DOCSLIB.ORG

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Contribution to the Philosophical Discourse On

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Contribution to the Philosophical Discourse On 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Contribution to the Philosophical Discourse on Language Onyenuru Okechukwu. P. (OP). Student of Dominican Institute, Samanda, Ibadan, Nigeria. An unpublished work written: February 08, 2014. [email protected] 1.0. Introduction The one unquestionable task of philosophy is search for the truth. In philosophy, we struggle to discern ourselves and the universe, reality and existence, knowledge and beliefs, reason and reasoning, meaning and value of actions and objects. In all of these quests, truth is being sought, tirelessly too. In this activity, we strive to come in contact with reality on one hand, and on the other hand to present it the way it is, with minimal adulteration. Different epochs of philosophical thoughts can be characterised by peculiar prevalent methods of arriving at this curious quest. The modern period can boast of its peculiar methods such as rationalism, empiricism, idealism, scientism and the likes.1 These methods all cannot be right at the same time. Surely not! More pressing to the later modern philosophers2 was the claims of idealism that posits a seamless harmony between thought and object. For the idealist, reality consists in thought and object bound in a stringent coherent unity. What idealism claims as knowledge was for the more materialistic modern thinkers, a misrepresentation of reality, because what the idealists affirm is merely the content of the mind rather than the content of the world. Beginning with Bertrand Russell and G. E Moore, attempts were made to correct this purported erroneous pattern of thought, which culminated in the founding of the Analytic School. Language was the key to clearing the cobwebs of philosophical issues. The disingenuous character of language was the true cause of philosophical disputes. If language can be penetrated to reveal its content, then 1 Cf. Scotus Roger, The Short History of Modern Philosophy (London: Routledge Press, 1981), p. 21-23 2 I use the term late modern philosophers to mean philosophers who lived within the 18th and 19th centuries. 2 philosophy would have one less problem. This gave birth to the discipline of philosophy of language. This essay shall explore Wittgenstein’s approach to solving the perennial problem of philosophy in two of his works: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. We will attempt a retrieval of the thoughts of Wittgenstein in his most famous work. Prior to this, we shall take a cursory look at the historical events that influenced of his works and finally highlight his contribution to the next generation of philosophers. 2.0. Wittgenstein’s Background Wittgenstein Ludwig Josef Johann, the Austrian-British philosopher, was born in Vienna in 1889, the youngest of a family of 10. A descent of a Jewish father and a Roman Catholic mother, Wittgenstein was educated at home until his fourteenth birthday, during this period he developed interest in engineering. He moved on to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochschule at Charlottenburg in Berlin for two years, and later at the University of Manchester.3 Wittgenstein’s interest began to shift from engineering to pure mathematics and then to philosophical foundation of mathematics when he was had stumbled upon the book of Bertrand Russell- Principles of mathematics.4 In this book Russell, while grappling with the problem of language, tries to prove that the foundation of every language is rooted in mathematics, and so a quest in the understanding language required that the philosopher investigate into the principles of mathematics. In 1912, he enrolled in Trinity College to study philosophy under Russell, but in 1913, Wittgenstein went into seclusion in Norway. When the First World War broke out, Wittgenstein enlisted as a volunteer in the Austrian Army. During these years, he committed himself to putting down his perplexing thought. They are what have come down to us as the Tractatus Logico Philisophicus. 3.0. The Tractatus Logico Philisophicus (Early Wittgenstein) The Tractatus is a short, cryptic and enigmatic work of extreme originality. It is constructed around seven foundational propositions numbered 1-7, with all other paragraphs numbered by 3 Cf. Kenny Anthony, A New History of Western Philosophy, Vol. 4. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2007), p. 72 4 Norman Malcolm “Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann”, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Ed. Donald M. Borchert, 1967 p. 800 3 decimal expansions of each foundational proposition. The seven statements capture everything that he wishes to say, but since they are quite abstract, other propositions shed light on them. 1. The world is all that is the case. 2. What is the case (a fact) is the existence of atomic facts. 3. A logical picture of the facts is the thought. 4 The thought is the significant proposition. 5 A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth function itself.) 6 The general form of a truth-function is [p, E, N (E)]. This is the general form of a proposition. 