Preface 1 Introduction

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NOTES

Preface

1. R. Evan Ellis, China: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). 2. Ibid. 3. R. Evan Ellis, The Strategic Dimension of China’s Engagement with Latin America (Washington, DC: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013).

1 Introduction

1. Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, September 2013), 23. 2. Ibid. 3. Indeed, China’s diplomatic initiatives toward Latin America at this time may have been motivated, in part, by its desire to secure entry into the WTO. See Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom, “Latin America and China: South-South Relations in a New Era,” in Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations Beyond the Washington Consensus, eds., Alex. E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012). 4. Latin America scholar Dan Erikson argues that it was from this moment that China’s expansion into Latin America began to attract “wide- spread notice” in the United States. Daniel P. Erikson, “Conflicting U.S. Perceptions of China’s Inroads in Latin America,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 121. See also “Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing Comments on the Fruitful Results of President Hu Jintao’s Trip to Latin America,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. November 26, 2004. http://www.fmprc .gov.cn/eng/topics/huvisit/t172349.htm. 5. Alejandro Rebossio, “La mayor economía de Asia continental se expande fuera de su territorio y de a poco aparecen las verdaderas inver siones chinas,” La Nación, November 14, 2004. http://www.lanacion .com.ar. 214 NOTES

6. Interview with Dr. Adrian Bonilla, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Quito, Ecuador. July 10, 2007. 7. This figure includes both Confucius institutes and Confucius classrooms. See “China to Deepen Ties with Latin-America,” China Daily, January 17, 2012. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012diplomats/2012 -01/17/content_14463885.htm. 8. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, Working Document (Santiago, Chile: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2013). 9. In 2009, for example, the Cayman Islands received an estimated $5.3 billion in Chinese foreign direct investment, attributed by one analyst to the “Chinese use of Caribbean tax havens.” Ezra Fieser, “Why Is China Spending Billions in the Caribbean?” Global Post, April 22, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com. 10. “CVRD Develops Brazil-China Ore Shipping Service,” Reuters, May 2, 2007,.http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/05/02/brazil-cvrd-vessels -idUSN0231590420070502. 11. Agnieszka Troszkiewicz and Maria Kolesnikova, “Codelco Expects Decline in Copper Cathode Shipments to China,” Bloomberg, March 6, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/codelco- expects-decline-in-copper-cathode-shipments-to-china.html. 12. “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (Full Text),” Government of the People’s Republic of China, November 2008, http:// english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm. 13. Beyond such investments, China’s accumulated surplus of capital created the potential for much more. As of the end of 2012, the P.R.C.’s sovereign wealth fund, administered by the China Investment Corporation (CIC) was capitalized at a total value of $482 billion. See Nick Edwards and Kang Xize, “China Wealth Fund Eyes Asia as Western Protectionism Rises,” Reuters, November 10, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article /2012/11/11/us-china-congress-cic-idUSBRE8AA01120121111. 14. Zhou Siyu, “The Ups and Downs of Latin Adventure,” China Daily, July 24, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. See also “Latin America the 2nd Biggest Investment Target for China,” Xinhua, June 18, 2012, http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/english. 15. Matt Ferchen, “China-Latin American Relations: The End of the Honeymoon?” China Brief, January 16, 2012, http://carnegieendow ment.org. 16. Starwood hotels, for example, reported a 364 percent increase in Chinese tourists at its Sheraton hotel in Mexico City, as well as a 260 percent increase in its Park Tower facility in Buenos Aires. Brian Byrnes, “Latin America Lures Chinese Tourists,” CNN, September 27, 2011, http:// www.cnn.com. 17. As the general manager of a Chinese mining firm once noted, “If there are more Chinese people and companies already there, this will attract NOTES 215

others who will find it easier” with the general manager of a Chinese mining firm. See Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente, “Mapping Chinese Mining Investment in Latin America: Politics or Market?” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 46. 18. Veronica Sanchez, “Llegan más chinos al País,” Reforma, October 9, 2011, http://www.reforma.com. 19. See Ding Qingfen, “Companies Still Drawn to Peru, Despite Obstacles,” China Daily, December 11, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. See also “Hay más de 80 firmas chinas en el Perú,” Gestión, December 11, 2012, http://gestion.pe. 20. Mercedes Alvaro, “Ecuador and China Seek to Strengthen Ties,” Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2014, http://online.wsj.com. 21. “38 empresas chinas están en las areas estratégicas y construcción,” El Universo, June 18, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 22. “Aumenta número de empresas chinas en Perú,” América Economía, February 10, 2014, http://www.americaeconomia.com/economia- mercados/comercio/aumenta-numero-de-empresas-chinas-en-peru. 23. See, for example, “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (Full Text),” Government of the People’s Republic of China, November 2008, http://english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05/content _1140347.htm. 24. The role of the community of ethnic Chinese abroad as an important component of Chinese foreign policy was acknowledged by then– P.R.C. foreign minister Yang Jeichi in his forward to the official P.R.C. government reference book China’s Foreign Affairs 2010. Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China (Beijing, China: World Affairs Press, 2010). 25. A. Catalinac, S. Cesarin, J. Corrales, J. Domínguez, S. R. Golob, A. Kennedy, A. Liebman, M. Musacchio-Farias, J. Resende-Santos, and R. Russell, China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, China Working Paper (Washington, DC: InterAmerican Dialogue, 2006). 26. Florencia Jubany and Daniel Poon, “Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America,” Canadian Foundation for the Americas, March 2006, http://focal.ca/pdf/china_latam.pdf. 27. Daniel Lederman, Marcelo Olarrega, and Guillermo E Perry, “China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?” World Bank, 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC /Resources/China_India_Challenge_to_LA.pdf. See also Caroline Freund and Caglar Ozden “The Effect of China’s Exports on Latin American Trade with the World,” World Bank, August 2006, http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACOFFICEOFCE/Resources/ IndustryLevelTradeFlows.pdf. See also “Latin America and the Caribbean’s Response to the Growth of China and India: Overview 216 NOTES

of Research Findings and Policy Implications,” World Bank, August 2006, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACOFFICEOFCE /Resources/LAC_response_to_China_and_India_Overview.pdf. 28. Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, The Dragon in the Room (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 29. Rhys Jenkins and Enrique Dussel Peters, China and Latin America: Economic Relations in the 21st Century (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2009). 30. Ben Laidler, Qu Hongbin, Todd Dunivant, Simon Francis, Thomas Hilboldt, and Andre Loes, South-South Special: What a Globalizing China Means for LatAm (HSBC Global Research, November 2013). 31. Cynthia J. Arnson, Mark Mohr, and Riordan Roett, eds., Enter the Dragon: China’s Presence in Latin America (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Institute, 2008). 32. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008). 33. A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez, eds., China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011). 34. Gastón Fornés and Alan Butt Philip, The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the Future of Globalisation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 35. Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony, eds., From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 36. Benjamin Creutzfeldt, ed., China en America Latina: Reflecciones sobre las relaciones transpacificas (Bogota, Colombia: Universidad Externado, 2012). 37. In virtually all of the compiled works published in English on China– Latin America relations prior to 2012, it is Jiang Shixue who is represented as providing the “Chinese perspective.” See, for example, Jiang Shixue, “Three Factors in Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations,” in Enter the Dragon: China’s Presence in Latin America, eds., Cynthia Arnson, Mark Mohr, and Riordan Roett (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2008), 43–52. See also Jiang Shixue, “The Chinese Foreign Policy Perspective,” in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States, eds., Rioardan Roett and Guadalupe Paz (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008), 27–43. See also Jiang Shixue, “Ten Key Questions,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., Adrian H. Hearn and José Luis León-Manríquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2011), 51–66. 38. An important work in this regard was China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson NOTES 217

Center, 2011. The short work was based on a conference held by the Woodrow Wilson Center on China’s relationship with Latin America, and which consequently published summarized perspectives of the positions of various Chinese scholars previously not widely published in the West, including Sun Hongbo, Philip Yang, and Chai Yu. 39. See, for example, Sun Hongbo, “China’s Benefits in Latin America: American Scholars’ Judgement and Anxiety,” in China-Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis, Vol. 1, ed., He Shuangrong (Reading, MA: Paths International, 2012), 46–55. 40. See, for example, Yang Zhimin, “Policy Choice in China-Latin American Trade Cooperation in Response to the Financial Crisis,” in China-Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis, Vol. 1, ed., He Shuangrong (Reading, MA: Paths International, 2012), 96–106. 41. See, for example, Wang Peng, “China-Venezuelan Relations during the Chávez Reign,” in China-Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis, Vol. 1, ed., He Shuangrong (Reading, MA: Paths International, 2012), 143–149. 42. He Shuangrong, ed., China-Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis, Vol. 1 (Reading, MA: Paths International, 2012). 43. See, Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review, 65(3), September 1971): 682–693.

2 Natural Resource Development—Petroleum, Mining, and Agriculture

1. “Bridas desistió de comprar la cuota de BP en Pan American Energy,” Cronista, November 6, 2011, http://www.cronista.com. 2. “UPDATE 2—Wuhan Talks to Build Brazil Steel Mill ‘Dormant’— LLX,” Reuters, November 8, 2012, http://www.reuters.com. 3. The project reportedly fell victim to multiple changes in management and environmental laws at the state level. Nonetheless, according to recent reports in the Brazilian media, it now appears to have new life. 4. “Proyecto suspendido,” La Nación, November 24, 2011, http://www .lanacion.com.ar. 5. “China pagará 900 millones de dólares para acceder a la Faja del Orinoco,” El Universal, April 20, 2010, http://www.eluniversal.com. 6. Diana Davila, “Ecuador firmará contrato minero con empresa China este lunes,” Confirmado, March 2, 2012, http://www.confirmado.net. 7. This observation was made, for example, by Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente in his analysis of Chinese activities in the Peruvian mining sector. See Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente, “Mapping Chinese Mining Investment in Latin America: Politics or Market?” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 218 NOTES

8. This does not always imply the use of Chinese equipment, however. There are, for example, cases of Shougang and other Chinese construction firms purchasing Caterpillar equipment rather than equipment from Chinese companies where the former appears better suited to the task. Nonetheless, it is believed that Chinese government encourages Chinese contractors to use Chinese equipment. Interview with construction equipment industry executive. 9. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), almost 90 percent of Venezuela’s exports are com- prised of just three products: Crude petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas. “Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): Exports of the 10 leading products (SITC, rev. 1), by their percentage share each year (Leading products).” http://websie.eclac.cl. Accessed January 18, 2013. 10. “Recursos de Venezuela,” Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., accessed January 22, 2013, http://www.pdvsa.com/lexico/venezuela/recursos.htm. 11. The significance of such projects notwithstanding, virtually all of these activities were construction and technical service contracts paid for by the Venezuelan government through loans, and thus resemble more the dynamics of the loan-backed construction projects discussed in chapter 5, rather than the equity-based investments discussed in the present chapter. 12. “Khan reporta avance de acuerdos con China para potenciar Guayana,” El Universal, October 14, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. 13. Ernesto J. Tovar, “China entra al area minera para extraere oro en Las Cristinas,” El Universal, February 25, 2012, http://www.eluniversal. com. 14. “Venezuela Now to Mine Massive Las Cristinas Gold Project with Help from China,” Reuters, February 25, 2002, http://www.reuters.com. 15. “China Railway Won CNY2.6bn Iron Ore Mining Contract,” MENAFN, June 15, 2012, http://www.menafn.com. 16. “Empresa china Citic Group elaborará mapa minero de Venezuela,” El Universal, September 22, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 17. “Nuevo crédito de $5 mil millones recibirá Venezuela de China,” El Universal, September 22, 2013, http://www.eluniversal.com. 18. R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2009), 129. 19. “Tongling, China Railway Plan to Invest $3 Billion in Ecuador Copper Mine,” Bloomberg, August 13, 2010, http://mobile.bloomberg.com /news/2010-08-13/tongling-china.railway-plan-to-invest-3-billion -in-ecuador-copper-mine. 20. Davila, “Ecuador firmará contrato minero con empresa China este lunes.” 21. “Ocho sectores concentran los mayores planes de inversión,” El Universo, March 10, 2011, http://www.eluniverso.com. 22. “Ecuador Says Mining Reform Will Pave Way for Contracts,” Reuters, August 2, 2012, http://www.miningweekly.com. NOTES 219

23. Walter Spurrier Baquerizo, “Se acordaron de la minería,” El Universo, November 14, 2010, http://www.eluniverso.com. 24. See, for example, “Bolivian President Applauds China, Russia Ties, Laments Rift with U.S.,” Xinhua, January 7, 2014, http://news.xinhua net.com/english. 25. “Citic financiará exploración de litio en salar de Coipasa,” Business News Americas, September 26, 2011, http://www.bnamericas.com. 26. Carlos Valdez, “China Explores Bolivian Lithium Investments,” Salon, March 19, 2012, http://www.salon.com. 27. “China to Help Install Lithium Battery Plant in Bolivia,” Xinhua, September 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com. 28. “Prevén que Huanuni genere $us 1,3 milliones,” Los Tiempos, October 13, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 29. “Colquiri aún dialoga y denuncian más tomas,” Los Tiempos, June 9, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 30. “Mutún (en Bolivia) recibe otra propuesta china por US$ 5 mil millones,” Hidrocarburos Bolivia, July 20, 2013, http:/www.hydrocarburos bolivia.com. 31. If the Chinese company Minmetals successfully acquires the Las Bambas project, the total is projected to rise to $19 billion, or one-third of all mining investment in the country. Rachel Chase, “China Could Son Own One Third of Mining Properties in Peru,” Peru This Week, November 8, 2013, http://www.perthisweek.com. 32. “Inversiones chinas aumentan en minería peruana,” Xinhua, September 9, 2010, http://spanish.news.cn. 33. The Peruvian Mines and Energy Ministry (MEM) reported, for example, that during the first four months of 2013, accumulated Chinese investment in the Marcona mine jumped 23 percent to $1.48 billion. “Seven Projects in Peru See Capex Increase in 2013,” Business News Americas, May 28, 2013, http://www.bnamericas.com. 34. “Shougang iniciaría proyecto de ampliación de Mina de Marcona,” Marcona Digital Noticias, July 2, 2011, http://marconadigitalnoticias .blogspot.com. 35. “Nanjinzhao inicia perforación en Pampa del Pongo.” Gestión. Lima, Peru. http://gestion.pe/noticia. September 6, 2010. 36. Elizabeth Huanca Urrutia, “Chinos invierten US$ 200 millones en explorar “Pampa de Pongo,” La Revista, January 3, 2012, http://lare vista.aqpsoluciones.com. 37. “Empresa china invertirá más de $10 milliones en mina de cobre de Arequipa,” Andina, September 6, 2012, http://www.andina.com.pe. 38. “Chinalco obtiene permiso de uso de reserva de agua para proyecto Toromocho,” Gestión, June 7, 2012, http://gestion.pe/noticia. 39. Ryan Dube, “Chinalco Approves $1.32 Billion Expansion of Peru Copper Project,” Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2013, http://online.wsj.com. 40. “Huancayo: pobladores protestaron contra reubicación de Morococha,” El Comercio, November 17, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.pe. 220 NOTES

41. Alex Emery, “Chinalco Starts Up Toromocho Copper Mine in Peru,” BNAmericas, December 12, 2013, http://www.bnamericas.com. December 12, 2013. 42. “Cámara de Comercio: proyecto minero Toromocho impulsará a empresas de Junín en el Perú,” América Economía, December 12, 2013, http://americaeconomia.com/node/106899. 43. “Cartera de proyectos mineros a ejecutar en Perú suma US$ 39,323 millones,” Agencia Peruana de Noticias, July 29, 2010, http://www.andina .com.pe. 44. “La minería peruana crece menos que producción mundial por segundo año,” El Comercio, July 4, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.pe. 45. “Consorcio chino podría pagar US$5.000 mlls. por Las Bambas,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, January 16, 2014, http://elcomercio.pe/econo mia/negocios/consorcio-chino-podria-pagar-us5000-mlls-bambas -noticia-1703168. 46. Gillian Tan, Alex Macdonald and Cynthia Koons, “Chinese Consortium Is Front-Runner to Buy Peru Copper Mine,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2014, http://online.wsj.com. 47. Based on CEPALSTAT database. “2012 Argentina GDP Data,” accessed July 5, 2013, http://interwp.cepal.org. 48. Francisca Pouiller, “Deal Reached in Water-Supply Dispute at Sierra Grande Mine,” Mining Weekly, September 3, 2009, http://www.mining weekley.com. 49. “Anuncian inversions chinas por $140 milliones en minería,” La Nación, January 26, 2010, http://www.lanacion.com. 50. “Anuncian inversions chinas por $140 milliones en minería,” La Nación, January 26, 2010, http://www.lanacion.com. 51. Ibid. 52. Orlando Andrada and Mariela Arias, “Al wok. China saltó al tercer puesto en la inversión extranjera en la Argentina,” La Nación, March 6, 2011, http://www.lanacion.com. 53. Ibid. 54. R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Investment in Brazil,” Brazil Confidential, September 29 2011: 29, http://www.brazilconfidential.com. 55. “Modernização do setor de logística da CVRD,” Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Accessed January 22, 2013, http://www.jbic .org.br/setor-de-logistica.php. 56. “Ports and Terminals,” Vale Official Website, Accessed January 22, 2013, http://www.vale.com. 57. “China’s ECE to Pay $1.2 Bln for Brazil Miner,” Reuters, March 25, 2010, http://www.reuters.com. See also Fernanda de Biaga, “Chinese Firms Looking to go Solo in Iron Ore Mining—Ibram,” Business News Americas, October 25, 2010, http://www.bnamericas.com/news. 58. “Honbridge Picks Pipeline for Brazil Iron Mine—Paper,” Reuters, July 7, 2012, http://www.reuters.com. NOTES 221

59. “Chineses querem investir em construção e mineração no Piauí,” 180 Graus, March 15, 2012, http://180graus.com/geral/chineses-querem -investir-em-construcao-e-mineracao-no-piaui-505249.html. 60. Alison Tudor, “China Group Taps Into Brazil Mine,” Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2011, http://online.wsj.com. 61. Diana Kinch, “Chinese Steelmakers Buy into Brazil’s CBMM,” Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2011, http://online.wsj.com. 62. “Codelco Confirms Minmetals Option on Gaby Closed for Good,” Business News Americas, September 29, 2008, http://www.bnamericas. com. 63. “China Minmetals and Codelco to Cooperate in Search for Minerals,” Sinolatin Capital Newsletter, January, 2013, http://www.sinolatincapital .cn. 64. Frik Els, “Phew. Codelco Wriggles Out of 15-year Deal Inked at $1.50 a Pound,” Mining, February 21, 2013, http://www.mining.com /phew-codelco-wriggles-out-of-15-year-deal-inked-at-1-50-a-pound -82202/. 65. “Compañía industrial china invertirá $250 millones de dólares en Chile,” Prensa, August 20, 2011, http://www.prensa.com. 66. Clarise Ardúz, “Compañía china invierte en megapuerto y mina de hierro en Chile,” KHL Magazine, September 3, 2012, http://wwww .khl.com. 67. “El hierro se recupera, pero proyectos siguen estancados,” Mineria Chilena, December 16, 2013, http://www.mch.cl/2013/12/16/el-hierro -se-recupera-pero-proyectos-siguen-estancados/. 68. Walker Rowe, “Chinese Investment in South America,” China US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com. 69. “CIEChile Promotes Opportunities in Chile at China’s Most Important Investment Fail,” CIEChile, December 12, 2013, http://www.ciechile. gob.cl/en/ciechile-promueve-oportunidades-de-inversion-en-la-feria -de-inversiones-mas-importante-de-china/. 70. Shoaib-ur-Rehman Siddiqui, “Chile Opens Access to Its Lithium Reserves,” Business Recorder, June 17, 2012, http://www.brecorder .com. 71. Georgina Gasca, “Extraen hasta 100 mil toneladas al mes; planean llegar a las 400 mil toneladas,” El Sol de Morelia, September 30, 2011, http:// www.oem.com.mx/elsoldezamora. 72. Ibid. 73. Jesús Francisco Sánchez, “Invertirá China en Durango 150 mdd: Yuming,” El Sol de Durango, March 9, 2012, http://www.oem.com.mx /elsoldedurango/notas/n2459849.htm. See also “Genera resultados pro- moción del gobernador Jorge Herrera Caldera,” El Sol de Durango, July 20, 2011, http://www.oem.com.mx/laprensa. 74. “Monica” IMI Gold. Official Website, http://imigold.com.Monicaeng. com. 222 NOTES

75. Regarding the lack of importance of mining in Central America in general, a report by Oxfam International writes that “Despite its long history in Central America, mining has never played a significant role in the economies of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Even if all the resources of these nations were developed, revenue from minerals would amount to only a small fraction of their broadly diversified economies.” “Metals Mining and Sustainable Development in Central America: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs,” Oxfam America, February 17, 2009. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/files/metals-mining-and-sustainable- development-in-central-america.pdf. 76. The only Central American government recognized by the P.R.C. is Costa Rica, with which it established diplomatic recognition in 2007. 77. “Honduras adjudicará en cuatro meses concesiones mineras,” America Economia, July 25, 2013, http://www.americaeconomia.com/nego cios-industrias/honduras-adjudicara-en-cuatro-meses-concesiones -mineras. 78. “China’s Bosai Snaps up IAMGOLD’s Omai Bauxite—Guyana,” Business News Americas, February 15, 2007, http://www.bnamericas .com. 79. “China Regulator Approves Bosai Minerals’ Stake Buy in Guyana’s Omai Bauxite.” WorldAl, March 6, 2007, http://www.worldal.com /news/china/2007-03-06/126398431514660.shtmlP.R.C. 80. “Bosai’s Expansion Plans Still On—Persaud,” Guyana Times, June 17, 2013, http://www.guyanatimesgy.com. 81. “Bai Shan Lin Boss Denies Violating Forestry Laws,” Stabroek News, July 14, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 82. Based on interviews with Guyanese politicians and senior officials. Georgetown, Guyana. August 15–20, 2013. 83. “Suriname and China Working on Joint Ventures,” De Ware Tijd, Online English-Language Edition, August 6, 2013, http://www .dwtonline.com. 84. “Pekín y Santo Domingo impulsarán relaciones aún sin vínculos diplomáticos,” El Nuevo Diario, August 2, 2011, http://www.elnuevo diario.com.do. See also “Afirman China y RD desean ampliar nexos,” El Nacional, August 2, 2011, http://www.elnacional.com.do. 85. “Resalta RD liderara captación inversión en el Caribe en 201,” Hoy, August 2, 2012, http://www.hoy.com.do. 86. Tania Molina, “Empresa de China adquiere derecho para explotar minas de República Dominicana,” Diario Libre, July 25, 2013, http:// www.diariolibre.com.do. 87. “Pekín y Santo Domingo impulsarán relaciones aún sin vínculos diplomáticos,” El Nuevo Diario, August 2, 2011. http://www.elnuevo diario.com.do. 88. Subsequently, prices plunged in the international bauxite market, forc- ing the new Russian owners to shut down its plants in the region in 2009, although the Ewarton plant was reopened in July 2010 following NOTES 223

the granting of financial inceptives from the Jamaican government. See “Rusal Sets Sight on Jamalco.” Jamaica Gleaner. April 8, 2011. http:// jamaica-gleaner.com. 89. “Venezuelan Ferro-Nickel Project on Track,” Cuba Standard, February 23, 2010, http://www.cubastandard.com. 90. OPEC Official Website, Accessed July 5, 2013,http://www.opec.org /opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm. 91. Wan Zhihong, “Venezuela, China ink $16b oil deal,” China Daily, September 18, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. 92. See, for example, Ellis, China in Latin America, 110–115. 93. “Ecuador,” China National Petroleum Company, Accessed March 14, 2013, http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/cnpcworldwide. See also Javier Corrales, “China and Venezuela’s Search for Oil Markets,” in Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations Beyond the Washington Consensus, eds. Alex. E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 126. 94. “Chávez nacionaliza la gigantesca faja petrolífera del Orinoco,” Nación, May 1, 2007, http://www.nacion.com. 95. Pierre Bertrand, “Venezuela to End All Ventures with Exxon Mobil,” International Business Times, March 16, 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com. 96. “Conozca datos sobre los planes impulsados por Pdvsa en la Faja del Orinoco,” Noticias24, October 11, 2010, http://economia.noticias24. com. 97. According to petroleum analyst Thomas O’Donnell, “the Chinese have grown frustrated with the chaos surrounding Chavez.” Anatoly Kurmanev and Stephen Bierman, “Chavez Cancer Freezes Venezuela’s Overseas Oil Funding,” Bloomberg, January 25, 2013, http://www .bloomberg.com. 98. “China operará cuatro nuevos campos petroleos en Venezuela,” El Universal, November 23, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. 99. “CNPC Pumping 200,000 b/d in Venezuela, Targets 800,000 B/D: VP,” Platts Commodity News, June 13, 2012, http://www.platts.com. 100. “PdVSA Picks China, Malaysia, Russia, and Algeria for Offshore Gas Project,” Petroleum World, February 16, 2011, http://www.petroleum world.com/storyt11021601.htm. 101. “Update 1—CNPC to Help Develop Junin 10 Project in Venezuela— Ramirez,” Reuters, September 18, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. See also “SINOPEC Will Help PDVSA Develop Junin 1 Oil Field at the Orinoco Belt,” Petroleum World, September 18, 2013, http://www .petroleumworld.com. 102. “Pdvsa y China invertirán $40 mil millones en la Faja,” El Universal, December 3, 2010, http://www.eluniversal.com. 103. “China invertirá $4.000 millones para elevar producción de Sinovensa,” El Universal, May 16, 2013, http://www.eluniversal.com. See also “Venezuela pagará prestamo de Fondo Chino con petróleo,” El Nacional, November 22, 2013, http://www.el-nacional.com. See also 224 NOTES

R. Evan Ellis, “Are Big Chinese Energy Investments in Latin America a Concern?” The Manzella Report, November 23, 2013, http://www .manzellareport.com. 104. China National Petroleum Company. 105. “Operadoras chinas dominan negocio petrolero ecuatoriano,” El Universo, November 3, 2009, http://www.eluniverso.com. 106. “38 empresas chinas están en las areas estratégicas y construcción,” El Universo, June 18, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 107. “Repsol to Sell Ecuador Oil Affiliate to Sinopec,” Dow Jones Newswires, August 1, 2012, http://www.forbusiness.com/news. 108. Li Jiabao and Lyu Chang, “CNPC Expands in Ecuador,” China Daily, January 23, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. 109. Simon Hall, “China’s CNPC Nears Ecuador Refinery Deal,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2013, http://online.wsj.com. See also “China y Ecuador firmaron un acuerdo,” Hoy Ecuador, June 13, 2013, http:// www.hoy.com.ec. As of July 2013, the project was reportedly 21 percent complete. “China’s CNPC joins $12bn Ecuador refinery project,” Construction Week Online, July 9, 2013, http://www.constructionweek online.com. July 9, 2013. 110. “Ecuador busca potenciar su matriz productiva gracias a China,” América Economía, February 9, 2014, http://americaeconomia.com /economia-mercados/ecuador-busca-potenciar-su-matriz-productiva -gracias-china. 111. “El Gobierno llega con ventaja al día decisivo para explotación del Yasuní,” El Comercio, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 3, 2013, http:// www.elcomercio.com. 112. In 2005, the Chinese firm Huanji proposed a $600 million investment project to construct a plant in Bolivia that would liquefy natural gas, but the plans never came to fruition. “Grandes empresas chinas inverter’an en Bolivia,” Portal Minero, January 10, 2006, http://www.portalminero .com. 113. Allison Murray, “Shengli Maintains Investment Plans,” Business News Americas, February 24, 2005, http://www.bnamericas.com. 114. Pablo Poveda, “Bolivia and China: Indirect Relations in a Global Market,” in Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations Beyond the Washington Consensus, eds., Alex. E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 164. 115. Katherine Schmidt, “YPFB Eyes Chinese Partner for Sanandita,” Upstream, June 15, 2012, http://www.upstreamonline.com. 116. “YPFB espera ‘supertaladros’ para perforar pozo en La Paz,” Los Tiempos, January 11, 2013, http://www.lostiempos.com. 117. “YPFB compra tres taladros chinos y uno operará en Lliquimuni,” Página Siete, January 11, 2013, http://www.hidrocarburosbolivia.com. 118. China National Petroleum Company. 119. Rubén Berrios, “Bridging the Pacific: Peru and China,” in Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations Beyond the Washington Consensus, NOTES 225

eds., Alex. E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 143. 120. R. Evan Ellis, “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America,” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (June 2005), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mi l/pdffiles/pub606.pdf. 121. See Ding Qingfen, “Companies Still Drawn to Peru, Despite Obstacles,” China Daily, December 11, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. 122. “Petrobras cerró la venta de sus activos en Perú a CNPC por US$2.600 mlls,” El Comercio, November 13, 2013, http://elcomercio.pe. 123. ”ONGC-Sinopec Acquires Columbian Oil Firm.” The Hindu Business Line, September 21, 2006, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006 /09/22/stories/2006092202200200.htm. 124. “Emerald Energy PLC,” Sinochem Official Website, Accessed January 30, 2013, http://www.sinochem.com/g858/s1803/t4345.aspx. 125. “China’s CNOOC expects 69MBoe from Colombia Unit Nexen in 2014,” Business News Americas, January 21, 2014, www.bnamericas .com. 126. “Compañía china de fabricación de equipos para yacimientos petrolíf- eros se enfoca en Colombia,” América Economía, November 26, 2013, http://americaeconomia.com/node/105749. 127. The cases are thus distinguished from Venezuela, where the Chinese have acquired options for developing oilfields through direct negotia- tions with the Venezuelan state. 128. One of the earliest major deals was a potential partnership between China Sonangol and the Argentine state oil firm Enarsa, mentioned in a memorandum of understanding signed during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s trip to Argentina in November 2004, contemplating $5 billion in projects including joint oil exploration off the Argentine coast. See “Tratados bilaterales: Republica Popular de China,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Republica de Argentina, Accessed January 1, 2008, http://www.mrecic.gov.ar. See also “Argentine Petroleum Firm Seeks Foreign Help for Oil Exploration,” People’s Daily Online, September 20, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn. 129. Yvonne Lee and Nisha Gopalan, “Cnooc Acquires Argentina Oil Assets,” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2010, http://online.wsj.com. 130. “Cerro Dragón no recupera el ritmo de producción y PAE frena las per- foraciones,” El Cronista, August 22, 2012, http://www.cronista.com. 131. This was prior to prior to the expropriation of Repsol YPF’s assets in Argentina in April 2012. José Calero, “Cristina busca aumentar rápido la producción petrolera, apuesta a un profesional y mira a China,” El Liberal, May 5, 2012, http://www.elliberal.com.ar. 132. BP subsequently sued Bridas in a US federal court in April 2012 over the failed purchase. “La inglesa BP va a la Justicia contra su socia argentina Bridas,” Clarín, April 24, 2012, http://www.ieco.Clarín.com/empresas /inglesa-BP-Justicia-argentina-Bridas_0_688131396.html. 226 NOTES

133. “OXY Argentina Deal Closed,” Sinopec Official Website, http://www .sipc.cn/english/News/news/146.shtml. See also “Sinopec Buys Occidental Unit for $2.45 Billion,” The Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2010, http://online.wsj.com. 134. Ariel M. Slipak, “Por qué China está interesada en YPF,” El Liberal, April 27, 2012, http://www.elliberal.com.ar. 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid. 137. “Los chinos, más cerca de cerrar un acuerdo para inverter en YPF,” Clarín, December 5, 2012, http://www.Clarín.com. 138. “Concedieron áreas a la empresa china JHP,” El Tribuno, November 19, 2012, http://www.eltribuno.info. 139. The deal was announced in February 2009, and sealed during then Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva to China during May of the same year. Iuri Dantas and Jeb Blount, “Petrobras Gets $10 Billion China Loan, Sinopec Deal (Update1),” Bloomberg, February 19, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com. 140. Fabiana Frayssinet, “Brazil and China, Oiling the Wheels of Business,” Asia Times, May 25, 2012, http://www.asiatimes.com. 141. Ibid. 142. “Repsol Sinopec mantendrá las inversiones previstas en Brasil,” América Economía, November 11, 2013, http://www.americaeconomia.com /node/104796. 143. “Sinopec and Galp Close Petrogal Brazil Transaction,” Sinopec Official Website, April 1, 2012, http://www.sinopecgroup.com/english /Sinopecnews/Pages/201204180852.aspx. 144. Frayssinet, “Brazil and China.” 145. Jeff Fick, “Perenco’s Brazil Unit to Sell 10% Stake in Offshore Blocks to Sinochem,” Wall Street Journal Online, January 8, 2012, http://online .wsj.com. 146. Christiane Lucchesi, Zijing Wu, and Peter Millard, “CNPC Said in Talks to Buy Brazil’s Barra for $2 Billion.” Bloomberg, May 8, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com. 147. Jeff Fick, “UPDATE: Brazil’s Barra Energia Suspends Talks to Sell Oil Company,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2013, http://online.wsj.com. 148. Andre Soliani and Peter Millard, “Sinopec to Join Petrobras at Offshore Blocks, Gabrielli Says,” Bloomberg, April 11, 2011, http://www .bloomberg.com. See also Frayssinet, “Brazil and China.” 149. Jeff Fick, Paul Kieman, and Luciana Magalhaes, “Brazil Awards Libra Oil Field Rights to Consortium of Petrobras, Total, Shell, Cnooc, CNPC,” The Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2013, http://online.wsj.com. 150. This limitation is not unlike that which has prevented significant Chinese investment in the Chilean mining sector. 151. Anthony Harrup, “Mexico’s Pemex Starts New Round of Integrated Contracts,” Wall Street Journal Online, December 20, 2012, http://online .wsj.com. NOTES 227

