 2019, www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-has-goodreasons-to- join-pacific-trade-pact-but-obstacles-remain. Hillman, Jonathan. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2018. 71

Huang, Yiping. “Understanding China's Belt & Road initiative: motivation, framework and assessment.” China Economic Review, vol. 40, 2016, p. 314-321. Liao, Rebecca. “Out of the Bretton Woods: how the AIIB is different.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 27, 2015, p. 633-649. Morrison, Wayne M. “China's economic rise: history, trends, challenges, and implications for the United States.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. Natapoff, Sam. “China's Belt and Road Initiative Shows How China and the U.S. Are Swapping Roles in Global Trade.” Salon, 6 May, 2019, www.salon.com/2019/05/04/chinas-belt-and- road-initiative-shows-how-china-and-theu-s-are-swapping-roles-in-global-trade/. “Panama cuts ties with Taiwan in favour of China.” BBC News, 13 June, 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40256499. School, NUS Business. “Why China's 'New Silk Road' Is The Ultimate In Sophisticated Marketing Strategies.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 16 November, 2017, www.forbes.com/sites/nusbusinessschool/2017/11/16/why-chinas-new-silk-road-is-the- ultimate-in-sophisticated-marketing-strategies/. Shepard, Wade. “The Real Role Of The AIIB In China's New Silk Road.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 15 July 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/07/15/the- realrole-of-the-aiib-in-chinas-new-silk-road/#4e695da97472. Wang, Hongying. “New multilateral development banks: opportunities and challenges for global governance.” Global Policy, vol. 8, no.1, 2017, p. 113-118. “The CPTPP Trade Deal.” South China Morning Post, 19 February, 2019, www.scmp.com/week- asia/explained/article/2186475/explained-cptpp-trade-deal. “Trump's Trade War Puts ‘Belt and Road First.’” Council on Foreign Relations, 12 August, 2019, www.cfr.org/blog/trumps-trade-war-puts-belt-and-road-first. “What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?” Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp. “Xi Jinping Quotes Dickens in Defence of Trade to Woo the Crowds at Davos.” Australian Financial Review, 18 January, 2017, www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/xi-jinpingquotes- dickens-in-defence-of-trade-to-woo-the-crowds-at-davos-20170118-gttdi8. “Xi Jinping Says World Has Nothing to Fear from Awakening of 'Peaceful Lion'.” South China Morning Post, 29 March, 2014, www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1459168/xi-saysworld- has-nothing-fear-awakening-peaceful-lion.

III History, Society & Culture

DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020.6 75

John Mason National Self-Determination and the Failure of International Institutions to Uphold Human Rights in the Twentieth Century

The first half of the twentieth century saw enormous losses of life, not just in the fighting of the two World Wars, but through numerous atrocities in which nations sought, in some form or another, to erase certain groups from the population of their respective states. While is today perhaps the most prominent of these atrocities, many other nation-states throughout the world pursued policies of exclusion and ethnic cleansing. was likely referring to these sorts of actions when she wrote the following in The Origins of Totalitarianism:

The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human. (295)

Atrocities such as Turkey’s ethnic cleansing of Greek people in 1923, for example, demonstrate this assessment as true. Despite the horrendous nature of this event, the international community took no action, supporting and viewing the so-called “population exchanges” as legitimate. Turkey was hardly the only state to carry out policies which targeted ethnic minorities. France, for example, carried out similar actions against ethnic Germans after the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine from Germany in 1919, and the United States treated its minority populations as second-class citizens throughout the twentieth century, as the conditions for African-Americans under Jim Crow demonstrate. More than perhaps anything else, it was the policy of self-determination and the resulting formation of nation-states which legitimized state suppression and exclusion of minority national and ethnic groups. Ultimately, states have become the most important actors in the enforcement of human rights, leaving “stateless” populations unprotected. In addition to this, the organization of states along national lines created a system where the term “citizen” became synonymous with someone who is a member of the ruling or majority national (sometimes ethnic) group. This system of nation-state organization has essentially disengaged many minority groups from international recognition, while simultaneously subjecting these minority populations to the will of the majority and ruling nationalities of states. States and their institutions have long been responsible for maintaining and enforcing rules regarding human rights to their respective populations. The emergence of the League of Nations and the United Nations in the twentieth century only made this responsibility to protect human rights more prominent. It is perhaps ironic that institutions established in part to uphold human rights could be powerless to stop human rights abuses, but that has certainly been the case in many situations, such as the Turkish ethnic cleansing of their Greek population as they sought to create 76 a nationally homogenized nation-state. The international community fully accepted this violent expulsion of the Greeks from Turkey under the principle of self-determination and the desire for an international organization based on nation-states. The importance of states in international politics is vital to the enforcement of human rights, but the organization of nation-states along the principles of self-determination created dangerous potentials for the violation of human rights. Before self-determination became the guiding principle, it is important to recognize that the nation-state and nationalism emerged as particularly important during the Napoleonic Era. Throughout his reign, Napoleon restructured state borders based on rational and egalitarian principles – such as a common language – rather than monarchical claims to territory. As Lynn Hunt explains, “everywhere [Napoleon] went, he created new entities […] produced new opportunities, or provoked new animosities that would feed into national aspirations” (Hunt 182). This shift regarding the meaning and usage of state and national borders led to the growth of nationalist ideas, as people began to see themselves in terms of a national collective rather than as subjects to a monarch. Such shifts occurred not just in France, but in places such as Poland, Germany, and other places such as South America, where Simón Bolívar led independence movements using the language of nationalism (Hunt 182). In 1918, near the end of the First World War, United States President Woodrow Wilson argued that self-determination ought to be the guiding principle of state organization after the war (Weitz 180). Wilson’s faith in the power of self-determination for peace is clear from his famous “Fourteen Points” speech, where he argued that the principle was, in part, necessary for the world to “be made fit and safe to live in […] for every peace-loving nation” (Fried 318). Although the ‘great powers’ of Europe would not agree on everything Wilson put forth in his “Fourteen Points” speech, they generally agreed upon the ideas put forth about self-determination, which thereafter became foundational to the post-war world. In a speech given on April 6, 1918, Wilson placed the “principle of the free self-determination of nations” on the same level of importance as “the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty,” which he declared “all the modern world insists” (Fried 324). The phrase “self-determination” refers to the policy that states should be based upon the borders of national groups. In other words, it prescribes that national groups should be able to determine their borders and the rule of law within those borders. With a system like this in place throughout the world, revolutionary nationalist activity – such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand – would cease to occur, or at least, so Wilson argued. Self-determination proved to be incredibly dangerous for minority populations, however, as it promoted policies of homogenization. As Peter Gatrell notes in The Making of the Modern Refugee, “minorities accounted for one-quarter of the total population” of successor states to emerge from , and obviously, minority populations existed – and continue to exist – within states 77 everywhere else as well” (53). The presence of minorities in these new nation-states became quite precarious, as state officials could easily exclude minorities from the nation. Such actions would essentially exclude these groups from being state citizens and deprive them of the rights otherwise granted to citizens as such. Desires for a homogenous nation-state proved to be quite dangerous for many minority groups, yet the international community often viewed the expulsion of these groups as beneficial to international security. The so-called “population exchanges” of the Lausanne Treaty, which authorized the expulsion of Greeks from Turkey, represent one such case, as it was an ethnic cleansing meant to both “modernize” Turkey and prevent future conflict from Greek populations by forcing them to migrate out of the country (Weitz 186-8). The international community saw Turkey as a newly established nation-state, and they viewed this ethnic cleansing as a part of the process of national homogenization and prevention of future conflict. As George Curzon, the British foreign secretary at the time, stated, “the greater homogeneity of the population [will result in] the disappearance of the causes of ancient and deep-rooted conflicts” (Weitz 188). The international community’s encouragement of self-determination, then, contributed to these sorts of extreme actions, as it led to a denial of the rights to nationality and citizenship for minority populations like the Greeks in Turkey. The system of states based on the principle of self-determination was further flawed, however, as the international community of states applied the principle unequally. The principle of self- determination was vital in the establishment of the Baltic states, for example, and yet the Entente Powers prevented states like Germany and Italy from gaining territory based on that very same principle. The Treaty of Versailles explicitly forbade the Anschluss, for example, which would have united Germany and Austria on the basis that both populations considered themselves to be German (Treaty of Versailles 86). In addition to this, states like France and Great Britain held onto their colonial territories. The continued existence of these colonial territories, in particular, was antithetical to the supposed belief in self-determination, as imperial powers in Africa and elsewhere prevented those nations from determining their own borders and rule of law. Rosa Luxemburg argued as early as 1916 that these colonial empires’ claims to the right of self-determination were hypocritical when she stated in an ironic fashion, that “perhaps the Third French Republic, with its colonial possessions in four continents […] is the expression of the self-determination of the French Nation” (Davis 290). French representatives indeed insisted that France had “no minorities” on the basis that France had no treaties for minority protection (Zahra 137). It is obviously untrue that France had no minorities, especially when considering that France identified and expelled over 200,000 Germans from the region of Alsace-Lorraine after the First World War, as well as the fact that France maintained colonial rule in regions like Algeria until 1962 (Zahra 139). If France indeed had 78 no minorities, and its citizens believed such a thing to be accurate, then perhaps cases such as the – which exposed anti-Semitism in France for all the world to see - would not have occurred. In actuality, France provides an excellent case for why refusing to recognize minority groups can be harmful, as they frequently denied rights to those groups that they claimed did not exist. In the case of France, then, officials used the language of self-determination and homogenization to suppress the actual existence of minority groups. In all cases, this has allowed for what Hannah Arendt describes as “denationalization,” in which minority populations lose nationally guaranteed rights because the state no longer considers them to be a part of the nation (Arendt 268). In general, it did not matter how one viewed oneself, what ultimately mattered was whether or not the state considered one to be a part of the nation. In the case of Alsace-Lorraine, French officials did not consider ethnic German populations to be truly French, regardless of how they viewed themselves, and this decision by the state could lead to the loss of rights and potentially forced migration. In the case of French Algeria, refusal to submit to colonial rule and accept oneself as French rather than Algerian could bring about violent repercussions. Whether or not either population was “objectively French” (if there is such a thing) did not play a role in how France treated these populations. France’s own actions to rid themselves of other minorities in these sorts of ways demonstrates that French authorities recognized and proclaimed differences in nationality in Alsace-Lorraine and Algeria, at the very least. Systems of classification, whether in France or elsewhere, tended to ignore things like mixed marriages, and instead based nationalities on surface- level and often racist distinctions. In Alsace-Lorraine, France put these distinctions in place in part “to protect French racial purity,” despite French and German populations having lived and copulated with each other in that region for centuries (Zahra 145). The rhetoric here is similar – while not quite as extreme – as that which used in , wherein he proclaimed that the creation of a “folkish state conception,” essentially a populist German nation-state, would rely on the “elimination” of the perceived Jewish state (453). It is perhaps not too surprising, then, that the racist system of classification, exclusion, and expulsion in France is, of course, similar to how Nazi Germany would come to classify and exclude their Jewish populations, eventually leading to the Holocaust. Moreover, the Nazis and Italian fascists came to stress the double-standards of states like France towards the principle of self-determination, as Hitler and Mussolini used it to justify aggressive expansion. The Nazi Party argued for the right of self-determination as far back as 1920, as the program of the Nazi Party stated the aim for “the union of all Germans, on the basis of the right of self-determination, to form a Great Germany” as the very first of 25 points of their platform (Haynes 109). The placement of this at the very beginning of the program demonstrates 79 both how popular of a position the Nazis expected this to be as well as how important this issue was to the extremist group. Hitler demonstrated the continued importance of this concept throughout his dictatorship, as shown in a speech from February 20, 1938 where he claimed the unfairness of the Entente’s application of the principle:

