Pozsgai-Alvarez, J. 2018. The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption: stability Peru’s Experience with its First National Anti-Corruption Commission. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 7(1): 15, pp. 1–19, DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.600

RESEARCH ARTICLE The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption: Peru’s Experience with its First National Anti-Corruption Commission Joseph Pozsgai-Alvarez

Despite progress made over the past two decades, current international ­anti-corruption efforts continue to struggle with implementation issues in ­individual nations. The present study proposes an approach to anti-corruption ­policy ­implementation that considers the fight against public malfeasance in terms of its potential costs and benefits for political leadership. The existence of a ­political cycle for anti-corruption initiatives is proposed and tested through an ­examination of Peru’s National Anti-Corruption Commission from 2001 to 2005. The ­empirical analysis supports the theoretical tenets, showing how the ­government of ­President Toledo created and later devolved the anti-corruption commission due to private interests and political circumstances.

Introduction (UNDP 2014). As a result, most countries in Over the past two decades, an international the world maintain explicit anti-corruption anti-corruption movement has emerged with laws and regulations. Today, the fight against the shared understanding that malfeasance­ public malfeasance is as ubiquitous as that has negative implications for ­governance against poverty and other societal ills. and development. According to the United However, the outcomes of these efforts States Agency for International Development have not only lagged behind the investments (USAID), there is “an emerging global con- made, but are, in many cases, almost non- sensus that fighting corruption and building existent. This situation does not necessarily good governance are essential for the develop- challenge our current understanding of the ment of people, markets, and nations” (USAID problem, but rather reflects the challenges 2005: 1). This connection has also been rec- of policy implementation. While corruption­ ognized and adopted by the United Nations remains pervasive in the developing world, Development Programme (UNDP), specifically political rhetoric commonly hijacks anti-­ by its Global Thematic Programme on Anti- corruption discourse, resulting in its instru- Corruption for Development Effectiveness mentalization and exploitation for the (PACDE) (2008–2013) and its Global Anti- benefit of national leaders. Thus, instead of Corruption Initiative (GAIN) (2014–2017) leading to economic and social development, the anti-corruption movement has been assimilated into the regular political cycles of University of Tsukuba, JP nations. The result is that reform is often dis- [email protected] cussed but scarcely carried out. When it does Art. 15, page 2 of 19 Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption take place, interventions are usually piece- 2007; Man 2009); the bottom-up approach, meal and followed by counter-reform efforts, represented by civil society and their moni- a lack of implementation, and/or sabotage. toring of public officials (Kisubi 1999; This article provides a logical and empiri- Brunetti and Weder 2003; Kpundeh 2005; cal reference for the reasons why national Shelley 2005); and the international anti- ­governments engage in anti-corruption corruption movement, which, as its name efforts and the ways in which the anti-­ suggests, focuses on the monitoring role corruption discourse enters national politics, and capabilities of foreign agents in fighting becomes assimilated into the regular political­ local corruption (Martin 1999; Marong 2002; cycle, and eventually devolves to suit the Carr 2007; Wouters et al. 2012). Each of these status quo. To fulfil this objective, the arti- approaches has been crucially important in cle is structured as follows: the first section creating potential avenues to curb corrup- reviews the literature on anti-corruption and tion, and, thus, a vast array of normative its depiction of national political incentives, arrangements is now available from which to proposing in response a model centered on select the most appropriate (UNODC 2003, political capital and corruption profits as cru- 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2011; OECD et al. 2013; cial elements for empirical analysis. The final Transparency International 2014; Richard sections review and explain the Peruvian Holloway 2011). experience through one specific type of The bottom-up approach to the principal- anti-corruption effort, the National Anti- agent model would seem particularly promis- Corruption Commission (known as CNA, its ing as society, being the disadvantaged party Spanish acronym), and present conclusions. in a corruption transaction (Spengler 2010; Karklins 2005), should have an inherent Incentives Behind Anti-Corruption motivation to fight malfeasance in the pub- Efforts lic sphere. However, the argument continues Literature Review working under the paradigm that there is an Though it is a relatively young field of study, actor in the domestic system willing and able corruption is the focus of an important body to take the role of the principal. Such a prem- of literature that examines its core elements, ise gives way to the problem of collective from which the discussion of anti-corruption action. Bo Rothstein has given much atten- extends to a consideration of actors, strate- tion to this issue (2005, 2011). He describes gies, processes, and problems. Traditionally this position as questioning “the underlying speaking, the normative approach to anti- assumption [in the principal-agent theory] corruption studies is best exemplified by that all societies hold at least one group of the principal-agent model, with the works of actors willing to act like ‘principals’ and, as Robert Klitgaard (1988), Jeremy Pope (1999), such, enforce such regimes” (Persson et al. Daniel Kaufmann (1997), and Rose-Ackerman 2013: 8). The collective action problem posits (1998) being among the most prominent. that, in societies ravaged by systemic corrup- Succinctly put, this model sees corruption tion or simply in those were the issue of cor- as being due to the limited information and ruption does not stay restricted to the higher actions available to leaders to control the levels of government but can be found in behavior of public officials, thus resulting everyday life (ubiquitous petty corruption), in abuses of the public trust. Presented in there may not be any actor willing to take such a way, the model allows for three com- the role of the principal, as it is always more binations of principals and agents depend- profitable to partake in corruption rather ing on the structure of power favored: the than spend private resources to fight it (Del top-down approach, represented by political Castillo and Guerrero 2003; Karklins 2005; leaders being in charge of overseeing state Uslaner 2008). It becomes the common for- bureaucrats (Doig 1995; Khan 2006; Aron mula: ‘if everyone is corrupt, then nobody is.’ Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption Art. 15, page 3 of 19