152. “Chinese Oil Companies Interested in Investing in Mexico, Ambassador Says,” Global Post, January 8, 2014, http://globalpost.com. 153. Mao Xianglin, Carlos Alzugaray Treto, Liu Weiguang, and Adrian H. Hearn, “China and Cuba: Past, Present and Future,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 191. 154. “Cuba cifra sus esperanzas petroleras en el Golfo de México,” Nación, March 21, 2007, http://wvw.nacion.com. March 21, 2007. 155. Jeff Franks, “Oil Rig Arrives for Cuba Offshore Exploration Work,” Reuters, January 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com. 156. Clifford Krauss and Damien Cave, “Cuba’s Prospects for an Oil- Fueled Economic Jolt Falter With Departure of Rig,” New York Times, November 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com. 157. Curtis Williams, “NGC: Gas Agreement between Sabic/Sinopec in Three Months,” Trinidad Guardian, April 24, 2012, http://m.guard ian.co.tt/business-guardian. See also “SABIC, Sinopec in Talks with Trinidad over Methanol Plant,” Reuters, February 11, 2012, http:// www.reuters.com. 158. “Press Release,” Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs Government of Trinidad and Tobago, March 14, 2013, http://www.energy.gov.tt/con tent/SABIC_SINOPEC_Deal_Update_.pdf. 159. The Spanish company Repsol was previously involved in exploratory drilling, but left at the end of its concession, apparently because it did not find sufficient oil to continue. 160. “Chinese Oil Major Eyeing Investment Here,” Stabroek News, August 30, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 161. “Major Chinese Offshore Oil Company Expresses Interest in Investing Here,” Guyana Chronicle, August 30, 2012, http://www.guyanachronicleonline.com. 162. “China confirma su interés por el sector agrícola venezolano,” El Universal, July 19, 2013, http://www.eluniversal.com. 163. “Venezuela crea empresa con China para producir alimentos,” La Prensa Grafica, March 7, 2011, http://www.laprensagrafica.com. 164. “Acuerdos de la Comisión Mixta de Alto Nivel Venezuela-China,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, September 24, 2013, http://www.eluni versal.com. 165. “Passed 1.2 Billion for Agricultural Projects,” AVN, June 4 2012, http:// www.avn.info.ve. 166. “Chinese V.P. Views Beijing’s Money at Work in Venezuela,” EFE, May 14, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com. 167. “China impulsa proyectos de producción agrícola en Bolivia,” FM Bolivia, March 27, 2012, http://www.fmbolivia.com.bo. 168. Margaret Meyers, “China Eyes Latin America to Fill Its Kitchen Cupboard,” Caixin Online, January 8, 2014, http://english.caixin .com/2014-01-08/100626498.html. 228 NOTES

169. Rao Aimin, “China, Bolivia Promote Friendly Relations,” Xinhua, December 19, 2013, http://english.people.com.cn. 170. “China desarrollará un centro de investigación agrícola en Perú,” La Republica, April 3, 2013, http://www.larepublica.pe. 171. “China Fisheries Acquires a Fishing Plant and Further Increases Its Fishing Quota in Peru,” China Fisheries Group, November 8, 2011, http://www.chinaf isherygroup.com/attachment/2011111012270117_ en.pdf. See also “China Fishery Furthers Strategic Roadmap with New Acquisitions in Peru.” China Fishery Group Ltd., June 4, 2007, http:// www.chinafisherygroup.com/newsroom_press.htm. 172. “Cermaq Agrees to Sell Its Copeinca Shares to China Fishery Group,” Reuters, June 24, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. See also Robert Kozak, “Peru’s Copeinca Chairman Sees China Fishery’s Share Purchase Offer Proceeding,” 4-Traders, Accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.4-traders .com. 173. “Transnacionales asiáticas buscan comprar más pesqueras peruanas,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, January 27, 2014, http://www.elcomercio.com. 174. “Inversiones de China en nuestro país totalizan 3,000 millones de dólares,” La Republica, April 24, 2012, http://www.larepublica.pe. 175. It should be noted, however that each of the projects face serious challenges in terms of funding, environmental and other sources of opposition, and that Colombia has a long legacy of infrastructure projects which have not been realized. 176. “El presidente Santos llega a China en busca de acuerdos económicos,” El Nacional, May 8, 2012, http://www.elnacional.com.do. 177. “China busca mayor presencia,” El Día, May 6, 2012, http://www .eldia.com.ar. See also “Una empresa china compró extensos campos al norte de Santiago del Estero,” Para El Mundo, May 4, 2012, http:// www.pararelmundo.com. 178. “China Set Eyes on LatAm Agriculture to Promote Cooperation and Food Security,” Mercopress, June 12, 2013, http://en.mercopress.com. 179. Alejandro Rebossio, “Argentina limita la compra de tierras por empresas y Gobiernos extranjeros,” El Pais, December 23, 2011, http://www .internacional.elpais.com/international. 180. Rodrigo Orihuela, “Chinese Agro Giant to Invest $1.5b in Argentina,” China Daily, June 10, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. See also Paula Lopez-Gamundi and Winston Hanks, “Land-Grab Loopholes in Latin America,” World Press, August 11, 2011, http://www.worldpress.org. 181. Zhou Siyu, “$10m Argentine Farming Deal mulled,” Xinhua, June 30, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english See also “Molinos Cañuelas explora acuerdo con Chongqing Grain,” Dangdai, July 10, 2012, http:// www.dangdai.com.ar. 182. Andrada and Arias, “Al wok.” 183. Prudence Ho, Isabella Steger, and Shane Romig, “China’s Cofco to Buy 51% of Grain Trader Nidera,” The Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2014. http://online.wsj.com. NOTES 229

184. Naveen Thukral and Michael Flaherty, “China’s COFCO to Pay $1.5 Billion for Stake in Noble’s Agribusiness,” Reuters, April 2, 2014, http:// www.reuters.com. 185. “China se tornará principal destino agrícola brasileiro,” Em.com.br, November 19, 2012, http:www/em.com.br. 186. “Chinese Capital Eyes Brazil’s High-Tech Sector,” China Daily, July 5, 2011, http://www.china.org.cn. 187. “Chinese Group Chongqing Dragonfly Oil Sunday in Brazil Lays First Stone of Soy Processing Factory,” MacauHub, June 7, 2011, http://www .macauhub.com. See also “China Plans to Invest 10 Billion USD in Soy Production and Processing in Brazil,” Mercopress, April 11, 2011, http:// en.mercopress.com. 188. “Syngenta’s Latest Plant Aims to Satisfy China’s Increasing Sweet Tooth,” China Daily, June 18, 2012, http://www.chinapost.com. 189. “China Plans to Invest 10 Billion USD.” 190. Gastón Fornés and Alan Butt Philip argue that the cities of Latin America are the “real emerging market” for the Chinese and others. See Gastón Fornés and Alan Butt Philip, The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the Future of Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 42–43. 191. Meyers. 192. “Empresarios chinos interesados en la agroindustria chilena,” Diario Financero, December 7, 2012, http://w2.df.cl. 193. Gastón Fornés and Alan Butt Philip argue that the cities of Latin America are the “real emerging market” for the Chinese and others. See Gastón Fornés and Alan Butt Philip, The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the Future of Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 42–43. 194. Chile was the final stop on a trip for the delegation which also included Ecuador and Brazil. Ironically, according to one account, it was the Chileans who raised the issue of Chinese investment in the Chilean fishing industry. See Analia Murias, “China’s Interest to Invest in Fisheries-Aquaculture Sector,” Fish Information & Services, June 15, 2012, http://www.fis.com. 195. “Principales partidas de las exportaciones de Uruguay con sus principales 3 destinos,” in Informe de comercio exterior de Uruguay Enero–Setiembre 2011, Government of Uruguay, October 3, 2011, http://gp.gub.uy/sites /default/files/documentos/informe_de_comercio_exterior_de_uru guay_uruguayxxi_03-10-2011_411.pdf. October 3, 2011. 196. “Uruguay aumenta exportaciones a China de cortes de valor,” Argfood, December 26, 2012, http://argfood.wordpress.com. 197. “Uruguay: Una ley para evitar la extranjerización de la tierra,” Agencia Popular de Noticias Suramericana, August 2, 2012, http://www.apc -suramerica.net/?p=4999. 198. See, for example, “Mexico—Infrastructure, Power, and Communi- cations,” Encyclopedia of the Nations, Accessed March 4, 2013, http:// www.nationsencyclopedia.com. 230 NOTES

199. “Empresarios Chinos interesados en el campo hidalguense.” 200. “Oil Palm Industry Projected for Nickerie,” Stabroek News, July 30, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 201. Fany Alvarenga, “Chinos comprarán bonos de carbono en Honduras,” La Prensa, December 13, 2012, http://www.laprensa.com. 202. Alicia Dunkley, “Country Sold Short with Sugar Deal, Says Clarke,” Jamaica Observer, May 31, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 203. Camilo Thame, “Chinese Sees Sugar Profit in Year Two,” Jamaica Observer, December 12, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 204. “Pan-Caribbean to Sell Sugar on Behalf of Cane Farmers,” Jamaica Observer, Kingston, Jamaica, January 16, 2014, http://www.jamaicaob server.com. 205. “$400m Plan for Sugar Industry,” Nation News, September 12, 2012, http://www.nationnews.com. 206. “China Wants in on Bajan Sugar Factory,” Stabroek News, March 3, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 207. Although a larger initial proposal was blocked by the resistance of local community activists, the Chinese investors returned with a scaled- down version of the project in 2012, which they were able to take forward. “Oil Palm Industry Projected for Nickerie.” 208. It is not clear whether the action is an attempt to lock-up Surinamese timber resources, a way to get Chinese capital out of the P.R.C., or a ponzi scheme by Sinolumber to lure investors with a superficially large but difficult to exploit overseas resource base. See R. Evan Ellis, “Suriname and the Chinese: Timber, Migration, and the Less-Told Stories of Globalization,” SAIS Review, 32(2), Summer–Fall 2012: 85–97. 209. “Bai Shan Lin sets sights on operating 183,740 hectares of forest here,” Stabroek News, January 20, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 210. “Bai Shan Lin Boss Denies Violating Forestry Laws,” Stabroek News, July 14, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 211. “Chinese Firm Preps Launch of US$500M Venture,” Stabroek News, January 15, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 212. Although the agreement declared that 85 percent of laborers on the site would ultimately be Guyanese, it included an important caveat that a higher percentage of foreign workers could be used in the initial stages if workers with the required skills were not available locally. “Bai Shan Lin Sets Sights.”

3 Loan-Backed Construction—The New Model

1. See, for example, Daniel P. Erikson and Janice Chen, “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 31(2), Summer 2007: 69–89. 2. Daniel P. Erikson, “Conflicting U.S. Perceptions of China’s Inroads in Latin America,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, NOTES 231

eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 129. Indeed, the number of P.R.C.-funded sports stadiums was so great that the term, “cricket diplomacy” came into use to refer to the construction of cricket stadiums in the region by Chinese companies in the run-up to the 2007 Cricket Cup in the region. See Daniel Erikson and Paul Wander, “China: Cricket ‘Champion’,” Miami Herald, April 28, 2007, http://www.miamiherald.com. 3. Technically, however, Taiwan’s increasing discontent with “checkbook diplomacy” was visible at least a year prior to such developments. In 2007, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party declared that it was ending the practice of “personal donations” to Latin America’s political leaders. Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, “Central America between Two Dragons: Relations with the Two Chinas,” in Latin America Facing China: South- South Relations beyond the Washington Consensus, eds., Alex. E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 171. 4. “Presidente electo de Taiwán rechaza ‘diplomacia de la chequera’,” El Mercurio, March 23, 2008, http://www.emol.com. 5. Ralph Jennings, “Taiwan’s Pro-Independence Opposition Gains in Election Campaign,” Voice of America, January 9, 2012, http://www .voanews.com/content/taiwans-pro-independence-opposition-gains -in-election-campaign-136991603/150505.html. 6. Osvaldo Pandolfo, “El Estadio Nacional misión cumplida,” Nación, March 11, 2011, http://www.nacion.com. 7. “Los chinos del Estadio,” Nación, December 5, 2010, http://www .nacion.com. 8. Rodrigo Calvo C., “Símbolos chinos en estadio perdurarán,” Nación, March 20, 2011, http://www.nacion.com. 9. Ibid. 10. “Costa Rica or China Rica?” The Costa Rica News, June 13, 2012, http://thecostaricanews.com. 11. Steve Ercolani, “Costa Rica’s Love Affair with China Now Has a Monument,” Tico Times, October 4, 2012, http://www.ticotimes.net. 12. “China ofrece construir Escuela Nacional de Policía en Pococí,” Nación, August 22, 2012, http://www.nacion.com. 13. Isabella Cota, “China Lends Costa Rica $400 Mln on Xi Visit,” Reuters, June 3, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. 14. Gabriela Contreras, “China donó $16,3 millones más para Escuela de Policía, Canciller dice que aún faltan $14 millones,” Costa Rica Hoy, June 3, 2013, http://www.crhoy.com. 15. Luis Miguel Herrera C., “MOPT da por seguro crédito de China para vía Sarapiquí-Limón,” Nación, June 1, 2013, http://www.nacion.com. 16. Ezra Fieser, “Why Is China Spending Billions in the Caribbean?” Global Post, April 22, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com. 17. “A Chinese Beachhead?” The Economist, March 10, 2012, http://www .economist.com. 232 NOTES

18. “Chinese to Build US$150M Children’s Hospital in Couva,” The Trinidad Express, March 2, 2012, http://www.trinidadexpress.com. 19. Nikita Braxton-Benjamin, “Persad-Bissessar, Xi Visit Hospital Site,” Trinidad Express, June 1, 2013, http://www.trinidadexpress.com. 20. “What’s up with Arima Hospital?” The Guardian, October 13, 2013, http://guardian.co.tt. 21. “US Embassy Cables: U.S. Fears Chinese Investment in Bahamas,” The Guardian, January 13, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world /us-embassy-cables-documents/225201. 22. Randal C. Archibold, “China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice,” New York Times, New York, April 7, 2012, http://www .nytimes.com. See also “A Chinese Beachhead?” 23. Julian Richardson, “Jamaica, China Sign Four Agreements,” Jamaica Observer, August 22, 2013, http://jamaicaobserver.com. 24. Daraine Luton, “Jamaica-China Agreement to Provide Jobs,” Stabroek News, August 22, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 25. Grenada first diplomatically recognized the P.R.C. in October 1985, ten months after the election of the Grenada National Party government of Herbert Blaize, restoring civilian rule to the island after the 1983 US takeover of the island and a transition government thereafter. 26. Fieser, “Why Is China spending billions?” See also Kenneth Tan, “Grenada Thanks China for New Stadium with a Rendition of Taiwan Anthem,” The Shanghai List, February 8, 2007, http://shanghaiist.com. 27. “China Gives Grenada Stadium Gift,” Nation’s News, December 18, 2006, http://www.nationsnews.com. 28. “Chinese Housing Project Completed,” Spice Grenada, September 9, 2012, http://www.spicegrenada.com. 29. Jaime Daremblum, “Beijing Is Flooding the Region with Investment. Should America Be Worried?” The Weekly Standard, June 18, 2012, http://www.weeklystandard.com. 30. “China and Antigua & Barbuda,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Official Website, August 26, 2010, http://www.mfa .gov.cn. 31. Fieser, “Why Is China spending billions?” 32. Archibold, “China Buys Inroads.” 33. “Edward Oliver Leblanc Highway Formally Opens; Road Safety Tops Agenda,” Dominica News Online, April 21, 2012, http://dominicanewsonline.com. See also Ronald Sanders, “China’s Presence in Dominica,” Caribbean 360, April 28, 2011, http://www.caribbean360.com. 34. Simon Tomero, “With Aid and Migrants, China Expands Its Presence in a South American Nation,” New York Times, April 11, 2011, A4. 35. As of the time that this book went to press, the promised hospital had not yet been built. “China to Donate Hospital to Suriname,” Starbroek News, August 18, 2011, http://www.starbroeknews.com. 36. “Chinese Ambassador: Suriname/China Presidential Talks Will Strengthen Ties,” DevSur, May 31, 2013, http://www.devsur.com. NOTES 233

37. “China’s Caribbean March,” BBC, October 20, 2010, http://www.bbc .co.uk. 38. “About Us,” Baha Mar Official Website, Accessed December 20, 2010, http://www.bahamar.com/about-us/. 39. “Bahamas, China Sign Economic Technical Cooperation Agreement,” The Bahamas Investor, September 12, 2011, http://www.thebahamasin vestor.com. 40. “About Us—Partnerships,” Baha Mar Official Website, Accessed December 20, 2012, http://www.bahamar.com/about-us/#!/partnerships/general -contractor. 41. Taneka Thompson, “Wilchcombe Dismisses Hotel Union’s Concerns on GB Jobs,” Nassau Guardian, October 23, 2012, http://www.thenas sauguardian.com. 42. Neil Hartnell, “$6bn Developers Rush to Meet PM Departure Date,” The Tribune, October 29, 2013. 43. Alison Lowe, “Chinese Delegation to ‘Finalize’ Blackwood Project,” The Nassau Guardian, January 28, 2014, http://www.thenassauguardian .com. 44. “Chinese Banks to Finance Dominican Tourism Project,” Latin American Herald Tribune, http://www.laht.com. See also “Afirman China y RD desean ampliar nexos,” El Nacional, August 2, 2011, http://www.elna cional.com.do. “China’s Caribbean March,” BBC, October 20, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk. 45. “China financiará con 460 millones de dólares proyecto turístico,” El Nuevo Diario, October 14, 2010, http://www.elnuevodiario.com.do. See also “Llegan capitales de China,” Hoy, October 14, 2010, http:// www.hoy.com.do. 46. “Apartan al juez de un caso de estafa por parentesco con un querellado,” El Confidencial, April 28, 2013, http://www.elconfidencial.com. 47. “Project Number 20490,” International Finance Corporation, Accessed July 5, 2013, http://ifcext.ifc.org. 48. Normally, such a high percentage of foreign workers would have been a violation of Dominican law, but the project was granted a special exception. 49. Interview with Guyanese businessmen and officials on conditions of anonymity. 50. “Brassington Promises Details on Marriott Financing, Investors,” Stabroek News, July 16, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 51. This information was the consensus of senior political leaders and others interviewed in Guyana for this project. Georgetown, Guyana. August 15–20, 2013. 52. “Marriott Hotel’s Framework to Be Completed by April—President Visits Site,” Government of Guyana, http://www.op.gov.gy/index .php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1657:marriott-hotels -framework-to-be-completed-by-april-president-visits-site&catid =34:world-news. 234 NOTES

53. “Chinese Investors Promise Investment in Grenada,” BBC, May 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.com. 54. “Grenada Resort Obtains Financing,” Caribbean News Now, December 22, 2012, http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com. 55. Ibid. 56. “China and Jamaica to Conclude Harmony Cove Development Talks,” Jamaica Observer, February 11, 2014, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 57. Karyl Walker, “No Special Favours for China Harbour, says PM,” Jamaica Observer, December 6, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 58. “PM Welcomes Plans by CHEC to Establish Offices in Jamaica,” Jamaica Information Service, August 22, 2013, http://www.jis.gov.jm. 59. Indeed, those knowledgeable of the project suggested that China Harbour originally wanted to do the North-South highway as a loan- financed project as well, and only agreed to build it as a toll-road when the Jamaican government convinced it that there was no other option if it wanted the work. 60. Such observations are, of course, broad generalizations. The inclusion of local contractors and workers in such projects, and requirements to adhere to local labor laws has varied according to the government in question. Smaller states, such as those in the Caribbean, and anti-Western regimes, such as Venezuela, generally tend to negotiate agreements that impose fewer conditions on the Chinese. 61. “Central America-China Ties to Deepen,” Latin America Monitor, May 2011, http://www.latinamericamonitor.com. 62. Tim Rogers, “Nicaragua Taps China for Canal Project,” Nicaragua Dispatch, September 11, 2012, http://www.nicaraguadispatch.com. 63. “UPDATE 3—China’s Wen Offers $10 Billion Latin America Credit Line,” Reuters, June 16, 2012, http://in.reuters.com. 64. “China to Loan Caribbean $1 Billion,” Caribbean Journal, September 13, 2011, http://www.caribjournal.com/2011/09/13/china-to-loan -caribbean-1-billion/. 65. “UPDATE 4—China’s Wen Offers $10 Billion Latin America Credit Line,” Reuters, June 27, 2012, http://in.reuters.com. 66. “China to Provide $2 Billion for Latin America and the Caribbean Co-financing Fund,” InterAmerican Development Bank Official Website, March 16, 2013. 67. Mayela Armas H., “230 mil barriles de crudo al día irán al pago de deuda con China,” El Universal, May 10, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. See also R. Evan Ellis, “China’s Cautious Economic and Strategic Gamble in Venezuela,” China Brief, 11(18), September 30, 2011: 7–11. 68. “Venezuela Says It Receives $5 Billion Promised by China,” The Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2013, http://online.wsj.com. 69. Ernestro J. Tovar, “Envíos a China por acuerdos suman 200 mil barriles al día,” El Universal, February 29, 2012, http://eluniversal.com. NOTES 235

70. R. Evan Ellis, “China, Russia, India and the Venezuelan Petroleum Industry,” Latin Business Chronicle, December 11, 2013, http://www.lat inbusinesschronicle.com. 71. “Gobierno firma contrato ferrovario con china por $7500 milliones,” El Universal, July 30, 2009, http://eluniversal.com. 72. “Guardia Nacional resguarda construcción de tramo ferroviario Tinaco- Anaco,” El Periodiquito, December 14, 2011, http://www.elperiodiquito .com. 73. “Envíos a China por acuerdos suman 200 mil barriles al día.” 74. “Venezuela Is World’s Fifth Highest Investor in Energy,” Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Washington DC Official Website, August 23, 2010, http://venezuela-us.org. 75. “Delegaciones de Venezuela y China realizan inspecciones a Hidroé- ctrica,” Radio Mundial, June 6, 2012, http://www.radiomundial.com .ve. 76. “Venezuela y China firman acuerdos sobre proyectos eléctricos y petroleros,” El Universal, December 3, 2012, http://www.eluniversal .com. 77. “Venezuela Signs Three New Agreements with China,” El Universal, September 6, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. 78. Ibid. 79. “Venezuela y China firman acuerdo para construir Nuevo Puerto,” El Nacional, October 4, 2011, http://el-nacional.com. 80. “Research and Markets: Venezuela Shipping Report Q1 2012—China to Provide Badly Needed Infrastructure Improvements at Venezuelan Port,” Research and Markets, January 11, 2012, http://www.researchand markets.com. 81. “SANY’s Equipment Used for Construction of Venezuela Ports,” SANY Official Website, July 11, 2013, http://www.sanygroup.com /group/en-us/media/36524_for_news_text.htm. 82. “Chinese V.P. Views Beijing’s Money at Work in Venezuela,” EFE, May 14, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com. 83. “Venezuela y China firman acuerdo para construir plataformas petroleras,” El Universal, February 24, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. The agreement complimented a 2006 agreement with China to purchase petroleum drilling platforms from Chinese companies, but to eventually assemble them in Venezuela. 84. “Acuerdo con China para megacomplejo petrolero en Faja del Orinoco,” Terra, April 28, 2012, http://noticias.terra.com.ar. 85. “China construirá condominios industriales en la Faja,” El Universal, April 29, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 86. See Wei Tian, “Venezuela Seeks to Fuel Oil Links,” China Daily, December 1, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. See also Mayela Armas H., “Venezuela comprará 6.000 maquinarias chinas para vivien- das,” El Universal, August 26, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. 236 NOTES

87. Ana Diaz, “Rechazan contracion de obreros chinos,” El Nacional, June 18, 2012, http://www.el-nacional.com. A separate report referred to $1.5 billion for 13,000 houses in Ciudad Tiuna in Caracas, and other parts of Venezuela, done by CITIC Construction and paid for by ICBC funds; see “Envíos a China por acuerdos suman 200 mil barriles al día.” 88. “Las relaciones con China son excelentes, según el embajador de Ecuador,” Hoy, November 16, 2012, http://www.hoy.com.ec. See also Andrés Reliche, “Inician montajes electromecánicos en proyecto hidroeléctrico Coca Codo Sinclair,” Agencia Publica de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramerica, June 17, 2013, http://www.andes.info.ec. 89. Nathan Gil and Henry Sanderson, “China Development Bank Agrees to Loan Ecuador $2 Billion, Bolstering Bonds,” Bloomberg, June 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com. 90. “Central Coca-Codo Sinclair registra un avance del 22 percent,” El Comercio, December 16, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.com. 91. “Con China se oficializa crédito para segunda hidroeléctrica,” El Universal, October 11, 2011, http://eluniverso.com. 92. Jaime Jaramillo, “The Paute-Soplador Hydroelectric Project Advances 28 Percent,” Agencia Pública de Noticias de Ecuador y Suramerica, April 9, 2013, http://www.andes.info.ec. 93. “El financiamiento para Toachi Pilatón tropieza,” El Universo, December 29, 2010, http://eluniverso.com. 94. “Ecuador promueve inversiones, comercio, y turismo en el norte de China,” People’s Daily, June 16, 2012, http://spanish.peopledaily.com .cn. 95. “Cuarta firma china para hidroeléctrica,” El Universo, February 15, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 96. “¿Por qué el gobierno de Ecuador perdonó a Odebrecht?” America Economía, September 18, 2010, http://www.americaeconomia.com. 97. “Cuarta firma china para hidroeléctrica.” 98. “38 empresas chinas están en las areas estratégicas y construcción,” El Universo, June 18, 2012. 99. “Wind Energy in Ecuador: The First Wind Farm Will Make by Chinese Companies,” Revista Eólica y del Vehículo Eléctrico, August 16, 2011, http://www.evwind.es. 100. Ibid. 101. For a discussion of the difficulties with the Project, see “Rio Grande no vende ni compra en cantón Chone,” El Universo, November 12, 2011, http://eluniverso.com. See also “38 empresas chinas están en las areas estratégicas y construcción.” 102. “Ecuador’s Senagua Cancels Chone Project Contract with Chinese- Led Consortium,” Business News Americas, June 4, 2013, http://www .bnamericas.com. 103. “38 empresas chinas están en las areas estratégicas y construcción.” NOTES 237

104. “Embajador ecuatoriano intensifica las relaciones académicas con China, El Comercio, May 11, 2012, http://elcomercio.pe. 105. “Luz verde a Sinopec para explorar el Itaguazurenda,” Los Tiempos, July 1, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 106. “Prevén que Huanuni genere $us 1,3 milliones,” Los Tiempos, October 13, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 107. Dorothy Kosich, “China May Help Bolivia Finance El Mutún,” MineWeb, May 28, 2010, http://www.mineweb.com. 108. See “Exportación de hierro se trunca con salida de Jindal,” Los Tiempos, December 28, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 109. “Bolivia Pursues Hydro-Power Deal with China,” Fox News, July 29, 2012, http://latino.foxnews.com. 110. “Bolivia negocia construcción de hidroeléctrica de 1.300 millioones de dólares,” La Razón, July 11, 2013, http://www.la-razon.com. 111. “YPFB perdió $us 70 millones en la perforación de pozos que ‘falla- ron,” Los Tiempos, March 17, 2013, http://www.lostiempos.com. 112. “Bolivia buscará salir al mar ‘casi con autonomia’ por Puerto peruano,” El Comercio, August 6, 2011, http://elcomercio.pe. 113. “Evo quiere aprovechar las costas de Ilo para la construcción de ‘mega puertos’,” La Razón, March 24, 2013, http://www.la-razon.com. 114. “Empresa china CWE asfaltará carretera en Bolivia por 80 mdd,” China. Org, October 22, 2013, http://spanish.china.org.cn. 115. “Una empresa china construirá los dos puentes viales más largos de Bolivia,” El Nacional, January 24, 2014, http://www.el-nacional.com. 116. “Firman contrato para construir ingenio azucarero,” Los Tiempos, March 6, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 117. A. D. Hans Soria O. “Alcanzan 90 percent de avance en reactivación de Papelbol,” Los Tiempos, October 14, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 118. R. Evan Ellis, “Las relaciones China-Colombia en el contexto de la relación estratégica entre Colombia y los Estados Unidos,” In China en América Latina, ed., Benjamin Creutzfelt (Bogota, Colombia; Universidad Externado, 2012), 295–325. 119. Cristian Pardo Quinn, “Hyundai, entre nuevos interesados en manejar Rio Magdalena,” Portafolio, February 13, 2012, http://www.portafolio .com. 120. Juan Andres Abarca, “Colombia’s US$680Mn Magdalena River Project Receives Nine Bids,” Business News Americas, April 9, 2013, http:// www.bnamericas.com. 121. R. Evan Ellis, “Las relaciones China-Colombia en el contexto de la relación estratégica entre Colombia y los EE.UU,” Security and Defense Studies Review, 9(1–2), 2009: 16. 122. “Santos pidió pista en Singapur y va por los inversionistas chinos,” El Colombiano, May 7, 2012, http://www.elcolombiano.com. 123. “China, interesada en construir oleoducto en Colombia,” El Espectador, May 9, 2012, http://www.elespectador.com. 238 NOTES

124. “China and Colombia announce ‘alternative Panama Canal’,” BBC News, February 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-1244 8580. 125. “Acuerdo Para Que Llegue Inversión Chino,” El Tiempo, March 30, 2009, http://www.eltiempo.com. 126. “Alcaldesa (e.) ordenó suspender proyecto del metro de Bogotá,” El Tiempo, May 18, 2011, http://www.eltiempo.com. 127. “Colombia y China están cerca de negociar vía ferroviaria en el Pacífico,” Caracol, October 17, 2013, http://www.caracol.com.co. 128. “Colombia y Venezuela construirán oleoducto binacional,” La Opinión, March 29, 2012, http://www.laopinion.com.co. See also Edulfo Peña, “Presidente Santos visita a Gobierno chino, su ‘mejor nuevo socio,” El Tiempo, May 5, 2012, http://www.eltiempo.com. See also Edulfo Peña, “Carbón y petróleo, entre los intereses de China en Colombia” Portafolio, May 9, 2012, http://www.portafolio.co. 129. Peña, “Carbón y petróleo, entre los intereses de China en Colombia.” 130. “China, interesada en construir oleoducto en Colombia.” 131. As this book went to press, the southern interoceanic corridor linking Peru and Brazil was in its final stage of completion. “Interoceanic Highway, Brazil,” Roadtraffic Technology.com, Accessed July 29, 2013, http://www .roadtraffic-technology.com/projects/interoceanichighway/. 132. “Empresarios loretanos paralizan obra de alcantarillado de Iquitos por abuso de empresa china,” La Voz de la Selva, January 11, 2011, http:// Radiolvs.cnr.org.pe/ninterna.html?x=10229. January 11, 2011. 133. “Argentina Gets China Investment,” BBC News, November 17, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk. 134. “Qué pasa,” La Nación, February 21, 2008, http://www.lanacion.com. 135. “Cristina regresó de China sin soluciones para la venta de soja,” Clarín, July 17, 2010, http://www.clarin.com. 136. “Argentina y China firmarán millonarios acuerdos, pese a disputa por la soja,” America Economía, July 6, 2010, http://www.americaeconomia .com. 137. “China Agrees to Reopen Market to Argentine Soybean Oil Imports, People Say,” Bloomberg, October 11, 2010, http://www.bloomberg. com. 138. Juan Pablo De Santis, “El Gobierno intervino el Belgrano Cargas,” La Nación, October 26, 2012, http://www.lanacionlcom.ar. 139. Neil Denslow, “China Backs $12 Billion Argentina Rail Projects to Ease Commodity Supplies,” Bloomberg, July, 14, 2010, http://www. bloomberg.com. 140. “China to Invest in Argentine Railways,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com. 141. Juan Pablo De Santis, “El Gobierno intervino el Belgrano Cargas,” La Nación, October 26, 2012, http://www.lanacionlcom.ar. 142. “Habrá financiamiento chino para el tren Belgrano Cargas,” La Nación, September 10, 2011, http://www.lanacion.com. NOTES 239

