THE /L e C g O i

DiscussionPaper

AFRICAREGIONAL SERIES

Report No. IDP-130

Demobilizationand Reintegration of Military Personnelin :

The Evidencefrom Seven Country CaseStudies

October1993 MICROGRAPHICS

Report No: IDP- 130 Type: IDP

DlscussionPapers are not formal publicationsof the World Bank.They present prelihnary and unpolishedresults of country analysisorresearchthatiscirculatedtoencouragediscussionandcomment;citationand theuseof sucha papershouldtakeaccount of its provisional character.This research was conducted for the Afrca Region Working Group on Demobilizationand Reintegrationof MilitaryPersonnel (composed of members from each countzydepartment in the region,the AfricaDivision of the LegalDepartment, the Afica TechnicalDepartment, the AfricaRegional Office of the ChiefEconomist, the PublicEconomics of the Policy ResearchDeartmet, and the Eonomic Deveopment Institute). The findings, intetations, and concls expressedin this paper areentirely thwse of the authousand shouidnot be atributed in any maner to the WorldBank to its affiatd orgaizations, or to membersof its Boardof ExecutiveDiectors or the countriesthey represent. PREFACE

The principalautliors of this reportare SamahKeener (task manager), Suzanne Heigh (consultant), Luiz Pereirada Silva (task manager)and NicoleBall (consultant).It is based on sevencountly case studiesprepared by Elsie Garfield(editing of all case studies),Nat J. Colletta(Uganda), and consultantsAlain Rouvez (Angola,Chad, Mozambique,, Zimbabwe), Nicole Ball (Uganda,Nicaragua), and SuzanneHeigh (revisionand fict- checkingof all case studies). RumanaHuque also providedwriting and researchsupport. Ross Pfile provided editorialsupport and Sarah Ismaeland MyrinaHarris processed the document. Substantialpeer reviewingwas providedby Elsie Garfield, Bension Varon, ElizabethMornis-Hughes, Philippe Benoit, George Alibaruho, SalvatoreSchiavo-Camnpo, and Robert Anmstrong. The report was financedby the Afica Region Country Departnents,the AfricaRegional Office of the ChiefEconomist, the PolicyResearch Departnent, and the Global Coalitionfor Africa.

Thisstudy was initially conceived of as informalresearch for a networkof Bankstaff in the AfricaRegion working on countrieswhich were faced with demobilization. However, as interestin infonnationon this subjectincreassed, it becameclear that it wouldbe usefulto sharethis infonnalfiLct-gathering exercise with a wideraudience. While this reportexplores a broadspectrum of issuesrelevant to the transitionfrom war to peace, it shouldnot be interpreted as representinga statementof Bank policyin this area Bank involvementwith client countriesis restrictedto financingtechnical assistance and productive invesmnts leadingtowards economic growth.

vice Presdent AfricaRegion Abstract

Thecombination of economicdeterioration during the 1980sand the end of the ColdWar rivalryhas createda climatein whichmany African governments - thoseemerging from civil strife as wellas thoseat peace - arestarting to exploreways to shifthuman and material rest.urces to non-military sectorsof the economyfor politicaland/or fiscal reasons. Witha viewtowards filling an information gapon thepractical issues arising in theimplementation of programs to assistwith sdich a transition,this studysummarizes the experience of sevencountries (Angola, Chad, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Uganda,and Zimbabwe) in theircurrent and past efforts to demobilizemilitary personnel and to facilitate their reintegrationinto the civilianeconomy and society. The studyexamines the projects,costs, managementissues, and contextof each stage of the initialtransfer to civilianlife (encampment, disarmament,demobilization, transportation) and providesinformation on the programsoffered to facilitatelonger-term reintegration (cash payments, NGO and community-based programs, training and employmentcreation).

Severalcommon observations surface from this comparativs view. A politicallycharged contextintroduced tension in severalcases betweenachieving political objectives (balancing the political/ethnicrepresentation of the armedforces or civilservice, or providingjobs to preventa return to fighting)and achieving a netfiscal peace dividend. Deadlines set as partof peaceagreements or for electionsoften introduced an addedtime pressure to theseprograms which are substantiallylarger and more complex,logistically and institutionally,than similar civil service retrenchmentprograms. Moreover,the programsrequired coordination among a diversegroup of players- donors,military leaders,NMOs, community groups - whomay not havedeveloped systems for suchcoordination. In termsof reintegrationprograms, cash compensation constituted the bulkof theprogram costs, although programmanagers stressed the importanceof basictraining as a componentof anyreintegration project. Somepreliminary lessons emerge from the experiencein theseseven countries. First, in practice,demobilization and reintegration represent different phases of an interdependentcontinuum - - withprograms often implemented simultaneously instead of sequentiallygiven the large scale and timing of demobilization.Second, program managers recommended technical assistance, coordination and negotiationat an early stage in order to makesome programsmore efficientgiven the substantial institutionaldemands of these programs(for example,surveys on the profileof often diverseex- combatantsand assistanceto set up the institutionsto managereintegration). Third, programsthat experiencedfewer problems in implementationenjoyed some convergence/consensus between the political andthe economicagenda of all participants.Fourth, although information is scarceon the progressof reintegrationprograms, some smaller-scale NaO projectsappear promising, in part becausethey are morelikely to avoidmisjudging market demand for trainingor employmentthan larger-scale publicly run programs.Program managers' suggestions include providing matching credits for participation in already existingNGO or privatevocational training programs. Fifth, more recent programs have included caps on civilservice employment to avoidthe subsequent inflation of thecivil service with former combatants as occurredin Zimbabwe.Given the earlystage of the majorityof theseprograms, new lessons and insightswill likely emerge as the programsmature. LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADRA Actionfor Rural Development CCFA Joint Commissionfor Formationof ArmedForces in Angola CCN Councilof Churchesin Namibia CCFA Joint Commissionfor the Formationof the ArmedForces (Angola) CCPM Joint MPLA/UN1TAPolitical Military Commission (Angola) CENPAP The NationalCenter for Planningand Administrationof Development Poles (Nicaragua) CFC Cease-fireCommission (Mozambique) CFD CafsseFrnpaase de Dvewloppement CIAV Commissionof Supportand Verificationsin Nicaragua CIVPOL PoliceArm of UN ObserverForce in Namibia CMVF Joint Commissionfor the Verificationand Controlof the Cease-fire (Angola) CORE ReintegrationCommission CRS CatholicRelief Services(Angola) CSC Supervisoryand ControlCommission DRP Demobilizationand ReintegrationPrograms DVC DistrictVeterans Committee (Uganda) DVO DistrictVeterans Offices (Uganda) EEC EuropeanEconomic Community EPS Nicaragua'sSandinista Popular (Nicaragua) FALA UNITAForces GuerrillaArmy in Angola FAM MozambicanArmed Forces (Government) FAO Food & AgriculturalOrganization FAPLA Armyof MPLAGovernment in Angola GDP GrossDomestic Product GNP Gross NationalProduct G GermanCooperation Agency IBRD InternationalBank for Reconstructionand Development ICCO Inter-ChurchCooperation Organization (Angola) ID IdentificationCards ILO InternationalLabor Organization (Angola) IMF InternationalMonetary Fund MPLA PopularMovement for the Independenceof Angola(po1itical party) NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganization N1TRAM CompanyFormed by Ex-combatantsin Zimbabwe NR NicaraguanResistance Fighters (Nicaragua) NRA NationalResistance Army (Uganda) OAS Organizationof AmericanStates ODA OfficialDevelopment Assistance OECD Organizationof EconomicCooperation and Development ONUCA UnitedNations Observer Group in CentralAmerica (Nicaragua) PAHO Pan AmericanHealth Organization PLAN People's LiberationArmy of Namibia PNP PanamanianNational Police (nowPDF) RENAMO NationalResistance Movement of Mozambique RRR Repatriation,Resettlement, and ReconstructionCommittee SADF SouthAfrican Defense Forces (Namibia) SEED RsintegrationProj6ct in Zimbabwe SIDA SwedishInternational Development Authority SPA SpecialProgram of Assistance SPR Secrtariat Pennanenta la Rdinserdondes Dlatids (Ohad) SWAPO SouthWest AfricanPeople's Organizaton(Angola) SWAPOL Former Souti African-sponsoredPolice Force in Namibia SWATF SouthWest AfricanTerritoral Forces (Namibia) TU TechnicalUnit UNAVEM UnitedNations Angola Verification Mission UNDP UnitedNations Development Program UNHCR UnitedNations High Commissionof Refugees(Angola) UNICEF UnitedNations International Children's Education Fund UNITA NationalUnion for the Total Independenceof Angola UNO Naonal OppositionUnion (Nicaragua) UNTAG Unted NationsTransitory Assistance GrOup USAID UnitedStates Agency of Intational Development UVAB UgandaVeterans Assistance Board VAP Vets' AssistanceProgram (Uganda) WFP World Food Program WHO World HealthOrganization WRF World RehabilitationFund ZANLA ZimbabweAfrican National Liberation Army, ZANUParty's MilitaryWing ZANU ZimbabweAfrican National Union ZIPRA ZimbabwePeople's RevolutionaryArmy ZAPU ZimbabweAfrican People's Union TABLEOF CONTENTS Page

ExectitveSunmuTl ...... v Cbaptw1: IntrducRon ...... 1 Radnfortb Study ...... 2

Methodologyofthe Study ...... 3

IleDemoblizadon andReingradon Procmss ...... 4 OrganizatlonofReport...... 5

Chapt Ir:Objtdves ofDeobizatdolRentegmlonProces ...... 11

PoiticalContext and Program Objectives .1...... 11

IndicatorsofSuccess ...... 19

Chaptew I)ln: ofdDeimobillzadon Progr.an ...... 23

Encampment...... 23 A. Delays...... 25 B.Transportation ...... 26

Registrationand Documentation ...... 27

Disa= ent andWeapons Control .2...... 29

A. Disamamentof DemobilizedCombatas .3...... 30 B. WeaponsReclaiming Programs ...... 31 C. MimesandDe-niing Progmms...... 35 Chapte IV: Institonal Mngmnto DemobigzationlRentegratonProgams .37 Coordinaon...... 37 oniftring ...... 40

InstiutonalStructure of DemobilizadonPrograms...... 45 InstitutionalStructure ofRProgrms...... 48

Tabkof Conten i page Chapter V:.Degp oflRlategatlon Program ...... S1 GenealversusTargetedPtogn=" ...... 5 1 Surveryssand th Profileof Combgatat...... I..* .**.. *. .0 4. . SS5 CashCompenaumon ...... S9 A. LumpSum Payms ...... 59 B. Allowances...... 63 C. Pensions...... 64 D. PaymentAffangements ...... 66 Seting-inAssistance...... 66 TargetedReinegraton Progrms Non-CLsh)...... 68 A. Pre-ReleasePrograms ...... 68 B. FormalEducation ...... 69 C. VocadtionlTraiSn andIncome Generation ...... 70 D. Job Placment ...... 74 E.Community-asedand NGO Ptogmnm ...... 75 H^ousingand Land Issues ...... 77 SpecWNWnerableGkup ...... 79 Chapb I5:CostandFundingof DemobiBuon and Rdnegr|ationProgram ...... 83 Costof Demobiliai/Rntaio Programs ...... 83 ProgramFudingSources ...... 89

ChapteVI: Progrm ResultsandLmm nLamed...... 93 issuesofPocess ...... 93

lmstudoni M iueo...... 0...... 95 Defmobiliadon...... 96 Reintgudon...... 97 A.Survey...... 97 B.CashCompenadon Schefmes ...... 97

Tab 0 CWOO Page C. Education,Targeted Tralning and Employment Programs ...... 99 ProgramResults ...... 101 Areasfor FurtherResearch ...... 103 Bibllography Annex:Teoms of Reference

Text Tables I.1 CurrentStts of DemobilhzationlReintegrati on...... 7 1.2 TheArmed Forces - Before,During, and After Demobilization .... 8...... 8 I.3 KeyEconomic Indicators ...... 9 11.1 Modvationsand Objectives of Demobilizatdon/ReintegrationPrograms ...... 17 II. 2 Successof Demobilizaton,Reintegration, and Demiitarization Programs .. 20 111.1Monthly Rat of Demobilization...... 25 IV.1 InstitutionalStructures for Monitoring DRPs ...... 44 IV.2 InstitutionalStructure of DemobilizationPrograms ...... 46 IV.3 InstltutionalStructure of ReintegrationPrograms .0...... S V.1 TheProfle of Combatants...... ,..,.,.,.,...... 56 V.2 CompensationUnder Demobilization/Reintegration Programs ...... 62 V.3 Levelof CashCompensaton ...... 65 V1.1 TheRelative Cost of DemobiizationReegtion Programs...... 84 VI.2 DemobUlizationandReintegrationProgram Costs ...... 85 VI.3 CostBreakdown for DRPsin Nlcaragua,Uganda and Mozambique ...... 88 VI.4 ProgramFunding Sources (approxwmate) ...... 91 V11.1 ReintegrationResults in Zimbabwe...... 101 VYI.2Activities of ChadiansVeterans LessTban One Year After Demobiization ...... 103 Text Boxes 11.1'he Contetfor Demobilzaton...... 11 1.2 The PoliticalDimension of DemobilizationinZimbabwe ...... 13 11.3The Significance of SelectionCriteria ...... 18 MAl Encampmentin Angola ...... 24 m.2 IroningOut Logistcs witha Pilot Program in Uganda...... 27 111.3 Ams Buy back Program InPam ...... 33 111.4 OneDefense Analyst's Suggestions for Conductingan ArmsBuy Back Program ... I .... 34 IV.1 Coordinationin Mozambique ...... 40 IV.2 TheUN as Mediatorin Nauibia ...... 42 JV.3 ProgramManagement Functions of CLAV-OAS...... 45 IV.4 Angola:Implemenation Diffictdes withInterim Govements ...... 47 IV.5 VeteransAssociation in Uganda ...... 48 V.1 TheSocial Adjustment of PLANGuerillas in Namibia ...... 53 V.2 Angola-T1he Polltical Motivations Behind Cash Payments ...... 60

Tabk f Cow*u i Page

V.3 CashAllowances In Zimbabwe ...... 64 V.4 PaymenArragements I Zimbabwe...... 66 V.5 PaymentOptions for Angola ...... 67 V.6 Nicaragua:Reducig thePotdal br theftof -Kind enefits ...... 68 V.7 Zimbabwe:Specialized Scools for Veterans * ...... 69 V.8 VocaionalTainingin Zimbabwe:Me DanhikoProject - Oe Suces ...... 71 V.9 Zimbabwe:Cooperas- vesZmaweProJect...... oject...... 72 V.10 Nicarapa:IhcomeGoeneg Project ...... 73 V.11 Namibia:NGO-sponsored Reintegratlon Programs ...... 76 V.12 Angola:NGO-sponsored Reintegration Programs ...... 77 V.13 Nicaragua:Disabled Vrans Prgrams ...... 80 V.14 NicaraguaReintegradon: A FamnyAffir ...... * * 81 VII.1 Strengthsand Weaknesses of CashAllowahces ...... 98 VII.2 ThePublic Sector as *RelntegratorofLast Resort ...... 101

Figures 1.1 lhe TypicalDemobization and Rentegraton Program ...... 6 V.1 Zimbabwe:ZANLA and ZIPRA Career Ambitions .. 57 V.2 Angola:PAPIA Career Ambitions ...... 58 V.3 Angola:FALA Career Ambitions ...... 58

iv Tabkeof Contn DaobWzWou and Rtotraton of Mtay Petsonnel

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DBkvuwd

1. For manyAfrican countries, It hasbecome painfully clear that the isecity anddiversion of fal resourcescaused by civi warrepresent the prmary roadblock to a retu to economicand social developmentSuch conflict has Imposed a heavyburden on thecontinent, which 18 host to moretefuigees and displacedpersons th anyother region of the world- 20 million,of which80% are womenand chldrlY Uountriesrecedy embroiledin conflictsuch as Angola,Cbad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia,and Sudan,have routinel spentbetween 15 and 40 percentof their nationalbudgets and betweenS and 10 percentof their GN? on the military;at the sametime, all rank in the bottom15 perent of UNDP'shuman developmet Index and spend only between .6% and 6% of their GNPon prio developmentsectors.Y However, the combinationof economicdeterioration and the end of the ColdWar riry has createda climatein whichmany Af'lcan governments -those emerging from civil stife as well as thoseat peaco- are startingto exploreways to shifthuman and maial resourcesto non-militarysectors of the economyfor politicalandlor fiscal reasons. H. It is in this contextthat the WorldBank is increasinglyreceiving requests by member governmentsfor technicaland financial assistance and advicefor programsto reintegratedemobilized combatantsinto the economYyHowever, little published information was availableon experiencewith demobilizationand reintegration programs (DRPs) in the Africancontext. Thas,the primaryobjective of thisstudy Is to beginto fill thisinfmaion voidby describingthe experiencewith DRP's to datein veancountry case studies with a viewtoward developing a teive frameworkfot undetading the manyIues raisedin DRPdesign and Implementation.# While the researchcovers a broadrange of Issuesrelevant to the contextof a DRP, It shouldnot be interpretedas represeing or implyinga statementconcening World Bank policy or Involvementin thisarea. i. Thisstudy constitutes a synthesisof themain issues identified in the sevencountry case sdies whichwere completed through a deskreview. The researchwas basedon writtenmaterial, mostlypress articles,and drew heavilyon interviewswith thoseinvolved in DRPs. Becauseof the sensitivenaure of the securityissues involved in a givencountry's DRP, and the limitedinformaion avaiale, the casestudies are, to someextent, incomplete.

1/ W.I.D. Unit, AfricaTohalcal D _aruWorl Badnk,hrman Sheet:Rfgee andDpaed Wome and ChIldren S-Sahan 4#*fca.

21 UNDP,Hma DeveRlm ort, 1992.

/ There amat leastsewn Afican ounti which haverequested assistance or advicein the past two yeas. i t hM stdy -s coonductdfw th Aica RegionWorking Gwup on Deznobizbatlon/renegmaonof Mltay Personnel,wc was crated in Apl 1992at the rcques of the AfricaRegion Vice PresideL

Becutv SumnEr Pagev Demobilizationand Retegraton of MilitaryPersonnael

iv. Theseven countries were chosen as examplesof thediverse situations under which a DRP mayoccur. TheAfrican cases include countries that had either completed a DRP(Zimbabwe, Namibia) or hada programunderway (Angola at thetime of research,Mozambique, Uganda, Chad). Allbut one of the casestook place in countriesjust emergingfrom a periodof civilstrife - in the caseof Uganda, thecivil war ended six years ago and the situation has sincenormalized. The one case outside the region (Nicaragua)was chosen because of the comprehensivescope of Its DRP,which was nearing completion at the time of research. Eacbof the casestudies sought to provideinformation aud analysison the programs'objectives, design, cost, management,donors roles, opporunitiesfor coordination,and experiencegained. V. Demobilizationisdefined for the purpose of thisreport as theprocess by which the armed forces(government and/or opposition or factionalforces such as guerrillaarmies) either downsize or completelydisband. Althoughthis definitionis rathernarrow, in manycountries DRPs are part of a muchbroader transformation from a war-to a peace-timeeconomy (transfer of resourcesto non-military sectors,reconstruction of infastructure,restoration of security). A restructuringof the armedforces, whichmay include creating an ethnically and/or politically balanced "national army," often accompanies demobllizatlonyReintegration programs generally refer to targetedprograms of cash compensation, taibnig, or incomegeneration meant to increasethe potentialfor economicand social reintegration of ex-wcombatanuand theirfamilies, or otherdisplaced persons.

Dem6bilzaion vi. PoUticalcontext. Themixed record of successwith DRPs in thecountries studied (some aborted,others delayed, others carried out successfullyin theinitial stages) underlines the fat thattheir successor failureis intertwined,to varyingdegrees, with the political backdrop in whichthey take place. Thecase study countries point to thevery different dynamics of a DRPwhich is carriedout duringpeace- time witha clearlyestablished government in power(the caseof Uganda)versus a DRPundertaken in the contextof war-to-peacetransition characterized by someloosely controlled factions and a someform of power-sharingin the government(Angola, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe). In thelatter cases, the decisions of whetherto reducethe size of the armedforces, whom to demobilize,and whatbenefits to offer, becamepart of the peacenegotiation; such decisions were often influenced by the threatof onegroup returing to conflict,and claimingthat benefitsand/or positions in a new armedforce were awarded inequitablyor based on ethnic/politicalalleglances.Y The more ambiguousthe conflictand its termination,the more susceptible the DRP seems to be to becomingembroiled in factionaldisputes. In contrast,in Uganda,the decisions of whowould be demobilizedand who would receive benefits, appear to have been less complicated(based on technicalfactors such as the desiredcomposition of the

/ The proceu of *profssionalzlng may include improvin miliay training, modenizing militry equipment, andlor reducingthe militays politicizationand mcreasingits loyaltyto the tnaterather than to a particularfaction or individual.

l PForexample, in Zimbabwe tensions arose over the number of ea¢h army which obtained positions in the new amied foroe.. Also, in Nicaagua, the benefis awardedto ex-NicaraguanResistance fighters (NR) differed substantiallyfrom those awarded to Sandinistacombatants.

Page vi xecutve Summary DeomobilIIonand Reintegration of Mility Person retrctured army, the fiscaltargets for the militarybudget) and saemto baverequired comparatively less egotiation.I In addition,delays In implemetion In Ugandadid not have the same repercussionsas they have followinga conflict(as in Namibiawhere demobilization was considereda preconditionfor olctions, or as In Mozambiquewhoem many view demobilizationas a prerequisiteto elecdonsand thus as connectedto the rebel forces, RENAMO,buying time to first transforminto a politicalparty). " vii. Program objectives. The motivationfor Implementinga DRP can be looselydivided ito four categories:political, security, economic, and fiscal. These objectivesare not alwaysmutually consistet. For example,improvlng the securltysituation could involve absorbing ex-combatants Into the civilservice, and schievingpolitical objectives could include balancing the ethnic/politicalrepresentation of the army/civilservice; however,attining these two objectivescould reduce the fiscal benefit of demobilizatiot,as occurred in Zimbabwe. In the case study countrieswhich wer emergingfrom a conflictsituation (all but Ugandaand Chd to a certa degree),goverments naturallyviewed the DRP as a key elementin the transitionfrom war to peace (althoughdonors may place a higher value on Its utility as a tool for increasingresources for prioritysectors); in Uganda, in contrast, the govement designedthe endre.program around achieving fiscal and economicgoals (i.e. a net reductionIn military expenditurewas a principleof assistance).' In both peaeo-and war-timesituations, the abilityof the govement to achieveeither a net reductionin militaryexpenditures over the medium-termor to cement peace dependsto a large degree on the sustainedcommitment and leadershipof the key stakeholders (militaryleaders, the government). vii. Coordintion. The counries studied seem to point to the efficiency of planning demobilizationand reintegrationat approximatelythe same time, and of recognizingthe substandtial ovedap between the two. In Nicaragua, where demobilizadonand reintegraion were planned conmurentlydurng peacenegotiations, the targetednumber of ex-combaantswas demobilizedwith less delay than in some other programsstudied, and the demobilizationprogram experienced fewer inwial problemsduring implementation.i In Uganda,and some other countries,reintegration payments for ex-combatantswho had left campswere planned in advance(prior to demobilization)in recognitionof

71 The Uganda.mgity had beoomoinflated duing the late1980sdue to widp Ienal confl sad tho verment' armustioepolicy of ingratig oppositiongueilla s int do gularovemnt amed force. A publioexpndit rviw (1991)revesd that the mita budga oonsumedmor than 30% of tho ovumets reourc in 1989an 1"9 (excludmgdonor fund), and ld to the decio to downsizethe amy.

/1 For rferenceon Mozambique, see ObrdAnalyca,September 3, 1993.

2/ n someoourAies, the mibty leadehip may chooseto ine th wagesof the remainig soldiersandlor upgmadeequipment and training, and thus military expenitres wil not nooessrilydecreae with a reductonin pewd. I JUAlthoughsome Niaran ex-ombatan retunedto ams wihin monthsof the demobilization,many repoeaedly did findemployment (in November1991 the Orgniztion of AmetioanSttes (OAS)estimated tat only10% of the NicaaguanResistance (NR) we not self-sufficIntand had seriousecoonomio problems). WhAil there were someweakresss with program deign (unfilWd pmi for land,beft acordingto poitica affiltion), the hul progamimplementation proceeded relvy smoothywih individl ex-combdts presed in a malter of days. Tl cmasehiggts the pointthat although a DRPmay proceed smoothly, it cannt oort fudamental problenu uling fromlow grow*th, high unemploymaet, or dee-rooted tensions.

Exeutive Summay Pagevii Denobilzaton and Reintegmtionof MilitaryPersonnel their complexadministrative requirements (transporting 73,000 people all over the country,setting up the proceduresand Instrumentsfor administeringdecentralized targeted benefits))" Such advance planningrequired coordination among a diversegroup of players(governments, NGOs, donors,military leaders)who may not typicallycommunicate with one another. Treatingdemobilization and reintegration as Independentprograms (as in Namibia and Angola)seems to have been among the factors which contributedto inefficienciesor delays. To ilustrate, in Nanibia reintegrationpayments were offeredto ex-wcombatantsas an afterthought,16 months after the demobilizationprogram. Becausesystems of identificationhad not been set up at the time of demobilizationfor that purpose(when It may have been easierto determinewho was and wbo wasnot a combatant),twice as many peoplepresented themselves fbr paymentas predictedand a dispute ensued.) However,one potentialpitfall of early planningis makingpromises which cannotbe delivered;in Nicaragua,where demobilizationand reintegrationwere planned fairly early on, the governmentpromised land to each ex-combatantand later encountered problemsin deliveringon this promisein part becauseof multipleclaims to land and problemswith land tenure. Accordingto those involvedwith the program,disputes over land representedone of the most divisiveissues contributing towards recent conflict from re-armedcombatants. ix. Monitors. Outsidemonitors (bilateral or multilateral)appear to have facilitatedsmooth program implementationin countries where they were perceived as neutral by all parties, had a sufficientlybroad mandate, and had adequatefinancial and staffresources (as in Namibia,Nicaragua and Zimbabwe). For example,In politicallytense situations,a neutral monitorhas been instrumentalIn verifyingthe numbersof combatantsdemobilized from each force (oftena subjectof contentionby each side), in enforcingdisarmament in camps,and in assuringthe equitabledistribution of benefits. Without such a neutralparty, the DRPprocess can succumbto factionaldisputes on these issues. For example, amongthe manyresponsibilities of UN monitorsin Namibiawere: verificationand mediationof disputes on the ground of breachesof the peace agreement,organization of a special force to monitor the neutralityof the police force, disarmingcombatants and guardingweapons depots, and assistancewith legal and electionreform.

X. Disarmamentand weaponscontrol. The casestudies confirm the conventionalwisdom that establishinga secureenvironment following a protractedcivil war is a complicatedtask affectedby manyfactors (the political environment, porous borders with countrieshaving large arms markets,weak capacityof the police to professionallyand evenlyenforce the law, poor or dispersedcontrol of guns by manyfactions). Followinga protractedinternal conflict (applicable to mostof the casestudies), weapons are so numerousboth amongcombatants and civilians,that requiringcombatants to turn in one weapon has a limited impact; in some of the case study countries,the poor quality of the weaponscollected

I Thus, the timing of incntion by donrs may influencethe dynamicsof the process;early interventionin the fonn of dialogueand technicalauistnce may incroasethe chancesof smoothprogram implementation. For the demobiizationreintegrationprooess to proceedsmoothly and to attain the objectiveof helping ex-combatants becomeproducdvo members of civiLiansociety, planning (and technicalassidance to do so) wouldneed to begin well in advanceof combants demobilization- In case involvingoonflict, before the peace negotiationsare complteod. fl 32,000ex-combatants claimed oligibility instead of the 16,000budgeeed, prompting ex-combatants to take over a Bankat one point. From, "PlanPay-Out Problems,' 2he NAmibia,August 5, 1991:p. 3.

Pagr vm ExecutiveSummay Demobilion and Ration of MilOayPersonnel

indicatedthat combatantswere probablyhiding additiona weapons (.e., arms caches)for future contingencies.WIn thecountries studied, general security was sought through three means: enforcement (policeenforcement of a prohibitionagainst open carrying of weapons),persuosion (weapons are traded in by the generalpopulation In ex hangefor cashor In-kindbenefits), and/or frcefid seizure(typically carriedout immediatelyfollowing a conflictsituation by an armedforce). xi. Somecountries have used arms buyback or armsexchange schemes as a toolto improve overallsecurity (in additionto theseven country case studies, several other counties were examined for theirexperience in restoringsecurity following conflict).1f In Nicaragua,one programoffered high pricesin exchangefor weaponsfrom two armed groups, although additional groups (over twenty) showed up to sell weapons;however, both the weaponssupply and overall level of securityshowed littleimprovementA One of the likelydifficulties with such programs is that If the valueof a weapon remainshigh k1because of insecurity, lack of aneffective police force, lack of economicopportunity other an banditry,or becauseof a continueddesire to wagewar becauseof dissatisfactionwith government or with an opposingarmed group), people may use moneyfrom a buybackprogram to purchasenew weapons.Also, in situationssuch as in Somalia,insecurity may pose a chicken-and-eggdilemma where lackof controlover weaponsbreeds insecurity which keeps the value of weaponshigh. Thearrival of Americanand other UN in Somaliaresulted in a significantdrop in theprice of guns. In areas securedby U.S. troops,such as Mogadishu,the price of anAK47 was reportedly one-tenth to one-fouith of the existingprice in unsecuredareas such as Baidoa.

Reitgrtion xii. Institutionalwealmess. DRPs differ from civil service retrenchment programs because of the substantiallylarger numberof peopleinvolved, the frequentneed to disperseex-combatants geographicallyover a shortperiod of time,and the security repercussions of a failedprogram. They call for substaWalinstitutional capacity (involving providing decentralized benefits to up to 120,000 individualsin somecases) in termsof planning,implementation and oversight for potentialfraud. The managementburden of planning,coordinating, and obtainingfunding for reintegrationprograms is especiallyacute for countrieswhere there is no firmlyestablished government in placeat the startof demobilization.This was the casein Angoladuring its temporarycease-fire and demobilization effort. The absenceof clear governmentalauthority pending the Angolanelection contributed to delaysin implementationas programsand planning became bogged down by partisanquarrels (such as clearing

12/ Lackof stict moning of weapons(soeurely storing, frequently chockng, aduately guarding,and diposing of the weaponsemoved from encamped combatant) in Angolarepotedly conributed to increasedsecourty rsk. j41 An informalbackgound note prepard by a consulant, Aain Rouvez,examned arms repurchase and corol programsin Panama, Nicgua, El Salvador,Somalia, South Afica, Mozaimbique,Liberia, Cambodia,and Afghanistn. Of these nine countries,only Panama,Niara, and SouthAfrica had implmented someform of ams buybck or exchua schemes.

I/ Also in Niaragua,Disaman Brigdes wre formedfrom both Sandinistapolice and army officersand fonner Conta. The Briades offer food, housing,constuotion materials and in somecases money in exchangefor guns. Lite informationis availebleon the effectivenessof this program.

ExoeutiveSummy Pageix Demolzaon and Reiegmtion of MiliWuyPononnsl

all decisionswith both UN1TAand the Interimgovernment). Newly electedgovernments following a protractedconflict also havedifficulties with program planning as they are facedwith a myriadof equally urgentreconstruction demands, and maylack the necessaryadministrative capacity and financialresources to Implementthem. Even establishedgovernments not recentlyemerging from a conflictmay require external technicalassistance to help design and implementDRPs (assistancewith conductingsurveys, program costing, identifyingappropriate instittions to manageprograms, advisingon how to make programsefficient and sustainable).

xiii. Donor support. Reintegrationprograms which rely on providing assistanceto ex- combatantsat their placeof resettlement,instead of at camps,are complexand requiresubstantial advance preparationand planning. At the sametime, in countriessuch as Angola,some donors appeared hesitant to commitfunds and other resourcesuntil the strengthof the peace agreementwas demonstrated- at whichpoint demobilizationwould have alreadybegun. However,without donor assistance, the countries studiedlacked sufficientresources to plan or launcheffective DRPs in a timely manner. In Namibia, Zimbabwe,Angola and Nicaraguapolitical circumstances created an addedpressure to implementthe programquickly once the agreementto demobilizehad been reached. As an alternativeto demobilizing to show commitmentto the program, in some countries (i.e. Uganda) the military has provided informationkey to planningreitegration (suchas the settling-pointfor veterans,the timing and scale of demobilization)and has workedwith donors to designprograms. In the case of Chad, accessto relevant informationon thoseto demobilizewas initiallynot forthcoming,In part becauseof the voluntarynature of the program,and possiblybecause of lackof fill commitmentby key militaryleaders during the initial phaseof the program.

xiv. The need for surveys. Surveys conductedprior to demobilization(or during encampment)on the number,socioeconomic profile, career aspirationsand intendedplace of settlement of the differentforces withina countryprovides information critical to the design of tailoredprograms appropriatefor combatants.An accuratecensus of the numberof combatantsto be demobilizedis needed early on to facilitatebudgeting and other preparationsfor demobilizationand reintegration. However, in countrieswith non-traditionalforces or looselycontrolled military factions it may be impossibleto obtain an accuratecount of forces.Jy 'he caseshave shownthat employmentand educationneeds and desiresdiffer not onlybetween countries but amongvarious military forces in the same country. These variationscan have significantimplicadons for the design of tailored programs. For example, in Zimbabweearly reintegrationprograms focused primarily on agriculturalcooperatives, while only 4% of ZANLA and ZIPRA combatantsexpressed an interest in agriculture. In Uganda, a survey of combatantscarried out prior to demobilizationrevealed that a large percentagewere HIV-positive,thus requiringspecial medical care and education.CIAV-OAS officials in Nicaragua,who did not have access to this sort of data when planningthe demobilizationprograms, urged that such surveysbe conducted, arguing that their programscould have been better targetedif they had some basic informationabout NicaraguanResistance (NR) troops. Advanceknowledge of whereex-combatants will settlemay permit

16/ Incountries such as Somaliaor Chd, wh the discton betweenmilitary and non-militaryformes muy be blurred,or wherethere are manypattime forces,obtaining an accuratecensu maybe verydiffiwu. However, surveysof a sampleof fore to detrine thdirdesired camera and sill., can still be undeitakeneven in suoh situations.

Pge x ExecutiveSummary Domobllztonand RdOgtoton of Mtay PersonAel plannersto prepare specificcommunities where large numberof ex-combatantsare expected,and also allowsfor the developmentof community-basedprograms in these areas.0 xv. Familiesas a target group. In manycases DRPsaffected families, not just individual combatantssince many combatant groups fought and traveledwith their families(Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Uganda). Failingto take into accountcombatans' dependentsin estimatingthe beneficiarypopulation for transport needs, in-kind setding-in packages, and other services can cause inadequatesupport, budgetarystrain, and may delayreintegration. For example,In Nicaraguaand Uganda,there wereover twce as manydependents as combatants.In Nicaragua,providing benefits to ex-wcombatants'wives and familiesapparently resulted in a more equitabledistribution of food withinthe family,and better control and use of ma(neywhile in Uganda, benefitsincluded payment of school fees for two children per combatantfor one year. In Zimbabwe,the wivesof ex-combatantsproved to be successfulin collective farming. Someprogram planners suggest giving women the responsibilityfor collectingfood and other assistanceprovided as partof the settling-inkit, incorporatingthem intotraining/education programs, and givingthem the opportunityto borrowmoney to begin smallfarming or other productiveenterprises.

Xvi. Targeted vs. non-targetedreintegratlon programs. An importantstrategic choice faced by reintegrationprogram planners is whetherto emphasizetailored programs for ex-combatantsand their families,or to supportprograms in which ex-combatantsand their familiescan participate,but which are not restricted to this target group (abor intensivepublic works for examplemeant to benefit disadvantagedgroups In general).WThe choiceof non-targetedversus targeted reintegration programs hinges on the followingconsiderations: (i) whether demobilizedex-combatants are a special needs population;(ii) whethertheir returnto productivenon-military activity is more importantto the overall seurity of the nation than that of other groups; and (iii) whethertargeted programs are effectiveand efficient xvii. Surveydata examinedfor the case studiessuggest many former combatantslack basic education,marketablejob skills, and for some, the socialskills needed for successfuleconomic and social -eintegration. The prevalenceof child-soldiersin Mozambique,Uganda, Angola, Chad, and likely elsewhere,means that some soldiersare fimiliar only with a "militarywlifestyle (15% of soldiers in Zimbabwewere under the age of 20); somemay have lost their socialroots; and many have foregone opportunitiesfor fbrmal education,or for accumulatingassets such as livestock,equipment, or fertile

12/ In Nicaagu, h govemt assignod2S,000 squarekllometers in 23 "developmentpoles' to ex-NRand their families. Theseaeas wee locd in remoterural areas, and were to be providedwith expandedsocial services, and free of Sandint police and army units. However,many cx-NRpreferred their home communitiesin neothn Nicargus to the developmentpols; problems repotedly included strined relations with local populationsbecause some desiaed lnds wer occupiedby poor peasants,subsequent problems with obtaining land title whichwould allow ibr accessto agriculuralcredit, and fear that the pols left the NR opento Sandinista haasmeat (souroe:Eguizebal, et al. 1993). In Uganda,the govenment and donors are creatinglocal veterans commites and soca servicesin communitesexpedtng large numbes of veteran.

8IV The rationalemost often cted for not targetingis that ex-combatantsshould not be singled out for special tratment in lght of the larke numberof other needygroups (for example,in Angolathere may be as manyas 2 millionpeople dispload by war).

