A Shelter Comes out the Hahn Cabin Entrapment and Fire Shelter Deployment

A Shelter Comes Out The Hahn Cabin Entrapment and Fire Shelter Deployment

Rice Ridge Fire Facilitated Learning Analysis

September 12, 2017

This photo was taken from the gravel bar on Youngs Creek on the afternoon of Sept. 12, 2017, by one of

the two firefighters who used this gravel bar as a safety zone when the approaching Rice Ridge Fire surrounded and engulfed them with embers and smoke.

Contents

1. Summary………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2

2. Narrative………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3

3. Discussion Points

A. Safety Zone……………………………………………………………………………… 12

B. Deploying the Fire Shelter………………………………………………………… 12

C. Lookout(s)……………………………………………………………………………….. 13

D. Structure Protection Plan………………………………………………………… 13

E. The Big Picture………………………………………………………………………….. 14

F. The Safety “Margin”………………………………………………………………….. 14

G. Roles/Responsibilities, Delegation and Communication…………… 17

4. Timeline………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18

5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 19

6. FLA Team Members……………………………………………………………………………..… 19

7. Appendix – Photos of Fire Shelter After Deployment…………………………….. 20

National Wildfire Coordinating Group Definitions

Entrapment – A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire behavior-related, life- threatening position where planned Escape Routes or Safety Zones are absent, inadequate, or compromised. An entrapment may or may not include deployment of a fire shelter for its intended purpose. These situations may or may not result in injury. They include “near misses.”

Fire Shelter Deployment – Removing a fire shelter from its case and unfolding it to use as protection against heat, smoke, and burning embers.

1. Summary

Two Spotted Bear Ranger District firefighters on the Flathead National Forest were flown into the Bob Marshall Wilderness to implement a Point/Zone Protection Strategy for the Forest’s historic Hahn Cabin, located within the northern portion of the Rice Ridge Fire. This was the second consecutive Point/Zone Protection assignment for this pair of firefighters. Because of concerning bear activity during the first assignment the firefighters requested extraction and reassignment.

Hahn Cabin is one of several administrative and historic cabins situated along the trail system of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area in Montana.

The objective of the two firefighters was to monitor the progression of the Rice Ridge Fire toward the cabin and, as conditions necessitated, protect the historic structure with a sprinkler system, protective wrap and/or firing out around the building.

The sprinklers and other water handling equipment, along with structure protection wrap, had all been installed weeks prior to the firefighters’ arrival on the afternoon of September 11, 2017.

Winds and Fire Activity Increases The next day, on the afternoon of September 12, the Rice Ridge Fire advanced north and east under Red Flag conditions, with humidity in the low teens and ridgetop winds gusting 25-35 mph.

The two firefighters had spent the morning completing projects around the cabin and monitoring the approaching fire’s progression, as well as the fire’s progress toward the nearby occupied Jumbo Mountain Lookout, located 2.5 miles east of the Hahn Cabin.

During the latter afternoon into the early evening, the firefighters noticed that both the winds and fire activity were increasing. They had traveled to a gravel bar on Youngs Creek (that they had previously identified as their Safety Zone), located approximately 0.5 miles (a 7-minute walk) north of the Hahn Cabin. From this location, they observed some canopy fire to the south of the Hahn Cabin and black smoke near the cabin.

The firefighters returned to the cabin to start the pumps, close-up doors and windows, and burn-out—readying the cabin for the imminent fire impact.

Next, as they had previously discussed, the two firefighters separately and independently made a hasty retreat back to that gravel bar on Youngs Creek—their predetermined Safety Zone.

Entrapment and Fire Shelter Deployment Site While the fire continued to actively burn adjacent to what they had previously agreed to and considered a Safety Zone, this gravel bar would become an entrapment site as well as a fire shelter deployment site.

The two firefighters deployed a single fire shelter to prevent injuries such as burns from ember wash and/or smoke inhalation. Although they had two fire shelters, the two firefighters both took refuge under one shelter.

As they had originally planned, the two firefighters spent the night on the gravel bar with the fire continuing to burn around the cabin and their location.

On September 12, the day of their entrapment and shelter deployment, the Rice Ridge Fire grew nearly 16,500 acres.

The next morning, the two firefighters returned to the undamaged cabin and began to mop-up around the cabin and remove the water handling equipment. The two firefighters then began their three-day 48-mile trek to the Meadow Creek Trailhead via Big Prairie Work Center and Black Bear Cabin.

Rain and snow was observed at Hahn Cabin on September 13 and 14. On September 14, the nearby Big Prairie RAWS logged precipitation for the first time over 30 days.

A Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) Team was ordered on September 22. The FLA process was adopted by the U.S. Forest Service in part to reduce stigmatization around reporting close calls and to identify systemic issues in the way our firefighting professionals are trained to make decisions. Stigmas tend to exist around recognizing and vocalizing the presence of an unacceptable risk, being entrapped, or using the full range of tactics and tools provided to us, including our fire shelters.

2. Narrative

“This was a normal operation for us here on The Bob,” informed a fire management employee who works for one of the Forests that administers the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex.

The 1.5 million-acre Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex, often referred to as “The Bob,” is comprised of the Great Bear Wilderness, the Bob Marshall Wilderness, and the Scapegoat Wilderness. Managed by four National Forests and five Ranger Districts, it represents the Lower 48 States’ third largest wilderness complex.

The northern edge of the Rice Ridge Fire, which started on July 24, 2017, located outside of the wilderness would merge with the Reef Fire within the boundary of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex on September 7.

The Rice Ridge Fire was being managed by a Type 1 Incident Management Team (IMT1). When this fire merged with the Reef Fire, the management of these two fires was also merged under the IMT1. In addition, the IMT1 was also managing the nearby Liberty Fire and was in discussions regarding assuming control of the Type 2 Park Fire, as well as managing a new fire start at the extreme east end of the Rice Ridge Fire.

National Wildfire Coordinating Group Definition

Point/Zone Protection – A wildfire response strategy which protects specific assets or highly valued resources from the wildfire without directly halting the continued spread of the wildfire.

Definition Extension – 1) Points or Zones being protected may be communities, individual structures, areas of high resource value, etc. 2) Continued wildfire spread may be desirable in order to achieve management objectives or may be inevitable due to extreme burning conditions, safety concerns, or other limitations. Other wildfire response strategies are: Monitoring, Confine, Contained, and Suppression.

Local Unit to Manage the Rice Ridge Fire A discussion occurred between the District Duty Officer and the IMT1 Operations Section Chief regarding the recently merged Reef Fire. It was decided that given the amount of activity on other portions of the Rice Ridge Fire and the knowledge and capabilities of the local unit, the values and tactical operations within the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex would be managed by the local unit.

The northern edge of the Rice Ridge Fire that was actively burning in the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex was being managed with a Point/Zone Protection Strategy (see definition above).

Wildland fires are a naturally occurring disturbance in the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex ecosystems. An objective of the wildland fire program is to allow fire to perform its natural role in the evolution and maintenance of these wilderness ecosystems.

The fire suppression strategy that was selected would provide Point Protection at several historic administrative cabins dotted within the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex, including the Hahn Cabin and the Jumbo Mountain Lookout. It was determined that these two structures were the primary infrastructure values within the fire area that could likely be impacted by wildfire.

The area of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex where these two values are located is remote. Hahn Cabin is nested in the Youngs Creek drainage of the South Fork of the Flathead River, with Jumbo Mountain Lookout perched 2.5 miles to the east.

Hahn Cabin is approximately 18 miles from the nearest trailhead. However, this trailhead route was impacted by wildfire and therefore had restricted access. Fire personnel would therefore be inserted via helicopter to implement Point Protection for Hahn Cabin, including wrapping the cabin and outbuildings with structure protection wrap and establishing a gravity feed water handling/sprinkler system and pump/sprinkler system for the structures.

The local District had a structure protection plan and structure wrapping supplies cached at the Ranger District.

Safety Zone Location Identified On August 29, a pair of local firefighters from the District Engine Crew were flown into Hahn Cabin to begin Point Protection. The flight in was relatively smoke free, allowing them to view the fire’s location, fire behavior, and adjacent fuels.

At that time, the fire was several miles away from the cabin. Prior to being inserted into the cabin, the two firefighters and their Duty Officer discussed that their Escape Route would be down Youngs Creek to the confluence of Danaher Creek, where their Safety Zone would be located. There was a considerable distance (4 miles) from the Hahn Cabin to this Safety Zone. When the two firefighters were inserted on September 11, the fire had moved to within a 1/8 to 1/4 mile of the cabin in places, providing a safety zone in the black, but they would have to travel through green to get to it. Upon further investigation and discussions with the previous two firefighters, they determined that the closer gravel bar on Youngs Creek would also be a viable Safety Zone. The two firefighters who were flown into Hahn Cabin on August 29 established the sprinkler system and structure protection-wrapped the cabin and its outbuilding (outhouse). The Fire is Backing Through Riparian Vegetation Over the course of the next several days, the two firefighters who had been inserted on August 29 set to work, first establishing a sprinkler system then wrapping the cabin and outbuilding. They completed this work by September 1, at which time their primary task became monitoring fire growth toward the cabin.