143. Orlando Andrada and Mariela Arias, “Al wok. China saltó al tercer puesto en la inversión extranjera en la Argentina,” La Nación, March 6, 2011, http://www.lanacion.com. 144. Jorge Castro, “El primer ministro chino y una visita clave para el país,” Clarín, June 12, 2012, http://www.Clarín.com. June 12, 2012. 145. Juan Pablo De Santis, “El Gobierno intervino el Belgrano Cargas.” 146. “Estatizan el ferrocarril Belgrano Cargas,” La Nación, May 23, 2013, http://www.lanacion.com.ar. 147. Andres Bermúdez Liévano, “Un gigante chino, interesado en las hidroeléctricas de Santa Cruz,” La Nación, September 28, 2012, http:// www.lanacion.com.ar. 148. “Tras años de promesas, arranca la obra Portezuelo del Viento,” Diario Uno, November 16, 2011, http://www.diariouno.com. 149. Andres Bermúdez Liévano, “Un gigante chino, interesado en las hidroeléctricas de Santa Cruz.” 150. “Cayó el financiamiento para las represas Cóndor Cliff-La Barrancosa. China se negó a asegurar el financiamiento,” OPI Santa Cruz, November 7, 2013, http://opisantacruz.com.ar. 151. “Una petrolera comprometió obras para dar agua a Caleta Olivia y Pico Truncado,” Ahora Calafate, December 20, 2012. http://ahoracalafate. com.ar. 152. “Paco Pérez ahora amenaza a Vale con darle la mina a los chinos,” La Politica, January 28, 2013, http://www.lapoliticaonline.com. 153. “Sinopec Signs Brazil Pipeline Deal with Petrobras,” Downstream Today, January 21, 2008, http://www.downstreamtoday.com. 154. “China State-Run Banks Plan to Invest in Brazil’s High-Speed Train Project,” Bloomberg, September 14, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com. 155. “Brazil Bullet Train Project Fails to Attract Bidders,” BBC News, July 12, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk. 156. “New Rules for Rio-São Paulo Bullet Train Tender Leave Chinese Contenders Ineligible.” Business News Americas, August 24, 2012, http:// www.bnamericas.com. 157. “Chinese Prime Minister Visits Chile to Boost Transpacific Trade,” The Santiago Times, June 26, 2012, http://www.santiagotimes.cl/world /chile-abroad/23982-chinese-prime-minister-visits-chile-to-boost -transpacific-trade. 158. “Chile busca atraer inversiones chinas en transporte y telecomunicaciones,” Peoples Daily Online, December 7, 2012, http://spanish.people daily.com.cn. 159. Karina Albornoz, “Empresarios chinos quieren crear ciudad comercial en San Antonio.” Tierra, March 26, 2012, http://economia.terra.com .ar. 160. “Empresa china interesada en proyectos de infraestructura,” El Espectador, March 7, 2012, http://www.espectador.com. 161. “Uruguay: Mujica on a most ambitious misión to China after investments for ports and railways,” MercoPress, May 22, 2013, http://en.mercopress 240 NOTES

.com. See also “Brasil o China podrían dragar el canal Martin Garcia, dijo Almagro,” El Pais, June 4, 2013, http://www.elpais.com.uy. 162. “China reafirma decisión de invertir en infraestructra en Uruguay,” 180, June 23, 2012, http://www.180.com.uy. See also “Uruguay y China firmarán acuerdo para concretar puerto de aguas profundas,” La Red 21, June 8, 2012, http://www.lr21.com.uy. 163. Julia Reyna Quiroz, “Proyecta China invertir en Mexico,” La Jornada, May 28, 2013, http://www.journada.unam.mx. 164. “Mexico y China firman 12 acuerdos estratégicos,” ADN Político, June 4, 2013, http://www.adnpolitico.com. 165. R. Evan Ellis, “The China-Mexico Strategic Relationship and Its Impact on the U.S.” The Manzella Report, June 2, 2014, http://www .manzellareport.com. 166. Graham Bowley, “Cash Helped China Win Costa Rica’s Recognition,” New York Times, September 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com. 167. “País pide a China donación para ampliar ruta Río Frío-Limón,” Nación, August 2, 2010, http://www.nacion.com. 168. Ibid. 169. Vanesa Loaiza N., “Gobierno logra crédito chino de $400 millones para vía a Limón,” Nación, September 26, 2012, http://www.nacion.com. 170. Herrera C., “MOPT da por seguro.” 171. “Sinohydro: Social Responsibility Good for Business,” China Daily, October 11, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. 172. China aprueba seguir con plan de refineria con Recope,” Nación, October 10, 2011, http://www.nacion.com. 173. “Costa Rica and China Agree to Seek Financing for Joint Oil Refinery,” Costa Rica Star, June 11, 2012, http://news.co.cr. 174. Eugenia Soto Morales, “Construcción de nuevo muelle petrolero en Moín recibe luz verde,” El Financiero, February 29, 2012, http://www .elfinancero.com. 175. Isabella Cota, “Costa Rica Halts Chinese-Backed Plan for Refinery Upgrade,” Reuters, June 20, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. 176. The higher-end estimate comes from off-the-record interviews in 2013 with engineers in the commercial sector who had done a detailed analysis of the cost of various canal routes. 177. Rogers, “Nicaragua Taps China.” 178. Ivan Castro, “Nicaraguan Assembly Oks $40 Billion Chinese Canal to Rival Panama’s,” Reuters, June 13, 2013, http://www.reuters.com /article/2013/06/13/us-nicaragua-canal-idUSBRE95C1HI20130613 179. Tim Rogers, “Can China Finally Make the Nicaragua Canal Dream Happen?” Christian Science Monitor, July 24, 2013, http://www.csmonitor .com. 180. “El canal chino de Nicaragua: una gigantesca estafa,” Semana, July 3, 2013, http://www.semana.com. 181. On the basis of multiple off-the-record conversations by the author with persons associated with, or investigating, the project during 2013 and early 2014. NOTES 241

182. Patrick Boehler, “Revealed: China State-Owned Contractor Involved in Nicaragua Canal Project,” South China Morning Post, July 12, 2013, http://www.scmp.com. 183. “Nicaragua congressional committee OKs giving Chinese Company Concession to Build, Run Canal,” Washington Post, June 10, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com. 184. Patricia Rey Mallén, “Chinese Workers Arrive in Nicaragua to Do Viability Studies for Controversial Canal,” IBI Times, December 12, 2013, http://ibitimes.com. 185. “HKND anuncia empresas que realizarán estudios de factibilidad,” La Prensa, Managua, Nicaragua, February 4, 2014, http://www.laprensa .com. 186. “Canal en Nicaragua iniciará obras a finales de 2014 o inicio de 2015,” América Economía, January 5, 2014, http://americaeconomia.com/negocios -industrias/canal-en-nicaragua-iniciara-obras-finales-de-2014-o-inicio -de-2015. 187. Vladimir Vásquez, “Canal sin ruta, tampoco estudio,” La Prensa, Managua, Nicaragua, February 4, 2014, http://www.laprensa.com. 188. Rezaye Alvarez M, “Canal ‘sí va’ a finales de 2014,” La Prensa, Managua, Nicaragua, January 8, 2014, http://www.laprensa.com. 189. Tim Rogers, “Nicaragua Canal: Bonanza or Boondogle?” Nicaragua Dispatch, July 10, 2013, http://www.nicaraguadispatch.com. 190. For a more in-depth analysis of this issue, see R. Evan Ellis, “El canal de Nicaragua y de América Latina,” InfoBAE, June 26, 2013, http:// opinion.infobae.com. 191. Patrick Boehler, “Nicaraguan Canal Team Quietly Visit Mainland,” South China Morning Post, October 29, 2013, http://www.scmp.com. See also Russell Flannery, “Nicaraguan President’s Son Laureano Ortega Discusses $40 Bln Canal During China Visit,” Forbes, October 31, 2013, http://www.forbes.com. 192. “Chinos construirán mega refinería en Nicaragua,” El Comercio, April 27, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.com/mundo. 193. Vladimir Vásquez, “Refinería a cuentagotas,” La Prensa, Managua, Nicaragua. February 4, 2014, http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2014/02/04 /ambito/181036-refineria-a-cuentagotas. 194. In 2002, China Harbour was awarded the contract for Port of Balboa Container Terminal Development Phase 3. China Harbour Engineering Company Official Website, Accessed June 9, 2014, http://www.checlatin. com/index.php/panama. See also Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, “Central America between Two Dragons: Relations with the Two Chinas,” 174. 195. See “ACP adjudica licitación de diseño y fabricación de draga,” La Estrella, April 14, 2011, http://www.laestrella.com. 196. Shen Qing, “Panama Canal Expansion Stalled over Cost Overrun Dispute,” Xinhua, February 6, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng lish/world/2014-02/06/c_133094613.htm. 242 NOTES

197. “Honduras firma convenio por USD 50,5 millones con China para hidroeléctrica,” Nación, August, http://www.nacion.com. 198. “Honduras firma convenio con China para hidroeléctrica,” La Tribuna, April 17, 2011, http://www.latribuna.hn. 199. Sinohydro won the work after the initial bidder, a Taiwanese firm could not meet the terms insisted upon by the Honduran government. See “Honduras firma convenio con China para Patuca III,” La Prensa, April 17, 2011, http://archivo.laprensa.hn. 200. “Estancadas las obras en la represa hidroeléctrica Patuca III en Honduras,” La Prensa, June 9, 2013, http://www.laprensa.hn. 201. “Injupemp dispone de $200 millones para Patuca III,” La Prensa, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, November 12, 2013, http://www.laprensa .hn/economia/421379-98/injupemp-dispone-de-200-millones-para -patuca-iii. 202. Chris Davis, “Chinese Dam Business in South America on the Rise,” China Daily, January 20, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn. 203. “Chinos Interesados en Palmerola y El Tablón,” El Heraldo, May 22, 2013, http://www.elheraldo.hn. 204. “Jumping on the Inter-Oceanic Bandwagon,” LA News, June 27, 2013, http://www.lanews.com. 205. “Honduras pide a ONU intervenir en disputa con El Salvador por un islote,” People’s Daily Online, September 11, 2012, http://spanish.peo pledaily.com.cn. 206. “AEI’S Jaguar Energy Begins Construction of 300 MW Power Plant in Guatemala,” Business Wire, May 7, 2010, http://www.businesswire .com. 207. Urias M. Gamarro and Byron Dardon G., “Carbonera Jaguar buscará mejorar cobertura eléctrica,” Prensa Libre, August 17, 2009, http:// www.prensalibre.com. 208. Andres Oppenheimer, “Does Central America Need Three Inter-oceanic Corridors?” Miami Herald, Miami, Florida, July 31, 2013, http://www .miamiherald.com/2013/07/31/3535059/andres-oppenheimer-does -central.html. 209. Davis, “Chinese Dam Business.” 210. R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 237. 211. Chinese credits for Cuba’s purchase of Chinese goods were renewed and extended during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s trip to the island in November 2008. See “El president chino visita a Fidel Castro,” El Nuevo Herald, November 19, 2008, http://www.elnuevoherald.com. 212. “China, Cuba Agree on Refinery Project, New Loans,” Cuba Standard, June 6, 2011, http://www.cubastandard.com. 213. Jeff Franks, “Amid Uncertainties, Cuba Seeks Funding for Refinery Expansion,” Reuters, February 10, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. 214. Randal C. Archibold, “China Buys Inroads.” NOTES 243

215. Krystel Rolle, “Challenges Delay Airport Gateway Project,” The Nassau Guardian, May 18, 2013, http://www.thenassauguardian.com. See also “Bilateral Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Official Website for Relations between the P.R.C. and the Bahamas, August 26, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn. See also Aranaud de Borschgrave, “China Wins Friends at Breakneck Speed,” Trade Reform, April 21, 2011, http://www.tradereform.org/2011/04/china- wins-friends-at-breakneck-speed/. See also Daniel Erikson, “China in the Caribbean: The New Big Brother,” Presentation to the Jamestown Foundation, December 16, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org. 216. “Chinese Contractor for Timehri Airport Racking up Procurement Concerns across Caribbean,” Starbroek News, May 7, 2012, http://www .stabroeknews.com. 217. “Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping Attended the Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Montego Bay Convention Center Project,” Complant Official Website, Accessed April 1, 2013, www.complant.com. 218. “Gov’t Secures $6-B Funding from China for Pallasadoes,” Jamaica Observer, February 3, 2010, http://jamaicaobserver.com. 219. Ingrid Brown, “Palisadoes Road Work Now Set to Start in October,” Jamaica Observer, August 13, 2010, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 220. Garfield Meyers, “JDIP Will Boost Economy—Golding,” Jamaica Observer, September 13, 2010, http://jamaicaobserver.com. 221. “Chinese Contractor for Timehri Airport.” 222. Anthony Lewis, “Poor Supervision Undermined JDIP,” Jamaica Observer, July 4, 2013, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 223. “Gov’t Signs $423-Million Economic Agreement with China,” Jamaica Observer, August 23, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 224. Al Edwards, “China Harbour Engineering Company: Building a Better Jamaica,” Jamaica Observer, September 2, 2011, http://www.jamaicaob server.com. 225. “COMPLANT to Build Jamaican Homes Backed by J$6.5B Chinese Loan,” The Jamaica Gleaner, December 5, 2010, http://jamaica-gleaner .com. 226. “Chinese to Build Homes for Tourism Workers,” The Jamaica Gleaner, May 15, 2012, http://jamaica-gleaner.com. 227. Kimone Thompson, “10,000 Jobs from Goat Islands Port,” Jamaica Observer, January 22, 2013, http://jamaicaobserver.com. Accessed January 22, 2014. 228. Julien Neaves, “Chinese Firm Wins $500M UWI Contract,” Trinidad Express, May 18, 2012, http://www.trinidadexpress.com. 229. “Govt, China Sign $1.8B Deal,” Caribbean 360, March 18, 2012, http:// www.caribbean360.com. 230. Joshua Goodman, “China’s Xi Offers Caribbean Nations $3 Billion in Loans,” Bloomberg, June 3, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com. 231. Lesley Anderson, “China-Antigua Agreements Strengthen Relations,” Antigua News, January 1, 2011, http://www.caribarena.com. 244 NOTES

232. “Antigua: PM Spencer Praises China EXIM Bank for Partnering With Government,” Antigua Observer, April 15, 2011. See also “‘Lone Wolf’ gives Chinese ultimatum,” Antigua Observer, http://www.antiguaob server.com. 233. “Chinese Offers No Guarantee for US$47M Antigua Power Plant,” Kaieteur News Online, July 10, 2012, http://www.kaieteurnewsonline. com. See also Martina Johnson, “We Will Fight Charges All the Way— Lone Wolf,” Antigua Observer, January 24, 2013, http://www.antiguaob server.com. 234. “Chinese Almond,” Barbados Today Online, July 18, 2013, http://cdn .barbadostoday.bb. 235. James Pall, “China’s Princelings Storing Riches in Caribbean Offshore Haven,” The Guardian, January 21, 2014, http://www.theguardian. com/world/ng-interactive/2014/jan/21/china-british-virgin-islands -wealth-offshore-havens. 236. “China Harbour Is ‘deeply disappointed’,” Cayman Net News, November 8, 2012, http://caymannetnews.com. 237. “More Dominicans to Be Employed on State House Project,” Dominica News Online, August 9, 2011, http://dominicanewsonline.com. 238. “New Dominica State College to Aid in Achieving Education for All,” CaribSeek News, December 19, 2012, http://news.caribseek.com. See also “Bilateral Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Official Website for Relations between the P.R.C. and Dominica, August 22, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn. 239. “New Dominica Sate College to Aid in Achieving Education for All,” Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, December 18, 2012, http://news.gov.dm/index.php/news/4-headline-news/488-new -dominica-state-college-to-aid-in-achieving-education-for-all. 240. “Chinese Contractors Impact Local Techniques,” Dominica News Online, April 23, 2012, http://dominicanewsonline.com. 241. “No Chinese Warranty for ‘Botched’ Skeldon Sugar Factory,” Kaieteur News, June 26, 2012, http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com. See also “Bilateral Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Official Website for Relations between the P.R.C. and Guyana, August 26, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn. 242. “IDB, China to Finance Amaila Falls,” Kaiteur News, November 19, 2009, http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com. November 19, 2009. 243. “Chinese Company that Bungled US$200M Skeldon Plant Given US$48M GPL Contract,” Kaieteur News, March 27, 2012, http://www .kaieteurnewsonline.com. 244. “Chinese Contractor for Timehri Airport.” 245. “China Bankrolls $150 Million Upgrade of Guyana’s International Airport,” Baltimore Post Examiner, June 17, 2013, http://bantimore postexaminer.com. 246. “Amaila Hydro-Project Construction Agreement Signed in China,” Stabroek News, September 12, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. NOTES 245

247. Under the plan, Sythe Global would provide $150 million of the $840 million project cost, in return for a 60 percent initial stake in the project. “More Hydro Questions,” Kaiteur News, July 26, 2013, http:// www.kaieteurnewsonline.com. 248. Abena Rockcliffe, “President Consulting with Opposition Leader to Save Amaila,” Kaiteur News, August 12, 2013, http://www.kaieteur newsonline.com. 249. Interview with Guyanese government officials. Georgetown, Guyana, August 18, 2013. 250. “China Likely to Fund Guyana-Suriname Bridge,” Kaieteur News. February 4, 2014. http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com. 251. See R. Evan Ellis, “Suriname and the Chinese: Timber, Migration, and the Less-Told Stories of Globalization.” SAIS Review, 32(2), Summer– Fall 2012: 85–97. 252. Paul Tjon Sie Fat, Chinese New Migrants in Suriname: The Inevitability of Ethnic Performing (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009). 253. In 1980, a military coup led by then Sergeant Major Desi Bouterse put an end to Suriname’s elected post-independence government. In December 1982, 15 members of the opposition were arrested on charges of plotting against the new military government, and killed in deten- tion under mysterious circumstances, including allegations that two of the victims were personally shot by Bouterse, currently the president of the country. Although Bouterse was never judged criminally respon- sible for the killings, he was separately convicted in absentia in 1999 by a Dutch court on narcotrafficking charges. With the return of Bouterse to power in 2010, the Netherlands cut off aid to the country, while the United States and other countries have adopted a very cautious posture toward the new regime. “Bouterse heeft Daal en Rambocus doodges- choten,” Starnieuws, March 23, 2012, http://www.starnieuws.com. 254. Ellis, “Suriname and the Chinese.” 255. “China Bank Approves US$50M for Suriname Houses,” Stabroek News, April 28, 2012. 256. “China Has No Concrete Plans with Suriname Yet on Mega Projects,” Stabroek News, August 7, 2011, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 257. Mark McGowan, “Suriname’s Deep Sea Port, Road and Rail Link to Brazil Challenge Guyana’s Bid to Become Brazilian Gateway,” Stabroek News, December 12, 2010, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 258. At the time that this book went to press, the project had not gone forward, nor had the location of the port been specified, although experts on the subject in Suriname believed that such a port, if built, would be located at the mouth of the Commewijne, Coppename, or Corentyne Rivers. See Ellis, “Suriname and the Chinese.” 259. “Suriname Not Borrowing from China Without Thinking, Lackin Says,” Stabroek News, July 27, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 260. “China Has Solar and Hydroelectricity Projects in Store for Suriname,” De Ware Tijd, June 29, 2013, http://www.dwtonline.com. 246 NOTES

4 Retail Outlets, Distribution Networks, and Manufacturing Centers

1. The planned (but subsequently cancelled) JAC automobile factory in Brazil was an example of this approach. See “China’s JAC Motors to Build Plant in Brazil,” Reuters, October 7, 2011, http://www.reuters .com. 2. In Mexico, manufacturers may be exempted from paying taxes on cars that they import into the country for the first three years, given that they are working toward the establishment of a production facility there. Enrique Dussel Peters, “The Auto Parts-Automotive Chain in Mexico and China: Co-operation Potential?” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 91. 3. “Programa Mi Casa Bien Equipada ha vendido 850 mil equipos,” El Universal, February 7, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 4. Francisco Javier Arias R., “Con tecnología china, salen al mercado las motos AKT,” El Colombiano, April 11, 2013, http://www.elcolombiano .com. 5. Sinatex, S.A., de C.V. Official Website, Accessed April 4, 2013, http:// www.sinatexonline.com. 6. “Golden Dragon logra la mayor inversión china en México,” China Daily, October 29, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com. See also Adrian H. Hearn, Alan Smart, and Roberto Hernández Hernández, “China and Mexico: Trade, Migration, and Guanxi,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 142. 7. “Venezuela y China suscriben más acuerdos en energia y agro,” El Universal, November 24, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. See also “Gobierno firma acuerdos con empresa china Haier,” El Universal, May 14, 2010, http://www.eluniversal.com. 8. Mireya Tabuas and Maria Alesia Sosa, “No es un cuento chino,” El Nacional, April 15, 2012, http://el-nacional.com. 9. “3 millones de equipos chinos para ‘Mi casa bien equipada,” El Universal, July 6, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. As of February 2011, the government had received 1.4 million of the appliances, and had sold 850,000 of them. See “Programa Mi Casa Bien Equipada ha vendido 850 mil equipos.” 10. “China’s Major Municipal Port Ready to Build Linkages with Guyana,” Office of the President of Guyana, June 11, 2012, http://opnew.op.gov.gy. See also “Haier’s Overseas Expansion,” October 25, 2011, www.cnc world.tv. 11. Haier Guyana Official Website, Accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.hai erguyana.com. 12. Interview with Haier sales personnel. Georgetown, Guyana. August 20, 2013. NOTES 247

13. Mao Xianglin, Carlos Alzugaray Treto, Liu Weiguang, and Adrian H. Hearn, “China and Cuba: Past, Present and Future,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 191. 14. “TLC hace más atractivo producir en Colombia,” El Tiempo, Portafolio, May 28, 2012, http://www.portafolio.co/economia/tlc-hace-mas -atractivo-producir-colombia-0. 15. “Bolivia Seeks Investment from China,” Xinhua, November 28, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english. 16. See, for example, “Eruviel Ávila anuncia inversiones para generar empleos en Zumpango,” El Sol de Toluca, July 31, 2013, http://www .oem.com.mx/elsoldeleon. See also Juan Guízar, “Fuerte Inversión de Asia viene a Tijuana,” El Sol de Tijuana, June 28, 2013, http://www .oem.com.mx/elsoldetijuana. See also Paloma Anguiano, “Descartan autoridades y empresarios sea competencia,” El Sol de León, June 5 2013, http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldeleon. See also “República China interesada por inversiones en Durango,” El Sol de la Laguna, July 26, 2012, http://www.oem.com.mx/noticiasdelsoldelalaguna. See also José Mercado, “Poderoso consorcio chino desea invertir en Mexicali,” El Voz de la Frontera, February 19, 2011, http://www.oem.com.mx /lavozdelafrontera. See also “Primera inversión de la República Popular China en Aguascalientes,” El Sol del Centro, February 2, 2011, http:// www.oem.com.mx/elsoldelcentro. 17. Tracy Wilkinson, “Foes in Cancun See a Fire-Breathing Dragon Mart,” Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com. 18. Hu Yuanyuan, “Plans Afoot to Open Second ‘Dragon Mart’ Commercial Center in Mexico,” China Daily, February, 2012, http://www.china daily.com.cn. 19. “Dragon Mart in Dubai,” Dubai City Website, Accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.dubaicity.com/dubai-dubai-dragon-mart/. 20. Jesús Vázquez, “Relanzarán el Dragon Mart Cancún,” El Economista, June 11, 2012, http://eleconomista.com.mx. 21. Maickol Tamayo, “Proposed Chinese Dragon Mart Complex Raises Eyebrows in Cancun, Mexico,” PVAngels, January 10, 2013, http:// pvangels.com/news-mexico/5068/chinese-dragon-mart-complex -raises-eyebrows-in-cancun. 22. “Celebrarán freno a Dragon Mart Cancún,” El Informador, April 27, 2013, http://www.informador.com.mx/. 23. “Nueva fábrica de motos en Cali,” El Tiempo, May 16, 1997, http:// www.eltiempo.com. 24. “Jincheng: 15 años de operaciones en Colombia,” www.publimotos .com, November 5, 2012. See also “Nuestra compañía,” Jialing Colombia Official Website, Accessed June 22, 2012, http://www.motosjialing.com /nuestra_compania.php?id=4. 25. Rafael Miotto, “Alta do IPI de motos faz Shineray repensar fábrica de R$ 100 milhões,” Globo, September 3, 2012, http://g1.globo.com. 248 NOTES

26. “China’s Shineray Motorcycle Company starts assembling motorcycles in Brazil,” MacauHub, January 28, 2013, http://www.macauhub.com. mo. 27. “38 empresas chinas están en las areas estratégicas y construcción,” El Universo, June 18, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 28. Indeed, by 2010, China was producing 23.5 percent of all cars manufac- tured throughout the world, the single largest global producer. Peters, “The Auto Parts-Automotive Chain.” 29. Interview with Enrique Dussel Peters, Head of the China-Mexico studies Institute (CECHIMEX) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Berkeley, California. May 22, 2012. 30. “Giant Motors presenta camiones,” El Sol del Hidalgo, June 23, 2011, http://www.oem.com.mx. 31. “Foton, autorizado para vender camiones Daimler en México,” T21Mex, June 18, 2013, http://t21.com.mx. See also R. Evan Ellis, “The China- Mexico Strategic Relationship and Its Impact on the U.S.” The Manzella Report, June 2, 2014, http://www.manzellareport.com. 32. Emmanuel Moreno, “La empresa china Geely se instalará en León,” El Sol de Bajio, July 11, 2008, http://www.oem.com.mx, See also Hearn, Smart, and Hernández Hernández, “China and Mexico.” 33. “La china Lifan compra la urugyaya Effa,” Reuters, August 3, 2012, http://www.reuters.com. 34. “Uno de cada cuatro autos vendidos en Uruguay es chino,” América Economía, October 8, 2013, http://americaeconomia.com/node/102543. 35. Such plans were accelerated when the Brazilian government raised taxes on imported cars by 30 percent in September 2012. 36. “Brazilian company Effa Motors to manufacture vehicles of China’s Harbin HF Automobile Industry Group Co., in Brazil,” Macau Hub, April 27, 2012, http://www.macauhub.com.mo. 37. Eleonora Gosman, “China amplía en US$68.400 milliones su inversion en Brazil,” Clarín, November 23, 2012, http://www.Clarín.com. 38. The plant would reportedly have an initial capability to assemble 50,000 cars per year “Chinesa Changan pode ter fábrica em Goiás,” Estadao. com.br, May 29, 2012, http://www.estadao.com.br. 39. Gosman, “China amplía en US$68.400 milliones su inversion en Brazil.” See also “Shineray anuncia fábrica em Permambuco e mostra tres motos,” UOL Carros, October 4, 2011, http://carros.uol.com.br. 40. Li Fangfang, “Local Car Producers Looking to Brazil for Growth,” China Daily, January 6, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. 41. The plant, which would be JAC’s first “full manufacturing operation outside China” would reportedly have the capacity to produce 100,000 cars per year. Sheena Rossiter, “Brazil Sees Auto Plant Boom as Vehicle Importers Rethink Strategies,” Wards Auto, May 21, 2013, http://ward sauto.com. See also “Navistar International signs deal with China’s JAC for sale of trucks in Brazil,” Macau Hub, April 25, 2012, http:// www.macauhub.com. See also “China’s JAC Motors to Build Factory NOTES 249

in Brazil, Hoping to Avoid Higher Import Taxes,” Mercopress, October 9, 2011, http://www.mercopress.com. 42. Fangfang, “Local Car Producers.” 43. In August 2012, the project was temporarily postponed because JAC could not structure a deal in such a way that the production of the plant would not be subject to the newly imposed Brazilian “industrial products tax.” Luciani Otoni, “UPDATE 2—Brazil to Boost Import Taxes Again to Help Local Industry,” Reuters, September 4, 2012, http:// www.reuters.com. 44. Fangfang, “Local Car Producers.” 45. Roberto Deniz, “Ejecutivo prevé ensamblar 5,000 autos en empresa mixta,” El Universal, August 16, 2011, http://www.eluniversal. 46. Roberto Deniz, “Gobierno prevé importer más si se incumplen precios de Sundecop,” El Universal, February 12, 2012, http://www.eluniversal .com. 47. “Venezuela to Assemble and Export Exclusive Chery cars to Mercosur,” El Universal, November 12, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 48. Simon Romero, “With Brazil as Advocate, Venezuela Joins Trade Bloc,” New York Time, July 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com. 49. “Venezuela y empresa china buscan mayor producción de vehículos,” América Economía, December 4, 2013, http://americaeconomia.com /node/106341. 50. “Venezuelan Consumers Line up to Buy China’s Locally Assembled Chery,” China Post, March 12, 2012, http://www.chinapost.com.tw. 51. “Suvinca suspendió la venta de vehículos importados,” El Universal, January 23, 2013, http://www.eluniversal.com. 52. Since Foton in China would make changes to its models during different years, Corbeta faced inherent challenges with ensuring that it had the right parts to support the right models in Colombia. 53. Orlando Andrada and Mariela Arias, “Al wok. China saltó al tercer puesto en la inversión extranjera en la Argentina,” La Nación, March 6, 2011, http://www.lanacion.com. 54. “Ni altos aranceles pararon importación de autos chinos,” El Portfolio. Bogotá, Colombia, December 21, 2011, http://www.portafolio.co/detalle _archivo/DR-31815. 55. “El primer vehículo “made in Paraguay,” ABC, September 7, 2012, http://www.abc.com.py. 56. “Chinese Construction Machinery Company to Invest in Brazil,” Macau Hub, February 23, 2010, http://www.macauhub.com.mo. 57. Ibid. 58. “The First Excavator Rolled off the Production Line in Sany Brazil,” Sany, Inc. Official Website, February 25, 2011, http://www.sanygroup .com. 59. “Brazilian Subsidiary of Chinese Group Sany Plans to Increase Turnover in Brazil,” Macau Hub, September2, 2011, http://www.macauhub.com .mo. 250 NOTES

60. “Sany comenzara a producer en Brasil en 2013,” Cpampa, August 20, 2012, www.cpampa.com. 61. “China’s Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group to open branch in Brazil,” Macau Hub, February 24, 2011, http://www.macauhub.com .mo. 62. “Chinese Giant XCMG Takes German Schwing,” Construction Week Online, April 24, 2012, http://www.constructionweekonline. 63. “Chinese Group XCMG to Invest in Brazilian State of Minas Gerais,” Macau Hub, May 17, 2011, http://www.macauhub.com.mo. 64. Li Fangfang, “Zoomlion Speeds up Overseas Expansion,” China Daily, September 28, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn. 65. Clarise Ardúz, “Zoomlion Cifa anuncia inicio de sus operaciones en Brazil y inaguración de fabrica,” KHL, September 17, 2013, www.khl .com. 66. Murray Pollok, “GJJ plans assembly plants in India and Brazil,” Access International, December 20, 2012, http://www.khl.com/magazines/access -international. 67. Kenneth Rapoza, “China to Build Trains in Rio de Janeiro,” Forbes, June 21, 2011, http://www.forbes.com. 68. Tabuas and Sosa, “No es un cuento chino.” 69. Colum Murphy and Rogerio Jelmayer, “Chinese Auto Maker BYD Eyes $100 Million Investment in Brazil Plant,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2014. 70. PdVSA, “Balance de la Gestión Social y Ambiental Año 2011,” El Universal, April 17, 2012, http://www.static.eluniversal.com. April 17, 2012. 71. “Pdvsa construye 20 taladros con apoyo de China,” El Universal, September 18, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. See also R. Evan Ellis, “China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business and Strategic Position,” US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 25, 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army. mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1077. 72. “Venezuelan acude a China e Italia para elevar producción de alu- minio,” El Universal, March 11, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 73. “Ecuador busca potenciar su matriz productiva gracias a China,” América Economía, February 9, 2014, http://americaeconomia.com /economia-mercados/ecuador-busca-potenciar-su-matriz-productiva- gracias-china. 74. Oliver Galak, “Invierten 1000 millones de dólares para fabricar úrea,” La Nación, January 14, 2011, http://www.lanacion.com.ar. 75. “Comenzó la construcción de la planta petroquímica de Shaanxi en Tierra del Fuego,” Petroquimica, April 28, 2012, http://revistapetro quimica.com/comenzo-la-construccion-de-la-planta-petroquimica -de-shaanxi-en-tierra-del-fuego/. 76. Indeed, the role of Chinese companies and labor in the project became the subject of a public dispute in April 2012 when the Argentine NOTES 251

government prevented a ship containing workers and materials for the project from the P.R.C. from entering the country. See Zhou Siyu, “The Ups and Downs of Latin Adventure,” China Daily, July 24, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. See also “Latin America the 2nd Biggest Investment Target for China,” Xinhua, June 18, 2012, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english. In the end, the ship was forced to divert to Chile at great cost, pending the resolution of the dispute. “Se va a Chile: El barco chino descargará su material en el Puerto de Punta Arenas,” Sur 54, May 9, 2011, http://sur54.com.ar. 77. Barbara Hogenboom, “Mexico vs. China: The Troublesome Politics of Competitiveness,” in Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations beyond the Washington Consensus, eds., Alex. E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 61. 78. “Monterrey sera centro técnológico estratégico en México,” Lenovo Official Website, February 18, 2009, http://www.lenovo.com. 79. “Lenovo’s Mexican Computer Factory Starts Production,” China Tech News, February 23, 2009, http://www.chinatechnews.com. See also Jeremy Kirk, “Lenovo Opens Manufacturing Plants in Mexico and India,” PCWorld, July 26, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com. 80. Eleonora Gosman, “China amplía en US$68.400 milliones su inversion en Brazil.” See also Juro Osawa, “Lenovo executive: Firm eyes acquisitions in Brazil,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2012, http://www .marketwatch.com. 81. Loretta Chao, “Chinese Tech Titans Eye Brazil,” Wall Street Journal Online, January 8, 2013, http://online.wsj.com. 82. Andrada and Arias, “Al wok.” 83. Nuria Rebon, “Lenovo empezó a fabricar notebooks en Tierra del Fuego,” El Cronista, August 25, 2011, http://190.2.45.93/nego cios/Lenovo-empiezo-a-fabricar-notebooks-en-Tierra-del-Fuego -20110825-0066.html. 84. “Chávez celebra el lanzamiento del ‘Vergatario,” El Universal, May 10, 2009, http://www.eluniversal.com. 85. “Presidente anuncia operación de fábrica de celulares Orinoquia,” El Universal, May 9, 2010, http://www.eluniversal.com. 86. “Gobierno destaca alta producción de celulares y computadoras,” El Universal, December 19, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 87. In the Project, TCL is operating in partnership with the local company Radio Victoria Fueguina. Andrada and Arias, “Al wok.” 88. Alejandro Alfie, “La china ZTE fabricará celulares para Movistar,” Clarín, July 27, 2011, www.Clarín.com. In addition, the Taiwanese company HTC, which specializes in smartphones, announced its establishment of a production facility in Tierra del Fuego in March 2012, “Llega otra marca china al Sur,” La Nación, March 9, 2012, http://www.lanacion.com.ar. 89. “Empresa china confirmó inversiones en Tierra del Fuego y tiene pre- visto fabricar 500 mil celulares,” El Surenio, July 9, 2011, http://www .surenio.com.ar. 252 NOTES

90. The facility was built by renovating an electronics plant run on the site by the company Celestica until it closed in 2009. 91. “Huawei Kicks off Smartphone Production in Brazil,” ZDNet, June 24, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/huawei-kicks-off-smartphone-production -in-brazil-7000017219. 92. “Huawei inagura centro de distribucion de US$61,5mn,” Business News Americas, May 31, 2012, http://www.bnamericas.com. 93. Thiago Tanji, “Huawei fabricará smartphones no Brasil,” Exame, June 24, 2013, http://exame.abril.com.br/tecnologia/noticias/huawei-fabricara -smartphones-no-brasil. 94. “Huawei analiza instalar una fabrica en Peru,” El Comercio, February 6, 2012, http://elcomercio.pe. 95. “China Huawei inicia producción de teléfonos inteligentes en Brasil,” Terra, August 13, 2013, http://noticias.terra.com.co. 96. “ZTE Begins Brazil Expansion.” Business Monitor Online. August 15, 2011. 97. Leonel Araiza, “Llega China con 20 mmdd,” El Sol de Leon, November 12, 2012, www.oem.com.mx. 98. Josué Reyes, “Construirán en Centro Fox un mega edificio,” El Sol de Leon, November 24, 2013, http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldeleon /notas/n3202759.htm.