Exetw Sumary Pagexi Demiobil*tionand Reintegrtionof MilitaryPesonnoel land. For example, in Angola FALA guerrilla forces reportedly lived in non-monetizedcamps. Similarly,Namibian PLAN guerrillas abroad often depended completely upon the politicalorgaization, SWAPO,and faced substantialadjustment when they repatriated. In addition,governments may favor a targetedapproach because they fear the threat that frustrated,unemployed ex-combatants may pose to security(through either organizedpolitical or criminalviolence), national reconciliation, and indirectly, economicreconstruction efforts. Adoptinga targeted approachimplies clear criteria for distinguishing the beneficiarypopulation (ID card, eligibilityrequirements); program managers in Nicaraguastressed the importanceof definingsuch clear criteriafor the target populationearly on in the DRP process. xviii. The effectIvenessof targeted relatepation programs. It is still too early in most of the cases studiedto assess whethertargeted programs are more effectivethan other types of programs. Namibiainitially did not provide any reintegrationprograms targeted to ex-combatants,but later found this approachineffective as roughly80% of ex-guerrillasremained unemployed sixteen months after their demobilization.WIn Zimbabwe,the only case where a DRP programended more than five years ago, the targeted non-cashreintegration programs offered were 11mitodin scope (iteracy and vocational taining, cooperatives-inwhich roughly 13% of ex-combatantsparticipated), compared to the cash paymentswhich were higherthan in any of the other programsstudied. Morethan five years after the programended, almost40% of those participatingin cooperativeshad droppedout (argely becauseof lack of appropriateskills and experience),only 28% of ex-combatantshad foundemployment outside of the public and militarysector, and 17% remainedunemployed.A The limited informationavailable in the sevencase studies suggests that targetedprograms in financialmanagement, literacy, civics, health, and educationcan enhancethe likelihoodof successfulreintegration. However,it is too early in most casesto assessthe cost-effectivenessof such programsand the long-termrate of success. xix. Targeted monetarycompensation. Reintegrationpackagesin all of the countriesstudied includedmonetary payments. Cash paymentsare relativelyeasy to administer,and are attractiveto combatantswho want immediatecompensation. Such paymentswere providedin variousforms: lump- sums, allowances("severance pay"), and/orpensions. Lump-sumpayments have rangedfrom amounts equivalentto 12% of GNP per capitain Nicaragua,to 78% in Zimbabwe. Cash allowances,typically

12 However,a lack of progress on economicreforms and in the implementationof broad-basedreconstruction programs may have contrbutedto a olimateof low economicgrowth and low employment. Thisemployment figureis derivedfrom the estimatednumber of ex-PLANguerillas registeringas unemployedin order to receive benefitsfollowing demobilizaton.

2Q/ The non-cashprograms in Zimbabweoonssted primarDy of a programwhich provided oombatants with skldlsin agriculturewhile they were stl in camps, training, and funds for labor-intensivecooperative farming by ex- combatans(benefitting pproximately120 families). The one prognm wiuohwas managedwhile combatants wae still in the armed forces,Operation SEED, sufferedfrom mismanagement,and was stoppedafter the first year, havingreached only aboutone-fifth of the intendedtarget audience. Of the 100or so cooperativesset up by approximately10,000 former combants (stat-sponsored,and thosein which formercombatants pooled their cash allowances),only 6,383 were still operatingin 1988, over five years after the progrm began. Problemsoited includedlack of funding,management sills, supplyproblems and poor transpotation. Oneof the more sucoessful educationand voatonal trng programsrn by a privateorgniation (the Danhikoschool) reporedly achieved employmentrates among its graduateswcU above averago rates for most secondaryschool graduates, and managed to becomeself-sufficient in manyof its aotivities.

Pagp xii ExecutiveSummary DemobIlatiionand Reintegrationof Miltar Personnel

spreadout over a periodof one to two years,and often provided to ex-combatantsin the villagewhere theysette, rangedfrom amounts equivalent to 38%of GNPper capitain Angolato 444%of GNPper capita(on an aualized basis)in Chad.1 Whencompared to averagewage levels in the eivilservice or in the formalsector, however, cash allowances averaged 73% of suchwage levels across countries.

XX. Cash compensationprovides a neededsource of incometo bridgethe gap between demobilizationand re-employment.However, the evidencesuggests that if cash paymentsare not supplementedby otherreintegration programs or at leastaccompanied by mechanismsto encouragetheir expenditureon educationand productive investments, a significant proportion of formercombatants will experiencedifficulty using the paymentsto increasetheir long-term income. The reasonscited include combatans'limited money management and investment experience (combined in manyinstances with a poorlydeveloped financial sector), lack of practicalskills, and family pressures. To coun ct this,some programsincluded special mechanisms to encourageproductive spending; for example,deducting the cost of trainingcourses before paying out themonthly allowance; providing financial counseling and a course on budgetingand accounting; or, withthe consentof combatants,setting aside a part of theirallowance for purchasingmeans of production,i.e., land,machinery, tools, and other inputs (accompanied by an educationalprogram to explainthe purpose and method of the procedure).t xxi. Targetedin-knd assistance.Many former combatants and their families frequendy find themselveswithout many of thebasic necessities of life (shelter,medical care, food,household goods) whichhad previously been provided by the armedforces or guerrillagroups. In threeof the countries studied,ex-combaants were provided with a "setting-inpackage" to furnishbasic necessities to last a periodof severalmonths immediately following discharge (including civilian clothing for the soldiers, personalitems, building materials, work tools, and agriculturl Inputs). In Uganda,this package included paymentof primaryschool fees for veteran'schildren for oneyear and was furnished mostly In cashin lieuof directdistribution of goods. In Namibia,the creationof BuildingBrigades addressed the critical needfor housingof demobilizedcombatants and repatriates in general. Engagingreturnees in building housesfor theirown community not onlyhelps secure them hoasing at a low cost, but also provides valuableconstruction skills and work experience.In Namibia,as well as Nicaraguaand Uganda, programmanagers provided ex-combatant with the constructionmaterials needed to buildtheir own houses. Accordingto one evaluationof the DRP in Nicaragua,the initialexpectation of program

2,1 In most of e cas studid, aLonc were provide to combatat at their finaldesiation in order to: dipese ex-combatants;fili their tansion to civilianlie (removingthem from the milty community);encourwg relianceon famy ties; discourag.growth in and reducethe hood of orimi violence. In some of the couries specialmethods of paymentwer desied to compensa for the limitedinsdutional famewok and administrave infrasucre for distuting allowancesto ex-combatan dispersedthroughout the county. In Zimbabwe,branches of the Post OfficeBank in townsnear concentraionsof reseted ex.combatantswoe used to dribute allowances.In Angola,a progamminvolvmng Payment Coupons and so.calledPeace Bonds was prposed to compenatefor inadequaciesin the baing system.

WJ Also,payments could be timedto oincidewith the beginningof trining programsor crop cycles.

ExeuativeSumm Pagexi Demobzsatonand Raintegrtion of MilituyPersonnel

plannersthat ex-combatantswould be self-sufficientwithin six to ten monthswas overambitious;one programproviding basic supplieslasted 15 monthsinstead of the anticipated6.2'

xxii. Targeted training and employmentschemes. Manyprogram managers have stressed the importanceof includinga training componentIn 4l1reintegration projects for ex-combatant,who often lack basic skills. In Zimbabwe, the governmentprovided basic educationand agriculual employmentschemes to two guerrillagroups while they were still encamped.In Nicaragua,Namibia and Zimbabwegovernments designed training schemes for combatantsqter they had been demobilized,in all cases in conjunctionwith employment(rice growingin Nicaragua)or cooperativeventures (the ZimbabweProject and DevelopmentBrigades in Namibia).Although training programs were offered in each of the countrieswhich had completeddemobilization, little follow-upinformation Is availableto assesstheir long-termviability, whether they have benefittedmost of those wantingto paricipate, and how effectiveand relevant the courses were for veterans' subsequentcivilian careers. Similarly,few studieshave been completedon the successof the employmentcreation programs often associatedwith training programs. Managementproblems reportedly charactzed the employmentand cooperatve schemesin Zimbabweand someex-combatants complained tat the incomegenerated from these schemes was insufficientto supporttheir large extendedfamily. Problemsfaced by someof the microentelprises createdunder this program may have been overcomehad there been an assessmentof other income generatingactivities in the area, recognitionof the substantialtraining required to allow ex-combatants to fiuction effectivelyin the privatesector, and an indicationof the level of competitionthe enterprises wouldfce. However,anecdotl informationfrom those workingin someof these countriesat the time suggeststhat large, publicly-runtraining or employmentprograms may encountergreater difficulty in predictingmarket demand than do smaller,privately-run and/or community-based programs. Programs which subsidizeexisting vocational or on-the-jobtraining may eliminatethe need for such forecasting.

xxiii. Of the very limited number of reintegrationprograms examined, those which were managed by the sector (NGOs or other), but which are adapted to the specific needs of combatants, appeared more successful (and more efficient) than large-scale government-created programs. One privately run program, the Danhiko School in Zimbabwe,combined education, vocationaltining, and apprenticeships,and reportedachieving high employment rates among graduates. The schoolrecruited ex-combatants (including disabled combatants) directly from camps, and provided them withhigh-quaity training from proven professionals and apprenticeshipsin areas such as fuiture design(for whicha marketfeasibility study had been carriedout). The studentswere required to board awayfrom their familiesat the school. The schoolhas becomefinancially self-sufficient (through sale of goodsproduced during training), and sustainableas it nowserves civiliansas well as ex-combatats. Anothernew iniative which seems to balancethe need for relianceon market forces with proactive programs to reach ex-combatans, is an apprenticeshipprogram sponsored by the Otto Benecke

221 Aoding to, U.S. Gmed AccoundngOffice, Repostto Congrsional Requestes, AMDto Mcoragu. US. ASS4 S " Economc and SocdlDevlopnn, August,19M.

2I Thiswas alsothe opinion of NGOand rieration programmanages interviewd.

Pap xiv BxecutiveSummary Demobilizationand Reintegrationof MiIltaryPerwnnel

Foundationin Namibia. The Foundationunderwrites the costs of three-monthprivate sector internships for ex-combatants.After the three months,the programstaff follow-up with participants to identifyskill shortcomingsand to directparticipants to appropriatespecialized training programs. Someof the other proposalsreintegration program managers have suggestedfor effectivetargeting include:

* Establishingcommunity-based programs wbere concentrationsof ex-combatantssettle or, integratingex-combatants into existingcommunity-based programs. * Providingvouchers to ex-combatantswhich could be used as a contributionto an existing community-basedproject in which they could participate,or for use with existingvocational trainingprograms (but coveringonly a portionof the costs)in the formalor informalsector. * Utilizingaffirmative action programssuch as quotas,or offering incentivesto private sector companiesto hire veterans,combined with temporarily subsidizing their on-the-jobtraining (i.e., apprenticeships)to ensurethere is a marketdemand for the trainingoffered and counterany bias againsthiring veterans. * Allowingveterans to participate in the managementof programs either through veterans associationsor as individuals. * Usingthe militaryhierarchical structure of the formerarmed force and the militarydiscipline to: (i) implementtraining programs, and help ensure class attendance;(ii) send delegationsof respectedcommanders to personallyexplain programs to combatants; (iii)use someof the best- educated,senior combatantsas trainers; (iv) link the training and educationof ex-combatants directlyto Income-generatingactivities; and, (v) establisha closelink betweenthe struggle(if It was a war of independence)and its continuationas reconstruction.

xxiv. Some NGOs believethat community-basedprograms provide flexibility, can be easily monitored,and help to ease the healingand reconciliationprocess following war by integratingveterans into civiliancommunities. In addition,the transitionto mainstreamdevelopment programs may be easier at the community-level.This transitionis importantbecause providing ex-combatants with benefitsand opportunitiesthat exceedthose of the rest of the populationwho are also quite needy and have also suffered the consequencesof protractedperiods of war, may create the basis for new hostilities. Accordingto programplanners in Nicaragua,reintegration programs should seek to avoid increasing polarizationamong social groups by being limitedin durationand integratedwith regular (mainstream) developmentprograms as soon as possible.; Specificdetails on community-basedprograms in the case stdies is scarce, partly becausemany are still in the planningstage.

xxV. NGO involvement.In some cases, NGOshave been governments'and donors' most valuablepartners in implementingdemobiization/reintegration programs. For example,NGOs have organizedtransportation to camps(Namibia), distributed food, medicalcare, and materials(Namibia), and providedtraining and job counseling(Zimbabwe). NGOscan compensatein part for weak public sector institutions. In addition,local NMOsare frequentlyinvolved in community-baseddevelopment projects,have extensiveexperience of localconditions and needs,and possessa measureof independence from the government,factions, and local politicalparties. However, substantialcommunication and coordinationis necessarybetween those managingthe demobilizationprocess and the NGOsproviding

31/ USAD offiil.

ExecutiveSummaq Pagexv Demobin;ationand Reintegrationof MilitaryPersonnel

reintegrationprograms. Lack of sufficientNOOs willing to participatein the processposed a problem In Angola.

Coas

XXvi. The annutOizedcosts of demobilizationand reintegrationrange fromone-third of annual ODA in Angola's planned program, 22% in Zimbabweto 5% in Nicaragua;both Zimbabweand Nicargua completeddemobilization, although the Zimbabweprogram provided much larger cash benefits per soldierand was characterizedby the long-termcost of an inflatedcivil serviceand army. The costs of programs focused primarily on demobilization(or for which informationis only available on demobilizationcosts) such as those In Namibia,Chad, Uganda, and Mozambiquerange from 4 to 7 percentof anmualODA.

xxvii. The programs'per capitacost is in manycases lower (thoughsometimes twice the level of the country'sGNP per capita)than availableinformation on the averagecost of civilservice reductions in similar countries. The cost por combatantfor both demobilizationand reintegrationranged from US$1,938for the NR in Nicaraguato over US$3,000for the guerrillas in Zimbabwe.W The per combant cost of demobilizationprograms with eithervery limitedor no reintegrationprograms range from about US$840in Ugandato a projectedUS$573 in Angola. The cost for reintegrationprograms alone in Namibiawas US$6.4million (the government's program, excluding repatriation). 2 ' In the one coplmed DRP, Zimbabwe,the cost of both the demobilizationand the reintegrationprogram per ex- combatantemployed or In trainingouside of the civUservice and securityforces(seven years after the program's start) was roughlyUS$8,469 (with demobilization accounting for the majorityof costs).&

W& However,it is difficultto comparecosts of the progmms,because some oosttotals includeitems not refected in the othess; for oxample,Zimbabwe includes the estimatedcost of paying oombatants'salaries while they were en_amped,while the oosttotal for the NR doesnot includetheir salaries(if in fact they rneeivedsalaries while in te camps,which i unlikely);some of the cst totalsM ilude the opeting costs of the UN observerforce or other -1etr monitor,othcs do not.

22 The exactnumber of benefioiaries;B not known.

W In Zimbabwe,if one includesex-combatant employed in the eivil serviceamong thoseemployed, the total costa decreaseto US$5,928per employedex-combant. Demobilizationcosto here do not includeUS$42 million in sadaes to encampedcombatats. In comparison,in civil srvice redeploymentprogmams in Africa, special reiteation schemesand creditscost US$11,000in Senegal(DIRB/FNE programs), US$4,200 in Guineaand US$1,700in Mall (PIR program). To these costs, one would need to add the often substanial depatre alowances to comparewith the total DRP costs presentedabove. These depure allowancesfor civil servioe programsranged from48 monthsof salaryin somecase in Senegal,to an averageof US$6,807per personfor a depuWe packagein Mali; one could comparethis laer figure with just over US$3,000for depature and integraio allowancesin Zimbabwe.The benefits provided in Zimbabwewere higherthan in any other progam and a large percentap of the excombatazitsfound employmentin the police or military. Thus, most other progammswhich bar ex-combatamtswho reoeivedemobilization benefits fiom employmentin the militaryor civil setvice can be expWectedto have substantiallylower costs. Sources:Redeployment of Laid-Qff Public Sector Empkyees, itrn draft paperby MarcSchacter, CECPS, IBRD; Civil Servce ReformIn Mal: An Evalwkaonof de Volunmy DepartureProgram, intrnal draftpaper by AlbertZeufack, APSCO, IBRD, September, 1993; Les Fords D'EOploi- Sont-iltficaces? Une EvalWdonSocio-Economiqw de la DIREIFNEau Sindgal, internal daft by ElianeKarp-Toledo, AFISP, IBRD,July 30, 1993.

Pap Xvi ExecutiveSummary Demobilzdon and Rointegmaionof MilitaryPenonnel

Results xxviii. The objectiveof this study was not to quantifythe contributionthat a DRP may have madetowards peac and employment.However, it is likely that the net benefitsof these programsin both social and economicterms can be substantial. In Uganda the 'peace dividend' from reduced militaryexpenditures is estimatedto be $14 millionfor the first stage of the programin FY93 alone. In Zimbabwe,although many former comoatantsended up in the civil service,defense expenditures as a percentageof GNP nonethelessdeclined from 8.8% in 1980to 6% in 1985,and finallyto 6.7% in 1989. In Nicaragua,defense expenditures as a percentof GDP droppedfrom 28% in 1989to 5% in 1991. In contrastwith Zimbabwe,in Nicaraguathe size of the civil servicehas decreased. xxix. Five years after the conclusionof the Zimbabweprogram 83% of the formercombatants found employmentor were in training (although55% of these were in the civil service or military). Alongsimilar lines, program managers in Nicaraguaestimated that 80%of the ex-NRwere self-sufficient 18 monthsafter the program'sstart. In Chad, a surveyof 506 of the first waveof demobilizedrevealed that less than one year fromthe p-.ogram'sstart, 78% reportedsome type of economicactivity (although the first to volunteerfor demobilizationmay also be those most likelyto find employment). nclusdon xxx. The successof DRPsappears to be tightly linkedto the specificpolitical, economic and securityclimate faced by each of the countriesstudied. Tbis is particularlytrue in countriesemerging ftom civil conflict. In countrieswhere governmentsand programmanagers have been able to take an integratedapproach to planningdemobilization and reintegration,implementation has proceeded relatively smoothly,which in and of itself cannot guaranteea return to securityand a lower militaryexpenditure burden. Such an integratedapproach requires substantial advance coordination among a diversegroup of actors. It is clear that as programsevolve, better informationmay becomeavailable, and new and more conclusivelessons may emerge.

Poive Summary Pagexvi Demobilizationand Reintegadon of MiliaryPersonnel

CHAPrER I INTRODUCTION

1. The countriesof Sub-SaharanAfrica recordedimportant gains in economicand social sectrs over the last 30 years, particularlyduring the 1960sand 1970s. However,progress has often been slowerand more uneventhan anticipated. The regionwas affected particularly severely by the "lost decade of developmentopportunities" of the 1980s, when social welfare, productive capacity, and infrastructuredeclined in large parts of the developingworld. Economicstagnation has combinedwith deterioratingterms of trade, rapid populationgrowth, and levelsof indebtednessthat are amongthe highestIn the worldto producean economiccrisis of significantproportions.

2. Thiseconomic crisis has presentedmany African countries with a dwlidlingrevenue base at a time whengrowing populations require increasingresources for basic health care and education. It has also becomepainfully clear for some countriesthat the primaryroadblock to a return to productive economicactivity and investmentis the lack of securitycaused by civil war. Countriesin this situation, such as Angola,Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan,have routinelyspent between 15 and 40% of their nationalbudgets and between5 and 10% of their GNP on the military. All rank in the bottom15% of the UNDP's humandevelopment index and spendonly between.6 and 6% of their GNP on priority developmentsectorsY The case studies examinedfor this report reflect the particular challengesAfrican countries face to assuresecurity when economic opportunities are scarceand control over combatantsand weaponsis used as a primaryvehicle for gainingand retainingcontrol over political and economiccapital.

3. As in other regions,the end of the ColdWar has had importantrepercussions on conflicts in Africa and has promptedincreased motivation to reduce the burdenof militaryexpenditures. The demise of superpowerrivalry and 's movementtoward majorityrule have influenceda reductionin tensionsthroughout the regionand are contributingto conditionsunder whichefforts to end the most costlyconflicts have a chanceto succeed. 1naddition, several African countries are attempting to consolidatetheir transitionfrom militaryregimes to civilian,multiparty governments and to reduce militaryexpenditures and/or demobilizearmies inflatedby war. In some countries,the challengeof reconstructionafter yeas of war, and resettlementof huge refugeepopulations is immense.YIn others, while the militarymay not representa substantialportion of the population,the insecurityfrom armed forceswith insufficient civilian control has an enormouscost in termsof foregoneinvestment and growth (Chad,Somalia, Mozambique). Thus, the potentialbenefits of facilitatingthe ex-combatant'sretum to civilianlife and to productiveeconomic activity are substantial.

1/ UNDP, NwnmaDevelome Report,1992. 1 IForeample, in Angola,the mitay sectorrepresen 5% of the activepopulation; 300,000 refugees have fledto Zaireand Zambiaand 800,000 are displacedwithin the country. In Mozambique,up to 30%of the popultion ik, displacedwithin and outside the country.

Chapter1 - ntuoduction Page1 Demobiization and Reintegrationof MilitaryPersonnel

RATIONALE FOR TiE SWRY

4. The WorldBank is increasinglyreceiving requests by membergovernments for technical and/orfinancial assistance for programsto reintegratedemobilized combatants and displacedpersons into the economy. Theserequests have placednew demands and challengeson Bankstaff, in an area in which the Bankhas litle direct experienceY

S. Experiencewith demobilization and reintegrationis limited-especiallyin countrieswith very weak economiesand low administrativeand institutionalcapacities. In August 1991, an informal workingpaper was preparedto assistthe Chadcountry team in respondingto the Governmentof Chad's requestto designa programto reintegratecombatants. This paper drew substantialattention both within and outsidethe Bank and confirmedthe need for a more thoroughreview of experience.Y

6. To follow up on this work, the Vice Presidentof the Africa Region requestedthe formaion of the AfricaRegion Working Group on Demobilization/Reintegrationof Military Personnel in April 1992. The Groupincludes members from each countrydepartment in the region,as well as the AfricaDivision of the Legal Department,the AfricaTechnical Department, the AfricaRegional Office of the Chief Economist,the Public EconomicsDivision of the PolicyResearch Department, and the Eonomic DevelopmentInstitute. Discussionamong Bank staff workingon countriessuch as Chad, Mozambique,Angola, Namibia, Liberia, and Uganda highlightedthe urgent need to gather more informationon experiencewith demobiliz.tionand reintegration. Such informationwould allow for a more informedresponse to governments'requests for assistance.The primaryobjective of this studyis to describethe experiencewith DRPs to date in sevencountry case studies,and to developa preliminary understandingof best and worst practicesin the implementationof such programs. The report explores a broad rangeof issuesarising in the demobilizationprocess in an effort to betterunderstand the context In whichit has takenplace. However,it is not meant to imply any statementregarding Bank policy in this area. The terms of referencefor this studyare in AnnexI.

7. Donorsare also startingto think abouthow they canuse their fundsto supportthese types of efforts. Demobilizationand reintegrationare closelyrelated to someof the recommendationsof donor assistancepolicies, for examplea shift in the compositionof public expenditures. Althoughthe donor communityhas often linked its adjustmentlending efforts to downsizingand reforming recipient countries' civilservices, until recenty, less has been doneto addressthe issue of the level and natureof militaryexpenditures. A numberof initiativesare now emergingat bothbilateral and multilaterallevels.

a/ SeveralBank and IMP studiesae underwayon the impactof militaryexpendiu on development,and on the potal sad economicsof reapinga 'peace dividend,'but no knownstudies had been conductedon operational responss to the demobiiaton of combatants.

Thisstudy uses theterm ^combatant' to referto all membersof armedforces in a country,including the goveramet ('regukl) armyas well as membersof guerilla armiesand armedopposition factions. The label of combatantrefers to supportpersonnel as wellas actualfighters, and doesnot implythat they are cuetly activelyenaged in fighg. The term 'soldiers' refersspecifically to membersof the regular,goverament armed forces.

Page 2 Chapter 1 - hurdmdion Demoblzationand Rl1e1at on of MIiP- Pesonnel

At the SpecialProgram of Assistance(SPA) meeting in Tokyoin late 1992,several donors met to discuss policy issuesand lessonsregarding demobilization, din4rmament and reintegration. In Febnry 1993, a meetingwas heldat the Organizationof Economick:ooperation and Development(OECD) to educate the donor communityon militaryexpenditures and developmentand to formulatecoherent responses to requestsfor fundingby countries. The GlobalCoalition for Africasponsored a meetingin Kampalain 1992centered on the reductionof militaryexpenditures, and anotherin Beninin June 1993which touched upon the same topic. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissionedthe International DevelopmentCenter of Japanto prepare a reporton Militay ExpendituresIn DevelopingCountres and Aid Policyin March 1992. Theseexamples are amongthe numerousdiscussions and conferencesbeing sponsoredby donors and interestgroups.Y

MErHODOLOGYOF TBE STUDY

8. Little informationhas beenpublished, or is readilyavailable, on experiencewith DRPs in general,and especiallyon suchprograms in Africa. Giventhe lack of literatureavailable on this topic, extensiveprimary research was necessaryto compilethe case studies. Disparatepieces of information were assembledfrom a variety of sources,with particularreliance on the following: interviewswith officialsfrom governments,militaries, internationaland regional organizations,and NGOs actually Involvedwith designingand implementingthese programs; memoranda,and documentsfrom these organizations;interviews with World Bank officials and reports, especiallyto assessthe socioeconomic impactand residualproblems of DRPs; and heavyreliance on press articlesfrom the variouscountries involvedin the programs. Becauseof the time-consumingnature of this primary research, and the sensitiveand continuallychanging nature of the political, economic,and securityissues involvedin a given country'sDRP, the case studiesare to someextent incomplete.

9. The African cases selected-Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Uganda, Angola and Mozambique-includecountries that either had completeda program (Zimbabwe,Namibia), or had a programunderway (Angola at the time of research,Mozambique, Uganda, Chad). All but one of the countrieswas just emergingfrom a period of civil strife-Uganda's civil war ended six years ago. Countrycase studieswere selectedin order to provide a diverse samplingof the variety of situations under which a DRP may occur, but do not includeall examplesin the region (notablyEthiopia, and Somalia, which became a candidatefor demobilizationafter the researchfor this study had already commenced).Y The one case outside of the region (Nicaragua)was chosen because of the comprehensivescope of its DRP to compareand contrastwith the other caseschosen.

Al In addition,the Afiicaa-Amerin Instituteorganized a Conferenceon Democraizationand theRole of the MUtary in Afica, held in BurundiIn February1993; tih GermanCooperation Agency (GTZ) issueda PropoSalfordi Reitgration ofRefugeea, Dsplaced Persons and E-Combatants 44dsSpecial Reference to Sub-Saharanfrca in August1992; and the GermanFoundation for IternadonalDevelopment organized a forumfor policydiscussion on Diamwnem andDevelopment in February1992. J/ AAthoughthis was based on the experieces in seven countries,some referencesare mnte, where rlevant, to informationon countriesother than these sevenwhich emerged during the courseof reserch (e.g ams buyback programs).

Chapter1 - ntroduction Page3 Domobilizationand Reintegrationof MiliutaryPersonnel

10. Each of the seven case studieswhich form the basis for this report soughtto provide informationand analysisin the followingseven areas: programobjectives and content;design; cost;management; results; donor roles and the opportunitiesfor donorcoordination; and lessons emerging from individualcountry experiences. The major findingsfrom each case are comparedand contrasted. Thisreport should be read keepingin mindthat it is basedon the limitedinformation available on a small sampleof countries. Thereis still considerableopportunity to learn fromthe experiencesfrom these and other countrycases, and to refinethe initialfindings.

THE DEMOBIUZATIONAND REiTGRATION PItOCESS

11. Demobilizationand reintegrationare stages in a process by which governmentarmed forces and/oropposition forces (i.e., guerrillaarmies) are eitherreduced or completelydisbanded, and the ex-combatantsjoin the civiliansociety and economy. Thus, the numberof combatantsin a country is reduced,and the burdenof the militarywage bill on publicexpenditures is possiblyreduced as well.2' As shownin Figure 1.1, demobilizationand reintegrationcan be brokendown into componentsor steps: encampingcombatants or confiningsoldiers to barracks;performing a censusand other registrationand documentationactivitles; disarmament;transferring them to civilian status upon release; and then providingtraining/rehabilitation programs to enable them and their families to become productive civilians. The encampmentof combatantsprior to their releaseis often used by governmentsto gather informationon combatants,to count them, and to controlthe pace of demobilization.

12. In casesof internalconflict, the decisionson whetherto reducethe armedforces, by how much, and whomto demobilizewere often determinedas part of the peace process. In cases such as Uganda,the demobilizationprocess was not relatedto a conflict,but followeda decisionby government and military leaders to reduce the number of troops.1' A restructuringof the armed forces often accompaniesdemobilization programs. The government,in conjunctionwith the military and/or oppositionleaders, determines the size of the new armedforces required for the country'ssecurity needs and consequentlythe number of combatantsto be demobilized:when oppositionforces are involved, those parties negotiatingdetermine the representationfrom each factionto join the new armed forces. Restructuringmay include introducingan ethnic and/or partisan balance to the armed forces and increasingthe military's professionalism.-' Once the number to be demobilizedis set, each side determinesthe number of their armed forces who will voluntarilybe demobilized,or who will automaticallybe demobilized(too young,too old, disabled)and whatpositive or negativeincentives may be requiredto persuadethe remainderto demobilize.

/ BecausemiliRy leadershipmay choose to inoreasethe wagesof the remainingsoldiers and/or upgrade equipment and tmining,militaq expendituresmay not necessarilybe reducedwith the decreasein personnel. 1 Uganda'smilitary had becomeinflated during the late-1980sdue to widespreadintemal confliet and the government's annisticepolicy of offeringamnesty to oppositionguerrilla forces and integatingthem intothe regulararmed forces. As the securitysiuation improved,economic and fscal constaintsbecame more prominent. 2/ Theprocess of 'professionalizing'may includeimproving military training, modernizing milituy equipment,and/or reducingthe militay's politicizationand increasingits loyaltyto the nadon ratherthan to a particularfaction or individual.

Page4 ChapterI -introduction Demobilizationand Reintegration of Milary Pesonnel

13. Reintegrationin all of the case studlesincludes monetary compensation payments (such as severancepay and pensions),which are oftenaccompanied by a set of programsto facilitatethe return to productivecivilian activities(See Figure 1.1). Theseprogram may be targetedspecifically to ex- combatants,such as vocationaltraining and incomegeneration projects, or to the generalpopulation, such as reconstructionprograms. While commonly seen as sequentialphases, demobilization and reintegration actuallyoverlap since in mostcountries studied combatants demobilized in phases. Furthermore,in order to enhancea smoothtransition to civilianlife, reintegrationprograms would need to begin as soon as possibleafter demobilization.This Impliesplanning reintegration during or prior to demobilization.

ORGANzATIONOF REPORT

14. Chapter Two examinesthe motivationsand objectivesfor implementingDRPs in the sevencase studies, and the stageswhich comprise the demobilizationand reintegrationprocess. Chapter Three reviewsthe variedexperiences with the designof demobilizationprograms in each of the country cases. ChapterFour examinesissues of process touchingboth demobilizationand reintegration,and managementstructures for both programs. Chapter Five compares reintegrationprogram design, followedby ChapterSix whichfocuses on the costs and fundingof the DRPs studied. ChapterSeven highlightssome preliminaryobservations from the case experiences,and lessonslearned from apparent successesand failures.

Cbap 1 - broduct PP S Figure I. 1

TH lTYPICAL ADHBDLLZAA|D RETa NN

Rcgdw F~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~mployed RtedweFmbcmo /vS Pubce Endof omct EEJr

Coordilnat Cbrcles:programs Dk D_e3_ e_ or Ckodes bdcae pubc

noran _ m m m m m m m m too. -an c

LDEMIOBILI ZATION I G R A T I TablC Li: Ckmnt Status of DembW zdon/Rdntegnrtlo

Angob Chad Mozambique Namibia NUwagua Ugna Zimbabwe Current stats Demobiliation Denwobiization Peace declared, DemobIization Demobilzation Demobilization Program baked, return to ongoing demobiliztion (repa ) c oning cwopleted198S VWar bdng plnned compltd, reitgraio reintegration ongoing,inemite ongoing figting reace Election held in NIA, establshed Cease-fire Eletions hdd Cease-fireageed to NtA, Elecio hdd n ations Septeme 1992, govenment in implmentd 1989. estabshd in 1990, demobiliza- establishedgt 1980,esablished but UNITA did place Novnmber 1992 goverunt in lin began April in place govt in piace not accept defeat. place 1990, completedby warre d July1992 Demobilization Encampment Delayedby one up to 16,000 Demobilzation of Contmsdenobiized; Started 75,000 guerilas incomplete. year, bit (out of 103,000 all annies 85% of Sandinista December demobilizod' widespad commencing to 137,000) completedbefore armed forces 1992; first desertion fiom slowly as of registeredfor independencein demobilized phase of 23,000 camps, 20,000 out December1992; Pro-peace 1990 completd by of 151,000 9,173 dAmobitonr 1993 demobilized(Juno demobized or (Augt 1992) 1992), but retired as of but cease-fire subsequerny August 1993. agmeedbefore eurnd to denobilization fighting

Rdintegration Programspro- No major pro- No formal Project ongoing; Range of programs, No major No major pared, not gram; rlying on progams yet, unemploymentand benefitted both oom- progam other program, reli cndorsed,no cash compensa- cabinedcreated absorptioninto batant groups phls than settling-in on NGOsbut gave financingsecured, tions and fture to coordnate public serwicebigh dqedens; asistace; litde funds; in none impkmanted help from NGOs reintegation rehiring into public Veterans 1989public sector sector, uncmploy- Assitance had reabsorbe meat and under- Board created; 55%, 17% employmnt high reintegration unemployed under design Disarmamentl Failedto disarm Intermtnt Est. 25,000 to Comparatively Arms asdy availabl Stable Stable -security soldiersduring banditry, fighting 1.5 million stable; although despite various established encampmt, weapons in crime ate up weapons controland desertion with circulation;UN buy-backprograms; arms leading to peace-keeping ntmittent fighting bandity; cst. 2 force being scet persistsin rurl aress million weapons in to disarm circulation

At Sm15,000 of this number were no longer active combatants,but becam eligible for demobiliation benefits. Table 1.2: The Armed Forces- Bere, During, and aer Demobiiadon

Angola Chad Mozambique Nan" Nicaamgua Uganda Zmnbabwc Sieof ar e77 -.- - Sfo0r2ces -00 f bfre 0 deobiliao GoVt 113,700 43.7002 88,000-116,000 32.000' apL 94,000 80.000 lS,OO Gueillas 37,300 n/a 15,000-21,000 20,000apm s 22,5006 n/a 50,0001

.~~~~~~ A Govt (l,) 9,173 73,000-78,000 32,00012 a . 70,010 30,000 projecd 0P ___~~~I _ __ __ ._I Guerrillas (18.523)'4 n/a 0-5.000projeded 13,00PW 22,50 nJ/ 75,000X6 Status of demob i-

19,3 demobil- Socondpaprce of As of August 1992. 7,OO annew 25,2S0remin ink Phase l for 43%in nw armed izedbefore oonSJ 8,0001tobqgin in 12-15,000regsered anncd forces; BSP7% as of 1993 addtioa 10,000 fore; 12% resumed ci svc; 11/93. for demobization unemployed;36% demobiid 17%unemployed; 6% subisenc agric.; uanderplaning fimmallyemployed _ _ 7% form all cntpL ______

1/ UNAVEMcount as of Ju 1992. V Figuresar approximateas the goverments estiate of the size of the army hae varied btwee 37.,043,667 (te latr fom the cens prior to da). Accordig to progmram16.000 wer to be eaoumaed to leavc, the fint 1991 25,000wve to be integratedinto new amed forcs, and an unknownnumber wow to be demobilizedimmediately (to old or to young). 2/ From 16.000-24,000are believedto be only *peyday soldis (existingon the payoll but actual comaoom) or hav left the army on their own; up to 62,000 govnmnttops will rport to assmbly areas, and an additnal 10,000to 30,000 will not rport to asemby are. Al SouthAfrican and SouthAfricaponoe forces 5I Estiates of the numben of SWAPOex-combaants are approximateas they wenerepatiatd with othr eaumes; this numbermay be an u- as it wa muported that 32,000 people caring to be SWAPOvans showedup when the govermen annoued paymerts for vtrans. 6/ CIAV-OASreports that 22,500ex-NR and 6,500 other epatries (e xa and civiians mi togetber)wer disarmedand receivedbeneft. Becae it is not clear how mny of the 6,500 wer ex-combtaut, thy have not been includd he. An addiional 82,000 depndent accompane the ex-combatanta. 21 Number of combatas whoreported to assemblycamps; actual numberof co_ibat washigher #/ Demobiizedas of June 1992;assumed retuned to combat after conflict resumedand no longer 'demoblled' 21 is includes4,366 rTS. Approximaiey354 additinal soldiersw dismissedwithout benefits (eligible), and 120wer reted before the deoaion bepan. B1 Sameas l8 above IL/ This estmate tak into account searal thousand of the soldiers clained by the govermntt not to actualy exist and thus wo will not actually be demobid, fioukthe payoll. but ody removed 12/ Most dqaited ountry, reuned to Souh Afica 131 Severl thousandRhodesian soldiers retired, the remaider wer integr into the new Z&babwe army 141 Same as # 8 above J51 The figure presentedher is net of the 7,000 guerril whojoined the new Namibianarned forum after being demwbilized J_61The numbecrof guerrilla vetea who receiweddemobilion benefits difecn amongvaious soures; includedhee are 15,000'inactive and 10,000 'reserve guerrilas Table 13: Key Economic Indkators

ANGOLA | CHAD MOZAMBIQUE NAMIBIA NICARAGUA UGANDA ZIMBABWE

Populaion' 10 mmllon 5.9 million 15.7 milion 1.78 million2 3.9 million 16.6 mions 6.7 m.11(1979)

.______._____ 4___ _.__.__ 8.4 m ii (1985)' Poption growth 2.7%' 2.4% 2.6% 3.2% 3.3% (1991) 2.5% 3.4%

GNPIaia USS S620 (1991)" Before $610 (19899 $210 (1991) $80 (1990) $1080 (1990) $420 (1990) $170 (1991)" $580 (1979) After .. .. $1120 (1991p $340 (19919)' , S640 (1985)" Real GNP 1.0% (1990)' -3.2 (1988-90) -.5% (1988-90) -1.4% (1985-90)"6; -7.3 (1990) 3.3% (1980-91) -15%(19700) Growhcapita14 0.3% (1990-91) I% (1991)' -0.8%(1980-90) UMeImploymaet rate - Before ...... 25-40%" 13% (1990) Afr ...... 30-40%" 16% (1992)" 3.4%-.3%" 12% Civi Service Before 145,000 21,500 (198n .. 50,000 (1988) 70,000 (1990) 244,159(1988) 71,000 (1980) After n/a 26,000 (1990) .. 61-65,000 (1991) 60,000 (1992) 314,70021 89,400 (1985) DefensreEp. as 21.5%" 3.8% 10.4% 5.7% (1988) 28.3% (1989) 1.6(1988)" 8.8% (1980) % of GDP" 2.5% (1990)" 5% (1991)" 6% (1985) ______6.7%(1989) ! DefSenseEx~p. as 34.3%" 40%" 33% (19909' 13% (1988) 38.3% (1989) 31.2 25% (1980) % of CGE 6.5% (1991p) 22% (1990'u 14.4% (1985)4 Soci Sextor 4.4% 4% (1989)" 1.8% (for 2.5% 7.4% (1989) 3.7% 12.7% Spending as % Education;Heakh 9.2% (1991) 1.7% (1990-91)" GNP" _ n/a) ______

Social Sector 14% 13.1% .. .. 23% (1989) 18.9% (1990-91) Spending as % of 34% (1991) CGB _ Total Combatants" Before 151,000 43,700 103,00O-137,000 22,000" (1988) I16,500 (1990) 8,000 7s,000 (1980) After Ufa n/a n/a" 7,100 (1990) 15,250 (1993I) nta 46,000(1985) . . . ._ . ,"gw= TABLE : Key Ecoomi I Sndiator(cokt)

j/ For mid-1990. fro Trends In DevelopingEconomies 1992 and Sodial indiator of Develpamen 1991-92,The World Bank. unles othrwise indxate. 21 For 1991 fom The WorldBankAtAls, 1991, The World Bankl 31 From Ugonda Growing Ou of Povety, March, 1993, World BankGrey Cover ReportNo. 11380-UG. A/ Both dates from World Tables, 1989-90EditIon, #T World Bank, 1990. ,V Average anmualgrowth rate for period 1980-90, fromWoild Bank, WorldDevelopnt Report. 1992, uness ocrws noted. l/ Most recent estiante from Sotia Indicatorsqf Development,1991-92, The Wodd Bank. 2/ For 1991 fim WorldDevopmet Repor 1993 uss othwie noted. If available, data are preswted for the year deambilaton implented, nd year complteWd. jI Most rcent estimatefrom Soci bnatos of Develpment, 1991-92,The World Bank. 2i For 1990, 1991 from 7he WorldBank Atlas, 25th AnniversaryEdtioI, 1992, The Wold Bank. JlI For 1990, 1991from The Worli Baxk Ada, 25th Annnrsay Eion, 1992, The World Bank. 111From Uganda:Growing Ota of Povert. March, 1993,World Bank Grey Cover ReportNo.11380UG. U3 From The WorldBk Atl, 25th Anniversary dition, 1992, The World Bank. J31This and previous years from WorldTables, 1989-90Eitiion, The World Bank, 1990. I41 Figures fom The WorldBank Atas (1983, 1991 aad 1992edition), unlss otherwse indicated. 111World Bankestmate from Angola: Public xpen re lssus and PrioriWesDring Transon to a Marka Econmy, June 1993, World Bank InternolGreen Cover ReportNo. 11649-ANG. IV Growthin real GDP per capita firomNamibia, PovertyAlleviation wlth Susaiabl Growth,World Bank, 1992. tI7 From IBRD Pesden's report: ProposedEconomic Recovery Credit to de Repsblic of MNaragua,September 3, 1991 IN World Bankesates. _9125-30% in formal sector, from NAWnibia.Powrt Aleviton with Sustanabl Growth,World Bank Count Stdy, 1992. LO/ For urban and nrual areas, respectively,in 1992, from Tho World Bank, UgandaGrowing Out of Povet, Marh 31, 1993. Il 1988 figure includes53,S93 parastaal employes; 1992 figur includes216,800 parastal employees;data fromThe World Bank, Uganda:r wing Ot of Povrty, March 31, 1993. 3.. For 1989, from HumsanDevpmewt Roflt. 1992, UNDP, uless othw ottd. 231Throughout the 1980's this ranged from 15-20% acOrding to, Angola- Publc Epediture Isswesand PJorie Durifnansition to a Market Economy,June 1993, World Bank. 24/From Nintbia. PovertyAniaton with Sustainabk Growth,World BankCoutry Study, 1992. 711 Figure is % of GDP; from World Bank Nicargua countrydepartment. 7_1 As percent GNP. From WorldMilitary Kvpendituresand Arms Trafers, 1990, US. Arms Control and Disanment Agency. .2/For 1980, 1985and 1989as a percentof GNP. From WorlMlitrwy Eapendiuresand Anmu Transfe. 1990, and from Worl DevelopmentReport 1993, The Wodd Bank. 27_11992 'gures from Angola PublicExpenditure Issues and PrioritiesDring Tranirion to a Market Econony, June 1993, World Bank Grem cover itrnal report No. tt649-ANG. 22/ For 1987from WorldMilitary Erpendituresand Arms Transfers,1990, U.S. Arms Controland Dsarmamet Agency. 22I Ftomthe World Bank, Motawnbque,Second PublicExpendtre Review (green cover), Deciber 31, 1992. 1/ From WorldDevelopment Report 1993 and ambiaPoverw Alleviationwith Sutainable Growth,World BankCountry Study, 1992. 3/ From World Bank, Nicaagua Country Dcept. U1 From, *Warto Peac Tansion in Uganda, in Fnance & Development,June 1993. 34 For 1980and 1985 frm Worl MiiUtwyErpendiures and Anzs Dhmvfers,1950, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmmnt Agency. 71/From HmunanDvelopmt Report, 1992, combines spding for Educationin 1989and Heath in 1987, unkss otherwisenoted. &1 From SPA tabls. f21Fige combinesnumber of toops i govement's armed forceswith number of combatantsin guerrila forces. 3U 4S,OO projeted to be demobilizodfirst year, 9,000 secoondyear. 39/ Iwcldes SADF (South Afican spportd mility forces). NQ/Offiia figute as of August, 1993according to CLAV-OASofficial. Deobizationd R_adon of MiliaryPwon=d

CHAPTERI OBJECTIVESOF DEMOBILIZATION/REINTEGRATIONPROCESS

15. This chapterprovides background on the contextin whichDRPs have occurredin the cases studied. It also illustratesthe link betweenthe contextand the priorityplaced on differentobjectives by governments,particularly In countriesemerging from conflict. The chapterthen touchesupon how the program'sobjectives can influencethe selectionof who is to be demobilized.A set of criteriausefill for evaluatingthe successof demobilization/reintegrationprograms is also presented.