For the well-known inventors of the right of self-determination, […] it meant nothing at all that through the Peace ‘Diktats’ the wishes of 6½ million human beings were throttled and that these millions were compelled to accept this rape of their right of self-determination and to suffer this unnatural separation from the great common motherland. (Haynes 1429)

Less than a month after this speech came the German annexation of Austria, the Anschluss. Less than a year later was the Night of Broken Glass, , where Nazis attacked and destroyed their property throughout Germany and Austria. Kristallnacht and the Holocaust were, in part, expressions of the Nazi ideology that race was the essential factor for what constituted the German nation, and that Jews were not only separate from this nation, they were an active danger to it. In all of these situations, minority populations did not receive the protection of the international community, and this problem would continue even after the end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations. The fates of stateless or displaced populations have, for example, found themselves in precarious and dangerous situations both because the states they exist in often have no interest in protecting their rights, viewing them as a sort of outside entity, and because no state exists to offer them protection under international law. Referring once again to Arendt’s quote that “the world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human,” the loss or nonexistence of statehood for a group of people often portended danger for that group (Arendt 295). The creation of danger as a result of losing state representation was certainly the case in 1946-1947 when many Eastern and Central European states forced their German populations to migrate out of their countries and into Germany. At the end of World War II, the Allied powers (specifically Great Britain, the USSR, the USA, and France) occupied Germany, and states throughout Europe viewed Germans with intense scrutiny, leading to their expulsion into occupied Germany. This combination of factors at the end of World War II left many Germans as a displaced, nearly stateless group, leaving them with no one to advocate for them on an international level. Although many states viewed this sort of treatment as justified, the United Nations’ 1948 Declaration of Human Rights would describe these so-called “population transfers” as a violation of human rights. Article 9, for example, states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile,” while articles 17 and 25 state the right to own property and the right to an adequate standard of living (6-7). These articles, passed only one year after these “population transfers” of German peoples took place, demonstrate that the international community should likely have viewed these actions as human rights violations. Instead, the international community 80 viewed German populations explicitly in terms of their nationality. Additionally, because they also recognized the German nation as the perpetrators of World War II and the Holocaust, the international community saw these “population transfers” as a sort of justified retribution. Knowledge of Nazi war crimes and the Allied occupation of Germany after the war put German people in the position where there was no state willing to stand up for their human rights at this time, even retroactively, through the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Minority populations elsewhere have also found themselves at risk because of their lack of state representation. The National Negro Congress (NNC), for example, protested the inhumane treatment and oppression of African-Americans in the United States and presented their case to the UN in June of 1946. This case was ultimately unsuccessful, in part because UN officials argued that they “had little, if any, authority to receive petitions from non-governmental organizations” (Anderson 546). In other words, because the NNC was not a state, and because a state did not present their petition, the UN could not proceed with any sort of action. Five years later, the Civil Rights Congress argued that the United States government was responsible not only for violating the civil rights of African-Americans but for the genocide of African-Americans in the 1951 book We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People. This book, which never received the backing of the United States, was also not accepted by the United Nations, despite accusations of genocide based upon the UN Conventions on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and quotes from sitting United States politicians who sought the creation of “concentration camps” and deportations of “disloyal minorities” (Patterson 237). In order to bring their case to the UN, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sought the aid of the Soviet Union, thereby gaining representation through a state. This situation demonstrates that simply being human was not enough for the international community to uphold human rights. Because the international community is composed of states, the United Nations requires state representation for cases involving human rights. While the UN has this organizational structure because member states wanted it that way – in part to prevent other global conflicts like the two World Wars – this no doubt has harmed many minority populations throughout the world, as the previous examples have demonstrated. A system of self-determination and nation-states is foolish in part because such a system is impossible to ever fully put into place. There is no genuinely homogenous population, and no population fits into perfect borders which only include that one population. These systems have effectively created artificial borders and distinctions between people that determine what rights belong to who rather than a system which the United Nations and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights claims to represent: a universal system and standard by which the human rights of 81 all people are respected, regardless of who they are or where they live. Hannah Arendt’s conclusion that “[t]he world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human” was largely based on this idea that states were the only entities capable of enforcing human rights (295). The principle of self-determination created a system by which the international community justified the exclusion and suppression of ethnic minorities. By the time the Holocaust had started, other nations throughout the world, like Turkey, France, and the United States, had already normalized the processes of exclusion, classification, and denationalization which would come to define much of how the Nazis had treated the Jews. The nation-state system, built upon the principles of self- determination, created significant potentials for disaster among minority, stateless, and displaced populations while simultaneously making it difficult for them to have their human rights respected on an international level.

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Works Cited Anderson, Carol. “Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations: From Hope to Disillusion: African Americans, the United Nations, and the Struggle for Human Rights, 1944- 1947.” Diplomatic History, vol. 20, no. 4, 1996, pp. 531-563. Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt, 1951. Davis, Horace B., editor. The National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg. Monthly Review Press, 1976. Fried, Albert, editor. A Day of Dedication: The Essential Writings & Speeches of Woodrow Wilson. The Easton Press, 1965. Gatrell, Peter. The Making of the Modern Refugee. Oxford University Press, 2013. Haynes, Norman H., editor. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler April 1922-August 1939. Howard Fertig, 1969. Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Ralph Manheim, translator. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999. Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: A History. W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. Patterson, William L., editor. We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People. Civil Rights Congress, 1951. Treaty of Versailles. June 28, 1919. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 25+ Human Rights Documents. Columbia University Press, 2005. Weitz, Eric D. A World Divided: The Global Struggle for Human Rights in the Age of Nation-States. Princeton University Press, 2019. Zahra, Tara. “The ‘Minority Problem’ and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands.” Contemporary European History, vol. 17, no. 2, May 2008, pp. 137-165.

DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020.7 83

Lorraine Rumson If You’re Into That, I Guess: Refiguring Male Patients in the Study of Hysterical Vibrators

It has recently become a piece of pop cultural knowledge, codified in texts like the 2011 film Hysteria, that the modern vibrator has its origins in Victorian doctor’s offices, where it was used to treat the eponymous ailment. “Hysteria” has its linguistic origin in the Latin word for uterus, and has long been used as a catch-all term for emotional, psychological, or psychosexual illnesses in women. In The Technology of Orgasm, Rachel Maines introduces hysteria by calling it “a disease […] that from at least the fourth century B.C. until the American Psychiatric Association dropped the term in 1952 […] displayed a symptomatology consistent with the normal functioning of female sexuality” (Maines 2). Although the exact nature of a hysteria diagnosis has varied across time and place, its association with women, and specifically with women who suffered psychological or social distress from some sort of inappropriate sexual experiences, has become the basis of a significant cultural narrative about how sexuality has been treated by medicine, history, and medical history. This cultural storytelling laminates the treatment of late-nineteenth-century hysteria with contemporary views of the late Victorian period and its treatment of women (the Victorian hysteric of the vibrator narrative is invariably a woman). However, despite both the uterine origins of hysteria, and the long-standing stereotype of Victorians as being particularly anti-woman, the hysteria diagnosis of the late nineteenth century was not confined to people with uteruses. The diagnosis – and subsequent treatment – of hysteria in men was also a matter of medical concern in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As such, the historical study of the hysterical vibrator remains incomplete if the narrative of the vibrator remains tied only to the narrative of the hysterical women. Historically, male symptomologies similar to hysteria, when they were categorized as medical problems, were assigned terminology such as “hypochondriasis” or “nervous illness” – or in the twentieth century, Damon Silvers posits, diagnosed as borderline personality disorder or immature personality disorder (Silvers 113, 115). This split in terminology between the “hysteric” and the “hypochondriac” has allowed hysteria to remain, in the popular consciousness, a woman’s disease. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, hysteria was not understood as exclusively female in the medical profession. Sigmund Freud, easily the most famous scholar of hysteria, described research that was, in the 1880s, being done on male hysterics (Freud 11-2, in Silvers 114). By the 1910s, this had trickled into the popular consciousness as well, and the 1913 edition of the People’s Home Library, a popular book of home medicine, makes no mention of gender in its brief blurb on the treatment of hysteria (Barnum 19). 84