Consequently, as high levels of corruption Theoretical Discussion allow it to become self-sustaining through In the words of Sahr J. Kpundeh, the study its impact on public perceptions, principal- of political will for anti-corruption reform agent strategies fail to gain traction, growing brings into the scholarly discussion the role irrelevant or, even worse, detrimental. The of “the actors, their motives and the choices real problem then emerges: who is to lead they make to promote and implement anti- the change when the argument is based on corruption reforms” (1998: 92). As govern- the absence of willing actors? In response, ment activities are never free, the simple collective action tends to propose solutions idea of performing an action intended to that invariably require authoritative leader- fight corruption requires us to consider the ship, thus falling prey to circular logic and inherent costs of that action as a starting demonstrating an inherent weakness in its point. For example, Klitgaard (1988: 195) range of applications. highlights the tradeoff in terms of efficiency Reacting to similar issues in other areas by noting that the level of anticorruption of research, the Thinking and Working effort will be short of the maximum and the Politically (TWP) approach has recently coa- optimal level of corruption will not, in prac- lesced to openly point to the crucial role that tice, be zero. This type of cost, however, is not local political contexts and actors play, and the only (or even the most important) vari- at the need to address them at every stage of able when it comes to real-life politics. If the policy formulation and implementation. In leadership is engaged in illegal acts, the anti- the case of anti-corruption efforts, the logic corruption drive will not only stop short of of TWP can be found in Hassid and Brass its maximum level, but much earlier, exactly (2015), who discuss the difference between at the point where future corruption profits China and Kenya – with respect to their han- are potentially threatened. dling of corruption cases – by referring to On the other hand, anti-corruption efforts, the levels of pressure and danger each gov- just as any other government activity, do not ernment experienced. Bueno de Mesquita only translate into costs (financial or other- and Smith (2011: 252) make a similar point wise) but, because they positively impact by pointing out that if the individual harmed society, also create benefits for the govern- by change is the ruler or the CEO, the same ment in the form of political capital, a crucial person who has to initiate the change, then type of resource that describes the amount we can be confident that change is not going of support received from international and to happen. However, in the 1980s, this argu- societal groups in response to specific cir- ment was already being offered by Chubb cumstances. With this support (which can and Vannicelli (1988: 145), who, in discuss- take such forms as citizen compliance, ing the handling of political scandals in Italy, popular approval, public demonstrations of realized that the paradox lies in the fact that endorsement, political and financial back- the initiative for the reform of public institu- ing, electoral preference, and many others), tions and the moralization of public life must authorities can exert control over the politi- come from precisely those political actors cal system and carry out their duties without who are among the prime causes of the relying solely on coercion. degeneration. The TWP builds on this reason- Although concerns about political capital ing to address corruption-related issues from are maintained with respect to most govern- a mainly political perspective, seemingly ment activities, anti-corruption initiatives acknowledging the basic conundrum behind present a peculiar situation as they specifi- the topic: because anti-corruption measures cally target governmental actors, including usually target the actors responsible for their national leaders. Going back to the case of a implementation, political will cannot be pre- leadership engaged in corruption, the situa- sumed to exist in any single case. tion quickly takes a turn for the worse when Art. 15, page 4 of 19 Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption we consider that political capital can be com- correspondingly strong political will to take pletely forsaken in favor of larger rewards in mitigating or remedial action.” the form of illegal proceeds. In any case, the But just as political capital becomes a strong relative weight of political capital as com- incentive to create ACAs, on the opposite pared to illegal income depends on the sub- side of the alley, political leaders shun away jective preferences of the political actors and from them out of fear of seeing themselves when the latter are prioritized, we should exposed to prosecution. These seemingly expect anti-corruption reform to completely dissonant reactions to ACAs are exemplified stagnate. by the governmental attacks on Slovenia’s What this line of reasoning represents for Commission for the Prevention of Corruption the pursuit of anti-corruption efforts can be (Batory 2010), or in the treatment received by summarized as follows: For an honest gov- anti-corruption initiatives in Georgia before ernment, anti-corruption policies should be the Rose Revolution (Kupatadze 2012). The attractive only in direct relation to the politi- ebb and flow of this cycle of political will for cal capital they can generate; for a corrupt anti-corruption efforts is, thus, summarized government, anti-corruption policies should by Maor (2004: 22–23): be avoided in direct relation to the interests threatened. As the preferences and interests ‘Given that the origin of [special anti- of the leadership are many and change over corruption prosecutors] comes from time, we can (and should) expect government profound public disquiet over the initiatives to be highly reactive to political cir- integrity of senior political execu- cumstances. In other words, anti-corruption tives, that corruption scandals are initiatives may exhibit their own political mass media events, and that there is cycle based on their potential to garner politi- a widespread cynicism in the general cal capital and threaten corrupt interests. public regarding the ethical standards Characterization and evidence of the type of politicians… political executives of institutional behavior stated above can be are forced to act boldly in order to found in the body of literature specifically root out corruption. Consequently, focused on anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). they often resort to overkill, that is, De Sousa (2010: 13) appropriately posits that they set up mechanisms with a level they are vulnerable to be used as “window of independence higher and a range dressing institutions or at best they func- of powers larger than they are will- tion as a governmental anti-corruption dis- ing to tolerate. Later when investiga- course mechanism,” and that consequently tions come close to home, they retract they “can bring considerable symbolic gains and try to undermine the credibility to the incumbent” (De Sousa 2010: 17). This of anticorruption mechanisms, and position, of course, shares the centrality of when deemed necessary, to terminate political capital as the argument offered by their operation.’ authors dealing with political cleanups, who agree that the impetus to address corrup- The Political Cycle of Fighting tion can be provided by political exigency, Corruption rather than by real interest in the efficient Following the preceding arguments, the functioning of the political and economic political cycle of an anti-corruption initia- institutions (Mbaku 1996: 108). Indeed, tive is proposed here to have five stages, as discussing China’s approach to fighting depicted in Figure 1 below. ­corruption, Cheung (2007: 66) concluded The process begins when internal and/or that “so long as there is the perceived threat external actors express a demand for the to the leadership’s political security (i.e. a improvement of anti-corruption systems corruption-induced crisis), there should be a in the country, with the offer of providing Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption Art. 15, page 5 of 19

Figure 1: Political Cycle of an Anti-Corruption Initiative. political capital in return. Although this lack of incentives and rise of disincentives might be considered as an overall negative may even open the door to the devolution of scenario, the situation represents an oppor- anti-corruption structures, which will even- tunity for new political actors to strengthen tually make the problem of corruption sali- their position. Particularly when leaders ent again and restart the whole cycle. need political capital, the administration will To test the above model, the next sec- proceed to adopt an anti-corruption initia- tion adopts a single case study approach to tive, which may or may not be designed to guarantee scientific rigor in the identifica- realistically reform the system, but which tion of elite interests from policy decisions. nonetheless will prove successful in stimu- This approach is selected for its potential lating support. This ‘payment’ for having to provide a detailed and highly contextual- heeded demands represents the peak and ized analysis of events that would be other- central point of the cycle, when both sides of wise unfeasible (Lewis 2003). Furthermore, the issue feel satisfied with the outcome of the focus on a single case will allow for the their exchange. employment of a process-tracing strategy, Content with the apparent resolution, which offers the possibility to assess not only internal and/or external actors then turn the main cause-effect relationship of inter- their attention away from anti-corruption est – political conditions and public policy demands and towards more salient issues, – but also the intervening mechanisms that consequently making the political value connect them both. As explained by George of further anti-corruption efforts decline. and Bennett, “(t)he process-tracing method When this decline is joined by the involve- attempts to identify the intervening causal ment of members of the administration in process—the causal chain and causal mecha- corrupt activities, or when anti-corruption nism—between an independent variable (or becomes an active threat to the stability of variables) and the outcome of the depend- the leadership, the complete exhaustion of ent variable” (George & Bennett 2005: 206). the previously adopted initiative will follow In other words, process tracing is an analytic the expected decline in political will. As a tool for drawing descriptive and causal infer- result, and depending on the degree of gov- ences from diagnostic pieces of evidence ernment involvement in illicit affairs, the often as part of a temporal sequence of Art. 15, page 6 of 19 Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption events or phenomena (Collier 2011: 824). members, the INA not only succeeded in pro- Therefore, by choosing a single case study ducing the first coherent and comprehensive approach, an attempt will be made to repro- set of recommendations (INA 2001), but also duce the chain of events as closely as possi- became the common point of reference for ble, tracing the adoption and outcomes of future initiatives on the subject. policy measures back to the contextual fac- The task given to the INA – to develop tors that gave birth to them. a framework for future anti-corruption For the above reasons, the study now actions (going beyond the transforma- turns to a review and analysis of Peru’s first tion already underway) – was described by experiment with an ACA, the National Anti- Minister of Justice García-Sayán as consist- Corruption Commission (CNA), between ing in the development of guidelines for a 2001 and 2005. national plan against corruption that could be adopted by the government and Peruvian The National Commission to Fight society once new authorities assumed lead- Against Corruption ership in July 2001 (Zileri 2001).2 Starting Immediate antecedents at 56% in January 2001, by May of that After the collapse of President Alberto year, 69% of people surveyed in the country Fujimori’s government in late 2000 due to ­supported Paniagua, with 42% expressing the discovery of a vast network of corrup- their approval of his staying until 2005, if tion throughout the state, the post-Fujimori needed (Los Andes 2001). By the end of the transitional government, led by President transitional government, in July, as many as Valentín Paniagua, was tasked with organiz- 83% of Peruvians supported the president ing a new electoral process, while expected (La República 2001a). at the same time to establish the basis for In dealing with the severe political crisis what would become the first national anti- left by his predecessor, President Paniagua corruption structure in the country. adopted and implemented measures to On April 11, 2001, as one of the actions address the spread of corruption in the adopted by the Paniagua administration to country – measures that effectively gave stabilize the country and regain political sup- rise to a new set of national anti-corruption port for the system, the government created standards. The work of the INA, and the new the National Anti-Corruption Initiative1 (INA, norms for transparency and access to infor- its acronym in Spanish), an official forum for mation, created the basis for efforts focus- the discussion and proposal of anti-corrup- ing