POLIICAL CONTEXTANM PROGRAM OBJECIVES

16. The spectrumpresented in Box IL1 illustratesthe diverserange of situationsin whicha DRP may take place. Someof the case studycountries may not fail neady into one category,such as Chad whichhas intermit small-scalefighting between armed factions but has one governmentin place. In

Box 1.1: lhe Conextfor Demobilaon

Ey | E| ogovwime n t | S g g E : E 2 E g

Fi~~~~~~I I 3 pE 'o1gi iifrig 4!tftE l

six of the seven cases studied, countries were recendy emerging from a period of civil strife. In the coultrles such as Angola or Zimbabvwewith protrate civil war, the DRP process and the choice of who would stay in and leave the armed forces took on political significance; experience in te seven countries studied suggest 1t the more ambiguous the conflict and its termination, the more politicaly charged the

Chapr 2 - OoNec& of D_don/_ Pago 11 Demobilio and Reintsation of Mkrj Prsonnel

contxt for a DRP since followingcivil war power often stems from controlover armed forces.2 In such cases, the decisionsof whetherto reducethe size of the armed forces, and whomto demobilize, ofte becamepart of the peace agreementand were more likely to be influencedby the threat of one group reurning to conflict, and claimingthat benefitsof demobilizationand reintegrationprograms and/orpositions in a new armedforce were awardedinequitably or basedon partisanor ethnicallegiance (see also para. 27). In contrast, in countries where there is a clear winner or clearly established government,as in Uganda,decisions on who is to receivebeneflts, and who is to be demobilized,have appearedless complicated (with a greaterfocus on technicalfactors such as the preferredskill mix needed for the restructuredarmy) and may requireless negotiation.

17. The cases of Chad and Angolailustrate the importanceof commitmentby all concerned parties (throughsufficient incetives) and of leadershipto the success of DRPs. The demobilization decisionin Chad followedthe armed overthrowof the Habre regime in December1990. Te new governmentproclaimed gatthe DRP's objectivewas to improve security and reinforce stability, democratization,and nationalunity by buildingan integrated,professional and smallerarmed force. Chad's primary foreignsupporter, France, and other donorsalso made it clear that the demobilization of a percentageof the armed forcesand a reductionin militaryexpenditures were importantcriteria for fure assistance.However, despite substi Frenchtechical and financialassistance, demobilizon was, at times, challengedby military factionalism(which makes assessingunderlying commitment difficult),the long-standingtradition of resortingto force to gain power, and the strengthof the military factionsto block reforms if they do not perceivethe reform to be in their interest. In Chad's initial demobilizationprogram of 1991, some militarycommanders had little incentiveto let troops go, and someworried all woulddepart oncethe substantialcash benefits were announced, thus diminishingtheir military strength.1 Without sufficientincentive or the commitmentof key military stakeholders, demobilizationis vulnerableto reversal(as in Angola)or slow initialimplementation (as in Chad).

18. In Angola,the LisbonAgreement of May, 1991 endedthe 16-yearlong civil war between the MPLAgovernment of Angola(and its armedforces, FAPLA) led by Jose Eduardodos Santoswith supportfrom Cuba and the former SovietUnion, and the UNfTA guerrillas(and their militarywing, FALA)led by JonasSavimbi, who weresupported by the U.S. and SouthAfrica. The LisbonAgreement coveredthe cease-fire,integration of the two (and thus demobilizationof a percentageof each), and multipartyelections scheduled in 1992. The UN AngolaVerification Mission (UNAVEM) counted 74,400 troops assembledin 46 camps throughoutthe country in June 1992. Demobilizationhad

W One couldargue that this lie behindthe diffiultes encounteredin the demobilizationprogram in Cambodiadespite substanta efoa, in tenns of both financialand pemonal resoures, by the UN and donorsto negotiatea peae accord and design d tion egrtion program. Condering politicalcontrol to be their dominant motivation,the KbmerRouge saw Itt icentive to accedeits powerbase.

Aftaerlittle progrs in its first demobilizationattempt in 1991,the Chadiansrevised the tenns of the progam and sabteda new progrm in July 1992. 12/ Futher Repostof the Secetay-Generalon the UnitedNations Angola Verificaton Mission (Unavem 11),- June 24, 1992.

Page 12 Chapter2 - Objctves of Demobilization/ReinegrationProcess Demobilizationand Reintegrationof Miitary Personnel

begun, albeit behind schedule,but was reversedfollowing the September1992 electionsin which the results were contestedby UNITA, and war resumed.

19. The case of Zimbabwe(Box 11.2)provides another illustrationof the interplaybetween the transitionto peace and the demobilizationprocess. Prior to demobilizationin 1981,Zimbabwe had been embroiledin a protractedcivil/independence war in whichtwo Africanparties continued armed resistance againstwhite rule in Rhodesia. The two Africanparties were the ZimbabweAfrican NationalUnion (ZANU)party of RobertMugabe (and its militarywing, the ZimbabweAfrican National Liberation Army - ZANLA),and the ZimbabweAfrican People's Union (ZAPU)under the leadershipof JoshuaNkomo (andits militarywing, the ZimbabwePeople's Revolutionary Army - ZIPRA),which both operated from neighboringcountries, ZANU in Mozambiqueand ZAPU in Zambia. The war endedin 1979with the signingof the LancasterHouse agreements which established:(1) the terms of the Constitutionfor an IndependentZimbabwe; (2) the terms for free elections;and (3) a BritishCommonwealth-supervised ceae-fire. Afterwinning the electionsin 1980,Robert Mugabe of the ZANUgovemment became Prime Ministerand appointedhimself as Ministerof Defense. Followingprotracted negotiations, Mugabe gave managementof the Ministryof HomeAffairs, with control over the 8,iOman policeforce, to his rival, Joshua Nkomo. Beginningin April of 1980, the governmentimplemented force restructuring, demobilizationand reintegrationprograms for all three combatantgroups (ZANLA, ZIPRA, and Rhodesianforces) with the objectiveof buildingan integrated,professional, and ethnicallybalanced armedforce of 25,000.

Box 11J2:lhe PoliticalDimension of Demobilizationin Zimbabwe

. gg g , gEE . .g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. ...

20. In Nicaragua,the decisionto demobilizewas the result of extensiveregional and internal negotiations. On August7, 1989,after a decadeof civil war betweenthe NicaraguanResistance (NR) and , t the presidelt. of Costa Rica, El Salvador,Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua signedtFe TelaAccord which caled for the NRto voluntarilydisarm and acceptrepatriation to Nicaragua or to a third countrywith the supervisionof the UN and the OASb However,efforts to disbandthe

120 In this study,for simplicity,we wid ref r to al of the insurgentfsctions as NR. The Nicavrguaninsurgents, known as lcontras,*were not actuallya unifiedgroup, but includedat leastthree factions. The main force,the Nicaraguan Resistance,operated in nothern Nicaragua,mainly from basesin Honduras. The FrenteSur operatedin southern Nicaragua,at times frombases in CostaRica. The smallestgroup, Yatama, was an allianceof severalAtlantic Coast Indiangroups. Each of the three groupssigned separate demobilization agreoments with the govenment,although all in the samegeneral time period and undersimilar terms and procedures.

Chapter2 - Objectivesof Demobilzaon/RcintgrationProcess Page 13 Demobilizationand Reintegrationof Mituy Personnel

NR laggeduntil after the electionof the NationalOpposition Union (UNO),led by VioletaChamorro, on February25, 1990. One monthaft the elections,the NR and President-electChamorro signed the ToncontinAccord which providedfor the disarmamentand demobilizationof the NR. Under this agreement, Mrs. Chamorro pledged her new government 'to intercede before the appropriate governmentsto obtain-for the durationof the demobilizationprocess-humanitarian aid for membersof the NicaraguanResistance as well as the necessarymedical infrastructure to provideneeded attention for the victims of the conflict.2' These peace agreementsdid not address demobilizationof the Sandinista'sPeople's Army (EPS) and no arrangementswere made for restructuringof the regulararmed forces, nor for the integrationof any of the NR into the regular army.WyHowever, in June of 1990, PresidentChamorro announced that her governmentwould cut the EPS by more than 50 percent, to 41,000by August, 1990.A

21. Some leadersof the NR violatedthe agreementand tried to avoid demobilizingby moving as many troops from Hondurasinto Nicaraguaas possiblebefore the demobilizationprocess of NR in Hondurasbegan. However,on April 19, 1990,the leadershipof the EPS and the NR agreedto a cease- fire and a timetablefor demobilizingall NR troops. On April 20, NR forces began assemblingin designated,UN-supervised areas in Nicaraguaand Honduras. They agreedthat acWtaldemobilization would not begin until after PresidentChamorro's inauguration on April 25. Under the agreement, demobilizationwas to occur over a 47-dayperiod, endingon June 10, 1990. The U.S. Government, which was financingthe DRP of ex-NR, was restrictedby its own policy from financingthe ex- Sandinistas;thus, the demobilizationof these two forceswere treated as separateprograms with separate benefitsA. The particularpolitical circumstances-the change in governmentand the mutualcredibility of the negotiatedsettlement-were apparentlycontributing factors to the initial success the DRP achieved.1y

22. In Mozambiqueplans for a UN-monitoredcease-fire (for October 1992) in the civil war between the FRELIMOgovernment and the RENAMOrebel group were fialized in the Rome Agreementsigned on August7, 1992. Plans for demobilizationof roughly 83,000 combatantsare

I#! 'Tex of the ToncontinAccord for the Disrmamentand Demobilizationof theNicaraguan Resistance," March 23, 1990,reproduced in Pder Kornbluh(ad.), Mcaragw 7he Makingof US. Policy.1978-1990, Vokune 1, Alexandra, Va.: The NationalSecurity Archive and Chadwyck-Healey,Inc., 1991; on January10, 1990,Nicaraguan Resistance leadershad been informedby U.S. AssistantSecretary of StateBeanard Aronson that U.S. aistance to the NRwould be haltedfoUowing the February25 eloctonbut that the BushAdmiitation wouldseek to securefndling to assist the demobiization/reptriationpmress (in Korbluh (ed.), op. cit, p. 121). I5/ The ageeme did, however,provide for the formationof a specialpolice force, known as the Rural Police, comprisedof formerNR, for the DevelopmentPoles (described later) or where concentrationsof NR setted. J1/ From 'ChamorroReveals Size of Cutback,"Latin American Weekly Report, WR-90-24, June 28, 1990, p.3 . 1C/ Accordingto one artice, the "politiizationof humanitarianaction continued,which had marked much of the involvementof governmentsin Nicaraguaduring the previousdecade. Conditionsof USAIDand someinernational organizations,such as excludingex-Sandinista soldiers as beneficiaries,undermined rather than supportedthe search for longer-termreconciliation." from Hwnankarban Chalenges in CentralAmerica Learing the Lessonsof Recent ArmedCo,icts, Eguizabal,et al. /I Someobservers now argue, with the benefitof hindsight,that the cease-fireagreement was not specificenough concerningthe terms of demobilization;they pointto El Salvador'speace agreement as a belterexample to follow.

Page 14 Chapter2 - Objectivesof Demobilization/RecitegrtionProcess Demobilizatonand Reintegrationof Militay PesoMnnel

currentlyunderway. In additionto the objectiveof cementingpeace, some observers have noted that with the declinein externalmilitary assistance from formerEastern bloc countries, the fiscalburden of paying the militaryhas becomesubstantial.

23. In Namibia,the decisionto demobilizewas characterizedby substantialUN involvement,and was considereda preconditionfor the transitionto independenceand free elections. For ten yearsprior to independence(March, 1990), Namibiahad been embroiledin a conflict involvingthree primary militaryforces: the SouthAfrican troops (SADF);locally recruited South West Africantroops (SWATP and paramilitary);and the PLAN guerrillasof SWAPO's militarywing based in Angola. The UN Resolution435 governingthe transitionto peace called for the completionof demobilizationbefore elections. Thus, most of the SADFand SWATFtroops had been confinedto barracksand demobilized by the beginningof June. The opposingPLAN guerrillas were to reportto UNTAG-monitoredbases in Angola from where they, in civilianstatus, would return to Namibiawith the other civiliansbeing repatriatedunder UN supervision. The UN-supervisedelections were held in November 1989, and SWAPO's Samuel Nujomawas elected presidentA2 Thus, in contrastto Zimbabwe,there was no Namibianarmy at independencesince almost all forces were demobilizedprior to the cessationof conflict. The challengeof creatingan integratedarmed force (andthus decisionsof whomto demobilize) was not centralto the establishmentof peace; it arose only after independencehad been declared.

24. As illustratedin the descriptionsabove, in casesinvolving transition from an internalconflict, the priority governmentsplace on differentobjectives for a demobilizationeffort derive, in part, from the circumstancesof the conflicttermination. In Ethiopia(not one of the case studies)and Namibia, where the conflict terminationwas less ambiguousrelative to other cases followingcivil war, the governmentsplaced priority on securityconcerns-defusing tension and rapidlyrelocating and dispersing the defeatedforces. In Angolaand Zimbabwe,where peace was reachedbased on compromiseamong opposingforces, programplamers viewed demobilizationprimarily as a tool for preventingfurter outbreaksof violence,and more emphasiswas placed on negotiatingreductions in force sizes among differentarmed groups. In additionto the primaryobjectives, governments have often cited other reasons for demobilization;such as, maximizingthe transfer of resourcesfrom the militaryto more productive sectors, ensuringthat demobilizedcombatants return to productiveeconomic activity, and improvingthe securitysituation to pave the way for stabilityand economicgrowth. Table 11.1illustrates the various types of objectivesof a DRP and a set of indicatorsthat can be used to gaugethe level of successin achievingthese specificobjectives. The DRP objectivescited in the countriesstudied are summarized in Table 11.2,in order of the governments'stated priority.

25. In the one case where the demobilizationeffort occurredin the absenceof a recent, major conflict(Uganda), fiscal and economicobjectives were accordedpriority and the decisionof whetherand how to reducethe size of the armedforces were drivenlargely by technicalconsiderations (the desired

19/ In fact, morethan ten yearsearlier, In 1978,the UN SecurityCouncil had approvedResolution 435 outlininga plan for Namibia'stranition to indepdeneoounder a UN TransitoryAssistance Group (UNTAG). However, it wasnot implementeduntil 1989/90. In addition,the US brokereda mulinationalagreenent linling the departureof Cuban soldiersfrom Angola to the withdrawalof SouthAfrican troops fromNamibia and the latter's independencewhich was signedin December1988 by SouthAfrica, Cuba and Angola;but not by any Namibianparty.

Chapter2 - Objectivesof Demobiizaton/ReintegraionProcess pag 1S Desoblzon and Reintegrtionof Milituy ilersonn=l professionalcomposition of the remainingarmed force and the budget target); also, the timing of the demobilizationmay have less significancefor national security, allowingplanners time to carefully preparethe programsand institutions.In recent years Ugandahas been undergoinga processof social and economicreconstruction following 15 years of civil strife, and has achievedincreased growth and economicstability. The govermDent'sdecision in May 1992 to demobilize50,000 combatantsover a period of three years cameafter reflectionand analysisby governmentand donorson how to capitalize on the improvedsecurity environment and reallocatepublic sector expenditureto the social sectors.3' Seniorgovernment officials, including military officers, acknowledged the securitysituation had improved and that the militarybudget must absorbfewer goverment resources.

26. The case studiessuggest that the DRP objective,and perceivedpriorities, may differ among donors,the government(and various goverment offices),and the military.At the outsetof the program, such differencesin perceivedpriorities may not be apparent,but often as the programprogresses and becomesbetter defined,such differencesaffect choicesof programdesign and can have a substantial Impacton programresults. For example,in Zimbabwepeace was sustainedfollowing demobilization, but after the programwas completed,17% of the demobilizedsoldiers were unemployedand another 55% had been absorbedinto the civil serviceand the army; thus, the government'slatter goal, shown in Table II.2, of reducingthe size of the armedforces to be commensuratewith the securityrisks and fiscal constraintswere given less attentionthan immediatepolitical and securityconcerns. In Uganda, the Armyleadership adopted the demobilizationprogram, but may be motivatedby a differentobjective; the militarywould like to professionalizeits armed forces (imcludingimproving training and purchasing equipment),and may viewthe demobilizationas a tool for reducingthe wagecomponent of the military budgetto allow for this reform. Tbe government'sprimary objective, however, is to achievea peace dividend(estimated at aroundUS$14 million per year by the end of the program)to be used for priority developmentexpenditures. In order to ensurethat this peacedividend is achieved,explicit objectives of the program includea permanentnet reductionin the armed forces, no replacementof demobilized veterans,and the barringof veteransfrom employmentin the civilor militaryservice.

27. In some countries,even those not emergingfrom recent civil conflict,the power that may be associatedwith control over factionsin an army means that demobilizationmay be viewed with suspicionby certaingroups; they may suspect that the underlyingobjective of the DRP is to squeezethem out of the militarystructure, thus consolidating the powerof one particularopposing faction or group(see also Box 11.2on the suspicionsof guerrillasin Zimbabwe). It is for this reason that selectioncriteria used to determinewbich combatants will be demobilizedand which willjoin the new, restructuredforce often are importantsymbols for the underlyingobjective of the program. Withouttransparent selection criteria, demobilizationmay be viewedby somegroups as a ploy to achievea governmentor faction's motives;depending on the particularpolitical situation, this may slow or halt programimplementation (i.e. large numbersmay not reportto camps).

2M Thisalso followeda pubLicexpendure review which analyzed the sectomalcompositon of expenditures.

Page 16 Chapter2 - Objectivesof Denobilization/ReintegationProces Demobilizationantd Reintegration of MilitaryPersonnel

Table 11.1: Motivatonsand Objecdvesof Demobilization/ReintegrationPrograms

MOTIVA oBJECTIVES INDICATORSOP SUCCESS TION

Scourty * Reducenumber of asmscfircu ing and prevalenceof o Peaoeprocess sustained mines * Reduotionin numberof guns oirculating * Maketnsition fmomwar to peace * Romovalof minesfrom agricultural land,transportation routes * Defuseimmediate tensions and disperseformer * Ex-combatantsdipersed combats * No resumptionof fightingor oriminality * Restucture,professionalize armed foroes to be more * Resumptionof normaleconomio activity; inorease in GNP offioientfor a givenseourity situation * Desiredregional, ethnic, political, officer-enlisted * Reducetheat of formercombatants returning balancein armedforces to arms,involved in politicalor oriminal * Anry discipline,training, professionalism, oivilian violence(short/medium-term) control- smaler, more efficientarmed forces

PolitiOal * Consolidatepostion of civilwar victors * Politcal stability * Reducepotentil anti-governmentarmed opposition * Multipartypolitics, including free, fair elections, c Jncreasegovernment control over armedforces resultshonored by all parties * Consolidateposition of newgovernmnent * Desiredregional, ethnic, political, officer-enlisted * Increasenaional unity,reduce factionalism balancein armedforces Economic * Resumonormal economic activity, unconstained by * Reductionin militaryexpenditures securityconcerns * Resumptionof normaleconomic activity o Reducethreat of formercombatants returning * Sustainabil;tyof newvctivities/occupations to anns, involvedin politicalor criminal * GNP per capitaand GNP growthrate comparedto violence beforeprograms implementod * Increasesocial, economic stabiliy * Changein overallunemployment and % ex-combatants * Ensurecombatant returnto trod v (non-military) unemployed activityand minimizeresultant unemployment | % formercombatants employed in militaryand publicsector . Improvecombtants' skils applicableto * Resultsof oducation,training programs compared to civilianlife combatants'preferences

Piscal * Maximizefinancial peace dividend or * Sustainedreductions in militaryexpenditures, public maximizecost savings:transfer resources ector employment frommilitary to other economicsectors e Shiftallocation of publicexpenditures from militay * Avoidinflating pubLic sector and militaryto to productivesectors employex-combatants * LAvelof reabsorptionof formercomnbatants into

Overall * Progmrmscost-effetve rlative to gas in * Sustainedreductions in militar expenditures,public economy,seurity, governmentfinances, sector poiticalobjectives * Politicalobjectives accomplshed * Cost/benefitanalysis of cost of demobilization/reintegrationprograms vs. public financesavings, economic, political, and security gains

ChWer 2 - Objectivesof DemobilizationR egrtion Procss Page 17 Demobllztion and Reintegationof MilitauyPersonnel

Box 113: heSignfilcance of SelectionCriteria

28. In Chad, for example,the governmentset broad goals for the numberto join the new army and to be demobilized.Since the first phase of demobilizationhas been on a voluntarybasis, as far as can be ascertained,no selectioncriteria (either technicalor partisan)were publiclyannounced concerningwho was to be demobilized.However, for the secondstage of the programwhich will begin in November1993, there maybe no more volunteers,and selectioncriteria will need to be defined. In Mozambique, donor countries have requested demobilizationprogram procedures be open or "transparent"for the selectionof the demobilizationcandidates they are helpingto finance; a simple questionnairewill be fllledout on each soldierto be demobilizedand enteredinto a database,which will be providedto potenial donors. In Ugandathe Army Councilannounced selection criteria publiclyon the radio.

INDICATORSOF SUCCESS

29. A DRP canbe evr4uatedaccording to severalcriteria, as outlinedin TableI. 1, although programresults canbe more accuratelyassessed by keepingin mindthe govemment'sinitial priorities. For example,designers of Namibia'sdemobilization and repatriationprogram were more concernedwith disarming and disbandingcombatants, and returning Nanibians to their home territory than with providingtargeted reintegration programs. Thus, basedon the programplanners' priority of satisfying the pre-conditionsfor elections(including the completedemobilization of forces), the programcould be considereda successin spiteof the subsequentproblems with high unemployment among the demobilized. Also, real tradeoffs often exist between maximizingthe number of ex-combatantsemployed, and achievinga longer-termfiscal dividend. In Namibia,the government'sfailure to builda new armedforce of 10,000troops (only7,000 werehired) wouldbe assessedas favorableusing fiscal criteria;however, the factthat an additional3,000 ex-combatants remained unemployed may be unfavorablefrom a political point of view.

30. In addition, a DRP is but one tool in the transitionfrom war to peace and from investmentin the militaryto investmentin other sectorsof the economy. Therefore,apparent 'failures' may be due to politicalor economicconstraints and not stem from inherentflaws in programdesign. Economicfactors, such as the low absorptioncapacity of the economy,compounded by the low education level and lack of experienceof many ex-combatants,may result in low employmentof ex-combatants, despitethe best effortsof programdesigners.

Page 18 Chapter2 - Objeciivesof Demobilizaition/ReintegrationProcess DemobilzatIonand Reintegration of Militay Personnel

31. Finally,one of the problemsassociated with assessingthe successof a DRP lies in the difficultyof determininghow the political,security and economicsituation would have evolvedin the absenceof such a program. In Zimbabwe,the demobilizationof the three armies and the integrationof the remainingcombatants into a newnational (although fractionalized and largerthan planned)army could be regardedas a success in the medium-termusing security and political criteria.u' The tendency towardorganized violence was reduced,and, as a formercombatant lamented in a November1989 press article, '... the revolutionaryarmies of ZIPRAand ZANLAare todaynon-existent as a socialor political force.*' Therehave been few serioussecurity problems since that time. Othersuccesses in Zimbabwe includeat least a partialresumption of normaleconomic activity since the conflictended. Despitethe increase in the size of the armed forces well beyond the desired size, military expendituresas a percentageof GDP declinedfrom 8.8% in 1980 to 6% in 1985, and as a percentageof total central governmentexpenditures, declined from 25.4% to 14.4%in the same years, showingsome evidenceof a "peacedividend." The reintegrationeffort has been less successful,given the high numberof ex- combatantssubsequently rehired by the government(a total of 55% in the civil service and military, combined)and a relativelyhigh level of unemployedex-combatants. Nonetheless, it wouldbe impossible to predictthe potentialhuman and economiccost had no DRP been implemented.

32. The same question, concerningthe possible course of events had no programbeen implemented,could be posed in Nicaragua. Recentreports of the rearmingof formermembers of the NR and demobilizedSandinista soldiers (commonly referred to as recontrasand recompas)and clashes betweenthem appearto have cast a shadowon the successof the DRP. One of the most importantpoints of tensionin programimplementation concerned broken promises to provideland to each ex-combatant. Disputesover landtitles and accessto land combinedwith general economic stagnation, a severedrought, and, accordingto somesources, the exclusionof ex-Sandinistasfrom receivingcertain benefits, to cause the current unrest. ' Nonetheless,the numberof rearmed combatantsis generallybelieved to total around 1,000-comparedto the over 22,500 NR combatantswho were demobilized. The program succeededin deliveringassistance in a cost-effectivemanner, supplyinga wide range of goods and servicesto demobilizedsoldiers and their familiesover a period of two years for about US$393per person, and providedthe basic necessitiesof life during the initial phase of their reintegrationinto Nicaraguansociety. The reintegrationprogram also providedcrucial technical and materialsupport which facilitatedthe re-entryof a numberof formerNR combatantsinto the labor market, assistedthem with legalproblems, and madeefforts to protecttheir human rights. However,because of Nicaragua'sdeep- seated economicand politicalproblems, it is difficultto assess how muchbetter or worse off both the former combatantsand the country'ssituation would have been in the absenceof such programs.

zi' Shoty aRerdemobilizon therewas somearmed banditry and isobted incidentsof small-scalefighdng. Howevr, thesedid not pensstand did not hampera returnto economicactivity. 2/ SwidayMail, 5 November1989. 2/ Theargument that the continued polticization of aidadded to tensionsis madein Hmnanita,n Chalengesin Cenrl Amerca:Lwrnng e Lessonsof RecentArnedConlcts, Eguizabal,Crisina et al. 1993.

Chapter2 - Objectivesof DemionblRevtion Process Phgp19 Table 11.2: Success of Demobilizaon, Reintegradon, and Demiltariaton Programs

Crteria Angoa Chad Mozanique Namila Naragua Ugan Zimbabwe Staed Objectives ^Suain casefire *Restoresecurky *Carryout Iprepce *Defuseinmediat eS*stainpeacc 'Reduce mbitar *Sustainpaoce *lmprovesecurity, socal and 'Restructure and demobizationto tensions proces, defuse expenditue, use poss, defuse (m order of politicals y, subsequent professionalie milta mprow socia st b 'Build new, tensions svi in tensions priority) economicdevopment *Reducebuwden of & rdce arms in restuctued army epatriate, resettle productivesct 'Demobilize 'Rcinte cmbaan into militay expendiur cdiaton *Hope for ex-NR oReduc sie of gueias civiliansociety pave way for 'Reduce size of anmed 'spontaneous' 'Reduce aiDita amed forc coDss- 'Resrcur intega multipartydemoracy formcs rntegraon expencditures tnt with socuiy ed, etically baS- *Reducemalita Restructuretrmed mdi ancedamed foce expenditure forces *Resela veterans 'Alin size of armed oncaesocil secuity *Transferpeace 'Pofessionaliz forcs withthleats dividendto amy (reduceit) productivesetors*Assist ex-

______intocivilian life __ WI,m.+(. e W¢ ai. NA a Transitionfromn war Peace proces not sustaied; At peace; inmterttnt Peaceprocess sustined PeCeCprocess Penceprocess No conflict Peac process to peace encampodcombaants resumed conflict;delays of I yr. to date, athough sustined; no largo- suained; NR sustaind; no lage- conflict in demobilizingbut demobilztion delayed sale fightinr. combatants scale fighting,forces progressingas of am3 due to need to set up combatants demobilizedbut demobilized in ons and demobilized smalscale fighting RENAMOoffices in resumed Maputo .~~______.ap.to ___,______:___ _

Demilitarizationl Return to war, failureto Banditry,fighting UN peacekeepingforces Some improvems Smallreduction in SecurityEstablhed disarm ecamped combatants continue;no argo-scale planto disarm in security;but arms due to disamament inresed mi rate disaant progrms; but ba, snal- scale fighting ______continue

Resump_ionof At war Amed banditryand High small incrase in No confict Economicgrowh normalecono fightingcontinue to unemployment; GNPin 1992; improed afner1980 movitq hamper -o inceased cnme bandiry, rural economicactivity in conflit political many areas of country insabilty hamper Prouton_ crtei Angoa Chad Mo bi Na.nia Niaragu uganda Zhubobwe ECONOMIC(cont.) At war Too earl to asses,,but Too earl to asa, but Usaccalto Part Sceew Too ear to asia, Paral Succsr 55% few rnegrtin no eintation d:unp ent higher unemploy- retegration Combatants of ex-combatatam rehun to progam plannedothet pgms planned rate 3040%; pubfic ment/under- proms produce actvity an being paid by govt. 6% in tan cash paymes secor empiyint employnt (54%); plaond foral employnmen inceresed land distribuion 17%uemplod majorty NR self sufficient

Maximizingpaeo At war Hiing in public Dese spending dividendand trnsaer Currentbudget High rebsortion sector surgpd;size and size of miutar etantes of resoures to tedet a into military,pubic of armed forcescut; slashed;publc substantialdecline in sector setor (55%);,sinc of -f defens spendingas sectorcut lal esourcesto the miita ind; % of govt spending miary (from defen as %GDP cut 32.5% of total local declind 19805, expendituresin incad slightlyby FY9/91 to an 1991albeit stil esmaed 16.7% in bwwr tmanlavel i FY 993) 1980

£ World Bankestiat. Demobiiztonand Reintegrationof MilitaryPersonnel

CHAVTERm

DESIGNOF DEMOBILIZATIONPROGRAMS

33. As shown in ChapterOne, demobilizationand reintegrationcan be brokendown into several stages. In reality, however,the distinctionand sequencingmay not be as clear-cut, and the processdoes not necessarilyproceed as smoothlyas portrayed. The steps of a demobilizationprogram are as follows(although they do not alwaysoccur in the order shown,and may overlap):

* Encampmentof combatantsor their confinementto barracks; * Disarmamentof combatants; * Transportationand transitionof combatantsto civilianlife; * Reintegrationprograms.

This chaptersummarizes experience with the design, and implementationof demobilizationprograms; managementand Institutionalissues will be coveredin the followingchapter.

ENCAMPMENT

34. In countriesemerging from a civil war, encampmentinvolved: (1) announcingand publicizingthe demobilizationprogram; (2) directingcombatants to report to assemblypoints, and in some cases, providing their transportationto the camps; (3) providingsalaries and adequatefood, clothing, shelter and medicalcare to camp occupants;(4) registrationand documentation,including performinga census,maintaiing a recordof combatants'arrival and departures,providing identification and other documents;(5) ensuringthat desertion,especially with arms, is minimized;and (6) disarming combatantsprior to their demobilization.In the conflict-relatedcases studied,separate camps were set up for each force, and the assemblyareas were locatedthroughout the country,generally in the units' operatingareas. While in the campsawaiting demobilization, in some cases combatantscontinued to draw a salary, and were providedwith food, shelter, and medicalcare. Foreignforces involvedin the conflict, such as the SouthAfrican forces in Namibiaand Cuban forces in Angola, were confinedto barracksas well pendingdeparture to their home countries.

35. The variouscases show that the numberof combatantswho actuallyreport to assembly areas and registerfor demobilizationbenefits may be lower-or higher-than estimated,depending pardy on: (1) how securemilitary leaders feel in reporting to the campsand their confidencein the peace process;and (2)the incentivesoffered and conditionsin the camps. In Zimbabwe,guerrilla leaders held back an estimated10,000-15,000 active guerrilla combatants in reserveacross the borderas an insurance policy. In Angola,widespread cheating occurred on both sides during the demobilizationprocess: the governmentreportedly shifted 10,000 to 20,000 eliteFAPLA troops intoa paramilitarypolice force, and UNfTAkept its heaviestweapons and 25,000or more of its best fightershidden in the bush. Although combatantsnot officiallyregistered at the assemblypoints wouldbe deniedeligibility for demobilization supportand benefits,this was apparendynot a sufficientincentive to motivatemany combatantsto report to the camps,nor to dissuademany more fromdeserting once they arrived. In Namibia,SWAPO forces

ChapWer3 - Deaignof DemobilizationProgmms Pag 23 Demobilizationand Reintegrion of MilitaryPeaonnel violatedthe cease-fireagreement in an attemptto avoidencampment and demobilizationby crossingfrom Angolainto Namibia.

36. The case studieshighlight the importanceof the encampmentstage to the subsequent successof the DRPprocess, as describedin Boxm.1. The lessonslearned in Angolaare alreadybeing appliedto Mozambiquewhere program planners are tryingto ensurethat conditionsin the assemblyareas are decent and acceptable. Becauseof food shortagesand budgetarydifficulties in Mozambique,the internationalcommunity has been asked to supply the assemblyareas with the main staples required (maize,rice, beans, oil, sugar, and soap). To supportthe assemblyareas, a projectedvolume of 3,000 metrictons of food per monthwill have to be procuredabroad, regularly reach the camps,and be fairly distributed for up to 120,000,which includessoldiers' dependents. Each assemblyarea will have a health clinic,which may also servethe surroundingcivilian population. The UN observerswill confirm food deliveriesand report regularlyto their headquarterson the availabilityand distributionof food. Medicalexams, basic preventative health care, and healtheducation will be providedto soldiersand their dependentsby at least two health workersin each assemblyarea.