7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silence. From the outset, Wittgenstein clearly states what his aim is which is to “deal with the problem of philosophy and show...., that the reason why these problems are posed is that logic of our language is misunderstood.”5 Thus in addressing the central problem of philosophy as regards the world, thought and language, he posits that the solution to this dilemma lies in logic, and the nature of representation. For Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy is and should be directed to “the logical clarification of thought,” 6 which makes it an activity rather than a discipline. Thoughts are contents of the mind and are built upon language. Language on its part has an underlying logical structure, so that an understanding of the relationship between these variables show the limit of what can clearly and meaningfully be said.7 This was contrary to Russell’s earlier position that mathematics carries us beyond what is human into the realm of absolute reality where all truth can be grasped, to which not only the actual world, but every possible world must conform.8 Russels postulation implies that truth is to be built upon mathematical principles, which alone exposes or clarifies 5 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing) 2009. p. 2 6 Cf. Ibid., 4.112 7 Cf. Grayling A. C, Wittgenstein, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 18 8 Copleston Vol VIII p. 438 4 proposition. Although both of them agreed to the basic problem of philosophy, Wittgenstein proved in the Tractatus that mathematical principles can be reducible to logic in the sense that the number theory (Arithmetic) can be reduced to propositions containing only logical concepts such as variables, predicates, constants and quantifiers.9Thus mathematical logic rather than mathematics is the perfect language for analysing language of ordinary discourse. For it captures reality formally without emotions, vagueness and ambiguities. This idea was adopted by Russell and Frege, but Wittgenstein was to take a step further by positing that the idea that logic is the essential framework to all the thought goes along with the idea that there is a perfect logical order in the propositions of ordinary language. This position does not merely have a theoretical status, but the status of prescription of how a language in which thoughts are expressed must be.10 3.1. Picture Theory of Meaning The major theme of the Tractatus is the picture theory of meaning. When we communicate what we perceive to be true about the way the world is, we do this in a language. So there is a connection between our thought, language of communication and the world. This is what the picture theory of meaning seeks to establish. When we experience the world, it becomes part of our reservoir of consciousness. When we wish then to communicate this knowledge to others, we conceive this idea in thought, and thought is built upon language and conversely, language is composed of propositions which when spoken is understood by the hearer. Wittgenstein claims that because every proposition carries a truth function (they can either be true or false11), language claims are logical. Thoughts are logical pictures of fact12 and the world is a totality of facts.13 Since thoughts are propositions that make sense, language consists of propositions which are perceptible expressions of thought and are thus a picture of reality14. When I hear or see a proposition expressed in a language, it is for me a perceptible expression of the thought of someone else. Its meaning however lies in its (the expression) ability to convey 9 Stroll Avrum, Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) p. 11 10 Cf. Mcginn Marie, Elucidating the Tractatus (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 91 11 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing) 2009. No. 4.06 12 Ibid., 3. 13 Ibid. 1.1 14 Ibid. 4.01 5 the picture of reality in the speaker or writer’s mind into mine not just as words, ideas or concepts but as pictures. This picture is either true or false depending on whether or not it is able to present the facts of the reality the way they are. This is the logical relationship of language thought, and the world. Propositions are made in a language and each language is composed of words which are not merely jumbled-up, but must stand “in a determinate relation to one another.”15 Words that make propositions correspond to objects in reality,16 not by naming them, but acting as signs representing them.17 Propositions picture reality in the sense that their elements (words) depict or identify that there are objects in the world, and the arrangement of the elements make perspicuous description of the state of affairs of these objects.18 Wittgenstein refers to the content of propositional sign as simple signs19 or names.20 And a name means an object.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The ('('Orthodox" View of Theories: Remarks in Defense As Well As Critique
    -----HERBERT FEIGL----- The ('('Orthodox" View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as well as Critique The purpose of the following remarks is to present in outline some of the more important features of scientific theories. I shall discuss the "standard" or "orthodox" view, mainly in order to set up a target for criticisms, some of which I shall briefly sketch by way of anticipation. The standard account of the structure of scientific theories was given quite explicitly by Norman R. Campbell [7], as well as independently in a little-known article by R. Carnap [12]. A large part of the voluminous literature in the philosophy of science of the logical empiricists and re­ lated thinkers contains, though with a great many variations, develop­ ments, modifications, and terminological diversities, essentially similar analyses of the logical structure and the empirical foundations of the theories of physics, biology, psychology, and some of the social sciences. Anticipating to some extent Campbell and Carnap, Moritz Schlick, in his epoch-making AIIgemeine Erkenntnisiehre [38], championed the doc­ trine of "implicit definition." In this he was influenced by David Hil­ bert's axiomatization of geometry, as well as by Henri Poincare's and Albert Einstein's conceptions of theoretical physics and the role of ge­ ometry in physics. These matters were then developed more fully and precisely in the work of H. Reichenbach, R. Carnap, C. G. Hempel, R. B. Braithwaite, E. Nagel, and many other logicians and methodolo­ gists of science. In order to understand the aim of this important approach in the philosophy of science it is essential to distinguish it from historical, so­ ciological, or psychological studies of scientific theories.