Nonetheless, the study of hysteria in the twenty-first century has continued to examine hysteria in the context of its traditional role: an all-purpose feminine diagnosis, or pathologization of the female body. Although contemporary studies are critical of this diagnosis, they reaffirm hysteria’s inherent femininity by continuing to position the discussion in the context of women’s history. Even when hysteria is used as a male diagnosis in the twentieth century, it is in the context of hysterical men’s pathological femininity: Silvers quotes twentieth-century doctors who claimed that “a male hysterical personality would most likely be a passive homosexual, and [...] appear [...] very feminine” (Chodoff and Lyons, in Silvers 114). Although scholars now, of course, criticize the view of women that calls functioning female sexuality “hysteria,” the framework by which they criticize it continues to undermine the history of male hysteria patients, and the way in which they may have experienced the treatments being developed for hysteria in the 1880s through 1910s. Because of the persistent femininity of the hysteria diagnosis, when the vibrator is prescribed as the cure for hysteria, it is likewise gendered female. The purpose of the vibrator in this narrative is not only to induce orgasm under medically sanctioned circumstances, but specifically to induce female orgasm. What is the purpose of a vibrator? To produce orgasms. What is the purpose of a medical vibrator? To medically organize the production of orgasms. Maines calls this a response to “the failure of androcentrically defined sexuality to produce orgasm regularly in most women” (Maines 3). As she claims, androcentric sex (that is, sex in the sense of penetration of a vagina with a penis, repeated until the point of orgasm for the owner of the penis) is not consistently sexually satisfying to the owners of the vaginas. Vibrators for women, therefore, operate outside the androcentric paradigm: no male orgasm is involved, and (depending on the model of vibrator) the stimulation is typically focused on the clitoris, which is a more reliable source of orgasms for women. As Maines illustrates, in spite of the success of the vibrator, the androcentric definition of sex is intensely culturally ingrained for women, affecting such elements of their lives as the presumption that they should masturbate penetratively (58) and the persistent advice that it is worthwhile for them to fake orgasms (119). If the model of sex in which a penis penetrates a vagina until the point of male orgasm is intensely ingrained for women, it is insurmountably so for men. Maines’s text, and others like it that point out the fallibility of this model for consistently satisfying female sexuality (Tavris & Sadd, for example) still do not go so far as to address the limits of the model in satisfying male sexuality. Indeed, the underlying assumption of Maines’s insistence on the centrality of this model is that it is so central because it is how men experience sexual pleasure, and men hold the power to dictate how sexual pleasure should be experienced. Few would disagree that human sexual response is a complex and variable matter, and thus that any generalizations about sexual experience will by nature be limited, normative, and not 85 necessarily the experience of any given individual. It is, therefore, unlikely that Maines, Travis, or Sadd would go so far as to insist, when questioned, that androcentric sex is the only way that all men experience sexual pleasure. However, all of them present it as a normative view on which other arguments are based, and thus enforce the notion that this model of male pleasure is an acceptable generalization. While acknowledging that any discussion of sexual experience will involve exceptions, it is important not to rely so strongly on normative claims, on the basis of their normativity, as to neglect the evidence that a significant number of people experiencing sexuality differently. It is for this reason that I call into question the immutability of the androcentric model in the sexual experiences of men living in the age of the hysterical vibrator. If it is agreed that the vibrator offered a meaningful supplement to female sexual experience, why should the same claim not be made about men? In short, I posit, it is a meaningful piece of information, not a bizarre side-note, that the medical hysterical vibrator was used on male as well as female patients. The use of the medical vibrator on men is rarely discussed, yet, in exploration of primary source documents, it is illustrated. As an example of a male-friendly genital-stimulating vibrator, I offer the Chattanooga vibrator, a device Maines does not discuss, but does include an illustration of.

Fig. 1. Vibrator Instrument Company, The Chattanooga Vibrator, 3, 26, in Maines, 99.

The specifics of the Chattanooga vibrator are detailed in M. L. H. Arnold Snow’s Mechanical Vibration and its Therapeutic Application, published 1904. The Chattanooga vibrator, which Maines calls “the Cadillac of vibrators” (15), is equipped with a range of attachments for therapeutic application to various body parts: “a hard rubber rectal, a throat attachment, a hard rubber ball for spinal work, a soft rubber brush, or multiple point vibratode, and a rubber cup” (Snow 33). While it is, of course, possible that Snow uses “abdominal” to euphemistically refer to vaginal stimulation, it is worth noting that there is nothing explicitly present either in the description of the vibrator’s 86 technical elements on page 33, or the instructions for usage on page 62, to suggest that this vibrator is intended for stimulation of the vulva or vagina. By contrast, its function as stimulating the rectum is listed first, and illustrated by the Vibrator Instrument Company. Maines presents without comment the image of the Chattanooga vibrator being used to penetrate a male patient. Neglecting the opportunity to comment on the disruption of androcentric sexual experience, the illustration (fig. 1) is presented only with the caption “The Chattanooga Vibrator in use on a male patient, about 1904.” A normative view of heterosexual sexual experience would most likely discount the function of sexual pleasure in this scene, and ironically play the same card as the Victorian doctors who claimed that the vibrator could not possibly be causing women sexual pleasure if it didn’t penetrate them. In both situations, to paraphrase Degler, a view of the sexual experience that “ought to be” (that is, what ought to promote maximum procreative heterosexual intercourse) overshadows the sexual experience that manifestly “was” (that is, that sexual response is generated through a variety of erogenous zones including but not limited to the clitoris, penis, interior vagina, and anus). The variant on this heteronormative narrative would be to suggest that hysterical men of the sort illustrated underwent this procedure so as to carry out, in a socially sanctioned way, homosexual experiences. The mid-twentieth-century specter of the gay male hysteric is resurrected. And while that the majority of late Victorian doctors were male, and thus a man undergoing a medical procedure would likely be doing it under the observation of another man, this alone is not cause for the assumption of homosexuality, the element that causes this image particularly to resonate with homosexuality is undoubtedly penetration. This is not to discount the probability that some men treated for hysteria were gay. In fact, they may indeed have been disproportionally represented, not only on the basis of homosexual behavior constituting hysteric symptomology, but also on account of the societal stress associated with male homosexuality in Victorian England. However, this does not by necessity indicate that hysteria treatment was experienced by all (or most, or many) men as a particularly homosexual act. It is, of course, difficult to determine how hysteria treatment was experienced, given our reliance on medical reports and other self-censored forms of documentation. However, in the same way that a normative view of clitoral stimulation protected it from being seen as illicit sexual activity, might a normative view of male anal penetration also similarly be viewed as something that normatively could not cause sexual pleasure and thus was not worth worrying about? Anal intercourse was indeed part of the topos of Victorian gay male experience and the way in which it was policed by concerned sexologists (for example, Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s encyclopedic study of sexual abnormality). Relatively queer pornography such as The Pearl’s serial story Lady Pokingham, which features strap-on dildos during lesbian sex scenes (Issue 6) as well as the rare material of gay 87 male sex (which does include anal penetration; Issue 11), includes no scenes in which women penetrate men, and male anal penetration is not fashioned as an element of sexual experience outside of homosexual experience. If these texts are indicative, the association of male anal penetration with homosexuality was in fact stronger than it is today. However, what it means to be associated with homosexuality today is not the same as what it meant at the turn of the twentieth century. Early-twentieth-century male homosexuality was figured as an intense psychological disruption, simultaneously congenital and prospectively criminal (Krafft- Ebing 364). An accusation of homosexuality carried significantly more weight, and thus, conversely, either giving it or incorporating it into one’s self-identification was to be taken seriously. Krafft-Ebing’s work on gay men suggests that the prevailing desire identified by doctors as “homosexual” involves desire for “fervent embraces” (Krafft-Ebing 367), mutual masturbation, and oral sex with men (368), while anal sex, an “abnormality” of its own regardless of who was involved, was present but less emphasized. Regardless of the degree to which anal penetration was taboo particularly among men who were not identified as “homosexuals,” it undeniably falls squarely outside the androcentric paradigm that Maines outlines. A key element of the androcentric model is the penis as the ultimate site of sexual pleasure: to have a penis and not use it, therefore, constitutes a total failure to adhere to the model. While the use of a penetrative vibrator on a vagina (as was the case for the use of hysteria vibrators on women) mimics heterosexual androcentric sex, the use of a penetrative vibrator on a male rectum constitutes something entirely different. The fact that the sexual experience of male hysterics treated with vibrators has not yet been explored may be related to the pervasive discussion of the medical vibrator in the context of women’s history. The assertion that vibrators were in fact satisfying a healthy female sexual desire is an unsurprising reaction to the aggressive attempts by late nineteenth- and early twentieth- century doctors to disavow the possibility that hysteria treatment could be equivalent to other sexual experience for themselves or their female patients (Maines 4). The dissociation between medical theory and sexual experience has systematically affected women, to a greater extent than men, by categorizing common sexual experiences as medical problems, or practicing “what Foucault called the ‘hystericization of women’s bodies’” (Foucault 104, in Maines 7). While medicalization has affected male bodies, the discourse of male sexuality as inherently abnormal has never been either as pervasive or as genital-specific as it has been for women. However, now that the medical-sexual origins of vibrators in women’s health have entered into the mainstream consciousness, the world is ready for this narrative to be complicated by the inclusion of male hysteria patients. To my knowledge, there exists no personal testimony describing the effects (either erotic or non-erotic) of the Chattanooga vibrator from a patient’s perspective. However, M. L. H. Arnold 88

Snow’s book Mechanical Vibration and its Therapeutic Application does provide descriptions of its functionality.

Fig. 2. Maines 16. To quote at length, Snow describes the mechanical elements of the Chattanooga vibrator in the following way: It consists of a perpendicular1 bar mounted on a metal base at right angles to it. To the perpendicular bar is attached one end of a jointed arm supporting a weight, the other arm being supported by a short perpendicular bar to the base. On the upper part of the long perpendicular bar is a rigid jointed arm supporting a motor, to one side of which is attached the metal handle bar with its perpendicular attachment, on the end of which are screwed the vibratodes. The rigidity of the arm is a particular feature of this apparatus. It can be operated by means of the direct or alternating electric current. By means of two adjusting devices the vibratodes as a whole can be swung backwards and forwards, or from side to side. The motor is connected by insulated cords to a plug screwed into an incandescent lamp socket. The holder of the vibratode has a short shaft clamped by a nut on each side, which can be shifted in such a manner as to lengthen or shorten the stroke. The motion of the vibratode itself is to and fro in one plane. (Snow 33) Stationary and upright, the Chattanooga vibrator bears little resemblance to a contemporary hand- held vibrator. The large box attached to the lower arm, illustrated in fig. 2, is a weight, the sole purpose of which seems to be to keep the vibrator’s center of gravity low enough that it is stable, as it would otherwise tip forward from the weight of the engine. The vibratode (vibrating element meant for application to the patient) may be identified as the small vertical attachments at the end of the upper arm – an almost comically small attachment compared to the size of the apparatus.

1 In this passage, “perpendicular” invariably means “perpendicular to the ground” – that is, vertical 89

Fig. 3. The Chattanooga vibrator vibratode (detail). Snow 34.

