Demobilization and Reintegration of Military
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THE WORLD BANK /L e C g O i DiscussionPaper AFRICAREGIONAL SERIES Report No. IDP-130 Demobilizationand Reintegration of Military Personnelin Africa: The Evidencefrom Seven Country CaseStudies October1993 MICROGRAPHICS Report No: IDP- 130 Type: IDP DlscussionPapers are not formal publicationsof the World Bank.They present prelihnary and unpolishedresults of country analysisorresearchthatiscirculatedtoencouragediscussionandcomment;citationand theuseof sucha papershouldtakeaccount of its provisional character.This research was conducted for the Afrca Region Working Group on Demobilizationand Reintegrationof MilitaryPersonnel (composed of members from each countzydepartment in the region,the AfricaDivision of the LegalDepartment, the Afica TechnicalDepartment, the AfricaRegional Office of the ChiefEconomist, the PublicEconomics Division of the Policy ResearchDeartmet, and the Eonomic Deveopment Institute). The findings, intetations, and concls expressedin this paper areentirely thwse of the authousand shouidnot be atributed in any maner to the WorldBank to its affiatd orgaizations, or to membersof its Boardof ExecutiveDiectors or the countriesthey represent. PREFACE The principalautliors of this reportare SamahKeener (task manager), Suzanne Heigh (consultant), Luiz Pereirada Silva (task manager)and NicoleBall (consultant).It is based on sevencountly case studiesprepared by Elsie Garfield(editing of all case studies),Nat J. Colletta(Uganda), and consultantsAlain Rouvez (Angola,Chad, Mozambique,Namibia, Zimbabwe), Nicole Ball (Uganda,Nicaragua), and SuzanneHeigh (revisionand fict- checkingof all case studies). RumanaHuque also providedwriting and researchsupport. Ross Pfile provided editorialsupport and Sarah Ismaeland MyrinaHarris processed the document. Substantialpeer reviewingwas providedby Elsie Garfield, Bension Varon, ElizabethMornis-Hughes, Philippe Benoit, George Alibaruho, SalvatoreSchiavo-Camnpo, and Robert Anmstrong. The report was financedby the Afica Region Country Departnents,the AfricaRegional Office of the ChiefEconomist, the PolicyResearch Departnent, and the Global Coalitionfor Africa. Thisstudy was initially conceived of as informalresearch for a networkof Bankstaff in the AfricaRegion working on countrieswhich were faced with demobilization. However, as interestin infonnationon this subjectincreassed, it becameclear that it wouldbe usefulto sharethis infonnalfiLct-gathering exercise with a wideraudience. While this reportexplores a broadspectrum of issuesrelevant to the transitionfrom war to peace, it shouldnot be interpreted as representinga statementof Bank policyin this area Bank involvementwith client countriesis restrictedto financingtechnical assistance and productive invesmnts leadingtowards economic growth. vice Presdent AfricaRegion Abstract Thecombination of economicdeterioration during the 1980sand the end of the ColdWar rivalryhas createda climatein whichmany African governments - thoseemerging from civil strife as wellas thoseat peace - arestarting to exploreways to shifthuman and material rest.urces to non-military sectorsof the economyfor politicaland/or fiscal reasons. Witha viewtowards filling an information gapon thepractical issues arising in theimplementation of programs to assistwith sdich a transition,this studysummarizes the experience of sevencountries (Angola, Chad, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Uganda,and Zimbabwe) in theircurrent and past efforts to demobilizemilitary personnel and to facilitate their reintegrationinto the civilianeconomy and society. The studyexamines the projects,costs, managementissues, and contextof each stage of the initialtransfer to civilianlife (encampment, disarmament,demobilization, transportation) and providesinformation on the programsoffered to facilitatelonger-term reintegration (cash payments, NGO and community-based programs, training and employmentcreation). Severalcommon observations surface from this comparativs view. A politicallycharged contextintroduced tension in severalcases betweenachieving political objectives (balancing the political/ethnicrepresentation of the armedforces or civilservice, or providingjobs to preventa return to fighting)and achieving a netfiscal peace dividend. Deadlines set as partof peaceagreements or for electionsoften introduced an addedtime pressure to theseprograms which are substantiallylarger and more complex,logistically and institutionally,than similar civil service retrenchmentprograms. Moreover,the programsrequired coordination among a diversegroup of players- donors,military leaders,NMOs, community groups - whomay not havedeveloped systems for suchcoordination. In termsof reintegrationprograms, cash compensation constituted the bulkof theprogram