While monitoring the fire, one of the firefighters made a mental note that: “Fire was actively backing through riparian vegetation—it was burning green stuff.”

During the next ten days, the pair would travel between the confluence of Youngs Creek and Danaher Creek and the cabin several times. Three separate times, the pair decided that based on fire progress and fire behavior they would turn on the sprinklers and return to their Safety Zone at the confluence of the two creeks.

Depending on fire behavior and anticipated growth, the two spent the night either at the cabin or the confluence. After completing their 14 day assignment at Hahn Cabin, the pair got word from the District that they would transition out with two other firefighters.

Two New Firefighters Take Over Point Protection Operations On September 11, this crew swap occurs via helicopter and the new pair of firefighters take over protection of the Hahn Cabin. These two firefighters, one Single Resource Boss (SRB) and one Firefighter Type 2 (FFT2), transitioned with the other two firefighters who had been at Hahn Cabin the previous 13 days to continue Point Protection operations.

Prior to this insertion, both incoming firefighters had a satellite phone call with the outgoing firefighters. During the call, a brief operations update and a discussion of supply needs occurred.

Although the incoming firefighters flew to the cabin and attempted an aerial reconnaissance of the cabin and adjacent area, visibility was poor, adding to the less-than-ideal flight conditions due to smoke and wind (Red Flag conditions).

Because these conditions precluded the helicopter from shutting down, cargo and backhaul was swapped out quickly while the incoming and outgoing firefighters engaged in a short face-to-face briefing.

Identifying Escape Routes and Safety Zones Upon arrival at the cabin, the two incoming firefighters’ first task was to scout out Escape Routes and Safety Zones. They located two Safety Zones. One Safety Zone was in the black, with minimal snags, about a 25-minute walk west of the cabin but required an escape route through unburned vegetation. The second Safety Zone was a gravel bar situated to the north along Youngs Creek, located approximately 0.5 miles (a 7-minute walk) from the cabin.

The SRB believed that the fire would impact the cabin site during the course of the next few days and therefore wanted to ensure Safety Zones and Escape Routes were identified. Once their Escape Routes and Safety Zones were established, the two firefighters set to work replacing parts, repairing the water handling system, and test-firing the pumps.

In conjunction with ensuring the function of the water handling system, the two also scouted to the south, trying to establish a vantage point from which they could observe fire activity.

They spent the rest of their first day monitoring fire activity and working on projects at the cabin, in which they stayed overnight.

Fire Activity Increases The next day, September 12, the firefighters moved between the cabin and the gravel bar, monitoring the progress of the fire. This day was another Red Flag Day and fire activity was increasing as the morning turned into afternoon. (While the previous day had also been a Red Flag Day, the fire that day hadn’t made significant expansion.)

On September 12, with the increase in fire behavior, it became difficult for the personnel at Jumbo Mountain Lookout (pictured) to perform their duties. At approximately 2030, they moved from the lookout to their Safety Zone.

With the increase in fire behavior it became difficult for the personnel on Jumbo Mountain Lookout to serve as their lookout. In fact, given the direction of fire spread, the firefighters at the cabin were alternatively moving throughout the day between the cabin and the gravel bar to get eyes on Jumbo Mountain Lookout as well as the fire activity.

At this same time, from their location on the gravel bar, the two firefighters observed that the fire had spread closer to the southern Hahn Cabin area. They then headed back to the cabin to start the pumps and fire out around the cabin.

It was approximately 1800 when the firefighters at Hahn Cabin reported they would be starting pumps, firing and moving to the gravel bar.

Once at the cabin, the FFT2 secured the cabin, set out the SRB’s overnight gear, grabbed FFT2’s own overnight gear and hurriedly headed for the gravel bar. The SRB remained at the cabin to start the pumps, firing a few tactical fire strips north of the cabin. After that, the SRB snatched his overnight gear and started down the path for the gravel bar.

While exiting the area, the SRB noticed the fire was burning about 20 yards to the west into the timber.

The SRB was moving at a fast pace toward the gravel bar, noting that the main fire was paralleling him and there was group torching to the west. This observation caused the SRB to contemplate dropping his gear to expedite his retreat. However, he opted to just continue to the gravel bar without disposing of his drip torch and overnight gear.

Fire Progresses Around Gravel Bar – Enveloping Firefighters in Smoke and Ember Wash The SRB arrived at the gravel bar approximately ten minutes behind the FFT2 after starting the pump and completing firing operations. The SRB noticed that the FFT2 had their fire shelter out of their pack, still in the plastic container, holding it in their arms. The SRB and the FFT2 settled in at the gravel bar and made a satellite call back to the local unit to let them know that they had completed their work and had retreated to the gravel bar.