The size of the Chattanooga vibrator allowed it to be positioned with great versatility, which contributed to both its functionality on various parts of the body, and its ability to be used “while he [the patient] is sitting or standing, if desired” (Snow 35). The precise nature of the vibratode’s movement, which Snow speaks of as the “stroke” “to and from in one plane” (30) seems to be like a pendulum: that is, a short u-shaped movement, the “plane” of which is perpendicular to the handlebar. While a pendular movement of variable size (the “short shaft clamped by a nut on each side [...] can be shifted in such a manner as to lengthen or shorten the stroke” (Snow 33)) seems reasonable for massage to the back, it does not seem like the ideal motion for anal penetration, since the movement is u-shaped rather than either a “buzz” (as with a contemporary vibrator) or a straight “in and out” line. And, should there be any doubt from Fig. 1 as to whether it was in fact penetrative, Snow’s description on page 62 advises on the use of the rectal attachment for maximum comfort: The rectal attachment of the above machine [the Chattanooga vibrator] can be more easily tolerated when the attachment (having been lubricated) is set in motion before introduction, and removed while still in vibration, as the greatest vibrating arc then comes in contact with the external parts and gradually makes a way for itself as it is introduced; whereas, otherwise the maximum vibrating arc for a given speed acts more in the nature of a shock to that part of the bowel reached by the free or distal end of the attachment. (67) From this description, it is clear that the “attachment” should be “introduced” into the “bowel” and not merely used to stimulate the outer sphincter, yet it warns against the prospective discomfort that may be caused by the movement trajectory. Lacking the ability to evaluate the range of movement with a physical version of the Chattanooga vibrator, these descriptions of its functionality clearly illustrate that it was not comparable in ease (or, probably, pleasure) of use to a contemporary sex toy. That begs the question of why it was used at all – much less to have “called forth considerable favorable comment” (Snow 33) or warrant the moniker “Cadillac of vibrators” for anything other than its size (Maines 15). Bearing in mind the potential for discomfort in anal penetration (particularly in a period when, if Lady Pokingham is indicative, the lubricant of choice was cold cream), an anally penetrative device is not necessarily an obvious choice for an addition 90 to a doctor’s office. Granting also that, unlike the difference between clitoral and vaginal stimulation, anal stimulation is not necessarily the most efficient way to achieve orgasm, then what could possibly possess people to want to use it? The first option is, naturally, that there is something genuinely curative about mechanical anal penetration, apart from its contribution to sexual relief. If a medically educated reader informs me that this is the case, then we may leave the question here. However, I am doubtful of this possibility. Of course, it is also not impossible that the Chattanooga vibrator, rudimentary though it was, was still significantly more pleasurable to use than non-vibratory options such as fingers, or than no anal penetration at all. This seems to consistently be the case with clitoral vibrators, even rudimentary ones, hence their documented popularity with doctors for their efficiency. Similarly, the use of a vibrator of any sort may have sidestepped taboos against masturbation, as seems to have been the case with the use of vibrators on women. While it is hard to judge whether fear surrounding male masturbation was stronger or weaker than fear surrounding female masturbation, it was certainly more a topic of public debate, which could understandably lead to anxiety around the morality of seeking sexual release outside of a marriage. As with women’s vibrators, the presence of a doctor meant that the project of inducing orgasm was not masturbation, and that it was sanctioned by the authority of institutionalized medicine. However, in this context and for the sake of both sexes, it is important not to elide too closely the experiences of male and female patients of the Chattanooga vibrator, because this can lead to a temptation to see the entire process – from the diagnosis of hysteria to the penetration itself – as an exercise in emasculation for the male patient. Undoubtedly, the experience was not identical for all patients. Some patients probably did experience it as an emasculation, just as some female patients of the hysterical vibrator probably experienced it as a violation. However, just as some female patients probably experienced the hysterical vibrator as a source of pleasure, there is no reason to assume this was not also the case for male patients. How the medical process was felt is a question that can only be answered by the one feeling it. However, given the challenges inherent to the technology, the non-intuitive decision to use a rectal probe at all (compared to the long history of stimulating the vulva to relieve female hysteria), and the fact that men have not historically experienced the same type of dispossession of their bodies that would allow decisions to be made systematically on their behalf and without their consent (as has periodically been the case with women’s bodies) there is reason to anticipate that the hysterical vibrator was not experienced negatively by the broad collective of male patients. As always when historical details enter the realm of cultural storytelling, the details and experiences of turn-of-the-century hysterics are in the process of being distilled into a grand narrative. In this case, the narrative is that the late nineteenth century had become so immersed in anti-sex and male- 91 dominated perspectives that they were shocked and awed by facts about the female body that any woman could have told them. While this is an amusing story that fits comfortably with a teleological perspective on sexual progress (after all, we in the twenty-first century would never be so dismissive of women’s sexual experiences), its cultural prominence does nothing more than replace one set of broad assumptions about sexuality with another. Even as the hysterical vibrator enjoyed its greatest success, the experiences associated with its use cannot and should not be reduced to a single narrative of male chauvinism, nor to a fresh set of normative assumptions about sexual experience.

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Works Cited Anonymous. Lady Pokingham, or They All Do It. The Pearl, vol. 1-vol. 15, 1879-1880. Barnum, R. C. People’s Home Library. Imperial Publishing Co., 1913. Chodoff, P. and H. Lyons. “Hysteria, the Hysterical Personality, and ‘Hysterical’ Conversion.” American Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 114, 1958, pp. 734-740. Degler, Carl. “What Ought to Be and What Was: Women’s Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century.” The American Historical Review, vol. 79, no. 5, 1974, pp. 1467-1490. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality vol 1: An Introduction. Random House, 1978. Freud, Sigmund. An Autobiographical Study. W. W. Norton & Co., 1925. Krafft-Ebing, Richard. Psychopathia Sexualis. Trans. F. J. Rebman, Rebman Company, 1906. Maines, Rachel. The Technology of Orgasm: “Hysteria,” the Vibrator, and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. Silvers, Damon. “Male Hysteria: Imagining a Case Through the Lens of Contextual and Clinical Change.” Psychoanalytic Inquiry, vol. 37, no. 2, 2017, pp. 112-125. Snow, M. L. H. Arnold. Mechanical Vibration and its Therapeutic Application. The Scientific Authors’ Publishing Co, 1904. Tavris, Carol and Susan Sadd. The Redbook Report on Female Sexuality. Delacorte, 1977.

DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020.8 93

Besmir Shishko Besa: Grounded Honor in Altruism

Dynamic Oral Tradition The nature of oral tradition has its roots in the history of humans earlier than it is scientifically and historically known. Oral tradition preceded writing, containing historical, moral, and lawful traditions that occupy a special place within the minds of the people who carry them. Oral traditions are living documents of the past and the present, making the tradition a real and serious record (Vansina xi). This way of sharing and bonding has been the source of storytelling, education, and understanding of how to be a human for longer than it is absolutely known. Oral tradition has become a way to uniquely define the elements of what sets humans apart from the rest of the mammals. The method of oral tradition is so prominent of a human faculty of knowing, that even in the Age of Information within the 21st century, with all the devices and technologies that can tell stories more accurately and in a fundamentally direct way, oral tradition still remains to be a useful and viable tool for communication and education. Even within the modern ethnographic communities attempting to formulate the most effective and efficient methods for information and data exchange, oral tradition in the modes of lectures, open discussions, and gatherings has a high value (Lowie 598). Granted, in the environment of empirical formulation, hypotheses, and the extensive means to prove or disprove through careful recording and collecting, the oral tradition is adopted, but with cautious respect. It is impossible to ignore the mythological application that oral traditions have always carried with them, often containing the non-rational and earthly supra-natural ethos that imminently has led to goodwill and a desire for peaceful means. Another source states that Albania, which is just 28,748 square kilometers, has frequently struggled with national issues, including cooperating with neighboring countries, and this has had a profound impact on the functioning of the country as a whole (Berend 178-179).

Oral Torah Throughout human history, oral tradition has stood for the way that humans can make sense of meaning and their purpose on earth. Within all oral traditions, meaning stands as the foremost imperative point to gather; to derive a meaning out of the seemingly chaotic and ruthless world simply through sharing, through the interconnected truths found within the stories exchanged, and to come to a consensus about the ways in which humans must make amends with the evil in the world in order to derive some good. This gives incredible purpose to those who share and actively live the stories told through oral traditions. 94

Oral traditions have been the predominant means for cultures to pass aspects on the Assiniboine creation myth that single-handedly unfolded the beginnings of a hero-trickster who creates the earth, regulates the seasons, and creates man and horses simultaneously, or of the Hopi Spider- Woman as creating the burro, relating historical reconstructions through the culture’s particular values, synergistic production of subsistence and society, and give a course through techniques upon living life (Lowie 598-599). One of the most prominent examples among the major religions today is the ancient oral tradition of the Torah, where the roots of Biblical law were originally instructed through oral traditions. In early rabbinic Judaism, the Oral Torah was responsible for hashing out and giving interpretation to the Hebrew Bible (Appel para1), instructed within the family unit and was considered education in the most formal manner. Ethics and morals were the main concern for educated ancients in the Hebrew world, which served them well throughout many centuries. The Hebrew oral tradition served to instruct the religious laws and guide for prayer for families, while it served as a conglomerate of law, unique blend of logic, and philosophy for rabbis (Appel para1). This culminated as the philosophy of the Mitzvot, or mitzvah, which translates to English as a “commandment”, precepts given by God, with instruction and demonstration to one’s spiritual duty (Appel para1). The mitzvah is a system of philosophical, theological, and political tradition that defined the moral code within Judaism. Similar to the Code of Besa, the Mitzvot pertaining to Love and Brotherhood within the Torah, stipulates “We are commanded not to leave a condition that may cause harm, to construct our homes in ways that will prevent people from being harmed, and to help a person whose life is in danger” (Lev. 19:16). These commandments regarding the preservation of life are so important in Judaism that they override all of the ritual observances.