5 Commercial Service Offerings—Telecom, Electricity, Logistics, and Banking

1. “Full Text: China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean,” People’s Daily Online, November 6, 2008, http://english.people.com.cn. 2. “Latinoamérica, uno de los mercados en mayor crecimiento para Huawei,” EFE, October 29, 2012. 3. Huawei Official Website, Accessed February 4, 2013, http://www.hua wei.com/worldwide/index.htm. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. “Latinoamérica, uno de los mercados en mayor crecimiento para Huawei.” 7. In Chile, for example, ZTE was among the first to offer such products to the market. “Telefónica confía en América Latina para implementar su sistema móvil de bajo costo,” El Mercurio, October 8, 2012, http:// www.emol.com. 8. The projects are described in general terms, in the websites of both companies. See, for example, “Huawei America Latina,” http://www.hua wei.com/es/catalog.do?id=343. See also Janie Hulse, “China’s Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal from Argentina’s Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National Security,” in US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (September 2007). NOTES 253

9. “Teléfono celular de marca blanca llegará a Ecuador,” El Universo, February 17, 2010, http://www.eluniverso.com. 10. “Telefónica and ZTE to Strengthen Smartphone Offer in Latin America with Launch of Movistar Prime,” ZTE Official Website, February 17, 2011, http://www.zte.com.cn. 11. “China’s Huawei invests US$300 million in research centre in Brazil,” MacauHub, April 12, 2012, http://www.macauhub.com. 12. “Huawei inaugura centro de distribución de US$61,5mn,” Business News Americas, May 31, 2012, http://www.bnamericas.com. 13. “NII Holdings has Selected Huawei as UMTS Supplier in Mexico and Brazil,” Press Release. Huawei Official Website, Accessed February 5, 2013, http://www.huawei.com. 14. In discussing Huawei’s establishment of a technology center in Sao Paolo State, Brazilian Communications minister Paulo Bernardo expressed his hope that the center would help Huawei to implement its new 4G network across the entire country, including providing new coverage to rural areas, then use its base in Brazil as a launching point for deploying its networks more broadly in the region. “Chinese telecom company can have technology center in Brazil,” Folha, July 11, 2010, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/1118691-empresa-chinesa -de-telecomunicacao-pode-ter-centro-tecnologico-no-brasil.shtml. 15. “ZTE Completes First Phase of Ultra Broadband Project for TIM Brazil,” ZTE Official Website, October 15, 2012, http://www.zte.com .cn. 16. Yun-Hee Kim, “ZTE to invest in high-tech industrial park in Brazil,” ZTE Official Website, April 13, 2011, http://www.zte.com.cn. See also “China invertirá en alta tecnología en Brasil,” La Nación, July 5, 2011, http://www.lanacion.com.py. 17. “Acuerdan instalación de parque industrial de tecnología china en Brasil,” Xinhua, March 28, 2011, http://spanish.news.cn. 18. “Chinese Telecom Firms to Expand in Latin America,” Xinhua, June 12, 2012. 19. “China Telecom sets up unit in Brazil,” Global Telecom Business, June 14, 2012, http://www.globaltelecombusiness.com. 20. Damián Kantor, “Cuáles son las rutas posibles para la telefonía móvil estatal,” Clarín, October 21, 2012, http://www.ieco.Clarín.com. See also Jorge Oviedo, “¿Cual es el limite de la aspiradora de dólares?” La Nación, October 21, 2012, http://www.lanacion.com.ar. 21. Huawei reportedly registered $200 million in sales in Chile in 2010, less than a tenth of its activities in Brazil. “Tecnológica china Huawei proyecta alza de 50 percent de ventas en Chile,” El Mercurio, June 13, 2011, http://www.emol.com. 22. Ibid. 23. “Chile y China empujan inversión y proponen duplicar comercio en visita de Wen,” EFE, June 26, 2012. 254 NOTES

24. “ZTE, Universidad de Chile to Open Innovation Center,” ZTE Official Website, July 12, 2012, http://wwwen.zte.com.cn. 25. “Chile busca aumentar inversión extranjera directa china en sector de telecomunicaciones,” Business News Americas, December 10, 2012, http://www.bnamericas.com. 26. “Premier Wen Vows to Further Ties with Uruguay,” China.org, June 23, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn. 27. Industry analysts note that ZTE is a leader in implementing the technology involved, the next generation “Gigabit Passive Optical Network (GPON), and will have a major role in building and maintaining similar architectures not only in Uruguay, but potentially throughout the region. See “ANTEL Selects ZTE for Uruguay National GPON Project,” ZTE Official Website, October 10, 2012, http://www.zte.com .cn. See also “Antel Selects ZTE for GPON Network,” Business News Americas, September 22, 2011, http://www.bnamericas.com. 28. Mireya Tabuas and Maria Alesia Sosa, “No es un cuento chino,” El Nacional, Caracas, Venezuela, April 15, 2012, http://el-nacional.com. 29. “Venezuela CANTV Selected Huawei Technologies to Upgrade Its Optical Fiber National Backbone Network,” Huawei Official Website, December 31, 2004, http://www.huawei.com. December 31, 2004. In addition, evidence suggests that Huawei has been contracted by the Venezuelan government to implement a command and control system for the Venezuelan defense organization DICOFAN. See for example, Monica Suinaga. Huawei Design Engineer, Online Resume, http:// ve.linkedin.com/pub/monica-suinaga/3/996/111. 30. “ZTE proveerá televisión IP en Venezuela,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, April 26, 2009, http://www.eluniversal.com. 31. “Créditos pactados con China ascienden a $30 millardos,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, November 25, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. 32. “Inside Telecom,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, March 4, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 33. “El futuro de la telefonía,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, July 10, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 34. “Empresa china ZTE ayudará con automatización de Sidor y FMO,” Business News Americas, November 25, 2011, http://www.bnamerocas .com. 35. “Venezuela implantará sistema chino de monitoreo en minas,” Xinhua, November 24, 2011, http://spanish.news.cn. 36. “La empresa china Huawei se adjudicó proyecto TCT de Entel,” Jornada, October 8, 2009, http://www.jornadanet.com. See also “ENTEL eje- cutará proyecto Territorio con Cobertura Total en 2010,” Jornada, December 5, 2009, http://www.jornadanet.com. 37. Ibid. 38. “Oruro es declarado ‘Territorio con cobertura total’,” Jornada, February 9, 2010, http://www.jornada.com. NOTES 255

39. “Multan con $us. 8 millones a china Huawei por incumplir contrato,” Jornada, December 22, 2010, http://www.jornadanet.com. 40. “Evo Morales pide a los empresarios chinos mayor inversion en Bolivia,” EFE, August 11, 2011, http://www.efe.com. 41. “Bolivia y China firman 6 acuerdos de cooperación,” Los Tiempos, September 23, 2011, http://www.lostiempos.com. 42. “Anuncian entrega de 40 cámaras de seguridad,” Los Tiempos, January 21, 2013, http://www.lostiempos.com. 43. Jeeyla Benitez, “Dos dragones chinos pelearon por jugosos contratos de la CNT,” El Comercio, January 16, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.com. 44. Ironically, Huawei’s closest competitor in the bid was ZTE. “Alcatel y Huawey logran adjudicacion para instalar red 3G.” El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. http://www.eluniverso.com. July 25, 2011. 45. “CNT Picks Huawei for 4G Network Deployment in Ecuador,” Telecom Paper. http://www.telecompaper.com. May 16, 2013. 46. “Movistar traerá a Ecuador nuevos dispositivos móviles.” El Comercio. Quito, Ecuador. February 17, 2010. 47. “Desde Guayaquil se empezará a ensamblar celulares a fin de mes.” El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. http://www.eluniverso.com. October 4, 2010 48. “El Ecuador se dirige a fabricar celulares.” El Comercio. Quito, Ecuador. April 13, 2010. 49. Benitez, “Dos dragones chinos.” 50. “Huawei apuesta por 4G como su ‘negocio del año’,” La República, March 8, 2013, http://www.larepublica.com.co. 51. Ibid. 52. “Nextel Peru Unveils World’s First W-CDMA Network with Push-to- Talk Services,” September 30, 2011, http//www.huawei.com. 53. This work reportedly included the installation of a new core network replacing Telefonica’s legacy switched system. See “ZTE IMS to Update Telefónica Group in Perú Fixed Network,” ZTE Official Website, April 23, 2012, http://www.zte.com.cn. 54. “Peru’s First 4G Wireless Network Set for Success,” Telecommunications Insight, August 2011, http://www.telecomsinsight.com. 55. “ZTE se adjudica proyecto de red inalámbrica nacional 2G/3G con Viettel,” Business News Americas, July 11, 2012, http://www.bnamericas .com. 56. See, for example, “Huawei Deploys WiMAX Network in Trinidad and Tobago,” Caribbean Information Society Portal, Accessed June 15, 2011, http://www.carib-is.net/news/huawei-deploys-wimax-network -trinidad-and-tobago. 57. “Huawei and Digicel Deliver Seamless 3G Network in the Caribbean,” Huawei Press Release, March 14, 2007, http://www-ctc .huawei.com/ilink/en/about-huawei/newsroom/press-release/HW _089379?KeyTemps=News. 256 NOTES

58. “ZTE to Roll out 3G Networks in French Caribbean and Indian Ocean,” ZTE Press Release, February 24, 2009, http://wwwen.zte .com.cn/en/press_center/press_clipping/200902/t20090223_171128 .html. 59. “Moving Towards 3G with ZTE’s All-IP CDMA2000,” ZTE Press Release, Accessed June 15, 2011, http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/en/solu tions/wireless/cdma2000/200709/t20070919_157315.html. 60. Mark Lyndersay, “TSTT Announces Mobile Broadband Strategy,” Trinidad Guardian, April 26, 2012, http://guardian.co.tt. 61. Mark Lyndersay, “Bmobile Goes to Bat for 4G,” Trinidad Guardian, November 13, 2012, http://guardian.co.tt. 62. “Tricom implementará nueva red móvil 4g-LTE,” El Caribe, July 2, 2012, http://www.elcaribe.com.do/2012/07/02/tricom-implementara- nueva-red-movil-4glte.v. 63. Amilicar Nevar, “Empresa china tras mercados desde RD,” El Caribe, September 6, 2012, http://www.elcaribe.com.do/2012/09/06/empresa- china-tras-mercados-desde. 64. “Huawei Marine and Global Marine Systems Complete Construction of the Suriname-Guyana Submarine Cable System,” Huawei Official Website, May 28, 2010, http://www.huawei.com/en. 65. “Gov’t Sells GT&T Shares to Chinese Company for US$30M,” Stabroek News, April 6, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 66. “GT&T Shares Buyer Linked to Chinese Military,” Kaieteur News Online, April 13, 2012, http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com. See also “Guyana, China Sign Bilateral Cooperation Projects Deal,” Guyana Times International, January 3, 2013, http://www.guyanatimesinterna- tional.com. 67. “First Phase e-Governance Initiative 85 percent Complete,” Guyana Chronicle Online, March 6, 2012, http://www.guyanachronicleonline. com. 68. Adrian Hearn, “Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States,” Florida International University, June 2009. 69. “Cuba Gets Fiber-Optic Cable Link to Venezuela,” Reuters, February 10, 2011, http://www.reuters.com. 70. “Cuba, Venezuela Link Via Undersea Cable,” The Right Perspective, January 23, 2011, www.therightperspective.org. 71. Mileika Lasso, “Huawei presenta gama ADSL y 3G,” La Estrella, July 19, 2011, http://www.laestrellaonline.com. 72. “Preocupados trabajadores por possible privatizacion de Hondutel,” La Tribuna, October 23, 2010, http://www.latribuna.com. 73. “China’s Xinwei to Launch Phone Service in Nicaragua,” Reuters, January 11, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. 74. “El canal chino de Nicaragua: una gigantesca estafa,” Semana, July 3, 2013, http://www.semana.com. 75. “Xinwei hasta el próximo año,” La Prensa, Managua, Nicaragua, November 5, 2013, http://www.laprensa.com.ni. NOTES 257

76. The penetration of Huawei in selling cell phones through different providers to the Costa Rican and other telecommunications markets was illustrated dramatically in February 2013 when the company acci- dentally shipped a case of 1,000 phones purchased by the Costa Rican telecommunications agency ICE, bearing the logo of its competitor, Movistar. See “Huawei se disculpa con ICE por confusión con logo de celulares,” Nación, February 8, 2013, http://www.nacion.com. 77. Huawei Official Website, Accessed February 5, 2013, http://www.hua wei.com.en/about-hauwei/newsroom/resources/latin_america/index .htm. 78. Ulises Díaz, “Avanza Huawei en México,” Reforma, August 17, 2013, http://www.reforma.com. 79. Huawei reportedly invested $20 million to establish the center in 2006. See “China Huawei invierte 20 milliones de dólares en México,” Terra, November 14, 2006, http://www.terra.com. 80. “Espera México recibir hasta 900 mdd de inversions chinas,” El Sol del Bajío, July 11, 2008, http://www.www.oem.com.mx/elsoldelbajio. 81. Ulises Díaz, “Avanza Huawei en México,” Reforma, August 17, 2011, http://www.reforma.com. 82. “NII Holdings Has Selected Huawei.” 83. “Total Play descarta sinergias en servicios con Cablevisión,” El Universal, June 1, 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com. 84. “AM Launches Mexico’s First Commercial LTE Network with Huawei,” Huawei Official Website, November 15, 2012, http://m.hua wei.com/enmobile/news/hw-197173.htm. 85. W. David Gardner, “China’s ZTE To Build Massive Wi-Fi Network For Mexico City,” Information Week, April 3, 2007, http://www.infor mationweek.com. 86. “Movistar y Mozilla lanzan los smartphones Firefox OS en México,” La Prensa, Mexico City, October 31, 2013, http://www.oem.com.mx /laprensa/notas/n3177462.htm. 87. Richard Fu, “State Grid Powers on by Buying 7 Brazilian Firms,” Shanghai Daily, December 12, 2010, http://www.shanghaidaily.com. 88. Asher Levine and Guillermo Parra-Bernal, “Brazil May Oppose Neoenergia, China Deal—Report,” Reuters, May 14, 2012, http://www .reuters.com. 89. “Cuarta firma china para hidroeléctrica,” El Universo, February 15, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 90. “Ecuador promueve inversiones, comercio, y turismo en el norte de China,” People’s Daily, June 16, 2012, http://spanish.peopledaily.com.cn. 91. “38 empresas chinas están en las areas estratégicas y construcción,” El Universo, June 18, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 92. “Retrasos y negligencia en el sector electric,” El Comercio, May 4, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.com. In addition to Goldwind, the firm Hydrochina also submitted a bid in response to the August 2011 solici- tation by the Ecuadoran government. 258 NOTES

93. “El proyecto eólico Villonaco se inaugurará el miércoles en Loja,” El Comercio, December 30, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.com. 94. Patrick Smith, “Bolivia’s First Wind Farm Opened,” WindPower Monthly, January 3, 2014, http://www.windpowermonthly.com. 95. Jose Santamarta, “Wind Energy in Bolivia: China Will Give Funding for the First Wind Farm,” Reve, December 18, 2011, http://www .evwind.es. See also “Arce: Bolivia teme al acuerdo entre China y Perú,” Los Tiempos, January 17, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 96. “Empresas de nuestro país y China invertirán 3.500 millones de dólares en una central eólica en Gastre,” El Chubut, July 9, 2012, http://www .elchubut.com.ar. 97. Progress on the project was highlighted by Argentine Minister of the Economy Axel Kicillof following a trip from Beijing in December 2013. See “Empresarios chinos confirmaron millonarias inversiones en Argentina,” América Economía, December 9, 2013, http://ameri caeconomia.com/economia-mercados/finanzas/empresarios-chinos -confirmaron-millonarias-inversiones-en-argentina. 98. “China captura cuota del mercado eólico latinoamericano con présta- mos baratos,” Economía y Negocios, November 20, 2012, http://www .economiaynegocios.cl. 99. “China Development Bank Funds Sinovel Wind in Brazil,” Sinocast, September 11, 2012, www.sinocast.com. See also, “Sinovel Delivers 23 Wind Turbines to Brazil,” Renewable Energy Focus, September 29, 2011. http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com. 100. According to the article, work was begun on the project in March 2013. See “Compañia china Goldwind construira dos parques eólicos en Chile,” Xinhua, February 12, 2013, http://www.spanish.news.cn. See also “Eólica en Chile: aerogeneradores chinos para un parquet eólico en Bío Bío,” Reve, February 5, 2013, http://www.evwind.com. 101. “Compañia china Goldwind construira dos parques eólicos en Chile.” See also “China y su apuesta por la energiaeólica,” Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, February 27, 2012, http://www.asiapacifico.bcn.cl. 102. “Empresa irlandesa logra financiacion para un parquet eólico,” Power Engineering, February 1, 2013, http://www.powerengineeringint .com. 103. “China, Chile Aim to Double Bilateral Trade by 2015,” The Globe and Mail, June 26, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com. 104. “China’s Trina Solar Sets up Shop in Chile to Tap South America,” Recharge, September 5, 2012, http://www.rechargenews.com. In early 2013, Sky Solar announced it was increasing its investment in Chile to $1.36 billion. “Firma china Sky Solar amplía a US$ 1.360 millones la inversión en Chile,” Emol, January 25, 2013, http://www.emol.com. 105. Mercedes Agüero, “Chinos usarán luz solar de Guanacaste para generar energía,” La Nación, August 14, 2012, http://www.nacion.com. 106. “Empresa china instalará planta de energía solar,” El Sol de Sinaloa, October 27, 2011, http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldesinaloa. NOTES 259

107. Jesús Francisco Sánchez, “Invertirá China en Durango 150 mdd: Yuming,” El Sol de Durango, March 9, 2012, http://www.oem.com.mx /elsoldedurango/notas/n2459849.htm. 108. Pilar Perez, “Podría China financiar proyecto de energía solar,” El Sol de Puebla, April 16, 2013, http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldepuebla. 109. Jesus Manuel Ruiz, “Producirá Chihuahua energía eléctrica mediante granjas solares,” El Mexicano, January 3, 2014, http://www.oem.com .mx/elmexicano. 110. “China’s State Grid Corp Plans to Invest US$5 Billion in Brazil by 2015,” MacauHub, September 4, 2012, http://www.macauhub.com. 111. “China State Grid Awarded Tender for Construction of Power Lines in Brazil,” MacauHub, December 27, 2012, http://www.macauhub.com .mo. 112. “China State Grid partners Companies in Brazil to Build Power Transmission Line,” MacauHub, February 10, 2014, http://www.macau hub.com.mo. 113. “Contrato (en Ecuador) por US$ 632 millones para empresa Harbin de China,” El Comercio, July 27, 2013, http://www.elcomercio.com. 114. “Más gestión china en electricidad,” El Comercio, December 12, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.com. 115. Abelardo Pachano, “Inquietudes nacionales,” El Comercio, December 15, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.com. 116. Indeed, in the case of the Hong Kong–based company Hutchison- Whampoa, there has been some debate with respect to whether Hutchison should legitimately be considered a “Chinese company” or not. 117. Indeed, during this period, if US politicians and senior officials were aware of one detail of P.R.C.’s then nascent involvement in Latin America, it was that a Chinese company had “control” of both sides of the Panama Canal. See, for example, Steven Mufson, “In Panama: Ports in a Storm; GOP Critics Decry Hong Kong Firm’s Role at Each End of Canal,” Washington Post, December 8, 1999, http://www.washington post.com. 118. “Freeport Container Port,” Hutchison Port Holdings Official Website, Accessed March 4, 2013, http://www.hph.com/globalbusiness/busi ness.aspx?gid=59. 119. Ianthia Smith, “Gov’t Told ‘Block Hutchison,” Jones Bahamas, October 29, 2009, http://www.jonesbahamas.com. 120. See Anastacia Stubbs, “Freeport Container Port to speak to New Providence businesspersons,” Bahamas Weekly, October 17, 2008, http:// www.thebahamasweekly.com. 121. Smith, “Gov’t Told ‘Block Hutchison.” 122. “Ecuador buscará reemplazo a Hutchison para operar puerto de Manta,” El Universo, March 19, 2009, http://www.eluniverso.com. 123. Reportedly, part of the reason was concern that with its presence in Freeport, Colon, and Cristobal, Hutchison already had too significant 260 NOTES

of a presence in the region, generating political resistance to the project within Panama. Panamanian logistics executives, speaking off the record, argued, for example, that Panamanian authorities came to believe that Hutchison would not dedicate adequate resources to the new facility. 124. “Empresa china, lider en construcción de astilleros y puertos se interesa por inverter en Ecuador,” Ecuador Inmediato, August 7, 2012, http:// www.ecuadorinmediato.com.See also “Gobernador insiste en conce- sionar el Puerto,” El Comercio, January 2, 2013, http://www.elcomercio .com. 125. “Air China plans to increase frequency of flights between China and Brazil,” December 19, 2012, MacauHub, http://www.macauhub.com .mo. 126. China Airport Holdings is an entity commercial constituted in Colombia representing the operator of 39 different airports in the P.R.C., including the international airports in Beijing and Shanghai. 127. On the basis of off-the-record interviews with Colombian businessmen close to the deal. Medellín, Colombia, March 2013. 128. Ibid. 129. The Colombian government further required that the partner used to meet the operational experience requirements (the Chinese in this case) have at least a 10 percent stake in the overall investment. This requirement was met by China Airport Holdings having a 52 percent stake in CAH Colombia, and CAH Colombia, in turn, having a 20 percent stake in Air Plan. The Chinese met the 10 percent requirement, but just barely. 130. Interview with Air Plan personnel, Medellín, Colombia, March 2013. 131. The Chinese sovereign wealth fund will hold a 34.2 percent stake in the portfolio, which includes 34 assets, approximately 88 percent of which are located in the Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro areas. See Pooja Thakur, “GLP Ties up with Funds to Buy 2.9 Billion Real of Brazil Assets,” Washington Post, November 14, 2012, http://washpost.bloomberg.com. 132. Chen Jia, “Companies Keep Eyes on Market in Brazil,” China Daily, November 27, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. 133. “China Construction Bank Negotiates Acquisition of a Bank in Brazil,” MacauHub, January 17, 2012, http://www.macauhub.com. 134. “China Telecom Acts to Gain Brazil Foothold,” Financial Times, June 13, 2012, http://www.ft.com. 135. “Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Opens in Brazil in 2013,” MacauHub, December 28, 2012, http://www.macauhub.com.mo. 136. “El ICBC abrió sus puertas en Perú.” Peru21. Lima, Peru. http://peru21 .pe. November 28, 2012. 137. Land of opportunity,” China Daily, May 24, 2012, http://www.china daily.com. 138. “ICBC Bank facilitará operaciones de comercio exterior entre Perú y Asia,” América Economía, January 30, 2013, http://www.americaeconomia NOTES 261

.com/economia-mercados/finanzas/icbc-bank-facilitara-operaciones -de-comercio-exterior-entre-peru-y-asia. 139. See, for example, R. Evan Ellis, “China, Russia, India and the Venezuelan Petroleum Industry,” Latin Business Chronicle, December 11, 2013, http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com. 140. “38 empresas chinas están.” 141. Carlos Lara, “Se reunió Peña Nieto con banqueros chinos,” La Prensa, November 23, 2012, http://www.oem.com.mx/laprensa. See also Alejandro Colón, “Pronto, subsidiaria del banco chino en nuestro país,” La Prensa, November 23, 2012, http://www.oem.com.mx/laprensa. 142. Juan Guizar, “Invertiría China en Tijuana para Banco y ferrocarril,” El Sol de Tiajuana, July 26, 2013, http:// www.oem.com.mx/elsoldeti juana. 143. “ICBC Sets Up Branch in Brazil.” ICBC Company Website, January 23, 2013, http://www.icbc.com.cn/icbc/newsupdates/icbc%20news /ICBC%20Sets%20up%20Branch%20in%20Brazil.htm. 144. “Standard Bank: el BCRA aprueba la venta al chino ICBC pero pide que lo conduzca un argentino,” Crash Noticias, August 14, 2012, http:// www.crashnoticias.com.ar/shop/detallenot.asp?notid=98679. 145. “Aprueban el ingreso chino al Standard,” Clarín, November 12, 2012, http://www.Clarín.com. 146. Marcela Pagano, “Standard Bank: los chinos hacen pie y ya preparan el cambio de nombre,” Clarín, November 30, 2012, http://www.Clarín. com. 147. “China Construction Bank Negotiates Acquisition of a Bank in Brazil,” MacauHub, January 17, 2012, http://www.macauhub.com. 148. “China Construction Bank Negotiates Entry into Brazilian Market,” MacauHub, May 12, 2012, http://www.macauhub.com. 149. Isabella Steger, “Mizuho Buys Brazil Bank From Ailing WestLB,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com. 150. Cristiane Lucchesi, Dakin Campbell, and Giulia Camillo, “Construction Bank Agrees to Buy Majority of Brazil Bank,” Bloomberg, November 1, 2013, http:// http://www.bloomberg.com/.