The two firefighters planned to spend the night on the gravel bar and had their overnight gear to do so.

Over the next 3-4 hours the fire would progress around the gravel bar. The fire burned in pulses. Each pulse of fire growth enveloped the firefighters in more smoke and more ember wash.

Approximately 20 Minutes Prior to Shelter Deployment

Photos taken by the firefighters while at the gravel bar on September 12 depict fire behavior and fire progress in the area adjacent to the gravel bar approximately 20 minutes prior to the shelter deployment.

Decision Made to Deploy Fire Shelter At approximately 2000 hours, during the second pulse of smoke and embers, the pair made the decision to deploy FFT2’s fire shelter. Both firefighters then climbed into this single shelter to provide protection from the smoke and embers that were encompassing them.

The Gravel Bar – Entrapment Site

“It wasn’t business as usual. But we believed that we were in a good spot and felt comfortable.”

“Nothing had held (the fire spread) this year—not fire scars, aspen stands, or bodies of water.”

The Single Resource Boss Commenting on their gravel bar Safety Zone.

This photo was taken on September 12 at 2145 from the Jumbo Mountain Lookout.

For the most part, the two stayed inside the deployed shelter until 2130. Occasionally the SRB lifted the edge of the shelter to survey the fire behavior. By this time, the fire activity near the gravel bar and cabin had subsided. However, the pair felt the safest option was not to return to the cabin due to snag hazards and areas of unburned fuel between the gravel bar and the cabin.

At 2230, the firefighters pulled out their overnight gear and spent the night on the gravel bar.

Fire Behavior Moderates At 0630 the next day, September 13, the two firefighters headed back to secure and mop-up around the cabin. Neither of the firefighters sustained injury, but it was definitely uncomfortable to spend time in the smoke and ember wash.

The gear pack that the firefighters had with them at the gravel bar did sustain damage from falling embers (see photo below) along with a few discolored spots on their flame resistant clothing.

Despite the previous day’s conditions that resulted in very active fire behavior in the area, it would rain and snow at Hahn Cabin on Photo taken during a helicopter reconnaissance of the fire area on September 27, 2017. September 13 and 14. The two firefighters spent September 13-14 at the cabin securing the site by mopping up the area around the cabin and dismantling the water handling system.

Firefighter’s gear pack shows The onset of moisture resulted in a moderation of fire behavior and fire urgency. burn holes sustained from falling embers. See Appendix Thus, the two firefighters were instructed to begin their long 48-mile hike out of the for shelter photos. Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex on September 15. (In alignment with the wilderness ethic, the firefighters would hike out versus incurring a helicopter landing in the wilderness.) Unfortunately, due to the Rice Ridge Fire footprint, a more direct hiking route was not accessible to firefighters. However, they would be able to ferry their gear out of the wilderness on a pack string. They would spend that first night at Big Prairie Work Center. The second night, September 16, they stayed at Black Bear Cabin. The two were picked up on September 17 at the Meadow Creek Trailhead.

Capitalize on Learning Later that evening, the topic of deployment or “getting out the big foil” was discussed during a debriefing. Neither firefighter really considered this event as an “actual” fire shelter deployment within a safety zone. Fire managers for the District recognized the seriousness of the situation and that the actions that occurred did meet the definition of a shelter deployment. First and foremost, local fire managers wanted to ensure to address the health and welfare of the two firefighters. They also wanted to capitalize on any learning that might be beneficial for others.

Notifications were made by the District Duty Officer to Forest-level fire management on September 17 and the Regional-level fire management the next day. In addition, the local fire management arranged for a Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) engagement.

After discussion among the various levels of fire management, it was initially decided that the District would begin the Rapid Lesson Sharing (RLS) review process. However, a Facilitated Learning Analysis Team was ordered.

3. Discussion Points

A. Safety Zone The Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG) defines “Safety Zone” as: “A Safety Zone is an area where a firefighter can survive without a Fire Shelter.” Do you feel this is an adequate definition? What would you recommend? The two firefighters at Hahn Cabin believe they would have survived without a fire shelter and utilized it to protect themselves from firebrands and smoke, thus meeting this definition.

What one firefighter sees as a “Safety Zone”, another may not. Even with guidelines, Safety Zones are opinions until the fire proves it.

The Safety Zone guidelines (IRPG page 8) ask firefighters to imagine average flame height. Newer draft guidelines require calculations with a slope judgement and wind speed prediction. Safety Zone assessment is not an exact science, but the guidelines are the accepted way to judge one.

The two firefighters scouted, flagged and timed a safety zone (in the black, relatively free from snags) approximately one mile to the north of the Hahn Cabin. If they were to use this Safety Zone, they would need to use it before fire activity increased—this potential escape route went through a portion of green timber. They also judged the gravel bar as a Safety Zone. It was only half of a mile from the cabin.

The firefighters discussed burning out around the gravel bar and moving from one side to the other. Judging from past incidents, burning out to increase a Safety Zone is sometimes successful. However, moving from one side of the Safety Zone to the other is not always possible—especially if fire impacts the entire area at one time.

In this incident, the two firefighters used their Safety Zone to avoid significant ember wash and smoke, not necessarily radiant heat from flames or superheated gasses as might be more common in entrapment sites.

For more insights and discussion on this topic, see the following: 2017 Incident Review Summary, Page 10 - Call it What it is – Entrapment https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/annual-incident-review-summaries

B. Deploying the Fire Shelter With crown fire and group torching in the area, the two firefighters were being pelted with burning embers for the second time. This second wave was much more intense than the first. Finding themselves being smothered by heavy smoke and not certain if it would get worse, the FFT2 made the decision that deploying a single fire shelter made sense.

For more insights and discussion on this topic, see the following: Fall 2011 Two More Chains – Your Fire Shelter: Would You Hesitate Deploying It? https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/two-more-chains-fall-2011pdf

The FFT2 tore the shelter’s PVC bag tear strip, grabbed the shake handles, and deployed the shelter. (The physical act of deploying the shelter was performed exactly how we train to do so.)

The SRB soon joined the FFT2 inside the shelter. Finding relief from the burning embers and heavy smoke, they stayed inside the shelter for approximately one hour. During that hour, a third wave of embers, heat and smoke impacted the shelter.

From page 5 of The New Generation Fire Shelter training booklet: “While the fire shelter is considered a last resort, it can also protect you from falling embers or thick smoke. You should not hesitate to use your shelter to protect yourself. Do not worry about the cost of the fire shelter—your safety is always the highest priority.”

C. Lookout(s) Symbiotic Lookouts: Normally, Jumbo Mountain Lookout would have a clear view into the Hahn Cabin area. However, due to smoke, visibility was intermittent. Knowing the visibility challenge, the two firefighters needed to walk to different areas around the cabin to see the areas of concern up-close.

They were also able to act as a lookout for the folks up on Jumbo Mountain Lookout. Thus, the personnel on the ground were very much in tune with maintaining the “L” in LCES—even though it proved to be very challenging.

D. Structure Protection Plan Backcountry structures have been protected from wildland fire impacts more than 40 times on the Spotted Bear Ranger District. During six of these incidents, structures have been impacted by fire. At the time of this incident, five other structures on the District were being protected from other fires.

The Spotted Bear Ranger District has a structure protection plan for its backcountry assets. It focuses on logistical needs: amount of structure wrap, staples, amount of time, as well as LCES and safety concerns.

From the Spotted Bear Ranger District Structure Protection Plan for Hahn Cabin:

Safety – LCES Lookouts  Jumbo Mountain LO is ~ 2.5 miles east. This vantage point can see entire area around the site as well as specific attributes of the site.  Junction of Trail #125 and Trail #141 north of Youngs Creek affords a view east south and west of the cabin site.

Communications  Handheld Radio . Direct to: Jumbo Mountain LO, Mud Lake LO, Big Prairie Work Center. . Repeaters: Jumbo Repeater.

 Cell Phone Coverage: None.  Satellite Phone: Check with Rec./Wilderness regarding location and batteries.

Escape Routes  Trail #125 – Maintained open north and south. . Downstream (north) – Heavy timber in a narrow canyon for 7 miles to 2003 burned area (Gordon Creek), then 1 mile to junction with Trail #80, then north 1 mile on Trail #80 to Cayuse Meadow. . Upstream (south) – Heavy timber 5 miles to 2001 burn (Monture Creek), then 3 miles to Hahn Creek Pass.

 Trail #141 – West 16 miles to Pyramid Pass Heavy Timber.

Safety Zones – Options must be confirmed at time of fire, based on fire behavior.  No Safety Zones on site.  7 miles to recently burned area northeast of Trail #125 (Gordon Creek, 2003).  Bear Park ~ 6 miles south on Trail #125 (burned in 2001, Monture).

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An updated plan will include more in the areas of strategy and tactics as well as gaming of different fire scenarios: When to burn? What distance between the cabin and the main fire is appropriate? What time of day to burn? Need a formal burn plan with anchor, holding and secure it—or just a ring around the cabin?

Different fire scenarios and plans have different complexity. Different complexities require different levels of qualifications.