European Torah All of the rich elaboration through oral tradition within European Jewish communities culminated in the shtetl, a small town with a Jewish population found all throughout Central and Eastern Europe before the Holocaust (Chavel 1). The word shtetl is a Yiddish word meaning “town”, which over time became synonymous with the image and existence of a European Jewish town. These little towns for centuries were the source of living a mimetic religious life, one where a person could pour over the Talmud and derive purpose simply by participating in it. A shtetl was a place that one could hear and learn about the ways of life and was able to live by a strict moral and religious code. This way of living and all shtetl were completely destroyed, along with the oral manifestations of their spiritual, religious, and artistic existence. This meant that the dependence upon the Hebrew 95 oral tradition and the manifested truth and worth that came from simple participation was at an end (Chavel 1). The example of the Jewish people’s own oral tradition and the history of the destruction of it were merely to illustrate the intense relationship that humans have with their own oral traditions, and how they have served to build culture throughout the centuries prior and after written words. The power behind oral tradition is nothing short of remarkable, and demonstrates the many ways in which another culture, the Albanian culture, formed off of the oral tradition known as Besa, a code of honor, which still today serves as the highest ethical code in the country, could drive an entire nation to stand on its own head, against rational reactions of a tyrannical giant like the Nazi regime, and go against the demands to hand over a part of its people.

Albanian Culture The history of oral tradition leads to a greater understanding of the background and full immersion the Albanian people felt with their Besa. Before 1933, the year of the rise of Hitler, Albania was a small mountainous region that contained Balkan tradition among the scant population of slightly over 800,000 people. Of this small population, there were merely approximately two hundred Jewish dwellers. During the Holocaust, the estimated numbers of Jewish immigrants to Albania were between six hundred to eighteen hundred, with most hoping to end their immigrant journey to the sacred land of Israel; the Jewish sanctuary (Gershman para 1-5). After the German occupation in 1943, the Albanian nation refused the demands of turning over lists of Jewish immigrants and citizens. Not only did they refuse to give any support to the occupation and turn in its Jewish inhabitants over to be deported to concentration camps, but also various governmental agencies forged legal documentation and handed it to Jewish families so they could be camouflaged within Albanian citizenry (Gershman para 1-5).

Kanun’s Besa The Albanians were operating out of their own oral tradition, the code of honor grounded within the Besa. The Code of Honor that was the glue of Albanian culture led the Albanian people to feel compelled to provide protection and assistance, which was seen as a religious privilege and merit that governed many Albanians to a higher value of living, leading them to even fight over who would give the greatest help to its Jewish population (Gershman para 1-5). The oral tradition that shaped the moral codes of the Albanian people was a traditional account of customary law known as the Code created by Leke Dukagjini. The origins of the customary law and moral codes that formed the Code are unknown, yet there are interesting similarities and practiced parts to the ancient Illyrian people, from whom the Albanian people descended. The Homeric epic is ripe within the 96 rhapsodic Albanian tradition of passing along their morals, with Homer’s native tongue being the same language that the Albanians speak (Griffin 18). With pride, the Albanian people claim to be the oldest living Balkans, and Durham’s studies seemed to confirm that she had, in fact, found a culture that was the “living representation of the past” (Tarifa 5). The moral laws and codes were passed down by word of mouth for centuries, never being written down, giving instruction on the ways of mimetic norms, mores, and injunctions. They were passed on through rhapsodic collective memory, reflecting the history of their people, giving permanence to the power of the Kanun (Tarifa 5). These codes of moral laws are known as the Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit, Kanuni i Malsisë, also known as the Code of the Highlands, with the word Kanun derived from its Greek origins simultaneously meaning “norm,” “rule,” “measure” (Tarifa 3). Along with Dukagjini’s Code of Honor, the Albanian people also claimed they followed the moral imperatives represented by Skanderbeg’s Kanuni i Skënderbeut, the Code of Skanderbeg, and in the south the Kanuni i Labërisë, the Code of Labëria, though these were never as strongly enforced as Dukagjini’s Code of Honor (Tarifa 4).

Historical Application of Kanun These moral codes of honor had already been put to the test six hundred years prior when the Ottoman Empire threatened the then divided principalities residing in the mountainous region of Albania. It was Skanderberg who united all of the different Albanian factions together in the face of the dangerous threats from the Ottoman invasion, with the help of one of his closest allies, Dukagjini. For a whole quarter of a century, these Christian crusaders resisted the territorial threat of the Ottoman Empire, which finally took over ten years after Skanderberg’s death. Yet, only then, the Ottoman Empire was able to exert no more than a small force upon the Albanian people, who seemingly resisted full invasion by the moral structures of their oral traditions. The effect has been described by Edith Durham, who stated, “the mountain tribesman has never been more than nominally conquered—and is still untamed. Empires pass over him and run off like water from a duck’s back” (Durham 453, as cited by Tarifa 4). In fact, even before the Turks, there were hardly any other dominating and invasive cultures that really ever bothered too much with the Albanian peoples. They held together like an iron formation, encircling its people with the conviction, validation, and insight on how important community and nation were to life. Dukagjini has been likened to an Albanian Moses, with proverbs and rites in hand, guiding the nation to remain together through customary law. He really was the one who did this more rigidly than others and customized the code while adding penalties to secure the sanction of wisdom within the moral codes (Tarifa 4). With the Kanun, the Albanian 97 people enriched their sense of moral duty through the Besa, which simultaneously means, “oath, faith, trust, protection, truce, word of honor” (Tarifa 8), creating a cohesive whole that recognized and defined the Albanian peoples' primary institution within society. The most important trait, perhaps the defining imperative that granted the Jewish immigrants’ safe haven within the Albanian social fabric, was that these codes elaborated upon the highest value-family honor- an inseparable concept of lineage honor and brotherly community, the highest value that was placed above personal liberty. This honor could be stretched and placed upon the extended family, a sort of Cosmo-Philosophical element of nationalism, yet with the intimate and traditional respect of family first (Tarifa 8). The Albanian people had adopted, welcomed, and accepted the Jewish communities that made a home within their borders long before the Holocaust, thus the extended family tradition of honor became one-and-the-same for all Jewish people that sought refuge with the Albanians.

Albanian Jews and the Immigrants The Besa has become the cornerstone of tolerance, trust, the binding support system, felt like a solemn oath among the Albanian people and to those who are less fortunate, Albanian or not. Albanians swore by giving the Besa, as opposed to other traditional forms of oath done in the name of gods. As was mentioned before, the real-life effect of this oral oath led the Albanians to prefer death over breaking oath, which played a large hand in the protection of the Jewish people. It can be surmised from this idea of death over dishonor that the Albanian people had religiously extended their oath out onto the Jewish people that sought refuge and resided peacefully in small Albanian pockets. The Jewish people were simply comrades, brothers, and defenders of the same family, thus the oath carried on through the greatest challenge any code of honor could go through; true resignation to death over dishonor.

Muslims and Jews in Albania The role of Muslims within the Albanian communities is unique. It directly condemns and opposes the Anti-Semitic stance of the majority of Muslim Arabs today. Much has been denied by the Muslim communities in modern Arabic regions, and of particular disdain is the code of honor that the Albanian Muslims held against the Nazis in WWII. This role of honor for the Jews is a polar opposite to the current state of racial affairs since some of the current political atmospheres within Palestine were derived from the colonization of the Arab world by the Nazis. German occupation and invasion are often considered strictly a European affair, yet the truth is that Jews were imprisoned and murdered on a much larger scale outside of Europe. It has been estimated that six 98 million Jews were slaughtered during WWII, but as new records surface, the numbers have been adding up. History has shown that since the seventeenth century, Muslims and Jews were splitting ways, and by the colonization of Europe into North Africa and Arabian ports, Jews had sought refuge within Europe, hoping to develop a peaceful Jewry beyond the Arabic world. Historians call this the end of the medieval ages and the dawn of the modern era for the Middle Eastern Jews (Afridi para14). For the first time, France gave Jews the option of citizenship, under the attitude of, “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,” (Afridi para15) demonstrating the first time that Jews were able to use the goodwill and graces of other nations, and the first movements into European territory. Muslims were not such a prominent feature within Europe until the Ottoman Empire swept Muslims further west and deep into European history. Under the threat of colonization and manipulation from European factors, the general stability that once resided between Muslims and Jews switched drastically and formed the anti-Semitic reactions of modern Muslims. It is to this point that Albanian Muslims were in direct confrontation with their own cultural systems. But by the adoption of the Albanian Besa, for which they too took part in, their moral codes overwhelmed the historical malady between the Muslims and Jews, and once again, Islam and Judaism were co- mingling under a brotherhood within a small mountainous region. Albanian Muslims gave assistance to the Jews within Albanian borders such as providing false identification and hid them in their homes, all under the influence of the Besa (Afridi para 30). The example of the Muslim people reintegrating their own religious affiliations with the Nazis was overwhelmed in the face of the Albanian tradition. Much can be said about the power, the impact, and the faith that can be produced by the face-to-face encounters of sharing traditions, especially in the form of purpose and meaning, social duty and obligation. The Balkan people were able to instill a magnificent relation with their moral justifications, and by swearing on the honor of family, all who were affected and came in physical contact of the seemingly mystical effects of oral epics and Homeric traditions, temporarily changed the lives of the European Muslims, reduced the anti-Semitic fabrics of Nazi influences, and defined all families and individuals who resided and sought sanctuary within Albania as a unified folk incapable of being separated from their oaths.

Holocaust Altruism The Nazi regime with the movement of the Holocaust ornamented by death camps and genocide required true acts of altruistic endeavor from those who stood against the pressure and threat of complete annihilation. It is difficult to put into a scope and gauge the level of fear and horror that was felt simultaneously by most of the world. The powerful torment of the German invasions and occupations left many innocent people to have to decide quickly how they would perform in the 99 face of death. Many nations were simply unprotected and under the lasting impression of their country’s underlying faiths, which may or may not result in compliance with the genocidal thoughts and ideas performed by Hitler. To understand the reaction of those who complied, one would simply have to look to Michel Foucault’s position in religion as the ultimate moral facet of an entire nation, and the psychology of human behavior studied by Zimbardo and Milgram to understand the basic tenets of obedience, compliance, and negative metamorphosis against seemingly obvious distinctions of right and wrong. By examining the various aspects of human behavior in the face of authority, altruism comes to be a fantastic feat, especially when it comes from an entire unified group willing to suspend survival for honor.

Similarities in Good and Evil Interestingly, the aspects that make altruism a tenet of human behavior are also similar to those that make true believers compliant in genocide. Both followers of horror and altruistic beings are not at all seeking self-interested endeavors. Both altruistic means and followers of a strong belief have beside them a unified faith governing their characters, personas, and particular manners. They both rely on selfless and sacrificial natures to perform the ultimate goal by the group. Altruistic individuals, such as the famous Albanian nun Mother Teresa, simply do not see themselves as individuals by nature of survival and one’s own. The adapted costs of altruism are for the benefit of another outside of one’s own personal sphere, without the expectation of reward or merit. What is difficult to separate are the selfless acts inherent in both obedience and altruism. Complete obedience to authority was of the utmost interest to Stanley Milgram, born in NYC, in 1933 to a family of Jewish immigrants and affected by his exposure to family members who survived and Nazi concentration camps, dedicated his life to studying the reasons behind complete compliance and obedience to an obviously demonic and evil standard of behavior. Milgram's test could be and frequently was, used as something of a litmus test to identify the psychological fundamentals of many of the most horrifying and heinous acts that occurred during World War II. According to Milgram, “the essence of obedience consists in the fact that a person comes to view himself as the instrument for carrying out another person's wishes, and he therefore no longer sees himself as responsible for his actions. Once this critical shift of viewpoint has occurred in the person, all of the essential features of obedience follow.” Thus, “the major problem for the subject is to recapture control of his own regnant processes once he has committed them to the purposes of the experimenter.” (Milgram 108). These experiments, though, require a bit more background. In the 1960s, Milgram conducted experiments to identify the causal nature of obeying authority. By administering fake electric shocks to one participant (Milgram’s actor) controlled by 100 another participant (blind and unknowing), the participants were coaxed on by a man in a white coat (symbolically representing authority). As the shocks reached dangerous levels, the white coat man continued to act unabated by the cries and pleadings of the shock victim. With the option to quit the experiment unknowingly at hand, none of Milgram’s participants stopped administering shocks, even at their own visual and apparent apprehension and fear (Slater et al para 4-8). In the end, Milgram was able to demonstrate that people have an unbelievable need to obey, which seems to defy the natural structure of empathy, caring, and altruistic endeavors (Blass 356). It is necessary to compare and interesting to see how communal and selfless both evil and good acts are. WWII demonstrated a rare look into the various forms of selfless acts, both within the arena of complete compliance to torture, destruction, and murder and within the arena of voluntary will toward the benefit of another. To understand the real performance of killing by millions of citizens willing to stay on the side of the winning team, it is important to state that the real and tragic events were not necessarily real to them. As far as the people involved understood, Hitler dressed up 80 million soldiers in costumes and had them perform in a heroic, bloody opera (Hoffer 67). The massive movement of change that was promoted by the Nazis was an action toward a future self, and the inception of the ideal moment was never in the present tense, rather, it was eluded to repeatedly, and required the battle line to be drawn between things that were and things that will be (Hoffer 69). For the millions of Nazi followers, this line and opera was an impressive and persuasive element of the necessity of their compliance. More than anything, Hitler’s people identified with him, and the people never felt alone when they were complying with the man who drove them forward. The community involvement meant they were all together and never individual, with the capacity of coercion into becoming a member of a compact party- the Communists (Hoffer 62). The identification with a brutal and malicious faction was simply natural to the human frailty of identification with the group. It comes automatically for those who are asked, “Who are you?” to respond that one is Christian, Communist, Muslim, Albanian, American, German, and so on. The self is not separated from this identification and is not separated from the group. Conversely, the austerity of a sacrificial nature of a saint exemplifies the freedom from self by behaving altruistically. There are those who are born saintly, who have the faculties of grace and regard without apprehending themselves. Sainthood is ripe when the presence of suffering demands their sacrifice. There is no better way to describe a saint’s sacrifice other than to say they live in flames with wise men next to them (Cioran 14). For altruistic behaviors, the saints go beyond philosophical matters and enter into an unadulterated form of consciousness. From this will power, saints hold non-rational morals that speak toward a universal existence of truth, value, and justification of life. Through the sacrifices 101 of those saints, altruistic means are employed to garner a rational spectrum of beliefs that also lead to selfless behaviors. From saints, cultures have gathered their morals, values, and ethics, and often are left to be compared to them for an eternity. This is just another interpretation of another facet of what drove the Albanians to incredible resilience. The power to protect their moral integrity is not so different or made less than a saint. It is no wonder, then, that Albania has produced a modern saint; Mother Teresa. Yet it is interesting to be aware of the demographic relation with those who acted in altruistic heroism was heterogeneous and contained different backgrounds, among a large number of other demographic elements. The Albanians had demonstrated an act of altruism that was being replicated, albeit in much smaller numbers, all over the affected regions that met evil at the hands of the Communists. Their altruism was to support their own people, including the Jewish extended family, meaning that they turned against the consensus of genocide regardless of their safety (Warneken and Tomasello 455). This elevated their moralistic spirit to a heroic level, and a rare demonstration made by the whole of the Albanian people. Conclusion The concept of Besa in the self-titled documentary is based upon faithfulness toward one's word in the form of loyalty or as an allegiance guarantee and furthermore, it is a powerful look at a historic example of basic human solidarity. Besa contains mores toward obligations to the family and a friend, the demand to have internal commitment, loyalty and solidarity when conducting oneself with others and secrecy in relation to outsiders. In this regard under German occupation, Albanians rescued and hid over 2000 Jews from Nazi persecution, motivated in part by the cultural institution of Besa that emphasizes aiding and protecting people in moments of need. According to , the Israeli museum that holds the world’s largest repository of documents and information related to the Holocaust, there is not a single known case of a Jew being turned over to Nazi authorities in Albania during its occupation. There is also a possibility that the Talmudic traditions held by the Jews themselves simply melded with the long-standing oral traditions that grabbed the Albanian spirit and manifested a brotherly concern for one another. The similarities between Besa and loving-kindness in Judaism are closely linked with compassion in the traditions of both nations. In Jewish teaching, compassion is among the highest of virtues, as its opposite, cruelty, is among the worst of vices. The repeated injunctions of the Law that the widow, the orphan and the stranger should be protected show how deeply the feeling of compassion was rooted in the hearts of the righteous in ancient Israel. The Talmudic sages Hillel and Rabbi Akiva indicate that the central commandment of the Torah emboldens individuals to treat each other as equals which requires first valuing oneself in order to be able to mirror that love onto others. Similarly, another significant commandment is to “not 102 stand idly by the blood of your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:16), which can be exhibited in many forms. Some Jewish sources have even emphasized the importance of self-sacrifice in regards to putting our needs second to another's, which was also similar with the case of Albanians sheltering Jews during WWII. Milgram’s conclusion that ordinary people, under the direction of an authority figure, would obey just about any order they were given, even to torture, has been seen as a phenomenon that’s been used to explain atrocities of the Holocaust. Over the last 50 years Milgram’s experiments have been thoroughly studied by many scholars. In the introduction of his 1963 paper, he invoked the Nazis within the first few paragraphs: “Obedience, as a determinant of behavior, is of particular relevance to our time,” he wrote. “Gas chambers were built, death camps were guarded; daily quotas of corpses were produced…These inhumane policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they could only be carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of persons obeyed orders.” (Milgram 109). However, Smith and Bond in their review of Milgram’s experiments point out that the majority of these studies have been conducted in industrialized Western cultures and thus we should be cautious before we conclude that a universal trait of social behavior has been identified. (Smith & Bond 23). This conclusion is very important in relation to the Albanians, especially if we keep in mind that the Albanians must have seen a kindred soul within the Jewish people, and the atrocities that were being committed by the Nazi regime was so overpoweringly different to the standards of their religious upbringing and strongly against their honorable ethical norm that it was a simple natural attitude they adopted for protecting the Jews. It is easy to see the fundamental political altruism of the Albanian people, yet it is interesting to see how this fact proved to be a unified endeavor of the individual Albanian families, who strove to provide for those in need, a fundamental Christian, Greek, Jewish and Muslim value. The common strong bond between the different races and cultures strengthened the altruistic behavior, which directly gives meaning and purpose to the existential well-being (Xi et al 2). The perceived similarities of the two cultures likely gathered selfless cooperation and increased the likelihood of enduring and facing greater altruistic punishment. This is a commonality within psychology and sociology as a whole, and it naturally played out in a fundamental way throughout this process, over the course of a great deal of time. Further, humans are more willing to altruistically punish uncooperative behavior, strengthening a requirement to obey and a requirement to join the group. As it was demonstrated, both the Communists and the Albanians developed a strong selfless behavior in the name of a belief, moral, and philosophy that engaged resilience among an entire people. Between the Jews and the Albanians, the pure similarity in 103 historical martyrdom and moral codes through oral traditions created an altruistic bond. Another source here states that within many people in Albania, there is something of an identity crisis, and these events have contributed prominently to this (Reineck 100-101). What the Albanians did for the Jewish people, both citizens and immigrants, was no less than altruistic heroism and friendship, strengthened and passed on through the oral Albanian tradition of the Kanun, grounded in the promise of the verbalized oath in the Besa. This oral tradition has its roots in the ancient Greeks, passed on through Balkan heritage, manifested in action within the Holocaust by the Albanians facing Nazi atrocities upon the Jews. Due to the kinship and pure similarity between the cultures, an altruistic purpose took hold of the people, and led them to become some of the rare, the few and far between, altruistic heroes of the Holocaust. These accomplishments have been able to stand the test of time as well, becoming part of the immortal stories and histories that are able to be observed from the numerous exploits of World War II.