Box 1.1: Encampmentin Angola

Mi E......

thtafaml Xis E4.ai24dChapw E Ec~~| Wof EM XzadonPeodtin 3 - DE|inte atsDe.oa n elcroa_ ME~~~EOf W)htez~ w 1n ona~t ~ . E~ .wi m) Er ig* D f~~~~~~~~~~~~e~Eeogn.o th nir=tfoW,~L~: 37 p Ing casgeo~*~smwich fbre downsiz~inginot01 relatedg tota peaceprocess asein~Uanda solierianE wee confinted4.to44tShioX2itOz thi ae during~iwth i.es.m demo .biztoiprces.nItn Chd,th demorlyotfce . restut.uri~ngroes.sengiafieou un~eitbyunit becauermannits (Alackfie fareiorbaes and arecnfinedp there,Wutil instPeructedtjorainthe new avrmy or releasued.nsomeizcases, 4lfer Inflcasesin whc focboni inghintrelted to aI~Sp aceproess,asid Uganda sodirs wereconfnd otei assdinngth dembiiztion prces IonClad, e

demobilizationfforcerestructuring process is beingcarried out unitby unitbecause many units lack fixed bases. Soldiersfrom specific units volunteering for demobilizationor retirementreport to designated areasor basesand are confinedthere, until instructed to join the newarmy or released.In somecases,

Psgb24 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Chapkte3 - Designof Demobilizaton Programs Dauobil;i2tonand Reint :gration of MilikauyPeiwonnol if soldiersare not paid, or there is poor controlover weaponsin camps,confinement to barracksor campsis ineffectiveand security problems arise.

A. Delays

38. Thelength of timerequired for demobilizationvaried, ranging from approximately two monthsfor thefirst phase of thedemobilization program in Uganda,roughly five months in Nicaragua, andsix monthsin Namibia,to overtwo yearsin Chad(still ongoing) and Zimbabwe. Serious delays were commonin all the programsexcept Namibia and Uganda. The higherrates of demobilization occurredin thecountries with the largest ratio of observersto combatants,and with multilateral monitors whohad a broadmandate. One &~ctor which contributed to the initialdelays in Chadwas the ongoing fightingin severalregions, and a lackcof centralcontrol over armyfactions outside the capital,which impededthe censusof the armedforces, confinement to barraclcs,and other demobilization procedures. Also, in Chad'sfirst demobilizationattempt, soldiers remaining in the "residualarmy" (those not yet chosenfor the new army,yet not volunteeringfor demobilization)continued to receivetheir salary throughFrench financing; those who were eligible for retirementpreferred to stay in thisresidual army ratherthan retire with uncertain pension payments from the Chadian government. The French have now addressedthis disincentiveand thiedelays it causedin the currentprogram by discontinuingsalary paymentsto theresidual army. Theprogram's pace improved in July 1993.

Table 11.1: Momhl Rateof DeobWzladon (Sno.of combatantsdemobilized)

C1iapw~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~3I 33,esg3f00oilzfonPoPae2 Demobilizationand Reintegrationof Military Pemaonnel

39. Planners in Angola intended that no combatantswould be demobilizeduntil the encampmentprocess was complete,and all combatantswould be eitherdemobilized or integratedinto the new nationalarmy before the September1992 election. The demobilizationof the two forces ran far behindthe originalrapid scheduleof roughly20,000 per month; althoughthe deadlinefor encampment was August 1991, as of June 1992 only 37% of MPLA-governmenttroops and 85% of the FALA guerrillaforces had been confinedand 20,000 combatantsfrom either side demobilized.2yDelays resultedpartly from logistical problems, including shortages of funds,civilian clothing, and transportation problems;however, more fundamentally,delays stemmed from poor planningand unevencommitment by both sides to the demobilizationprocess. Accordingto one source "the Impatienceof those awaiting demobilizationhad becomea major causeof tension;in severalinstances soldiers from both sides have stormedgovernment offices in regionalcapitals demanding their demobilizationpapers. Othersstormed aerodromesdemanding to be put on planesto Luanda."' By the electiondate, 40,000 troopshad yet to be demobilized,the two oppositionforces were still nearlyintact, and the new, integratedarmy barely formed. Whenthe UNITAleader, Savimbi, was dissatisfied with election results, the continuedexistence of the two armies contributedto a rapid resurgenceof the conflict. Many familiarwith the Angolan situationtheorize that the politicalnecessity of disbandingthe two forcesprior to the electionsled to an unrealistictimetable for the demobilizationof so many troops.

40. In Mozambique,the initial plan for a pre-peacedemobilization was not adheredto, althoughup to 16,000 soldiers were registeredfor demobilization. Contributingfactors to the slow implementationinclude the timerequired to set up the variouscommissions and managementinstitutions, and delaysin settingup officesand stafffor RENAMO,which had a very low representationin Maputo. In contrastwith Angola,elections will not be held for at least a year followingthe cease-fire. Thus, changesin the schedulefor demobilizationwill also likely changethe schedulefor elections.

41. Delays in implementationcan have severe consequences,threatening not only further progressin the demobilizationeffort but also the peaceprocess. Boredomand frustrationin the camps canexacerbate violence, cause a lossof confidencein the demobilizationand reintegrationprocess, a loss of faith in the government'scontrol over the program, and provoke massivedeserions (usuallywith arms) further compoundingsecurity problems. In additionto the lost time and frustrationsfor those encamped,the cost of paying wages and providingother support during the delayspose a substantial fiscal burden(US$42 million in Zimbabwe). In Uganda,the Governmentestimated that each month's delayin demobilizing20,000 soldiers (the Phase1 objective)would cost US$1.5million; through strong leadershipand good planning,it managedto completethe Phase 1 demobilizationin two months.

B. Transportation

42. In someof the cases, transportationproblems were a significantfactor which delayed the encampmentprocess. Many of the assemblyareas in Mozambiquewill be located in rural regions,

I 'Furher Report of the Secreary-Geneualon the Unied Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM11)," June 24, 1992.

21/ "Angola: BulletsThreaten the Ballots,' Africa Coiential (October 9, 1992): 2.

Page 26 Chapter 3 - Design of DemobilzationPrograms Demobi;ationand Reintegmtionof MilitayPersonnel

includingdistricts devastated by the droughtand difficultto reach due to minedand deterioratedroads. Similarly, in Angola, Inadequatetransportation to assemblyareas contributedto program delays. Destructionfrom the war such as unclearedland minesand destroyedbridges impeded movements, the flow of suppliesto the campsand the movementsof monitoringforces. The U.S. belatedlysupplied three Air Forcetransport aircraft to assistin transportingcombatants to assemblyareas, but this was still insufficient.In Namibia,the UNHCRalong with its implementingpartner, the Councilof Churchesin Namibia(CCN), providedair and land transportationfor SWAPOguerrillas and their dependentsto camps and to their final destinations. The provisionof adequatetransportation contributed to rapid completionof Namibia'sdemobilization and repatriationprogram. In Nicaragua,CIAV-OAS arranged for those outsideNicaragua at the time of the demobilizationto be transportedto the reportingcenters, which also contributedto the relativelyrapid rate of demobilizationand processingof the NR who typicallyremained in receptioncenters only for a periodof days.

43. Severalof the programsin the case studiesalso providedtransportation from campsor reportingcenters to combatants'settlement destination. In Uganda, the Governmentcontracted with privatetransport companies to take soldiershome (see Box 111.2).During Chad's 1991demobilization program,many soldiersdid not understandthat they had to find their owntransportation home; the lack of transportationallowances or arrangementsinhibited the dispersionof soldiersand inhibitedmany from returninghome. In Chad's currentprogram, a transportationallowance is providedto demobilizedand retired soldiersand their familiesto returnto their home districts.

Box mf.2: Iroing OutLogistics wth a PilotProgram In Uganda

x~~~ ~~ ......

REGISMATION AND DOCUMETATION

44. Registrationand documentationtasks in the cases studiedincluded performing a census of all combatantsreporting to the assemblyareas and registeringall forcesupon their entry. Experience showsthat it is difficultto obtainan accuratecount, and there are generallydiscrepancies with the force totals claimed prior to the start of the demobilizationlreintegrationprocess. Military leaders may deliberatelyinflate the size of the force to appearmore intimidatingto their oppositionor to receive additionalbenefits, while others under-reportto try to hold a portion of their forces hiddenoutside the camps 'in reserve' to respondto contingencies(see para. 35). The use of nomsde guerre,common in guerrillaforces, firther complicatesthe identificationand countingprocess. In addition,commanders

Chapr 3 - Desip of Dembtion Programs Page27 Demobilizaionand Reintegrationof MilitauyPersonnel often do not know the actualnumber of forces under their commandat a given time. For example,in the case of guerrillaforces, often there are no formal 'rolls' nor salaries,and there are often part-time combatants.

45. Rules have to be establishedto determinewho will be eligible for demobilizationl reintegrationbenefits. In Zimbabwe,planners Initially decided to restrictbenefits to thosewho reported to the assemblypoints and registeredlbr demobilizationby a certain date. However, program administratorsdiscovered that thousandsof combatantshad been held back in reserve,under the orders of their leaders, who were entrustingof the cease-fireprocess. Anotherdilemma was presentedby formercombatants, i.e., ex-guerrillas,who had left service beforethe conflictended. Approximately 10,000additional combatants who had been in hidingand 15,000'Inactive' combatantsalso eventually becameeligible to receivedemobilization and reintegrationbenefits. Programadministrators, known as the DemobilizationDirectorate, set up a series of tests to determinewhether an individualhad actually been a combatantin the liberation struggle, i.e., breakdown and reassemblyof a weapon.A In Nicaragua,program planners underestimated the numberof beneficiaries(60,000 estimated and 117,500 as of July 1991) becauseeligibility criteria were not sufficientlyclear at the outset. This posed a substantialburden to programstaff*Zlv

46. In some cases, such as Nicaraguaand Namibia,a census of the combatantswas not performedprior to the start of the demobilizationprogram; the case of Chad demonstrateshow difficult a censusmay be to carry out, and how rampantfraud can be. In Chad a censuswas performedprior to the 1991demobilization program, but the resultswere unreliable due to substantialmovement of troops in and out of barracks. Means of identificationat the start of encampmentwere insufficientor nonexistent and since there was no roster of combatants,there was no way of verifyingwhether the individualsreporting to the campswere members of the Chadianarmed forces. This enabledboth firad by individualstrying to receivebenefits for whichthey werenot eligible,and cheatingat the levelof the military commanders. Some individualswho had not been heard of for thirty years suddenly *reappeared"to try to claim a share of the bounty. Therewere also reportsof combatantsfrom Sudan posing as Chadiansoldiers to obtaindemobilization benefits. To addresssome of these problems,for Chad's current (revised)DRP, a new army censushas been carriedout of soldiers,and soldiersarriving at campsare photographed,registered, disarmed if they are to demobilizeor retire, and then issuedID cards whichmakes them eligiblefor demobilizationbenefits. In Angola, inadequatemonitoring of the comingsand goings of combatants,a poorly controlledleave policy, and inadequateregistration and documentationprocedures resulted in a large discrepancyin the numberof combatantsclaimed to be present. The discrepancybetween the previouslyidentified number of combatantsin the two forces and

2&/ Prom The ZimbabweProject's Exprienoo in ResettlingEx-Combatants, August 1989.

22/ Initialestmat of progam benefciaies wer basedupon the numberof peoplethe U.S. Govemmenthad suppotted in Honduras. Howeve, this estimatedid not accountfor thwnumber of NRwho wer alreadyliving in Nicaagua, or thosewho were beingrepatiatd by the U.N., but who were not closerelatvs of formerNR members. After discusions bet_e OAS, the U.N. and U.S., it was agreedthat these two groupswould be included. Oneof the lesons damwnby the U.S. Govenmenton this programis to establishclear eligibilitycriteria at the outsetof the progam in orderto avoidthis problemin planning.Prom, U.S. Genal AccountingOffice, Report to Congressional Requesters,'AID to Nicaagua, U.S. Ausisnce SupportsEconomic and SocialDevelopment, " August,1992.

PapSs28 Chapter3 - Designof Demobilztion Program Demobilizationand Reintegrationof Militay Personnel the actual number of UN1TAand MPLA forces in the assemblycamps motivatedthe governmentto declarethat onlythose present in campsas of a certaindate plus thoseauthorized to be absentwould be consideredeligible for demobilizationcompensation packages. Establishingsuch a cut-offdate was seen as necessaryto motivatecombatants to reportto and remainin camps, and to identifymore exactlythe numbereligible for demobilizationbenefits and reintegrationassistance.

47. In Mozambique,the demobilizationplan calls for all troops reportingto the assembly areas to be registeredby their militarycommander under UN supervision. A simple questionnairewill be filledout for each soldier,Including personal information needed to monitorand furtherplan the DRP. The registrationlists and questionnaireswill be sent to the capital(where a data processingunit will be established)which would maintaina data base useful in the planningof reintegrationprograms as was done for the 16,000 goverment soldiers previously registered in preparation for the pre-peace demobilizationprogram which was never actuallyimplemented. In turn, the data processingunit will Issue for each registeredsoldier: (i) a demobilizationIdentification card; (i) an entitlementto travel, accompaniedby closestrelatives, to the districtchosen; and (ii) an entitlementto six monthssalary. These documentswill only be valid after signed and stampedby UN observersat the camps. As demobilizationand force restructuringproceed, the records will be transmittedto the Ministriesof Financeand D)efenseto administerpayment of indemnitysalaries to those being demobilizedor army salaries to those joining the new army. Combatantsin several other case studies were provided Identificationcards. In Uganda,program planners invested substantial time in findingthe I.D. cardleast likely to be subjectto counterfeit.These IDs facilitatethe registrationprocess, and are used for proving eligibilityfor subsequentdemobilization benefits.

48. An accuratecensus and informationprovided from the registrationand documentation proceduresare valuablefor planningother demobilizationsteps, such as budgetingfood and other costs, to designreintgraton programs,and to determinewho will, and who will not, be eligiblefor benefits. This data can be used to plantransportation arrangements and to assessthe cost of relocatingcombatants followingtheir demobilization.Knowing in advancethe intendeddestinations of ex-combatantsand their fmilies can also be used to help make necessarypreparations and impactassessments for the regions wherethey will be concentrated. In Nicaragua,program planners tried unsuccessfullyto direct ex-NR to pre-determinedareas whereservices were to be provided(Development Poles); most NR preferredto return to their home areas. Also requestingcombatants to indicatetheir preferred occupationalfield followingdemobilization can be helpfil for tailoringtraining and employmentprograms. The value of surveysand developinga profileof demobflizingcombatants will be coveredmore fully in ChapterFive.

DIsAIA1a Am WEAPOMCOmmOL

49. In the several of the counties studied(Nicaragua, Chad, Zimbabwe),restoring security followingconflict poses a complexchallenge which appears to be influencedby manyfcors (thepolitical environment,porous borders with countries with active gun markets, low police capacity to professionally and evenlyenforce civil laws, poor or dispersedcontrol over weaponsby splinteredfactions, prevalence of a "weaponsoculture). Tbis challengeis exacerbatd by the lack of economicopportunity that insecurityengenders. In the countriesstudied, establishmentof securitywas attemptedthrough three means: eriforcement(enforcement of a prohibitionfrom open carrying of weapons),persuasion (weapons

ChWar3 - Designof Demobiltion Pogms Pap 29 Demobilizatonand Reintegrationof MilitauyPeronnel

are traded in by the generalpopulation in exchangefor cashor in-kindbenefits), andlorforcefid sezre (typicallycarried out immediatelyfollowing a conflictsituation by an armed force or throughreliance on searches,surveillance, and rewardsfor tips on locationof arms caches).

A. Disumament of Demobilized Combatants

50. In all the cases studied, combatantswere required to turn in a weapon either upon registrationat the campsor upon their demobilization,to becomeeligible for variousbenefits.W Some countrieshave been more effectivethan others In enforcingdisarmament at camps.

51. In Namibia,when paramilitary forces established by SouthAfrica were demobilized prior to the elections,the UN force, UNTAG,also confilscatedand guarded their weaponsand equipment. However,much of the war materialand semi-automaticfirearms continued to be held by combatantsfrom the differentarmed factionsafter their demobilization,since they had created arms cachesduring the transitionalperiod329' To address the proliferationof weapons,the Namibiangovernment announced an amnestyperiod for the surrenderof illegal and unlicensedweapons. The period was subsequently extended,following which heavypenalties were establishedfor unauthorizedpossession of weapons. 'Some successwas achieved,although only a smallfraction of the anticipatedvolume was turned in."'

52. In Angola, UNAVEM-IIeAperienced difficulty in effectivelydisarming combatants becauseof substantialmovement in and out of camps(which at one point had inadequatefood), and an inadequatenumber of monitorswith a limited mandate. Accordingto anecdotalaccounts and UN sources,the collectedweapons were poorly guarded and storedin unsecuredlocations in the camps. UN officialsreported that in some cases, combatantsat the assemblypoints awaitingdemobilization were given their guns back on the understandingthey were used only to hunt for food, fearingthat tens of thousandsof hungry soldierscould turn to violentcrime if provisionwere not made for them. There were no plans by eitherUNAVEM-JI (it was outsidetheir mandate),by Angolanauthorities, or foreign

21V In additonto the exmples sbove,in Mozanibique,it is plannedthat colection of combatants'weapons be supervised by five unarmedUN observersat eachassembly area. In Chad, soldiersare requiredto ur in their weaponsupon demobilizingor rtiring to becomeeligible for relatedbenefits.

I2/ For example,military and paramilitaryforces esablishedby SouthAfrica, totalingroughly 33,000 and including 11,578"citizen forces and "commandos,"were demobilized prior to the elections,with their weapons and equipmeat underUNTAG guard. However,some units were reactivated during clashes with SWAPO groups in April1989, but were soon dembilized again. The SouthAfricansponsored Eoewvd paramiitary force, over 2,000 strong,was ostenaiblyabsored intothe policeas a counterinsurgencyforce prior to implementationof Resolution435. Because the ex-Koevoeunits resembleda mlitary forcemore than a polce force, they actuallyshould have been disbanded witbhthe other military forces. Theycontinued to patrolin armoredand heavilyarmed convoys in the northernregion, and wereviolent, disruptive and repressiveuntil a specialSecurity Council Resolution (number 640) demanded their disbandment.'Security Council Demands Disbandment of Par8militaryForces in Namibia,'"UN Chronick, Decmber 1989.

IW ShmonDavid, "Oneyear on", Nmila Yearbook:199091, 67.

Page30 Chapter3 - Designof DemobilizationPrograms Demobilizationand Reintegration of MilitauyPersonnel

contributorsto try to reduce the high numberof weaponsprevalent throughout the country.W As in other countries,reports on the poor qualityand limitedquantity of the weaponsstored at assemblycamps indicatedthat both FAPLAand FALAwere storing hidden weapons for potentialfuture contingencies.; This wasalso the case in Nicaragua,where the NR forceswere required to turn in one weapon,although they likely had many more; manyof the weaponsturned in were reportedlyold or unserviceable.)V

53. In Zimbabwe,combatants were grantedthe right to keep their arms when they entered the assemblypoints, but were requiredto store the armswith camnpadministrators while on leavefrom camps. Combatantswere required to turn in a weaponwhen demobilizing to becomeeligible for benefits. The confiscatedweapons were guarded by the British monitoringforce, and later transferredto the NationalArmory, for use by the remainingmilitary.

B. Weapons Reclaiming Programs

54. Followinga protractedinternal conflict (applicable to mostof the case studies),weapons are so numerousin both the combatantand civiliansphere that requiring combatantsto turn in one weaponhas a limited impact. In Angola, Namibia, and Nicaraguasome demobilizedcombatants reportedlyturned to banditry; in Nicaraguaand Mozambiquesome soldiers belongingto the regular armedforces allegedly stole weapons and sold them on the blackmarket. Withouteconomic opporhtnity and censurefor the possessionof weapons,ex-combatants can re-arm, and the civilianpopulation may possessweapons as well. Duringa civil war, so muchof a country'spopulation becomes mobilized for the militaryeffort on one side or the other, and the definitionof a combatantbecomes less precise, as peoples'militia and other part-timeforces are formed. Militiamembers receive weapons and minimal militarytraining, and followinga conflictoften retaintheir weaponas well. Accountabilityand records of the weaponsdistributed are oftenpoor or nonexistentin such a situation.

55. Becausenone of the seven countriesin the case studieshas local arms manufacturing capabilities,all firearms must be imported. Governmentforces can obtain weaponsfrom foreign governments,including sales and grants, legitimatecommercial imports, and black marketsmuggling (both for new and second-handweapons). In additionto the abovesources, rebel groups and armed actionscan alsoobtain weapons from sympathetic foreign insurgent groups, captured government stocks, sympatheticarmy deserters, and sales from disillusionedor cash-hungrygovernment soldiers. The borders of these countriesare generallyso porousthat smuggling,of weaponsand other goods, is very common. Proliferationof weapons among civilians can occur by their distributionto civilian

1/ PurFCerReport of the SecretMay-enralon theUnited Nations Angola Veification Mission (UNAVEM-D), 24 June 1992.

NJ/ Accountby Dale Lautenbachreported in 'Angola: Tale of 2 Annies', 7TheSar (Johannesburg),22 June 1992,11; quotedin DBIS-AFR-92-121,June 23, 1992,20. Also, 'Angola:Arms Dump,' Focuson Afica, June1992.

X31 Theweapons were handed over to theWorld Rehabilitation Fund (WRP), a non-governmentalorganiaton which had assised 1S3countries in progms forthe rehabiliatonof disabledpeople. The scrapmetal was eventuallyto be recycledinto aftificial limbs. (wAnms for Amns,'Disarmament Newsletter, October 1990, p. 6.)

Chapter3 - Designof DemobilizationPrgrams Pap 31 Demobilizationand Reintegrationof MilitaryPersonnel

sympathizersby besiegedgovernments or insurgentgroups during the conflict,as well as by commercial sale of legitimateimports, and the blackmarket, including sale of weaponstocks stolen by undisciplined soldiers. An additionalsource of weaponsproliferation is failureto disarmsoldiers who are demobilized or retired, or otherwiseend their militaryservice.

56. Arms buy back or arms exchangeschemes have been used in some countriesas a tool to Improveoverall security. -V In countrieswhere these were used (includingcountries not amongthe seven case studies),they did not appear to provide durablesolutions to insecurity,particularly where borders are porous, economicopportunities scant, and widespreadinsecurity prevails. In the summer of 1991in Nicaragua,after demobilizationof the NRs, an armedconflict began to intensifyin the rural northern and central regions between approximately1,500 former NRs and Sandinistascommonly referred to as "Recontras" and "Recompas" (many ex-combatantshad hidden arms prior to demobilization).As the violenceincreased in Novemberof 1991,the Governmentannounced plans for a disarmamentprogram addressing both groupsjointly and requestedthat CIAV-OASmediate between the recontrasand governmentofficials. 2-' Abovemarket prices were offeredin exchangefor weapons fromthe two armedgroups, although many more (over20) additionalgroups showed up to negotiatethe purchaseof their weapons. Althoughthe programpurchased more than the plannednumber of weapons (17,000instead of 5,000), insecurityand largenumbers of weaponspersisted. In a secondoperation (Fall of 1991),Disarmament were formedby both Sandinistapolice and army officersand former NRs to disarm groups of people.3WThe Brigadesoffer food, housing,construction materials and in somecases cash in exchangefor weapons. Anotherprogram attempted in Panamais summarizedin Box 1.3. Somerecommendations of best practiceson armsbuy backprograms from one defenseanalyst are presentedin Box III.4.

;S1 An informalbackground note by AlainRouvez, consultant, examined programs to improvedomestic security in nine countries (Paama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Somalia, South Africa, Mozambique,Liberia, Cambodia,and Afghanista); of these only Panama,Nicaragua and SouthAfrica had imnplementedsome form of armsbuyback or oxchangeschm.

/I CIAV-OASofficials located reamed groupsin the oountryside,persuaded them to suspendhostlities, coordinated aranremengsfor theirdisarmament and demobilization in conjunctionwith Disarmament Brigades, and negotiatedthe rlse of hostagestaken. They maintaineda dialoguebetween these groups and the governmentauthorities, and monitoredcompliance between the govenmmentand rearmedgroups.

31 Whilcnegotiaton with re-armed groups continues in January1992, the governmentmade a publicdistinction between criminab(who would be prosecuted)and rearmedgroups who werein negotiations(CIAV-OAS, Progress Report, Februay-March1992)

Page32 Chapter3 - Designof DemobilizationPrograms Demobilizationand Reintegration of Military Personnel

Box111.3: Arms Buy back ProgramIn Panama

begnnigew y~cl)'a A~rthoIn1S1ass~id~iU hatluie wer tUl 00olongi amon arso Aowtry .. Am'stu olcin iei ahof Phaamas trenaor cites T1ep-4grMwa publil~e4ash or Waponstdi.4O~Qred corers (ananania Dofe.. Pr~e ?D ''a,wl-41s.4

*~ur b4djpe toilat~o1.Cnldn htmostwaon 1de a bee repurchasedWhIch ;oOldJbe

)Folwntecoinoftefracolcinets a fewadditional lwepons were trne In lotcahtU$

~tts~ A ~U4*Weps anqos *iint onwrecolete throughthe weaponis buy bc rga~a

.j zike.w:fo U$15riiciandautmatc wapos;US$125'for shotgun;~US$100 frpsosamdrioV%

r4~Wert~ ofereifo nonweaonscahe tiptoa mamum:Of US$500prUo* ~e~ ~o11ectedwged'f~nialingehotsand smallarmsto hih caliber automaticweaos ofs*r1 ifrj > ~naufctuesancontie ofomgb. ~ial alierwePOnswere overwem P gly-fo 4Lstblcoutis A

tOe fhstlieTesto s,U force

~*vntuilyreeivdether eapns ackr 1naicwcompnO IVn

0.1 ofted 't'vrar fto'. m

comlee nvetoy .a-made...~ o~aeyt&easltr. h ovrmeantreundto ayk 'ofweaponsthe ~leeni ..pro.it. .. o.o te L. q ~eIbr epn)~idoUS? m~~r~f >~a~by the P.nani4n"ai...... PN-fomd rmth enn to tefomr D ~ms~itbr U S:nrirainfre er efrigapbi scrt iito irigtefrtdy t

~~onstitutedIiiiied N 66oPb.

Waselpul n etabishngecurty n te h,Vtrni,bu itisdacuk to, know'whatth situ-ti won. likn wthothelonerter,t. hos dsiingtorepenshtheir weaponsst06okWiey have aD, pllt~t, ~'6troehbot s. Isitmae ndilitsucs

Chapter3 - Designiof DemobilizationPrograms Ppag33 lg,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;7 Demobilizationand Reintegrationof MilitaryPersonnel

57. In Somalia(not one of the casestudies), although persuasion through buy backprograms was not used,the MultUateralTask Force led by the U.S. graduallydisarmed weapons holders in secured zones. Accordingto UN officialsInvolved in the operation,the price for an AK47 in the US-secured zones was one-tenthto one-fourthof the existing price in the unsecuredareas: the demand, and consequentlythe value of weaponscollapsed when security was restored (at least temporarily). If accompaniedby a means of providingsecurity, weaponsreclaiming programs may help improvea country'ssecurity situation, especially in the volatileand polarizedsituation immediately following a civil war, or in cases such as Chad or Somaliawith conflictbetween numerous armed factions,and acts of violenceby armedfactions against unarmed civilians. This seemsto suggestthat the valueof a weapon and the willingnessto part with it dependsprimarily on two factors: its perceivedeconomic value-in terms of the economicgains it can be used to obtain-and Its securityvalue-the perceivedrequirement of that weaponto preserveone's securityand/or threaten that of others.

C. Mines and De-miningPrograms

58. A legacy of a protracted,internal conflict, especiallywhere substantialforeign support from major powers was involved,is a prevalenceof buried land mines. Mines continueto maim hundredsof peopleyearly, threatensecurity and interferewith the economy(commerce, transportation, investmentand reconstructionefforts) well afterthe conflicthas ended. Estimatesof the numberof mines which remain in Nicaragua, Mozaunbique,and Angola exceed one million. Most of the mines In Nicaraguaare buriedon prime agriculturalland in rural areas withinNicaragua and on its borderswith CostaRica and Honduras. Casualtiesare mostfrequent during plowing season. Theseaffected countries have neitherthe mine-clearingexpertise and equipmentneeded to removethe minesin a timelymanner, nor the fundsto obtainan adequatedemining capability. In Angola,mines have maimednearly 80,000 people, often children, and interferewith transportationand agriculture.3"Joint mine-clearingefforts have been undertaken,but progressis slow.

59. The Nicaraguanmilitary has madea seriouseffort to deminerural areas. The locations of many mine fields are unknowndue to inadequaterecord-keeping, and maps which do exist are imprecisesince many of the mineshave shiftedover time. No informationon the locations,type, and numbersof mineslaid by the NR has been provided,due both to inadequaterecord-keeping and their reluctanceto cooperatewith the Sandinistaarmy and the Chamorrogovernment. Removingthe mines is a challengingendeavor, because of the advancedage, varied type, and tentativelocations, modern mines are often not made of metal, and thus more difficultto locate. The Sandinistaarmy has only a limiteddemining capability and requiresbetter deminingtraining and more equipment.In 1992,appeals by the Nicaraguangovernment for financial,technical and trainingassistance yielded some results: the OASSecretary General established a specialregional fund to assistNicaragua, El Salvadorand Honduras in their deminingefforts, with fundingby the U.S., Canada,, Norway,Italy and other donorsof up to US$10million. The fund will sponsortraining and equipmentto local personnel,who would then actuallyconduct the deminingeffort.

37/ Fmike,Vicki, "Brothersin Arms," fica Report(March/April 1992): 63. Also, recentestinates of thenumber of uneploded minesin Angolaexceod one million. Source:Coulson, Anita. "TheParadox of Peace,"Afria Report, September-October1991.

Chapter3 - Designof DemobilizationProgmams Page35 Dbilizatlon and Reintegationof Milituy Personnel

CH[APTERIV

INSTTUTIONALMANAGEMENT OF DEMOBILIZATION/REINTEGRATIONPROGRAMS

60. Thischapter examines the institutionswhich manage DRPs, and isues of processarising in the implementationof such programs. In some countriesthere is overlap betweenthe institutions managingdemobilization and reintegration;given the links betweenthe two programs, institutional managementfor both programsis discussedin this chapter. COORDINATION

61. DRPs in the casesstudied tend to involvelarge numbersof people (as many as 120,000 in some cases),and, at the same time, are often constrainedby the politicalnecessity of completingthe process quicldy. Thus,the experiencesof the DRPs in the countriesstudied show that the natureof the DRPprocess calls for early coordinationamong the variousactors (government agencies, armed forces, NOs, relief organizationand the donorcommunity) and advancedplanning of all stages in order to be more successful(i.e. to avoid riots in assemblycamps, ensure payments promised can be made, in order to prevent fraud, etc.). Earlycoordination is often importantbecause of the long time neededto design reintegrationprograms and arrange fiuding, because the nature of the programs often involve surmountingsubstantial logistical obstacles, and because once demobilization actually begins, action must proceedquickly to avoid a longperiod of encampment.;

62. In Nicaragua,demobilization and initialreintegration were planned and coordinaedalong withthe peaceprocess. Comprehensiveprograms were designedin advancewhich addressed the many short-termneeds of combatantsand their families (includingthe Food and MaterialsProgram; Self- SufficiencyPrograms; Disabled Veterans Program; Medicine Distribution Program; U.S. Government ColdRation Program). After the initialsix monthprogram, OAS decided to expandits effortsto include developmentprojects and longer-temsupport (Housing and Schoolsprogram, Managua Clinic, Atlantic CoastRice ProductionProject). BecauseOAS was not bureaucratic,it was able to respondquicldy to developprograms to fit ex-combatantneeds as they arose. Someanalysts of Nicaragua'sdemobilization programattribute the relativelysuccessful demobilization of manyof the NRto this integrated,long-range planningand early coordination.In Uganda,programs for both demobilizationand initialreintegration (institutionalsupport at the local level)were designedtogether prior to initiationof any of the program steps. As Uganda's program is still ongoingit is too early to assess the long-termresults of this approah, however,program administrators and donorsare very optimistic.

a/ One of the reasons for early coordinationis that, in many programs,demobilation, reintegation and force restucturingoverlap in tine. SimCmost countries have a limitedcapacity to demobilizeand transpostcombats, demobilizationcan strtch out overmany months or evenover a year meaningthat the two stages-demobiliztonand reintrion-will overlap.

Chapter4 -Instiutional Managementof Demobilizaton/ReintegrationPrograms Page 37 Dntobilation andReinteation of MilitayPersonnel

63. In Namibia, Angola, Chad, and Zimbabwe, demobilization,reintegration, and disarmamentwere viewed by plannersas distinctprograms; at times, eventhe variouscomponents of an individualstage were treated separately. For example,in Namibiait was initiallyhoped that reintegration wouldoccur *spontaneously*after combatantswere demobilizedand the governmentInitially made no specWplans to facilitatethe reintegrationof ex-combatants.Faced with a high levelof unemployment and a highlyinflated public sector sixteen months after independence,the governmentbegan a haphazard approachto reintegration(i.e., a lump-sumcash paymentinsufficient to makea significantproductive investment,and the DevelopmentBrigades, a publicly-financedon-the-job vocational training program). 'his late start producedextremely limited results and publicoutcrys over the mechanismused to identify who had been a combatant.-' In Zimbabwe,although the demobilizationof approximately75,000 guerrillaswas relativelysuccessful, the governmentpaid scant attention to the reintegrationof combatants. Then, rather than incur the immediatepolitical and securityrisk potentiallyposed by a large numberof discontented,unemployed ex-combatants, the governmentrehired manyof the combatantsinto the civil service and the military: as noted previously,by 1988,over half of those demobilizedhad endedup either In the public service or armed forces. Failing to plan in advancefor reintegrationmay have resultedin the recourseto inflatingthe bureaucracy,with negativelong-term consequences.

64. Someof the case studiessuggest that in the aftermathof an internalconflict with no clear winner,an adequatereintegration package may playa role in persuadingthe key partiesinvolved to agree to demobilize.To avoidlong encampmentperiods (as occurredin Zimbabwewhere some soldiers were nc;ampedfor over a year), finacial, technical,and materialresources for the programsto reintegrate ux-combaantswould be most effectiveif in place at the beginningof the demobilizationprocess to provide incentivesto leavethe military. In Mozambique,one group of combatantsreportedly caused someunrest as they demandedcompensation for demobilizing.Unfortunately, countries seeking to secure resources face the dilemmathat donors are reluctantto provide financingunless governmentshave demonsratedtheir commitmentto the programby launchingit. However,governments are unableto plan, let alone launch, a full-fledgedprogram unless they have some senseof the amountof resources that will be availableto them. This dilemmahas been at the heart of many of the problemsthat such programshave faced.

65. The reasonsfor the setbacksin Angola'speace processand demobilizationprogram are multiple;however, a well-plannedreintegration program with secured financingmight have provided incentivesfor combatantsto reportto and stay in campsin anticipationof benefits. Most donors,other than the European EconomicCommunity (EEC), were slow to respond in firming up resourcesfor monitoring,demobilization, or reintegration(see nextsection on monitoring)because they feared political Instability.The political agreement to encampand demobilizecombatants thus seemedto be a step ahead of securingsufficient financing and personnelfor UNAVEM-IIand for the encampment,demobilization, and reiegation process;as notedpreviously, this contributedto starvationin somecamps, the needfor

39/ ThoMinisbty of HomeAfirs andDefense had caled for regisation of ex-oombatantsin Septemberand October 1990, qVer they had beeAdemobilized and dispersed. Accordingto one newspaperrepotts, the Ministerfor informationand Broadasting,Mr. HidipoHamutenyathought that many of theex-combatants may have misundaetood the meaningof theword 'grtuity in the call for reisation for benefits- PlanPay-outs Could be Stoppedwams Hamutenya, lhe Namibian,July 24, 1991.

Page38 Chapter4 - istitutionalManagement of Demobilization/ReintegrationProgams Demobilizatonand Reintegrationof Milituy Prsonnel

emergencyfood suppliesto be shippedin, widespreaddesertion from the camps,and a worseningsecurity situation. In additionto the politicaltensions which characterizedthe program,there appearedto be insufficientequipment and personnelto handlethe actualdemobilization of the ex-combatants.

66. In Chad, boththe 1991and 1992programs for demobilizationdealt only marginallywith the issue of reintegratingsoldiers to civilianlife. The programswere designedby French and Chadian military planners, who hoped that civilian authoritieswould later develop appropriatereintegration projects and secure fundingfrom donors. The demobilizationprogram fell behindschedule in part becauseof the time requiredto set up the administrativestructures (15 local reintegrationoffices) and payment mechanismsin a country where institutionalcapacity is low. Some of the administrative problemsincluded lack of computerizationand basic materialsfor the Veteran's Office, which was supposedto establishand verifythe list of those eligibleto retire. Althoughthe seconddemobilization programwas started in July 1992,plans for reintegrationprograms are, accordingto one source, still '...at a level more theoreticalthan operational." However, as the program has progressed, the governmentstrategy towards reintegration has evolved,and seemsto be focusedmore narrowlyon cash compensationthan initial plans suggested. This stems from the government'ssurvey of 506 ex- combatantswhich showedthat ex-combatantsare reintegratingon their own, with only 22% of the ex- combatantsreporting that they had no economicactivity, and the majorityof the rest occupiedin agriculture/pastoralismand commerce. Nonetheless,this first stage of demobilizationis voluntary,and the next phaseof combatants(of 8,000) mayhave a harder timereintegrating as many will likelynot be volunteers.

67. Somedonors note that there may be essentiallytwo sourcesfor slow initialprogress in designingreintegration plans in Chad: (1) the militarywas slow in providingthe necessaryinformation to civilianauthorities (and others)on the profileof the combatantsto be demobilizedand their intended place of origin (partlybecause the programis supposedto be voluntary);and (2) donorswere taking a wait-and-seeapproach, wanting to see whether demobilizationprogressed (and that there was firm commitmentto It by all parties concerned)and whatform it wouldtake before investingstaff time and riskingfunds to designand implementa reintegrationprogram. In additionto the issue of coordination and communicationbetween the civiliangovernment and the military(which facilitates design of tailored reintegrationprograms), a secondaryissue concernscoordination between the government,the military, NMOs,and donors. Duringthe 1991demobilization program in Chad,a donor-NGOworking group was formedto help the government'sHaut ComWtedesign and plan reintegrationprograms. However,since the militarydid not participatein the group, lack of informationon veteransprofiles continued, and after the 1991Protocol on demobilizationwas suspended,the workinggroup lost steam. As discussedearlier (see para. 17), the difficultiesencountered in designingChad's reintegrationprogram are not likely to be the major source of slow programimplementation (soldiers are offeredsubstantial cash allowances upon demobilizing).

68. In Mozambique,although programs have been designedfor demobilizationof both governmentand guerrillaforces and for creatinga new integratedforce, litfleattention has been paid to the reintegrationof combatants. Basedon the examplesof Namibiaand Zimbabwe,even if forces are successfullypersuaded to demobilize,reintegration will be much more difficultto achieve(and likely more expensive)if/when it becomesa futureobjective than if it had been includedin earlier planning.