costs, although programmanagers stressed the importanceof basictraining as a componentof anyreintegration project. Somepreliminary lessons emerge from the experiencein theseseven countries. First, in practice,demobilization and reintegration represent different phases of an interdependentcontinuum - - withprograms often implemented simultaneously instead of sequentiallygiven the large scale and timing of demobilization.Second, program managers recommended technical assistance, coordination and negotiationat an early stage in order to makesome programsmore efficientgiven the substantial institutionaldemands of these programs(for example,surveys on the profileof often diverseex- combatantsand assistanceto set up the institutionsto managereintegration). Third, programsthat experiencedfewer problems in implementationenjoyed some convergence/consensus between the political andthe economicagenda of all participants.Fourth, although information is scarceon the progressof reintegrationprograms, some smaller-scale NaO projectsappear promising, in part becausethey are morelikely to avoidmisjudging market demand for trainingor employmentthan larger-scale publicly run programs.Program managers' suggestions include providing matching credits for participation in already existingNGO or privatevocational training programs. Fifth, more recent programs have included caps on civilservice employment to avoidthe subsequent inflation of thecivil service with former combatants as occurredin Zimbabwe.Given the earlystage of the majorityof theseprograms, new lessons and insightswill likely emerge as the programsmature. LIST OF ACRONYMS ADRA Actionfor Rural Development CCFA Joint Commissionfor Formationof ArmedForces in Angola CCN Councilof Churchesin Namibia CCFA Joint Commissionfor the Formationof the ArmedForces (Angola) CCPM Joint MPLA/UN1TAPolitical Military Commission (Angola) CENPAP The NationalCenter for Planningand Administrationof Development Poles (Nicaragua) CFC Cease-fireCommission (Mozambique) CFD CafsseFrnpaase de Dvewloppement CIAV Commissionof Supportand Verificationsin Nicaragua CIVPOL PoliceArm of UN ObserverForce in Namibia CMVF Joint Commissionfor the Verificationand Controlof the Cease-fire (Angola) CORE ReintegrationCommission CRS CatholicRelief Services(Angola) CSC Supervisoryand ControlCommission DRP Demobilizationand ReintegrationPrograms DVC DistrictVeterans Committee (Uganda) DVO DistrictVeterans Offices (Uganda) EEC EuropeanEconomic Community EPS Nicaragua'sSandinista Popular Army (Nicaragua) FALA UNITAForces GuerrillaArmy in Angola FAM MozambicanArmed Forces (Government) FAO Food & AgriculturalOrganization FAPLA Armyof MPLAGovernment in Angola GDP GrossDomestic Product GNP Gross NationalProduct G GermanCooperation Agency IBRD InternationalBank for Reconstructionand Development ICCO Inter-ChurchCooperation Organization (Angola) ID IdentificationCards ILO InternationalLabor Organization (Angola) IMF InternationalMonetary Fund MPLA PopularMovement for the Independenceof Angola(po1itical party) NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganization N1TRAM CompanyFormed by Ex-combatantsin Zimbabwe NR NicaraguanResistance Fighters (Nicaragua) NRA NationalResistance Army (Uganda) OAS Organizationof AmericanStates ODA OfficialDevelopment Assistance OECD Organizationof EconomicCooperation and Development ONUCA UnitedNations Observer Group in CentralAmerica (Nicaragua) PAHO Pan AmericanHealth Organization PLAN People's LiberationArmy of Namibia PNP PanamanianNational Police (nowPDF) RENAMO NationalResistance Movement of Mozambique RRR Repatriation,Resettlement, and ReconstructionCommittee SADF SouthAfrican Defense Forces (Namibia) SEED RsintegrationProj6ct in Zimbabwe SIDA SwedishInternational Development Authority SPA SpecialProgram of Assistance SPR Secrtariat Pennanenta la Rdinserdondes Dlatids (Ohad) SWAPO SouthWest AfricanPeople's Organizaton(Angola) SWAPOL Former Souti African-sponsoredPolice Force in Namibia SWATF SouthWest AfricanTerritoral Forces (Namibia) TU TechnicalUnit UNAVEM UnitedNations Angola Verification Mission UNDP UnitedNations Development Program UNHCR UnitedNations High Commissionof Refugees(Angola) UNICEF UnitedNations International Children's Education Fund UNITA NationalUnion for the Total Independenceof Angola UNO Naonal OppositionUnion (Nicaragua) UNTAG Unted NationsTransitory Assistance GrOup USAID UnitedStates Agency of Intational Development UVAB UgandaVeterans Assistance Board VAP Vets' AssistanceProgram (Uganda) WFP World Food Program WHO World HealthOrganization WRF World RehabilitationFund ZANLA ZimbabweAfrican National Liberation Army, ZANUParty's MilitaryWing ZANU ZimbabweAfrican National Union ZIPRA ZimbabwePeople's RevolutionaryArmy ZAPU ZimbabweAfrican People's Union TABLEOF CONTENTS Page ExectitveSunmuTl ................................. v Cbaptw1: