Literarische Formen Der Geopolitik
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Australian Parliamentary Delegation
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Australian Parliamentary Delegation to the Russian Federation and the Italian Republic 17 April – 1 May 2005 REPORT June 2005 ii © Commonwealth of Australia 2005 ISBN 0 642 71532 7 This document was printed by the Senate Printing Unit, Department of the Senate, Parliament House, Canberra. iii MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION Leader Senator the Hon. Paul Calvert President of the Senate Senator for Tasmania Liberal Party of Australia Deputy Leader Ms Jill Hall, MP Member for Shortland (NSW) Australian Labor Party Members Senator Jacinta Collins Senator for Victoria Australian Labor Party Mrs Kay Elson, MP Member for Forde (QLD) Liberal Party of Australia Senator Jeannie Ferris Senator for South Australia Liberal Party of Australia The Hon. Jackie Kelly, MP Member for Lindsay (NSW) Liberal Party of Australia Senator Ross Lightfoot Senator for Western Australia Liberal Party of Australia Delegation secretary Mr John Vander Wyk Department of the Senate Private Secretary to the Mr Don Morris President of the Senate iv The delegation with the Archimandrite of the Holy Trinity-St Sergius Lavra monastery at Sergiev Posad, Father Savva. From left, the Deputy Head of Mission and Counsellor at the Australian Embassy, Mr Alex Brooking, Senator Jacinta Collins, Mrs Kay Elson, MP, Senator the Hon. Paul Calvert (Delegation Leader), Father Savva, Senator Ross Lightfoot, Senator Jeannie Ferris, the Hon. Jackie Kelly, MP, and Mrs Jill Hall (Deputy Leader). v TABLE OF CONTENTS MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION iii PREFACE -
Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: a Comparison
WELFARE REFORMS IN POST-SOVIET STATES: A COMPARISON OF SOCIAL BENEFITS REFORM IN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN by ELENA MALTSEVA A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Elena Maltseva (2012) Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: A Comparison of Social Benefits Reform in Russia and Kazakhstan Elena Maltseva Doctor of Philosophy Political Science University of Toronto (2012) Abstract: Concerned with the question of why governments display varying degrees of success in implementing social reforms, (judged by their ability to arrive at coherent policy outcomes), my dissertation aims to identify the most important factors responsible for the stagnation of social benefits reform in Russia, as opposed to its successful implementation in Kazakhstan. Given their comparable Soviet political and economic characteristics in the immediate aftermath of Communism’s disintegration, why did the implementation of social benefits reform succeed in Kazakhstan, but largely fail in Russia? I argue that although several political and institutional factors did, to a certain degree, influence the course of social benefits reform in these two countries, their success or failure was ultimately determined by the capacity of key state actors to frame the problem and form an effective policy coalition that could further the reform agenda despite various political and institutional obstacles and socioeconomic challenges. In the case of Kazakhstan, the successful implementation of the social benefits reform was a result of a bold and skillful endeavour by Kazakhstani authorities, who used the existing conditions to justify the reform initiative and achieve the reform’s original objectives. -
Forum 8.Indb
No 8 FORUM FOR ANTHROPOLOGY AND CULTURE 250 Mikhail Alekseevsky Who Are All Those People (the Ones with Placards)? The mass protests against the rigged elections to the State Duma, which took place in many cities across Russia in December 2011 were a surprise for the authorities and for ordinary citizens alike. For many years political street protests were not broadly popular in Russia; the last opposition protests that drew tens of thou- sands of participants happened at the turn of the 1990s, i.e. before the fall of the Soviet Union. It was not only the particularly high number of participants in the street protests that was unex- pected, but also the behaviour of the public at the different events. One of the distinguishing features of the December protests was the home made placards carried by participants. These were sometimes ironic, caustic or absurd, but at all times quite unlike typical forms of po- litical campaigning. It has been repeatedly noted both in journalistic articles and comments made by the government and participants themselves that the majority of protesters are not activists affiliated to any politi- cal movement, but rather people who have previ- ously avoided protests of this kind and who are not especially interested in politics. Unexpect- edly, a new and powerful force has emerged onto the political arena, about which little is known. It is evident that the majority of protesters oppose the current government, but that is not to say that Mikhail Alekseevsky they therefore belong to the parties or move- State Republic Centre ments that have been organising the protests. -
A Captive Island Kaliningrad Between MOSCOW and the EU
41 A CAPTIVE ISLAND KAlInIngRAD bETWEEn MOSCOW AnD ThE EU Jadwiga Rogoża, Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, Iwona Wiśniewska NUMBER 41 WARSAW JULY 2012 A CAPTIVE ISLAND KALININGRAD BETWEEN MOSCOW AND THE EU Jadwiga Rogoża, Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, Iwona Wiśniewska © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies CONTENT EDITORS Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak EDITORS Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska TRANSLATION Ilona Duchnowicz CO-OPERATION Jim Todd GRAPHIC DESIGN PARA-BUCH CHARTS, MAP, PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER Wojciech Mańkowski DTP GroupMedia PuBLISHER Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl ISBN 978–83–62936–13–7 Contents KEY POINTS /5 INTRODUCTION /8 I. KALININGRAD OBLAST: A SUBJECT OR AN OBJECT OF THE F EDERATION? /9 1. THE AMBER ISLAND: Kaliningrad today /9 1.1. Kaliningrad in the legal, political and economic space of the Russian Federation /9 1.2. Current political situation /13 1.3. The current economic situation /17 1.4. The social situation /24 1.5. Characteristics of the Kaliningrad residents /27 1.6. The ecological situation /32 2. AN AREA UNDER SPECIAL SURVEILLANCE: Moscow’s policy towards the region /34 2.1. The policy of compensating for Kaliningrad’s location as an exclave /34 2.2. The policy of reinforcing social ties with the rest of Russia /43 2.3. The policy of restricted access for foreign partners to the region /45 2.4. The policy of controlling the region’s co-operation with other countries /47 3. -
The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology Or Internal Dissent?
The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology or Internal Dissent? Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Eileen Marie Kunkler, B.A. Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies The Ohio State University 2010 Thesis Committee: Goldie Shabad, Adviser Trevor Brown Copyright by Eileen Marie Kunkler 2010 Abstract In 2008, three political clubs were officially formed within the United Russia party structure: the Social-Conservative Club, the Liberal-Conservative Club, and the State-Patriotic Club. Membership of these clubs includes many powerful Duma representatives. Officially, their function is to help develop strategies for implementing the government‟s Strategy 2020. However, a closer examination of these clubs suggests that they also may function as an ideology incubator for the larger party and as a safety valve for internal party dissent. To answer the question of what the true function of these clubs is an attempt will be made to give: a brief overview of Unity‟s and Fatherland-All Russia‟s formation; a description of how United Russia formed; a summary of the ideological currents within United Russia from 2001-2009; a discussion of the three clubs; and a comparative analysis of these clubs to the Christian Democratic party of Italy and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Based on this evidence, it will be argued that primary purpose of these clubs is to contain intra-party conflict. ii Dedication Dedicated to my family and friends iii Acknowledgements I wish to thank my adviser, Goldie Shabad, for all of her help, advice, and patience in working on this project with me. -
Brott Och Straff I Ryssland: Fallet Magnitskij AV WILLIAM BROWDER INLEDNING AV MATS JOHANSSON
BRIEFING NR: 2 ISBN 91-7566-878-9 · Februari 2012 BRIEFING: Brott och straff i Ryssland: Fallet Magnitskij AV WILLIAM BROWDER INLEDNING AV MATS JOHANSSON INLEDNING: korruption, bland annat inom den presidentvalet den 4 mars. Vilket Sergej Magnitskij var en av Ryss- statliga energijätten Gazprom. 2006 väcker frågan om på vilka villkor lands ledande affärsjurister fram till sin svartlistades Browder av den ryska re- utländska företag kan göra affärer i död 2009, 37 år gammal. Då mörda- geringen, klassad som ett hot mot den Ryssland. Det avslöjar hur brott och des han under en sjukhusvistelse på nationella säkerheten, och utvisades. straff hanteras i en rövarstat som allt grund av sitt försvar för lag och rätt Nu står han medåtalad i processen tydligare visar sitt förakt för spelregler i processen mot funktionärer som mot den döde Magnitskij. i mellanstatliga och internationella stulit företag tillhöriga det utländska Bifogad dokumentation utgör under- relationer. investmentbolaget Hermitage. Ingen laget för den hearing som hölls i den Utomlands har fallet väckt starka uppsatt ansvarig har ännu straffats. amerikanska senatens utrikesutskotts reaktioner och ingår numera i under- Tvärtom har den ryska staten nyligen underkommitté för Europa den 14 visningen vid Harvard. Det är dags att vidtagit den ovanliga åtgärden att åtala december 2011 under rubriken ”The även Sverige reagerar och agerar. Så Magnitskij efter hans död. State of Human Rights and The Rule skedde nyligen när den svenska reger- Den ryska mörkläggningen ska inte of Law in Russia”. ingen tillsammans med den brittiska ske i tysthet. Fallet behandlas nu i den Innehållet tecknar bilden av en stat tog upp fallet i Europarådets minis- amerikanska senaten på initiativ av som saknar grundläggande skydd för terkommitté med krav på en effektiv den demokratiske senatorn Ben Car- individen. -
