The Difficult Rapprochement Between Spain and Equatorial Guinea
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Area: Europe - ARI Nº 18/2004 2/26/2004 The difficult rapprochement between Spain and Equatorial Guinea Carlos Ruiz Miguel ∗ Subject: Various attempts have been made to improve the strained nature of the relationship between Spain and Equatorial Guinea. The strange incident involving the departure and sudden return of the naval vessels Patiño and Canarias demonstrates the difficulty of rebuilding relations between the two countries even at times when their interests appear to converge. Summary: The despatch of two Spanish naval vessels to the Gulf of Guinea is an unprecedented act in the history of Spanish-Guinean relations. The reasons behind this mission were not sufficiently explained and no convincing explanation for the counter- order was given either. One wonders if the action had something to do with internal or external Guinean politics. If internal, what was the meaning of a Spanish naval presence? If external, it may have been related to one of the frontier squabbles with its neighbours. In either case, the key reason could be the strategic oilfields off the Guinean coast. Analysis: Decolonisation of Equatorial Guinea occurred on October 12th 1968. At that time the territory consisted of Rio Muni on the mainland and the islands of Fernando Poo (now Bioko), Annobon, Corisco and other nearby islands (Elobey Grande, Elobey Chico, Mbañé and Cocoteros). It was a traumatic event. Spain destroyed the dreams of independence cherished by the Bubis, who inhabited the islands. They feared –what was in fact to happen– domination by the Fang, who lived on the mainland. Furthermore and despite Spanish control of the electoral process, the first president of the new republic was the candidate most hostile to Spain, Francisco Macías Nguema. He very quickly turned into a corrupt and bloody tyrant. Macías not only expelled Spanish businessmen but also other Spaniards who were involved in work such as education, health and religion. The vast majority of Spaniards fled in fear, after being stripped of their belongings, rather than be murdered by marauding gangs of fanatics. The president then aligned his foreign policy with the oriental version of communism and built close ties with China and North Korea. The revolt led by Macías’ nephew, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, at first enjoyed a certain amount of Spanish sympathy although it does not appear that Spain had anything to do with it. It was soon seen that domestic policy would change little. Despite some cosmetic moves, the Fang continued to dominate and the Bubi population was completely marginalised. Under Macias the dominant Fang tribe had been the Mongomo (from an inland area of Rio Muni) and they continued in this role. Although the most sinister aspects of Macías’ rule (such as cannibalism) disappeared, the new regime continued to act in a tyrannical fashion. Electoral processes were falsified, there were systematic violations of human rights and widespread corruption. These circumstances (ethnic tension and despotic policies) were behind a number of revolts that failed, including the attempt by Severo Moto and the Bubi revolts. In addition, coups were invented as an excuse to hunt down the most active members of the domestic opposition (as in the case ∗ Chair of Constitutional Law of the Santiago de Compostela University 1 Area: Europe - ARI Nº 18/2004 2/26/2004 of Placido Micó) or to settle scores among members of the dominant clan (as in the case of Felipe Ondó). However, although the new regime made few changes to domestic policy, more significant changes were made in foreign policy. The first and most important of these was to encourage reconciliation with Spain. At the same time, the country distanced itself from the communist regimes. In the African arena, Obiang started to co-operate with Morocco’s King Hassan. From then onwards, Moroccan soldiers formed the dictator’s ‘Praetorian Guard’. In exchange, Obiang made Equatorial Guinea one of the African states that defended the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara in the OAU and at the UN. He also approved some Islamic missions sponsored by Hassan. For his part, the Moroccan King arranged for Equatorial Guinea to become part of the Francophone economic area (replacing the Guinean peseta with the CFA franc) and brought it into the area of French cultural influence (the Francophonie). From then on, Obiang could put pressure on Spain by threatening to join the French camp. Indeed, there were several crises in Spanish- Guinean relations. The worst was perhaps in 1993 when the Spanish consul in Bata was expelled for “being involved in domestic affairs”. The Spanish government responded by expelling an Equatorial Guinean diplomat, cutting financial aid by half and interrupting its aid programme. However, various international events have steadily altered this scenario. The