on corruption prevention. The fall of tion policies that included actors from the Fujimori had exposed the political system public and private spheres. Additionally, to unprecedented levels of public scrutiny, and perhaps more importantly, the INA was creating radically higher levels of corruption established to address the extent and nature awareness. In addition, the international of corruption in the country and to pro- anti-corruption movement, which was cru- duce a national dialogue upon which future cial to the prosecution of Fujimori’s cronies standards could be based. Three months and the recovery of stolen assets, had finally were given for the execution of these tasks made its first real impression on Peruvians; as this was the time left before the transi- from then on, foreign actors would continue tional government had to transfer power increasing their level of participation. to the new constitutionally-elected leader- ship. Nonetheless, thanks to the political Emergence circumstances, the support of international The 2001 congressional and presidential actors (and that of President Paniagua and elections saw the victory of Alejandro Toledo his minister of Justice, Diego García-Sayán and his party Perú Posible. The newly elected Larrabure), and the heterogeneity of its president took office when anti-corruption Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption Art. 15, page 7 of 19 efforts were highly regarded and expected by an anti-corruption czar would interfere with many groups, both in the country and abroad. other offices, Toledo reassured members of Such groups were inclined to offer their sup- those offices that Belaunde Moreyra’s duties port to a government invested in such poli- would not interfere with the activities of cies, but were also ready to withdraw their the judiciary, the Public Ministry, the Public support, if their demands and expectations Procurator’s Office or the Congress, particu- went unfulfilled. Aware of these circum- larly in relation to the Fujimori-Montesinos stances, the Toledo administration was quick case (La República 2001b). to act and promised the appointment of a However, despite public discourse, the so-called ‘anti-corruption czar’ (Valenzuela government was not as interested in creating 2001), a measure that was not only politically a powerful (or even relevant) anti-corruption promising, but also had become increasingly agency, as it was in creating the impression necessary. In the short span of four months, of doing so. To acquire political capital, sym- the 59% of popular approval enjoyed by bolic measures were considered as good as Toledo in late July eroded at an impressive real actions. While this anti-corruption ini- rate, dropping to 32% in November of the tiative represented a good opportunity to same year (Tanaka 2005). Facing plummet- recover from, or at least stabilize, the loss of ing levels of political capital, the government popular approval suffered over the previous was in desperate need of renewed legitimacy. months, a fully implemented office would Through a decree3 published in El Peruano clearly represent a more taxing and unnec- on October 12, 2001, the government essary endeavor. Hence, the initiative was appointed Martín Belaunde Moreyra, who designed with political capital – and not the was at the time dean of the Association of fight against corruption – at its core. Lawyers of Lima, as ‘High Level Advisor of the To provide evidence of the above asser- President of the Republic for the Fight Against tion, we must first discuss the circumstances Corruption and the Promotion of Ethics under which Belaunde Moreyra was selected. and Transparency in Public Management’. According to a staff member of the CNA,4 the Although the title was rather elaborate, the relationship between Belaunde Moreyra and decree itself did not include any information Toledo started during the election campaign. about the functions that Belaunde Moreyra The staff explained that Juan Paz, then politi- would perform, nor did it provide any other cal operator and later executive secretary of information. However, a day earlier President the CNA, arranged for Toledo to speak at the Toledo (with Prime Minister Roberto Dañino Association of Lawyers of Lima, headed at Zapata) had given a press conference to pub- the time by Belaunde Moreyra. Many opposi- licly present his promised anti-corruption tion politicians criticized the move as Toledo czar and state that some of the czar’s duties had been given a prominent political plat- would be the prevention of irregular acts form and people have since assumed that and the monitoring of activities that could this meant Toledo owed a favor to the man turn into corruption. The latter task was con- who would go on to become the anti-cor- sidered a rather delicate subject due to the ruption czar. This account closely follows the interests with which it could clash. The Public description provided by a former senior offi- Procurator’s Office, for example, was already cial of the Association of Lawyers of Lima.5 facing ‘institutional jealousy’ (Ugaz 2014: The official described a “direct line” between 66) on the part of the Attorney General, who Belaunde Moreyra and Toledo because of the stated that Procurator José Ugaz and his team election support and added that Belaunde involved themselves in areas of competency Moreyra had good relationships with other that were the exclusive domain of the Attorney senior political leaders. General. Therefore, with the alleged intent of Such anecdotal evidence suggests that this addressing beliefs that the appointment of may have been a patronage appointment Art. 15, page 8 of 19 Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption and points to a potential lack of independ- a legislative proposal to create an ‘Office ence on the part of the czar. This problem Against Corruption’ with normative, techni- was brought to light only a couple of months cal, economic, financial, and administrative later. In January 2002, local newspapers6 autonomy and whose chair would be chosen reported that Belaunde Moreyra was avoid- by Congress.8 However, four days before the ing the investigation of members of the gov- ruling on Townsend’s proposal, the govern- ernment regarding allegations of corruption ment created the CNA, which, according to (La República 2002) and even acted as in a member of the anti-corruption commis- their defence (Cavero 2002). Indeed, one staff sion,9 the government had decided upon member of the CNA believed that Belaunde only two weeks after Belaunde Moreyra was Moreyra was trying to obstruct the work of appointed czar. The sudden existence of a the commissioners when issues affecting the commission with similar duties as the one government were brought forth.7 proposed by Congress member Townsend, To appreciate the true nature of the albeit with different types of power, provided ­government initiative, we must also con- grounds for the national parliament to reject sider the CNA design and function. This anti-­ her proposal. corruption commission, the first of its kind Furthermore, Supreme Decree No. 120- at the national level, was created by Supreme 2001-PCM established that the CNA would Decree No. 120-2001-PCM on November 17, be presided over by the representative of 2001, roughly a month after Belaunde’s the president of the republic; to be precise, appointment. It was to be presided over by art. 7 of the decree reads: ‘The High Level a representative of the president, filled by Advisor of the President of the Republic members of the government and civil soci- for the Fight Against Corruption and the ety, and included the participation of the Promotion of Ethics and Transparency in comptroller general and the ombudsman (or Public Management is to be the President their representatives). Among its functions of the National Commission of Prevention were the development of anti-corruption and Fight against Corruption and Ethics and plans and recommendations, the promo- Transparency in Public Management’.10 In tion of ethical behavior and transparency in other words, deep-seated in the norm was the public sphere, the promotion of inter- the presence of Martín Belaunde Moreyra national cooperation, conducting periodic as the CNA’s president. Under these circum- surveys, and other activities aimed at sup- stances, the CNA could only be as politically porting the fight against corruption. These independent as the anti-corruption czar functions gave the CNA a leading position as himself. the Peruvian anti-corruption body in charge of prevention. However, the most notable Normalization tasks of the CNA involved not the prevention There were early signs that the creation of an but the control of corruption as they were anti-corruption commission could be at least also tasked to: (1) evaluate and denounce partially credited to the administration’s pur- acts of corruption to the Public Prosecutor; suit of political capital. A member of the CNA11 (2) provide information about corruption remembers: ‘When he [Belaunde Moreyra] involving public officials or private citizens; was appointed they made a big circus out of and (3) conduct public hearings to analyze it. They went all out. He went to Congress, cases of administrative corruption. and every day he appeared on the news’. One of the key aspects regarding the crea- Belaunde Moreyra also approached various tion of the CNA was its timing. On October opposition leaders, such as Alan García Pérez 9 (two days before the appointment of from the American Popular Revolutionary Belaunde Moreyra as czar), Congressmember Alliance party (APRA) and Lourdes Flores Ana Elena Townsend Diez Canseco introduced Nano from National Unity (Caretas 2001), Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption Art. 15, page 9 of 19 who had the second- and third-largest parties Belaunde Moreyra had carried out, and in parliament, respectively.’ was replaced by Rafael Villegas Cerro, who When the CNA was created, it was clear was also brought in by the czar. Guillermo for some that Toledo’s approach to the pre- Benavente Ercilla, representative from the vention of corruption was markedly differ- Catholic Church, quit for similar reasons. In ent from the approach that was expected. August, Carlos Morelli Zavala, representative According to Peña-Mancillas (2011), NGO from the Ministry of Justice, followed suit Proética criticized the creation of the CNA for and was replaced a month later by Alberto not addressing the suggestions produced by Ygor Martínez Llanos, former congres- the INA, which were clearly stated in its final sional candidate for the list of Perú Posible report, A Perú Without Corruption (INA 2001). (President Toledo’s party) in 2000. The format of the anti-corruption body as Another important element underpinning recommended by the INA was closer to that the CNA’s symbolic nature was the provision proposed by Congress member Ana Elena (or rather absence) of material resources. Townsend: its chair should be appointed by When the CNA was established, there were a majority of parliament, and its political no resources for operations; Belaunde and administrative autonomy guaranteed. Moreyra was not even given an office dur- It was evident that, notwithstanding the ing the first months of his appointment and amount of formal power originally given to had to perform his duties from the building the CNA, its effectiveness would be impaired of the Association of Lawyers. According to a if a level of independence was not main- senior official of the association,16 Belaunde tained. However, as described earlier, instead Moreyra was forced to work there due to the of being empowered to pursue any incidence absence of a budget and carried out neces- of alleged corruption in the government, the sary duties with the help of the association’s CNA was tightly linked to the political will employees. Even as he recruited staff, there of President Toledo. A member of the INA12 was no office for them until January 10, observed how the idea of an anti-corruption when Belaunde left the position of dean and commission evolved from requiring the lead- moved with his staff to a small office in the ership of relevant and prestigious members building of Petroperú (the state-owned petro- of civil society who could ensure impartiality, leum company). to one controlled almost entirely by govern- According to the audit report (PCM 2006), ment agencies under a czar. According to the in 2002 the CNA was allocated S/. 3 million interviewee, when they observed the selec- (approximately US $1 million), an amount tion process, they predicted this would not that, as the document states, was below the be effective. Another member of the INA13 amount required to fulfill its mandate. The was even more vocal, observing that ‘in the first part of this budget – S/. 1 million (about government of Toledo, there was never a real US $330 thousand) – was not transferred interest in getting involved in the issue of until late March.17 Belaunde Moreyra himself anti-corruption’. was on a monthly contract basis,18 a fact that The situation was not improved by suggests a level of informality in the manage- Belaunde’s selection of close – though ulti- ment of the agency. Furthermore, through- mately critical – friends to fill some of the out the thirteen months the commissioners commissioners’ seats, particularly those cru- were appointed to their posts, and despite cial to the CNA’s objective: Agustín Figueroa repeated official requests to the prime min- Benza, Francisco Diez-Canseco Távara, and ister, the budget for allowances was never Enrique Obando Arbulú, three of the four allocated, an issue which highlighted the representatives from civil society.14 By the absence of executive support. middle of 2001, Figueroa quit the CNA due Regardless of the formal limitations to his dissent15 with some of the activities the commission faced in pursuing the Art. 15, page 10 of 19 Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption fulfillment of its anti-corruption duties, it and contextual information, it seems that still proved effective as a core element in the commission that Belaunde Moreyra the government’s efforts to show its com- presided over was only as attractive as the mitment to anti-corruption. A study carried political capital it could generate. out in February 2002 showed that 10% of However, early in the second year of the respondents thought that the fight against Toledo administration, circumstances in and corruption (independent of the prosecu- around the CNA began to change and affect tion of the Fujimori-Montesinos case) was its political value. After generating what little being prioritized by the Toledo admin- political capital was available from the sym- istration above everything else (APOYO bolic implementation of an anti-corruption 2002). Another study, conducted in March, agency, the CNA reached the peak of its rel- showed that 46.1% of surveyed people were evance in the political cycle and entered a aware of the existence of the CNA, and that period of institutional devolution, ultimately almost half of them believed that it would ending in its deactivation. accomplish its mission (University of Lima 2002). Furthermore, while a study spon- Fall from grace sored by the World Bank (2001) during the With political and financial dependence on Paniagua administration had found that the executive, the CNA was always going 85% of respondents identified corruption as to struggle to be an independent body. The the second most important obstacle in the characteristics described earlier made it country (outdone only by ‘unemployment’), particularly difficult for the commission to a national survey conducted by Proética undertake any serious actions to execute (2002) and published in November 2002 its official duties. However, with time, the found that corruption had fallen to third Commission tried to pursue its own institu- place at 63%, behind ‘economic crisis’ and tional evolution, leading to confrontations ‘unemployment’, and even to fourth place with the administration. (behind ‘crime’) when considering sponta- The Commission became interested in neous answers. This data on public percep- gaining institutional legitimacy by following tions indicates that the creation and political two strategies. First, it pursued the improve- management of the CNA throughout 2002 ment of its legal status by seeking support in succeeded in ameliorating the anti-corrup- Congress. The Commissioners’ intention was tion demands inherited from the previous to institutionalize the fight against corrup- administration and helped to portray the tion and ensure the longevity of the CNA by Toledo administration as invested in actively replacing the executive decree that created fighting corruption. it with a proper law. The text of a legislative From the above account, it is possible to project was finalized by a subgroup of com- assert that the CNA’s role during the first missioners on October 4, 2002. year of the Toledo administration largely Second, the commissioners (including involved the stimulation of political sup- Belaunde Moreyra) saw the involvement of port for the government – that is, to offer the CNA in investigations of corruption scan- a display of official anti-corruption efforts dals as a way of attracting popular attention without unnecessary spending of politi- and increased support. While this strategy cal resources or fostering new sources of represented, in principle, a position com- pressure. Toledo’s government created an mon with that of the Toledo administration, empty structure able to publicly display it also required the Commission’s engage- ­commitment to anti-corruption­ efforts, ment in activities that would threaten the while being politically and financially corrupt interests of powerful people. A restricted to address systemic change. member of the Public Procurator’s Office19 Therefore, based on the above anecdotal confirmed the pressure that was placed on Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption Art. 15, page 11 of 19 anti-corruption investigators to forgo cases political interests and justifying the decision against powerful individuals and the resist- to end the CNA based on complaints made by ance they experienced. the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG). The CNA’s approach to high-profile From the beginning, and disregarding cases started as early as February 2002, Toledo’s public discourse, other govern- with a request for information from the ment agencies had criticized the work of the National Superintendent Agency for Tax commission for what they perceived was an Administration (SUNAT, by its Spanish acro- unconstitutional invasion of their functions. nym) regarding irregular procurements. The most hostile among them was the OCG, However, the real political friction began which, although it had been included by with the adoption of a critical position by norm as an observer member of the CNA’s the CNA during a scandal involving First Lady activities, refused to participate in any of Eliane Karp and her contractual relationship its meetings. By early February 2002, the with private bank Wiese Sudameris. As con- Comptroller General had sent an official firmed by a member of the CNA20 President communication to the presidency of the Toledo and the Prime Minister were angered Council of Ministers (PCM) requesting the by it and did not provide any further support modification of the CNA’s normative role in to the CNA. Another member of the commis- two key aspects: the removal of certain attri- sion21 states: ‘The Commission became a sort butions from the Commission -particularly of enemy, or an agency that should be feared’. those related to ex post control duties that Indeed, as the media echoed the CNA’s posi- the OCG considered to be part of the latter’s tion and highlighted its criticism of the whole prerogatives – and the exclusion of the OCG affair (Núñez 2002), the government began as a member.23 Soon thereafter, President to see the CNA as a source of pressure. Toledo and Prime Minister Dañino expressed The last straw that precipitated the fall of to members of the Commission their opin- the CNA was the interest of the anti-corrup- ion that the CNA should focus on prevention tion czar Belaunde Moreyra in the case of rather than the control of corruption.24 Minister of Internal Affairs Alberto Sanabria The management audit carried out by the Ortiz, who, after taking the post in January PCM (2006: 11–14) explains that “as a con- 2003, immediately faced allegations of cor- sequence of [the OCG’s] apprehensions and ruption and favoritism (Chávez 2003). Due previous coordination between the members to Belaunde’s position, the government took of the Commission, the Prime Minister, and steps to cripple the young anti-corruption the President of the Republic… five of the commission, which by then had exhausted eight articles of Supreme Decree No. 120- its role as a source of support and become a 2001-PCM [were] modified.” Through com- potential threat to its interests. munication dated October 05, 2006,25 the The last official meeting of the CNA took technical secretariat of the CNA reported that place on February 6, 2003. Exactly one “among the most important consequences [of week later, Martín Belaunde Moreyra was the modification of the norm in 2003], is the appointed as ambassador to Argentina,22 fact that the CNA lost the possibility of driving departing the country a day later. The rush processes of investigation of presumed acts of was so great that his resignation was only corruption or lack of transparency in the dif- made official two months later, on April 25, ferent levels of government and especially in which meant that the ministerial decree had the higher spheres of political power.” 