6 Addressing the New Challenges

1. See, for example, Amos Irwin and Kevin P. Gallagher, “Chinese Investment in Peru: A Comparative Analysis, Discussion Paper No. 34,” Tufts University (2012), http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP34Ir win- GallagherDec12.pdf. 2. A 2007 study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences indicated that the general Chinese public knows very little about the region. See Simon Shen, “Online Chinese Perceptions of Latin America: How They Differ from the Official View,” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss 262 NOTES

and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 160. 3. Enrique Dussel Peters, Presentation to the Latin American Studies Association Annual Meeting, May 25, 2012, San Francisco, California. 4. Indeed, one analysis of Chinese engagement with Latin America notes that big Chinese firms have made significant progress by recruiting top graduates from not only Chinese universities, but from local ones as well, operating truly like multinational companies. 5. See Ding Qingfen, “Companies Still Drawn to Peru, Despite Obstacles,” China Daily, December 11, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. 6. For a discussion of these concerns, see Rhys Jenkins and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, “Fear for Manufacturing? China and the Future of Industry in Brazil and Latin America,” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 59–81. 7. David Shambaugh, “Foreword,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), xv. Indeed, a 2012 Latin Business survey identified Argentina as the most protectionist nation in the world. See “Argentina with the Largest Number of Protectionist Measures Worldwide,” Mercopress, June 19, 2012, http://en.mercopress. com. See also Tom Miles and Hugh Bronstein, “Argentina Accused of ‘Protectionism’ at WTO, Strikes Back,” Reuters, August 21, 2012, http://www.reuters.com. See also Zhou Siyu, “Trade with Argentina ‘Hit by Protectionism,’” May 23, 2012, China Daily. http://www.china daily.com.cn. 8. “China Continues to Face Increasing Trade Friction in 2014,” PriceWaterhouseCooper, Official Website, September 13, 2013, http:// pwccn.com/home/eng/pr_160913.html. See also, “Exporters to Face More Trade Friction,” Xinhua, August 17, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/china/2013-09/17/c_132727591.htm. 9. Hu Yifan, “Pitfalls on the Road to Superpower Status,” China Daily, May 4, 2012: 9. 10. See, for example, “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (Full Text),” Government of the People’s Republic of China, November 5, 2008, http://english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05 /content_1140347.htm. 11. Peruvian scholar, Rubén Gonzalez-Vicente notes, for example, that Chinese mining executives interviewed consistently have shown a “sincere concern about the adaptation of Chinese businesses to Latin American contexts.” See Rubén Gonzalez-Vicente, “Mapping Chinese Mining Investment in Latin America: Politics or Market?” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.). NOTES 263

7 The Struggle to Acquire Companies and Win Project Work in Latin America

1. “Noranda Ends Exclusive Period of Talks with China Minmetals,” CBC News, November 16, 2004, http://www.cbc.ca. 2. “Why China’s Unocal Bid Ran out of Gas,” Businessweek, August 3, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com. See also Isabela Steger, “Cnooc’s Unocal Lessons,” Blog, Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2012, http://blogs .wsj.com. 3. David Renwick, “A Chance for Petrotrin,” Trinidad Express, October 2, 2012, http://www.trinidadexpress.com. 4. “Valero to Transform Aruba Refinery—Analyst Blog,” NASDAQ, September 4, 2012, http://www.nasdaq.com. 5. Rodrigo Orihuela, “BP’s $7.1 Billion Sale of Pan American to Cnooc Group Scrapped,” Businessweek, November 7, 2001, http://www.business week.com. 6. Steven Mufson, “In Panama: Ports in a Storm; GOP Critics Decry Hong Kong Firm’s Role at Each End of Canal,” Washington Post, December 8, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com. 7. “Saudi Petrochemical Giant Sabic Halts Plans to Build $5.3 Billion Methanol Complex in Trinidad,” Fox News, March 3, 2013, http:// www.foxnews.com. 8. Curtis Williams, “NGC: Gas Agreement between Sabic/Sinopec in Three Months,” Trinidad Guardian, April 26, 2012, http://m.guardian .co.tt/business-guardian/2012-04-24/ngc-gas-agreement-between -sabicsinopec-three-months. See also “SABIC, Sinopec in Talks with Trinidad over Methanol Plant,” Reuters, February 11, 2012, http:// www.reuters.com. 9. “SABIC Project May Not Gain Traction, says Methanex Boss,” Trinidad Guardian, May 11, 2012, http://guardian.co.tt/business/2012-05-11 /sabic-project-may-not-gain-traction-says-methanex-boss. 10. Brent Fuller, “China Harbour Berthing Project Talks Extended,” Cay Compass, April 2, 2012, http://www.compasscayman.com. 11. Norma Connolly, “Cruise Lines Want to Build Cayman’s Berths,” Caymanian Compass, March 5, 2013, http://www.compasscayman. com/caycompass/2013/03/05/Cruise-lines-want-to-build-Cayman-s -berths/. 12. “China Harbour Is ‘Deeply Disappointed’,” Cayman Net News, November 8, 2012, http://caymannetnews.com. 13. “Standard Bank: el BCRA aprueba la venta al chino ICBC pero pide que lo conduzca un argentino,” Crash Noticias, August 14, 2012, http:// www.crashnoticias.com.ar/shop/detallenot.asp?notid=98679. 14. Simon Rabinovitch and Paul Davies, “ICBC Closes in on Standard Bank Deal,” Financial Times, August 7, 2013, http://www.ft.com. 15. Zhou Siyu, “The Ups and Downs of Latin Adventure,” China Daily, July 24, 2012, http://www.usa.chinadaily.com.cn. 264 NOTES

16. Written correspondence with Carlos García Martínez, November 2012. 17. “Otro capítulo del cuento chino,” El Diario del Fin del Mundo, July 10, 2012, http://www.eldiariodelfindelmundo.com. 18. Caspar W. Weinberger, “Panama, the Canal and China,” Forbes, October 4, 1999, http://www.forbes.com. 19. Manuel Luna, “Megapuerto de Farfán naufragó,” La Estrella, November 28, 2008, http://www.laestrella.com.pa/online/impreso/2008/11/28 /megapuerto-de-farfan-naufrago.asp. 20. “Introduction,” Lázaro Cardenas Terminal Portuaria de Contenedores., 2005, http://www.lctpc.com.mx/ingles/index.htm. 21. Interview with Enrique Dussel Peters, Head of the Mexico–China Studies Center (CECHIMEX) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Berkeley, California, May 22, 2012. 22. See, for example, the Hutchison Port Holdings Official Website, Accessed January 31, 2013, http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/en /businesses/global.php. 23. Ianthia Smith, “Gov’t Told ‘Block Hutchison’,” Jones Bahamas, October 29, 2009, http://www.jonesbahamas.com. 24. Enrique Ahumada Benítez, “China y Chile llegan a acuerdo sobre propiedad de mina Gaby,” Library of the Chilean National Concress—Asia -Pacific, September 24, 2008, http://www.asiapacifico.bcn.cl. 25. See “The New Chinese Engagement with Latin America: Understanding Its Dynamics and the Implications for the Region,” Uni versity of Miami Center for Hemispheric Policy, March 3, 2006, https://www6.miami. edu/hemisphericpolicy/EllisTheNewChineseEngagementWithLatin America030306.pdf. See also Rodrigo Cárdenas, “Licitación de Gaby estará lista a inicios de 2008,” El Mercurio, February 23, 2006, http:// www.emol.com. 26. “Contrato de Coca Codo evita licitación,” El Universo, April 3, 2009, http://www.eluniverso.com. 27. “38 empresas chinas están en las aéreas estratégicas y construcción,” El Universo, June 18, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 28. This was particularly attractive given that Ecuador’s ability to obtain financing in international credit markets was severely restricted in light of its 2008 default on debt obligations to international lending institutions. See “Bancos de Ecuador temen que ‘default’ afecte créditos,” El Universo, December 14, 2008, http://www.eluniverso.com. 29. “Estado, garante de préstamo para Coca Codo,” El Universo, April 2, 2009, http://www.eluniverso.com/2009. 30. President Correa declared that the conditions were an insult to Ecuador, and that the IMF had never imposed conditions as abusive as those that the Chinese were attempting to impose. See “Correa dice que Ecuador ha sido maltratado por China,” El Universo, December 1, 2009, http:// www.eluniverso.com. 31. “38 empresas chinas están.” NOTES 265

32. The suspension was not the first delay in the project. “China-Funded Costa Rica Refinery Still Being Negotiated,” Reuters, August 15, 2012, http://in.reuters.com. 33. Isabella Cota, “Costa Rica Halts Chinese-Backed Plan for Refinery Upgrade,” Reuters, June 20, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. 34. Evan Ellis, “Costa Rica at Crossroads in Courtship with Beijing,” China Brief, Vol. 14, Issue 10, http://www.jamestown.org. 35. “Decreto aguardado pela JAC Motors para instalação de fábrica está garantido, diz governo,” Correio, July 31, 2012, http://www.correio 24horas.com.br. 36. Jesús Vázquez, “Relanzarán el Dragon Mart Cancún,” El Economista., June 11, 2012, http://eleconomista.com.mx. 37. Maickol Tamayo, “Proposed Chinese Dragon Mart Complex Raises Eyebrows in Cancun, Mexico,” PVAngels, January 10, 2013, http:// pvangels.com/news-mexico/5068/chinese-dragon-mart-complex -raises-eyebrows-in-cancun. 38. Amy Guthrie, “China Plan Raises Ire in Mexico,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2013, http://online.wsj.com. 39. “Dragon mart rejected,” LatinNews, April 25, 2013, http://www.latin news.com. 40. Tracy Wilkinson, “Foes in Cancun See a Fire-Breathing Dragon Mart,” LA Times, June 1, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com. 41. Alberto Escenario, “Chinese Retailer “DragonMart” Fights and Wins a Spot on Mexican Soil,” Mexican Law Blog, October 9, 2013, http:// mexicanlawblog.com/chinese-retailer-dragonmart-fights-and-wins-a -spot-on-mexican-soil/. 42. “Contrato de Coca Codo.” 43. See Julien Neaves, “Chinese Firm Wins $500m UWI Contract,” Trinidad Express., May 18, 2012, http://www.trinidadexpress.com. 44. Mercedes Agüero, “Contraloría frena megared de Internet veloz del ICE,” Nacion, San Jose, Costa Rica, August 30, 2013, http://www .nacion.com. 45. Gerardo Ruiz Ramón, “Comisión extendió plazo para estudiar crédito chino para ampliar vía a Limón,” Nación, December 3, 2013, http:// http://www.nacion.com/. 46. “CJIA Expansion Works to Await Review of World Bank Sanction,” Starbroek News, June 23, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 47. Fernando Villavicencio V., Ecuador Made in China, second edition, Miami, FL: InterAmerican Institute for Democracy, January 2013. 48. “MTOP defiende contratación de empresa china,” El Universo, June 8, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 49. “Fate of CJIA Expansion in Limbo,” Stabroek News, June 23, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 50. “Govt. Defends $424,000 Toilet Bowls for CJIA,” Stabroek News, July 4, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. In the end, however, the pri- mary argument for killing the project was that it was not justified by 266 NOTES

the amount of traffic using the airport. On the basis of multiple off- the-record interviews with political leaders in Guyana, August 15–20, 2013. 51. Abena Rockcliffe, “President Consulting with Opposition Leader to Save Amaila,” Kaieteur News, August 12, 2013, http://www.kaieteur newsonline.com. 52. “Sithe Global Pulls Out of Amaila,” Stabroek News, August 9, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 53. “Amaila: False Dilemma,” Kaieteur News, August 12, 2013, http://www .kaieteurnewsonline.com. 54. “Brassington Promises Details on Marriott Financing, Investors,” Stabroek News., July 16, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 55. “Desmond Trotman Moves to Block Transfer of Marriott Hotel Land,” Stabroek News, June 29, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 56. “President Pleased with Marriott Hotel Construction,” Stabroek News, January 6, 2014, http://stabroeknews.com. 57. Margaret Meyers, “China Eyes Overseas Agriculture to Achieve Food Security,” Caxin Online. January 7, 2014, http://www.thedialogue.org /page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3479. 58. Alexei Barrionuevo, “China’s Interest in Farmland Makes Brazil Uneasy,” New York Times, May 27, 2011, http://www.newyorktimes .com. 59. “Chinese Investment in Argentina Continues to Grow,” The Debts of a Nation, June 17, 2011, http://debtsofanation.blogspot.com/2011/06 /chinese-investment-in-argentina.html. 60. “Uruguay quiere impedir la venta de tierras a Estados extranjeros,” InfoBae, Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 12, 2013, http://www .infobae.com/2013/11/12/1523199-uruguay-quiere-impedir-la-venta -tierras-estados-extranjeros. 61. In the election, Carlos Soria, the candidate of the ruling national coalition Frente para la Victoria defeated the governor who had previously signed the accords, César Barbeito. See “Triunfó el kirchnerismo en la ciudad de Bariloche,” La Nación, October 3, 2011, http://www.lana cion.com.ar. Soria was shot to death in January 2012, just 21 days after taking office. “A un año de su trágica muerte, homenajearon a Carlos Soria,” La Nación, February 1, 2013, http://www.lanacion.com.ar. 62. “Proyecto suspendido,” La Nación, November 24, 2011, http://www .lanacion.com.ar. 63. “Derogación de Ley 72 publicada en Gaceta Oficial,’’ La Estrella, October 29, 2012, http://www.laestrella.com.pa. 64. Correspondence with Carlos Garcia Martinez, October 29, 2012. 65. Krystel Rolle, “8,000 Jobs in Jeopardy?” The Freeport News, November 20, 2010, http://freeportarchive.nassauguardian.net. 66. “Chinese Contractor for Timehri Airport Racking up Procurement Concerns across Caribbean,” Starbroek News, May 7, 2012, http://www .stabroeknews.com. NOTES 267

67. Dixie-Ann Dickson, “At What Cost, Chinese Labour?” The Guardian, June 7, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2012 -06-06/what-cost-chinese-labour. 68. “Chinese Investor to Breathe New Life into Palm Oil Industry,” DevSur, May 3, 2011, http://www.devsur.com/chinese-investor-to-breathe -new-life-into-palm-oil-industry/2011/05/03/. Despite these concerns, however, a scaled down version of the project was successfully introduced in 2012. See “Oil Palm Industry Projected for Nickerie,” Stabroek News, February 13, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 69. On the basis of interviews with multiple Guyanese politicians for this study. Georgetown, Guyana. August 15–20, 2013. 70. “Rio Grande no vende ni compra en cantón Chone,” El Universo, November 12, 2011, http://eluniverso.com. 71. Juan Bosco Zambrano, “Notifican fin de contrato a empresa china a cargo de proyecto multipropósito en Chone,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, June 1, 2013, http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2013/06/01/nota /977491/notifican-fin-contrato-empresa-china-cargo-proyecto-multi proposito. 72. “Brazil: Indian Activist Occupy Belo Monte Hidroelectric Dam,” The Huffington Post, October 27, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com. 73. Belo Monte was to be the third largest hydroelectric project in the world. Song Shengxia, “China Seals Brazil Dam Deal,” Global Times, April 15, 2011, http://business.globaltimes.cn. 74. “China afirma tras protesta en Quito que sus inversions benefician al Ecuador,” El Universo, March 7, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 75. “Marcha avanzó a Latacunga y está a 75 kilómetros de Quito,” El Universo, March 20, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 76. “IMC, la segunda firma minera en despedirse del Ecuador este año,” El Comercio, December 4, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.com. 77. “ECSA pagó $ 40 millones por regalía minera,” El Universal, Guayaquil, Ecuador, December 28, 2012, http://www.eluniverso. com/2012/12/28/1/1356/ecsa-pago-40-millones-regalia-minera.html. 78. Aldo Miguel, “Expulsan pobladores de Zautla a mineros chinos,” El Sol del Puebla, November 22, 2012, http://www.oem.com.mx. 79. In 2006, the firm Barrack Gold similarly was forced by local residents to abandon plans to develop the mine. “Continuará el corte de vecinos en Famatina,” No a la Mina, June 23, 2012, http://www.noalamina.org. 80. Orlando Andrada and Mariela Arias, “Al wok. China saltó al tercer puesto en la inversión extranjera en la Argentina,” La Nación, March 6, 2011, http://www.lanacion.com. 81. See, for example, “Acusan al alcalde de Sapalache de apoyar violencia contra Río Blanco,” El Comercio, November 23, 2011, http://www. elcomercio.pe. 82. Community leaders who were seen as “troublemakers” had been detained by local police, and there had been extrajudicial killings in the nearby town of Huancabamba. The mine was also located in the 268 NOTES

vicinity of poppy growing areas, creating the rumor, which was never well-substantiated, that the growing and harvesting of poppies for her- oin production by local criminal groups was a factor in the difficulties of the mine. See Marco Aquino, “Peru Mine Killings Work of Drug Trade: Businessmen,” Reuters, November 3, 2009, http://www.reuters .com. 83. Rio Blanco also illustrates how opposition to projects on environmental grounds may be intertwined with other problems. Two of the key play- ers in the deal, the Peruvian ambassador to the P.R.C., Luis Chan, and the British ambassador to Peru, Richard Ralph, both left their posts to assume positions on the board of directors of Monterrico Metals. Ralph was subsequently found guilty by a British court and fined $118,000 pounds for insider trading involving the project. See Julia Kollewe, “Former British Ambassador Fined £118,000 for Insider Trading,” The Guardian, November 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk. 84. See, for example, “Acusan al alcalde de Sapalache de apoyar violencia contra Río Blanco.” 85. Felicity Lawrence, “Global Food Crisis: China Land Deal Causes Unease in Argentina,” The Guardian, June 1, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk. 86. “Colombia: policía contra defensores del río Magdalena,” La Pluma, August 15, 2012, http://www.es.lapluma.net. 87. Celestine Nixon, “Baha Mar Eases Fears over Beach Construction Work,” Tribune, June 8, 2012, http://www.tribune242.com. 88. “Honduras Dam Project Shadowed by Violence,” al Jazeera, December 24, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com. 89. Tamayo, “Proposed Chinese Dragon Mart.” 90. “Indígenas anticipan movilizaciones si Gobierno decide explotar el Yasuní,” El Universo, August 14, 2013, http://eluniverso.com. 91. Julian Richardson, “Gov’t Admits Goat Islands under ‘Serious Consideration’ for Trans-shipment hub,” Jamaica Observer, August 22, 2013, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 92. “Wuhan Steel Halts $5 Billion Brazil Plant Project,” MarketWatch, November 9, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com. 93. “UPDATE 2—Wuhan Talks to Build Brazil Steel Mill ‘Dormant’— LLX.” Reuters. http://www.reuters.com. November 8, 2012. 94. Ibid. 95. See “Acumula México proyectos fracasados de autos chinos,” El Financiero, June 3, 2013, http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx. See also “Marcha atrás a planta armadora de autos de la FAW en Michoacán,” Cambio de Michoacán, April 13, 2009, http://www.cambiodemichoacan. com.mx/vernota.php?id=99078. 96. “China, Cuba Agree on Refinery Project, New Loans,” Cuba Standard, June 6, 2011, http://www.cubastandard.com. 97. Jeff Franks, “Amid Uncertainties, Cuba Seeks Funding for Refinery Expansion,” Reuters, February 10, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. NOTES 269

98. “Exclusivo: se cayó el financiamiento para las represas de Santa Cruz,” La Política, November 6, 2013, http//lapoliticaonline.com. 99. “Chinese ‘Face’ and Soft Power in Argentina,” The Manzella Report, January 1, 2014, http://www.manzellareport.com. 10 0. “E s t a nc a d a s l a s o b r a s e n l a r e pr e s a h id r o e lé c t r ic a Pa t uc a I I I e n Hond u r a s ,” La Prensa, June 9, 2013, http://www.laprensa.hn. See also “Con $300 millones se concluirá Patuca III,” La Tribuna, June 1, 2013, http://www. http://www.latribuna.hn. 101. “Congreso de Honduras aprueba préstamo por L6,258 millones para Patuca,” La Prensa, December 6, 2013, http://www.laprensa.hn.

8 Day-to-Day Management Challenges Faced by Chinese Companies in Latin America

1. The dispute involved a question of Petroriental’s compliance with a 2006 commitment to employ 80 percent local workers in its operations in the region. “Heridos 24 militares en incidentes en protestas en Orellana,” El Universo, July 5, 2007, http://www.el-universo.com. 2. Kimmo Matthews, “Angry Protesters Demand Jobs on Palisadoes Project,” Jamaica Observer, September 22, 2010, http://www.jamaicaob server.com. 3. “Opposition Pickets Marriott over Hiring Practices,” Stabroek News, February 14, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. Indeed, in the case of Shanghai Construction Group, the Guyana Trades Union Congress threatened to take legal action against because of alleged “discrimination” in hiring practices, although it ultimately did not do so. See “Chinese Ambassador Appeals for Positive Media Coverage on Guyana /China Relations,” Guyana Chronicle, March 5, 2013, http://www.guy anachronicleonline.com. 4. As if to dispel concerns over the large number of Chinese workers, the Bahamian government also emphasized that during the period, the ratio of Bahamian to foreign contractors had been 3:1 Ironically, as of June 2012, only 1,000 Chinese had been employed. Neil Hartnell, “Baha Mar ‘Close’ To $150m Spend on Bahamians,” Tribune 242, June 12, 2012, http://www.tribune242.com. 5. “Envíos a China por acuerdos suman 200 mil barriles al día,” El Universal, February 29, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 6. Mialgros Salazar, “Social Responsibility Missing in Growing Trade Ties,” Inter Press Service, February 3, 2010, http://www.ipsnews.net /news.asp?idnews=50206. 7. William Neuman, “Hundreds in Peru Balk at Relocation from Site of Mine,” New York Times, January 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com. In November 2012, dozens of Morococha residents opposed to the relocation took their protests to the archbishop of Huancayo, where a dialogue was being held regarding the move. See “Huancayo: pobladores 270 NOTES

protestaron contra reubicacion de Morococha,” El Comercio, November 17, 2012, http://www.elcomercio.pe. 8. Jorge Lanta in his television program “Periodismo Para Todos,” which received significant coverage by the Argentine print media, argued, however, that the Chinese were simply assembling appliances from kits brought in from the P.R.C., with very little value added. “Un cuento chino: la ‘industria nacional’ de Tierra del Fuego bajo la lupa de Lanata,” Clarín, June 11, 2012, http://www.Clarín.com. See also “La industria Argentina de Cristina se fabrica en China: lo mostró Lanata,” June 11, 2012, http://www.contexto.com.ar. 9. “Surge in Chinese Investment in Latin America,” The Argentina Independent, June 14, 2011, http://www.argentinaindependent.com. See also “Celulares: China también arma en Tierra del Fuego,” Clarín, September 7, 2011, http://www.ieco.Clarín.com. 10. “Cristie at Odds with PM over Six Planned Hotels,” The Tribune, November 8, 2010, http://www.tribune24.com. See also Brent Dean, “Political Parties Quiet on Baha Mar Chinese Labour Issue,” The Freeport News, April 7, 2010, http://freeport.nassauguardian.net. 11. “China Presents the Bahamas with Multi-million Dollar Gift,” The Bahamas Investor, 2011, http://www.thebahamasinvestor.com. 12. “DNA Blasts Government on Budget for Opening of National Stadium,” Nassau Guardian, March 3, 2012, http://freeport.nassauguardian.net /national_local/302259441163328.php. 13. Randal C. Archibold, “China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice,” New York Times, April 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com. 14. “Cámara denuncia desvío de recursos del Estadio Nacional,” Nación, March 7, 2010, http://www.nacion.com. 15. Alonso Mata B, “Constructora china cancela operaciones comerciales en el país,” Nación, July 1, 2010, http://www.nacion.com. 16. “Brutal represión en Morococha en nombre de Chinalco,” YouTube, February 1, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9Uqrvck3dk. 17. Interview with Cynthia Sanborn, Director, Centro de Investigaciones Universidad del Pacifico, September 21, 2012. 18. See Ding Qingfen, “Companies Still Drawn to Peru, Despite Obstacles,” China Daily, December 11, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn. 19. Jiang Shixue “Ten Key Questions,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 62. 20. “Ecuador,” China National Petroleum Company, Accessed March 14, 2013, http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/cnpcworldwide. 21. Ibid. 22. Shixue, “Ten Key Questions.” 23. “AmericasBarometer.” Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2012, www.LapopSurveys.org. 24. As Cynthia Sanborn notes, to some degree, the Marcona miners were already relatively radicalized at the time that Shougang acquired NOTES 271

the company from the Peruvian government in 1993. Written correspondence, June 22, 2012. 25. “Protestan fuera del Coliseo de Ica mientras congresistas debaten,” El Comercio, September 8, 2011, http://elcomercio.pe. 26. “Ica: Mineros de Marcona exigen aumentos salariales,” RPP, October 15, 2012, http://www.rpp.com.pe. 27. “Ica: obreros de la minera Shougang marcharon por la Panamericana Sur,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, September 3, 2013, http://www.elcom ercio.com.pe. 28. Balford Henry, “China Harbour/Union Dispute Brewing,” Jamaica Observer, December 16, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 29. Toh Han Shih, “Chinese Dam Builders Rush to Latin America,” South China Morning Post, January 6, 2014, http://www.scmp.com. 30. “Trabajadores de proyecto hidroeléctrico Toachi–Pilatón reclaman aumento de utilidades,” El Universo, April 16, 2013, http://www.eluni verso.com. 31. Danela Luces, “Paralizaron construcción del tramo Tinaco-Anaco,” El Tiempo, August 23, 2011, http://ciberprotesta.over-blog.com/article -paralizaron-construccion-del-tramo-tinaco-anaco-82257033.html. 32. Interview with Enrique Dussel Peters, Head of the Mexico–China Studies Center (CECHIMEX) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), May 22, 2012. 33. Khrisna Virgil, “PM Hits Out at Baha Mar,” Tribune, February 12, 2013, http://www.tribune242.com. 34. “Empresarios loretanos paralizan obra de alcantarillado de Iquitos por abuso de empresa china,” La Voz de la Selva, January 11, 2011, Radiolvs. cnr.org.pe/ninterna.html?x=10229. 35. Alicia Dunkley-Willis, “Feud Quashed, JDIP Restarts,” Jamaica Observer, September 24, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 36. Balford Henry, “PAAC to Summon CHEC on Debts Owed to JDIP Contractors,” Jamaica Observer, July 25, 2013, http://www.jamaicaob server.com. 37. Keino Swamber, “Chinese Firm, Local Company Try to Settle Lawsuits,” Trinidad Express, May 22, 2012, http://www.trinidadexpress.com. 38. Alison Lowe, “No Impact on Future Chinese Investment from Road Destruction,” The Nassau Guardian, July 29, 2013, http://www.thenas sauguardian.com. 39. “Chubut: Pan American Energy dijo que acudirá a la conciliación con los ‘Dragones’,” Clarín, July 5, 2012, http://www.ieco.Clarín.com. 40. “’Los Dragones’ y la PAE vuelven a negociar hoy,” TN, July 19, 2012, http://tn.com.ar. 41. Pablo Rossi, “Chery evalúa cerrar su planta en Uruguay por trabas de Argentina,” El País, July 20, 2012, http://www.elpais.com.uy. 42. Ernesto J. Tovar Miram Rivero, “Petroleros paralizaron 30 taladros por pagos atrasados,” El Universal, August 10, 2012, http://www.eluniversal .com. 272 NOTES

43. Mireya Tabuas and Maria Alesia Sosa, “No es un cuento chino.” El Nacional. Caracas, Venezuela. http://el-nacional.com. April 15, 2012. 44. Ingrid Brown, “Bridging the Language Divide,” Jamaica Observer, June 11, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 45. Ibid. 46. “An Eye-Opener for the Chinese at the Sierra Grande Mine,” No a la Mina, April 6, 2010, http://www.noaqlamina.org. 47. Tabuas and Sosa, “No es un cuento chino.” 48. On the basis of numerous off-the-record conversations between the author and Latin American businessmen over the course of 2011–2012. 49. Robin Emmott, “Peru Miners Feel Oppressed by China’s Shougang,” Mines and Communities, July 21, 2005, http://www.minesandcommuni ties.org. 50. Yanela Pimentel, “Demandan a Minera Cerro de Maimón por contam- inación y apropiación de terrenos,” Noticias Sin, September 25, 2012, http://www.noticiassin.com. 51. “La difícil experencia china en la mina de Sierra Grande,” La Nación, March 21, 2010, http://www.lanacion.com.ar. 52. “Chinalco obtiene permiso de uso de reserva de agua para proyecto Toromocho,” Gestión, June 7, 2012, Lima, Peru. 53. “Un total de treinta y cuatro contratos petroleros están inactivos,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, January 2, 2014, http://www.elcomercio.com. pe. 54. Indeed some experts have suggested that the deepwater drilling being conducted by the Chinese and others off the coast of Brazil may be an environmental disaster waiting to happen, which could implicate the Chinese or other companies because of the possibilities for accidents, and the difficulty of sealing off such a well, were an accident to occur and safety cutoffs fail. See, for example, James Bosworth, “Chevron Oil Spill Hints at Risks of Brazil’s ‘Moonshot’ Deep Water Drilling,” Christian Science Monitor, November 21, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com. 55. Jeff Franks, “Oil Rig Arrives for Cuba Offshore Exploration Work,” Reuters, January 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com. 56. “Bosai Must Fund Lab, Treatment Facility for Dust Emission—Gordon,” Stabroek News, October 17, 2008, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 57. “Bosai’s Dust Collection System at Linden to be Commissioned Today,” Guyana Chronicle, September 27, 2012, http://www.guyanachronicle online.com. 58. See Ding, “Companies Still Drawn to Peru.” 59. In 2012 there was an average of one violent protest per week in the country. See “Peru Announces 28Bn Dollars in Mining Projects despite Growing Social Unrest,” Merco Press, June 18, 2012, http:// en.mercopress.com. 60. “Jiangxi Copper recién iniciaría mina en el Perú entre el 2014 y el 2016,” Semana Económica, March 28, 2012, http://semanaeconomica. com. NOTES 273

61. See Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente, “Mapping Chinese Mining Investment in Latin America: Politics or Market?” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 40. 62. “El grupo Brescia adquiere proyecto Mina Justa a China CST Mining Group,” EL Comercio, April 24, 2012, Lima, Peru, http://elcomercio .pe. 63. “Chinese Company Loses Millions as Protest Continues in Guyana,” Stabroek News, August 7, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. See also “Hamstrung by Linden Unrest, Bosai Fears Loss of Markets,” Stabroek News, August 8, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 64. Recognizing the need for such services, however, there is small but growing private security industry in China, focused on supporting Chinese companies doing business abroad, populated principally by retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials. Song Xiaojun, “Will China Send Forces to Somalia?” Blog commentary, December 1, 2008. See also R. Evan Ellis, “China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business and Strategic Position,” US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 25, 2011, http://www.strategic studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1077. 65. Rodrigo Calvo C., “Símbolos chinos en estadio perdurarán,” Nación, March 20, 2011, http://www.nacion.com. 66. See Devis Ramirez Miranda, “Grupo armado amordazó y asaltó a ocho ingenieros chinos en el Tuy,” El Universal, March 16, 2012, http://www .eluniversal.com. See also Tabuas and Sosa, “No es un cuento chino.” 67. 650,000 bolivares represented, at the time, about $100,000 at the official rate of exchange. 68. “Ladrones cargaron con Bs 650 mil de empresa china en Venezuela,” El Universal, December 16, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 69. Myers, Garfield, “China Harbour Employee Beaten with Spade,” Jamaica Observer, May 16, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. 70. Sue-Ann Wayow, “Chinese National Kidnapped,” Trinidad Express, April 7, 2012, www.trinidadexpress.com. 71. “Kidnapped Chinese Businessman Released,” Trinidad Express, April 9, 2012, www.trinidadexpress.com. 72. “Petrolera china desestima que protesta en Tarapoa haya afectado sus intereses,” El Universo, November 14, 2006, http://www.eluniverso .com. 73. The dispute was over Petroriental’s compliance with a 2006 promise to employ 80 percent local workers in its operations in the region. “Heridos 24 militares.” 74. “La violencia en Bagua deja hasta el momento 22 policías muertos,” El Comercio, June 6, 2009, http://elcomercio.pe/peru. 75. “Chinalco obtiene permiso de uso de reserva de agua para proyecto Toromocho.” 274 NOTES

76. “Empresa china invertirá más de $10 millones en mina de cobre de Arequipa,” Andina, September 6, 2012, http://www.andina.com.pe. See also “Compañía minera china Las Mellizas invertirá US$10 millons durante el 2012,” La Republica, September 7, 2012, http:// http://www .larepublica.pe. 77. See “Acusan al alcalde de Sapalache de apoyar violencia contra Río Blanco,” El Comercio, November 23, 2011, http://www.elcomercio .com.pe. 78. Jorge Loayaza, “Premier anuncia que instalarán base militar en Río Blanco,” La República, November 5, 2009, http://www.larepublica.pe. 79. “Colquiri aún dialoga y denuncian más tomas,” Los Tiempos, June 9, 2012, http://www.lostiempos.com. 80. “Gushers and guns: A boom, and threats to it,” The Economist, March 17, 2012, http://www.economist.com. 81. “Colombian ‘Farc rebels’ blow up bridge in San Vicente,” BBC News, July 20, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk. 82. “Emerald Energy suspends operations in southern Colombia following rebel attacks,” Colombia Reports, March 6, 2012, http://colombiareports. com. 83. “Vicepresidente les exige a las Farc liberar a tres cuídanos chinos,” El Tiempo, June 10, 2011, http://www.eltiempo.com. 84. Ibid. 85. “Gushers and guns: A boom, and threats to it.” 86. The released workers were the last hostages believed to be held by the FARC. “Liberados por las Farc viajarían a China el lunes,” El Tiempo, November 22, 2012, http://www.portafolio.co. 87. David Graham, “Chinese iron trade fuels port clash with Mexican drug cartel,” Reuters, January 1, 2014, http://www.reuters.com. 88. “Medio: Secuestros Chinos,” El Universal, November 29, 2011, http:// runrun.es/runrunes/30237/runrunes-el-universal-29-11-11.html. 89. “Guardia Nacional resguarda construcción de tramo ferroviario Tinaco- Anaco,” El Periodiquito, December 14, 2011, http://www.elperiodiquito. com. 90. “Estancadas las obras en la represa hidroeléctrica Patuca III en Honduras,” La Prensa, June 9, 2013, http://www.laprensa.hn. See also “China-Peru military ties growing stronger,” Washington Times, May 27, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/27. 91. “Estancadas las obras en la represa hidroeléctrica Patuca III en Honduras.” 92. See “Liberan a 29 trabajadores chinos secuestrados en Sudán,” El Universal, February 7, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com. 93. Stephen Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) 94. See Ding Qingfen, “Companies still drawn to Peru, despite obstacles.” 95. Lucien O. Chauvin, “Hierro Peru: China’s footprint in the Andes,” China Dialogue, December 1, 2006, http://www.chinadialogue.net. NOTES 275