Chapter4 - Instibdu Managementof Demobilzatoneitegaion Progmams Page39 Domobilizionand Rinegmiou of MilituyPeuwnuel

Box IV.1: Coordinton In Mozambique

Zs of fo4t...... ".. t iaaeil...... (2)aauo a*oAiU...... bzlt oaa pod. .n oiXoi Xi;t

In Namibiaand Zimbabwe,because there were sufficientpolitical incentives, the Inadequacyor absence of a reintegrationprogram did not jeopardizedemobilization-although lack of such programsmay have made it more difficuletfor combatantsto return to productiveactivities.

69. In the peace time situationof Uganda, coordinationamong the government,military leaders, and donors occurredfrom the initialplanning stages, resulting in a carefullyplanned, phased demobilizationand reintegaion program;the total US$19.4million budgetfor the first phase of the program(transporting and providing interm benefitsto 23,000soldiers and 50,000 dependents)has been fully subscribedby donors. Recognizingthe need for coordinationof the various stages of and participantsin the coordinationprocess, plannersof Mozambique'sdemobilization and reintegration programhave deliberatelydesigned an institutionalstructure to supportthis, as shown in Box IV.1.

MONIORING

70. The case study results suggest that outside monitorsor observers-eitherbilateral or multilateral-whoare perceivedas neutral, greatlyassist the demobilization/reintegrationprocess in two ways: (1)by providinga mechanismto resolvedisputes arising in implementationand thus strengthening the neutralityand credibilityof the program, particularlyin cases of internal conflict; and (2) by providingimpartial management of goodsand servicesto ensurethat they are distributedefficiendy and fairly.

71. UN observerforces were deployedto Namibiaand Angola, aided observersfrom the OAS in Nicaragua,and are currentlyin Mozanbiqueto verifyall aspectsof the peaceprocess following the cease-fire. Bilateralmonitors assisted the process in Zimbabwe(British) and are bothoverseeing and activelyassisting the demobilization/forcerestructuring process in Chad(French). As the demobilization programin Ugandais being carriedout in a non-volatilesituation, there is apparentlyless need for an externalmonitor.

72. Duringthe encampmentstage in the countriesstudied, monitors verified the numberand affiliationof combatantsentering and leavingcamps, helped settle disputesbetween opposing armed forces, and discouraged fraud. A monitor's ability to resolve such disputes helps ensure the demobilizationprocess proceedssmoothly in politicallytense situations. Becausethe leadershipof both sides of an internalconflict often try to "cheat*through holding a largeportion of their forces in biding,

Page40 Chapter4 - InstitdotnalManagenent of Demobilization/ReinteVgationPograms Demobiliz o and Reintegrationof MilitaryPeasonnel external monitors are helpful for trying to verify such reports (as in Namibia),locate unassembled combatants,and try to persuadethem to participatein the peace/demobilizationprocess. Althoughthere were allegationsfrom both sides in the Namibianconflict of attemptsto "cheat,*as describedin Box IV.2, the UN observer force had a sufficientlybroad mandateand adequateresources to enable it to mediatesuch disputes and completethe demobilizationand repatriationprocess withinthe scheduled periodof time.A

73.. In Angolathe demobilizationprocess was accompaniedby politicaldisputes and tension whichthe UN forces were ill-equippedto mediate. For example,the MPLAallegedly shifted military units to paramilitaryunits In the police force (whichfell outsideof the UN mandate),and the MPLA repeatedlyaccused UNITA of holding 20,000 combatantsin the southeasternprovince of Cuando Cubango (althoughthe achtal number is less than this allegation,the UN forces did not have the personnelto bring in those outsideof the camps).91 Thus, both sides of the conflictquestioned the declarednumber of troops (andthus the numbereligible for demobilization)of the opposingside. When the UNAVEMforces attemptedto providea 'neutral" countof forcesfrom each side withinthe camps, their numberswere suspectbecause they had inadequatecontrols to monitorthe exit and entry of troops into camps,and they only conducteda group countof who was in the campsonce a week. Becauseof inadequateUN personnelto monitordemobilization, desertion and uncontrolledextended leave from the campswith arms were common.

74. The contrastbetween the role of UN monitorsIn Angola and Namibiasuggests that monitorsrequire adequate resources (financial and human)and a fairlybroad mandatein orderto ensure that the demobilizationprocess proceeds smoothly. For Angola'spopulation of 10 millionand 150,000 combatants,UNAVEM-II was assigned450 personneland a budgetof roughlyUS$163 million: a ratio of 1:333 UN observers to combatants,and a ratio of financialresources of less than US$1100per combatant. In contrast, in Namibia, with a populationof only 1.78 million,UNTAG was allocated 8,000 personsand a budget three times as large as in Angola(nearly US$400million) to demobilize 20,000PLAN guerrillas and disbandor deport32,000 or so troopsfrom the SADFand SWATF: a ratio of 1:6 UN observersto combatantsand nearly US$7400per combatant. Accordingto the UN special envoyin Angola, 'The worldtried to do this one on the cheap. ...That's one of the reasonsthings came apart.'ia In Mozambique,the UN force will reportedly have a ratio of between nine and ten combatantsper observerand a broadermandate than the UN force in Angola.

A1/ UNTAG'sbroad mandate included monitoring the disarndt of citien's forces (includingSWATF), monitoring SADPpesonnol in Namibiaas wellas SWATFforces in neighboringcountries, securng instllationsin the northen borderarea, monoring essationof holites by all pates, keepingthe bordersundersurveillance, monitodng the pol;ce,and resolvig tensionseven at the locallevel. Thesetasks apparentlywent wel beyondthos in previousUN pnpkg opetions, and were supplmentd by the UNs activties to assut with the implemenationof fair elecions.

41/ TheJoint Commission for the Verificationand Controlof the Cease-fire(CMVF), technical adviors to one of the UN monitorngbodies, subsequently searched the provincofor the allegd concealedarmy. Awthoughthey did not find a large hiddenforce of the sizealleged by the MPLA,their seach confirmedthat therewere at leastseveral hundred encampedUNITA ttoops.

SI Taylor,Paul -in Angola,Seeking Peace 'On the Cheap'Renews War," TheWahington Post (March29, 193): Al.

Chaper 4 Institutona Managementof Demobilization/ReantegationPrograms Pap 41 DemoblUton and Raintegmdon of MiiuyM Pesonnel

Box W.2* 7he EWas Mediatorin Namfibia

CI IiSS lS | i ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... E 0 . . 2i i EEE§ !Bi W~~R

. | gE; aW

75.In som coesin adtotopronnthtrdtoaroeofnobrv,te moitowaaciv i nvle inadiiwn th dmb o adritgtonpgas,swsth mewit CIV-A in Niaau assoni ale V,I.ndBxI. I Ncrga h s aregeea ofth UNadteOS ageetesalhteInraiolCmisonfSupt andV erfctos CIValnwihteUorazaoaUieNainObevrGupnCnrl Amrc OUA whc a|ssitdw ith dembzato to suevs theLs'de mobliatonanrloato ofNRtop =adter depnet srqete nteTl cod.Prfterrspniiiyicue act asamdao_ewe tf fiil Wr,amde-obns(eops eota,adgop

ip4 h$ -1b*io: Maaevto eoffoWtgto tgm Demobilizationaa4 Reintegrationof Miltay Personnel of bothjoined together 'revueltos"). They wouldlocate military units whichhad re-armedin rural areas and negotiatewith them to stop their operations;they thus claimto have demobilizedand destroyedthe weaponsof 15,000 ex-combatantswho had re-armed. Anotherarea where CIAV-OASserved as a monitorwas in Investigatingand bringingto the attentionof the Government,human rights violations againstformer NR. In additionto acting as monitors,the CIAV-OASrepresentatives also administered the demobilizationand reintegrationfunctions. Where externalmonitors have been involvedin program management,they have becn cited as importantactors in verifyingthe equitywith which demobilization and reintegrationbenefits are providedto the participatingsides, and helpingto track programcosts.

76. Monitoringi8 also importantto prevent already demobilizedcombatants and non- combatantsfrom enteringcamps to obtainfood and other benefits. In Mozambique,documents stating eligibilityfr demobilizationbenefits will only be valid afterbeing signedand stampedby UN observers at the camps. The UN observerswill confirmdeliveries and report regularlyto their headquarterson the availabilityand distributionof food.' There is apparentlya danger, however,of encouraging dependencyon the exteral organization,something which occurred somewhatin Nicaraguawhere USAID and CIAV-OASprovided for most needs of the NR, which prompted a USAID official participatingin the demobilization/reintegration process to state: 'It is importantthat the government not be allowedto sit back and expectthe internationalcommunity to do everything."

77. The multilateral monitors who assisted the demobilization/reintegrationprocess in Nicargua, Namibia,Angola, and thus far in Mozambiquewere/are reportedly perceived as neutraland legimate by mostparties concerned. Despite numerous delays and problems,the demobilizationprocess was successfullycompleted in Namibia,and was proceedingin Angolabefore being cut short by the resumptionof conflict;in Nicaraguademobilization proceeded well but the persistenceof somere-armed groupscasts a shadowon the program; and in Mozambique,it is still too soon to evaluatethe success of the UN monitoringeffort. Theperformance of the bilateralmonitors is mixed;the Britishmonitoring force was reportedlysuccessful In conductingItself as a neutral, effectiveobserver and manager in Zimbabwe,and the requiredforces were demobilized.The Chadianpress has, at times, been criticalof the role of the French in their country.

78. CIAV-OAS'sinitial success both in managingthe demobilizationand reintegration processesand in verifyingthe requirementsof the peaceprocess was apparentlydue to a combinationof reasons: a broad mandate,adequate resources, and its perceptionas a neutralparty. Its legitimacywas strong both within Nicaraguaand in the internationalcommunity; this was especiallyimportant given that ClAV-OAS'smandate applied only to demobilizationof one side of the conflict, the NR, and its fundingwas providedalmost entirely by the UnitedStates-the NR's formerbacker. Uniqueamong the cases studied, CIAV-OASao monitoredthe humanrights status of retuning NR soldiersand their famlies under the HumanRights Monitoringand MediationEfforts program, as noted above.

nt Deliveryof the commoditieswgl be madethrough the WorldFood Program/UNILOG,which will be auAhorizedto subConamthe trspoat andmonoring to privateeneprises or NUOs

Chapr4 - Institonal Manaaemt of Demobilizadon/ReintegrationPrograms Page43 g~~~~~~. 1 X | -1 * * / jy

i~~~~~~~~~X S A 0E} DemuobDUz~onan Rintegration of Milituy Pononed

NSnTuroNAL STRUCWRE OF DEMOBLAzION PROGRAM

79. In certaincases there is a substantialoverlap between the institutionsmonitoring the peace process and encampment,managing demobilization, and overseeingreintegration activities. In Uganda, for example,some program elements (i.e. paymentsto ex-combatantsonce settledin their home district, veteransassistance organizations which will help withdemobilization but whichwill also servelong-term functions helping ex-com;batantsreintegrate at the local level) which are consideredpart of the reintegrationpackage in other countries,are categorizedas part of the demobilizationprogram. In other countries,as in Nicaragua,one institution(CIAV-OAS) was involvedin monitoringimplementation of the peaceagreement, management, and implementationof demobilizationand reintegration.In contrast, in Namibia,demobilization and reintegrationwere viewedas two separateprocesses and thus had fairly distinctmanagement (demobilization primarily with the assistanceof UN forces,and reintegration

BoxI1V3: ProgramManagewm Functions of CZAV-OAS

.~~~~~~~ E- r C. Et 6EJ

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h1p0 4i-ni E 1 Pg 45 I~~~ E 4. E E - ., i etgE Advitiesptagywth deelpentit4OA andalsoministries) llus,ucafnd tcrts,aindcutis I ::E U : ovrlppngpamofon proce. s Fo pthiraso,maag.emtezntand insituionlus cionceringboth demobizatinan refegraton a edicussdi Wthi chapea~r,~althug infrmautdiondon~ ritegation progamdsip s tratedIn Capt Fvie.r tPn rueat sgnzt 80. .'Me ad.mjst.atdivestruc.ture. deoUaioof ic1 rgasvaid althouhthee aesom eDmon .lemnutast ot of heprogamf~ass uma rizedin Tal V2 l he otcmo demobiliza†ioadrintegration, and consequetlyi thirn m~ain±ageetst r eautodr as differeInt actviteslaprimgparwit deveopmoent.Forganizrations manaentnd ministries.thus,iorass conertaingcontris demobilizationand reintegrationare discussedin thiischapter, although information on reintegration programdesign is treatedin ChapterFive. 80. The adminisrtve structlreof demobilizationprograms varied, although thiere are some commonelements to mostof the programsas sumnmarizedin Table IV.2. Thethree most common

Chaptor4 - InstiiulionalMaaemeni of Demobiliaton/ReintcgatonPrograms Page45 Demobiztion ad Reintegrationof MilitaryPonnel

TableIV.2: Instiutona Struure f DemobilizatdonPrograms

'____I Funoidons Angola Jolnt UNrTAIMPLAcommisdon (CCPM),Over demobilationand foeo restructuring. suporvis by UNAVEM Namibia Trpartite Committee(UNTAG, SWAPO, and Ovesee asembly and confinementof PLAN guerrillas;as SouthWestAican forme) rpatriationof refgees and guerrillas;overseo departr or disbanding of SouthAfrican forces (SAD?) and SouthAfcn-sponsored SWAT?. Zinbabwe * Cabinet-lovel oommittee for both e OverseeDemobilizaion Directorat. demobilization,& rintegation, chaired by Ministerof Labor& SocialWelfare * Britishmonitodrn force * Ovems encampment;disarm combatants. * DemobilIzationDirmtorate * Admister demobilizationpros. Niaragua e UN (ONUCA)and OAS (CLAV)together with * Supervisedemobilizatioa and relocationof NR troops and their representives of VerificationCommittee of 4dpedents;iJSue IDs; distrbuto setlingIn package. Cinal MiguolObando y Bravo * CIAV-OAS * Setup assemblyoamps; trnusport NR and depents to campsand to finaldestination; assist with disrmament and conflict mediation. * ONUCA * Disam NR,destoy weapons. * PanAnmerian Heath Organization (PAHO) * Conductmedioal exams in camps. Uganda UgandaVetcWan's Assistanco Board Solct candidatsfor demobilization,Implement demoblzation. Chad e Minist of Defense, with French military* Seloetsoldiers to be redredor demobilized;superviso all milta iassitnce aspectsof program;colect weapons and uniforms;issue ID cards; ditributedepartu allowanceand benefit temet documents. * Haw Cwi, presidedover by Ministryof * Overalladministration of demobilizdionprogram. plaing and Cooperadon * Secetfl Peanermt d la Risveron des * Subordinato Haut Canit, maagesimpleaentation of ptogrm. Defiatis(SPR) . 12 rgional reprosentativesof SPR * Supeviselocal level implementation; observe all demoblization activities;conduct documentation; establish lists of candates for domobilizationlretirement; prepare vedficaion Ults for entitemt benefits. * 20 Frenchadvisors * ReinforcSPR, asist in distrbutionof money,food, equipment, etc.; vcrfy applicaonsof demobilzton candiates. * Financialmanagemt deleged by Chad's * Topay rnton allowances,French Cate deDeveloppemet Ministryof Finnce to Headof FrenchMission (CFD) advances funds to speial accountin commercalbank in Cbad, for Coopeationand Culutal Afins. managedthrough double Franco-Chadia signature proce. Mozambique * Supervisoryand Control Commission (CSC) * Overseesall aspectsof peaceagreement * CeasefiroCommission (CFC) * OverseelogiSt suppostto assomblyareas and systemof registrion and documentain * TechnicalUnit (CM),composed of General* Ast coordinadonand communicationbetween government, Coordinator,and 3 experts RENAMO,ceral and locl CORE,other patiopants; cooordinat food supplyto assemblycamps; overse camnps'bealth cae, lving conditons;assist registration and documenton proess

Pagp46 Chapter4 - niional Managementof Demobilization/RentertonPrograms Demobiizatonand Reinteogadonof Militai Pesone

elementswere: (1) a high-levelplanning committee charged with broad policy formation, coordination at the ministeriallevel, (2) a secretariatattached to the planningcommittee responsible for day-to-day operationsand oversight and; (3) local implementing bodies.

81. Developinginstitutions needed to plan, coordinate,and obtainfunding for DRPsis especiallyproblematic when there is no establishedgovernment in placeat the startof demobilization. In a situationsuch as Angola(bighlighted in BoxIV.4), the absenceof cleargovernmental authority contributedto the lackof coordinatedaction to undertakelong-term planning for reintegration programs. Newlyelected governments following a protracted conflict, such as that of Namibia,also have difficulties withprogram planning as theyare faced with a myriadof equallyurgent reconstruction demands and may lackthe necessaryadministrative capacity and financial resources. Evenestablished governments not recenttyemerging from a conflict,as in Uganda,rely on externaltechnical assistance to helpdesign and implementdemobilization and reintegrationprograms. In Uganda,emphasis was placed on developing local capacityto managethe DRPthrough the provisionof trainingseminars for staff managingthe programsfor veterans (in job dutiesand responsibilities, problem solving and counseling, communications skills,and management).At the sametime, the programsought to integratethe temporarystructure managingdemobilization with the longer-termstructure of veteran'sassociations by requiringthat staff alsoserve as Veteran'sOfficers. 82. Mozambique'speace agreement, the RomeAgreement, created several commissions to carryout thepeace process, including the demobilizationprogram, as shownin TableIV.2 whichare currenty in the processof becomingoperational. As notedpreviously, the Mozambiqueprogram includesin its instittionsa mechanismfor coordination(Box IV.1). The Mozambicangovernment also receivedsupport from the Swiss Development Corporation to developinstitutions such as theCommission for Supervisionand Control of the PeaceProcess (CSC). In a similarfashion, and as notedabove, the Nicaraguapeace agreement included the creationof the institutionsto manageand monitorthe DRP (CIAV-OAS).

Box IV.4: Angola:Implementation DfflculNes ith InterimGovernments

2~~~I171,7 |E 777E7.7 m g7 RN 7E ~~~~~.co.~~~~~~.the.~~~~~~Xvilis~~~~~~:~t .c;~n waslef: .~...... PL...... ll... l icate.|~*E E.i I .' i X tw -

E I| &~ >I fi IS S. 43e a E g. : : thoghuEbnE teconryuo .~~~~~j~~~~~*S~~~~~~~ .~~~~~~..thieob .. ~ ~ ~.f ~i ~ ~ ~ ~avid ~~~.... n tr nof ts urban

S S. R S XMS B M$u S E....._.... -......

83. Forsecurity anld economic reasons, many program planners try to disperseex-combatants throughoutthe countryupon their demobilizationand avoidconcentration of ex-combatantsin urban areas. However,this createsadditional challenges to administersubsequent reintegration programs and

Ci6pte 4 -Insiutinal Managemntof Deiiob;iitlon/Rentegtion Pogmams Page47 Domobiizaionand Rnteltgration of MilitMuyPersonnel

distrlbutebenefits, requiring development of a broaderinstitutional strucure to carry out thesefinctions. For example, in Uganda, the governmentdelayed demobilization until the institutionalstructure to managesupport at the local leveland subsequentreintegiation, the Veteran'sAssistance Board, was In place (an optionnot availableto manycountries demobilizing immediately following a conflictsituation). This abilityto delay demobilizationmeant that programplanners could Identifypotential problem areas wherelarge numbersof combatausintended to sette for increasedsocial services and veteran'ssupport (see Box IV.S). The way in whichprogram planners tried to avoidthis in Nicaraguawas by trying to concentrateex-combatants from one side (NR) in pre-designatedareas, developmentpoles, whichcould be providedwith services. As notedpreviously, this was ultimatelyunsuccessful.

Box IV.S: VeteransAssociadon in Uganda

gg k g S ~~~~Rg~ Ia ug ...... U~~~~~~~~~~~~:7m !

S W.

INsTUONAL ST1UMC OF REDG AON PROGRANMS

84. 'Me institutionalstructure to managereintegration programs has varied accordingto the focusof he strategyfor reintegration(and whether planners were focused on reintegretionor preoccupied primarilywith demobilization).In Mozambique,special provincial commissions (CORE) will manage the reintegrationprocess and programsat the provinciallevel and willcoordinate with doors and NGOs. In some ca, donors soughtto channelreintegration assistance through NGOsand community-based

sp 48 Cluiep 4 - bnauiol Managiia of Demiobilizatiowlan/eini>afonPiogmams Demobilizaonand Reinteaion of Miitary Phonnel programs(discussed in ChapterFive). In the casesof Nicaraguaand Uganda,special veterans associationshave been used at the locallevel to managereintegration programs and provideassistance to veterans.In Nicaragua,in additionto the role of CIAV-OASnoted previously, a NGOcalled The NationalCenter for Planningand Administration of DevelopmentPoles (CENPAP) was createdby the CivicAssociation of the NR,to assistthose who settled in the developmentpoles. Afterthe conceptof the developmentpoles was abandonedbecause many veterans did not wantto settlein the designated areas,CENPAP assumed the responsibilitiesof promotingsocial and economicdevelopment in rural commnunitiesaffected by the war. CENPAPprovided legal and technical assistance, social orientation andintegration, and organized micro-enterprises and cooperatives. As describedin BoxIV.5, program pLannersin Ugangacreated an institutionalnetwork managed at the local levelby civilianVeterans AssistanceBoards to overseethe transition of soldiersbelonging to Uganda'sNational Resistance Army. This networkis uniquein its otganizationand attentionto the needfor coordination.In Namibiaa privately-runveteran's association, SWAPO's Veteran's Trust, has been establishedto offerveterans loansand grants, vocational training, support for veteranswith post-war psychological stress and to act as an ombudsmanwith the government.Both veterans programs are in the earlystages, and it is thus too earlyto assessthe utilityof suchorganizations In facilitatingreintegration. However, staff from one NGO in Zimbabwe(The DanhikoSchool) which had manageda reintegrationproject stressed the importanceof includingveterans in the managementof programstargeted to them.

Chaper 4 -Insdtuional Managemenof DanobnlRd_n Programs Page49 Demobilizationand Reintgrton of Milita Personnel

Table IV3: InstkutonalStructure of ReintegradonPrograms

Country Institution |Funcon Angola Intemlnate cabinetlevel offm headedby * Drft program for rintegimon, ris funds, truct Prime Minister and wh partioipoaon of provinial uas Minists of Planning,Defaes, Fmanco,Labor, Territoril Administrationand Education * Looalunits Monitorreintegraon process Namibia * Cabinet level dering committee,including * Overe DevelopmentBigades Mhiner of Infonnationand other Min a UNHCRassisted by Councilof ChurchesIn * Carriedout bulkof repatiaion and initial Namibia (CCN), and EmaergenyRepation, integaon of repatiae (inolu4inge-combatnts) Reelement, and Recondndion Committee MR) * UNICEF,WFP, WHO, UNESCO, PAO Supporedrepatriation/ reintegration effort in ter ______. _ wrespectiveaeas of speoaiation Zimbabwe * Demobilaon Direote * Admini demobilzaon and rengration proess * Ministgyof Education * Responsiblefor form educationalptograms * NOOs * Vocatonaltrining Nicarag * CIAVOAS * Oversee humniArian assisance and social reintegrationprograms, human rights statw of retning combatantsand famies. * CENPFP * Promotesocial and oconomicdevdopment in rural communies affeted by war, providelegl and tehnil asssance to agricutal seco.

* UNHCR * Repatiat ex-combatantsto Nicaraguafrom campsin

N ______I______Hondums;oversee programs for refugees. Uganda * Uga Veteans Assance Board(UVAB) * Formul and monior progams * Distdct VeteransOffices (DVO) * SupportUVAB at locallevel, to: ensure-eterans receivebenefts due; implemed,coordinate, and evaluat programs;counsel veterans; pro ide career guiance; orgnize trainingprograms; mtnitor looal finanoes * Disrict Vetans Committee(DVC) * Supervie DVO. Chad Franc-Chan DevdopmentFund Special credit fund to be created from leftover DemoSiizaion funds; ex-soldimrand o*ets apply for . _ . . lo~~~~~~wmandu ants Mozambique* ReintcRmtionCommission (CORE); includes * Overseescombatant' transitionto civilian life and represenatives from Direotoratesof Pinance, various steps of rentgrtn proces; prepare monthly Planing, TransporWtaion,Hath, Soial Acon reports for gvnment, RENAMO,and UN observers; train provincialCORE rpresnatives; assist pvcial COREoffices * Provinca CORE in eachprovince (oomposed * Prepr looal reintegrationprogams, coordinatelal of ProvincialEmegenoy Commision, whre reitegrtion prooess, inform NGOs and pyvate they eaid) enterprisesof and involvethem in programs

PgeS o Chapter4- Istdonal Manaement of Demobilization/e Programs Danobilizionand Reitegmtion of M;ity Penonel

CHAPrER V DESIGNOF REINTEGRATIONPROGRAMS

8S. This chapterdiscusses the design,and implementationexperiences of reintegration programs.The purpose of reintegrationprograms in the casestudies included providing an incentiveto combatantsto demobilize,helping to easecombatants' transition to civiliansociety, and reducing potential securityproblems following demobilization. All of thedemobilization and reintegration programs studied usedsome type of monetarycompensation (a cashpayment-either a lump-sum payment for transportation andother Immediate needs-and/or a seriesof subsequentpayments over a givenperiod of time,such as a pension). Someof the cases,including Zimbabwe and Nicaragua,also providedtargeted training, publicwork schemes, creation of cooperatives,or counselingto helpreinsert demobilized combatants into the productiveeconomy and society(following the modelof safetynet programsaccompanying a reductionin thesize of the civilservice). Other countries adopted a lesstargeted approach, of providing ronstructon, economicadjustment, and employmentcreation programs which would benefit the populationin general.

GENERALVERSUS TARGEMD PROGRAM

86. A keychoice in designingreintegration programs is whetherto adopta targetedor non- targetedstrategy to help ex-combatantsreintegrate. This choicehinges on the questionof whether demobilizedex-combatants are a specWialneeds population, whether their return to productivenon-military activityIs moreimportant to the overallsecurity of the nationthan that of othergroups, and finally, whethertargeted programs are effeicdve. Dermining whether combatants are a specialneeds population andassessing their potential security threat can only be doneon a country-pecificbasis, and on thebasis of the characteristicsof militaryfactions within a country.

87. Manygovernments and donors prefer addressing the needsof demobilizedcombatants as partof theirgeneral efforts toward helping needy communities, rather than as a discretetarget group. Under this non-trgetedapproach, combatants are providedshort-term financial compensation upon demobilization,then rely on mainstreamdevelopment programs. According to thisstrategy, by providing an enablingenvironment that facilitates growth, private sector development and productive employment, marketforces will crea employmentopporuities for demobilizedcombatants. This impliesthat ssistanceand employmentcreation programs will reachbeneficiaries according to their needs and priorities. 88. However,many expertsrecommend tailored programs to improvethe skills and experienceof ex-combatants,and counseling to easethe transition to civilianlife. Onecommon remark of thosewho have managed reintegraion programs, is the emphasisthat needs to be placedon providing traiing (civicscourses, basic accounting, problem solving) in conjunctionwith any type of reintegration program;in manycases (Nicaragua, Angola, PLAN members in Namibia),ex-combatants must adapt

ChapterS-Design of ReintegrationPrograms PageSi Demobiliztionand Reintegrationof Militay Porsonnel

to a completelynew way of life, and maylack manyof the skillsthat other beneficiariesof development projectspossess. Manyformer combatants also lack the socialskills to obtainjobs and the accessto land and other inputs necessaryto succeedin farmingor In startingbusinesses, having spent the better part, if not all, of their productivelives in the military.4 It is for these reasons that in Ugandathe ex- combatantand his familywere consideredas a vulnerablesocial unit and were providedsupport under a socialfund program (PAPSCA). In many countries,including Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, and Chad a practice of conscripting'children-soldiers," into the military even before adolescencewas commonand, in some cases, remainsprevalent. These children-soldiershave little recollectionof life outsideof the military. Approximately54% of MPLAsoldiers in Angolawere less than 25 yean old, 15% of soldiers in Zimbabwewere less than 20 years old, and an estimated35% of combatantsin- Mozambiqueare under 18, many havingserved under arms since the age of 12. Even if individual veteranspossess marketable skills (and selected statistics on the caseshere suggestthat in manycases they do not), they often lack job-searchskills. Finally,a commonrationale cited for targetingdemobilized combatantswith tailoredrepatriation programs Is based on the risk they may pose to security,political reconciliation,and indirecty, economicreconstruction efforts given their training as combatantsand (potential)access to arms, which could lead them to resort to both criminaland organized,political violence.

89. There is still too litte informationto judge whethertargeted programsare wordt the investmentin termsof increasingthe likelihoodof the combatantssocial and economicintegration. Most of the programsstudied are still in the early stage, and there is a markedabsence of ex-postevaluations for the few completedprograms, which makes it difficultto assessthe overalleffectiveness of a targeted approach. In particular,the case studieshave revealedthe paucityof informationon the design and successof trainingprograms. In the UgandaDRP, beneficiaryassessments, evaluations and auditshave been includedin the programdesign and mayprovide useful lessonsin the future.'

90. Namibia is a case where a nontargeted approachwas initially used, of hoping for "spontaneous"reintegration to followthe cessationof conflict,demobilization and repatraton. However, most of the economicreforms whichmight have stimulatedeconomic growth and greater employment opportunitydid not occur: there has been litflegovernment involvement in rural developmentactivities and infrastructureimprovements (pardy due to donorlimitations on lendingbecause of Namibia'sskewed incomedistribution which results in a deceptivelyhigh per capitaincome). In mid-1991,one year and a half afterrepatriation, unemployment of ex-PLANcombatants had reachedan estimated80% (compared

441 in Nambia, some fnale guerrillasrepaiad to find that they were excludedfrom fte new military;they faced subsan socialand economicadjurmeaL (Prom WomenSidelined by DefenceMen," Namibian, April2 , 1990).

Al/ For programswhich are ongoingor recenly finished,h wouldbe importantto ensurethat the lessonsfrom these experiencesare not lost. Some NGOshave likelydone such evaluationsand resoue personsicountry could ceatainlyshed more lighton the DRPprocess (Nicaragua, Namibia, Zimbabwe). For fiture projects,this pointsto te needto build projectevaluation into the progam design.

Page 52 ChapterS - Desig of ReintegrationProgms a J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~j:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~......

l, tE X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t*

60K~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0. Demobzliationand Reintegationof MilitaryPeronnel

to 57%for all repatriatesa year earlier), and overallunemployment was up to 35%.A Accordingto one evaluation,ex-PLAN members had becomedependent on the militarysupport structure, and faced considerablesocial adjustment(see Box V.1). In response, the Namibiangovernment changed their strategy and implementeda limited number of reintegrationprograms specificallytargeted to ex- combatantsincluding cash payments.

91. It is difficultto draw conclusionsabout the effectivenessof a targetedapproach from the Namibiancase becausethe reintegrationprograms implemented were so limitedin scope. The direct compensationprogram appeared to buy some short-termsocial peace, but was allegedlynot enoughto finance productive investments,educational programs, or housing. The DevelopmentBrigades, government-sponsoredon-the-job training described in detail later in the chapter, appearedpromising conceptuallybut were not actuallyimplemented on the scale originallyplanned. However,the 2,000- 3,000ex-combatants in the Brigadeswill receive a pensionof sortsfor up to two years,and be notionally removedfrom the ranks of the unemployed.The most extensivetargeted programs were carriedout in Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, which will be discussed further in the following on targeted reinteration programs.

92. The Angolan governient showed a preference for reintegrationprograms which specificallytargeted the needsof ex-combatants,in additionto providingfinancial compensation such as pensionsand severancepay. In Angola,the EEC developeda programfor the reintegrationof Angolan combatants,and inWendedto direct a budget of US$31million toward three areas: (1) 25% for basic training courses; (2) 25% for imports of essenti goods for employmentin agriculture, fishing, construction,etc.; and (3) 50% for NGOuse in training,roads and sewerreconstruction, health center and state buildingconstruction, road de-mining,and assistancein medical,agricultural and resetlement programs. Someother donorswere concerned that developingtargeted programs for the large number of ex-combatantswould lead to overambitiousplans for a resourceconstrained economy, and that the inabilityto fulfill such promisesbecause of lack of capacityor financingcould lead to even greater tension(as did unfulfilledpromises for land in Nicaragua).Those tasks competingfor resourcesincluded ntegratingan even larger numberof refugeesand displacedpersons, and repairingan economyand physicalinfrastructure devastated by war.

93. Once assistanceto veteransand their familiesmoves beyond immediateresettlement assistance and training and into projects that are designed to increase the long-term welfare of participans, questionsare legitimatelyraised as to whyveterans and their familiesshould be singledout for specialateion. The specialreintegration programs Oand, housing, settling-in package, training, healthcare) for one side of the conflictin Nicaragua,the NR veterans,did raise some resentmentabout their favored treatment.9 One USAID officialfamiliar with the Nicaraguanprogram suggestedthat

46 Tapsoowand Mulongeni,An E=Wtln of M1wWeMare and Fuv pect of Repaiated Nanians in Nordwrn Namibia,Augut 1990,Uniety of Namibia.The unemploymentfigure for ex-combatantsdenves from the number rgisteting as uaemployedin orderto obtainrintega_on payments.

47/ See 1quizabalet a, Hwnankran ChalkengesIn Central America Leanwtg de Leons of RecentAea Comfc, 1993.

Page 54 Chapter5 - Desigpof Rdeteaton Programs DenobUifazaioand Rintemgtionof Milituy Personnel after a certainperiod of timeparticipating in targetedprograms, ex-combatants should be mainstreamed into general developmentprograms. Another possibilitystrongly advocated by some NGOs is establishingcommunity-wide programs which could speed the reintegrationof former combatantsand their families,help strengthenthe local economy,create local employment opportunities, and reducethe chanceof localresentment of ex-combatants.The Ugandaprogram, for example,bolsters existing social servicesin communitieswhere large numbersof disabledor sick veteranswill settle and thus provides benefitsto the entire community.

SURVEYSAn THEPROFILE OF EX-COMDATANmS

94. The casestudies show that the profileand the careerambitions of the combatantsto whom targetedassistance is directedcan vary considerably.Surveys have been used in Uganda,Zimbabwe and Angola (see figures V.A - V.3) to assess the socio-economiccharacteristics of those likely to be demobilized,to determinefuture career interestsand to predictwhere concentrationsof ex-combatants willsettle. The dataprovided during the plannedregistration and documentationprocess for demobilizing combatantsin Mozambique,including detailed questionnaires to be filledout withassistance from trained observers,will fulfill a similarfunction. Surveysmay also provide informationon whethera targeted or non-targetedreintegration program is most efficientfor a particularsituation. In general, although there are wide variationsamong forces (particularlybetween rank and file soldiers and officers),the majorityof those to be reintegratedare relativelyyoung (under 25 years old), have little previous employmentexperience, and often have ambitionswhich do not match the availableopportunities in the country. The percentageof combatantswith dependentsand those to be accompaniedby their family membersduring the encampmentstage varied both amongcountries and betweenforces (regularand guerrilla)in the same country;such informationis helpfulfor planningreintegration programs and for budgetingdemobilization and reintegradoncosts. The differingbackgrounds of the two or more armed forces or factionswithin a countrysuggest that reintegrationprograms even withina countrymay be tailoredto the groupof combatantsbeing targeted (i.e. PLANveterans versus other veteransin Namibia).

95. In Angola, an EEC-supportedsurvey of the government'sFAPLA forces provided informationon their skilllevel and employmentinterests, as shownin Table V.1. The surveyhighlights the many differencesbetween the two combatantgroups in the same country(FAPLA and the guerrilla group, FALA). Notably,a vast majorityof FAPLAcombatants (83%) want to pursue some form of educationor training. Unexpectedin a country where the populationis 70% agrarian, the survey indicatesonly 8.8% of thesecombatants have demonstrated an interestin agriculturalactivities while 60% showedan interestin transportationand constuction. FAPLAcombatants have normally been dispersed throughoutthe country,often in urbanareas, and do not generallytravel withtheir families. In contrast, FALA forces reportedlyshowed a preferencefor agriculture,and generallytraveled with their families in less urbanizedareas.

Cbapwer - Des8n of ReintegrationProgams Pag 55 Demobilzaionand Reintegrationof MiLitaryPersonnel

TableV.1: Ihe Profileof Combatants

Angola:PAPLA Forces Angola:PALA Forces Mozambique:PAM Zimbabwe: (MPLA) (UNITA) Soldiers ZANLA/ZIPRA ,______.______Combatants in 1980 o Normallylive in areas * Generly operatecloser to * 60%age 2S-34 o 50%age 2G-25 otherthan homeregion; homedistict * 72%have 7 yearsof o 80%single dispersed ° GenealmUytravel with seviceor more * 13%no previous * S4%under 25 families a 42% are single education;69% part/full o 7S%are aer soldiers * Live in less urbanized *.63% have basic primay o 83%expressed interest in reas education * 75% no ptevious assistanceto reintegrate o Havelived in non 0 Largestoccupation employmentor unskilled throughtaining/aoquiring -monetizedeconomy, in prior to armywas new skilUs camps agrioulture(SS%) *Strit discipline

96. Donors financed local thica assistancein Uganda to carry out a survey of the backgroundand careerambitions of soldiers. Amongother usefulinformation, the surveyrevealed that approximatelyhalf were sick, maladjusted,or disabled, and about two-thirdswanted to return to agriculturalactivities. In caseswhere an outsidedonor has not providedthe technicalassistance to carry out such a survey of the needs of those to be reintegrted (as with the FALA forces in Angolaand SWAPO'sPLAN forcesin Namibia),information has been muchless reliable. In Nicaragua,CIAV-OAS staff responsiblefor overseeingthe DRP arguedthat their programscould have been better targeted if they had better informationabout the profileand destinationof the NR troops.

97. In Chad, a censusof the armed forces was carriedout, but focusedmore on counting combatantsthan on surveyinga sample(which may be easierin Chadthan countingall of the combatants giventheir frequentmovement in and out of camps)to determinetheir socioeconomicprofile and career ambitions. Sucha survey couldprovide usefid informationon whetherthe combatantscome primarily from northernregions, where economicopporunity is extremelylimited, or the southernarea, where a strong cottonsector provides opportuities for agriculturalactivity. One of the primarycomplaints of NGOsand donorsinterested in preparingreintegration programs during the 1991DRP attemptwas the slow provisionof informationon the backgroundof those to be demobilized;according to the Chadian government,the voluntary nature of the program's first phase made it impossibleto provide such informationin advance.A However,after the DRP had been in place for almost one year, in June

l The lackof informationon the intendeddestation for NRin Nicaraguamay havecontribued to designinga program aroundDevelopment Poles whoreNR ultimatelydid not wantsee.to

42/ Oftenthe type of infomationneeded is in whichspeofic communNieex-combatants intend to settle, and it is either not availableor not providedby the military. In Ethiopia(not a case study),one NGO notedthe difficultyof eablishing an ex-combatantprofile. It notesthat whilegovernment sourc providedgeneal nunbers on career ambitionsof soldiers,the numberswee not brokendown on the locallevel and localgovement office didnot have

Page 56 ChapterS- Designof ReintegrtionPrograms Demobilizationand Reintegaton of Militay Personnl

1993,the ChadianGovernment produced a surveyof the first phase of demobilizedcombatants. 5 The surveyshowed that the averageex-combatant was 33.5 years old, had 1.2 wives, 3.1 children,and cared for an additional3.6 people. Approximately40% expressedan interestin agriculture,followed by 30% in commerce,and 17% in livestock/pastoralism.Only 7.?% expressedan interestin participatingin an economicactivity with other demobilizedcombatants, while 34% wanted to work with others or in a group, and 58% wantedto work alone. Almosthalf had no education,and 28% expressedinterest in learningto read, while38% were interestedin vocationaltraining. The surveyalso providedinformation on the place of settlementof the combatants,although this may not be a good prrdictor for the future residenceof futuredemobilized combatants.

