Late Comment Letters for North River Farms Revised Final Environmental Impact Report Volume II, Responses to Comments
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Late Comment Letters for North River Farms Revised Final Environmental Impact Report Volume II, Responses to Comments Prepared by: 605 Third Street Encinitas, California 92024 Contact: Brian Grover NOVEMBER 2019 Printed on 30% post-consumer recycled material. LATE COMMENT LETTERS FOR NORTH RIVER FARMS REVISED FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT L1 LATE LETTERS OF OPPOSITION The City notes these multiple comments in opposition of the project. These comments express general concerns regarding General Plan consistency, greenhouse gas emissions, smart growth, growth inducement, population and housing, pollution, agricultural resources, infrastructure, traffic, fire safety, and flooding, which received extensive analysis in the Final EIR and the Recirculated Final EIR. Specifically, refer to Appendices T0 and W0 of the Revised FEIR. These comments do not raise any specific issue regarding that analysis, and no more specific response can therefore be provided or is required. The City will include the comment as part of the Revised FEIR for review and consideration by the decision-makers prior to a final decision on the project. North River Farms Revised Final Environmental Impact Report 9759 November 2019 I LATE COMMENT LETTERS FOR NORTH RIVER FARMS REVISED FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK North River Farms Revised Final Environmental Impact Report 9759 November 2019 2 LATE COMMENT LETTERS FOR NORTH RIVER FARMS REVISED FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT L2 LATE LETTERS OF SUPPORT The City notes these multiple comments in support of the project. These comments do not raise any specific issue regarding the project’s environmental analysis; no further response is therefore required. The City will include the comment as part of the Revised FEIR for review and consideration by the decision-makers prior to a final decision on the project. North River Farms Revised Final Environmental Impact Report 9759 November 2019 3 LATE COMMENT LETTERS FOR NORTH RIVER FARMS REVISED FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK North River Farms Revised Final Environmental Impact Report 9759 November 2019 4 LATE COMMENT LETTERS FOR NORTH RIVER FARMS REVISED FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT L3 PHIL JOHNSTON This comment letter contends that the Revised FEIR does not adequately address public safety impacts from flooding due to a dam failure as it relates to Henshaw Dam. The comment states that the North River Farms Revised FEIR is dismissive of concerns raised about the risk of dam failure, is unsupported by useful references, and contains statements about dam safety which are false. The comments are mistaken, and the previously provided responses to comments address these comments. Though CEQA does not require written responses to late comments submitted after the noticed public comment period (Pub. Resources Code, §§21091(d) and 21092.5(c); CEQA Guidelines, §15088), this letter is provided to correct the record. The Revised FEIR Analyzes Potential Impacts from Flooding from Dam Failure and Concludes Such Effects would be Less than Significant The EIR was modified to address public comments that the southern portion of the project site may be located within the dam inundation zone of Henshaw Dam. The Revised FEIR, Section 4.10.4 at pages 4.10-17 through 4.10-18 explains that it appears that the southern-most portion of the proposed project site, which would be retained in agricultural use, may be located within the Henshaw dam inundation area. The Revised FEIR ultimately concludes, however, that the project would not “expose people or structures to a significant risk of loss, injury or death involving flooding as a result of the failure of a levee or dam,” and, therefore, would not result in a significant impact under CEQA. This conclusion is based on a number of facts: First, since being built in 1923, the capacity of Henshaw Dam has been severely reduced—from 203,581 acre-feet to a limit of 50,000 acre-feet.1 Second, while the average water level of Lake Henshaw is generally retained at a much lower level than its maximum capacity, the water level averages about 11,600 acre-feet over 12 months. 2 (City of Oceanside General Plan, Public Safety Element, p. 29.) Third, Henshaw Dam received a condition assessment of “Satisfactory,” the highest condition rating achievable, from the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD). 3 This “Satisfactory” rating means: 1 Refer to City of Oceanside General Plan, Public Safety Element (2002), p. 29. Available at <https://www.ci.oceanside.ca.us/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=24949>. 