96. The company was reportedly granted the concession to mine and trans- port laterite in order to use it to repair a road that its trucks had dam- aged. The government claimed that, of the 144 truckloads of laterite that Bai Shan Lin had mined, only 10 had been used to repair the road, while the rest had been used to build access roads on its own properties. See Jeff Trotman, “Linmine withdraws bridge concession to Bai Shan Lin,” Stabroek News, July 4, 2013, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 97. Marco Antonio Gonzalez, “Multan Con $476 Mills. a Nokia, Ericsson y Huawei Por ‘Manipulación’ al ICE,” Prensa Libre, July 11, 2012, http:// www.prensalibre.cr. 98. Huawei won the contract with bid that came in at 159 percent of the cost of what the government had calculated the project should cost. See Cristian Leandro Córdoba, “Contraloría congela bienes de 12 altos funcionarios del ICE,” Prensa Libre, August 6, 2012, http://www.pren salibre.cr. See also “Empresa china cobra 159 percent más por instalar red celular,” Nación, August 5, 2008, http://www.nacion.com. 99. “Orimulsion Product in Venezuela,” Oil and Gas Industry Articles, September 4, 2006, http://www.oilgasarticles.com/articles/442/1 /Strategic-Associations-in-Venezuela/Page1.html. 100. See Javier Corrales, “China and Venezuela’s Search for Oil Markets,” in Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations Beyond the Washington Consensus, eds., Alex. E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 128. 101. “Venezuela ceases ormulsion production,” El Universal, September 26, 2006, http://www.eluniversal.com. See also “No Orimulsion Means More Coal Power Plants in China,” Energy Tribune, October 18, 2007, http://www.energytribune.com. 102. Corrales, “China and Venezuela’s Search for Oil Markets.” 103. See R. Evan Ellis, “China, S.A. como empresa local en America Latina,” Temas de Reflexión, Centro de Pensamiento Estratégico, Univerisad EAFIT. No. 7 (May 2013). 104. “Petrobras renegociará contrato de crudo con Ecuador,” El Universo, October 2, 2007, http://www.eluniverso.com. 105. “EE.UU. empieza retirada militar de la base de Manta,” El Universo, July 16, 2009, http://www.eluniverso.com. 106. The action by the Ecuadoran government, to some extent, also paral- leled the government of Panama’s selection of Hutchison to operate the ports of Cristobal and Balboa as the United States withdrew from the Panama Canal Zone less than earlier decade ago. 107. “Empresa de Hong Kong abandona proyecto en Manta acusando al Gobierno ecuatoriano,” Hoy, February 6, 2009, http://www.hoy.com .ec. 108. “Hutchison may lose Ecuador port project—report,” Reuters, January 4, 2009, http://www.reuters.com. 109. “Equipos de TIDE pasarán al Estado tras salir de Manta,” El Universo, February 8, 2009, http://www.eluniverso.com. 276 NOTES

110. “Menos carga mueve el puerto de Manta,” El Universo, April 9, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 111. “Sin ofertas el Puerto de Aguas Profundas,” El Universo, November 7, 2012, http://www.eluniverso.com. 112. Laura Benitez, “Government Takes Over Belgrano Cargas Railway,” The Argentina Independent, February 5, 2013, http://www.argentinain dependent.com. 113. Benitez, “Government Takes Over.” 114. Antonio Rossi, “Intervienen la operadora del ferrocarril Belgrano Cargas,” Clarín, October 26, 2012, http://www.clarín.com. Some analysts in Argentina suggested that the case was complicated because the local partner of the concession in question, Franco Macri, was not only a wealthy businessman, but a political rival to the Argentine President Cristina Fernandez. 115. “Con la intervención del Belgrano Cargas, el Gobierno cortó otro vín- culo con Macri,” La Nación, October 25, 2012, http://www.lanacion .com. 116. Zhou Siyu, “The Ups and Downs of Latin Adventure,” China Daily, July 24, 2012, http://www.usa.chinadaily.com.cn. 117. Pablo Gonzalez, “Argentina Increases Oil Exporters Cash Payment by 67%,” Bloomberg News, January 7, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com. See also “Argentina Cuts Oil Export Tax as It Seeks to Lure Investment,” Reuters, January 7, 2013, http://www.reuters.com. 118. “Chinese Builders of Troubled Skeldon Factory to Leave Next Month,” Stabroek News, August 31, 2012, http://www.stabroeknews.com. 119. “Privatising Sugar,” Kaieteur News, July 29, 2013, http://www.kaieteur newsonline.com. 120. “No Chinese Warranty for ‘Botched’ Skeldon Sugar Factory,” Kaieteur News, June 26, 2012, http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com. 121. “Chinese Offers No Guarantee for US$47M Antigua Power Plant,” Kaieteur News Online, July 10, 2012, http://www.kaieteurnewsonline .com. 122. “Fiscalía exige 19 años de prisión para Yván Vásquez,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, October 25, 2013, http://www.elcomercio.com.pe. 123. In the end, part of how the United States interprets such moves will depend on how the Chinese government is concurrently using its security forces in other parts of the world, and thus how the United States interprets China’s development of new security relationships globally. Chinese naval deployments in Asia, for example, may impact such US interpretations, as might the deployment of new weapons platforms by the P.R.C., including new anti-satellite weapons. Similarly, US inter- pretation of Chinese behavior in the Latin American space and telecom sector could be influenced by US perceptions that the P.R.C. is engaged in cyber attacks against US government and commercial targets elsewhere. NOTES 277

9 The Question of Chinese Communities

1. For a detailed account of anti-Chinese laws and discrimination in Mexico during the revolutionary period, see Robert Chao Romer, The Chinese in Mexico, 1882–1940 (Scottsdale, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2010.) 2. Based on not-for-attribution interviews with businessmen and political figures in Georgetown Guyana. August 15–20, 2013. 3. In the decade that I have traveled in Latin America studying Chinese activities there, I have frequently observed that Latin Americans from taxi drivers to white-collar businessmen, in talking about “the Chinese” commonly move uncritically from characterizations of visiting Chinese construction workers to the quality of imported Chinese products, to the work ethic of the Chinese community, many of whom have lived their entire lives in that Latin American country. 4. Adrian H. Hearn, “Harnessing the Dragon: Overseas Chinese Entre- preneurs in Mexico and Cuba,” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 112. 5. In Mexico, for example, Adrian Hearn speaks of new generations of Chinese shopkeepers in Mexico, relatively disconnected from the Mexican society in which they find themselves, whose activities include importing and retailing low-cost Chinese consumer goods. Hearn, “Harnessing the Dragon.” 6. For a discussion of the process by which a group such as the Chinese comes to be defined and perceived as “different” from, and even a threat to other parts of the population, see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkley: University of California Press, 1985). 7. Simon Romero, “With Aid and Migrants, China Expands Its Presence in a South American Nation,” New York Times, April 11, 2011, http:// www.nytimes.com. 8. Omar Santana, “Protestan contra nuevos comerciantes chinos,” Diario Libre, July 30, 2013, http://www.diariolibre.com. 9. In 2012, for example, the head of the business federation in Táchira gained national attention when he denounced the expansion of Chinese businesses in his state, referring to it as a “silent invasion.” See “Proliferan en el Táchira tiendas y resturantes chinos.” La Nacion, Caracas, Venezuela, December 3, 2012, http://www.lanacion.com.ve. 10. “Proliferan en el Táchira tiendas y restaurantes chinos,” La Nación, December 3, 2012, http://www.lanacion.com.ve. 11. Hearn, “Harnessing the Dragon.” See also Adrian H. Hearn, Alan Smart, and Roberto Hernández Hernández, “China and Mexico: Trade, Migration, and Guanxi,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 139. 278 NOTES

12. Interviews off-the-record of Guyanese businessmen, analysts, and political figures. Georgetown, Guyana. August 15–20, 2013. 13. Yolanda Ojeda Reyes, “Ciudanos chinos reciben protección,” El Universal, November 11, 2004, http://www.eluniversal.com. 14. “Los camioneros ratifican el boicot a los súper y autoservicios chinos,” Clarín, June 26, 2006, http://www.Clarín.com. 15. Amy Li, “Chinese Shop Owners in Argentina Arm Themselves with Guns amid Violent Looting,” South China Morning Post, December 13, 2013, http://www.scmp.com. 16. See R. Evan Ellis, “Suriname and the Chinese: Timber, Migration, and the Less-Told Stories of Globalization.” SAIS Review, 32(2), Summer– Fall 2012): 85–97. 17. “Empresarios chinos, afectados por violencia en Venezuela,” Informador, March 23, 2011, http://www.informador.com.mx. 18. Hearn, Smart, and Hernández Hernández, “China and Mexico.” 19. H. G. Helps, “Chinese under Siege—Criminals, Cops Extort, Rob Businessmen at Will,” Jamaica Observer, July 14, 2013, http://www .jamaicaobserver.com. 20. Interviews with multiple political and business figures in Guyana. Georgetown, Guyana. August 15–20, 2013. Helps, “Chinese under Siege.” 21. “Police to Ramp up Security Measures for Chinese Community in Jamaica,” Go Jamaica, August 27, 2013, http://go-jamaica.com. 22. R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America.” Prism, 4(1), December 1, 2012: 67–77. 23. “Aislados por el miedo a la violencia,” La Nación, October 11, 2011, http://www.lanacion.com.ar. 24. “Investigarán la mafia china en Argentina,” Diario Uno, December 24, 2011, http://www.diariouno.com.ar. 25. “Mafia china en Argentina . . . ‘70 mil dólares o te matamos’,” September 23, 2011, http://www.pdegdigital.com. 26. “Un nuevo golpe de la ‘mafia china’,” Clarín, October 2, 2011, http:// www.Clarín.com. 27. Alejandro Gamero, “La mafia china arribó a Mendoza e intimida a los comerciantes,” Diario Uno, August 21, 2011, http://www.diariouno .com.ar. 28. The Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, established by what is today the government of the Republic of China to oversee issues of “overseas Chinese ranks Peru as the country in the hemisphere with the largest Chinese population. It puts the number of Chinese in the country as a whole at 1.3 million persons. See “Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission.” http://www.ocac.gov.tw/english/public/public.asp?seln o=1163&no=1163&level=B.” 29. “Ciudadano chino cayó cuando iba a matar a su cuarta víctima,” El Comercio, June 22, 2010, http://elcomercio.pe. See also “Balacera en NOTES 279

chifa alarmó a vecinos del Rímac,” El Comercio, January 21, 2011, http:// elcomercio.pe. 30. “Mafia china lanzó bomba a chifa chalaco,” Trome, May 8, 2011, http:// trome.pe. 31. “El 95% de las llamadas de extorsión sale de las cárceles de Lima,” El Comercio, January 28, 2012, http://elcomercio.pe. 32. Juan Carlos Leal, “Caen cuatro chinos,” La Prensa, April 10, 2010, http://laprensalara.com.ve. 33. “Denuncian la presencia de ‘mafia china’ en el país,” El Universo, September 8, 2009, http://www.eluniverso.com. 34. See, for example, Rafáel Rodríguez, “Cárcel para miembros de la ‘mafia china’,” La Estrella, November 9, 2008, http://www.laestrella.com.pa. 35. Ana-Lisa Paul, “Police deny Chinese Singled out for Criminal Attack,” The Guardian, July 19, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.tt/news. 36. For an example of this problem in Venezuela, see Jhonathan Raul Segovia, “Cicpc desmantela mafia China en Carora,” Diario de los Andes, April 11, 2010, http://diariodelosandes.com. 37. “La mafia china trafica cocaína en Peru,” Peru 21, August 13, 2010, http://www.peru21.com. 38. This specific language was used by a government official, speaking with the author in Paramaribo, Suriname in July 2012, but similar responses have appeared in numerous other sources. In addition, one Trinidad- based journalist, for example, refers to the “fears about the . . . arrival of the ‘Chinese mafia’ and the facilitation of human trafficking.” Wesley Gibbings, “Caribbean Nerves over Chinese Business Settling,” The Trinidad Guardian, February 7, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.tt. 39. Hearn, Smart, and Hernández Hernández, “China and Mexico.” 40. Gonzalo Sebastian Paz, “China and Venezuela: Oil, Technology, and Socialism,” in China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, eds., A. H. Hearn and José Luis León Marquez (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 233. 41. Ezra Fieser, “Why Is China Spending Billions in the Caribbean?” Global Post, April 22, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com. 42. Thomas Fontane, “Dominica and the Growing Chinese Involvement in the Caribbean,” The Dominican, July 8, 2012, http://www.thedomini can.net. 43. “Proliferan en el Táchira tiendas y restaurants chinos,” La Nación, December 3, 2012, http://www.lanacion.com.ve. 44. Randal C. Archibold, “China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice,” The New York Times, April 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes .com. 45. “Mas evidente presencia de migrantes de otros continentes en Latinoamérica: ONU,” Milenio, February 1, 2012, http://www.milenio .com. 46. Sam Logan, “Ecuador: China’s Human Trafficking Backdoor to the USA,” ISN Security Watch, February 2, 2009. 280 NOTES

47. Ellis, “Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America.” 48. “Operan en la Ciudad mafias internacionales,” Reforma, October 8, 2007, http://www.gruporeforma.com. 49. “Deportaciones y expulsiones de ciudadanos chinos se dispararon en 2008, según datos del DAS,” El Tiempo, December 21, 2008, http:// www.eltiempo.com. The surge in Chinese also created a financial and administrative crisis for Colombian authorities, who lacked the resources to deport the enormous quantity of Chinese which the DAS had detained. See “Otro grupo de chinos trató de utilizar a Colombia como trampolín para llegar ilegalmente a E.U.,” El Tiempo, May 11, 2007, http://www.eltiempo.com. 50. “China complacida por lucha del tráfico de personas en Ecuador,” El Universo, November 14, 2008, http://www.eluniverso.com/. 51. Manuel Pascual, “Funcionarios de RENIEC peruana implicados con mafia china que trafica personas,” La Gran Época, July 31, 2011, http:// www.lagranepoca.com. 52. “Red de 22 empleados del Reniec implicados en tráfico de chinos.” El Comercio. Lima, Peru. http://www.elcomerciolcom.pe. July 25, 2011. 53. Ibid. See Pascual, “Funcionarios de RENIEC peruana implicados con mafia china que trafica personas.” 54. “Detuvieron a dos paraguayos acusados de traficar chinos,” La Nación, January 8, 2012, http://www.lanacion.com.py. 55. “Como opera en el país la mafia china,” Clarín, May 12, 2002, http:// www.clarín.com. 56. “Descubren asiáticos con estadía irregular en el país,” Los Tiempos, February 2, 2007, http://www.lostiempos.com. 57. “Con trabajo en equipo se destapó el caso de las visas,” La Razón, December 13, 2006, http://www.la-razon.com. 58. “Capturan a traficante de chinos,” Reforma, October 23, 2010, http:// gruporeforma.com. 59. “Borrando las huellas,” La Estrella, April 26, 2011, http://www.laest rella.com.pa. See also “Tráfico de chinos en el gobierno del cambio,” La Estrella, April 25, 2011, http://www.laestrella.com.pa. 60. José Meléndez, “La mafia china aumenta el tráfico de personas en AL,” El Universal, May 10, 2007, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx. 61. “Llegan a costa costarricense 61 inmigrantes dejados a la deriva,” Nación, April 23, 2007, http://www.nacion.com. 62. Meléndez, “La mafia china aumenta el tráfico de personas en AL.” 63. Ernesto U. Savona. “Case Studies of Organized Crime.” 64. Carlos Devers, “Apresan los primeros 15 chinos trataban de salir por Manzanillo; aumenta tráfico de ilegales—Rep. Dominicana,” El Nuevo Diario, March 22, 2012, http://www.diariof27.com /articulo,3765,html. 65. See, for example, “EE.UU. acusa a Venezuela de no combatir el tráfico de personas,” Clarín, May 6, 2006, http://edant.clarin.com. NOTES 281

66. Frank López Ballesteros, “La diáspora china en Venezuela acelera su relevo generacional,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, July 8, 2013, 67. Sailú Urribarrí Núñez, “Desmantelan banda que traía ilegalmente chinos,” El Universal, April 20, 2007, http://www.eluniversal.com. 68. German Dam V. “Desmantelan red de tráfico de chinos en Puerto Ordaz,” La Patilla, http://www.lapatilla.com. 69. “Chinos ahora nos usan para llegar a Venezuela,” El Tiempo, July 28, 2013, http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW _NOTA_INTERIOR-12953671.html. 70. “Chinese Triad Expands in T&T,” May 18, 2011. 71. Ibid. 72. Based on not-for-attribution interviews with Guyanese officials, Georgetown, Guyana. August 15–20, 2013. 73. “Cops Link Chinese to Organized Crime—Trinidad & Tobago,” The Guardian, May 16, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.tt. 74. “Operan en la Ciudad mafias internacionales.” 75. Dam V., “Desmantelan red de tráfico.” 76. For more on this phenomenon, see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.).

10 What It All Means

1. “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (Full Text),” Government of the People’s Republic of China, November 2008, http:// english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm. 2. See “China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 17, 2000, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn. 3. For a good discussion of China’s application of China’s evolving application of foreign policy principles in the Latin American context, see Julia Strauss, “Framing and Claiming: Contemporary Globalization and ‘Going Out’ in China’s Rhetoric Toward Latin America,” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 134–156. 4. “Venezuela Ceases Ormulsion Production,” El Universal, September 26, 2006, http://www.eluniversal.com. 5. “Petrobras renegociará contrato de crudo con Ecuador,” El Universo, October 2, 2007, http://www.eluniverso.com. 6. “Is Argentina Penny-wise and Pound Foolish with Its Trade Policies?” Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, June 16, 2010, http://www .wharton.universia.net. 7. See, for example, “China Soya Ban Angers Argentina,” BBC News, April 6, 2010, http://www.bbcnews.com. 282 NOTES

8. See also R. Evan Ellis, “Beyond ‘Win-Win’ and the Menacing Dragon: How China is Transforming Latin America,” Center for Hemispheric Policy Working Paper, January 31, 2013, https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda /hemisphericpolicy/Task_Force_Papers/Ellis-GlobalizationTFPaper .pdf. 9. See, for example, Peter Ritter, “Taiwan’s Leader Keeps Low Profile Abroad,” Time, August 11, 2008, http://content.time.com. 10. See Ellis, “Beyond ‘Win-Win’ and the Menacing Dragon.” 11. As noted previously, for example, the Hong Kong–based firm Hutchison Whampoa pulled out of the Port of Manta before its programmed investments to expand the capacity of the port had been completed. 12. “Evo anuncia reunión con Humala sobre megapuertos,” Los Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, February 13, 2013, http://www.lostiempos .com. 13. “Senador Daniel Ávila pide a Profepa evaluar impacto ambiental de Dragon Mart,” La Prensa, Mexico City, Mexico, October 2, 2013, http://www.oem.com.mx. 14. See Ellis, “Beyond ‘Win-Win’ and the Menacing Dragon.” 15. In smaller Caribbean basin countries such as Guyana and Suriname, an additional change is that Chinese merchants occupy an increasingly visible position in the retail sector. 16. See Ellis, “Beyond ‘Win-Win’ and the Menacing Dragon.” 17. See, for example, Carlos Salinas Maldonado, ““Tener un canal es un interés estratégico de China,” El Confidencial, June 17, 2013, http:// www.elconfidencial.com.ni. 18. Carl Mecham and R. Evan Ellis, “La Alianza del Pacífico y los éxitos que los países pueden alcanzar individualmente,” El Pais, May 23, 2013, http://internacional.elpais.com. 19. Indeed, in January 2014, the second annual CELAC summit formally established a China-CELAC forum as a vehicle for the region as a whole to relate to the P.R.C. without the presence of the United States, paral- leling the establishment of FOCAC in Africa. “CELAC Confirmed as an Interlocutor in the Region with the World,” Prensa Latina, January 31, 2014, http://www.plenglish.com. 20. Charley Keys, “Clinton warns of Iranian, Chinese gains in Latin America,” CNN, May 1, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com. 21. Arturo Valenzuela, “China ‘Not a Threat’ in L. America,” People’s Daily Online, August 19, 2010, http:// english.peopledaily.com.cn. Similarly, during his April 2004 testimony to Congress, for example, then– Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Rogelio Pardo-Maurer testi- fied that there was “no evidence that Chinese military activities in the Western Hemisphere, including arms sales, pose a direct conventional threat to the United States,” yet warned that “this is not to say that there are no concerns.” US House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Hearing on “China’s NOTES 283

Influence in the Western Hemisphere,” Serial No. 109–63, April 6, 2005. 22. In a November 2009 speech at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, then–Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for the Western Hemisphere Dr. Frank Mora said that it was his view that China’s deep- ening engagement in the hemisphere could play a productive role in ameliorating challenges affecting the region, but expressed concern over the transparency of Chinese activities in the region. Frank. O. Mora, Presentation to the Conference “Strategic Implications of China’s Evolving Relationship with Latin America,” Fort Lesley J. McNair. Washington, DC, November 6, 2009. 23. R. Evan Ellis, “The United States and China in Latin America: Cooperation and Competition,” Security and Defense Studies Review (Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies), 12 (1 & 2), Fall–Winter 2011: 37–44. 24. “The First Presidential Debate: Transcript,” New York Times, September 26, 2009. 25. Gonzalo Sebastian Paz, “China, the United States and Hegemonic Challenge in Latin America: An Overview and Some Lessons from Previous Instances of Hegemonic Challenge in the Region,” in From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century, eds., Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 18–34. 26. For a review of US policy toward China in Latin America during the past decade, see Ellis, “The United States and China in Latin America.” 27. “China’s Latin America Presence Not a Threat: U.S. Official,” Xinhua, November 13, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/. 28. John Kerry, “Remarks on U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,” US Department of State, November 18, 2013, http://www.state.gov /secretary/remarks/2013/11/217680.htm. 29. See, for example, R. Evan Ellis, “U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America,” The Manzella Report, June 7, 2013, http://www.manzellareport.com. 30. For a more in-depth treatment of this topic, see R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America,” Prism, 4(1), December 1, 2012: 67–77. 31. US House of Representatives, 112th Congress (October 8, 2012), Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE. See also R. Evan Ellis, “The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Activities in the Latin American Telecommunications Sector,” Revista Científica “General José María Córdova,” ed., Jesús Alberto Suárez Pineda, 11(11), January–June 2013: 121–140. 32. Indeed, various scholars have noted the interdependence between the perceptions and actions of actors on the Chinese side, within the United 284 NOTES

States, and within Latin America, referring to the relationship as a “triangle.” The first major reference to such a “triangular relationship” appeared in the 2007 essay by Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, “Latin America, China, and the United States: a Hopeful Triangle,” Open Democracy, February 9, 2007. It was however, arguably Barbara Stallings’ 2008 article, “The US-China-Latin America Triangle: Implications for the Future,” that most definitively introduced the concept. Barbara Stallings, “The US-China-Latin America Triangle: Implications for the Future,” in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, eds., Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.) Since that time, the term has been used in other significant works on China’s engagement with the region, including the January 2011 study China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011.) See also R. Evan Ellis, “The United States, Latin America and China: A ‘Triangular Relationship’?” Working Paper Series, InterAmerican Dialogue (Washington DC, May 2012.) See also China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations (Mexico City: Universidad Autonoma de Mexico, 2013.). BIBLIOGRAPHY

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A Partnership for National Unity Mexico, 42 (APNU), 146–7 overview, 15–17, 35–6, 44–5 Abaco Islands port project, 78, 148–9 Peru, 36, 38 Ace Investments, Ltd., 55 resistance to projects, 43, 149, 151 ADM, 7, 36 social unrest and protests, 15–16, 151 AFECC (Anhui Foreign Economic sugar production, 36, 41, 43, 64–5, Construction Group), 50, 81–2, 175 158–9, 167 Suriname, 36, 43–4, 230nn207–8 Afobaka hydroelectric facility, 83 timber and forestry projects, 25, 36, agricultural exports, 39–42 42–4, 149, 171, 203, 212n230, agricultural land acquisition, 39, 41, 275n96 42, 43, 148 Uruguay, 36, 42, 45, 204 agricultural research, 38 Venezuela, 37 agriculture wine production, 41 Argentina, 15–16, 35–6, 39–40, 45, agroindustrial facilities, 36–7, 40–1 151, 204 Aguilar, Daniel, 189 Barbados, 43 Air China, 120, 260n125 Bolivia, 37–8, 64–5 AirPlan, 121, 260nn129–30 Brazil, 35–6, 39, 40–1, 45, 204 airport construction, 71–2, 76, 80, Caribbean, 36, 43–4 120–1, 260nn129–30 Chile, 41, 229n194 AKT motorcycles, 92, 93, 96 Colombia, 38–9, 151, 228n175 ALBA. See Bolivarian Alliance of commercial competitors, resistance the Americas from, 145–6 Alcasa, 98 fisheries and fish farming, 36, 38, Alcatel (Shanghai Alcatel Bell), 103, 41, 229n194 109, 112 foodstuffs for export, 39–42 All Island Jamaica Cane Farmers growth of, 203–4 Association, 43 Guyana, 36, 44, 230n212 Alliance For Change (AFC), 146–7 Honduras, 42–3, 149, 151 Almond Beach Village Hotel, “industrial agriculture” initiatives, Barbados, 80 36–7, 40–1 aluminum production, 14, 83, 98 irrigation projects, 37 Amaila Fall hydroelectric project, Jamaica, 36, 43, 79, 149 82, 146–7, 245n247 292 INDEX

Amapala port project, 76–7 hydroelectric projects, 68–9, 116, America Electric Ecuador Ameltric 153, 204 SA, 93 investor instability and risks, 57 America Movil, 104 labor relations and disputes, 158, AmericasBarometer survey, 160 162–3, 164, 183–4 Anaco, Venezuela, 60, 161 land acquisitions, 35–6, 39, 148 Andes Petroleum, 168, 199 mining projects, 15, 22, 150, 164, Andrade, Trajano, 173 165 Anglo American, 22 petroleum and petrochemical Anhui Foreign Economic projects, 26, 31–2, 99, 140–2, Construction Group (AFECC), 175–6, 225n131, 225nn127–8 50, 158–9, 167 port and logistics projects, 67–9, Antel, 107 116, 119 Antigua protectionist initiatives, 199–200 airport construction, 80 rail and road construction government actions, 175 projects, 67–9, 99, 174, infrastructure and construction 250n76, 276n114 projects, 52, 80, 175 subway construction projects, 68 APEC leadership summits, 5, 7 telecommunications, 100, 104, 105, APNU (A Partnership for National 106–7 Unity), 146–7 Western capital, rejection of, 204, Aqua Zarca hydroelectric project, 59, 206 76, 116 wind power generation projects, Argentina 63, 116–17 agriculture projects, 15–16, 35–6, Arias, Oscar, 50, 72 39–40, 45, 151, 204 Armony, Ariel, 12 automobile retail and Aroaima Mining Company, 26 manufacturing, 96 Aruba banking services, 68, 123–4, 141 petroleum and petrochemical Chinese communities, 183–4, 186–7 projects, 140 Chinese investment growth in, 8 telecommunications, 111 Chinese land ownership, resistance Atlantic Hotels Inc. (AHI), to, 35–6, 148 54–5, 147 computer and electronics Australian firms, 21, 74 manufacturing, 99, 100 automobile retail and manufacturing, construction projects, 47, 67–9, 99, 93–6, 144, 246n2, 248n28, 134, 174, 276n114 248n41, 249n43 environmental resistance to bus manufacturing, 98 projects, 165 funding and market condition funding and market condition problems, 152 problems, 140, 153 government resistance to, 144 gas and oil exploration, 32, 33 labor disputes, 94 government actions, 174–5, light truck manufacturing, 96 199–200 motorcycles, 92–3, 96 government resistance to projects, Autopista de las Americas highway 141–2 project, 65 INDEX 293

Bacolet Bay Resort project, 53, 55–6 Beijing Zhengda Feedstuff, 41 Baha Mar resort, 53, 78, 148, 151, Belgian firms, 74 156, 158, 162, 269n4 Belgrano-Cargas railroad project, Bahamas 67, 68, 69, 99, 134, 174, bridge construction projects, 250n76, 276n114 78, 148–9 Belize construction projects, 51, 53–4, construction projects, 77, 166, 204 78, 148–9, 158 diplomatic relations with China, 77 labor relations and disputes, 148–9, hydroelectric projects, 77, 116, 157, 158, 161–2, 269n4 165–6, 204 port and logistics projects, 78–9, Belo Monte hydroelectric project, 119–20, 142, 161, 202, 259n123 116, 118, 149, 267n73 resistance to projects, 142–3, 151 Betec Group, 22 transportation construction BGH, 100 projects, 78–9 BGP Ecuador CO, 29 Bai Shan Lin Forest Development, BicBanco, 124 25, 44, 149, 171, 212n230, biofuels production projects, 36, 42–3 230n212, 275n96 Blackstone Group, 82, 147 Balboa port project, 119, 142, Blackwood Pointe Resort and Spa, 259n123, 275n106 Bahamas, 53–4 Banco West LB, 124 Boas Minerals Group, 25, 115, 166–7 Bank of China (BOC), 54, 59, 122 Bolipuertos, 60 banking services, 68, 122–6, 141, 203 Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas Chinese banks acquisitions in (ALBA) Argentina, 68, 123–4, 141 anti-US sentiment, 208 government resistance to, 141 China, relations with, 132, 207 retail banking, 122–3 dependence on China, 135 Baosteel, 15, 22, 23, 152 government actions and funding Barbados problems, 171–5 agriculture projects, 43 Western capital, rejection of, 204, construction projects, 80 206 telecommunications, 111 See also specific countries Barbeito, César, 15, 40, 266n61 Bolivia Barra, 33 agriculture projects, 37–8, 64–5 Barrick Gold, 25, 267n79 automobile retail and Bautista, Aike, 152 manufacturing, 96 bauxite mining, 17, 25–6, 44, 115, Chinese communities, 179 166, 222n88 Chinese illegal immigrants, beef, for export, 42 resentment of, 189, 190 Beidahuang Group, 15–16, 37, construction projects, 63–5 39–40, 41, 145, 148, 151, 203 human trafficking via, 190 Beijing Construction and hydroelectric projects, 64, 116, 204 Engineering Group, 52, 54, 80, investor instability and risks, 57 116, 175 investors in, treatment of, 171–2 Beijing GED Orient Tech mining projects, 19, 63, 169 Development, 42 oil and gas exploration, 30 294 INDEX

Bolivia—Continued petroleum and petrochemical petroleum and petrochemical projects, 26, 31, 32–4, 69, 165–6, projects, 30, 63, 224n112 203, 226n139, 272n54 retail and manufacturing, 91 port and logistics projects, 122, security challenges, 169 165–6, 260n131, 272n54 social unrest and protests, 63 protectionist initiatives and trade telecommunications, 105, 108–9 actions, 131 Bolivian Central Bank, 65 rail and train manufacturing, 98 Bouterse, Dési, 25, 83–4, 245n253 retail and manufacturing, 87, Boyo, Eddie, 180 204–5 BP, 15, 140, 165, 225n32, 225n132 tax regulations, 95, 144, 204 Brassington, Winston, 55 telecommunications, 100, 105, Brazil 106, 253n14 agriculture projects, 35–6, 39, thermoelectric generation, 115 40–1, 45, 204 trade with Asia, increase in, 205–6 automobile retail and wind power generation manufacturing, 95, 144, projects, 117 248n41, 249n43 Brazilian National Development banking services, 122–4 Bank (BANDES), 69 bus manufacturing, 98 Bridas Petroleum (Bridas cell phone manufacturing, 100 Corporation), 8, 15, 32, 140, Chinese communities, 179 162, 174, 225n132 Chinese investment growth in, 8 bridge construction projects Chinese land ownership, Bahamas, 78, 148–9 resistance to, 147–8 Chile, 70 computer and electronics Ecuador, 63 manufacturing, 99, 100 Guyana, 83 construction projects, 69–70, 99 Suriname, 83, 84 electrical power transmission Bridge Engineering Corporation, 63 infrastructure, 118 British Mobile, 111 environmental resistance to British Virgin Islands, tax projects, 149–50 regulations, 6, 214n9 foodstuffs for export, 40–1 Bunge, 7, 36 funding and market condition bus manufacturing, 98 problems, 152 Bush, McKeeva, 141 government resistance to, 144 business joint-venture partnerships, heavy equipment manufacturing, 15, 23–4, 47–8, 54, 68, 92–4, 97–8 98–100, 101–2, 217n3 hydroelectric projects, 116, 118, Bustamante Industrial Trade 149, 204, 267n73 Union (BITU), 161 Libra oilfield, 16, 34 Butt Philip, Alan, 12, 229n190, mining projects, 15, 22–5, 150, 229n193 152, 217n3 motorcycle retail and Cable & Wireless Panamá, 112 manufacturing, 90, 92–3 Cable Onda, 112 INDEX 295