    [Show full text]
  • Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy Ofscience Oflogical Empiricism
    -----HERBERT FEIGL----- Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy ofScience ofLogical Empiricism AsouT twenty-five years ago a small group of philosophically minded scientists and scientifically trained philosophers in Vienna formulated their declaration of independence from traditional philosophy. The pamphlet Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis (1929) contained the first succinct statement of the outlook which soon after became known as "logical positivism." In the first flush of enthusiasm we Viennese felt we had attained a philosophy to end all philosophies. Schlick spoke of a "Wende der Philosophie" (a decisive turning point of philosophy). Neurath and Frank declared "school philosophy" as obsolete and even suggested that our outlook drop the word "philoso­ phy" altogether, and replace it by "Einheitswissenschaft" or by "scien· tific empiricism." The notable impact of Alfred Ayer's first book in England, and my own efforts ~oward a propagation of Logical Positiv­ ism in the United States during the early thirties, and then the immi· gration of Carnap, Frank, von Mises, Reichenbach, Hempel and Berg­ mann created a powerful movement, but it elicited also sharp opposition nncl criticism. Through the discussions within the movement and its own production and progressive work, as well as in response to the NO'l'F.: This essay is a revised and considerably expanded .version of a lecture given in plenary session at the International Congress for Philosophy of Science, Zurich, /\ngust 25, 1954. It was first- published in Proceedi11gs of the Secono International Congress of the International Union for tl1e Philosophy ot Science (Neuchatel, Switzerland, 19 55). In the cordial letter of invitation I received from Professor Ferdinand Gonseth, president of the Congress, he asked me to discuss "I'empirisme logi<\ue,-ce qu'il fut, et ce qu'il est clevenu." Much as I appreciated the honor of t 1is ambitious assignment, I realized of course that the limitations of time would permit me to deal onJy with some selected topics within this larger frame.
    [Show full text]
  • Passmore, J. (1967). Logical Positivism. in P. Edwards (Ed.). the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 5, 52- 57). New York: Macmillan
    Passmore, J. (1967). Logical Positivism. In P. Edwards (Ed.). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 5, 52- 57). New York: Macmillan. LOGICAL POSITIVISM is the name given in 1931 by A. E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl to a set of philosophical ideas put forward by the Vienna circle. Synonymous expressions include "consistent empiricism," "logical empiricism," "scientific empiricism," and "logical neo-positivism." The name logical positivism is often, but misleadingly, used more broadly to include the "analytical" or "ordinary language philosophies developed at Cambridge and Oxford. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The logical positivists thought of themselves as continuing a nineteenth-century Viennese empirical tradition, closely linked with British empiricism and culminating in the antimetaphysical, scientifically oriented teaching of Ernst Mach. In 1907 the mathematician Hans Hahn, the economist Otto Neurath, and the physicist Philipp Frank, all of whom were later to be prominent members of the Vienna circle, came together as an informal group to discuss the philosophy of science. They hoped to give an account of science which would do justice -as, they thought, Mach did not- to the central importance of mathematics, logic, and theoretical physics, without abandoning Mach's general doctrine that science is, fundamentally, the description of experience. As a solution to their problems, they looked to the "new positivism" of Poincare; in attempting to reconcile Mach and Poincare; they anticipated the main themes of logical positivism. In 1922, at the instigation of members of the "Vienna group," Moritz Schlick was invited to Vienna as professor, like Mach before him (1895-1901), in the philosophy of the inductive sciences. Schlick had been trained as a scientist under Max Planck and had won a name for himself as an interpreter of Einstein's theory of relativity.