26,27 to explicitly state that it had ‘retroactive effi- Following these measures, the CNA was fur- cacy’. Finally, on April 30, the official news- ther denied political relevance by the appoint- paper El Peruano published Supreme Decree ment of a political operator, Juan Paz Espinoza, No. 047-2003-PCM, which modified the norm as the executive secretary of the commission creating the CNA, rendering it harmless to on May 1. This position had been officially Art. 15, page 12 of 19 Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption created by the amending norm (published about for a number of reasons, the most on April 30) to supersede the administrative important being: (1) Toledo’s government duties of the president of the Commission. was confronting its second-lowest level of By doing so, the government managed to: (1) popular support caused by a series of cor- avoid the appointment of a new president, (2) ruption scandals throughout the second disable any official meeting of commissioners, half of 2004; (2) the UNCAC had been rati- (3) guarantee its control of the CNA’s activi- fied by the Peruvian parliament on October ties, and (4) keep the commission running 19, 2004; and (3) the Agreement between (at least formally). For the next two years, no the Government of the Republic of Peru and meeting of commissioners would be organ- the Government of the United States regard- ized and most of the activities would revolve ing the transfer of confiscated assets (signed around the harmless and symbolic training of on June 12, 2004), which saw the return of public officials and civil society. funds stolen during the Fujimori administra- When asked about the fact that no repre- tion, demanded the setting of institutional sentative of the President of the Republic arrangements to comply with the require- was appointed after the ‘resignation’ of ments included in the agreement. These Belaunde Moreyra, Jaime Reyes Miranda, three circumstances created a new wave of secretary general of the PCM, explained that pressure on the government of President the appointment of the president of the CNA Toledo, which in turn put the CNA through a was the role of public officials other than the second, albeit shorter, political cycle. Secretary General of the PCM, noting fur- The government’s response was to modify ther that he had fulfilled his duty of warn- the CNA to allow its executive secretariat ing the successive presidents of the Council to hold official meetings of commission- of Ministers about the need to designate a ers in the event of the president’s absence. new president after the resignation of Martín In addition, certain preventive and control Belaunde Moreyra (PCM 2006: 9).28 functions were improved. However, in the With respect to the same issue, Juan Paz process of implementing these seemingly Espinoza asserted that (PCM 2006: 7) coor- positive steps, the political dependence of dination was carried out during important the commission was further secured. On meetings with the prime minister.29 The exec- January 13, 2005 (less than three months utive seemed to be aware of the situation of before the modification of the CNA’s statute), the CNA, purposely keeping it without lead- the government replaced Juan Paz as execu- ership and excluding it from participation in tive secretary with Alberto Ygor Martínez other government agencies and civil society. Llanos.30 Martínez Llanos held the post of As a result, according to the audit report of commissioner representing the Ministry of 2006, of the fourteen activities officially Justice, and like Juan Paz, was another actor planned by the CNA between 2002 and 2004, the government knew could be counted on the Commission focused on only four: the to keep the CNA under control. In contrast promotion of public ethics; training sessions; to his predecessor, who had been brought to media campaigns; and interinstitutional the commission by Belaunde Moreyra from agreements. In addition, the audit process the Association of Lawyers of Lima, he was found that in 2004 only 9.4% of the pro- an official member of the incumbent party. grammed activities could be accounted for, According to a staff member of the CNA, pointing to a serious deficit in management. Martínez Llanos was appointed because he was another political operator: “He was Transfer to the Ministry of Justice close to the president, and he belonged to The CNA was revisited through Supreme [Toledo’s] party. So, it was a matter of ‘it’s Decree No. 035-2005-PCM, signed on May 6, your turn now’”.31 The new executive secre- 2005. This second modification was brought tary had unsuccessfully run for Toledo’s Perú Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption Art. 15, page 13 of 19

Posible party in the congressional elections in the hurried and improvised way in which of 2000.32 President Alejandro Toledo first appointed an Subsequent events revealed the political anti-corruption czar and soon afterwards cre- instrumentalization of the commission for a ated the first national anti-corruption com- second time. On May 20, 2005 (exactly two mission. The political and symbolic nature of weeks after the modification of the norm), this office was sufficiently clear in the formal the government decreed33 that the CNA, powers granted to it and the limited resources along with the Ministry of Justice, would and support provided thereafter. be the agency in charge of identifying the Furthermore, once the commission ful- anti-corruption initiatives that the repatri- filled the goal set by the administration ated funds34 would be invested in. On August and political priorities changed, the study 8, the first meeting of commissioners in found that its development followed a pat- two-and-a-half years was finally held under tern consistent with the tipping point of the interim presidency of Martínez Llanos. our theorized political cycle. The deliberate During the next sessions, the task of identi- devolution of the CNA was evident in the fying anti-corruption initiatives was properly appointment of its president to the