Cachuela Esperanza hydroelectric labor relations and disputes, 148–9, project, 64, 116 161–3, 269n4 Cacimbas-Catu Gas Pipeline mining projects, 25–6, 165 (GASCAC), 69 oil and gas exploration: Guyana, 26 CAH Colombia, 121, 260n129 petroleum and petrochemical Cajas, Antonio, 21 projects, 26, 34–5, 98–9 CAMC Engineering Company telecommunications, 105, 110–12 (CAMCE), 37, 64, 75 U.S. presence in, 134–5 Camisea gasfields, 26, 30 See also specific countries Canada cars. See automobile retail and illegal immigration routes to, manufacturing 188, 190–3 Cayman Islands mining projects blocked by, 140 construction projects, 80–1 oilfield ownership in Ecuador, extraregional resistance to 29, 173 projects, 141 Canadian Council for the Americas government actions, 198 (FOCAC), 12, 282n19 port and logistics projects, 81 Canadian firms, 18, 25, 29, 31, 53, tax breaks in, 6, 80–1, 214n9 140, 173, 174 telecommunications, 111 canal projects CDB. See China Development Bank “dry canal” projects, 66, 76–7, 201 CDMA telecommunications Nicaragua Canal project, 47, 59, network, 110 73–5, 201, 202, 203, 206 CECHIMEX, 6 Panama Canal, 73, 75–6, 119, 140, CELAC, 206, 282n19 202, 205–6 cell phone manufacturing, 100–1, Cancun, Mexico, 91, 144, 151 105, 109–10 CANTV, 104, 108 Central America Cañuelas, Molinos, 40 China, diplomatic relations with, Cargill, 7, 36 24–5, 144, 222nn75–6 Carhuacoto, Peru, 21, 157–8 construction projects, 73–4 Caribbean human trafficking via, 189, 190 agriculture projects, 36, 43–4 hydroelectric projects, 59, 76, 116, China, impact of relationship with, 151, 153, 170, 201 4–8, 200–6 mining projects, 24–5, 222nn75–6 Chinese communities, 182–5, 187 motorcycle retail and Chinese illegal immigrants, manufacturing, 92–3 resentment of, 188–9 security challenges, 168, 170 Chinese investment growth in, 8 telecommunications, 105, 112–13 construction projects, 47–9, 51–2, See also specific countries 58–9, 77–84, 158 Cepernic, Jorge, 69, 116 environmental resistance to Cerro de Maimón mine, 25, 165 projects, 165–6 Cerro Dragon oil field, 32, 162, French Guyana, 81, 84 175–6 funding problems, 132 CGI, 162 human trafficking via, 192 Chachao Channel Bridge, 70 296 INDEX

Chalillo river hydroelectric project, trade with, growth of, 205–6 77, 116 World Trade Organization and, 5, Chan, Luis, 268n83 213n3 Chang’an International, 95 China, new challenges for Chavez, Hugo, 27, 100, 183, 223n97 Chinese response to, 134–6 “checkbook diplomacy,” 49, 51, 201, conflicts, increase in, 136–7 231n3 cultural barriers, 129–31, 136, 156, Cheddi Jagan International Airport, 163, 175 82, 145–6, 149 dynamics of Chinese presence, Chelieco, 98 136–7 Chery, 94–5, 163 for management personnel, 135–6 Chevron, 35 overview, 10–11, 129–30, 137–8 Chile protectionist initiatives, 130 agricultural land acquisition, regional influence, growth of, 39, 41, 43 136–8, 200 agriculture projects, 41, 229n194 “soft power,” 129, 135, 137, 138, automobile retail and 155, 177 manufacturing, 96 upcoming challenges, 130–4 construction projects, 70 China Agriculture International electricity generation, 117 Development Corporation, 41 fisheries and fish farming, 41, China Airport Holdings (CAH), 229n194 120–1, 260n126, 260n129 funding problems, 132 China Aluminum Company government resistance to (Chinalco), 16, 20–1, 30, 157–9, projects, 142–3 164, 165, 203 mining projects, 23–4, 142–3, China Building Material Tangshan 226n150 Installation Co. (CBMI), 54 port and logistics projects, 70, 202 China Communications and solar power projects, 117, 204 Construction Corporation subway construction projects, 70 (CCCC), 145 telecommunications, 104, 105, 107, China Communications Services, 252n7, 253n21 106 wind power generation projects, China Construction America, 78, 162 117, 258n104 China Construction Bank (CCB), Chiloé Island, 70 122, 124 China China Construction Corporation, 60 causes of growth for, 17, 87, 198 China Dailan, 83–4, 182 communism, 4–5, 5, 9–10, 197 China Development Bank (CDB), 8, domestic prosperity, increase in, 198 18, 33, 39, 43, 54, 61–3, 69, 82, global trade, growth of, 5–6, 116–17, 122, 123, 143, 147, 172, 103, 211 226n138 loans from Western entities, 57–8 China Development Corporation natural resources, need for, 17 (CDC), 43 “re-emergence” of, 198 China ExIm Bank, 78, 79, 82, 123 sovereign wealth fund, 122, China Export and Credit Insurance 214n13, 260n131 Corporation, 82 INDEX 297

China Export-Import Bank China National Electric Engineering (China-ExIm Bank), 53, Company, 62 69–70, 73, 78–82, 79, 81, China National Offshore Oil 82, 118, 122, 123 Corporation (CNOOC), 26, 27, China Fisheries Group, 38 31–2, 34, 35, 140 China Foreign Commerce Bank, 54 China National Petroleum China Goldwind, 116, 117, 257n92 Corporation (CNPC), 16, China Greenheart Group, 43–4 26–30, 33–4, 73, 98, 143–4, China Harbour Engineering 159–60, 162, 163, 172 Company China National Technical Import commercial competitors, resistance and Export Corporation from, 145 (CNTIC), 81–2, 175 construction projects, 56, 58, 60–1, China Northern Railway (CNR), 98 75–82, 161–2, 204, 234n59, China Oil, 73 241n194 China Overseas Food Corporation labor relations and disputes, 148–9, (COFCO), 40, 41 156, 161–2 China Railway 17th Bureau Group resistance to construction projects, Company, 81 140, 145–6, 199 China Railway Construction China Huanqiu Contracting and Company, 18–19, 74 Engineering, 78, 143, 152 China Railway Engineering China International Capital Corporation (CREC), 60, 68, Corporation, 122 161, 164, 169–70 China Investment Corporation (CIC), China Railway First Group, 82, 147 122, 214n13 China Railway Group, 18 China IPPR International China Railway Materials Engineering Corporation, 54 Corporation, 66 China Jiangsu International China Railway Road, 52, 98, Economic Co-operation Corp 168, 203 (CJI), 80, 145, 162 China Road and Bridge (CRBC), China Machine New Energy 63, 146, 162 Corporation (CMNEC), 77 China Sky Solar, 117, 258n104 China Machinery Engineering China State Construction and Corporation, 19, 55, 68 Engineering Corporation, 53, 78 China Mengniu Dairy, 40 China State Shipbuilding Company China Metallurgical Group (MCC), (CSSC), 120 22, 67 China Telecom, 106 China Metalurgical Corporation China Tiesijiu Civil Engineering (CMC), 22, 165 Group, 62–3, 149 China Minmetals, 16, 20, 21, 23–4, China Trading, 180 26, 140, 143, 166, 219n31 China Unified Mining China National Complete Plant Development, 24 Import Export Corporation China Water and Electric (Complant), 43, 79 Corporation (CWE), 62, 64, China National Development and 116, 161–2, 175, 204 Reform Commission, 131 China XD Group, 63 298 INDEX

China Zhang Heng Tai, 43, 149 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences China Zhong Heng Tai, 43, 149 (CASS), 12 Chinafecc Central America S.A., 159 Chinese ethnic communities China-focused business programs, 6, Chinese government protection 201 of, 185 China-Latin America relationship “Chinese mafia,” perceptions of, Chinese companies involved in, 9 183–90, 279n38 Chinese exports and, 4–8, 5, 131, community assistance vs. criminal 214nn16–17 activity in, 186 Chinese foreign policies, 9, 10, 134, discrimination and violence 2215n24 against, 168–9, 177, 180–5 Chinese investments, growth in, 8, economic role of, changes in, 214n13 181–5, 277n3, 277n5 diplomatic relations and trade, established vs. new communities, growth of, 22n76, 24–5, 49, 51, 180 112, 144, 201, 205, 231n3 ethnic favoritism, perception of, free trade zones, 90–3, 99, 100 182–3 “go out” (zou chuqu) policy, 5 growth of, 193–4 Hu Jintao and, 5, 49, 67, 225n128, history of, 179 242n211 human trafficking and, 188, impact on China, 197–200 189–94, 207, 289n49 implications, 10–11 illegal immigrants and resentment, industries and business sectors, 9 134, 188–93 joint-venture partnerships, 15, importing Chinese goods, 180–1 23–4, 47–8, 54, 68, 92–4, organized crime and, 185–8, 205 98–100, 101–2, 217n3 overview, 10, 179–81, 193–5, 205 Latin America, impact on, 200–6 perceptions of, 180–1 Latin American political alliances separate nature of, 55, 129, 133, and, 206 136, 176–7, 180, 182–3 “no intervention” foreign policy, “Chinese mafia,” perceptions of, 9, 134 183–90, 279n38 overview, 3–4, 4–5, 210–11 Chinese security companies, 167, scholarship on, evolution of, 11–13 273n64 security relationships, 177, Chinese “threat,” concept of, 207 276n123 Chongqing Grain, 39, 40, 41, 45, stages of development, 4–8, 214n13 93, 203–4 Taiwan, recognition of, 49–51, 72, Christie, Perry, 161 199, 201, 231n3 Chucas hydroelectric project, 73, 116 tax treatment and, 6, 80–1, 214n9 Chung Hsing Mining, 63 trade with Asia, growth of, 205–6 Cienfuegos Refinery, 78, 152 U.S., impact on, 206–10, 282n15, CITIC Construction Company, 283n22, 283n32 18–19, 21, 23, 37, 61, 71, 84, 157, Chinalco, 16, 20–1, 30, 157–9, 164, 236 n87 165, 203 CITIC Gouan, 19 ChinaTel (VelaTel), 110 CITIC Securities, 122 Chinchilla, Laura, 50–1, 72, 117, 143 Citifor, 41 INDEX 299

Ckani wind generation project, 117 port and logistics projects, 65 Claro, 107, 111, 112, 113 resistance to projects, 151 Claro Panamá, 112 retail and manufacturing, 91, 204 Clinton, Hillary, 206 security challenges, 38–9, 169, CNBM International, 117–18 228n175 CNLC Ecuador Corporacion S.A., 29 subway construction projects, 66 CNODC, 16, 140 telecommunications, 104, 105, 110 CNOOC. See China National water management projects, 65 Offshore Oil Corporation Colombia-US Free Trade CNPC (China National Petroleum Agreement, 91 Corporation), 16, 26–30, 33–4, Colquiri mine, 169 73, 98, 143–4, 159–60, 162, commercial service sectors 163, 172 banking, 122–4 CNT, 104, 109 electricity, 114–18 CNTIC, 81–2, 175 overview, 103, 124–6 coal production, 17, 21, 60, 66, 77 port and logistics projects, 114–22, Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric 125–6 project, 61–2, 116, 118, 143, telecommunications, 103–14, 125 145, 161 communications systems. See CODELCO, 7, 23–4, 143 telecommunications services COFCO (China Overseas Food communism, 4–5, 5, 9–10, 197 Corporation), 40, 41 community relations, as challenge, Colacem, S.p.A., 54 156–60 Cold War, 34, 78, 135 Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia Colombia e Minerac á o (CBMM), 23 agriculture projects, 38–9, 151, Compania Vale do Rio Doce 228n175 (CVRD), 7, 15, 22, 69, 152 airport construction projects, Complant, 43, 79 120–1, 260nn129–30 computer and electronics construction projects, 48, 58–9, manufacturing, 99–101 65–6, 203 CONAIE, 150 funding problems, 132 Conga mine, 20, 165, 168 government actions, 199 Conoco Philips, 27, 35 guerilla groups, 27, 31, 169 Construcciones Electromecanicas del highway construction projects, 64, Oeste, 68 65, 203 construction equipment purchasing, human trafficking via, 189, 190–1, 15, 218n8 192, 289n49 construction projects hydroelectric projects, 65 Antigua, 52, 80, 175 import taxes, 96 Argentina, 47, 67–9, 99, 134, 174, mining projects, 21, 38–9, 338n175 276n114 motorcycle retail and Bahamas, 51, 53–4, 78, 148–9, 158 manufacturing, 92, 93, 96 Barbados, 80 peace process, 38, 65 Belize, 77, 166, 204 petroleum and petrochemical Bolivia, 63–5 projects, 31, 66, 203 Brazil, 69–70, 99 300 INDEX construction projects—Continued paid for by Chinese investors, 52–6 Caribbean, 47–9, 51–2, 58–9, types of, 48 77–84, 158 Continex, 171 Cayman Islands, 80–1 Copeinca, 38 Central America, 73–4 copper mining and production, 16, Chile, 70 17, 18–21, 23–4, 143, 149–50, Colombia, 48, 58–9, 65–6, 203 168, 203, 219n31 commercial competitors, resistance Corbeta, 89, 93, 96, 249n52 from, 145–6 Cordoba, Argentina, 39–40, 68 Costa Rica, 49, 50–1, 58, 72–3 Coronel Kautz, Manuel, 74 Cuba, 58, 77–8, 152 Corporacion Andina de Fomento, 63 Dominica, 52, 81 Corporacion Andino de Fomento, Dominican Republic, 53, 54 63, 117 Ecuador, 47, 58, 61–3 Corporacion Minera Dominicana government actions against, 171–2 (Cormindum), 25 Grenada, 52, 55–6 Correa, Rafael, 30, 62, 109, 143, Guatemala, 77 173, 174, 199, 264n30 Guyana, 52, 53, 54–5, 81–3, 146–7 Corriente, 18 Honduras, 48, 76–7 corruption, 57, 60, 83, 145–6, 150, housing construction projects, 61, 171, 175, 245n253 79, 157 Cosmos Energy, 35 Jamaica, 35, 51–2, 56, 79, 80–1, Costa Rica 152, 156, 202, 234n59 China, diplomatic relations Mexico, 71–2, 202 with, 24–5, 144, 222n76 Nicaragua, 58, 73–5 commercial competitors, Panama, 75–6 resistance from, 145 Peru, 66–7, 202 construction projects, 49, 50–1, physical infrastructure 58, 72–3 construction, 49–52, 72, 80–1, government resistance to projects, 158, 167, 202, 231–2n2 71, 73, 141–4 security challenges, 167–8 human trafficking via, 189, 190 subway construction projects, 63, hydroelectric projects, 73, 116 66, 68, 70, 71 labor relations and disputes, 158–9 Trinidad and Tobago, 51, 52, petroleum and petrochemical 79–80, 141 projects, 51, 73, 143–4 Uruguay, 70–1, 202 security challenges, 167 construction projects, loan-backed solar power projects, 117 Chinese investors, paying for, telecommunications, 112, 113, 52–6 145, 257n76 as gifts from China to local CPEB Engineering, 26, 27 governments, 48–52 CPTDC Ecuador S.A., 29 government resistance to, 144 Creutzfeldt, Benjamin, 12 growth of, 48, 58 cricket stadiums, 49–52, 231–2n2 Latin American governments, crime and violence paying for, 56–84 cartels and gangs, 125–6, 169, overview, 47–50, 84–5 184–5, 191, 194, 207 INDEX 301

against Chinese communities, Dailan, 83–4, 182 168–9, 177, 180–5 Datang, 103, 107, 111, 112–13 Chinese communities and De Vido, Julio, 107 organized crime, 185–8, 205 deepwater ports, 79, 84, 152, 165–6, Chinese presence, impact on, 205 202, 245n253, 272n54 corruption, 57, 60, 83, 145–6, 150, Delsitanisagua hydroelectric 171, 175, 245n253 project, 62, 116 drug cartels and smuggling, 184–5, Deng Qilin, 152 191, 194, 207 Deng Xiaoping, 5 ethnic violence, 198 Departamento Administrativo de guerilla groups, 27, 31, 169 Seguridad (DAS), 189 human trafficking, 188, 189–94, Desarollos Energeticos S.A. 207, 289n49 (DESA), 76 kidnapping, risks of, 133–4, Diamante, 38 168–70, 199 DICOFAN, 108 mining-related violence, 168–9 Digicel, 104, 108, 112 organized crime, 183–90, Dominguez, Jorge, 12 279n30 Dominica physical security and insecurity as Chinese illegal immigrants, challenge, 167–70 resentment of, 188–9 See also security and insecurity construction projects, 52, 81 Cristobal port, 119, 142, 259n123, Dominican Republic 275n106 Chinese communities, protests CST Mining Group Limited, 166 against, 182 Cuba Chinese retails shops, 182 Chinese communities, 182–3 construction projects, 53, 54 construction projects, 58, 77–8, environmental resistance to 152 projects, 165 environmental resistance to labor relations and disputes, 54, projects, 166 223n48 funding and market condition mining projects, 25, 165 problems, 152–3 telecommunications, 111 mining projects, 26 Dragon Mart, 91–2, 144–5, 151, petroleum and petrochemical 203, 277n5 projects, 34, 152–3, 166 Dreyfus, 7, 36 telecommunications, 105, 112 drug cartels and smuggling, 169, cultural barriers 184–5, 189, 191, 194, 207 language barriers, 133, 155, 156, “dry canal” projects, 66, 76–7, 201 163–4, 180, 192–3, 194 Dussel Peters, Enrique, 12 management challenges and, 128, Dutch companies, 33, 40 133, 136, 156, 163, 176 “separateness” of Chinese East China Mineral Exploration communities, 55, 129, 133, and Development Bureau, 23 136, 176–7, 180, 182–3 Eastern Petroleum and Gas, 30 CVG Ferromineria Orinoco CA, 18 Ebrard, Marcelo, 114 CVRD, 7, 15, 22, 69, 152 Ecoenergiza, 118 302 INDEX

Economic Commission for Latin subway construction projects, 63 America and the Caribbean tax regulations, 198 (ECLAC), 218n9 telecommunications, 104, 105, 109 Ecuacorriente, 18 wind power generation projects, Ecuador 116, 204 automobile retail and Effa Motors, 94–5 manufacturing, 96 El Chorrin hydroelectric project, bridge construction projects, 63 60, 116 China, diplomatic relations with, 58 El Dorado airport, 120–1, Chinese banking services, 122, 123 260nn129–30 Chinese communities, 179, 187 El Mutún mining project, 19, 63 Chinese illegal immigrants, El Salvador resentment of, 189–90 mining projects, 222n75 Chinese owned companies in, 9 port construction projects, disputes commercial competitors, resistance on, 77, 202 from, 145 El Tablón dam project, 76 constitution, revision of, 18 El Viejo sugar company, 117 construction projects, 47, 58, 61–3 electricity generation projects crime and insecurity, 168 Argentina, 67 electrical power transmission constructing facilities for, 99 infrastructure, 118 hydroelectric generation, 62, 64, electronics manufacturing, 93 68, 115–16, 118, 149, 161 environmental resistance to overview, 114 projects, 30, 149–50, 151 power transmission government actions, 173–4, 198 infrastructure, 118 human trafficking via, 189–90 renewable energy, 114–15, 203 hydroelectric projects, 61–3, solar power generation, 116–18 115–16, 118, 143, 145, 161, 204, thermoelectric projects, 99, 114–15 264nn28–30 wind power generation projects, investor instability and risks, 57 63, 111, 116–18, 204, 258n104 investors in, treatment of, 171–2 electronics manufacturing, 89, 93, 96, labor relations and disputes, 156, 99–101, 249n52 159, 161, 168, 269n1, 273n73 Eletronorte, 118 metals transformations embassy construction projects, 78 manufacturing, 98–9 Emerald Energy, 31, 169, 199 mining projects, 16, 18–19, 45, employment opportunities, 21, 42–3, 145–6, 149–50, 203 50–1, 77, 92, 95, 97, 100, 113, 205 oil reserves in, 26 Empresa Azucarera San petroleum and petrochemical Buenaventura, 64 projects, 29–30, 58, 151–2, 203 Empresa Nacional Energia Electrica port and logistics projects, 119–21, (ENEE), 76 165, 173–4, 202, 203, 282n11 Empresas Publicas, 144 resistance to projects, 143 Enarsa, 225n128 security challenges, 168 EnCana, 29, 173 social unrest and protests, 156, 168, energy generation. See electricity 199 generation projects INDEX 303

Eni, 34 financial crisis, global, 7, 152 Entel, 107, 108, 109 financial institutions. See banking environmental conflicts services as management challenge, fisheries and fish farming, 36, 38, 165–6, 177 41, 229n194 mining projects, 149–50, 165–6 flower and plant production, 38 oil spills, 165–6 FOCAC (Canadian Council for the overview, 149–52 Americas), 12, 282n19 parkland, 30, 151 Fontaine, Thomson, 188 petroleum and petrochemical food production projects, 27, 30, 151, 165–6 Chinese domestic limits to, 198 timber and forestry projects, 25, construction projects for, 64–5 36, 42–4, 149, 171, 203, for export, 39–42 212n230, 275n96 milk production, 37, 40 water use and management, 65, See also agriculture 66–7, 165 Forland, 96 Environmental Resources Fornés, Gastón, 12, 229n190, Management, 74 229n193 Erikson, 171 Foton, 94, 95, 96, 249n52 Erikson, Daniel P., 213n4 Free National Movement (FNM), 148 Errázuriz, Pedro Pablo, 70, 107 free trade zones, 90–3, 99, 100 Espinoza, Marisol, 161 Freeport container port, 119–20, 142, excavator manufacturing, 97 161, 202, 259n123 Export-Import Bank of China, 53, Freeport container port projects, 69–70, 79, 81, 82, 122 119–20, 142, 161, 202, 259n123 exports French companies, 33, 99 Brazilian, 205 French Guyana, 81, 84 Chinese global growth of, 4–8, 5, funding and market conditions 131, 214nn16–17 Chinese impact on, 203–4 Japanese, 205 Chinese need for access to, 130–1 Venezuelan, 15, 218n9 financial crisis and, 152 extractive sector. See natural resource mergers and acquisitions, development problems with, 139–40 extraregional resistance, 140–1 problems in, 152–3 Exxon Mobil, 27 Furnas, 118 factories. See retail and manufacturing Gabriel Mistral (Gaby) mine, 23, 143 Falklands/Malvinas Islands, 142 Gallagher, Kevin, 12 FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Galleno copper mine, 20, 203 Revolucionarios de Colombia), Galp Energy, 33 169, 199 Gan Baixiam, 169 Farfan port project, 120, 142, 202, gangs. See crime and violence 259n123 Gasene pipeline, 69 FAW, 89, 94, 152 Gastre wind farm, 116 Fernández, Cristina, 32, 67–8, 123, Geassa (Gemdon eólica Argentina 140, 142, 184, 199, 276n114 del Sur SA), 116 304 INDEX

Geeley, 94, 95 bridge construction projects, 83 General Motors, 94 Chinese communities, 180, 183, genetically-engineered seeds, 40 185 George Town Cruise Ship terminal, 141 Chinese illegal immigrants, Gerdau, 15 resentment of, 189 Gezhouba Group, 62, 116 construction projects, 49, 52, 53, Ghezhouba Group, 37 54–5, 81–3, 146–7 Giant Motors, 94 environmental resistance to Glas, Jorge, 98 projects, 166 Glencore, 21 government actions, 170–5 Glormed, 90–1 human trafficking via, 192–3 “go out” (Zǒuchūqū Zhànlüè) policy, 5 hydroelectric projects, 82, 146–7, gold mining, 17–18, 22, 24, 25, 245n247 150, 267n79 labor relations and disputes, 25, 44, Golden Dragon Precise Copper 149, 171, 212n230, 275n96 Tube Group, 90 manufacturing and retail growth, Golden Resource, 24 282n15 Goldwind, 116, 117, 257n92 mining projects, 25, 44, 115, 166–7 Gran Investment Group, 42 motorcycle retail and Grand Bahamas Port Authority, manufacturing, 92 120, 142 port and logistics projects, 82–3, Great Wall Drilling Company, 202 26, 27, 31, 169, 199 resistance to projects, 146–7, 149 Gree, 90 social unrest and protests, 25, 44, Green S.A., 68, 117 115, 166–7, 230n212 Greenersys, 117 telecommunications, 111–12 greenhouse farming, 42 timber and forestry projects, 25, 36, Grenada 44, 149, 171, 212n230, 275n96 Chinese illegal immigrants, Guyana Power and Light, 82 resentment of, 188 Guyana Sugar Corporation, 82 construction projects, 52, 55–6 Guyana Telephone and Telegraph, 111 Grupo Unidos por el Canal (GUPC), 76 Haier, 89, 90, 163, 167 Guadeloupe, telecommunications in, 111 Haimorakabra, 44 Guangxi Road and Bridge Haiti Engineering Corporation, 63 immigrants in Dominican Guatemala Republic from, 182 construction projects, 59, 77 telecommunications, 104, 111 “dry canal” projects, 77 Harbin Electric Company, 62, mining projects, 222n75 116, 118 Guoxin Group, 21, 117 Harmony Cove Resort, Jamaica, Guyana 35, 56 agriculture projects, 36, 44, Hayduk, 38 230n212 Hearn, Adrian, 12, 181, 182, 277n5 airport construction, 82, heavy equipment manufacturing, 145–6, 149 97–8 INDEX 305

Hebei Wenfeng, 24 HSBC publications, 12 Heilongjiang Beidahuang Nongken Hu Jintao, 5, 49, 67, 225n128, Group, 15–16, 37, 39–40, 41, 242n211 145, 148, 151, 203 Hu Yifan, 134 Hidroituango project, 65 Huanji, 30, 224n112 Hierro Peru mine, 20, 157, 159, Huanuni mine, 19, 63 160–1, 165, 166, 171, 271n24 Huawei Highway 2000 project, 161 Argentina, 100, 106 highway and road construction Bolivia, 108–9 projects, 38, 56, 64–5, 72, 83–4, Brazil, 100, 106, 253n14 203, 234n59 Caribbean, 111–12 Hilong Oil Service & Engineering cell phone manufacturing, 100–1, 105 Ecuador Cia Ltd., 29 Central America, 112–13 HK Nicaragua Canal Development Chile, 107, 253n21 Investment Company (HKND), Colombia, 110 74, 75, 113 Costa Rica, 113, 145, 257n76 Honbridge Holdings, 23 Ecuador, 109 Honduras government actions against, 171 agriculture projects, 42–3, 149, 151 Guyana, 111–12 airport construction, 76 intelligence gathering by, risk of, biofuels production projects, 42–3 208 construction projects, 48, 76–7 labor disputes, 164 diplomatic relations with China, Latin American market share of, 76, 77 103–5 funding and market condition Mexico, 106, 113–14 problems, 153 Paraguay, 104 hydroelectric projects, 59, 76, 116, Peru, 110 151, 153, 170, 201, 204 Suriname, 111 mining projects, 25, 222n75 tax breaks, 100–1 port and logistics projects, 59, 76–7, telecommunications manufacturing 116, 202 facilities, 100 resistance to projects, 42, 151 Trinidad and Tobago, 111 security challenges, 170 Venezuela, 100, 108 telecommunications, 112 Western operational style vs., timber and forestry projects, 42–3 104–5, 130 transportation infrastructure ZTE, competing with, 109 construction projects, 76–7 human trafficking Hondutel, 112 Chinese communities and, 188, Hortolandia telecommunications 189–94, 207, 289n49 factory, 100, 106 law enforcement, challenges for, hospital construction projects, 52 192–3 hotel and resort construction, 35, Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), 53, 53–6, 71, 78, 80, 148, 151, 156, 119 158, 162, 269n4 Hutchison Whampoa housing construction projects, 61, construction projects, 53, 75 79, 157 extraregional resistance to, 140–1 306 INDEX

Hutchison Whampoa—Continued illegal immigrants, resentment of, government actions against, 188–93 173–4, 275n106 Ilo port project, 64, 66, 202, 203 governmental resistance to, 142 imports hiring practices, 161, 164 Chinese, 180–1 labor relations and disputes, 161, taxes on, 95, 96 164 Indian companies, 31, 63 Manta port project, 119–21, 165, indigenous groups 173–4, 202, 282n11 environmental resistance to operational expansion style, 130 projects, 149–50 Panama, 119–21, 130, 259n116, Industry and Commerce Bank of 259n123, 282n11 China, 67–8 physical security challenges, 169 Instituto Costarricense de port and logistics projects, 119–21, Electricidad (ICE), 113, 117, 130, 259n116, 259n123, 282n11 145, 171, 257n76, 275n98 Hydrochina Corporation, 62, 64, intelligence gathering, risks of, 116, 151, 257n92 177, 208, 276n123 hydroelectric projects Inter Rao UES, 62 Argentina, 68–9, 116, 153 Inter-American Development Belize, 77, 116, 165–6 Bank, 63 Bolivia, 64, 116, 204 InterAmerican Development Brazil, 116, 118, 149, 204, 267n73 Bank (IDB), 59, 82 Colombia, 65 InterAmerican Dialogue, 12 Costa Rica, 73, 116 Interbank, 122 Ecuador, 61–3, 115–16, 118, 143, International Commerce Bank of 145, 161, 204, 264nn28–30 China (ICBC), 29, 60–1, 69, Guyana, 82, 146–7, 245n247 122–4, 141, 153, 236n87 Honduras, 59, 76, 116, 151, 153, International Land Coalition, 151 170, 201, 204 International Monetary Fund, 12, overview, 115–16, 204 57, 264n30 political opposition to, 146–7 investor-funded construction resistance to, 143, 144, 149, 151, 201 projects, 52–6 Suriname, 84, 116, 245n253 iron ore mining, 17–18, 19, 22–3, Venezuela, 60, 116 152, 160–1 hydrological projects, 74–5. See also irrigation projects, 37 canal projects Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) oilfields, 30, 151 IamGold, 25 Isolux Corsan, 116–17 Iberdola, 115 Itaguazurenda oilfield, 63 ICBC Brazil, 123 Italian firms, 34, 54, 98 ICBC (International Commerce Bank Itaminas, 23 of China), 29, 60–1, 69, 122–4, 141, 153, 236n87 JAC Motors, 94, 95, 144, 246n1, ICE (Instituto Costarricense de 248n41, 249n43 Electricidad), 113, 117, 145, 171, Jacobsohn, Roberta, 207 257n76, 275n98 Jagdeo, Bharat, 55, 92 INDEX 307

Jaguar Energy, 59, 77 Jindal, 63 Jamaica Jing Long Engineering Machinery agriculture projects, 36, 43, 79, 149 Co., Ltd. (GJJ), 97 Chinese communities, 185 Jinzhao Mining Perú, 20 construction projects, 35, 51–2, 56, joint-venture partnerships, 15, 23–4, 79, 80–1, 152, 156, 202, 234n59 47–8, 54, 68, 92–4, 98–100, hotel and resort construction 101–2, 217n3 projects, 35, 56 Jorge Cepernic hydroelectric labor relations and disputes, 156–7, facility, 69, 116 161, 162, 163–4 Junin-4 oil project, 16, 28 mining projects, 25–6, 222n88 port and logistics projects, 79, Kalley brand, 89 152, 156, 202 Kallutaca industrial park, 91 resistance to projects, 152 Kerry, John, 207 school construction projects, Kerui, 26, 27, 29, 31 51–2, 80 Kicillof, Axel, 258n97 security challenges, 168 Kirchner, Nestor, 69, 116, 153 telecommunications, 111, 112 Knights Templar cartel, 169 transportation infrastructure Kong Aimin, 171 projects, 79, 156 Korea Jamaica Development Infrastructure as Latin American funding source, 143 Program (JDIP), 79, 162 manufacturing and export Jamaica Development Infrastructure market, 5, 6, 87, 92, 93 Programme (JDIP), 78, 79, 162 Kylin International, 53–4 Japan manufacturing and export market, La Minga environmental group, 151 5, 6, 87, 92, 93 La Rioja mining project, 22, 150 opposition to Chinese projects, 141 La Rocha deepwater port project, Japanese firms, 87, 124 71, 202 JDC Minerals, 99, 150 labor, employment opportunities for, JDIP (Jamaica Development 21, 42–3, 50–1, 77, 92, 95, 97, Infrastructure Programme), 78, 100, 113, 205 79, 162 labor, management challenges and Jenkins, Rhys, 12 Chinese response to, 135–6 Jereh, 26, 31 community benefits, lack of, 156–60 JHP, 32 cultural barriers, 129–31, 136, 156, Jia He Wei Ye, 24 163, 176 Jialing, 92 environmental conflicts, 165–6, 177 Jiang Jianqing, 123 government actions, 170–5 Jiang Shixue, 12, 216n37 improvements and solutions for, 176–7 Jiang Xi Zhong, 54 language barriers and, 133, 155, Jianghuai Automobile Co. (JAC), 94, 156, 163–4, 180 95, 144, 246n1, 248n41, 249n43 overview, 155, 176–7 Jiangxi Copper, 20, 166 physical security, 167–70, 177 Jilin Dequan Cement Group, 22 social unrest, 166–7 Jincheng, 92 subcontractors, relations with, 160–4 308 INDEX labor relations and disputes Chinese land ownership, resistance Argentina, 158, 162–3, 164, 183–4 to, 147–8 Bahamas, 148–9, 157, 158, 161–2, foreign ownership, cultural 269n4 sensitivity to, 147 Caribbean, 148–9, 161–3, 269n4 Latin American national identity Chinese response to, 198–200 and, 35–6 community benefits for projects, language barriers lack of, 156–60 labor disputes and, 133, 155, 156, construction projects, 50–1 163–4, 180 Costa Rica, 158–9 law enforcement challenges and, cultural barriers and, 129–31, 136, 192–3, 194 156, 163–4, 176 Lanta, Jorge, 158, 270n8 Dominican Republic, 54, 223n48 Las Bambas copper mine, 20, 21, due to acquiring financial interests, 219n31 162–3 Las Cristinas mine, 18 Ecuador, 156, 159, 161, 168, 269n1, Las Mellizas, 20, 168 273n73 Latin America-China relationship. foreign vs. local workers, hiring, See China-Latin America 44, 130, 132, 149, 156–60, 164, relationship 171, 175, 212n230, 223n48, Latin American governments 234n60 resistance to Chinese companies, Guyana, 25, 44, 149, 171, 212n230, 68, 123–4, 141–4 275n96 Lazaro Cardenas port project, 142, Jamaica, 156–7 169, 202 language barriers and, 133, 155, lead production, 17 156, 163–4, 180 Lenca indigenous group, 151 as management challenge, 156, Lenovo, 99 160–4 Leon, José Luis, 12 Mexico, 161 Li Keqiang, 185 Peru, 20, 148–9, 156, 157–62, 164, Li Yuanchao, 61 271n24 Libra oilfield, 16, 34 subcontractors, relations with, Lifan, 94 160–4 light truck manufacturing, 96 Suriname, 149 Linyi Gelon New Battery Trinidad and Tobago, 149, 162 Materials Company, 19 Venezuela, 157, 159, 161, 163, Liogang, 97 234n60 lithium production, 19, 24 workplace conditions and demands, loan-backed construction projects. 163–4, 182–3 See construction projects labor strikes, 62, 94, 161, 162, 163, Lobo, Porfirio, 76 183–4 logging. See timber and forestry labor unions, 161, 163, 164 projects Lake Nicaragua, 74 Loma Blanca wind farm, 116–17 land acquisition “Long-Term Evolution” (LTE) agricultural land ownership, 39, 41, network, 110–11, 114 42, 43, 148 López, Juan Carlos, 145 INDEX 309

