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Introduction NOTES Introduction 1. Quoted in Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. With a new preface by the author (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006), 204; italics in the original. 2. I put War on Terror within quotation marks because like many analysts, I think terrorism is a tactic and that we cannot wage wars against tactics. We are at war with al-Qaeda and its supporters, but not with terrorism in general. 3. For details of Kiriakou’s account, see ABC News, “Coming in From the Cold: CIA Spy Calls Waterboarding Necessary but Torture. Former Agent Says the Enhanced Technique Was Used on Al Qaeda Chief Abu Zubaydah,” available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ story?id=3978231&page=1. See also Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 162–179. Mayer challenges the accuracy of Kiriakou’s account suggesting that initially Abu Zubaydah success- fully resisted waterboarding. He may have been waterboarded repeatedly. 4. Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 2. 5. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), chapter 4; Charles Krauthammer, “Truth about Torture,” Weekly Standard, 11.12 (December 5, 2005), available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/ Articles/000/000/006/400rhqav.asp; Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Reflections on the Problem of ‘Dirty Hands.’ ” In Torture: A Collection, ed. Sanford Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 77–89; Michael Walzer famously presented the dirty hands approach to torture in the 1970s, see “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” in Torture: A collection, ed. Sanford Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 61–77. 6. For two works that do focus on religious issues, see William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), and George Hunsinger, ed., Torture Is a Moral Issue: Christians, Jews, Muslims, and People of Conscience Speak Out (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2008). 7. Sanford Levinson, “Contemplating Torture: An Introduction,” in Torture: A collection, ed. Sanford Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 33. I have learned a great deal from David Luban’s excellent analysis of ticking time bomb cases: see David Luban, “Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb,” in The Torture Debate in America, ed. Karen J. Greenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 35–84. Henry Shue also demonstrates the flaws in ticking time bomb scenarios: see “Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 37.2/3 (2006), 231–239. Finally, see Bob Brecher’s recent book, Torture and the Ticking Bomb (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007). 8. For an excellent analysis of torture’s institutional context, see Herbert C. Kelman, “The Social Context of Torture: Policy Process and Authority Structure,” in The Politics of 142 Notes Pain: Torturers and Their Masters, ed. Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), chapter 3. This volume contains other illuminating essays. I first learned of it by reading Brecher’s book. 9. For these kinds of arguments, see Luban, “Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb,” 37–44, and Seumus Miller, “Is Torture Ever Morally Justified?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19.2 (2005), 179–192. 10. John Paul II, “Salvifici Doloris,” section 5, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_11021984_salvifici-doloris_en.html. 11. For Elaine Scarry’s remarkable book about torture, see Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). See also David Sussman, “Defining Torture,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 37.2/3 (2006), 225–230. 12. John Paul II, “Salvifici Doloris,” section 2. 13. For an essay explaining Thomistic personalism, see Karol Wojtyla, “Thomistic Personalism,” Person and Community: Selected Essays. Translated by Theresa Sandork, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), chapter 10. For a famous introduction to personalism, see Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism. Translated by Philip Mairet (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970). The first chapter of this work is particularly insightful. For a general survey of different kinds of personalism and an accompanying bibliography, see Kevin Schmiesing, “A History of Personalism,” available at the Acton Institute Web site at http:// www.acton.org/research/pubs/papers/history_personalism.html. 14. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 68, 6; italics in the original. Translated with an introduction and notes by James F. Anderson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001). In this book, I use the following standard abbreviations for Aquinas’s work: ST for the Summa Theologica and SCG for the Summa Contra Gentiles. My reading of Aquinas pre- supposes a metaphysical background that I do not consider in detail. I have been influenced by the following works on twentieth-century Thomism: Joseph de Finance, S.J. Être et agir dans la philosophie de S. Thomas (Rome: Universitá Gregoriana, 1960); Cornelio Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tomasso d’Aquino (Torino: Società editrice internazionale, 1950); Fernand Van Steenberghen. Ontology. Translated by the Reverend Martin J. Flynn (New York: J.F. Wagner, 1952); Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952); Gregory Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2004); Rudi te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden, The Netherlands, E.J. Brill, 1995); John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 2000). 15. Josef Pieper, Living the Truth: The Truth of All Things and Reality and the Good (San Francisco, CA: St. Ignatius Press, 1989), 89. 16. See Joseph de Finance, S.J., Essai sur l’agir humain (Rome: Presses de l’Université grégori- enne, 1962), chapter deuxieme. 17. W. Norris Clarke, S.J., Person and Being (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1993), 94. 18. Clarke, Person and Being, 193. 19. Kenneth L. Schmitz, “The First Principle of Personal Becoming,” The Texture of Being: Essays in First Philosophy (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 2007), 194. 20. Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Henry Holt, 2007); Michael Otterman, American Torture: From the Cold War to Abu Ghraib and Beyond (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007). 21. For a good discussion of how Nazi examples cloud our understanding of torture, see Rejali, Torture and Democracy, chapter 24. Philippe Sands also discusses Nazi examples, consid- ering particularly what they mean for the moral responsibility of lawyers, see Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), chapters 24–25. Notes 143 22. John Paul II, “Salvifici Doloris,” section 5. 23. Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limit: Contemplations by a Survivor of Auschwitz and Its Realities. Translated by Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 39. One “The Soul Is Somehow All that Exists”: Spirituality and Human Dignity 1. Pieper, Living the Truth, 83. 2. Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility. Translated by H.T. Willetts (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1960), 21. 3. Ibid.; italic in the original. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., 22. For excellent analyses of how we experience persons, see John F. Crosby, Personalist Papers (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 2004); Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism. Translated by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973); and Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy (Washington DC: ICS, 1989). 6. Plato, Timaeus; italic in the original. Translated with an Introduction by Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000), 35a. In this section, I draw heavily on two articles: W. Norris Clarke, S.J., “Living on the Edge: The Human Person as ‘Frontier Being’ and Microcosm,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 36.2, issue no. 142 (June 1996), 183–199, and Gerard Verbeke, “Man as a ‘Frontier’ According to Aquinas,” in Aquinas and the Problems of His Time, ed. Gerard Verbeke and D. Verhults (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1976), 195–233. 7. Plotinus, The Enneads. Translated by Stephen McKenna. Abridged with an introduction and notes by John Dillon (London: Penguin Books, 1991), IV, 4, 3. 8. Nemesius of Emesa, “On the Nature of Man,” in Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa. Translated by William Telfer (London: SCM Press, 1955), 229. 9. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man. Translated by Robert Caponigni (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery, 1956), 7. 10. Plotinus, The Enneads, IV, 8, 4. 11. For a discussion of Plotinus, see Clarke, “Living on the Edge,” 185. 12. Clarke, Person and Being, 37. 13. For a discussion of the amphibian status, see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas: Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2003), chapter 6. 14. SCG, II, 68, 6; italics in the original. 15. ST, I, 77, 2, respondio. 16. I owe this point to conversations with W. Norris Clarke, S.J. 17. Verbeke, “Man as a ‘Frontier,’ ” 196. 18. Ibid., 207. 19. SCG, II, 68, 6. 20. Verbeke, “Man as a ‘Frontier,’ ” 198. 21. For a wonderful analysis of this dual citizenship, see Joseph de Finance, S.J., Citoyen de Deux Mondes: La place de l’homme dans la création (Rome: Universitá Gregorian Editrice, 1980). 22. Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 55.
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