98. In Zimbabwe,although many of the guerrillashad originallycome from rural families, the vast majorityof Zimbabweanguerrilla veterans had no desire to "return" to the land. Only 2% of 5,000 encampedguerrilla soldiers surveyed in 1980 expressedinterest in receivjig agriculturaltfaining and only 4% indicatedtheir intentionof taking up farmingafter demobilization.The majorityforesaw careers in industry(33%), the civil service(21%), and commerce(6%).

Figure V.1 ZIBABWE: ZANLA & ZIPRA Career Ambitions

15% * Other/Undecided Agriqcintre UCommerce

334 611/o~ ~ *Transort & Constrction Li Industry 21% USchool

lists of ay-combats rening to their locale; this makesadvance planning for sometimeslarge influxesof ex- combatactsdifficult.

SOi The surecyoonsisted of a questionnairegiven to thosedemobilizing in the program'sfirst phaseand is basedon 506 responsesreceived. However,becauso it is not basedon a randomsample, the responsesmay not ne¢essarily constitutea good predictorof the chalateistics of aU demobilized,or of those who may not be voluntaryin the progumm'ssecond phase.

aptr S - Designof Reiregration Programs Page57 Demobilizationand Rcintgadtionof Milita Penoanel

Figure V.2 Angola:FAPLA Career Ambitious

Othier/Undecided 59%g/0 . S | l l 15% mmAgriculWue Commerce UHeathCare 0 CivilSerce 5% C Tnwort & Construction 5% T

Figure V.3 Angola: FALA Career Ambitious

23%

*Heath Care/Medica

commeim

23% 0 Agriculture Other/Undecided

15%

Pa 58 ChapterS - Designof RentegmtionPrgams DemobilIzadonand Reitegraion of MilitaiyPersonnd

CASECOMPENSATION

99. Governmentsfrequently use cash compensation schemes as themain channel to fcilitate the combatant'stransition to civilianlife. Suchschemes were often used because they are popularand easilyimplemented, particularly in countrieswhere there is lowinstitutional or donorcapacity to provide morecomplex programs (such as training,job creation,job counseling,and job placement).Three generalforms of cashcompenaon schemeshave been used with the demobiizationand reintegration programsstudied: lump-sum cash payments, allowances, and pensions. All of the casestudy countries haveoffered or planto otferlump-sum and/or some form of severancepayment spaced out over a period of time(typically one to threeyears). However,the amountof compensationand the beneficiaries vary widely. 100. In Nicaragua,for example,demobilizing NR members only received US$50 in cash;the majorityof the compensationwas provided in-kind in the formof a setding-inpackage, and in various trainingand incomegeneratloii programs (described later in this chapter). In contrast,a program demobilizingsoldiers from Nicaragua's Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) provided a lump-sumpayment equalto approximatelysix months'salary; and 2,000 officerswere slatedto receivebetween 35 and 48 monthssalary, as wellas otherpossible benefits such as free medicalcare and accessto the Army commissaryfor a periodof time. Informationavailable on the EPSdemobilization is sketchyand the programswere managed separately. 101. The compensationin manyof the programsdiffers according to cpmbatants'rank or affiliation.Offering officers superior compensation packages is commonamong the cases studied, pary becauseofficers receive a muchhigher remuneration and are accustomedto a higherstandard of living andthus demand greater incentives for demobilizing; also, greater compensation packages are often used to try to satiatepotentially threatening leaders (to discouragecoup attempts). In Chad,officers receive US$1,212,non-commissioned officers US$1,024, and rank-and-file US$758 over ihe courseof oneyear for reintegration.In Angola,the officercorps would have been highly favored in the distibutionof fnancialrewards. EveniA absolute terms, the 10,000-strongofficer corps would have received almost as muchmoney as all of thelower ranked combatants combined.v Reportdly, additional benefits were alsoto be grantedto the officersthrough government concessions and businesses.

A. Lump-Sum Payments

102. In Nicaragua,Namibia, and Zimbabwe,ex-combatants received lump sumpayments whichranged from the equivalentof 12%of GNPper capitain Nicaraguato 78%in Zimbabwe.They tendto bemore modest in sizethan cash allowances and are provided in oneinsIlment, notspaced over time. Theyare sometimes meant to defiseactua or potentialpolitical tensions by providingtangible-if

Stl lh calculatonswere made on the basisof the March1992 salary ctu:

Soldiers NKz 12,000/month $8 NCOs NKz32,400/month $22 Officers NICz166,000/month $111

ChapterS - Designof RintegationPrgranms Pap 59 Demoblsaton and Rentemrionof Mitay Personnel

Box V.2: Angola- The Poltcal MotivadonsBehind Cash Payments

X~~~~7EN~~~~~~ E IIiup. .7777 Et S uf df a aueoe.2 scle poeU I .X r Sv.nua~e#t . devoted ogie special...... attn~ to tb~ penalon b M. e...

N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... ,

token-vidence that the governmentrecognizes the sacrificescombatants have madeon behalfof their counry or cause. Lump-sumpayment have beenused to encouragecomlbatants to demobilizerapidly,, as in Zimbabwe,where soldierswho voluntarilyleft the army in 1980 receiveda lump sum payment equivalentto US$556. Acceptanceof the cash compensationimplied that the beneficiarylost all rights toreuar mlitay pay (whichcombatants were receiving while encamped pending theif demobilization). oiven that ZimbabwetsGNP per capitawas US$710 in 1980,the schemehad a strong appeal among coanycombatants. However, soon after acceptingthe compensationand depating the camp, midy retured to the campsout of financialneld. Thwrelay vely large lump-sumpayment apparendy had little impacton the combatant'sability to find productiveemployment; the governmentsubsequendy offered anotherpackage, which includedmonthly allowances.

103. The rationalefor lump-sumpayments as opposedto allowancesspread out over time is that they provide an up-front sum for combatantswho want immediatecompensation. However,the paymentshave not been substantiallylarger than monthlyallowances, and ex-combatantsin the cases studied have tended to have litte success in investing the lump-sum for productive purposes. Combatants'limited money managementand investmentexperience, and the small amountoffered comparedto their immediateneeds have been cited as a partial explanationfor these sums being consumedso rapidly,instead of being investedin income-earningpossibilities. Unlikeallowances, all eligiblecombatants tend to receiveequivalent flat rate lump sum paymentswhich do not vary according to rank.

104. In Namibia, SWAPO guerrillas did not receive any compensationat the time of demobilization. South African-sponsoredforces, includingSWATF and paramilitaryforces, were provideda pensionpayment system set up by the SouthAfrican Governmentwhich was in place after NamibianIndependence; those combatantsineligible for a pension, receiveda 'mustering out" pay

p 60 ChaptrS- Designof ReintegrationPrgram Demob;iAton and Reintegrationof Mility Peronnel

equivalentto two months''salary.- Manysoldiers in SWATFand other paramilitary groups had been drafted,were eaget to returnto civilianlife, and did notface diminished job prospectsas theyhad not been involvedwith the armedforces for a prolongedperiod of time. Thus,'themustering out pay constitutedsufficient incentive, and many voluntarily left the armedforces. In contrast,many PLAN guerrillashad spentall their adult'lifein militaryservice away from home and generally faced a more difficulttask of findingemployment and adapting to a newway of life (seeBox V. 1). Sixteenmonths followingdemobilization, the Namibiangovernment and SouthAfrica provided compensation to all unemployed,demobilized combatants in Namibia.The payments of R1,400(US$476) to formerSWATF andother South African-sponsored paramilitary forces went smoothly since the registrationrecords were well-organized.However, payments to ex-PLANguerrillas were more difficult as PLANcombatants had not alwaysbeen formallyregistered; according to newspaperaccounts, In the fall of 1990, after demobilizationhad been completed,the Ministryof HomeAffairs and Defencerequ3sted that ex- combatantsregister their names on a "masterlist" withtte governmentfor payment.However, some reportssuggest that ex-combatantsmay not havebeen ablb to travelto register,showed up at the wrong collectionpoints, may not have been aware of the neeidto register,or maynot have fully understood the meaningof the word'gratuity" in'the announcement for registration.A9 In Aprilof 1991,the Ministry of HomeAffairs went to northernNamlbia to issuetemporary 1.D. cardsto peoplewho had already registeredin orderthat theybe eligibleto pickup theirpayment at theBank. However,under pressure officialsallegedly gave 30,000 testimonials for peoplewho bad not previouslyregistered and thus who werenot on the masterlist. Ultimately,the governmentpaid only the 16,080on the masterlist, wbile up to 32,000 individualspresented themselves for paymentat the designatedbanks, prompting demonstrations,delays, and protest. There were also alleged reports that some people who were already employedwere receiving payment.v 105. In Angola,conscripts, especially FAPLA combatants, were generallywilling to be demobilizedwithout incentive packages, wbile career combatants would apparently have to be offered appropriateincentives such as severancepay.

106. It is difficultto assessthe utilityof lump-sumpaymnents in providingan incentivefor combatantsto demobilizeunder voluntary schemes; in Nicaragua,although the value of thecash payment was small,the programwas relativelysuccessful in demobilizinga substantialnumber of combatants (althoughsome then re-armed)-however, it was supplementedby other in-kindbenefits. In another voluntaryprogram, in Chad,demobilization proceeded slowly up unti!June 1993, in spiteof largecash paymentsoffered. This suggests that the necessary administrative structure to makepayments and support of key militarycommanders, also represent key components of smoothImplementation.

W A pensionwas grantedafter 15 yearsof service,based on the highestgrade served for three years. Whileaccording to somereports South Africa is no longerpaying the pensions,which have technicalgybecome the responsibilityof the govement of Namibia,other sources indicate some ex-soldiers stll receiveSouth African pension checks. a/ -PlanPy-Outs Couldbe StoppedWarns Hamutenya,' flines ofNamiba, July24. 191: p.3. Also, PlanHits Backl," lhe NamibI4n,July 25, 1991.

54I S'Ex-PlanFighters up in ArmsOver Pay-Out,' The Namibian, July 25, 1991:p. 3. To quote,The wholeproblem had been causedby the factthat the termsfor the registraionof ex-Plancombatants had not beenproperly clarified. 'We do not knowwho is to benefitand who not.'"

ChaptesS - Designof ReintegrtionProgfms Page 61 Table V2: 1Ar mdrdo1_1 W _gI_im P

Anaoba Chd N__ t' h Neatgva 1gmd ____ (I) Lampsm Al salarin a van Fit intalmat of "noe $476 Om to Guerillas $50 +25 $119nbr $6 Payms offetedto FAPLA demobIleiao combetna unanlvd w a lnd4 Army purd.a of allavoe brgaand 16mont aer 25 mnaosm had + cbTaa cladhig paid WmD hmlmp sm equ*. 6-7 & basic demobgbmdm nws. pay offed to _ecssts for

somay jomey home __ (2) Considerd - stipad 1992Prooook Soldies Conscriptswt <3 yn., None BPSoffiom: 3548 mo. 309 ao final S139hmo.while in Danohiato 100%salh thr. 1992, $758, NCOs $1024, $10412per mo. for 6 sary + benefs desiaton is c ; ailowanoe a_awance 75% ib1993 + Sev- OfficensS1212 (for 1 m + tanspot (spred over a few yI.) reached;$63 S2S9hIw. fr 2 yn. eanocpa3. 3 mos. al- yr. payablemn4 two and a half my fr eey yr of msaln=") + upto Les lEm say beyod 4 $76 for npow firt payP" 1 (aihstsd or 5 (offie)

Seng- ia Cl ch; 1992Protocok No Nane Food, householdgoods, Food, clthng, ofing None assistance trnpor coss; sefingin assistance beddng ooking houebo goods, mateials, emagncy rief of foreseen filitics; packags fr buiding matals school oes, Sl3iu in food, blake, agrcultr shete, personal itm (sanp, communt tabt, ho macheles, construction,fumiy tootbrush), medicl soca sevic, seeds to those in cp suppot assistance(oly giVeDto tnspo ome the NR) (vaue = $218) EBoly $3.7 m;Lyr. Co 2 yi. 3 m, salary + Now None Non None R_gtEr pensionscheme rstirnie trnsot for rerees + and ea*r-reirement Fensions ~~~peminn? InducemantScemes for ______ez~~~~~~~~~~ciRhodesienArmy GNPper capia $610(1989) $2tO (1990) $80 (1990) $1080(1990) $420 (1990) S170(1991) S710(1980) Aveageanmual $418(milbq) $2728- 2955(civil $516(military) N/A $396 (winimumwage) Civilservice 51176-1680 wap $1769(pubic service) service) 5168-240(unilled wage: $136low (-nunm wage & lbor) (1991)y d; $1116high mary)

11 Somc of thc turd pronised to ex-comb ts bohNR and EPS) not yet distroA4d, was alrady oocupied,or lkdd cear ttles. ZI Paymentsare providedto thc ex-combatantin cash ahough they are termed aflowances for vaio pposed: of Ith cash payment$89 is supposdto be a trnition aowanc; two paymot of $63 for foodand medicine;and $157to coverthe purchaseof sgriual tools, seeds and housingmaterial. 3 Psgm faeoddifliculties paymg oblihi. /Fom MPU iaz , Second PuWBlcE qpxdueReviw Wodd Bankgivenover report, December31, 1992. ,11 Eulsmo WordiBa Upnda Coutry Eonomt Demobilizationand Reitegation of MilitazyPenonnel

B. Alowances

107. Monthlyallowances allow financially constrained governments to spreadthe Mca burden of demobilization/reintegrationsupport over a longerperiod of timeand provide the ex-combatawtwith a longertransition perlod to civilianlife. In Chadand Uganda,the allowancesare providedto ex- combatantsin the regionwhere they are to settle,thus providingan incentive for combatts to ret to theirhome regions rather than to settlein urbanareas. The rationaleof dispersingex-combatants i to facilitatetheir transition to civilianlife (byremoving them from the military community), encourge relianceon familyand communityties, discouragegrowth in urbanunemployment, and reducethe likelihoodof criminalviolence.-' The weaknessof the localbanking and/or postal system, however, maymake the distribution of suchdecentralized payments problematic, as willbe discussed futher below. 108. In somecases, such as Zimbabweand the demobilization of the regulararmed forces of Nicaragua,allowances were the most important components of theDRP. Unlikethe lump sum paymens, theallowances tended to be scaledto rankor timein service.The duration of theallowances varied from six months(Mozamblque, Uganda) to two years (Zimbabwe).In Angola,Mozambique, Chad and Zimbabweallowances were used or are proposedwhich amount to betweenthe equivalentof 38% of GNPper capita(Angola) and 444% of GNPper capita(Chad) on an annualizedbasis. 109. The generousalowance offered to soldiersin Zimbabwe(US$259 each mondi for two- years after demobilizing)reportedly fueled high expectationsand provideda disinefvw for ex- combats to find employment.Demobilized combatants had difficultysaving their allowancesand severancefees for later investmentor educationalexpenditures (see Box V.3). Somereports suggest manyex-combaa couldhave benefted fromfinancial counseling. A formerZimbabwe govenment minist identifiedthe allowancesas Zoneof the most seriousmistakes made in the demobilization process.' However,where cash payments are low (i.e., Angola),no/few complementary reitgration programsare offered,and employmentoptions are extremelylimited, demobilized combaans may be motivatedto retmuto theuse of forceto supportthemselves. 110. Althoughthere are manyadvantages to cash compensationschemes, the iesults of reintegrion programssuggest that if theyform the primaryor only sourceof assistanceto vet (Zimbabwe),a significant proportion of formercombatants will continueto experiencedifficulty trying to enterthe civilianwork force.

j/ In Sthiopia(not one of thoease studiea) approximaty 350,000 combatants (the lrgs demobizaon in Afica to date)have boon demoblzd; accoing to CatholioReief Sermoes (CRS), many ex-cobts do notwant to or oannotrun to theirodgl homes,and have remained in AddisAbaba or otherurban areaswhee job propet amdim. Th pottal impat on tWbanunemployment is significant

Chatr S - Dedgnof Reitegratio Pro Pagm63 Demnobizlionand Rbgton of MilitaryPesonoml

Box VJ: CashAllowances In Z*nbabwe

C.Iv. A , WEonsE

ill. In most of the cases, soldierswho served in the regular armed forces fbt a specified periodof timeare entitledto pensionpayments, assuming that the pensionsystem is not bankrupt,as was the case in Chad"s1991 program. Uncertinty aboutthe abfityBof the govenment of Chad to meetIts pensionobllgatons resulted in potentialretirees' reluctanceto leavethe anned forces.

hPag64 Chapte5 - Designof R DbamtoProgmam Demobilizationand Reintegrationof MilitauyPesonnal

Table V3 : Level of CashCompensadon

US$SComba?ant GNP Per WageLevel Pft. of GNP Pat of Wage (1) Capital US$ (3) PC - (1)/(2) (1)/(3) .. ______USS (2) LUMPSUM Nicaragua 50 420 396.2 12% 13% NZmibhi 476 1080 NA 44% NA Zimbabwe 556 710 105 78% 530% Uganda 119 170 NA 70% NA

ALLOWANCE (Totalover 1 yr) Angola 235 610 418. 38% 56% Mozambique 86 80 S16V 108% '7% Chad 9332' 210 2728-2955w 444% 32-34% ZUmbabwe 3108 710 16802' 4389% 185% Uganda 372 170 NAP 218% NA

I1 GNP per capitafor approximatelyt sameyear as paymet. 2/ Minimumwage; other wage levels lower: Agriul US$79,Manufacturing US$341, Governmeat US$115, Services,US$210. 1/ Weightedaverage based on th demobiized& retdredto date. IncludesIntil paymnt whichcould be consideredas lumpsum depature fee (). Offioersreceive US$1,212 (of whichUS$493 is inial payment), non-oommissionedofficers US$1024 ($379), and rank-and-fileUS$758 ($227). Al Miliry wage:publk sectorwage higher at US$1,769. I/ Militauywage: wage for unskille workeris US$168-240,and inrease up to US$2,916in the civilservice, an US$13,332in the privatesmctor for more skdlledworks. 2i EstimateWorld Bank - ChadCountry Economist of civil servicewage. Effictivemilitay wagemay be loweras salariesare sometim delayd. 1US$- 263.8 CFAF 2/ Guerrillawages. Minimumwage lower:US$1,176/yr. It No avago wageis avalablealthough the amountcan be comparedto low-endcivil servie wageof US$136 and higherend civil servicewage of US$1,116.

112. Pensionschemes can be alteredto facilitatethe demobilizationprocess. In Zimbabwe, for example,the agreementthat resultedfrom the ConsdtutionalConvention mediated by Great Britain guaranteedthe pensionrights of membersof the RhodesianArmy. This wasan importantfctor favoring the orderlydemobilization of manyRhodesian Army troops. The guerrillaforces, ZANLA and ZIPRA, however,had no pensionschemes. In the interestsof equityand in an effortto defise potenti tensions, the Zimbabwegovernment ultimately extended pension coverage to all ex-combatants. Benefitsfor formermembers of ZANLAand ZIPRAwere calculatedon the basis of age and lengthof service.

ChapterS - Desip of Reintgaton Prosgms Par 65 DaxobWtoa andRinlognaion of MilitasyPersonnel

D. Payment Arrangements 113. Variousmethods of paymentwere designed to compensatefor thelimited administraive nfrastructrein someof the countriesto pay allowancesto ex-combatantsdispersed throughout the country,and to encouragethe use of lump-sumpayments and allowances for productivepurposes. BoxV.4: Payment Arrangements In Zimbabwe

. .*I.E**.**

comb.tans;ispecillyfor fficers D stut bsineses H the kingsyste in Angl is very .fain. ~ E~ raii all6a*;; deN k . ~o~a4 1ut4bft 114. 7b~~~ewaeAnoangvemn consiidereset btingpa lieof credit forvdevmoblie

E .. | . Q * . wekn desw rewr&throughaM.out theonr.I Zmthew govrnen guaraonteeu.the dbt, thismyhv .0a aditonw ourgt. ubsidyh.4toembiiedcobt.antsd. Ifethe gov mt wnotguaranteedid aWtore .vrlon&Onw* eadedsusethe a pa.yme.nt~c. and*~l.* creditmechan smdscrbdi 114. The Angolangovernment considered seting up a line of credit for demobilized comts especiallyfor officersto startbusinesses. However, the banking system in Angolais very weakand does not reach throughout the cousy. If thegovernment guaranteed the debt, this may have reasultedin an additionaloutright subsidy to demobilizedcombatants. If thegovernment did notguarantee the debt, it wouldhave been very difficult for the weakbanking system to properlgscreen applications ade to recoverloans. Onealternative discussed was the paymentand creditmechanism described in BoxV.5. Anotheralternative focused instead on the creationof a revolvingfund for decentralized privateinitiatives, set up at the locallevel to financesmall-scale or micro-projects,instead of a lineof reditthrough the formalbanking system. Tbiswas seen as a wayto financeproductive enterprises a well alsa mechanismto privatizesmall-scale state enterprises; it woulduse the localcommunity as a presure mechanismfor the recoveryof loans. Aftermuch reflection in Uganda,program planners decidedto providemuch of the benefitsintended for housing,and equipment in cash insteadof trying to admnitr distributionof massiveamounts of materialgoods throughout the enltirecountry.

SEFFLING-INASsrANc.u

115. Immediatelyafter demobilization,former soldiers and their familiesfrequently find themselveswithout many of thebasic necessities of lifesuch as shelter,medical care, food, clothing, and householdgoods, all of whichhad previously been provided by the armedforces or guerrillagroups. In this they-aifferalmost completely from civil servants whose positions are terminatedas a resultof public-sect4rrestucturing.

1'P4p66 ChapterS- Designof ReinXtegrtionProgmams Deanobilizrtionand Reintegrationof Mility Personnel

Box V.5: PaymentOptionsfor Angola

; gg .Z RRS , S E| E>

* W?,re tn~e thi nom !inalWau &cua th _ee i| #~~~~~!iGl1 W saooW i fo a 0 it g 4 XW;a3 -M EC yw1a4l *2 *i th~~I 110Q* ot 42l ilne

S S .~~~~~~~~~~~i~b ... V io 116. sab1 Ina~reognitio ofathis problem, a numberI s ofmostofUNlzA'tio toeeinweraeonpotramsav providedor pland prvie4 the bawsticncssitie . fo eriodiof seera monhs~'Iimei telfolwn d~~~~~ N;a, eAlaeew payin oldierhaa access toas ianbriedsnofrog amswbic trovie 116.ramsffiem-andwere often * In thir recognition de 1endents-wiof this problem,food,r civlina numberrclivi*g of demobflization/reintegration an.Wdpesonliestoueodgosprograms have providedor planto providethe basicnecessities for a periodof severalmonths immediately following discharge.In Nicaragua,demobilize-d NR soldiers had access to a seriesof programswhich provided them-andoften their dependents-withfood, civilianclothing and personalitems, household goods, buildingmaterials, work tools, agriculturalinputs, and somemedical assistance. Severalof these programswere in placefor a yearor more. All repatriatedrefugees in Namibia-acategory which includeddemobilized SWAPO guerrillas since all guerrillaswere dischargedand disarmedprior to repatriation-receivedseveral months' stock of dry food, basic householdgoods, cooking facilities, bedding,agricultural tools and se%As,and housingconstruction material. The settling-inprogram being implementedin Ugandaprovides similar assistanceover a period of six months worth US$228and includingschool fees, transporthome, tin roofingmaterials, and socialservices (but as notedpreviously, cash paymentsfor other types of setding-inbenefits were preferred for logisticalreasons). The other demobilization/reintegrationprograms surveyed for this studyoffered little or no settling-inassistance, relying insteadon cashpayments, as in Zimbabwe.

117. The setding-inprograms for NR veteransin Nicaraguawere intendedto be short-term in nature. However,several were extended beyond their initialperiod (approximately 6 monthsin some cases) in responseto participants'needs. The Food and MaterialsProgram, for example,ran for fifteen months,rather than the anticipatedsix; a U.S. governmentreport notedthat it was unrealisticto expect ex-wombatantsto be resetted and self-sufficientafter the anticipatedsix to ten months. MWAll settling-in assistanceprograms have to confrontthe problemof lossesdue to cofruptionand theft. The experience of CIAV-OASin Nicaraguasuggests steps that can be taken to ensure those entitled actuallyreceive assistance,and fraud and theft are minimized,as shown in Box V.6. !n Nicaragua,it was found that designatingthe wives of ex-NR membersto be responsiblefor collectingthe monthly food rations associatedwith the settling-inassistance was an effectiveway to ensure that veterans'families received the rations intendedfor them. Setting-inassistance may supplementor replacecash allowances. Ex-

,/ U.S. GeneralAccounting Office, Repost to CongressionalRequestes, AiD to cAaguw US. Auitanae Sppo Economkand SocialDevelopmnt, August 1992.

Chapter5 - Designof Reitgration Plog=mm Papg67

t_J Dwmo=tia and Reictgrationof MiIkaiyPcuonnel

Bo V.6: Mcaragua:Reducing the Potenticfor Tft f In-KAndBenefits

. E E E .N ~~~~~~~~~~~...... t u- waR

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i XYN4S '.

suerillas in Nicuna and Namobiareceived sealing-in asisnce an a smalldemobilization payment but no cash allowances.

T*-tGE REMRAMINo PROJES (NON-CASH)

118. The majorityof trainingand employmentschemes in the countriesstudied were offered to combea*ts after they had bee demobiized, althoughin a limited number of cases training was providedwhie combatantswere stll enmped. Four majorkinds of targetedpost-release programs have beDenimplemented in-the countries covered by tis study: formaleducation, vocational training, income- geneating projects,and job plw ment. . . A. Pre-releasePros *

119. In the spring of 198, Operaon SEED was launched in Zimbabwe. 'ne program coasistedof income-generationprojes for soldien who were still in the military. Stronglysuppoted by Pritme Miniser RobertMugabe, it had twopurposes: (1) to providebasic skills to combatats waiting in assemblycamp tO be dischargedor induces into the new ZimbabweArmy; and (2) to inafease militaryunits" self-sufficiency, reducing the military/'sdependence on the civilianeconomy for food and basic evices by having themorganize into production units to grow food. TIe projectbad to be aborted

Per 68 Chapur S - Dai8n of ReimegmtionPtogrsns Demobiat;io and Reinteationof MlilaryPersonnel

audienceactually became involved. This was to be expected,since while the project concentratedon agriculture-relatedactivities, a surveyof combatantsindicated only 4% desired a career in agriculture. The SEED programalso contributedto the justificationfor maintaininga large amed force since the armed forces now had an additionalrole to that of security, becominga productionunit. Another programIn Zimbabwe,focused on providingtraining for ZANLAand ZIPRAsoldiers while they were still in assemblycamps, including basic education and literacycourses. Thesecourses were very popular, but it is not knownif all who wouldhave liked were able to participate. The instructorswere paid by the military, and the number of courses may have been limited by insufficientfunding. It is also unknownhow the coursesoffered affected veterans' subsequent civilian careers.

B. Formal Education

120. * In manydeveloping countries, particularly those emerging from protracted periods of civil strife, many combatantshave foregoneformal education, even at the primary school level. A socio- economicprofile of some5,000 encampedguerrilla soldiers in Zimbabwefound that fewerthan 20% had more than a primaryeducation. Thirteenpercent had no formaleducation. Governmentsmay find it in their Interestto provideveterans with the opportunityto completetheir formal education. In the short tem, this could reduce pressureon the job market by keepingthem in school, particularlyif large numbersof soldiersare demobilizedwithin a short period of time. In the longerterm, the educational level of the workforcewill be enhanced.

121. In Zimbabwe,ZIPRA and ZANLAveterans were offered room and board at special schoolsand placeswithin the regularschool system. However,less than 10%of themopted to complete their education. Many had family responsibilities,which put a premium on obtainingremunerative employmentas soonas possible,and others,if offeredplaces in the regularschool system, would hesitate to be placedin a classof children. In Uganda,vouchers to pay the schoolfees of the childrenof veterans are being providedas part of the settling-inpackage.

BoxV.7: Z 6mbabwe:Specialked Schoolsfor Veterans

7erE a

C 5 - Desgnof Reint*gmtionPtrogms Page09 Doauobbfrtionnd Roieration of MilitauyPeonno

C. Vocational Traliing and incomeGeneration

122. Just as mostvetrans havehad little formal education, many have very few marketable Skills. In Zimbabwe;combatants indicated their preference for technical/vocationaltraning over formal academiceducation, *speclalIy for older,less-educated and more senior-ranking combatants. A socio- culturalsurvey of 5000 encampedguerrilla soldiers In Zimbabwe found that three-quarters of themeither hadnever been employed previously (52%) or wereunskilled (23%). A similarstudy of 1,200Uganda soldierscaired out in 1901found that over 55% eitherpossessed only military skills (47%) or were totallyunskilled (8.5%). 123. .lb primaryreintegration program supported by the Namibiangovernment is the DevelopmetBigades. -programenvisioned providing vocational training for up to 25,000veterans of the SWAPOand SouthWest Africanforces through providing collectlv 'trainingand skillsin agricultur, constructiotad waterdevelopment. Trainees received a salaryof R5O/month(less than US$240tyear,compared toDfth 1990aNP per capitaof,US$1080 and wereto be deployedto six resettementcenters around the country. .TheZimbabwe govement reliedheavily on NGOprograms for vocationaltraining, notably n.NGO known as the:Zimbabwe Project (see Box V.9). CIAV-OAS progprasim Nicaragua also offered some on-thp-job training in basicvocational skills such as carpentry andmasory, despitethe factthat theirinitW purpose had been to provideonly short-term resettlement aid. In Mozambique,programs are reportedlybeing developed to providevocational training in the fiollowingfields: bricklaying,carpentry, electrician, pipelaying, mechanic, forester, and game warden. Nofurther details on theseplans are currently vailable.

424. TheNamibian intership program for artisans in specificcompanies sponsored by theOtto Benece Foundation.taclded one of the mostserious problems of skilledreturnees, including ex- combatants:their lackof employmentexperience. The foundationplaced candidates on three-month i* rships withprivate companies, and underwrote the costs. Traineesgain work experience, becoming moremarketable; companies receive frfee labor (after providing substantial attention during the training phase)and the opporunityto assessprospective employees without incurring future obligatlons. lhe Foundationfollowed up by Identifyingcandidates' skill shortcomings, and directed them to appropriate speciaizedtraining programs. No datais availableon theresults of thisprogram, or howsuccessfully It was Implemented. 125. Many of the vocationaltraining programs have been inadequatelyfnded and have reachedonly a smallproportion of thepotential target population. Only 2,000-3,000 trainees received placesin NamibianDevelopment Brigades during Its first yearof operation,and the drop-outrate was high. Fundingwas reportedlylimited, and somebrigade members organized a marchin June 1992 claimingincreasing frustration with the government'sinability to providethem with support or jobs. It is also unclearwhat proportionof the traineesobtained long-term employment in their area of specialization.In contrast,the Danhiko project run by a privatesector organization for disabledveterans, providedintensive vocational training to veterans(mcluding the disabled)who were recruited directly

:li Prom, Bx-fihtas Dqployed,'Thw of Namibia,August 27, 1991.

Pap 70 Chapter5 - Designof ReintegrationPogmams Danobilizain and ReintegMtonof MilitaryPersonnel

Box. V.8: VocatIonal7)alnln In Zimbabe: TheDanhiko Project - OneSuccess

|cu 4.u.1 .yi oman wo4 E nu ioIw . .i4,Eit |dtIt .~ ieiit W.f k2f WM seon oboJ M) th t |U ~ v~ in gb#o*.Ig 1tsnng .¢th Sovamnt'?oltoba s,io hec t |e *E~~pee.b pouat ozildait*.B0u ftentiv at flbprm1 |~~~~~~~~~h.bO Mfrs boXa'x44b uSoet ~et nd g.ut evnaWW rvddao~d~eho o~s~dotle ctdtto~*z

g~va~Lo~mm,n 3 h fom4n h ~tn o...fdntnpyn O

e~ ~ ~ ~ ~ lt 5'di ~ lj ~

S .

frmcms(e4o nu~iV.8);the p ogramclims tohae boosat.ed the empoymentwArthepof itsgadzuaete

available ontbeMqIMprogra desIign and~IL Vnce.softe aiian l)we lopmet Bigades, tbe wawrZin Project,our prjsithe icaaga*o...

in ~cours gr ffi tbiof stu wasy tie tospciicemlomet enues:agicltwraland ommercial coopertive)sand sal-ctin,ale aindustry.~TheZibbePojecart,oe for exml,heItnlve te toeiestab~lis10

fr omcamps (see t box.8) ptheopreogramh claims touhat bomostedgthe emplutoymntaeofsgrdae availableSon tDesiprormdsg of nucs th aiba eelpetBrgds the Zimagwe7 Dcwnoblllonand Rdntegmtion of Mity Psouonl

Box V.9: Z7mbabw:Cooperattves - TheZlmbabw Project

V XEB S 5'

gE .

E~~~~ l p E|'mN

.~ ufihtW*X*~~(v...... EW| wC4> 1apW r ... X ~~bOt L4 M11 ,p~lI I E~ U 1 m ,.

. . X X E X E g E 0 4 aRSXaF~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~... ~ .