2 Id. 3 “Dams within Jurisdiction of the State of California, Dam Rating Information, DSOD, September 2018, p. 40. Available at < https://water.ca.gov/-/media/DWR-Website/Web-Pages/Programs/All- Programs/Division-of-Safety-of-Dams/Files/Publications/Dams-Within-Jurisdiction-of-the-State-of- California-2018-Alphabetically-by-Dam-Name.pdf>. North River Farms Revised Final Environmental Impact Report 9759 November 2019 5 LATE COMMENT LETTERS FOR NORTH RIVER FARMS REVISED FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT No existing or potential dam safety deficiencies are recognized. Acceptable performance is expected under all loading conditions (static, hydrologic, seismic) in accordance with the applicable regulatory criteria or tolerable risk guidelines.”4 Dam failure, and adverse impacts therefrom, are therefore unlikely as Henshaw Dam is generally in good condition with no existing or potential dam safety issues recognized. Fourth, as explained in the City’s General Plan, “Henshaw dam is an earthfill dam that is not subject to the sudden catastrophic failure usually associated with concrete arch-type dams. Even if failure did occur, it would be of a slower, erosive type, resulting in less severe peak flows, allowing ample time for evacuation of downstream residents.”5 Fifth, the project site is located 29 miles west of the Dam, assuring ample time for evacuation of downstream residents—particularly when combined with a likely slower, erosive type failure were any dam failure to occur at this dam in good condition. Sixth, the area of the project site identified as within the dam inundation area (assuming a “worst case scenario”) condition includes southern-most portion of the project site, which would be retained in agricultural uses and not contain structures. 6 Note also that the Flow Retardation Structure, discussed below, was not yet in place and/or ignored in modeling the inundation area. Seventh, the project would implement grading and flood control improvements to remove all housing and structures from outside the 100-year flood hazard zone, which would likewise serve to remove most if not all such housing and structures from the dam inundation zone. As the General Plan notes, accommodation of a “100-year flood” within the channel would be “more than adequate size to handle any anticipated flooding caused by the failure of Henshaw Dam.”7 The EIR therefore concluded that the project’s potential to expose people or structures to a significant risk of loss, injury, or death due to flooding caused by dam inundation is not considered significant. Additional Analysis Provided May 15, 2019 Further Demonstrates the Project would Not Result in Significant Impacts related to Dam Inundation. On May 15, 2019, and following up on his testimony before the Planning Commission, Mr. Tory R. Walker, PE, CFM, LEED GA further responded to comments concerning potential significant impacts related to dam inundation. 8 Mr. Walker is a registered Professional Engineer, a Certified 4 “Dam Rating Information,” DSOD, August 2017, p. 2. Available at <https://water.ca.gov/LegacyFiles/damsafety/docs/Facts%20Sheet.pdf>. 5 City of Oceanside General Plan, Public Safety Element, p. 29. 6 City of Oceanside General Plan, Public Safety Element, p. 29, 31. 7 City of Oceanside General Plan, Public Safety Element, p. 31. 8 Letter from Tory R. Walker Engineering to City of Oceanside Re: Henshaw Dam Breach Analyses, dated May 15, 2019. North River Farms Revised Final Environmental Impact Report 9759 November 2019 6 LATE COMMENT LETTERS FOR NORTH RIVER FARMS REVISED FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT Floodplain Manager, and a widely recognized stormwater quality expert, with 35 years’ experience in water resources planning and engineering. Further, Mr. Walker is experienced in dam breach analysis, having prepared seven dam breach analyses under the jurisdiction of the California Department of Water Resources, DSOD, and written a paper on how to estimate dam breach parameters, “the most critical component of these studies.”9 The May 15, 2019 letter evaluated two Henshaw Dam inundation studies, dated 1991 and 2018, which had been cited by Mr. Johnson for the proposition that the project would result in significant impacts from exposing people or structures to a significant risk of loss, injury, or death due to flooding caused by dam inundation. Mr. Walker concluded, based on his expert review of these studies, that these studies provided no evidence of significant impacts; and the studies were adopted for modeling purposes only with extremely conservative, unreasonable assumptions. The 1991 study identified the southern portion of the project site within a dam inundation area with an inundation zone for Henshaw. However, on review of the study and assumptions made in the modeling, Mr. Walker concluded that the “1991 study is very conservative and that the 2018 study is impossible.”10 The 1991 study was done using conservative federal regulations, which ignored the presence of the Flow Retardation Structure constructed on the downstream face of the dam in 1981.11 The Flow Retardation Structure was added to the dam to address seismic risk and prevent catastrophic flooding downstream: The primary function of the flow retardation structure is: (1) to retain reservoir water in the event of failure of the Henshaw Dam by an earthquake, (2) to prevent catastrophic discharge of water downstream, (3) to provide added stability to the downstream slope of the old dam, and (4) to ensure resistance to, and control of piping in the old dam in the event of fault displacement.