104

Works Cited Afridi, Mehnaz M. “The Role of Muslims and the Holocaust.” Oxford Handbook Online, 2014. www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935420.001.0001/oxfordhb- 9780199935420-e-005. Appel, Gersion. A Philosophy of Mizvot: The Religious-Ethical Concepts of Judaism, Their Roots in Biblical Law, and the Oral Tradition. Ktav Publishing House, 1975. www.ortk.pw/hypyg.pdf. Berend, Ivan T. Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe Before World War II. University of California Press, 2001. Blass, Thomas. The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books, 2004. Chavel, Isaac. “On Haym Soloveitchik's 'Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transformation of Contemporary Orthodox Society': A Response.” The Torah U-Madda Journal, vol. 7, 1997, pp. 122-136. Cioran, Emile M. Tears and Saints. University of Chicago Press, 1995. Gershman, Norman H. Besa, a Code of Honor: Muslim Albanians Who Rescued Jews during the Holocaust. Yad Vashem, 2007. Griffin, Jasper. Homer on Life and Death. Oxford University Press, 1983. Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. Perennial, 1951. Lowie, Robert H. “Oral Tradition and History.” American Anthropologist, vol. 17, no. 3, 1915, pp. 597-599. Reineck, Janet. “Seizing the Past, Forging the Present: Changing Visions of Self and Nation Among the Kosovo Albanians.” Anthropology of East Europe Review vol. 11, no. 1 & 2, 1993, pp.100-109. Slater, Mel, et al. “A Virtual Reprise of the Stanley Milgram Obedience Experiments.” PloS one vol. 1, no. 1, Dec 2006, e39. Tarifa, Fatos. “Of Time, Honor, and Memory: Oral Law in Albania.” Oral tradition, vol.23, no. 1, 2008. Vansina, Jan M. Oral Tradition as History. Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1985. Warneken, Felix, and Michael Tomasello. “The Roots of Human Altruism.” British Journal of Psychology, vol. 100, no. 3, Aug 2009, pp. 455-471. Xi, Juan, et al. “Altruism and Existential Well-Being.” Applied Research in Quality of Life, vol. 12, no. 1, Feb 2017, pp.67-88. List of 613 Commandments compiled by Rambam in the Mishneh Torah, www.jewfaq.org/613.htm#Love Milgram, Stanley. “Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View” 1974, gyanpedia.in/Portals/0/Toys%20from%20Trash/Resources/books/milgram.pdf 105

Smith, P. B., & Bond, M. H. (1998). Social psychology across cultures (2nd Edition). Prentice Hall. www.simplypsychology.org/milgram.html

IV Literature & Media

DOI: 10.25364/25.6:2020.9 109

Lamiae Bouqentar GUSEGG Encounters: An Auto-Ethnographic Account

There are multiple ways of writing. Different social sciences and philosophers have tackled the question of writing as a practice (St-Pierre, 2005; Deleuze, 1975). What it does, what it performs, what it suggests and what it signifies. Writing narratives can be done in several ways depending on what we like to convey, express, or point out. Sometimes we narrate to exorcise a negative feeling or to heal (Behar, 1996), other times we write narratives to embark on lines of flights (Deleuze, 1975). Regardless of the motive behind such a writing practice, narratives can be perceived as a process of meaning making. This paper is mainly concerned with narrating the self with others. I proceed through encounters with others, people who I have met and interacted with at Graz International Summer School 2019, mainly professors, students and speakers. The first section of the paper introduces auto-ethnography as a methodological orientation largely used in queer studies. The second section expands on the idea of re-turn and re-visiting experiences and events, through the process of self-reflexivity. And the third and final section deals with the notion of encounter in an auto-ethnographic context that is GUSEGG 2019. Before proceeding to producing an auto-ethnographic account, what do we mean by auto-ethnography?

(Queer) Auto-ethnography “Each one of us, then, should speak of his roads, his crossroads, his roadside benches; each one of us should make a surveyor’s map of his lost fields and meadows.” (Bachelard, 1969, p. 11).

Autoethnography as a method of inquiry refers to “a research process (graphy), that mobilizes personal experience (auto) in order to understand and reflect on cultural experiences (ethno)” (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 2). The emergence of this research method can be traced back to the post- structuralist context. An epistemological context characterized by deconstruction of the rational neutral subject (Cumby, 2017) able to put aside emotions and the « irrational side » while researching his/her participants. With this being said, post-structuralist feminist, queer and postcolonial critiques have paved the way for new ways of sociological evidence (Probyn, 1992). Personal experiences, positionality of the researcher (Haraway, 1988), situatedness of objects of research as well as new ways of narrating the self – more fluid, more dynamic– have become legitimate modes of production of knowledge (Hallberstam, 2011). In the light of this context, the “self” is no longer conceived as this natural given fact (Woodward, 1997), but rather it is conceived as a product of different political forces (Butler, 1990; Hall, 1980.; Probyn, 1993). Therefore, even if emotions and affects are used in composing the narratives of autoethnographic methods, the 110 mobilization of “self” in this type of research does, nonetheless, not stem from psychological considerations but rather from political ones. The self here is neither psychoanalytical nor affective but rather relational. That is, a social self-interacting with others and occupying a situated positioning in the social field, and thus, the self is also positioned differently in research contexts. In this regard, autoethnography is rooted in the idea that the self is first and foremost political. In this regard, autoethnography, theoretical proceeding, as a method and as a product, seeks to destabilize this modern binary division between researcher and participant (Adams, Bochner & Ellis, 2011), by not only suggesting an inextricable link between the personal and the cultural but also pushing for nontraditional forms of inquiry and expression where the self is positioned, problematized and reflected upon (Wall, 2006). With that being said, one can say that the researcher draws “from epiphanies and profound intersubjective experiences that lead to personal growth” (Cumby, 2017, p. 3) and uses his/her personal diary entries and notes, sketches, to produce an embodied political account since the “everyday has been perpetuated by larger structures” (Ghabra, 2015, p. 13). Auto-ethnographers perform the transition from the personal to the cultural while acknowledging that “the cultural, geopolitical, and economic circumferences of our lives engender particular experiences and epistemologies that provide philosophies about reality different from those available to other groups” (Eguchi & Asante, 2016, p. 213–214). This “auto-writing” which was first coined by David Hayano in 1979 was not welcomed without criticism (Rondeau, 2011). Numerous social science scholars have doomed autoethnography as self-centered, lacking scientific rigor, and hardly generalizable; while literary scholars have thought that it lacked aesthetical values in terms of the writing style (Adams, Boshner, Ellis, 2011; Denzin, 2003). Nevertheless, in a post-modern fashion, autoethnography prides itself in deconstructing “grand narratives” (Lyotard, 1984) and fully embracing the researcher’s subjectivity as well as “the researcher's influence on research, rather than hiding from these matters or assuming they don't exist” (Adams, Bochner & Ellis, 2011, p. 4). Although the term “Queer” is widely associated with the study of the LGBTQ communities, in this essay, this term is not necessarily LGBT – all the while acknowledging the deep intellectual proximity with LGBTQ identities issues and studies. Rather, I draw from a critical cultural perspective (Ahmed, 2006; Hallberstam, 2011, Probyn, 1994) where doing a queer auto- ethnography means engaging in conversations about the banal, the ambivalent and use it as [a disruptive] force, a tool, that seeks to introduce cracks in the normative models of approaching things and conducting research (Manning, 2012). That is, queer autoethnography seeks “to put meanings into motion, to go against the fixity of knowledge production” (Bocher & Ellis, 2016 p. 76). Auto-ethnographers flirt with the banal to grasp some of the unspeakable, multiple fragments at a time. We “write to leave things unfinished and unanswered” (Adams & Jones, 2010, p. 211). 111

By doing so, we seek to fill gaps in the existing scholarship, one minor text at a time. What kind of stories do we tell? What literary criteria do we use to frame these narratives, to construct them, to lay out words and turn them into something meaningful. In “Composing a life,” Mary Catherine Bateson interrogates what makes or what creates a life. Bateson addresses the way “success stories » are framed and told as monogamous and permanent” (Bateson, 1990, p. 6). In this paper, it is precisely about another genre of writing practices. A fragmentary one that celebrates failures and mistakes in order to compose a queer low writing (Hallberstam, 2011). I seek to write queer to create fragments through an auto-reflexive writing practice and analysis while I have no literary background to write from or measure against. This writing is “low” (Hallberstam, 2011) in that it lacks any aesthetic value or whatsoever. Yet, this [queer] auto-reflexive text is political in the sense that it is produced from within political conditions; conditions that have shaped my relationship with languages.

Reflexivity: Re-Turning and Re-Membering 1. Where do I come from? “I am on a road, a line, between (origin and telos), moving with force and acceleration (depending on the cops) in a vectoral space. The road descends and crosses water, past the sailboats and on towards the ostrich farm and beyond. The space-time of Georgia morphs into the space-time of South Carolina.” (Macgregor, 2000, p. 295).

The Moroccan language is a meeting point of the Moroccan-Arabic and Amazigh dialect, mixed with French words. One could say we have a creolized language in the sense that it fails to possess a unified essence. I was raised in a post-colonial era where Arab nationalism was booming. The state decided to Arabize the school system in an effort to assert a nationalist-arab identity that would function as a marker from the other-the west, the colonizer. I have, therefore, studied in classical Arabic, a language only visible in official political discourses as well as in academic settings. During breaks, my school mates and I would play and talk to each other in Moroccan dialect mixed with French words. I would return home at the end of the day and watch TV in French and then the Moroccan news in classical Arabic around dinner table. Before going to bed, I would overhear my mother, over the phone, speaking in amazigh1 dialect with my grandmother. In high school, I majored in sciences. It was not so much a choice as it was an implicit injunction. In an effort to counter the leftist political revolutionaries of the 80s, the state underwent a weakening process of literary and philosophy studies. Human sciences programs were perceived as designed for less competent students. I was dis-oriented in terms of my program study. Having to sit through 2 hours of math, followed by another 2 hours of physics to end

1 Amazigh is a dialect spoken by of the first inhabitants of the region of North Africa (Reino, 2007).

112 the day with 2 hours of biology was a painful experience especially when one feels out of place, out of his/her elements. My high school years were a nightmare. Afterwards, I attended Alakhawayn University, an English-speaking university in Ifrane Morocco, a small city located in the coldest part of the country, the atlas mountain. The only region where it snows during winter. The university was also one of the most prestigious one gathering privileged students. We studied in English using American textbooks whose cover-below- read « designed for non-native speaking English publics ». I did learn enough English to get by, not sure it was enough to write properly, at least by international western universities standards. I also enjoyed getting exposed to new ways of learning in class. For the first time, we were asked to speak in public. But above all, Alakhawayn University was the first place where I got in touch with the « other »- from a different country, different nationality, different language. Afterwards, I moved to Montreal to pursue a master’s degree at Université de Montréal, a French speaking university in Canada. Although Montreal is a bi-lingual city: « bonjour- hi » is first sentence you’d be greeted by, everywhere you go in Montreal; attending a French-speaking university made me dive in the French aspect and the French culture of the province. I enjoyed learning about Quebec’s history and the importance of the linguistic identity for the peuple Québecois, as well as Le nationalisme Québecois. Living in Quebec for the past few years have strengthened my own relationship with the French language. And here I am back at it all over again. Re-trying to write this text in English. Turning back time 10 years ago when I had to use English. Here I go again fighting my way and wrestling with a language, resurging from the past, that I only grasp incompletely. I am spending whole days looking for translations for words crossing my mind in French, while trying to think and structure my thoughts in English, in vain. The effects of Arabic, French, and some English co-habit aggressively in my mind refusing to be left out. The « enough » that I have to get by doesn’t seem enough to write beautifully/aesthetically in a third language-English. I, thus, battle within this impossibility of reaching a full comprehension of the/one language. Yet, I cannot not write. This is, probably why I ended up in this seminar, « Narrative- based research/Research-Based Life Writing » at Graz International Summer School- Seggau 2019. To get confronted to new orientations as well as to new practices of writing that would thus foreground new limits and sketch new horizons for me, as an apprentice- researcher. I look for translation for the word « trace », Google translator suggests « fingerprints, tracks…» none of these words seem to capture what I am trying to convey. I am battling with unrelated unfinished fragments. I am battling from within the intersections of this multilingualism in me. Amidst this internal trans-lative chaos, I remember Samuel Beckett’s words « fail and fail better ». Words in my head travel and dance in French, how can I translate? I remember the advice of one of my professor’s on writing as stream of consciousness and how the goal is to start to get going the flow of writing. And I keep on writing. I have always dwelled in some kind of bricolage. 113

2. Re-Turning and Re-Membering Gusegg lived from June 30th to July 13th 2019. Another Gusegg was about to begin, post the physical temporality. A Gusegg re-shaped by memories and reflexivity.