V 4 .. S .SfEBf

C *mEI Q 4: pm4

cobaatsi ne. swiOmotloa N0, h Zimbabwe *ebwProeta hag deedn netrna

It ,.4. ES okepn,adctetyE naddnt- S S dn paticipntsit@& prov ide tf vbWc1

g I EECS SE.!gE=gE S s t S.>.RF. fnendasistnc tDst i hecoeavs Acorin to on prjc vluto seBo . v th.ogtr sbsMJtarAtWiOmube ofa the pcjec paartai~cipadrppe ou (~e40Mbofar~t cipa)1 I aMw imabe,exZAUitatvem omatnt fred acoman nae NnRA.M, fio ddb coopeaives which employedformer soldiers,provided relevant trann (includingtraining 75 maes and prosecutorsas well as 300 prison officers),and providedwelfaere support to exc- comba¢antIn need. Aswith most local NGOs, the Zimbabwe Project was heavily dependent on external funding.Pap72 b By 1984,some 10,000~ veterans4~o had1 is~ received hbasic vocational Caw 5 -trainingDWSn of~ inRewtgti~otrgm agriculture,cattle maniigement,bookkeeping, anld carpenty. In additionto trainingparticipants, it providedtechnical and fingncialassistance to set up thiecooperatives. According to oneproject evaluation (see Box V.9), over the'longterm a substantialnmber of the projectparticipants dropped out (40%of participants).In anptherinitiative in Zimbabwe,ex-ZAPU combatants formed a companynamned NITRAM, funded by contributionfrom ZIPRA veterans. This purchased farms, hotels, and small businesses which

PagB72 ChapterS - Designof Re_nertOn PzogmrnS Demobilizatonsnd Rente8rdtionof Miltay Personnel wererun by veterans.The discovery of armscaches on a.NlTRAMproperty in 1982caused the ZANU governmentto disbandthe company. 127. In Nicaragua,the National Center for Planning and Administration of Development Poles (CENPAP),an NGOestablished by the CivicAssociation of theNicaraguan Resistance, has helpedNR veteransestablish more than 100micro-enterprises and cooperativesand ran numerousworkshops on humanrelations and community development. The cooperatives are primarily in agriculture,but include fising, transport,carpentry, and shoemaking enterprises. In Mozambique,plans are being made to help create microenerprisesin agriculture,fishing, bricklaying, carpentry, electrician, pipelaying, and mechanics.No frter detailsare yet availableon thisprogram. BNoxV.10: Mcoaragua:Income-Generating Projects

~~~~_gi_i-_iaagl;E 4 Ls~~~~\' > ~i~t t ~ ~ IItfl.i~ dUtibA . " § Nih* Ma;

128 CIV-A also hle esaihteAl anti CoasRiAe Provdu4ctinand

progammst n haebenlmtedt 4 topNRetern.The projectsucceeded in estabishing0 fairemare

Howeer,thelontermviailiyo m angofthseeneprises tis unler thieCIVOAS worked . er

128. put CIo lo theepdesals Atlantic Coast fotn t Ricervd andProductionomeriahmwt h peesroginramustrnotuethaerbee limie guraveteeansto Theaprojgecet suceddi bestablisin aofaircomeallftrket priclemsaftermo fistgowlgsasn,twich the weioasbentest fconsidereakyincatorpofitsisccess Iensitill rundsm byoltheCAA reteginaofie,trheoa governintangisfece boamrdwoderes.Tabisheoud inlMarfch 192lTher hiarditoput thieAlnios rice projects.Siiaonsrit afcomercial fooin andRtoprovetide thembawithth

ChapterS-Design of ReintegrationProgramsPgt7 Deniobion and Raintegrationof Miltai Petsonnel

D. Job Placement

129. In additionto assistingveterans by creaingjobs, reintegrationprograms have assisted veteransin findingexisting jobs, both In theprivate and the public sectors. The economiesof all of the countiessurveyed were very weak at thetime of demobilization,and their ability to absorbnew entrants to the civilianlabor market was correspondinglylow. In addition,none of the govenmentsappear to haveestablished,formal mechanisms for assistingveterans to find employmentin the privatesector. In Zimbabwe,it was suggestedthat industryreceive tax breaksand other economicincentives to hire veterans,but it is not clearthat this proposal was ever implemented. Although the governmentdid not makeany efforts to directlyplace veterans in jobs, oneNGO offered a job counselingprogram. There Is littleinformation on the impactof thatprogram. However, eight years after independence, only about 28% of Zimbabweanveterans had found work in the formalsector or were self-employed.In Mozambique,a nationalreconstruction program Is beingdeveloped which, it is hoped,wIll offer ex- combatantsemployment in helpingto rebuildroads and sewers; rebuild health centers and state buildings; demineroadways; and construct channels and wells.

130. In Namibia,the privatesector has been extremely reluctant to hire formerguerrillas, for severalreasons: the Eastbloc training received by manyis consideredinadequate; a lackof previous professionalexperience; and polidcal bias. Mostveterans have settled In thenorth, while the majority of job opportunitiesare in thesouth. Theyhave found it difficultto obtaininformation on availablejobs, andbave often walted for assistancefrom SWAPO that was not forthcoming.The governmenttried to addressthe fact that manyveterans were unawareof job opportunitiesoutside of their regionby broadcastingopenings on specialradio programs. This did not solvethe problemsthougb, since, in additionto notknowing where to lookfor jobs, veterans also usually did nothave the resources to tavel to otherregions in thehope of findingemployment.'

131. The state remainsone of the largestsources of employmentfor demobilizedsoldiers. Whennational armies are reconstitutedfollowing protracted civil wars, manyformer soldiers (regular toops andguerrillas) are the firstto join. Othersare employedby thepolice or as gamewardens. In iAarch1992, the Angolangovernment issued radio announcements that the Ministryof Agricultureand RuralDevelopment was preparedto employup to 60,000veterans in rural farmingprojects or as park andgame reserve wardens. By 1992,it wasalleged that nearly 40% of the formerSWAPO guerrillas hadbeen absorbed into the new armyand police force. Tlherole of the statein reemployingveterans Is mostclearly seen in thecase of Zimbabwe,the onlycase that has been completed for overfive years. Thelack of a programto containthe civil service or themilitary meant that the programprovided large benefitsand the civil service and military grew substantially (armed forces from 15,000 in 1980to 54,500 in 1992,and the civil servicefrom 71,000in 1980to 89,400in 1985).P Whileemploying large mnmbersof ex-combatantsin the publicsector may solve some of the politicaland securityproblems facinggovernments, it failsto provideadequate relief to thepublic budget. The Zimbabwegovernment

V/ Tapsootand Mulongeni, An E whaiiof he Welfareand Futuwe Propects of Repaoted Nambans inNorrnJ Namibla,August, 1990.

R/ Someof ibs growthmay be attributedto the task of creatinga more raciallyinegated civil servie aftertie war.

Page74 Chaptr S - Designof ReiftegrationPrograms Demob ll and Reintogratonof Miya Personnel spenta totalof US$250million on its demobilization/reltgation program,only to find eight yearslater, that It was still payingthe salaries of 55% of the demobilizedsoldiers. More recent programshave focusedon both militaryand civiliandownsizing (Uganda, Chad, Mozambique)and thus may have a greater chanceof Increasingthe long-termfiscal 'peace dividend' from demobilization.

E. Community-Based and NGO Programs

132. In caseswhere the governmentis weak, donorshave soughtto channelprograms through NOOsand localcommunities In an effortto enhancesustainability. Many NOOs believe that community- basd programsare more easilymonitored and thereforehave a better chanceof being successful,and that the reintogrationof combatantsInto normal' communitieswould ease the healingand reconciliation proces as well.0i However,working with NGOsrequires an open channelof communicationbetween those maging the demobilizationprocess and the NOOsproviding reintegration programs-as well as sufficientNOOs willing to participatein the process.9v

133. In Namibia,NGOs were responsiblefor managingmost of the reintegrationprogms. The most ignificantwork In favor of returne"o wa peormed by the Councilof Churchesin Namibia (CCN). The CCN actedas localpartner for UNHCRand establisheda specialemergency Repatriation, Rsettement and Reconstuctioncommittee (RRR). Two hundredthirty pastors and church workers weretrained to deal withthe specialproblems of repatriation. RRRemployed up to 450 staffmembers, most of them Namibians. Other NGO-sponsoredreiltegraion programsin Namibiaare shown in 1.

134. As notedpreviously, an EEC-designedprogram in AngolaIntended to direct 50% of its stae drough projectscoordinated with the local authoritiesand Implementedby a partnershipof Eupean and AngolanNO0s. Theybelieved that allocatingtheir assistancethrough NGOs, particularly in ruril areas, wouldprovide them with greaterfreedom to accomplishspecific tasks at the local level and assistIn the repopulationand resettementof the Angola'sabandoned regions. The EEC was making specialeffortsto spread its programsover the entire country,and provideeach sub-regionwith medical, agricultal and taning projects. One NGOactive in Angola,Catholic Relief Services (CRS), believed that only In establishedcommunities would ex-combatantsfind the sustainedsocial support that they required. CR3 had also been consideringcreatng a new AngolanNGO or a consortiumof NGOs specificallyoriented toward reiation of ex-combatants.However, development progms, including those aimed at demobilizedcombatants, were inhibitedby a lack of local NGOs in Angola, posing stuory problemsfor internationalNMOs or other donorswhose policy it is not to channelresources

Ml InNicargua, somnNGOs ran small-scale agiculkurl projectsfocused on buildingconfidence between excontras and ex-Sandinistas. (Eguizbal at al., 1992).

JI As ued upon in footnoteS1, one key aspectof this communicationis the provisionof informationon the profies and specificdesnations of ex-combaantsto NCOs. In Ugpndasuch information was availableand thus acled plaing at thoe ommunitylveL. In Chadand Ethiopia,such informaton was eithernot availablein a formhelpful for localcommunities or not providedby the milit.

ChapteS - Dosignof Reingvation Programs Page7 DemobIItionand ReioAgomtion of Mgbry Poia

BoxV.: Nandbta:NGO-sponsored Refntegradon Programs

.. ,R i t .e g S t e v i

,~~~~~ ~.NS .% %.a 4 a i . V Qg& N *mE,vAX

pants. t t I t . , s ag p og's wb'h

OY $d at4 Sfi Q an t qf p i .wmUionvbut UE

2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- . . ifigS .l | g N_s reioPap76 f h inii i ualslir ynt mtjgtopedc- S theCS,Dspotppoprite 1teraMirdpfo f 0V exwmbhpdvt.

S~~~~~~~~~~ 01 - throug govrernment(or military)inlstitutions.' Furthermore, for mostof thieNGOs active in Angola, demobilizationwas a lowpriority. A samplingof thietypes of projectsproposed by NGOsIn Angolais prene in 2. Theseprojects were not implementedbefore the Angolanconflict resumed. 135. It is temptingto offervocational training programs to demobilizedsoldiers in camps wherethey are a captiveaudience. However, some observers have noted that someof the large-scale trann programsin Zimbabwefiled to accuratelypredict the specificemployment needs in the home regionof theindividual soldier. By notattempting to predictthe appropriate training for exs-ombatants but rather,by offeringsdipends or matchinggranlts for existingvocational training programs fo which thiemarket has alreadyproved a demand,it isles likelyex-combatants will be trainedin disciplineswith low employmentprospects (see example of the OttoBeneckce Foundation described in para. 123). Hence the needfor smallerscale, community-based programs which may mic demobilizedsoldiers withi other paticipant. Anotheralternlative is to focuson privately-run,small-scale training programs which conductadequte marketresearch as was donein theDanhiko Project in Zimbabwe(Ref. Box V.8).

§X/ Ca;ol ReliefSeonri meoandum, Pebrry 1992.

Peg.76 ChatrS - Dwaignof ReinteratonProgram. Dmobilizan andRditegraton of MituayPmoned

Box V.12: Angola:NGO-sponsored Rentegradon Progranms

acoUevItye heyweedtoivng . arggousandworingtoge the SomENG_ .u l . o f f

|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' .~ '4|

di3ipi. In Zplmbawesomein cobtnsepr essed:tDheipesre desr fortenaceivn torainin deleatives tof

respectedcommanders to explainprograms in personto combatant;to use someof the best-educated, seniorcombatants as triner; wolink the trinng andeducation of ex-combatantsto production,directy to income-geneamtinactivities; and tD establisha closelink betweenthe liberationstruggle and its continuationas reconsftrction. 13. In Mzmiu,government and developmentagencies are developingplans for community-basedprograms tD be Implementedin most of thedistricts where ex-combatants are to settle. Thi wll Includedistribution of seedsand agriculturaltools, trainingprograms, and infrastructure rehabilitation.Specific details on theseprograms are not availableat thistime-partly because many are st InI the planing ste.

HouSINGAND LAND IqsmU

138. A commontheme in reintegrationprograms among the countriesstudied is to assumeor encourageex-combat towretur to rurallife andtake up fsaing. However,this dependson ox- combatns havingthe desire to becomeinvolved in agriculture,and on the availabilityof land, equipmet,and atraiing.

Cilatio - Den of Rci detationPthosmse b Pav 77 Demobilizatonand Rointegaion of M y Personnel

139. In Angola,over 80% of FAPLAcombapats expressed interest In retrning to urban,not rural, areas(consitent with their greater concentration In urbanareas). In contrast,most former NR soldierswanted to settle In rural communities,as do two-thirdsof Ugandanarmy personnelfacing demobilization.For these individuals,the problemis accessto land. The Chamorrogovernment promisedeach demobilized Sandinista Army and NR soldier25 manzwa.aof land. However,because the Sandinistagovemment had nationalizedthe landand distributedit to its supporters,there are now significantproblems of multipletitles and claims. Manyindividuals who had landnationalized by the Sandinistagovernment are seekingto retaintitle. Manyformer soldiers have not receivedthe landor cleartites to land. Lacklngclear te, theyhave difficulty obtaining the loansthey need for equipment and othernecessities to workthe landthey occupy-these disputes over land,combined with a drought the sameyear they demobilized, have proven to be one of the mostimportant fctors contributingto renewedpolitical unrest in nrualareas of Nicaragua.By July 1991, only slightly over half of theforme NR had receivedland from the government;as of November1991, OAS officialsestaed that an additional25% of ex-NRhad obtained access to land,leaving 25% with ', access.m In Ugandaonly 30%of arableland is curreny in use so landavailability may present less of an issue(although quality and competinguses suchas for cattleraising may pose a problem).The localveterans committees in Ugandawill attemptto mediateland conflicts if theyarise. 140. Theexpecaion by governmentsthat the agrictural sectorwill absorb the vast majority of formersoldiers is thusconditioned on theavailability of ferdle,unclaimed land. Theremay be no free Landto redistributeor landtenre patternsmay prevent easy absorption. The experienceIn Zimbibwe, wherea substial portionof the communallands distributed to veta was deforestedin the pursuit of profit,suggests that it maybe desirableto requireformer soldiers to pay for the landthey receive. It seemstbat when individuals receive land free of charge-particularlyif they have no previousfarmig experienceand are not especiallycommitted to makng a caree of farming-theyview the land they are givenas the wayto turn a quickprofit rather than as a sourceof sustainedincome requiring proper management.

141. Whilein militaryservice, combatants are providedbarracks or shelter;upon being demobilizedthey requirehousing, and many do not havethe financialresources necessary to provide housingfor themselvesand their families (especily whenthey do notreceive large lump-sum payments upon demobilizing).In Namibia,Building Brigades composed of teamsof repatriates,including ex- combatants,addressed the criticalneed for housingof retnees; engagingthem in buildinghouses for their own communitynot onlyhelped sece themhousing at a low cost,but also providedvaluable constructionskills and work experience.Preliminary information dicatesthat this programwas effectiveand may be worthduplicating. In Namibia,as wellas Nicaraguaand Uganda, ex-combatants wereprovided the construction materials needed to buildtheir own houses. In Nicaraguaa programof self-helphousing resulted in theconstruction of 1,231homes and 41 schoolsin 1992:the beneficiaries broughtto the siteroofing material they had received after demobilization and formed teams to buildthe housesthey would inhabit.

W U.S.G.A.O.,Aid to Narwasa, U.S. Atsance S yp"E;conon andSoci Dwlpment, August,1992: p. 37.

Pagp 78 Chapter5 - Dedgnof Rentetion Programs Doobiano_n andROlntron of Muhy PNonomd

SBIJV ULNERABZGRoUPs

142. While It b appropriateIn may tnces to classifydemobilized soldiers as a "disadvantagedgroup" because of theirlack of resources,their low skilllevels, and their unfamiliarity withcivilian society, there are three subgroups that warrant special atention: disabledvetans, veterans' dependents,and "children-soldiers." 143. Onelegacy of protractedcivil strife Is large numbers of individualswith severe medical andpsychological disabilities. While providing special medical facilities for veten is not uncommon In the Industrialcountries, It Is nonethelesslegimate to quesionwhether separate progtams should be establishedfor veteransin countrieswhere large numbers of clvilianshave been physically and mentally damagedas a resultof war, particularlywhen veterans' programs might be createdat the expenseof similarprograms for civilians. 144. In Angola,a minimumof 40,000individuals are esdmatedto be mutilatedby war and 50,000children abandoned by war.t Manyof thosewere non-combatnts. Similarly, in Mozambique, by far thelargest number of thosewho suffered physically and menally from the 16-yearcivil war were civilians.In somecases, although civilians may be equailyneedy, restrictions on fundingmay limit the cdienteleof rehabilitationprograms to ex-combauts.CIAV-OAS programs in Nicaraguawere supported by UnitedStates financing, which was itended to be usedsolely for NRveterms. In othercases, such as the Centrefor the Disabledat Nakayale,Nainibia, civilians and former soldiers are treated together. 145. Programsdirected specifically at disabledveterms have been set up in Angola,Namibia, Nicaragua,and Zimbabwe, while others are planned for Mozambique and Uganda. These include special pensions,medical rehabilitation, and training. The Angolan government provides disabled veterans with a monthlypension equivalent to theirwages in the armedforces plus a foodallowance. Most of the rehabilitationand traning programshave relied entrely on foreignfunding and other assistance. Informationon mostof theseprograms is sketchyand it Is unclearwhether they have succeeded in (1) reachinga largeshare of theirpotenial clienele or (2)integrating rehabilitaed veterans into the civilian workforce.The program funded by CIAV-OASfor NRveterams (described in 3) clearlymade an effbrt to find employmentfor rehabiitatedveterans. In Namibia,the Cetre for the Disabledat Nakayale reportedlylacked links to thelocal economy which would have enabled rehablitted veteas withnewly acquiredskldls to gainemployment. In contrast,the Daihiko school in Zimbabwe,which included in its targetgroup a large numberof disabledveterans, appears to haveenjoyed some success in improving their employmentprospects. 146. In the Ugandaprogram, some estimate that half of the ex-combatantsare disabled, sociallymaladjusted, or severelyill (includingthose with AIDS). The progrm has contractedwith NGOsand private-sector agencies to provideadditional specialized social services to the communities wherethe ex-combatantswill concentre. Theservices are eentally providedto the community(not

S/ 'PuFoerReport of the Secreuan-Gcaaon the UnitedNaion AngolaVerification MJsion (UNAVEM-I)," June 24, 1992. haer5 - Designof R_itaton P1oam Pap 79 Demobizaotanand Reintoggationof Milit*uy Personnel

Just the Individualex-combatant) and are direed at strengtheningexlsLig basic socialservice capacity, thus avoidingexclusion of other needygroups and the creationof a separateinstitution.

Box V.13: Mcaragua:Disabled Veterans Progans

MM

1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~.4

.. a 147.Althoughl~~~~~~ S ademo.4iz tionreCraiAoA progrn pamfouponvdet erian,iti equsally imoran 'S 'S' theicoss. ndeed,a manycae*s,t.in anbed argued nthawatisttbeing rinosocerted intwoifan Jlif is9no

add,,-, 1 lnemato1a agenciesAandcNtos est.xabished,a chfbd survival progmp inaNycpragr a, Ho"urn,andd Cost Ricaltosisaid chlrnd wh werevictims of1U civ2bllaM strie In Nambia allprorams for

for147. merSWAP Athougheat~imebes demblziondepwere by defmtw onenter aimed pr~yogat**.***....*********.f__is tramsocsbeausheyt on eveteroans wereetendedtoallt i8eqall important rmes o utcmaat orwthe fombdatsimmediate fJ$amfis 'Me prora bid4ngimpemete in Ugndhas, fromtluliflbgni,exlcyp the annedtoxproidesuportfrd mbNze(olies n ttaethe needsaof veteras depdeUint ent coutwe design1n CtAVAprogram an acltn Pavgo prae f irlykapterChA~M -h Detigntof Rereiantesatod P2o1m theircosts. Indeed,in mnanycases, it canbe arguedthat what is beingreinserted into civilianlife is not "thesoldier" but "thefamily unit." The CIAV-OASprogram in Nicaraguawas ostensibly aimed at the approximately22,500 NR veteans whopresented themselves for demobilizationduring 1990, but ended up v providingassistance-either directly or indirectly-to82,000 dependents as well (see 4). In ad&>;., 11 internationalagencies and NGOsestablished a child survivalprogram in Nicaragua, Hoauras, andCosta Rica to aidchildren who were victims of civilstrife. ln Namibia,all programsfor formerSWAP0 memberswere by definitionaimed at families,because they were extendedto all returnees,not just combatantsor the combatants'immediate families. The program being implemented in UJgandahas, fromthe beginning,explicitly planned to providesupport for demobilizedsoldiers and theirdependents;.

Pages80 ChapterS- Designof ReintegrationPrograms DomobliUzadonand Reintegmtionof Militar Pcrsonnel

148. To improvethe efficiencyof distributionof benefits and to reach the objectiveof providingbasic needs to people, it may be desirableto structureprograms so that veterans' wives are fully integraed into the process. Studieshave shownthat womenwho receiveincome or food are more likelyto pass it on to the childrenin the householdthan men. CIAV-OASstaff membersin Nicaragua preferred channellingfood throughveterans' w: es for this reason. In addition,to ensure the timely completionof housingprojects constructed by smallteams of veterans,CIAV-OAS staff only allowed familiesto moveinto the new homeswhen all the housesa team wasto constructhad been finished.This ensuredthat the womenwould make sure that their husbandspresented themselves for work eachmorning for the durationof the project. In Zimbabwe,the wivesof ex-combatantshave proved successfulin collectivefarming. This has promptedthe transferof specificagricultural ministerial portfolios to the Ministryof Cooperativesand CommunityDevelopment and Women'sAffairs.-' Throughthis ministry, the Zimbabweangovernment 'has activelycontinued: to advise, train, and offer financialassistance to cooperatives;promoted greater access of ex-combatantsto raw materials,product markets, as well as managerialservices and appropriatetechnology; assisted new and existingex-combatants' cooperatives which demonstratethe capacityto increasetheir economicgrowth productionand employmentwith investmentcapital cashflow and expert managementservices. g

149. Children-soldiersinarguably constitute a needygroup which would experience difficulty maing the transitionto civilianlife. Becausemany of thesesoldiers are familiarwith a militarylifestyle, they may require psychologicalcounselling in additionto other services. Althoughone programwas tenively proposedby UNICEF for demobilizedchildren-soldiers in Chad, no further informationis availableon whetherthis programhas been approvedor implemented.

Box V.14: NicaraguaRelmegradon. A FaniUyAffair

gg | ttheRt1wiag ww.,a4.. _i_ he _ _. g| Sl d nted po.undS,'>E I

g~~iR Steri .lskt ,ai >, tn their,.S4epond>:' x > al;so2ESngiS.samto m z of:t:

661 Unitya Mustif Africa'sEconomy is to Survive,"in WIdhoekObsever, July 6, 1991,p. 2.08

6/ Mstial Sanent to Parliamentof Zimbabweon PIightof Ex-Combatanta,"August 4, 1988,p. 783.

Chpe 5 - Designof ReinlegrationProgzams Page81 DemobIlIzatn d ReiogatIon of Mitay PeriW

CHAPrER VI

COSTAND FUNDING OF DEMOBILIZATIONAND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS

150. Thischapter anlyzes the costof DRPs. Sufficientresources are needed to producethe balanceof positiveand negative incendves needed to inducecombatants and their leaders to proceedwith demobilization.Donors are often reluctantto commitresources, preferring to wait and see how successfulthe demobilization effort Is beforebecoming involved; however, experiences from the cases suggestdonor involvement-in the formof technicalassistance and promoting discussion and program coordination-isneeded at an earlystage to help designadequate programs and provide the incenives neededto carryout demobilization.

COSTOF EMOBHJAVON/REPEGRATIONPROGRAMS

151. Ihe costs-rofmost of the programs,while at first glantequite high, are not substantial whencomparel with the amountof ODAgiven to thesecountries. As shownin TableVI.1, the DRP cost(on an annualizedbasis) ranged from 32% of annualODA In Angolato 2% in Nicaragua.The costs of smaller-scaleprograms focused primarily on demobilization(or wherecost informationis available onlyfor demobilization), such as thoseIn Namibia,Chad, Uganda, and Mozambique range from 4 to 7% of the anual ODA. Tot programcosts are difficultto compareon a standardizedbasis, as thereare variationsin the costcomponents included in thetotal (seeTable VI.2).W 152. Theprograms' per capitacost is in manycases smaller (though sometimes twvice the level of thecountry's GDPlcapita) than the average cost of civilservice reductions in similarcountries. In the one casecompleted (Zimbabwe), the tol programcost per soldieremployed or in training(excluding thosereemloyed in the civil serviceand military)is approximatelyUS$8,469; because this program providedsubstanially larger cash compensation than any other and allowed re-employment in the civil serviceand military, one could expect the costs of otherprograms per employedex-combatant to be much

i/ Por example,the fundsalocatd to CIAV-OASin Nicanguaarm not brokendown into oategoiesspecifically for demobiizaon and reintegrtion. Also, the oostsof the UN observerforke and the adm in costs of the OAS oroin Nicagawee not Ihnlude,although similarosts erewincdedbfor someof the othercasestudios. Another disrepancyis that Zimbabws totalincludes payment of salries to combatantswhile they wereencamped; in other cases,this costwas covered by thegoveme's defensebudget or guerilla forceCn sonm cases, suchas the guerrilla ftoomeinAnol, PALA,com_b didnot receve salari at all. For Mozambiquc,high and lowestimates fir each cost componentwere based on the anticipatednumber of demobilizingcombalants.

hapter6 - Costand PFundingof Demobilizationand ReintegrationPrograms Pa Demoblaion and Reneaton of Milituy Personnel

Table VI1: TheRelatie Cost of Demobilaon/Relegratlon Programs

US$mion Angoab Chad Mozambique| Namibla Niarau Uganda Zimbabwe .1 = ~ = -_ - | - DRP $1251' $18.9 $54.4 - 62.6 $46.4 - $43.6a $19.4 $230' OCer $429.4' Codt____ (Projeckd) $62.5 $18.9' nfa n/a $18.5 $19.4 $46 Annual Average _ _ Annual ODA' $196 $262 $920 $184 $826 $525 $208 Ratioof DIP/ODA 31.8% 7.2% 64i% n/a 2.2% 3.7% 22.1%

NMo 1 Thlisin US$13milion i aemrgenoyas ne to enampd combatans.

2 Tbe lowerestimate inoludes diroct compensaion to ex-ombatan, the DevelopmentBrigade, and UNHCR repaation of 44,000 retums from abroad includingan estomated10,000 guerrillas. The highr coat estiate nhdes the entireUNTAG budget of $383 millionwhicb covered administrative costs and electons,demobilizaton, and repatriation.(of civilians u wellas ex-combatants). a DRPcosts for NRorly; costsfor subsequentdemobilzation of Sandiistamilitary unavailable. / Includescost of combatnts' salares while they were encampedfor 1 year or more (US$42mlion), not inoludedin total l)RPcosts of other cases. Does not include$23 millionin NOOprogams and a fundfor ex-combaansince the annualzedoosts of theseprograms are unklown. ,J Basedon US$1- 263.87CFPA, 1M92 average. 4/ Net disbusementsof officialdevelopment assistame from all souroesfor 1991,except Zimbabwe (1983) and Angola(1990); in Angolathe programaboted and fightingresumed. SourceWorld Dewlpnuw Repon, 1993,World Bank. Sourcefor Zimbabwe,World Devlopmne Report,1988, World Bank. Source for Angola,UNDP Angola mission esinate.

Page84 Chapter6 - Costand Funding of Demobilizationand Reitgrtion Prgms Table V12: Demobilizadonand Retntegaion Program Costs $-US$

~~~~~Angolaf Chad Mm __ I qe j NawHIba _ _ 2mUgand_ Z[nbabw

;m"bidon 59$l _ S18.9m $53.7-615m $3831 S2.7m S43.6ny S19.4i $207m#

Pn~jctcd oost over 2 For 18,000 For 77,000- 20,000 PLAN For 2,000 F or 22400 Pccd oost Danbili y. to demobiize soldlers 83,000 combata s gueuila BPS NR com- for 23,000 s for 75,O0 103,000comba_t officers1 btatns soldiks g_urs

Reiteaion $48m nr. $77,oooW $11.41n swederob. cost (SS 1"U $23mW Cods_ Projeced costs over 2 yrs (Dreepamet Vocational IneludosDeavopment For NlRomnbne with Still in planuig Fund$y training Brigades for 2-3,000 demobilizion costs; for tag. & cash paymen EPS: n/aw

Other Costs P : $62n n/a /a Repatiaion: S3Sm n/a nta for 44,000W Elecudoilease fi cost: 1991 Denob- S162.5m over 3 ys zation: $3.3n, Peasion S8m (for 2 yrs) Disabled: SlOm

Qw*4 S125mW $18.9mw $54.4-62.2m *46.4m U43.6S $19.4mW $230.

For 103,000projected Repatrato + Deambiliztion + Demobil4ia + dembizing combatarrn a onlyW rinegrtion of NR + oe tetative reintegraion

Iea-a-. U a- 2 p IR 1, Iludes $13 millio en asstO e mecomtnts Inldes total UNTAO b=dg of $383 milion for eectioas, epaiation, d n monitog and deobilization; UNTAG*sbudget did nt distinguishbetwen coatant and civilins as ex-combataAswee epatuted as cis. i iwludes ClAV-AS coss for demobilzton and integm on, eauding OASovehead. Costsincurred by the Nauagoan 1omuent, ONUCA.and the UNCR contrbuion to eptriaion a not inclded her Al Over five ye peiod. Icludes cost of salaries to combatantswhil socampedawaking demobiin (US$42mMion); this "at was not includedas dheDiP cost in the oth ca sudis If lbs number to be de _obizhas evolved over time; dhe 1992progm envisiond 15,000 ects md demobzed. This more recat figure comes fromthe Chadis Goverment §/ In addWion,UNTAG managed the confinement,disbandig or depature of oughly22,000 South African ad Soud' African-sponsoredtrops and 11.500 ^ciizensfores^ and comm"ndos y1 lnorm n n t cost of addkoa EBPSdeaobizin proguamsunvailable, alhoughthe wer approximately78,000 ex-combatantswho wer demobilize retired, deocasd or desd acording to governmentetmates of the anmybefot and after demobilation. Al Plus tei dependents,and 6,500 repatia headsof fmily and depndens mixd for a totl of 111,000beneficiries. 21 Seefootnot# 2 J9 Iwcldng benefitsto comban dependet, and incbes reitegmti oosts;cost per beneficiaryinwclig dependentsis $393. 11/ Mmevalue of the short-ternt asistace (6 mon)t) ahid ansport provided to vetea is $718 per family (or $226 per beneficiary asumng g a amily size of 3.17). The cZar above cost estimd in Cts; reprst e tdol com divid by do number of veotrns baefittig. Mreper beneficiazycost, wiich wouldinclude rughly 50,000 dep_dent, wud be $265. Foryet one,_xpmvedraWc as program; ohr programs r tedly dl in planing sags. U31Pled bit st in paning stages so not included in ost tota. JSt S17mfron NGOs(vocional taiing - TIS9 million,medical, rhai atida - US$8milon); X6mfrom Demobization Grauiy Fund. L1 Initially, US$1.2million was to be made availble to both ex-combatantsand otherswho applyand their project re approved;however, this componentseems to hvw been dops tde progm has evolvod. as / Unknowncost of addito foreoroduons; unableto computeaddtial -o* of denobization of BIPSdue to lack of data on numberof soldies deobilid eligible for various _opblo programs, and thdir salaries prior to demobilization. 11 Avotp of S32 per obdr 181 UNHCRcontribuon only for repatio of 43,400 of which an estimated10,000 were ox-PLAN figters; UNTAGalso coitributed to redaltion effoL 12/ Does o includeo e fi costs or cost of rpataio. 20 1992progm cost only 1991pnogm aborted, altboughan estimated$3.2 mlaio was spet on fore restructuringand payingthe *residl amy. Inlude ugh $758,000for admist coss ard a maxinum trnsport aowance of USS76per c_ombat WI Inchue procted $Im adminisrtive ost fo firs 6 mont of program. 2W Soefo*o tno 9 Demobiizationand Reintegrationof MilitaryPersonnel

lower. In terms of the cost per ex-combatant(and not per job found),programs ranged from a low- end estimateof US$655in Mozambique(where full reintegration programs are not yet developed)to over US$3,000in Zimbabwe. Detailedbreakdowns of per capitacosts are presentedin Table V1.2.

153. It is difficultto evaluatethe cost/benefitof a givenDRP as it is impossibleto predictthe likely social and economicconsequences of not implementinga program. However, if the political environmentis conducive,demobilization and reintegrationprograms can potentiallyhave a high ratio of marginalefficiency if one takes intoaccount the risks and costsof not implementinga programat all, or the impactthat a haphazarddemobilization with inadequateresources can have on a country'ssocial and politicalenvironment.

154. Table VI.3 provides an indicationof the distributionof resources among various componentsof a DRP in Nicaragua(for the NR), Mozambique,and Uganda. Such detailedcost informationis not available for the other programs. The breakdown shows the emphasis on Mozambique'sprogram on cash compensation,versus the Nicaraguanapproach of providingtargeted reintegrationprograms. In the caseof Mozambique,several different reintegration programs are being discussedbut are all still in the planningstages.

155. The known costs per combatantof US$655-807for Mozambique'sdemobilizadon program,including compensation allowances, appeas to be low comparedto that of similarprograms In some other countries;however, this does not represent the total costs, as the budget of the UN observerforce was not includedin the cost estimateas it was for someof the other case studies. Also, it only includesthe cost of one possible(as yet unapproved)reintegration program, and others are reportedlybeing planned. The anticipatedcost of the encampmentprocess is US$9.3-9.7million, US$112-121per combatant. The cost of the demobilizaionallowance (regular salaries for six months, with no additionallump stun severancepay) is low comparedto that in most of the other cases,but the per capitaimcome in Mozambiqueis the lowestamong the cases;also, the cost of the allowancesis high as a percentageof the totalcost of Mozambique'sDRP. Each cost componentof Mozambique'sprogram includesan extra S% whichwas budgeted for contingencies.The designofMozambique's demobilization

XI In Zimbabwe,if one includesex-combatns employedin the civil serviceamong those employed,the total cost decreasetoUS,928 per employedex-combatot Demobilizationcosts bere do notinclude US$42 million in sadaries to ecamped combatan. In comparison,in oiv serviceredeployment programs in Afica, specialreintegmdion sheme an creds cot US$11,000in Senegal(DIRIFNB programs),US$4,200 in uie and US$1,700in Mai (FIRprogamn). To thesecost, one wouldneed to add the oftensubsantal depautr allowancesto comparewith the total DRP costspresented above. 1se depat allowanc for civ servce progams rangedfrom 48 monthsof alar in somecases in Sonegal,to an aver of US$6,807per prson for a depazre packagcin Mali; one could compae this lattr figurewith just overUS$3,000 for depature and integrationallowances in imbabwe.Sources: Redeploymentof Laid- Pub&Setor Employee,iternal daft paper by Mare Schacter,CECPS, IBRD; Cvil ServiReRom in Mail An Evaluaionof the omoltaryDepartue rogrm, intrn daft paperby AlbertZeufack, APSCO,IBRD, Septembe, 1993; La FondaD '&lol - SoW fflcas? UneEvaluation SociEconoque de la DIRLN au Snga, intenmaldmft by lilian. Karp-Toledo,AFfSP, IBRD,July 30, 1993.

Chapter6 - Cost an Fundingof Demobizationand ReintegrtionPrograms Page87 Demobitlon and R _ltegationof Mitay Personnel

Table VI3: CostBreakdown for DRPsin Mcaragua,uganda and Mozambique

Category- Ncaraua (-) Uganda(%) 1' Mozambique(%)

Food 23.5 19 9.112 Opadond Coast 19.3 n/a n/a Contrton matea tools 10.5 5so nJa SpecialeConstuaao ptojects 7.8 n/a 2 Resettlen3entof disabled 7.6 A/a a 1' Tran orio 7.3 1 30-39 Medicalcan 5.8 3 27' AgicultWaltools 5.1 4 n/a Clothing 2.8 S 3 DemobilizationAllowane 2.3 n/a 35441 AgricUl Project 2.3! n/a n/a Administration 3/au' 8-10U' 1D Other 3.5 n/a TOTALCOST S$millions $43.6 (proected)$19.4W (ece $54.4- 61.2

I/ Muchof the assistanceprovided to ox-combatantsin Ugandawas in cah; duringthe firstsix months,exocombagatsn rceive payments of $490 in cash, although this Is Intended d calcd for ein purposes, sad only $228 in in-kad goods (roofing maeial, wshool fees, tport to home district, and community social svies). Prjed cost of food for assenbly areas; deliverywill be madethrough World FoodProgam/UNILO, whichwill be auhorizedto subcontmactthe tansport a monitoingto privatoenterprises or NOos. 1/ Cost of materdls for builng 3-om mud4and-wattlehouse, roofedwith corrugaed iron sheet, for each demobiized soldier. Y Covesanticipatedcostofncessayinfatuctal _ tpovemto .ssmblyarea,i.., saniadon,weldrilinginstallation of wavt pumps; any remaixde wil go to Mozambique's Nadonal Rural Water Progam, to provide water to rur settlaments. SI Plns for disabledsti i plang stages. il Basi medicalcare sovided fto-of-chag to all Ugandans;cost includesa supplementto caverpubase of medicines for eah combt nd E eperson costof providig medicalassinewas basedon the shareof GNP spent on health x percapia Pxthno perod (O.OS x US$220 x 6/12).

21 50 percent of which will go wd medicoin and supplies; unused resources will be provided to Mozambique's National HealthSystem. A/ Incls cost of adminisive arrnguem.

21 Funded by USAID; beneficires included other (ano-combatant) rese of Atan Coast region as well.

10/ Cost not broken out as separate category; patly illuded under categories of Operdond Costs and Octh.

IV Projected administrative coos of the gitm six months of the Vdterans ssisdanceProgamn including salaies for Veterans' orgnizaton personnel, rent, equm and supplies. W CoSt of reSAgition and docu_mation of combatants. yl An arly esdmate of the cost of the sattling kit alone (not including severance pay) was USS13.11 millio for 23,000 soldiers and their dependents. A more ret esdmato (April 1992) places the cost of the firt phas of the prgtam (demobilation, Ualspot, sattlin4-1n) at aound US$19.4 on; diution is assume to have remained approximately te smeo. In addition, US$S milion has been for futr rintegration programs (exclded here).

Pap Chapter 6 - Cost and Funding of Demobiizon and Reitgato Programs aoblAtIon andReinTeat ofMilay Pad

programseems to be highy efficient,especially the registration, documenon, anddatabase prodedures. If successfullyimplemented, such procedures will likelyresult in cost savingshough efficiencyand reducedfraud. 156. For Chad, demobilizationallowances and tmnsportationallowances combined are estimatedto costUS$18.1 million, plus an estimatedUS$758,000 for administratvecosts, for a totalof US$18.9million, Although the initWal1991 program reserved roughly US$1.2 million to be pooledinto a DevelopmentFund to coverthe reinegrton of ex-combatantsand others,this planhas sincebeen givena lowerprofile. Noother funds have been committed to thereinteion effort. It Isdifficult to evaluatethe benefits of thedemobilization and force restructuring efforts since they are stillIn progress. The costper comban of the &emobllizationand reinration effortsaro difficult to evaluategiven the initialvoluntary natu of the programand frequentiy changing force totas andtargets declared by the goverment. Totalcost estmates in TableVI.2 of approximatelyUS$1,050 per soldierfor oneyear, are basedon an epected 18,000soldiers demobUizing or retiring.P 157. For Namibia,the UNTAG/UNHCRoperaions for the cease-fire,peacekeeping, demobiliatdon,repatriation, and the electionscost roughly US$429 million from February 1989 to April 1990;UNTAG incurred the costs of demobilizationand ensuring combats fromall siuwreturned home or weredisamed and disbanded while UNHCR paid for mostof the repation operation.Since the UNTAGcost data are preeted as a lumpsum, it is difficultto estimaethe costof the demobilization program. l Most of the UNTAG/UNHCRprogms were directedtoward the generalrern communitY.The Namibiangoveranm later allocatedat leat US$6.4million for the reitegrationof former combatants,UJS$5 million -to* the direct cash compeion programfor unemployedex- combatn, andUS$1.4 million for the DevelopmentBrigades, deribed in ChapterFive. Sincenot a1l20,000 ex-PLAN guerillas benefitted from these two programs,it is moreaccurate to estimatethe costper participantth the per combatantcost; eac beneficiaryreceived $476 in cashcompension, andthe estimatedcost of the DevelopmentBrigades is US$480per participant.

PGR AM FUNDINGSOURCES

158. Each of the DRP studiedrelied heavilyon exten sourcesfor funding. The US governmentfunded the total cost of CIAV-OASprograms In Nicaragua for thedemobilization of theNR, with the exceptionof one program,the AtanticCoast Rice CommercializationProject, which was

I in t 1992ageme a o figureof 15,000to demobilire was _e sad the newarmy was to ach 25,000. lbe 18,000fiu comesfm. morereoent eatinuts by th Chadn Govemat 711 Someof th UNTAGand UNHCR Ands wem aloa to rnee' immediae,ba reeation needssuch as ood,bas ousholdgods, tmpoy cookinSfa ad shler, itial ehabilationasitc, includn tools ad sd fot aicdlua ru , le constucdonand amilaysuWo, ad limiedbasc trainin, andprograms b tguq the diabled.

Caitor 6 - costand uding of Demobio andReingat Progams Page89 Dmoblizationand Reintogaion of Mility Peronnel

supportedby the EuropeanCommunity. CIAV-OAS also obtaineda smallamount of fundingfrom the UNHCRand the Governmentof Italy.

159. In Uganda,following the NR ArmyCouncil's announcement of the demobilizationplan, PresidentMusaveni personally raised the issueof financingwith senior U.S. and multilateralorganization officialsduring a visitto Washington,D.C. in June 1992. Also in June 1992,the Governmentof Uganda hosted a meeing with the residentdonor communityin Kampalato solicit financialsupport for the proposedVeterans Assistance Program. Withoutexternal funding the programcould not go forward, since only very limited local financing was available. Donors were highly supportive of the demobilizationplan and consideredthe settling-inkit proposalwell thoughtout, and favoredfunding it. They did, however,raise questionsabout the speedwith which demobilization was planned to begin,the numberof troops that could be coveredin the Initialround of cuts, and the advisabilityof agreeingto fund the first six months withoutany informationon the government'slong-term plans for veterans. Bease of budgetarycycles and the lengthof the decision-makingprocess within donor instiutions,the donorswere unable to free up as muchfunding as rapidlyas the government'sproposed demobilization schedulerequired. Donorswere preparedto considera programthat wouldcover fewer troops-20,000 instead of 30,000-and begin as a later date (around October 1992). Tbe World Bank played a coordinatingrole in the effortto obtainpledges of assistance-financialor in-kind-to supportthe settling- in programfor 20,000 veteranswith its financialconribution and those of other donorspooled through the sochl dimensionsof adjustmentproject - PAPSCA. Several donors were already cbanneling contributionsthrough the PAPSCAsocial fund, and thus finacing the DRP merelyrequired increasing their allocaion, ratherthan setting up new budgetaryand disbursementagreements with each donor. This contributedto rapid implementaionof the program.

fl The Uitd Se alsoprovited the UNHCRwith US$2.5 mi11ion and US$10m311ion for its refugeeasistnue progmnuin Nicaagua and Hondura, respectveljy, to assin the epatiationeffort (most of theNR combatat had to beprie dom Hondur sad CosaRios to Nicaru). Asnoted prviously, du tortrictions by th US Congres,CIAV-OAS's .ctivities had to be directedsoldy to formerNR combabua.

