The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption: Stability Peru’S Experience with Its First National Anti-Corruption Commission

Pozsgai-Alvarez, J. 2018. The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption: stability Peru’s Experience with its First National Anti-Corruption Commission. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 7(1): 15, pp. 1–19, DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.600 RESEARCH ARTICLE The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption: Peru’s Experience with its First National Anti-Corruption Commission Joseph Pozsgai-Alvarez Despite progress made over the past two decades, current international anti-corruption efforts continue to struggle with implementation issues in individual nations. The present study proposes an approach to anti-corruption policy implementationthatconsidersthefightagainstpublicmalfeasanceintermsofits potentialcostsandbenefitsforpoliticalleadership.Theexistenceofapolitical cycleforanti-corruptioninitiativesisproposedandtestedthroughanexamination ofPeru’sNationalAnti-CorruptionCommissionfrom2001to2005.Theempirical analysissupportsthetheoreticaltenets,showinghowthegovernmentofPresident Toledo created and later devolved the anti-corruption commission due to private interests and political circumstances. Introduction (UNDP 2014). As a result, most countries in Over the past two decades, an international the world maintain explicit anti-corruption anti-corruption movement has emerged with laws and regulations. Today, the fight against the shared understanding that malfeasance public malfeasance is as ubiquitous as that has negative implications for governance against poverty and other societal ills. and development. According to the United However, the outcomes of these efforts States Agency for International Development have not only lagged behind the investments (USAID), there is “an emerging global con- made, but are, in many cases, almost non- sensus that fighting corruption and building existent. This situation does not necessarily good governance are essential for the develop- challenge our current understanding of the ment of people, markets, and nations” (USAID problem, but rather reflects the challenges 2005: 1). This connection has also been rec- of policy implementation. While corruption ognized and adopted by the United Nations remains pervasive in the developing world, Development Programme (UNDP), specifically political rhetoric commonly hijacks anti- by its Global Thematic Programme on Anti- corruption discourse, resulting in its instru- Corruption for Development Effectiveness mentalization and exploitation for the (PACDE) (2008–2013) and its Global Anti- benefit of national leaders. Thus, instead of Corruption Initiative (GAIN) (2014–2017) leading to economic and social development, the anti-corruption movement has been assimilated into the regular political cycles of University of Tsukuba, JP nations. The result is that reform is often dis- [email protected] cussed but scarcely carried out. When it does Art. 15, page 2 of 19 Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption take place, interventions are usually piece- 2007; Man 2009); the bottom-up approach, meal and followed by counter-reform efforts, represented by civil society and their moni- a lack of implementation, and/or sabotage. toring of public officials (Kisubi 1999; This article provides a logical and empiri- Brunetti and Weder 2003; Kpundeh 2005; cal reference for the reasons why national Shelley 2005); and the international anti- governments engage in anti-corruption corruption movement, which, as its name efforts and the ways in which the anti- suggests, focuses on the monitoring role corruption discourse enters national politics, and capabilities of foreign agents in fighting becomes assimilated into the regular political local corruption (Martin 1999; Marong 2002; cycle, and eventually devolves to suit the Carr 2007; Wouters et al. 2012). Each of these status quo. To fulfil this objective, the arti- approaches has been crucially important in cle is structured as follows: the first section creating potential avenues to curb corrup- reviews the literature on anti-corruption and tion, and, thus, a vast array of normative its depiction of national political incentives, arrangements is now available from which to proposing in response a model centered on select the most appropriate (UNODC 2003, political capital and corruption profits as cru- 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2011; OECD et al. 2013; cial elements for empirical analysis. The final Transparency International 2014; Richard sections review and explain the Peruvian Holloway 2011). experience through one specific type of The bottom-up approach to the principal- anti-corruption effort, the National Anti- agent model would seem particularly promis- Corruption Commission (known as CNA, its ing as society, being the disadvantaged party Spanish acronym), and present conclusions. in a corruption transaction (Spengler 2010; Karklins 2005), should have an inherent Incentives Behind Anti-Corruption motivation to fight malfeasance in the pub- Efforts lic sphere. However, the argument continues Literature Review working under the paradigm that there is an Though it is a relatively young field of study, actor in the domestic system willing and able corruption is the focus of an important body to take the role of the principal. Such a prem- of literature that examines its core elements, ise gives way to the problem of collective from which the discussion of anti-corruption action. Bo Rothstein has given much atten- extends to a consideration of actors, strate- tion to this issue (2005, 2011). He describes gies, processes, and problems. Traditionally this position as questioning “the underlying speaking, the normative approach to anti- assumption [in the principal-agent theory] corruption studies is best exemplified by that all societies hold at least one group of the principal-agent model, with the works of actors willing to act like ‘principals’ and, as Robert Klitgaard (1988), Jeremy Pope (1999), such, enforce such regimes” (Persson et al. Daniel Kaufmann (1997), and Rose-Ackerman 2013: 8). The collective action problem posits (1998) being among the most prominent. that, in societies ravaged by systemic corrup- Succinctly put, this model sees corruption tion or simply in those were the issue of cor- as being due to the limited information and ruption does not stay restricted to the higher actions available to leaders to control the levels of government but can be found in behavior of public officials, thus resulting everyday life (ubiquitous petty corruption), in abuses of the public trust. Presented in there may not be any actor willing to take such a way, the model allows for three com- the role of the principal, as it is always more binations of principals and agents depend- profitable to partake in corruption rather ing on the structure of power favored: the than spend private resources to fight it (Del top-down approach, represented by political Castillo and Guerrero 2003; Karklins 2005; leaders being in charge of overseeing state Uslaner 2008). It becomes the common for- bureaucrats (Doig 1995; Khan 2006; Aron mula: ‘if everyone is corrupt, then nobody is.’ Pozsgai-Alvarez: The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption Art. 15, page 3 of 19 Consequently, as high levels of corruption Theoretical Discussion allow it to become self-sustaining through In the words of Sahr J. Kpundeh, the study its impact on public perceptions, principal- of political will for anti-corruption reform agent strategies fail to gain traction, growing brings into the scholarly discussion the role irrelevant or, even worse, detrimental. The of “the actors, their motives and the choices real problem then emerges: who is to lead they make to promote and implement anti- the change when the argument is based on corruption reforms” (1998: 92). As govern- the absence of willing actors? In response, ment activities are never free, the simple collective action tends to propose solutions idea of performing an action intended to that invariably require authoritative leader- fight corruption requires us to consider the ship, thus falling prey to circular logic and inherent costs of that action as a starting demonstrating an inherent weakness in its point. For example, Klitgaard (1988: 195) range of applications. highlights the tradeoff in terms of efficiency Reacting to similar issues in other areas by noting that the level of anticorruption of research, the Thinking and Working effort will be short of the maximum and the Politically (TWP) approach has recently coa- optimal level of corruption will not, in prac- lesced to openly point to the crucial role that tice, be zero. This type of cost, however, is not local political contexts and actors play, and the only (or even the most important) vari- at the need to address them at every stage of able when it comes to real-life politics. If the policy formulation and implementation. In leadership is engaged in illegal acts, the anti- the case of anti-corruption efforts, the logic corruption drive will not only stop short of of TWP can be found in Hassid and Brass its maximum level, but much earlier, exactly (2015), who discuss the difference between at the point where future corruption profits China and Kenya – with respect to their han- are potentially threatened. dling of corruption cases – by referring to On the other hand, anti-corruption efforts, the levels of pressure and danger each gov- just as any other government activity, do not ernment experienced. Bueno de Mesquita only translate

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