In the IRPG, pages 12-16, “Wildland Urban Interface Firefighting”, it may not sound like a backcountry cabin, but much is the same. Many decision points for structure protection can be influenced by asking one question: “Is a Safety Zone present?” Structure size-up and triage topics provide additional considerations.

E. The Big Picture Are you prepared for a 2017-type fire season? How many assignments have you or your crew had back-to-back? Have you been able to debrief and “reset” with your coworkers, leaders and crew? Are stressors from your last assignment affecting how you think, communicate and act on this assignment? Are you watching out for the physical, mental and emotional fatigue of an extended, high-tempo season for yourself and others up and down the chain of command? Have discussions among AA and FMOs, Duty Officers and IC’s, Single Resource Bosses and firefighters. The Northern Rockies 2017 fire season far exceeded expectations. No matter what geographical area, these types of seasons are not going away. Discuss possible challenges you might face in a 2017-type fire season for your area—imagine extreme cases.

F. The Safety “Margin” All employees want the margin for safety to be as big as possible. This is especially true for operations on the fireline. Firefighters, fireline leadership, incident commanders, fire managers, and agency administrators all have a role in creating the margin for safety on the fireline. This section will explore the many ways to build margin into planning and implementation during a wildfire.

The focus for this Facilitated Learning Analysis is learning, so what were the multiple factors affecting the margin for safety for those firefighters assigned to Hahn Cabin? First, let’s think about their mission, which was: Protect Hahn Cabin.

The Agency Administrator, Resource Advisors (READS), and the FMO/Duty Officer all have an initial influence on the amount of risk to which firefighters are exposed based on the decision to protect—or not—the value at risk.

In this instance, the values were Hahn Cabin and several other back country cabins dotted within the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Options for backcounty cabins could include: no protection, protect by wrapping with no staffing, protect by wrapping/use sprinklers and staffing, and wrap/use sprinklers/burnout with staffing. How do upstream decisions by management impact downstream on-the-ground decisions, as well as firefighter exposure and risk?

What is the Acceptable Risk? What is the acceptable risk of each of these options? What environmental factors adjacent to a value could affect the amount of risk it might take to protect it?

The cabin system in the Bob Marshall Wilderness is an important component of the U.S. Forest Service’s management of this vast area and it is on the National Historic Register. During the past 20 years, Forest Service cabins in the Bob were often threatened by large wilderness fires.

While wrapping these cabin is a “normal operation” on the Spotted Bear Ranger District, the fire actually reaching them is infrequent. Each of these cabin sites is different in fuels, terrain, and access to Safety Zones, communications and potential to post a lookout.

Ways to build margin into structure protection plans include creating plans that do not require staffing. Beside fuel reduction around structures, consider fuel reduction around pre-identified Safety Zones if staffing is desired.

Important Questions The joint decision to staff the cabin has been made. Now put yourself in the role of an IC, Duty Officer, or Line Officer. What kind of resource do you assign to staff the cabin? What level of qualification should that leader of the resource assigned to the cabin have? Consider all the potential qualification levels of this leader (FFT1 to SRB to STL/TFLD to DIVS).

The complexity of the operation (firing vs not firing) and the environmental conditions (fuels, fire danger, etc.) would need to be considered when determining the level of qualification.

On August 10, the Planning Level elevated to “5” nationally. Montana had been engaged in its fire season since mid- July. Could this factor into your decisions?

On August 29, the initial pair of firefighters were flown into the Hahn Cabin. At that time the Reef Fire was 646 acres and 6 miles west of the cabin. The objectives were to wrap the cabin, set up sprinklers and monitor the fire.

What Would You be Thinking About? If you were assigned to protect a cabin like this what would you be thinking about? The plan is to transport you into the wilderness and leave you at the cabin for up to a 14-day assignment.

How would the cabin’s location and significance affect your margin? What questions would you ask about this assignment?

What conditions might precipitate a change in tactics or shift in strategy? When is the right time as firefighters when we determine it is just simply time to disengage? Further, how can we be comfortable with that decision knowing that values might be lost or damaged?

The two firefighters involved perceived that their previous assignment had ended in an assignment turndown. If you had to terminate a previous operation because of safety concerns are you “looking for a win”? Is your desire for operational success affecting your decision making? If you have ever turned down an assignment did you feel pressure to accept the next one? As a leader, can you appreciate the human factors at play after a resource has turned down an

15 assignment or negotiated a change for safety reasons? What are some ways a leader can ensure that safe decisions are as highly valued as decisions that meet operational objectives?

Assume the Role of IC or Duty Officer Now assume the role of the IC or Duty Officer. What subjects would you want to cover while briefing firefighters being sent in to protect one of these cabins?