Page90 Chapter6 - Costad Fundingof Demobiizaonand Rentgration Progam

-I.. Demobiion andRengaton of Mility Personnel

Table VIA: ProgramFuWng Sources(appraximate)

Iount' . _Arouut_(US$mlon) ,u e Angola DemobilizationBenefits: to UN,

- Govemment 34.7 AngolanGoverment, or UNITA - Foreign- US, EEC(40%), 71.5 for emergencyfood and Egypt,Itay, Denmnut preraon of reintegration _ _ .______. ___ _ .___ ptrogrms Nicragu Resettlementof NRand refugees - MoolyUS fnding 67 1990-1993bud at Uganda Demobilization- spoaton - Govitent (.73p and settlingin kdts - Otherdon 19.4 Chad Demobliion and reintegration Frenchfig 18.9 allowancesand administraton

I, ExcludingUNAVEM's own budget aI Pomposedby te Govnment of Ugandain July 1992. 3/ Donorsincluded the Word Bank,the Dutch,British, Swedish, Danish, Americans, Germas, EEC, UNDP,and UNICEF.

Chapter6 - Costand Funing of Demobilizationand Rebtegrton Pogrms Page91 DamdbWzatlouand Roawtgrelon of Mlts Pohnel

CHAPIERVII PROGRAMRESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

160. Thischapter presents some of the lessonson bothprocess and programs,which emanate from the varietyof countriesstudied. Most of the countriesexamined are at a relatvely early stage in. implemetingaDRP (onlyNamblb, Nicaraguia and Zimbabwehave completed demobilization, Zinbabwe alone has completedreitegaion), and thus tho observationspresented below may change as the programsin tie countriesconcerned mature. The chapte also examinesthe specificoutcome of the DRP process (whetherex-combatants found employment and where) in the countrieswhich have completed demobilization.

ISSUESOF PRoCESS

161. DRPs are complexprograms - politically,institutionally, and logistically- involving sometimesenormous numbers of combatantsand their dependents. Becauseof this, and becauseof the varietyof actorsinvolved, such programsmay have a higherrate of successif planningand coordination begins early on and if the linkagesbetween the demobilizationstage and the reintegrationstage are recognized. The programstypically involved a diverse set of actors, who may not be in the habit of coorditng amongthemselves, each with a specificfunction to fulfilland a comparativeadvantage at each stage of the DRP process:

* Externalmonitorshneditors (bl1ateral governents or iernadonal politcal bodies): set peace conditions, negotiate terms of demobilizationamong competingmilitary factions, verify numbersof demobilizedcombatants and enforce disarmamentin (and sometimesoutside of) camps;

* - the mltary, sometieswith governments:establish selection criteria for those to be demobilized,determine the numberto be demobilized,obtn information(through census or survey)on the profileof the force to be demobilized;

* Themiftary, the government(usualy the Ainlsty of FWce), and donors:determine cash compensationand paymentmethod, design logisticsof tnsporting demobilized combatat and their families,design reiegration progrm; * NGOsand concened communities: provide assistance during encampment, provide some reintegrtion programs,typically at the locallevel, providesupport services at the local levelto ex-combants, their families,and to communitieswhich may be strainedby the influxof new residents.

162. Becauseeach of the stagesof a DRP is interdependent,and often overlapping,Ealling to coordinateplanning and implementationof one phasewith others canresult in redundancy,contradictory

Caper7 -ProgmmRemuls and Lesnno Learned Pagp93 DoMoblationand R-ftsgrationof MilitaryPersonnel

; ,

programs,and Waste.,Often,c donors focuson and fund only specificparts of a program. Multilateral organizationsmight be willing to fund reintegrationprograms but are less likely to finance demobilization. Tbe UN might be more InterestedIn financingthe peace process and performinga monitoringrole. Inabilityto treatthe processas a wholeand the lack of coordinationamong all players Increasethe risk of a poorly designedprogram and the inabilityto attract adequatefunding. Financing only one aspectof the program is inefficientif proper coordinationis lackingand/or financingis not availablefor other key parts of the demobilization/reintegrationprocess.

163. Donors' disaggregaredapproach to fundingDRPs is partly due to reluctanceto commit fundinguntil the governmentdemonstrates Its politicalwill and abilityto Implementa DRP, or evenuntil Initialdemobilization success occurs. However,the governmentsin questiongenerally lack the resources and institutionalcapaclty to design and implementa DRP on their own. In many cases. governments undertakinga DRP are In transition,or are newly formed,and may not be able to focuson the careful planningneeded to design such programs. To break the stalematebetween governments and donors, governments(and the respectivemilitary institutions) have, in some cases, expressedtheir commitment by: (1)initiating discussions and requestingtechnical .advice from donors and other would-beparticipants (ocal NGOs, the privatesector) on options 'tarreintegration programs; (2) being open with relevant in*rmation on those to be demobilized,tofacilitate planning; and (3) workingwith donorsto design reintegrationplans prior to requestingfunding.r At aft earlystage, donors could offer technicalassistance (includingsupport for assistancefrom organiiations'in other countrieswhich have alreadyundergone a DRP) or adviceon reintegration,lobby other donorsto raise funds, or encouragecoordination between the govnment, the military,and NGOswho may need advancenotice to plan programs.

164. For the demobilization/reintegrationprocess to proceedsmoothly and attainthe objective of helpingex-combatants become productive members of civiliansociety, it is importantthat planning begin prior to the encampmentand demobilizationof combatants,possibly during peace negotiations. For targetedprograms, waiting until afterdemobilization has beencompleted and ex-combatantsdispersed may complicatethe alreadychallenging task of identifyingwho is to receivetargeted assistance(as in Namibiawhere failure to do so resultedin large numbers-ofpeople showing up for benefits)and of the most appropriateprograms for veterans. However,in DkPs which take place in a peace-timecontext, plannersmay be less constrainedby the needto proceedrapidly with demobilization for politicalreasons, and maybe able to delaydemobilization until the appropriateprograms and institutionsare in place (as in Uganda). In Mozambique,program planners have postponedelections until after demobilizationand diarmament, rather than proceedingwith electionsas was done in Angola..

165. The casesshowing the mostsuccess or progressthus far in countriesemerging from civil strife, have had an external,neutral body to enhancecoordination and communication,and to mediate diaputes,i.e., the UN in Namibia. Oncethe decisionto demobilizehas been made, externalmediators can play-'an importantrole in coordinatingdiscussions between the military, the various ministries Involvedin the process, lendersand NOOson the possiblecontent of the reintegrationprogram. This becomesespecially important in post-conflictsituations, where demobilization may begin before elections mandatedby peace accords are held. As shown in Angola, governmentsin existenceprior to the elecdonsmay not have sufficientlegitimacy to engagein the long-termplanning required by a successful

Pap 94 Chapter7 - Progrm Resultsand LessonsLcamed DemobiJzadonand Rdoradon of MilituyProsnnol

DRP. If an external,neutir actor couldtake responsibilityfor the planningprocess, in consultationwith local groups, demobilization/reintegrationmight have a greaterchance for success.

166. Monitorshave playeda positiverole in demobilizationwhere they have been regarded as neutral,had sufficientresources, and a sufficientlybroad mandateto effectvely carry out program objectivesand sustainthe peaceand demobilizationprocesses. In Angola,the UN force monitoringthe demobilizationand peaceprocess (UNAVEM-U) did not havesufficient human or financialresources and was unable to effectivelymonitor police forces or those not reportingto camps. In Namibia,UN monitorsplayed an etensive role, as they essentiallyran the demobilizationand repatriationprogram. While It is clearly not desirableto encouragedependency on external organizations,some form of externalmonitoring is helpfulin polically tense situationsto conductan unbiasedcensus, to verifythe numberand affiliationof combatantsentering and leavingcamps, and to ensurethat goodsand services are deliveredrapidly, efficiently, and fairly.

167. The politicalclimate and atmosphereof insecurityoften influenceprogram planners in their choices about priority program objectives (rapidly carrying out demobilizationto disperse combatants,perhaps without reintegration packages; ensuring that combatantsreceive services to enhance their employmentprospects; providing employment for combatantseven if it meansabsorbing them into the public service; esuring that the program results in a net fiscal 'peace dividend"). Political considerationsalso influencethe decisionto demobilizecombatants, the selecdon criteria used, the reintegrationprograms chosen, and overallprogram results. For example,in Nicaraguathe outcomeof LIAV-OASprograms was sometimesnegatively affected by eventsbeyond CIAV's control,such as the inabilityof the Chamorrogovemment to provideeach demobilizedcombatant with land and creditsas promised,and the significantupsurge in politicalviolence. CIAV-OAShas been able to aist someNR veta In obtainingclear title to their land, but there are significantproblems of multipletitles and claim. Failureto provideland or cleartitles to landto ex-combatantsis amongthe problemsthat have fueledpolitical unrest and rearmingof former combatants.

168.. Becausea DRP is essentiallya politicalprocess, particularly in countriesemerging from civilstrife, the first te in deteminng whetherInvestment in reintegrationprograms is warrantedwould be to assessthe strengh of the politicalsettlement preceding demobilization and the commitmentof a key stakeoolder,the military. Appropriateeconomic incentives (such as demobilizationallowance and tiargetedreitegraion programs)canfaclitate the DRPprocess, but sufficientpolitical incentives are key to determiningwhether demobi'izadon will succeed.

INSITUntONALMANAGEMENT

169. Case results indicatethat programs,however comprehensive and detailed,will amount to litde if not adaptedto local infastructureand institutionalcapacity. While somecountries will only needtechnica assistanceto strengthenexisting capabilities, others may requir. or preferan eal actor (in some casesthe monitoringagency) to manageand evenadminister the program. However,there is a need to balance Xt with the experiencein Nicaragua;in Nicaraguaprograms to benefitformer NR combatantswero endrely supportedby outsidedonors (mosdythe U.S.) and managedby CIAV-OAS administtion and thus no plans were madefor conversionto mainstreamdevelopment programs (i.e.

Chat 7 - PogramResulk and Lsaons Lwmod Pawp95 D.mobWzatlonand Roinftegrsionof Militaiy Personnol

maned by theNicaraguan Government). Tbis suggests that in programsadministered by externalactors projectcomponents could be includedto developlocal institutional capacity In order to increaseprograms' longer-termsustainability. For example,in Uganda,the programdesign includes the creationof local veteran'soffices. 170. The role of CIAV-OASin monitoringthe humanrights of formerNR combatantsand mediatingin ex-NRdisputes with the government and with the Sandinistas illustrates the utility of having an institutionalcapacity to protecthuman rights and to mediateinternal disputes between different factions (i.e., ex-NRand Sandinistas) and between ex-combatant groups and the government. 171. Creationof a stronggovernment organization or committeewith cabinet-level participation canplay a role in developingviable programs for the demobilized.Such committees have played roles In: advisingand assistingon employmentand trainingissues; coordinating programs with other governmentdepartments, participating International organizations and NGOs; assisting with efforts such as surveys;and providing feedback needed for programsto be adapted.In casesof civilwar, suchan organizationmay have more credibility if politicalrepresentation is balanced. 172. Some programplanners have stressedthe importanceof involvingveterans in the managementof reintegrationprograms and support services. Veterans' Associations have been used in Nicaragua,Namibia, and Ugandato providean organizationex-combatants feel is responsiveto their concernsand representsthem in dealingwith the governmentand externalagencies. Providinga legitimatepolitical outlet and a focalpoint to addressveterans' complaints may help defusetensions. Suchassociations could also help monitor the problems and progress of veteransat the locallevel. ZDEMomuAroN

173. The successof the encampmentstage of demobilizationmay affect the successof subsequentstages of theDRP process; encampment requires resources, but alsopresents an opportunity to gatherinformation which is keyto planningreintegration programs. Failure to provideadequate food, shelter,clothing, and transportationfor combatat and their dependentsto and fromthe campshas causedproblems in thedemobilization process, sometimes compounding problems of armedbanditry and desertionfrom camps. Caseexperiences show strict supervision and control of combatantsin assembly camps-andensuring all the designatedcombatants report to the camps-isanother key elementfor encampmentto proceedsmooWthly. Courses in basic education,civics, money management, health education,etc., providedto combatantswhile in assemblycamps may facilitate their transition to civilian life and keep them occupiedduring sometimes prolonged waiting periods in camps. Deermining eligibilityfor futurereintegration benefits (cash or other)and providinga meansof identificationfor eligibilityIs essenialif targetedreintegraon programs are to be offeredlater on. 174. In all of thecases, combatants were required to tun in a weaponeither upon registration at assemblycamps or upontheir demobilizaton, to becomeeligible for variousbenefits. However, these confiscatedweapons were not alwayssecurely stored and guarded (Angola), and in manycases were not destroyedbut' 1.erely redistributed within the country (.e., addedto regulararmy's arsenal). Procedures need to be devisedfor frequentchecks of stockedweapons, and for attendingto and disposingof

Page 96 Chaper 7 - ProgramResults and Lessons Learned DanobWldtionand Reintegration of Milituy Personnel weapons. However,most cases indicatethat disarmingcombatants at campsis insufficientin reducing the overalllevel of arms circulatingin a country, as manycombatants own more than one weapon,and many civiliansare armed as well.

175. Measuresto reclaimweapons, I.e., seizuresor buy backprograms, have been used in a limitednumber of countriesexamined in this study, as a tool to re-establishsecurity. Weaponsbuy back programshave had a limitedmedium-term impact in reducingthe number of weaponscirculating in countrieswhich have: (1) porousborders with countries with active weapons markets; (2) lack of capacity to enforceregulations on the open carryingand criminaluse of weapons,and; (3) a political,economic, or securityclimate which enhancesthe securityand economicvalue of owningand usinga weapon. In order to prevent the re-purchaseof new weapons, some buy back programs have offered In-kind Incentives,such as constructionmaterials or food, insteadof cash.

REiNMGRATION

A. Surveys

176. Conductingsurveys of combatantsto determinetheir number, their educational/skill levels, intendedplace of settlement,employment history/aspirations and of the country'seconomic needs and trainingcapacity prior to demobilizationIs crucialto designingtargeted programs appropriate for combatants'needs and preferencesand the country'seconomy. The caseshave shownthat employment and educationneeds and desiresmay differ both between countries and amongforces in the same country. CIAV-OASofficials in Nicaragua,who did not have access to this sort of data when planningthe demobilizationprograms for veterans,strongly urged that such surveysbe conducted,arguing that their programs could have been better targeted if they had some basic informationabout NR troops. Informationon the intendedplace of settlementof ex-combatantscan be criticalto planningcommunity- basedprogram and to preparingcommunities for sometimeslarge influxesof veterans(as is currentiy being done in Uganda). Technicalassistance with surveys constituteone area where donors have providedneeded assistance. Also, an accuratecensus of the numberof combatantsto be demobilizedis neededearly on to assistbudgeting and makeother preparationsfor demobilizationand reintegration.

B. Cash Compensation Schemes

177. An over-relianceon cash compensationmay be ineffectivein reintegratingcombatants and discouragethem frombecoming productive members of the society. The caseof Zimbabwesuggests that cashcompensation is best used if accompaniedby complementaryprograms in basic accountingand literacy,for example,and shouldbe limitedto thosewho are notplanning to re-enterthe militaryor civil service. Givinglarge cashbenefits to ex-combatantsmay satisfythem for a certainperiod of time, but withoutthe skillsnecessary to findjobs, their continuedunemployment and poor prospectsmay aggravate unrest-and the governmentmay resort to re-employingthem into the public sectorto reducepotential upheaval.

178. Lump-sumpayments can assistthe initial transitionprocess, providingsome spending money for immediatetransition needs, but do not contributesignificantly to combatants'long-term

Chapter7 - PogramResults and Leasos Leame Page97 Demobilizatonand Reintegraion of Milita Personnel

reintegrtion. In caseswhere lump-sum payments were used, they were allegedlyinsufficient to pay for training courses or productiveinvestments,-although anecdotal information suggests that attendingto family needs may also be an importantfactor in the lack of investmentof such funds. In addition,ex- combatas may lack the financialknowledge and disciplineto save and makeproductive investments. Suppl g or replacingsuch paymentswith in-kindassistance known as settling-inpackages, as in Nicaragua,may be more effective.

Box VI.1: Strengthsand Weaknessesof CashAllowances

Benefits PotentalProblems 1. PolificlgWhen payments are made in thehome 1. Limitedinstitutional frmework and infra- districtof soldier,they help disperse soldiers structuremakes distribution of paymentsto overthe country,diffusing political tensions and dispersedex-combatants a challenge. reducingthe prospectsof combatantsfor reassmblingand resumingwarfare.

2. Enomic: Sustainex-combatants while 2. Paymentsmay be moreproductive if they searchingfor employment,in school,beginning coincidewith start of educationprogams or farmingor startinga business. plantingseason.

3. &ioh In the form of montblypayments or 3. Most combatantswill probablyprefer cash and governmentsbonds, they help to sprnd the immediatepayments. Sincetheir educational govenment's fiscalburden over time. levelis generallylow, they are unlikelyto comprehendthe complexitiesof bondsand premiums.

179. Paymentmethods can be designedto distributeseverance pay to dispersedex-combatants. However,such mechanismsrequire both institutionalcapacity and infrastructure(banks, post offices) whichare often at their weakestfollowing war. In Zimbabwe,branches of the Post OfficeBank in towns near concentrationsof resettled ex-combatantswere used to distribute allowances. In Chad 15 rintegration offices were created all over the country. In Angola, a program involvingPayment Couponsand so-calledPeace Bonds was at one point discussedas an alternativeto cashpayments.

180. To encouragethe use of lump-sumpayments and allowancesfor productivepurposes, administratorscan deductthe cost of trainingcourses before paying out the monthlyallowance; provide a crash course on budgetingand accountingbefore demobilization; or, with the consentof combatants, set aside a part of the allowancefor purchasingmeans of production,i.e., land, machinery,tools, and other inputs,helping to involvecombatants in creatingtheir own wealth(accompanied by an educational programto explainthe purposeand methodof the procedure). Also,payments could be timedto coincide with th{ beginningof trainingprograms or crop cycles.

Chapter7 - ProgramResults and Lessons Learned Domobiidon and Rintegmtionof Milituy Penonnel

C. Education, Tareted Trann and EmploymentProgram 181. The loweducational levels of mostsoldiers and lack of experiencein theciviliansector indicatea needfor basiceducation, such as literacytraining and basic mathematics, and in somecases socialsupport services and counseling. In Zimbabwe,basic education courses were very popular. Where demobilizationinvolves an extendedperiod of encampment,this would be a usefultime to providesuch courses. 182. Surveysof ex-combatantshave revealed that relativelyfew combatantshave extensive formaleducation. Little emphasis was placed on formaleducation in thecases stuidied. In Zimbabwe, schoolswere provided by the government,but wereonly filled to a smallfraction of theircapacity. In somecases, older ex-combatants placed in regularschools felt humiliated at havingto sit in classeswith much-younger(but more educationallyadvanced) students. Alternativesto formaleducation include educationalstipends for existingwell-functioning adult education classes. 183. The combinationof low educationand skill levels, and ex-combatants' Immediate need for income(thus discouraginglong-term involvement in formal education)point to the need for vocationaltraining. Vocationaltraining in the caseswas in somecases underfunded, and based on the scantinformation available, results have been mixed (Namibia, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua). However, the limitedexperience suggests that large,publicly-run programs may have greater difficulty in designing rainingprograms which are consistentwith market demand than do smaller,privately-run programs. Oneway of tappinginto existing training capacity In theprivate (including informal) sector would be to offermatching credits (veteran pays halt) for entranceto theseprograms. On-the-job training, such as nternshpisand apprenticeships,may also help provideappropriate marketable training. One such programnwas implemented by a NGOin Namibia,but itsresults are unknown. Another private program was implementedin Zimbabwe,with some success. 184. Beforedesigning income generation or vocationaltraining projects, the impactand viabilityof similarprojects designed for civilianswould need to be evaluated.In existingreintegration prograips,most income-generation projects have focused on agricultural cooperatives (Development Poles In Nicaragua,also cooperativesin Zimbabwe)and somemicro-enterprises (CENPAP's programs in Nicaragua,the NITRAMproject in Zimbabwe).While-cooperatives on the.whole have worked well, -~micro-enterprises have been associated with poor managementskills, poor infrastructure,lack of raw naterials,and consequently, high attrition rates. Someof theproblems faced might have been overcome had there beenan assessmentof other incomegeneration projects in these areas,an examinationof existingbusinesses to assessthe economy's needs, recognition of thesubstantial training needed to allow ex-combatantsto successfullyfunction in theprivate sector, and an indicationof thelevel of competition micro-enterpriseswould face. 185. Jobplacement/counseling programs are hlpful as mostex-combatants lack job-searching knowledgeand skills, and the resources to travelto areaswhere jobs maybe located.In addition,there Is oftena bias againsthiring veterans in the privatesector-this may be party remediedby affirmative actionprograms ("hire a vet"), i.e., incentivesfor businesses.Tbese problems were citedl in Namibia, whereunemployment is estimatedat between30 and40%.

CbapW7 - ProgramResults and LessonsLearned Pagps Demobilizon and Reingradonof Mlitry Personnel

186. ProgramstargeteA solely at former combatantsand their familieshave the potentialof creatingresentment from non-beneficiaries. According to donorsinvolved with the Nicarapan program, DRPscould avoid indreaslng polarizaon among socW groups by being limited in durationand integrated with regulardevelopment and community-basedprograms as soon as possible. Programsaimed exclusivelyat formercombatants can be justifiedin somecases: fo examinple,to provide assistance to individualswho have no home after leaving the armed forces, or havebecome disabled durng military service;to providecontractily agreedupon severanco paciaps; to makeup for educational,training andjob opportunitiesforegone due to militaryservice; and for children-soldiers,who requiresuch extensivepreparation to makethe transition to civlianlife. However,providing soldier withbenefits andopportunities that exceed those of non-combatantsIn a sitation wherethe jatter are also quite needy andnumerous, an4 probably have suffered the consequencesof protractedperiods of war, maycreate the basisfor newhostilities.

187. Reintegrationmay be enhancedby incorporatingex-combtants Into new or existing community-baseddevelopment projets, thus offsettingsome of the potpntlalresentment from non- beneficiaries.Some unexplored possibilities include providing matching grants to soldierswishing to participatein community-baseddevelopment projects. The potentialfor usingcommunity-pressure to monitorsome of the projectsof veteranshas beenuntapped in manyof the reintegrationprograms. In Nicaragua,veterans were provided with material and training in housingconstruction, and each veteran wasallowed to moveinto his/har house only when all the houses a teamwas to constrtctwere finished. 188. Casestudy results indicate that for manycombatant groups, it is mostappropriate to targetfamilies, not just individual.combatants.Failing to takeinto account combatants' dependents can resultin inadequatesupport and may delay thei reintegration.Some evldence exists from Nicaragua and Zimbabwethat providingbenefts to.ex-cbmbatants' wives and familes, may increaseprogm success. In Nicaragua,program managers found that distributingbenefits to the wiveshas resultedin a more equitabledistribution of food witip the family,and better controland use of money. In Zimbabwe,the wives of ex-conbatantsproved to besuccessfil in collectivefrmiag.Women could be giventhe responsibilityfor collectig foodandother assistance provided as part of the setding-inkit, trainedin themanagement of householdfinances, and given the opportunityto borrowmoney to begin smallfarming or productionenterprises.

189. In somecases, NOOs have been governments' and donors' most valuable partners in implementingDRPs. For example,NMOs have organized transportation to tamps(Namibia), distributed food,medical cae, and materials(Namibia), and providedtraing andjob counseling(Zimbabwe). NMOscan help compensatein part for weakpublic sector insdtutions. In addition,local NGOs are frequentiyinvolved in community-baseddevelopment projects, have extensiveexperience of local conditionsand needs, and possess a measureof independencefrom the government, factions, and local politicalparties. In countrieswhere ex--combatants need to be dispersedbut governmentinstitutional capacityis weak,NGOs present a cost-effectiveveh!ole for designingand implementingreintegraion programs.

?3/ In Angola,for exmple, theremay be as manyas 2 milliondisplaced pesons.

Page 100 Chapter7 - PogrinmResults and LessonsLearnd Domobilior. andRo_tation of M}taryPersonnel

Box VIL2: The PublicSector as "Relntegrator"of Last Resort

C| Ea I~wE E 2 W i y42 _ uE. V |~ | ~|pt . d~~4E7 ar|yd tivn SVmElE on:'1 .~~~~~~EQ|Q. ijIlayn X enin nerl ante I1E O |~~~~~~~ :bf~ EuU EXeto ftiomi.c!Iy~ a*U07 ti*0 atQ | | S | I 2 U 1~~~~~~~I

MROGRAMRETSU7

190. In Zimbabwe,83% of fomler combatan found employmentor were in traning eight Yewrafte die DRP was implemented.However, as shownin Box VII.2 and in TableVIIt. 1, the primary soee of employmentwas the publicsector (the militaryand civilservice). In Namibia,the publicsector has exped significantlysince independence,but much of the grwth was needed to assume responsibiityfor ftnctions previouslycarried out by the South African goverment. Datare not a-vailableon the numberof exvoombatantsin the civilservice; however,some of the excpansionreportedly occu-ed to rewardpolical supportersand to assistthe government'spolitical paty, SWAPO,in gaining control over the bureaucracy. Similarly,the police force has absorbedformer errilla soldiersand is consideredoverstaffed (5% of formerpeffillas are now in the police force). A substtal numberof former guerrfilas (IS%) are allegedly employed in DevelopmentBrigades, also funded by the govemment.

191. Escalabeonof intermittentviolence in Nicaraguain late summer 1993point to the mixed resuts of its program. On the one hand, a substantialnumber of NRwere demobilizedrelathvely quicsy hnolong waitingtimes in camps), many allegedlyhave not remaoed, and the EPS army was reduced substibily wityin a short period of time having a dramatic impact on defense exentdiatu as a pavanlage of GNP (from 28% in 1989to aexcintcivil servic howver somn tofthexpansio i rhe size of the civil servicehas decreased. CIAVnOAShas estimatedthat as of November1991 75-80% of

Cbapr 7 - Program.ReOunth oneL hannsLea snw Paze101 Domobiliin andRelntegmtn of Muiity P _rone

Tabb V11.1:Relmegradon Results formerNR wer self sufficient(although there is no hard In2b*abwn data to verify this), On the other hand, official employmentand unemploymenthas increased,with some figure estmate at as highas S4%and intermittentviolence persists.-WNo knownsurveys have been conducted to date

*| .| on thepresent activities of ex-combatants. 192. InChad, asurvey retumed by 506of thefirs demobilizationprogram had begunIn July IM9).ZA The surveyreveals that 78% of the ex-combatantsreported some .typeof economicactivity (See Table VI.2) and that 53% * ~~~~~reportedhaving no availablefinancial means, while 47% | | | g|| ff | || g reportedhaving an averageof US$379. Since,most of the .*|.~| | | udemobuized | | | would still be receiving their reintegration . . paymentsless than one yearafter the startof theprogram, it .. is possiblethat there mayhave beensome misreporting of flnancialmeans.

"A ~,.''.- E193. The reingration experiencesof Zimbabwe, .... ~~~4n to someextent that of Nam1biaand Nicaragua, suggest the

:~' :.~::.s.s.':.:following: (1) successfulreintgration will not happen by ~ ~ .,~...Itself: reomo programsare important tD maxumizethe ~~~~ percentage~~~~of ex-combstant finding productive activities; and, | | | X @l| , || . C2(2)even if reiegration programsare provided,it may take sometime for veteransto find employment,and there will

|| 11. X| |. E| likelyalways be a percentagewho do not findemployment. | IE Xg SIt is thereforecruca to manageexpeaions aboutthe speed with whichemployment will be foundand the natureof the | | | B|| g g | g jobs veweansare likelyto obtain-andto supplytmNpraqy meansof sustenancefor a pre-definedpeiod of time.

g | g ; ;|| 194.Most of the countriesstudied face substantial economicdifficulties, and generally have high unemployment ______i_hus, in evaluatingprogm success,one legtimate questionto poseis whetherthe unemploymentrate of former combans exceedsthe country'soverall unemployment rate.

2I Aocordingto U.S.General Accounting Office, Repeo to CongmsionalRequesters, A.D to NkaragawU.S. Aklsxce Spp Economi and Socal Dewlopment,August, 1992.

71 Unemploymentand underemployment figur from"Nicaamg, After th Sandinistas,*The Atlantic, July, 1992.

2W/ Theresults of thissurvey are fromde first506 questionnairesturned in. Beoae it is notbased on a randomsample, thosample may be biaed.

Pap 102 Chapter7 - ProgramResults and Lessons Leaned Doniobilizationand Relntegmaton of Milkaq Personnel

Unfortunately,reliable unemployment data is scarcefor the countriesconcerned. Nonetheless,in both Zimbabweand Namibia,a portionof excombatantsremain unemployed, and one mightexpect a similar pattern in other reintegrationprograms currently underway.

Table VIL.2: Actdvidesof OzadlansVeterans Less than One YearAfter DemobUization

gE E ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- l

... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~. ~ ~ ......

AUMliOR tJRIHER PESI3ACI

19S. In undertakngresearch for the casestudies, it becameobvious that littleinformation has been publishedor is readity availablewhich addressesthe issuesof demobilizationanct reintegration progrm in generat,or whichprovides specific information and anysis of DRPsto date in Africa. In some cases, findinginformaon on these progams througha desk-studyis virtuallyinipossible. Ihis report thus represents only an initial attempt to pull together available information. Additional docmenatinprobably exists in-county, particularlyon smaller-scaleNGO or privately-munprograms, which is less accessiblethrugh a desk-stdy but would be hetpfut for comparingexperiences and suggestingfil(ther lessons which can be appliedto futureprograms. In addition,a numberof NGOsand bilatera donorsmay be beginning to gainexperience with such programsin numerouscountries (Catholic ReliefServices, thu EEC, USAID,Gr c, and couldalso be valuablesources of future information. som cae,fnigifraino heeporm hog eksud svrulyipsil.Ti

poamse7 - PogenmRal,ots and L onesL s se i Paga103 Domobliatdonand Reinwtegatdon of Miltry Personnel

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Dennis,Allistair. "TheIntegration of GuerrilaArmies into Conventional Forces: LessonsLearned from BMA1Tin Africa." Institutefor DefencePolitics Working Paper, issue no. 5, presentedat a conferenceon ChangingDynamics: Military-Strategic Issues for a FutureSouth Africa, Pretoria, August6, 1992.

"EmploymentChances for Ex-combatantsSlim, SaysActon," SundayMail, May 18, 1986,p. 8B3.

Madlumutsa,Malachia. "ZimbabweProject Helps Former Fighters Build Co-operatives,"Herald, December28, 1984,p. 8B3.

"Plightof Ex-Combatants,"Ministerial Statement to ZimbabweParliament on August4, 1988.

'A SoldierFaces His Critics, GeneralWalls talks about his country'sfuture," Tmi, September1, 1980, p. 34.

"SoldiersGet Detailsof DemobTerms," Herald,August 17, 1981,p. 8A1.

'A War-tom Nation'sRevival," Businesl Week, December15, 1980,p. 118, 122.

The ZimbabweProject, "lbe ZimbabweProject's Experiencein Resetling Ex-Combatants',August 1989.

Bibliogmaphy Page 7 ANNEX:TERMS OF REFERENCE TERMSOF REFERENCE

SfUDY OF BEST PRACTICES/PRELIMINARYLESSONS-ON

REINTEGRATIONOF MILITARYPERSONNEL AND OTHER DISPLACEDPERSONS

1. BACKGROUNDAND OBJECTIVES

1. The recently formed Working Group on Demobilization/Reintegrationin African countries has brought together World Bank staff working on African Countries currently undertakingor consideringdemobilization of militarypersonnel. Meetingson this topic have highlizhhtedthe increasingfrequency with which the Bank is being asked for technicaland/or financialassistance for programsto reintegratemilitary personnel and displacedpersons. Country teamsfor Angola,Chad, Mozambiqueand Ethiopiahave been involved,to varyingdegrees, in discussionon this topic with Government.Other countriessuch as Liberia, Sudanand Somalia may face the challengeof demobilization/reintegrationin the future.

2. Given the lack of Bank experiencein this field, and the potential impact that demobilization/reintegrationprocesses may have on operations,there is a strongly-feltand urgent needby staffto obtainfurthe. informationon the past and currentexperience of variouscountries withreintegration programs. At a meetingof interestedstaff held in February 1992,chaired by Ms. KatherineMarshall (AF5DR), it was agreedthat a studyof best practicesin this area was essential to provide guidance to Bank staff currently being asked for advice by client governments.The scope and focus of the proposedstudy have been discussedby membersof the WorkingGroup. An outlineof the study, intendedto be completedwithin the next two-to- three months,is presentedbelow.

3. In sum, the proposedstudy would be a cross-countrystudy in whichthe assessmentsof country cases of reintegrationprograms would cover: (i) the stated or imputedobjectives, approaches and policv and other instrumentsof the programs; (ii) policy and program implementation;and (iii) analysesof the reasonsfor the successor failureof implementation, includingevaluations of whetherthe programobjectives were appropriateto begin with. The comparative analysis would distill lessons of experience across countries and provide recommendationsregarding the design and implementationof demobilization/reintegration programsunder varying country circumstances. In addition,the studyshould summarize relevant lessons derived from studies on related issues such as refugee resettlement,civil service retrenchment/reintegrationprograms, and job trainingand placementprograms.

H. SCOPEAND CONTENT

4. Thisstudy will be basedon informationavailable in Washington,from sources inside and outsideof the Bank. It can build upon a previousworking paper by Sarah Keener (AF5CO September1991) that described briefly the demobilizationexperiences of Africanand non-African Countries. This study shouldgive priority to Africancases of already-completedor ongoing reintegrationprograms (e.g. Tanzania,Uganda, Zimbabwe). The study should also apply the derived lessons of experienceto African countries now at the bginning of the process of demobilizationand reinsertion(e.g. Angola,Mozambique, Ethiopia). -2 - 5. Whileit is preferableto drawupon examples in Africa,limited experience with these typesof programsin the regionwill meritthe inclusionof at least three non-Africancases illustratingparticular aspects of reintegration(e.g. Nicaragua,Columbia, China for training). 6. The studywill consistof three parts. Part I will consistof an executivesummary presentingthe most important conclusions and recommendations. EartIM will contain the several countrycase studies. Par III will comprisethe comparativeanalysis, deriving lessons of experience across countries and providing recommendations regarding demobilization/reintegrationpolicies and practicesto be emulatedand avoidedin African countries.

HI. OUTLINEOF COUNTRYCASES - PART11 7. The cut casesto be presentedin Partn shouldprovide information and analysisin thefollowing areas: A. ProgramObjectives and Contexts

- Political/ethnic/economiccontext of theprogram (e.g. fiscalretrenchment, war-to-peace transition,prolonged civil or briefexternal conflict,) state of theoverall security and employment situationsprior to theperiod of demobilization/reintegration.

- Objectivesof Governmentand major donors, such as: (i) providingdemobilized soldiers with what is due contractually, and ensuring their mobilityinto economicallyefficient jobs by creatingan enablingenvironment (training,information on-job opportunities, etc.); (ii) ensuring(or guaranteeing)that the demobilized personnel have jobs; and/or (iii) ensuringthat demobilized soldiers do not threatencivil society or continueto fight(by providing alternative employment/activities and/or disarming them). B. Policylnstruments and Program Aporoaches

- Programdesign: * theprocess of programdesign, including the roleof donors * if planned,the staging/sequencing of the programs * whethercredit to soldiersand reintegration programs are subject to samecriteria as othercredit allocations and other projects * for programsfocussed on targetedmaterial benefits, detailed descriptions of the natureand extent of thebenefits provided (e.g. severancepayments, land, oxen, tools,jobs in thepublic or privatesector, etc.) to specifictarget groups (soldiers, refugees,displaced persons). * for programsfocussed mainly on creatingan enablingenvironment for reintegration,descriptions of specificsignificant actions (e.g. focuson labor- intensiveprojects in the investmentprogram, etc.). - 3-

- Programcosts and financing:

* total and unit costs (e.g. per soldieror beneficiary)by main programcomponent (tables). * sourcesof financing,local and foreign, by main component(tables) * assessmentof fiscal/financingissues

Programmanagement

* organizations/agenciesinvolved in managingthe programand their capacities.

C. ImnIementatlonExperience and Issues

- Programresults:

outcomesin terms of quantitativeindicators of numbersof people "reintegrated' in variousways, numbersreceiving benefits, etc. identificationof successes/failuresin achieving 'stated' objectives and methods/criteriaused for trackingsuccess. assessmentof programaccording to criteria which may not have been part of stated objectives (cost-effectiveness, quality of services provided, perception/acceptanceof programby generalpopulation). main constraintsto effectiveimplementation. evaluationof reasonsfor success/failureof mainprogram components, including commitmentand 'ownership' by stakeholdersand implementingagencies as well as sequencingof reintegrationand demobilization.

- DonorsRoles and Aid CoordinationIssues:

donor roles in implementation,forms of technicalassistance identification/assessmentof aid coordinationproblems/issues WorldBank role.

D. SummarvAssessment of IndividualCountry Cases

- Lessonsof coun1tyexperience with particular reference to * appropriatenessand costs/benefitsof objectives,approach, instruments (i.e. did bypassingregular investmentcriteria produce new economicdistortions) * best/worstpractices: what workedbest and worst and why * prostconsof targetingsoldiers directly vs. combiningreintegration of soldiers with other displacedpersons. * most/leastefficient types of assistanceto soldiersand displacedpersons. * nature and timingof Bankinvolvement (actual or hypothetical).

I. List of Publicationsand References

- List of key publicationsreferred to (withbrief annotationswhere important)

- References:list of personsconsulted/identified -4-

I. OULINE OF SY&NTHES- PART III

8. Part III shouldprovide a comparativeassessment of the experienceof the case-study countriesin designing,financing and implementing programs of demobilizations/reintegration. It shoulddistill the lessons of experienceacross countries and provide guidance on programsmost likelyto succeed(according to variouscriteria) under different conditions. 9. Thepresentation will be mostuseful if donein a taxonomicform using tables or matrices to presentcomparative data, keyindicators and summary comments.