    [Show full text]
  • Introductory Lectures: the Nature and History of Cognitive Science Chapter 4: Philosophy’S Convergence Towards Cognitive Science by Dr
    Introductory Lectures: The Nature and History of Cognitive Science Chapter 4: Philosophy’s Convergence Towards Cognitive Science By Dr. Charles Wallis Last revision: 9/24/2018 Chapter Outline 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Scientific Explosion of the Early 20th Century 4.3 The Logical and Mathematical Explosion of the Early 20th Century 4.4 The Rise Logical Empiricism 4.5 Logical Behaviorism 4.6 Three Problems for Logical Behaviorism 4.7 Identity Theories: Reduction Through Reference Equivalence Rather Than Meaning Equivalence 4.8 Identity Theories: Type-Type Identity 4.9 Two Arguments For Type-Type Identity Theory 4.10 Identity Theories: Token-Token Identity 4.11 Functionalism 4.12 Computationalism 4.13 Property Dualism 4.14 Eliminative Materialism 4.15 Glossary of Key Terms 4.16 Bibliography The 20th Century and the Semantic Twist 4.1 Introduction Recall that ontological frameworks provide a general framework within which theorists specify domains of inquiry and construct theories to predict, manipulate, and explain phenomena within the domain. Once researchers articulate an ontological framework with sufficient clarity they begin to formulate and test theories. Chapter two ends with the suggestion that oppositional substance dualists face two major challenges in their attempt to transition from the articulation of an ontological framework to the formulation and testing of theories purporting to predict, manipulate, and explain mental phenomena. On the one hand, oppositional substance dualists have problems formulating theories providing explanations, predictions, and manipulations of the continual, seamless interaction between the mental and the physical. Philosophers often call this the interaction problem. On the other hand, the very nature of a mental substance--substance defined so as to share no properties with physical substance--gives rise to additional challenges.
    [Show full text]
  • 36Pm Mathews
    Michael R. Matthews 223 Rescuing Two Positivist “Babies” from the Educational Bathwater Michael R. Matthews University of New South Wales It is an understatement to say that Positivism is unpopular in education circles. “Positivist” has become for educators, what “terrorist” is for politicians. In the past two decades positivists and their bathwater have been summarily dispatched out the education window. This situation represents a dramatic turn in philosophical and educational fashion. In the 1920s, adherents of the newly formulated positivism, or the “Scien- tific Conception of the World,” were social and educational progressives in a reactionary central-European milieu. In the 1950s and 1960s the logical empiricist variant of positivism dominated philosophy of science and monopolized the “nature of science” chapters of science textbooks. Most serious educational researchers measured their work against positivist norms of rigor, clarity, objectivity, repeat- ability, and so on. The change in intellectual fashion was dramatic: from comfortable bath to defenestration in just the time it took to say “Thomas Kuhn.” But how well based is the educational rejection of positivism? What can be rescued from the bathwater? This paper will answer the question by going back to the sources and examining the philosophical and educational views of two of the founding Vienna Circle positivists — Philipp Frank and Herbert Feigl — and arguing that they at least should be rescued from the bathwater; and further that most of their orientation to science, philosophy and education should be rescued along with them. Both Frank and Feigl followed in the scientific and philosophical footsteps of Ernst Mach, who also had deep and robust educational views.1 THE MENACE OF POSITIVISM The sheer volume of positivist “bad press” in education makes a comprehensive survey impossible, but a small sampling gives an idea of the whole.
    [Show full text]
  • Realistic Claims in Logical Empiricism
    Realistic Claims in Logical Empiricism Matthias Neuber Logical empiricism is commonly seen as a counter-position to scientific realism. In the pre- sent paper it is shown that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist movement. In particular, I shall point out that at least four types of realistic arguments can be distinguished within this faction: Reichenbach’s ‘probabilistic argument,’ Feigl’s ‘pragmatic argument,’ Hempel’s ‘indispensability argument,’ and Kaila’s ‘invariantist argument.’ All these variations of arguments are intended to prevent the logical empiricist agenda from the shortcomings of radical positivism, instrumentalism, and other forms of scientific antirealism. On the whole, it will be seen that logical empiricism and scientific realism are essentially compatible with each other. Especially Kaila’s invariantist approach to science (and nature) comes quite close to what nowadays is discussed under the label ‘structural realism.’ This, in turn, necessitates a fundamental reevaluation of Kaila’s role in the logical empiricist move- ment in particular and in twentieth-century philosophy of science in general. Keywords: logical empiricism, structural realism, semantics, invariance, Eino Kaila 1 Introduction Logical Empiricism has for a long time been conceived of as a monolithic, one-dimensional, movement within early twentieth-century philosophy. As such, it frequently served as a con- trast for later, opposing viewpoints, such as scientific realism, critical rationalism, or Kuhnian historical
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophy of Karl Popper
    P1: JZX 0521839467Agg.xml CY443/Keuth 0521839467 August 25, 2004 16:38 The Philosophy of Karl Popper HERBERT KEUTH Eberhard Karls Universitat,¨ Tubingen¨ iii P1: JZX 0521839467Agg.xml CY443/Keuth 0521839467 August 25, 2004 16:38 published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom cambridge university press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, uk 40 West 20th Street, New York, ny 10011-4211, usa 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vic 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon´ 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org Die Philosophie Karl Poppers C J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 2000 English translation C Herbert Keuth 2005 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in German in 2000 English edition first published 2005 Printed in the United States of America Typeface itc New Baskerville 10/13 pt. System LATEX 2ε [tb] A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data Keuth, Herbert, 1940– [Philosophie Karl Poppers. English] The philosophy of Karl Popper / Herbert Keuth. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. isbn 0-521-83946-7 – isbn 0-521-54830-6 (pbk.) 1. Popper, Karl Raimund, Sir, 1902–1994 I. Title. b1649.p64k4813 2004 192 – dc22 2004045179 isbn 0 521 83946 7 hardback isbn 0 521 54830 6 paperback iv P1: JZX 0521839467Agg.xml CY443/Keuth 0521839467 August 25, 2004 16:38 Contents List of Abbreviations page xiii Preface xv Introduction 1 part i.
    [Show full text]
  • Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part II: Hans Reichenbach.” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8(11): 24–47
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Volume 8, Number 11 Great Intellectual Migration. Editor in Chief Part I: Rudolf Carnap Audrey Yap, University of Victoria Sander Verhaegh Editorial Board Annalisa Coliva, UC Irvine In the years before the Second World War, Rudolf Carnap and Henry Jackman, York University Hans Reichenbach emigrated to the United States, escaping the Frederique Janssen-Lauret, University of Manchester quickly deteriorating political situation on the continent. Once Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts in the U. S., the two significantly changed the American philo- Consuelo Preti, The College of New Jersey sophical climate. This two-part paper reconstructs Carnap’s and Marcus Rossberg, University of Connecticut Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with Ameri- Anthony Skelton, Western University can academics in the decades before their move in order to explain Mark Textor, King’s College London the impact of their arrival in the late 1930s. Building on archival Richard Zach, University of Calgary material of several key players and institutions, I take some first steps toward answering the question why logical empiricism be- Editors for Special Issues came so successful in the United States after the War. This first Sandra Lapointe, McMaster University part reconstructs Carnap’s development between 1923, when he Alexander Klein, McMaster University first visited New York, and 1936, when he was offered a position Review Editors at the University of Chicago. I describe Carnap’s first substantive Sean Morris, Metropolitan State University of Denver contacts with American philosophers as well as the events lead- Sanford Shieh, Wesleyan University ing up to his decision to emigrate.
    [Show full text]
  • Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hermann Broch: the Need for Fiction and Logic in Moral Philosophy Christopher Bailes Washington University in St
    Washington University in St. Louis Washington University Open Scholarship All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) 5-24-2012 Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hermann Broch: The Need for Fiction and Logic in Moral Philosophy Christopher Bailes Washington University in St. Louis Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd Recommended Citation Bailes, Christopher, "Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hermann Broch: The eN ed for Fiction and Logic in Moral Philosophy" (2012). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 681. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/681 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures Dissertation Examination Committee: Paul Michael Lützeler, Chair Julia Driver Matt Erlin Erin McGlothlin Gillian Russell Lynne Tatlock Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hermann Broch: The Need for Fiction and Logic in Moral Philosophy By Christopher Wade Bailes A dissertation presented to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2012 Saint Louis, Missouri Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures and Washington University in Saint Louis for their generous financial support. My dissertation benefited from various guest lecturers, conferences, and graduate seminars supported by the university, and would not have been financially feasible without the tuition waivers and more than adequate living stipends that kept me afloat.
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophy of Logical Positivism ______
    The Philosophy of Logical Positivism ________________________________________________ Mauro Murzi Member of Società Filosofica Italiana [email protected] http://www.murzim.net 1 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction.................................................................................................5 2. The Main Philosophical Tenets of Logical Positivism...............................7 a. Verifiability Principle.............................................................................7 b. Elimination of Metaphysics...................................................................7 c. The Language of Science.......................................................................8 d. Observational and Theoretical Terms..................................................10 e. Synthetic and Analytic Statements.......................................................11 f. Probability and Inductive Logic...........................................................12 g. Ethics....................................................................................................14 3. History of Logical Positivism...................................................................15 a. Before Logical Positivism....................................................................15 b. Early Research in Europe.....................................................................17 c. The American Period............................................................................17 d. Influences on European Philosophy.....................................................18
    [Show full text]
  • Economical Unification As a Method of Philosophical Analysis
    The Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies University of Helsinki Finland Economical Unification as a Method of Philosophical Analysis Avril Styrman ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in lecture room 13, University main building, on 17 December 2016, at 10 noon. Helsinki 2016 i Thesis Supervisor Professor Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Tallinn University of Technology Pre-Examiners Professor Simo Knuuttila, University of Helsinki Professor Sami Pihlström, University of Helsinki Custos Professor Gabriel Sandu, University of Helsinki Opponent Professor Sami Pihlström, University of Helsinki ISBN 978-951-51-2696-2 (paperback) ISBN 978-951-51-2697-9 (PDF) Unigrafia Helsinki 2016 ii 1 Introduction The method of economical unification resembles a production line with three inseparable elements that are interconnected in two stages: Economy → Economically unified ontology → Applications In the first stage an economically unified ontology is explicated by applying the principle of economy. In the second stage concepts are defined and disambiguated and problems are resolved in terms of the ontology. The central argument that is defended in this doctoral dissertation is that the method is more progressive than plain conceptual analysis that proceeds in the absence of an economically unified ontology and in the absence of the principle of economy as an evaluation criterion of alternative ontologies. Its progressiveness results from having a stable economically unified ontology that is the same for all derivative topics, and which enables defining and disambiguating meanings of concepts, thereby facilitating their gen- uine understanding and resolving problems around them, more efficiently than in plain conceptual analysis.
    [Show full text]
  • Logical Empiricism
    Logical Empiricism HISTORICAL CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES Edited by Paolo Parrini, University ofFlorence Wesley C. Salmon, University ofPittsburgh Merrilee H. Salmon, University of Pittsburgh UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH PRESS This book is dedicated to the memory of Wesley C . Salmon 1925-2001 Published by the University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, P&, 15260 Copyright ® 2003, University of Pittsburgh Press All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America Printed on add-free paper 10987654321 ISBN 0 - 8n9- 4194-5 Contents Preface Introduction r Paolo Parrini and Wesley Salmon I. Turning Points and Fundamental Controversies rt A Turning Point in Philosophy : Carnap-Cassirer-Heidegger 13 Michael Friedman Carnap's "Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language" : A Retrospective Consideration of the Relationship between Continental and Analytic Philosophy 30 Gottfried Gabriel Schlick and Husserl on the Essence of Knowledge 43 Roberta Lanfredini Carnap versus Gbdel on Syntax and Tolerance 57 S. Awodey and A. W Carus II. On the Origins and Development of the Vienna Circle 65 On the Austrian Roots of Logical Empiricism: The Case of the First Vienna Circle 67 Thomas Uebel On the International Encyclopedia, the Neurath-Carnap Disputes, and the Second World War 94 George Reisch Carl Gustav Hempel : Pragmatic Empiricist log Gereon Wolters III. The Riddle of Wittgenstein 123 The Methods of the Tractatus: Beyond Positivism and Metaphysics? 125 David G. Stern IV Philosophy of Physics 157 Two Roads from Kant : Cassirer, Reichenbach, and General Relativity ' 159 T A. Ryckman Vienna Indeterminism II : From Exner to Frank and von Mises 194 'Michael Stoltzner V. The Mind-Body Problem 231 The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism : Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism 233 Michael Heidelberger Logical Positivism and the Mind-Body Problem 263 Jaegwon Kim VI.
    [Show full text]