What is the level of readiness of your resources? Have you taken time to assess the level of cumulative stress and fatigue? The Duty Officer perceived that the two fire fighters had just completed a successful assignment where they had made an informed decision about risk and were ready and well prepared to take a similar assignment. Could debriefing previous assignments give you clues to how your resources perceive their situation? Might a quality debriefing allow all parties to come to a common perception of the situation to date, and is that important in providing a clear message of Leader’s Intent?

Smoke effects your margin by reducing visibility due to the fact that there are so many large fires occurring at this time in your area. (To get a sense of how smoky it was in Montana during this time, on August 29 the “Northern Rockies Coordination Center Detailed Situation Report” had 44 large fires for a combined 271,723 acres.)

Jumbo Mountain Lookout is located on a ridgetop 2.5 miles east of Hahn Cabin. The lookout had many days of reduced visibility. In addition, the ability to effectively employ aerial reconnaissance to observe and map the fire was minimal.

If you are smoked-in at Hahn Cabin how do you know where the fire is and what it is doing?

While nightly IR flights were occurring which showed fire growth, real-time intelligence of what the fire was doing was often limited.

What Do You Know about Transitions? Transitions can also affect the margin. The transition between the previous firefighters’ staffing the cabin and the two incoming firefighters—a Single Resource Boss (SRB) and Firefighter Type 2 (FFT2)—happened the day before they arrived via a satellite phone call. Then, when they arrived at the Hahn Cabin on September 11 via helicopter, they had a brief face-to-face conversation with the two outgoing firefighters as the helicopter was waiting to extract the previous pair of firefighters. Due to the smoky conditions, the pilot did not want to shut down the helicopter at the risk of being smoked out.

How might this situation have affected the information shared during this personnel transition?

New ICT4 Transition In addition, the new ICT4 transitioned at 1020 the morning of September 12. This IC, who also had responsibilities for the Monahan Fire, is sitting in the same room with the Duty Officer at the Spotted Bear Ranger District with oversite of structure protection operations at Hahn Cabin, Jumbo Mountain Lookout, Basin Cabin, and Danaher Cabin.

There had been several ICT4s assigned to this incident over the previous several weeks. This new IC will be in place for two days during which the previous IC will take R&R and then return.

The incoming ICT4, who was given an overview of where the structure protection operations were, had trust in the plan that was previously developed and was being implemented. Because all of the structure protection was occurring far away in the wilderness, radio and satellite phone was the link from the IC to these resources.

What kind of challenges would you as an IC have managing an incident in this way?

Duty Officer Transition Another important transition occurred on September 10 when the Duty Officer changed as one of the three local Duty Officers returned from an off-Forest fire assignment.

The outgoing Duty Officer was going to help with a Type 3 fire that had recently moved from the Spotted Bear Ranger District into the neighboring Forest. The third local Duty Officer was also off-Forest on a fire assignment.

All three Duty Officers have extensive knowledge of the fire management operation in the Bob Marshall Wilderness.

How Do You Ensure that You’re Receiving the Right Information? How do you ensure that you are giving or receiving enough information during a transition? How about the right information?

Briefing templates help with the quality of a briefing. Detailed notes also help.

What can improve with a more in-depth transition to increase the margin of safety? Longer transition periods often provide the opportunity for deeper knowledge transfer and increased situational awareness. Consideration should also be given to swapping on-the-ground crewmembers at different times and stagger transitions of crew and overhead.

Share Risk Dialogue at All Levels Wildland Fire Risk and Complexity Assessment for long-term fires needs to be reevaluated often. The Red Book’s Appendix E and F provides information that may be valuable in assessing complexity. This is a subjective process; multiple viewpoints can facilitate dialogue. ICs, the Agency Administrator, and Duty Officers/FMOs need to ensure that risk dialogue is shared at all levels.

G. Roles/Responsibilities, Delegation and Communication When the Reef Fire and the Rice Ridge Fire burned together on September 6, there was an IMT1 managing Rice Ridge and an ICT4 managing Reef. There were also several other fires burning within the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex. There was a Delegation of Authority and from the Flathead National Forest for the Rice Ridge Fire with designated agency representatives.

The IMT1 Operations Section Chief and the local Duty Officer discussed the merging of the incidents and transfer of command. They agreed upon an operational course of action for the portion of the fire where the entrapment and fire shelter deployment occurred. However, there was not a new or validated Delegation of Authority once the fire merged and details about role responsibility and communication at large could have been more clear.