Figure 1: Sketch of double temporalities One might ask why now and not earlier in the groups? because I was in it, in the experience fully immersed in its intensities and its offerings. To get reflexive, we need to take and make time, to meditate in silence as one speaker said at the closing ceremony of Gusegg. We leave the place that one aims to study to allow the land of memories to blossom. To perform their work along with their best companion-time. I have always felt that décalages and silence work for me. These in-betweenness and void that enables us to process, mess around with, flirt with, acquaint and wrestle with a new thought, a new idea. In between these two temporalities, we find time to stretch with the new. Only in going back and forth, re-visiting our memories, can we expand our scope of perception of the experience, work with the raw emotions, and thus transform them, and generate new knowledges. Together, in our doubts, our fears, our hesitations and our flaws, through the very act of telling, through the very act of writing banal stories, making them, revisiting them, making them circulate, we « bear witness together (…) to possibilities wrought in telling » (Adams & Jones, 2011, p. 6). We make room for larger interpretations, as well as grow new ones for new ambiguities for not knowing

Gusegg Encounters Take me back to these blue narrow streets Where we first laid eyes on each other And we are doomed to remain the world’s losers With each step of the journey we get more and more Mortified by our fears, traces and ratures Virtues and vices dance in each one of us Lamiae Bouqentar

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Encountering People, Ideas and Atmospheres To encounter in organizational communication literatures implies an interaction with someone, referred to as a « generalized other », a colleague, a partner, an adversary (Lauring, 2010). In ontological literatures, encounters are concerned about « otherness » with regards to human beings (Agamben, 1990; Nancy, 1996). From an intersubjective angle, Emanuelle Levinas understands encounters through the notion of ‘face’. Levinas (1974) explains that face directs, slants the other. He renders the face as an unmediated experience with otherness. To the question, what do we encounter? Philosopher Gilles Deleuze goes beyond the « face to face » dimension, and suggests a dynamic milieu composed of substances, objects, events. Prolonging this dynamic and anti-essentialist theorization coined by Deleuze, critical cultural theorists (Probyn, 2016.; Ahmed, 2006)- while acknowledging the specificity of the concept to these different authors- understand encounters as a contact that occurs in situated spaces. In Eating the Ocean, Elspeth Probyn (2016) follows oysters in a rhizomatic manner, that is in different directions without a necessary link with one another. For the author, her encounter with oysters is conceptualized as an articulation of discursive, affective and scenic dispositions (Probyn, 2016). These dispositions are intertwined and produce situated narratives. Contextualizing encounters, through the notion of milieu, enables us to recognize that we encounter what is rendered available for us. Critical cultural theorist Sara Ahmed (2006) suggests a « field of objects » that acts as a regulating modality of encounters. Following this dynamic theorization of milieu as suggested in critical cultural theory, in the context of Gusegg, we come to create « milieus » through the seminar, the attendance of lectures, the chatting during the breaks, the ones happening during lunch and those around drinks, etc. the milieu is also composed of memories, of a past shared exchange. We, therefore, encounter people, but also ideas, books, questions, statements, gestures as well as sceneries (Macgregor, 2000; Probyn, 2016). In these narratives, I address encounters as a physical meeting that took place in a physical and specific place, positioned in a country, Austria, but also in a supra-nationalist construction, which is Europe. Nevertheless, I hope that my choice of words and structuring of the text suggest that what I mean by « encounters » is not only confined to the « interpersonal realm ». When I say « encountering », although one of the dimensions is physical - encountering people in a specific time and place - I do not mean encountering people’s essence, as in I know them deeply more than anyone else. Rather, what is suggested here is encountering what goes on the surface, what is there, being made available for us in a specific time and place (Ahmed, 2006). Hence, the situatedness of narratives is crucial here. Thus, as mentioned above, an encounter can also be an exchange of a statement, a suggestion made by someone, a title of a book that came up during a conversation. What matters is that in each contact, in each coming together of two or multiple elements, an 115 affective intensity is produced or being generated (Deleuze, 1975; Probyn, 2016). This conceptualization of encounters renders the division between humans and objects obsolete. Moreover, this loose definition conveys that in conjunction with the physical un-easiness, we also en-counter dis-orienting ideas and thoughtful advices – a beautiful ambivalence, as one of the professors of Gusegg, would say. Therefore, I use encounters as a resonance/reasoning moment, an enlightening moment that is made of different intensities and tensions.

*************************************** I missed my train even though I was on time. I watched it pass me by and only half-way through its passing, have I realized that it was the train I was supposed to be in. How were people who cannot read or write able to travel or find their way? for a second, I thought of my grand-mother and how she always needs to be assisted in her travels to El Hadj, the Arab Muslim annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. It’s not a big deal since the next train was coming within 30 min and my ticket was valid for the next one. Yet, the image of that passing train, at that moment, at a train station where I could read the signs in English and still would get lost got into my head. it horrified me. For a second, I felt like my life flashed before my eyes. A life crossed by dis- orientations. Existential as well as physical ones. I have arrived at the Seggau castle where summer school was going to take place all week long. Something idyllic about this medieval castle, the architecture, the oldness, the well-cut green grass, the flowers. The perfection and apollonian beauty of its display and conception conveys an ancient and well-preserved energy. I check in and head to my room feeling a breeze against my cheek. For a second, I thought that this weather and this view could be a view in Ifrane, my college city. I walk slowly to the tables that oversee the large garden of the castle; where they were already people sitting, and others coming in at the same time as I was. We introduced ourselves, shared first cigarettes and first impressions. Ljubljana, Zagreb, Pristina, Budapest, Maribor, Kosovo. Those were words, my ears were hearing for the first time. Through our informal exchanges, I was discovering a new face of Europe, the « Balkans ». We clicked from the very first moments. After all, having all expenses paid for us, everything being taken care of, waiters serving us food and drinks can only contribute in making or emerging an “us.” The rest of the stay was only going to reinforce this impression and feeling. The more I talked to these people, the more I got attached to them. I felt at home with these people. As momentarily and as ephemerally as I know it was. I felt completely oriented, when talking to others addressing queer theories and the rise of the far-wing- populist politics in Europe. Engaging with another participant, the self-proclaimed « vocab-dealer », about her « engagement with [her] reading materials » and noticing how each time she gets excited about every new information heard or learned at Gusegg, especially in her Jewish and Modernity Class, would be the proper humorous break that would make me go on about my day. 116

My intent, here, is not to dive into an affective account of how we came to be constituted as a group, as an ‘us’ within a ‘we’. They will surely be infinite stories to tell, to create. What I want to invoke here is that we were all – beautifully clumsy gesticulating, translating our thoughts, hastily trying to get our points across, to reach and affect each other. We were all in constant trans-lating mode, moving across the tavern’s tables, laughing at our linguistic limits, using whatever objects in front of us (knife, packs of cigarettes, lighters) to explain ourselves, and to reach the other. This one other who gets closer and closer with each of these trans-lating attempt to get out of one’s comfort zone. We also, as someone so playfully said, engaged with the school’s material, but especially with our seminars. A professor’s reading of her poem titled “I don’t do lunch” was a beautiful resonance with the Mediterranean laid back lifestyle. Her poems had this ability to make time freeze. She would also come, sit, and look at the ceiling, turning around, reaching for her coffee, moving around, appropriating the space. Entering and leaving the congress room as she pleases. She was one young soul. At moments I would look at the other students and all I would see were blunt washed up faces, sometimes eyes half- closed, bodies tired of sitting still for hours, listening to lectures coming one after another. After a typical night of indulging in Dionysian pleasures with our group, my body would be shaking from the inside. I look at the gloomy congress room, and a vague memory of how I longed for her – her way of flipping her hair sweeps in… We had moments of dis-engagement. Anxiety would take the best of me. - “Why do you choose to be at the center? just be in the margins!!!!” My classmate said - “oh, I am in the margin, trust me”, I shockingly replied. I felt judged, and mis-placed. “Me at the center?”, I exclaimed, “how can it be true? I come from critical Queer theory, I come from the margins. How can she (mis)perceive me as someone from the center?”. I wondered. Why did it bother me, that much? Having let time brush it off, looking back at it; I, too, was rigid in my interaction, or reactions. I was manifesting the same symptoms of rigidity that I was accusing the institution of displaying. At moments, I was at the center, through my display of disengagement. As one professor talked to me about discourse theory, I was coming from somewhere. Somewhere more concerned about what we actually tell or render visible and the power dynamics behind it rather than showing or evoking, in more aesthetical subtle ways. I only knew how to be and perform at the center of things. I did not know how to write emotions, how to convey them. I only knew how to tell them. Making a fuss about them, expressing emotions in an activist way. All of a sudden, I was invited to escape this condition- this “where I come from.” But at the time of the event, it made me so scared and anxious that all I did was to resist it, to go against it, to counter it. These altercations made me realize the importance of the “who speaks? who writes? when? and where? with or to whom? (Clifford, 1986, p. 14)”. I was oriented in a particular way. In “queer phenomenology”, queer cultural theorist Sara Ahmed (2006) offers a groundbreaking outlook on what it means for bodies to be situated in time and space. For Ahmed (2006) the social world can be understood in terms of orientations and 117 dis-orientations. Orientations, as Ahmed (2006) writes enable getting in contacts with others, creating new encounters. So, do