Los Zetas, 189, 191 mergers and acquisitions Lucent, 145 funding problems, 139–40 Lula da Silva, Luiz Inacio, 226n139 in petroleum sector, 31–2, 140 Lupe mining project, 150 Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), 60, 165 Ma Jing-yeou, 49 metals transformations Macri, Francisco “Franco,” 68, 99, manufacturing, 98–9 114n276, 174 Mexico Madre de Dios highway project, 38, agriculture projects, 42 64, 203 airport construction, 71–2 Maduro, Nicholas, 18, 28 automobile retail and magnesium production, 17, 19 manufacturing, 94, 95, 96, 152, management challenges. See labor, 246n2 management challenges and Chinese banking services, 123 Manaus, Brazil, 90, 92–3 Chinese communities, 179–80, Mansarovar Energy Colombia Ltd., 31 182–5, 277n5 Manta port project, 119–21, 165, Chinese illegal immigrants, 173–4, 202, 282n11 resentment of, 188, 189 Manuel Piar hydroelectric center, 60 Chinese investment growth in, manufacturing projects. See retail 8, 214n16 and manufacturing Chinese owned companies in, 9 Maracay, Venezuela, 183, 185 commercial competitors, resistance Marcona mining project, 20, 157, from, 91, 144–5, 151 159, 160–1, 165, 166, 171, computer and electronics 219n33, 271n24 manufacturing, 99, 100–1 Maripaston, Suriname, 184, 185 construction projects, 71–2, 202 market conditions. See funding and drug cartels and smuggling, 169, market conditions 184–5, 191, 194, 207 Marriott Hotel project (Guyana), environmental resistance to 54–5, 149 projects, 150 Martinelli, Ricardo, 148 funding and market condition Maynard, Charles, 158 problems, 152 Mazar Dudas hydroelectric project, government resistance to 62, 116 projects, 142 McCain, John, 207 human trafficking via, 188, 189, MCC (China Metallurgical Group), 190 22, 67 labor relations and disputes, 161 Mcleod, Eroll, 149 Lazaro Cardenas port project, MEC Mining, 74 142, 169, 202 medical center construction mining projects, 24, 150 projects, 52 petroleum and petrochemical Memorandum of Understanding projects, 34 (MoU) agreements, 66, 74, port and logistics projects, 91, 83, 84 119, 202, 203 Menéndez, Ricardo, 95 protectionist initiatives and Mercosur, 95 trade actions, 131 310 INDEX

Mexico—Continued Jamaica, 25–6, 222n88 retail and manufacturing, 91–2, labor relations and disputes, 20, 144, 151, 203, 204, 277n5 148–9, 156, 157–62, 164, 271n24 security challenges, 169 Mexico, 24, 150 solar power projects, 117–18 overview, 15–17, 44–5 technology manufacturing, Peru, 19–21, 150–1, 157–61, 165, 100–1 166, 168, 171, 203, 219n31, telecommunications, 100–1, 105, 267n82, 269n7 106, 113–14 social unrest and protests, 20, U.S., trade relations with, 90 150–1, 165, 166, 168, 267n82, military activities, threat of, 135, 268n83 207, 282n21 Suriname, 25 milk production, 37, 40 Venezuela, 17–18, 45, 98 Miller, Portia Simpson, 51, 185 Ministry of Basic Industries and Millicom, 104 Mining (MIBAN), 17–18 Mina Justa mineL, 166 Minmetals, 16, 20, 21, 23–4, 26, 140, Minas Rio iron mine, 22 143, 166, 219n31 Minas San Francisco hydroelectric Mirador mining project, 16, 18–19, project, 62, 116 149–50, 203 mineral resources. See natural Miranda, Ricardo, 54 resource development Mizuho, 124 mining projects MMX, 15, 152 Argentina, 15, 22, 69, 150, 164, 165 Moin oil refinery, 51, 73, 143–4 Bolivia, 19, 63, 169 Montego Bay Convention Center, 79 Brazil, 15, 22–5, 150, 152, 217n3 Monterrico Metals, 150, 268n83 Caribbean, 25–6, 165 Mora, Frank O., 283n22 Central America, 24–5, 222nn75–6 Morales, Evo, 19, 38, 64, 109 Chile, 23–4, 142–3, 226n150 Morant Estate: Infant School, 51–2 Colombia, 21, 38–9, 338n175 Morococha, Peru, 21, 157–8, 257–8, commercial competitors, 269n7 resistance from, 145–6 motorcycle retail and manufacturing, Cuba, 26 92–3, 96 Dominican Republic, 25, 165 Movistar, 105, 110, 113 Ecuador, 45, 18–19, 16, 149–50, Mujica, José, 71, 107, 148 203, 145–6 Multiple Rositas hydroelectric environmental resistance to, project, 64, 116 149–50, 165–6 funding and market condition Nanjinzhao, 20 problems, 152–3 narcotrafficking, 184–5, 191, 194, 207 funding regulations, 171–2 Nari Group, 117 government actions, 171 National Autonomous University of government resistance to, 132, Mexico (UNAM), 6 142–3 National Hardware, 180 growth of, 15–16 National Telecommunications Guyana, 25, 44, 115, 166–7 Corporation of Ecuador Honduras, 25, 222n75 (CNT), 104, 109 INDEX 311

National Workers Union Obama, Barack, 3, 207 (NWU), 161 Occidental Petroleum, 8, 32 natural gas exploration, 26, 28, 30, Odebrecht, 62, 70, 204 34–5, 54, 218n9, 224n112, O’Donnell, Thomas, 223n97 227n159 oil and gas exploration, 26, 28, 30, natural resource development 34–5, 54, 218n9, 224n112, agriculture, 35–44 227n159. See also petroleum mining, 17–26 and petrochemicals overview, 15–17 oil spills, 165–6 petroleum and petrochemicals, Olaya Herrera airport, 121 26–35 Omai bauxite mine, 25, 44, 115 Negrette Cuel project, 117 Omimex, 31 Nestor Kirchner hydroelectric ONGC Videsh, 31 facility, 69, 116, 153 orimulsion production, 172 Netherlands Ormulsion fuel production, 199 Dutch companies, 33, 40 Ortega, Daniel, 74, 112–13 illegal immigration via, 189 Ortega, Laureano, 75 Suriname, relations with, 33, Oxfam International, 151, 222n75 83–4, 245n253 New San, 100 Palisadoes Road project, 79, 156 Nexen, 31 palm oil production, 42, 43, 149, Nextel, 104, 106, 107, 110, 113–14 230nn207–8 Nicaragua Palmerla airport, 76 construction projects, 58, 73–5 Palua port project Venezuela, 60 port construction projects, Pampa de Pongo mining project, 20 disputes on, 77, 202 Pan American Energy, 32, 140, Sandinista government in, 162, 174–5 112–13 Pan Caribbean Sugar Company, 43 telecommunications, 105, 112–13 Panama Nicaragua Canal project, 47, 59, Chinese communities, 179, 73–5, 201, 202, 203, 206 180, 187 Nichi Properties, 41 Chinese land ownership, NICIL, 55, 147 resistance to, 35–6, 148 nickel production, 17, 23, 25–6 construction projects, 75–6 Nidera, 40 government resistance to NII Holdings, 106 projects, 142 “no intervention” foreign policy, 9, human trafficking via, 189, 190 134 port and logistics projects, 119, 120, Noble Group, 40 142, 202, 259n123 Nokia, 171 telecommunications, 104, 112 Noranda, 140 trade with Asia, growth of, 205–6 North American Free Trade Panama Canal Agreement (NAFTA), 90, 99 building of, 73, 119 North-South Toll Road, Jamaica, 56, expansion of, 75–6, 205–6 234n59 expansion plans for, 76, 202 Norwegian firms, 33 extraregional resistance, 140–1 312 INDEX

Panama Canal—Continued Chinese illegal immigrants, port and logistics services, 202, resentment of, 189, 190 259n123 Chinese investment growth in, 8 U.S. control of relinquished, 140 Chinese owned companies in, 9 Panama Canal Authority (ACP), 76 construction projects, 66–7, 202 Panantza-San Carlos mining environmental resistance to project, 19 projects, 165 Papatam, Suriname, 184 fisheries and fish farming, 36, Papelbol, 65 38, 41 paper mill construction, 65 government actions, 170–5, 175 Paraguay human trafficking iva, 189, 190 agriculture, growth of, 204 labor relations and disputes, 20, automobile retail and 148–9, 156, 157–62, 164, 271n24 manufacturing, 92, 96 mining projects, 19–21, 150–1, Chinese communities, 179 157–61, 165, 166, 168, 171, 203, Chinese illegal immigrants, 219n31, 267n82, 269n7 resentment of, 189, 190 petroleum and petrochemical diplomatic relations with China, 96 projects, 26, 30–1, 165 human trafficking via, 190 port and logistics projects, 64, 66, telecommunications, 104 202, 203 partnerships, joint-venture, 15, 23–4, resistance to projects, 20, 21, 47–8, 54, 68, 92–4, 98–100, 150–1, 168, 267n82, 268n83 101–2, 217n3 security challenges, 168 Patuca III hydroelectric project, 59, social unrest and protests, 20, 76, 116, 153, 170 150–1, 165, 166, 168, 267n82, Paz, Gonzalo, 207 268n83 Paz, Guadalupe, 12 telecommunications, 104, 105, 110 PdVSA, 28, 60, 98, 163, 172, 199 timber and forestry projects, 36, PEMEX, 34 38, 64, 203 Peña Nieto, Enrique, 71–2, 145 water treatment projects, 66–7 Pengxin Group, 38 Peru Copper, 20 People Republic of China (P.R.C.). Petrobras, 31, 33–4, 69, 226n139 See China; China-Latin America petrochemical manufacturing, 98–9 relationship PetroChina, 140 People’s Progressive Party (PPP), 146 Petroecuador, 29 Pequiven, 28, 61 petroleum and petrochemicals, Perenco, 33 26, 31–2, 99, 140–2, 175–6, Pérez, Paco, 69 225n131, 225nn127–8 Permowl, John, 92 Bolivia, 30, 63, 224n112 Peru Brazil, 26, 31, 32–4, 69, 165–6, agriculture projects, 36, 38 203, 226n139, 272n54 automobile retail and Caribbean, 26, 34–5, 98–9 manufacturing, 96 Colombia, 31, 66, 203 Chinese banking services, 122 commercial competitors, resistance Chinese communities, 179, 187, from, 145–6 188, 278n28 Costa Rica, 51, 73, 143–4 INDEX 313

Cuba, 34, 152–3, 166 growth of, 202 Ecuador, 29–30, 45 Lazaro Cardenas port project, 142, failed bids for projects, 140 169, 202 funding and market condition port and logistics projects problems, 152–3 airport construction projects, 72–2, government actions, 172–4, 199 76, 80, 82, 120–1, 145–6, 149, government resistance to, 71, 73, 260n126, 260nn129–30 141–4 Argentina, 67–9, 116, 119 growth of, 26, 27, 203 Bahamas, 78–9, 119–20, 142, 161, Guyana, 26, 35 202, 259n123 heavy equipment manufacturing banking services, 125–6 for, 98 Brazil, 165–6, 260n131, 272n54 Mexico, 34 Cayman Islands, 81 natural gas exploration, 26, 28, Chile, 70, 202 30, 34–5, 54, 218n9, 224n112, Colombia, 65 227n159 Ecuador, 119–21, 165, 173–4, 202, offshore oil deposits, 165–6 203, 282n11 overview, 15–17, 26–7, 44–5 extraregional resistance to, 140–1 Peru, 26, 30–1, 165 Guyana, 82–3, 202 social unrest and protests, 168, 199 Honduras, 59, 76–7, 116, 202 Suriname, 26, 35, 227n159 Jamaica, 79, 152, 156, 202 Trinidad and Tobago, 26, 34–5 labor relations and disputes, 124–5 Venezuela, 16, 27–8, 45, 61, 98, Mexico, 91, 119, 202, 203 172, 203, 218nn8–11 Peru, 64, 66, 202, 203 petroleum sector construction Suriname, 83–4, 245n258 Colombia, 58–9 Venezuela, 60–1 Costa Rica, 51, 73, 143–4 Portezuelo del Viento project, 59, Cuba, 78, 152 68–9, 76, 116 Ecuador, 29–30, 58, 151–2, 203 Porzecanski, Roberto, 12 Nicaragua, 58, 75 Potasio Rio Colorado de Malargue Trinidad and Tobago, 31, 141 mining project, 69 Venezuela, 58, 75 power plant construction projects, Petronic, 75 52, 175 Petroriental, 156, 168, 269n1, 273n73 power transmission and generation physical infrastructure construction, infrastructure, 118 49–52, 72, 80–1, 158, 167, 202, Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), 148 231–2n2 project work, struggles in acquiring Piñera, Sebastian, 24 extraregional resistance to, 140–1 Pinzon, Mario Fernando, 120, 121 funding and market condition plant and flower production, 38 problems, 152–3 PlusPetrol Norte, 30, 33 mergers and acquisitions, problems port and logistics construction with, 139–40 projects overview, 139, 153–4 bridge construction projects, 63, Propreritas Group, 122 70, 78, 83, 84, 148–9 protectionist initiatives, 130, 199–200 government resistance to, 142 protests. See social unrest and protests 314 INDEX

Puerto Cabello project, 60–1 Chinese exports, impact on, 131 Puerto Morelos port project, 91, 203 Colombia, 91, 204 Punta Perla, Dominican Republic, computers and electronics, 99–101 53, 54 controversies and challenges, 91–2, 102, 144, 151, 203 Qilu Construction, 51, 158 growth of, 87, 101, 204 Qing (Manchu) Dynasty, 79, 186 heavy equipment, 97–8 Quijos hydroelectric project, 62, 116 light manufacturers and white goods, 89–92 railroad construction projects, 6, light truck manufacturing, 96 60, 63–74, 99, 134, 161, 164, metals transformations, 98–9 174, 276n114 Mexico, 91–2, 144, 151, 203, 204, railroad heavy equipment 277n5 manufacturing, 98 motorcycles, 92–3, 96 Ralph, Richard, 268n83 overview, 87–9, 101–2 Recope, 73, 143 petrochemicals, 98–9 Red Dragon group, 187, 188, 190, political dynamics of, 101–2 191 telecommunications equipment Reef Village resort, BAHAMAS, 53 manufacturing, 100–1, 106, Reimperex SRL, 96 145, 252n7 renewable energy. See electricity retail banking, 122–3 generation projects Reyes, Junior, 42 RENIEC national document registry, rice, for export, 42 190 rice production, 38 Repsol YPF, 8, 29, 32–4, 142, Rio Blanco mining project, 20, 21, 225n131, 227n159 150–1, 168, 267n82, 268n83 Republic Bank, 55 Rio Mulato commune, 169 resistance, to Chinese companies Rio Negro soy project, 15–16, 22, Chinese laborers, using, 78, 148–9 39–40, 148, 151, 200 from commercial competitors, Risen Group, 117 144–6 road and highway construction from environmental and local projects, 38, 56, 64–5, 72, communities, 149–52, 165–6 83–4, 203, 234n59 as land owners, 147–8 Roett, Riordan, 12 rom Latin American governments, Roggio, 68, 99 141–4 Royal Dutch Shell, 34 resort construction, 35, 53–6, 71, RusAl, 26 78, 80, 148, 151, 156, 158, 162, Russia, as funding source, 143 269n4 Russian firms, 26, 62, 143, 222n88 retail and manufacturing Ruta del Sol highway project, 65 automobile retail and manufacturing, 93–6, 144, SABIC, 35, 141 246n2, 248n28, 248n41, 249n43 Salinas Group, 114 Bolivia, 91, 96 San Jose (Costa Rica) Chinatown Brazil, 87, 204–5 project, 50–1 bus manufacturing, 98 San Juan mine, 22 INDEX 315

Sanborn, Cynthia, 270n24 Simon, Richard, 188 SanHe Hopeful, 22, 45, 68, 174, Singapore, sovereign wealth 203–4 fund of, 122 Santos, Juan Manuel, 21, 39, 65–6, Sinochem, 26, 27, 31, 33, 66, 169 100 Sinohydro Sany, 61, 96–7 agriculture irrigation projects, 37 Sapet, 30 construction projects, 56, 58, Saudia Arabian companies, 35, 141 60, 61–5, 68, 73, 76, 77, 204, SCAC, 117 242n199 school construction projects, 51–2, environmental and local 80, 81 resistance to, 151 SEBIN, 191 funding problems, 153 Second Harbour Engineering governmental resistance to, Company, 60–1 143, 144 security and insecurity hydroelectric generation projects, as challenge for Chinese 60, 115 companies, 133–4, 167–70 labor relations and disputes, 161 for Chinese communities, 168–9, physical security challenges for, 170 177, 182–5 Sinolumber, 44, 230n208 Chinese security firms, 177 Sinomach, 97, 116 kidnapping, risks of, 133–4, 168– Sinopec, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31–5, 63, 70, 199 69, 141 terrorism, threat of, 27, 184, 208 Sinosteel Equipment & Engineering See also crime and violence; social Co. Ltd., 98 unrest and protests Sinosure, 73, 153 service sectors. See commercial Sinovel Wind Group, 117 service offerings Skeldon sugar factory, 81–2, 175 Shaanxi Xinyida, 99 social unrest and protests ShanDong GuangXing Group, 93 agriculture projects, 15–16, 151 Shandong Kerui Petroleum Bolivia, 63 Equipment Co., 26, 27, 29, 31 as challenge, 132–3 Shangdong Gold, 22, 150 Chinese communities, actions Shanghai Alcatel Bell, 103, 109, 112 against, 182, 183–4, 185, Shanghai Construction Company, 189, 277n9 51, 81 Chinese management, challenges Shanghai Construction Group, 54–5, for, 166–7 147, 157, 269n3 on Chinese shopkeepers, 182 Shengli Oilfield Highland Petroleum conflicts, increase in as challenge, Equipment Co., 29, 30 136–7 Shenzhen Vicstar Machinery, 65 Ecuador, 156, 168, 199 Shineray, 92–3, 95 Guyana, 25, 44, 115, 166–7, Shougang, 20, 157, 159, 160–1, 165, 230n212 166, 171, 218n8, 270n24, 271n24 mining projects and, 20, 25, 44, Sierra Grande mine, 22, 164, 165 115, 165, 166, 168 Sigdo Koppers, 117 Morococha community relocation silver mining, 17, 150 project, 21, 257–8, 269n7 316 INDEX social unrest and protests—Continued Sul Americana de Metais, S.A. Peru, 20, 150–1, 165, 166, 168, (SAM), 23 267n82, 268n83 Sun Hongbo, 12 retail and manufacturing in Sun Kung Enterprise, 41 Mexico, 91–2, 144, 151, 203, Sunweng, 53 277n5 Suriname Venezuela, 182–5, 189, 277n9 agriculture projects, 36, 43–4, “soft power,” Chinese, 129, 135, 137, 230nn207–8 138, 155, 177 Bouterse presidency, 25, 83–4, Sogamoso hydroelectric project, 65 245n253 solar power generation projects, Chinese communities, 182, 184, 116–18, 204 185–7 Sonangol, 225n128 Chinese illegal immigrants, Sopladora hydroelectric project, 62, resentment of, 189 116, 118 construction projects, 52, 83–4, Soria, Carlos, 40, 266n61 245n2 “Southern Highway” project, 83 human trafficking via, 192 soy production hydroelectric projects, 84, 116, growth of, 15–16, 203 245n253 processing facilities and exports, 41, international diplomatic 42, 67 relations, 83 Rio Negro soy project, 15–16, 22, labor relations and disputes, 149 39–40, 148, 151, 200 military coup in, 245n253 Spanish firms, 34, 54, 115, 116–17 mining projects, 25 sports stadium construction, 49–52, natural gas exploration, 26, 35, 72, 158, 167, 231–2n2 227n159 St. Thomas, construction Netherlands, relations with, 33, projects in, 51–2 83–4, 245n253 Standard Bank, 68, 123–4, 141 organized crime, 186, 187 Starwood Hotels, 214n16 petroleum and petrochemical State Grid, 115, 116, 118, 149 projects, 26, 35, 227n159 “State House” construction port and logistics projects, 84, project, 81 245n258 Statoil, 8, 33 retail and manufacturing, 282n15 Ston Dansi hydropower project, telecommunications, 111 84, 116 timber and forestry projects, 36, Strauss, Julia, 12 43–4 Studiebureau voor Bouwkunde en Syngenta, 41 Expertises (SBE) de Bélgica, 74 Sythe Global, 82–3, 147, 245n247 subcontractors. See labor relations and disputes Táchira, Venezuela, 182, 189, 277n9 Subo, 19, 169 Taiwan, recognition of, 49–51, 199, subway construction projects, 63, 66, 201, 231n372 68, 70, 71 Talara oilfield, 30, 165 sugar production, 36, 41, 43, 64–5, Tapachula, Mexico, 189, 190 81–2, 175 Tarapoa oilfield, 168, 199 INDEX 317 tax regulations terrorism, threat of, 27, 184, 208 Chinese imports, 95, 96 thermoelectric generation, 99, on petroleum production, 144, 198 114–15 tax breaks and avoidance, 6, 80–1, Thomas, Tillman, 188 100–1, 158, 214n9 Thomas A. Robinson National Sports tax regulations, 95, 144, 158, 198, 204 Stadium, 51, 158 TCL Corporation, 99, 158, 251n87 Thomson, 99 technology manufacturing, 99–101 Thon Yung fund, 54 Telcel, 114 Tibet, independance of, 198 telecommunications Tierra del Fuego, Argentina, 99, 100, Argentina, 100, 104, 105, 106–7 158, 174 Bolivia, 105, 108–9 Tierra del Fuego Energía y Química, Brazil, 100, 105, 106, 253n14 99, 141 Caribbean, 110–12 Tiesijiu (China Tiesjiu Civil cell phone manufacturing, 100–1, Engineering Group), 62–3, 149 105, 109–10 Tigo, 108, 110 Central America, 105, 112–13 TIM, 104, 106 Chile, 104, 105, 107, 252n7, timber and forestry projects 253n21 Guyana, 25, 36, 44, 149, 171, Colombia, 104, 105, 110 212n230, 275n96 commercial competitors, Honduras, 42–3 resistance from, 145 Peru, 36, 38, 64, 203 Costa Rica, 113, 145, 257n76 Suriname, 36, 43–4 Cuba, 105, 112 tin ore production, 19, 63 Ecuador, 104, 105, 109 Toachi-Pilaton hydroelectric project, Guyana, 111–12 62, 116, 161 intelligence gathering, risks to, 177, Tongling, 16, 18–19, 149, 202–3 208, 276n123 Toromocho mining project, 20–1, Jamaica, 111, 112 157–8, 159, 165, 203 market growth, impact of, 103–5, Total, 34 204–5 “Total Territorial Coverage” (TCT) Mexico, 100–1, 105, 113–14 plan, 108–9 Peru, 104, 105, 110 Tower Hill Infant School, 51–2 Suriname, 111 train manufacturing, 98 Uruguay, 105, 107, 254n27 transportation infrastructure Venezuela, 100, 104, 105, 108, 112 construction telecommunications equipment Argentina, 67–9, 99, 174, 250n76, manufacturing, 100–1, 106, 276n114 145, 252n7 Bahamas, 78–9 Telefónica, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, Boliva, 64 112, 113, 255n53 Bolivia, 64 Telmex, 104 Brazil, 70, 152 Terminales Internacionales de Colombia, 38, 64, 65–6, 203 Ecuador, S.A. (TIDE), 174 Costa Rica, 72–3 Termoesmereldas II thermoelectric Dominica, 81 hydroelectric project, 62, 116 Guyana, 82–3 318 INDEX transportation infrastructure UMTS telecommunications construction—Continued infrastructures, 104, 114 highway and road construction UN Office against Drugs and projects, 38, 56, 64–5, 72, Crimes, 189 83–4, 203, 234n59 UNASUR, 206 Honduras, 76–7 Unicomer, 93 Jamaica, 56, 79, 152, 202, 234n59 United Metallurgical Workers Mexico, 71–2 (UMRA), 163 Nicaragua, 73–5, 74 United People’s Party (UPP), 175 Peru, 66 United States railroad construction projects, 6, China, diplomatic relations with, 60, 63–74, 99, 134, 161, 164, 135–6, 206–7, 259n117 174, 276n114 China-Latin America: relationship, subway construction projects, 63, impact on, 206–10, 282n15, 66, 68, 70, 71 283n22, 283n32 Suriname, 83–4 Cuba, diplomatic relations with, 34 Uruguay, 71, 202 illegal immigration routes to, 188, Venezuela, 60 190–3 See also canal projects; port and Latin America, presence in, 134–5 logistics projects Mexico, trade relations with, 90 transportation infrastructure projects Panama Canal, control to, 119 Jamaica, 79, 156 resistance to Chinese projects, Trina Solar, 117 140–1 Trinidad and Tobago Russia, diplomatic relations with, Chinese communities, 187 34, 78, 135 Chinese illegal immigrants, security challenges for, 177, 208, resentment of, 189 276n123 construction projects, 51, 52, security in, impact on, 207, 79–80, 141 282n15, 283n22 extraregional resistance to project University of the West Indies, 52, 80 work, 141 UNOCAL, 140 human trafficking via, 192 urbanization, in China, 17, 198 labor relations and disputes, 149, 162 urea production, 99, 141 natural gas exploration, 34–5 Uruguay petroleum and petrochemical agriculture projects, 36, 42, 45, 204 projects, 26, 34–5 automobile retail and security challenges, 168 manufacturing, 94–5 telecommunications, 111 Chinese land ownership, resistance Trinidad and Tobago Contractors to, 42, 148 Association (TTCA), 145 construction projects, 70–1, 202 Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of foodstuff exports, 42 Energy and Energy Affairs labor relations and disputes, 94, 163 (MEEA), 35 port and logistics projects, 71, 202 Trotman, Desmond, 147 telecommunications, 105, 107, TSTT, 111 254n27 TTGM International (USA) Inc., 63 UST Global, 100–1 INDEX 319

Vaca hydroelectric project, 77, 116, social unrest and protests, 182–5, 165–6 189, 277n9 Valencia, Venezuela, 183, 185 telecommunications, 100, 104, 105, Valero refinery, 140 108, 112 VC Bird International Airport, 80 thermoelectric generation, 114–15 vehicles. See automobile retail and Vicstar, 19, 63, 65 manufacturing Vietnamese companies, 110 VelaTel (ChinaTel), 110 Viettel, 110 Venetiaan, Ronald, 83 Villavicencio, Fernando, 145 Venezuela violence. See crime and violence; agriculture projects, 37 social unrest and protests automobile retail and Viva, 109 manufacturing, 95 Chavez presidency, 27, 100, 183, Wadadli Power Plant, 175 223n97 Wang Jing, 74, 113 China, relations with, 58 Wang Peng, 12 Chinese banking services, 122–3 water use and management, 65, 66–7, Chinese communities, resentment 165 of, 182–4, 187, 189, 277n9 weapons manufacturing, threat of, Chinese illegal immigrants, 276n123 resentment of, 188–9, 189, 191 Wen Jiabao, 59, 68, 71, 107, 174 Chinese investment growth in, 8 West LB AG, 124 construction projects, 15, 47, 58, Wijdenbosch, Jules, 83 59–61, 218n8 WiMax telecommunications crime and violence in, 184, network, 111 185, 187 wind power generation projects, 63, government actions, 172, 198 111, 116–17, 204, 258n104 human trafficking via, 189, 191–2 wine production, 41 hydroelectric projects, 60, 116 WISCO (Wuhan Iron and Steel investors in, treatment of, 57, Company), 15, 42, 75, 152 171–2 Wong, Jason, 180 irrigation projects, 37 Wood Association Industries labor relations and disputes, 157, Company Limited (WAICO), 44 159, 161, 163, 234n60 Woodrow Wilson Institute, 12, metals transformations 216n38 manufacturing, 98, 99 workplace practices. See labor mineral resources in, 17–18 relations and disputes mining projects, 17–18, 45, 98 World Bank, 12, 57, 113, 145 oil reserves, 26, 27, 218n9 World Trade Organization (WTO), petroleum and petrochemical 5, 213n3 projects, 16, 27–8, 45, 61, 98, Wu Jian, 130 172, 203, 218nn8–11 Wuhan Iron and Steel Company port and logistics projects, 60–1 (WISCO), 15, 42, 75, 152 railway construction projects, 98, 161, 164 XCMG (Xuzhou Construction security challenges, 167–70 Machinery Group), 96–7 320 INDEX

XEMX Windpower Co., 117 ZTE Xi Jinping, 3, 5, 51, 54, 71, 72, Argentina, 100, 106 73, 80, 83, 143 Bolivia, 108–9 Xiangtan, 116 Brazil, 100, 106 Xinwei Telecom Enterprise Group, Caribbean, 111 112–13 cell phone manufacturing, Xstrata, 21 100–1, 105 Xugong Brazil Investment, 97 Central America, 112–13 Xuzhou Construction Machinery Chile, 104, 105, 107, 252n7 Group (XCMG), 96–7 Colombia, 110 Ecuador, 109 Yacimientos Petrolíferos expansion into Latin America by, Fiscales Bolivianos 103–5 (YPFB), 63 Guyana, 111 Yang Jeichi, 215n24 Haiti, 104 Yang Zhimin, 12 Honduras, 112 Yasuni National Park, 30, 151 Huawei, competing with, 109 Yinren, 23 intelligence gathering by, YPFB, 30, 63 risk of, 208 Yuan Nansheng, 184 labor relations and disputes, 164 Latin American market Zamora-Chinchipe, Ecuador, 16, share of, 104–5 18–19, 62, 149–50, 203 Mexico, 113–14 Zhang Bouln, 172 Nicaragua, 112–13 Zhejiang Fudi, 40 Panama, 104 Zhizhong Wang, 41 Paraguay, 104 Zhong Ning Mexico and Mining Peru, 110 Investment, 24 tax breaks, 100–1 Zhong Tie 9th Ju, 63 telecommunication manufacturing Zhongjin Lingnan Nonfemet Co. facilities, 100 Ltd., 25 in Uruguay, 107, 254n27 Zijin Mining Group, 21, 150, 166 Venezuela, 100, 108 zinc production, 17 Western operational style vs., Zoomlion, 96–7 104–5, 130