Without a new or revised Delegation of Authority, individuals can be left to their own interpretations and assumptions regarding Leader’s Intent, lacking communication structure, and reduced clarity in specific roles and responsibilities at varying levels.

At a minimum, the current delegation should be reevaluated and revalidated in a complex fire season in which: fires are merging, fire footprints span multiple units, and fire and Forest leadership are operating at high tempos.

What form of transition is needed to pass the command from the previous local organization to the team that’s taking over?—WFDDS coordination to add values at risk and new MAPs for the additional fire and associated unit(s)?

Is there an assumption or “a given” that the current Agency Administrator is now the AA for a merged fire? How will communication work and what are the assigned roles and responsibilities associated with these roles?

4. Timeline

Hahn Cabin Incident/Rice Ridge Fire Timeline

July 24, 2017 – Rice Ridge Fire starts on the Seeley Lake Ranger District of the Lolo National Forest.

August 13 – Reef Fire starts in the Bob Marshall Wilderness on the Spotted Bear Ranger District, Flathead National Forest.

August 26 – Rice Ridge Fire spreads from the Lolo National Forest onto Flathead National Forest.

August 29 – Hahn Cabin staffed by two firefighters from the District Engine Crew to set up structure protection on cabin which will be threatened by the Reef Fire. The plan is to wrap the cabin, and outhouse, and to set up a hose lay with sprinklers around the structures.

August 30/31 – Hahn Cabin plumbed and wrap completed.

September 3 – Both Rice Ridge and Reef fires show significant growth. The two firefighters turn on sprinklers at Hahn Cabin and temporarily leave the area by hiking 5 miles north (away from the fire) to the confluence of Youngs Creek and Danaher Creek.

September 6 – Rice Ridge Fire burns into Reef Fire and is now considered the Rice Ridge Fire. An IMT1 was already assigned to the Rice Ridge Fire.

September 7 – Big Prairie Work Center radios the two firefighters to inform them that they can see a 20,000- foot smoke column from the fire. The firefighters turn on the sprinklers and once again head north 5 miles to the confluence of Youngs and Danaher creeks.

September 9 – The two firefighters scout the fire’s edge and a spot fire up Hahn Creek located behind Hahn Cabin. That evening, they start the pump and hike north toward the confluence of Youngs and Danaher creeks.

September 10 – The two firefighters return to Hahn Cabin and scout the new fire’s edge, noting that the fire has spread toward Pilot Peak, north of Youngs Creek.

September 11 – At 1430 hours, the transition of the two-person module at Hahn Cabin occurs via helicopter. The two firefighters are replaced by one Single Resource Boss (SRB) and one Firefighter Type 2 (FFT2). There is a Red Flag Warning.

September 12 – The fire burns actively late in the afternoon. The new two-person module makes the decision to turn on sprinklers and do some firing adjacent to the cabin. Afterwards, they hike to a nearby gravel bar (they considered a Safety Zone). A fire shelter was deployed to protect the firefighters from ember wash and heavy smoke as the fire moved through the area. They spend the night on the gravel bar.

September 13 – At 0630, the two firefighters leave the gravel bar and return back to Hahn Cabin. The cabin is unburned. They spend the day mopping up. It rains and snows at the cabin.

September 14 – Rain and snow continues to occur at Hahn Cabin.

September 15 – The two firefighters hike 12 miles from Hahn Cabin to Big Prairie Work Center and spend the night.

September 16 – They hike to Black Bear Cabin and spend the night there.

September 17 – The two firefighters are picked up at the Meadow Creek Trailhead.

5. Conclusion

In selecting our strategies and tactics, how much do we decrease or increase our margin? If an operation includes a shelter deployment with no injuries, how far out do you think you really were? How high up does that operation need to be reconsidered?

Finally, how much of a contradiction is it to carry a tool whose very use triggers a review? This very fact, known to wildland firefighters, creates its own strong stigma. We carry the weight of this tool every day on the line. Beyond its weight, how and where do we deploy this tool—or do we think about it at all? We must think and talk openly about the real possibility that in firefighting, even our best decisions can lead us to entrapments, and that in these situations we should not hesitate to use all of our tools.

6. FLA Team Members

Lori Bell District Ranger Caribou-Targhee National Forest, Westside Ranger District

Lathan Johnson Fuels Program Lead Upper Colorado River Interagency Fire Management

Paul Keller Technical Writer-Editor Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center

Tony Petrilli Equipment Specialist Missoula Technology and Development Center

Tara Umphries Wildland Fire Management Specialist Rocky Mountain Regional Office

7. Appendix – Photos of Fire Shelter After Deployment

The shelter shows some delamination caused by abrasion during the deployment.

Signs of a few embers causing discoloration can be seen on the shelter.