first was the discovery of oil in 1995. After Hispanoil (a Spanish company) and Elf (the French company that operates the oil fields in neighbouring Gabon) failed, the US companies Mobil Oil and UMC started commercial operations in the Zafiro field. From that point on, Equatorial Guinea appeared on the map of US geopolitical interests in the area. There were many reasons for this. The small country contains important oil reserves. In December 2002, the confirmed reserves of Equatorial Guinea were put at 563.5 million barrels. The aggregate figure for the entire Gulf of Guinea has been estimated at between 5% and 10% of the world’s reserves (in 2001 experts put confirmed West African reserves at 90,000 barrels –a very respectable figure). These oilfields are also safer to operate as they are situated offshore and transport from the gulf to North America is also safer and cheaper. In addition, there is no serious cultural friction between Equatorial Guinea and the US (unlike the situation in the Persian Gulf). Almost by chance then, the country became one of the important prizes in Africa in terms of US strategic interests –basically in the face of French competition. The second event was the consolidation of a deepening strategic alliance between Spain and the US during the second term of the Aznar government. The third event, which was closely linked to the previous one, was disagreement with France over several important issues (the invasion of the island of Perejil, the conflict in Western Sahara and the debate over the European constitution). The fourth and final event was Gabon’s invasion of Mbañé, an Equatorial Guinean islet, coveted for some time by France first and then by Gabon. The problem acquired a new dimension when it was found that there were extraordinary oil deposits in the waters around Mbañé. This has occurred at a time when oil output in Gabon is dropping alarmingly (in 2003 Gabon’s oil income was 268 billion CFA francs, down from 466 billion CFA francs in 2000). Together, the new circumstances have led to a new scenario. At present Spanish and Guinean interests have more than ever in common. First, the Mbañé conflict is seen not as a conflict between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea but as a conflict between Elf (a French oil company that controls Gabon, where the oil reserves are running out) and the US oil companies that control the growing reserves in Guinea. In this context, Spain’s relations with the US contribute to an objective approximation of Spanish and Equatorial Guinean positions. Secondly, the dispute has been put to international arbitration by the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, who has placed the case in the hands of a Canadian lawyer, Yves Fortier. As it turns out the key documents that support Equatorial 2 Area: Europe - ARI Nº 18/2004 2/26/2004 Guinea’s ownership of the islet are… in the hands of Spain. Furthermore, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Ana Palacio, during her visit to Guinea in November 2003, left the Quai d’Orsay deeply concerned by stating that Spain has documents that prove Spanish sovereignty of the island prior to independence. Thirdly, the necessary Spanish support in the Mbañé dispute and the good relationship with the US might explain why, since June 2003, Repsol has won licences in the African country. Specifically, it appears that the US company Vanco has ceded part of its Corisco Deep block. Not only that, it appears Repsol might also enter the Corisco Bay block (very close to Mbañé), which is currently shared by the Malaysian company Petronas and Vanco. Something similar might be about to happen with the E block, where Total had drilled without success. The enormous economic and strategic importance of Mbañé Islet has not only international repercussions but could also be the cause of the country’s current domestic instability. To the attempted coups sponsored by the opposition or by dissident elements of the ‘Mongomo clan’ has now been added a new domestic threat. Rumour has it that pro-French (or pro-Elf) and pro-Gabonese groups may be financing a new coup d’etat. Should this be the case, Obiang would be in serious danger. It is questionable whether the Moroccan forces that protect him at present would remain loyal or would act in the interests of Morocco (a very close ally of France and Gabon). New elections must be held in Equatorial Guinea in about six weeks time. Nothing appears to indicate anything other than a new electoral fraud. The question is whether the regime will move in the direction of democracy (with limited fraud) or continue as usual (massive fraud). The highly probable existence of fraud could become an excuse for launching a new coup. But this time things are different. We are not facing a coup d’etat like those before but one heavily supported and financed by French interests through its African arm, Elf (now TotalFinaElf), with the help of Gabon, which is totally dominated by Elf.