The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections
Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper REP 2011/01 The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections Andrew Monaghan Nato Defence College June 2011 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication. REP Programme Paper. The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections Introduction From among many important potential questions about developments in Russian politics and in Russia more broadly, one has emerged to dominate public policy and media discussion: who will be Russian president in 2012? This is the central point from which a series of other questions and debates cascade – the extent of differences between President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and how long their ‘Tandem’ can last, whether the presidential election campaign has already begun and whether they will run against each other being only the most prominent. Such questions are typically debated against a wider conceptual canvas – the prospects for change in Russia. Some believe that 2012 offers a potential turning point for Russia and its relations with the international community: leading to either the return of a more ‘reactionary’ Putin to the Kremlin, and the maintenance of ‘stability’, or another term for the more ‘modernizing’ and ‘liberal’ Medvedev. -
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests Jim Nichol, Coordinator Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs November 4, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33407 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests Summary Russia made some uneven progress in democratization during the 1990s, but according to most observers, this limited progress was reversed after Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999-2000. During this period, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) came to be dominated by government-approved parties and opposition democratic parties were excluded. Putin also abolished gubernatorial elections and established government ownership or control over major media and industries, including the energy sector. The methods used by the Putin government to suppress insurgency in the North Caucasus demonstrated a low regard for the rule of law and scant regard for human rights, according to critics. Dmitriy Medvedev, Vladimir Putin’s chosen successor and long-time protégé, was elected president in March 2008 and immediately chose Putin as prime minister. President Medvedev has continued policies established during the Putin presidency. In August 2008, the Medvedev-Putin “tandem” directed wide-scale military operations against Georgia and unilaterally recognized the independence of Georgia’s separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia, actions that were censured by most of the international community but which resulted in few, minor, and only temporary international sanctions against Russia. Russia’s economy began to recover from the Soviet collapse in 1999, led mainly by oil and gas exports, but the sharp decline in oil and gas prices in mid-2008 and other aspects of the global economic downturn put a halt to this growth. -
1 Protest Public As a Social Actor
Protest Public as a Social Actor: from mosaic of "issue-based groups" to the unity of "the other world possible" Abstract This paper is an attempt to address a methodological problem of defining the origin, the structure and social foundations of massive and lasting peaceful street protests, that had appeared spontaneously and almost simultaneously at the beginning of new millennia in the countries with very different level of public wealth and socio-political structure - from US and UK to Turkey, Brazil and Bulgaria, lately involving similar protest events in Russia and Ukraine. Been driven by different reasons, addressing different targets, those mass street actions have a lot of common features, that allow to consider them as one phenomena, which we define as a new type of social engagement, distinguished both from civil society organizations and social movements. This type of engagement is characterized by formation and activities of protesting publics, which can have deep and lasting impact on both society and policy process, including various fields of social policy, by transforming the public sphere through changing dominating public discourses. Such activities are largely based on common demand of ethical nature, that can bring together many diverse social groups and mini-publics, focused on issue-based protests. Paper is exploring theoretical foundations of perceiving self-organized publics as collective social actors with their unique features and capacities. It also seeks to develop a conceptual frame for protest events analysis as manifestations of protest publics, which allows to identify the type of specific public assembled for each event , its “qualities of actorness” and its transformative potential. -