post of discussed and reported, following govern- ambassador to Argentina, the sudden and ment orders. This process was officially com- dramatic downgrade of its functions, and the pleted with the approval of the projects by appointment of a political operator tasked Ministerial Resolution No. 402-2005-JUS on with keeping the commission running. These October 12. Two weeks later, on October 26, actions to limit the efficacy of the CNA seems the government produced Supreme Decree to confirm the logic offered earlier that sup- No. 082-2005-PCM, ordering the transfer of port is withdrawn and a counter-reform pro- the CNA from the sphere of the prime min- cess takes place when the cost-benefit ratio ister to the Ministry of Justice. In its new of an anti-corruption measure tips against sector, the CNA was put under the supervi- the interests of the political leadership. sion of Vice-Minister of Justice, Jaime Reyes In short, this study shows that the CNA was Miranda, who had been Secretary General of implemented only to the extent that it could the PCM between 2002 and 2005 – the years provide political capital without affecting during which the CNA was paralyzed – and the status quo. In doing so, it supports the who became the commission’s new presi- logic that anti-corruption policies are only as dent in early 2006.35 attractive as the benefits they provide to the With that decision, the CNA was effectively government. When the latter favors political demoted to the sectorial level and, although, capital, measures to curb public malfeasance its mandate remained national, it became are not only possible, but realistic. On the clear that, in terms of institutional power, other hand, when government is engaged it would have a limited impact on the fight in illegal activities, anti-corruption measures against corruption. are not allowed to be anything more than symbolic actions. In this respect, the Toledo Conclusions administration reflected both sets of cir- The case of Peru’s CNA shows that govern- cumstances between 2001 and 2003 by first ment efforts to fight corruption (particu- focusing on novel anti-corruption demands larly in those countries where malfeasance and creating an image of clean leadership, pervades the public sector) follow a lifecycle and then rushing to control the emergence highly dependent on political circumstances. of new corruption-related scandals. When political capital is needed, leaders are Finally, the above findings suggest that, incentivized to propose and adopt measures to in acknowledging the mutability of leaders’ fight corruption in direct relation to the ben- preferences and interests, it is possible to efits available. This was found to be the case determine the real anti-corruption potential Art. 15, page 14 of 19 Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption and mechanics of an administration by look- 17 Budget allocation ordered by Supreme ing at the concrete actions it takes to either Decree No. 048-2002-EF. support or devolve anti-corruption policies. 18 This point was made during the fifth While this may sound like a self-evident truth, meeting of the commission, held on the international anti-corruption move- February 19, 2002. ment could greatly improve its approach to 19 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, October national implementation of anti-corruption 21, 2013. Translated from Spanish. commitments by dropping any assump- 20 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, November tions regarding local political willingness 4, 2014. Translated from Spanish. to reform, and instead designing specific 21 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, October approaches using a case-by-case analysis of 24, 2014. Translated from Spanish. leaders’ interests and investments. Only in 22 Supreme Resolution No. 044-2003-RE of this way can we take advantage of political February 13, 2003. cycles in the fight against corruption. 23 The issue was discussed during the third meeting of the CNA, held on February 4, Notes 2002. 1 Supreme Resolution No.160-2001-JUS. 24 The issue was discussed during the eigth 2 Translated from Spanish. meeting of the CNA, held on March 27, 3 Supreme Resolution No. 500-2001-PCM. 2002. 4 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, November 25 By this time, the government had 13, 2014. Translated from Spanish. changed and President Alan García Pérez 5 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, November was in office. 4, 2014. Translated from Spanish. 26 Italics in original. 6 For example, Caretas (2002). 27 Translated from Spanish. 7 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, October 28 Translated from Spanish. 23, 2014. 29 Translated from Spanish. 8 Legislative Proposal No. 898/2001-CR. 30 Ministerial Resolution No. 006-2005-PCM. 9 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, November 31 Translated from Spanish. 4, 2014. 32 Alberto Ygor Martínez Llanos occupied 10 Translated from Spanish. place N° 85 in the list of congressional 11 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, November candidates as shown in Resolution No. 4, 2014. Translated from Spanish. 216-2000-JNE of the National Electoral 12 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, November Jury, published in El Peruano on February 6, 2014. Translated from Spanish. 19, 2000. 13 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, November 33 Supreme Decree No. 039-2005-PCM, 3, 2014. Translated from Spanish. published on May 24. 14 If we discard the representative from the 34 These funds are those described in the Catholic Church, only three spots existed bilateral agreement mentioned earlier. for representatives of civil society, all of 35 The term commission is used here to avoid which were designated by the president confusion. In fact, on January 16, 2006 of the CNA. the CNA was reinvented by the Ministry 15 Benavente would go so far as to contact of Justice as the National Anti-Corruption the Office of the Comptroller General to Council, which was given a slightly dif- request its intervention and the auditing ferent structure (Supreme Decree No. of the CNA (as discussed in the proceed- 002-2006-JUS). ings of the fifteenth session of the com- mission, held on October 2, 2001). Competing Interests 16 Personal Interview. Lima-Peru, November The author has no competing interests to 4, 2014. declare. Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption Art. 15, page 15 of 19

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How to cite this article: Pozsgai-Alvarez, J. 2018. The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption: Peru’s Experience with its First National Anti-Corruption Commission. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 7(1): 15, pp. 1–19, DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.600

Submitted: 27 November 2017 Accepted: 06 March 2018 Published: 28 June 2018

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