Russia's Armed Forces: the Power of Illusion
Russia's Armed Forces: The Power of Illusion Roger McDermott March 2009 Russia/NIS Center Ifri is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental and a non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debates and research activities. The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the official views of their institutions. Russia/NIS Center © All rights reserved – Ifri – Paris, 2009 ISBN: 978-2-86592-476-9 IFRI IFRI-Bruxelles 27 RUE DE LA PROCESSION RUE MARIE-THERESE, 21 75740 PARIS CEDEX 15 – FRANCE 1000 BRUXELLES TEL. : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 TEL. : 32(2) 238 51 10 FAX : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 FAX : 32 (2) 238 51 15 E-MAIL : [email protected] E-MAIL : [email protected] WEBSITE : www.ifri.org R. McDermott / Russian Military Power Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an electronic collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Written by leading experts, these policy-oriented papers deal with strategic, political, and economic issues. -
A Companion to Andrei Platonov's the Foundation
A Companion to Andrei Platonov’s The Foundation Pit Studies in Russian and Slavic Literatures, Cultures and History Series Editor: Lazar Fleishman A Companion to Andrei Platonov’s The Foundation Pit Thomas Seifrid University of Southern California Boston 2009 Copyright © 2009 Academic Studies Press All rights reserved ISBN 978-1-934843-57-4 Book design by Ivan Grave Published by Academic Studies Press in 2009 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com iv Effective December 12th, 2017, this book will be subject to a CC-BY-NC license. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/. Other than as provided by these licenses, no part of this book may be reproduced, transmitted, or displayed by any electronic or mechanical means without permission from the publisher or as permitted by law. The open access publication of this volume is made possible by: This open access publication is part of a project supported by The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Humanities Open Book initiative, which includes the open access release of several Academic Studies Press volumes. To view more titles available as free ebooks and to learn more about this project, please visit borderlinesfoundation.org/open. Published by Academic Studies Press 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE Platonov’s Life . 1 CHAPTER TWO Intellectual Influences on Platonov . 33 CHAPTER THREE The Literary Context of The Foundation Pit . 59 CHAPTER FOUR The Political Context of The Foundation Pit . 81 CHAPTER FIVE The Foundation Pit Itself . -
The Political Elite Under Putin by Dmitry Gorenburg
The Political Elite Under Putin By Dmitry Gorenburg Executive Summary Russia’s political elite has undergone relatively little change under Vladimir Putin’s rule. Only sixty people have been ranked twentieth or higher at least once between 2000 and 2019 in the annual Nezavisimaya Gazeta list of the most politically influential Russians. Eighteen people have appeared on every list during this period. The greatest shift in elite composition occurred between 2007 and 2008, with smaller shifts around the presidential elections of 2004 and 2012. Most of the political elite originate in the government bureaucracy in Moscow or St. Petersburg or came to their positions of influence through personal ties to Vladimir Putin, either in St. Petersburg or in the security services. Only ten percent came to power through electoral politics; another ten percent are businessmen who made their money independently of any connections to Vladimir Putin. The elite is fairly evenly divided between individuals who have political influence solely because of their positions in government and individuals who have influence outside of their official role. People in the first group generally drop off the list quickly after leaving government or being demoted, and people in the second group tend to retain influence regardless of their position at any given time and remain influential for extended periods, even after departing government service. Introduction For most of the post-Soviet period, the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta has conducted a monthly survey of Russian political experts. This survey asks its respondents to rank the 100 most politically influential Russians in the previous month. Throughout this period, the newspaper has also published an annual ranking,1 based on the average rank of those mentioned during the previous calendar year.