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The Israel Defense Force's Innovations Against Hybrid
MEETING THE HYBRID THREAT: THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE’S INNOVATIONS AGAINST HYBRID ENEMIES, 2000-2009 A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies By Eleazar S. Berman, B.A. Washington, DC April 16, 2010 Copyright 2010 by Eleazar S. Berman All Rights Reserved ii MEETING THE HYBRID THREAT: THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE’S INNOVATIONS AGAINST HYBRID ENEMIES, 2000- 2009 Eleazar S. Berman, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Jennifer E. Sims, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The 2006 war between Hizbullah and Israel attracted great interest within the American defense community, awakening it to the challenges of “hybrid warfare”. The Israel Defense Force, considered an innovative military, has been working to adapt to Hizbullah and Hamas, both dangerous hybrid organizations. This study explores IDF innovations in two periods, from May 2000- August 2006, the end of the Second Lebanon War, and from August 2006- January 2009, the end of Operation Cast Lead. It gives a history of the campaigns against Hizbullah and Hamas, then details the most important innovations over the two periods. Developing a new analytical framework, this work examines the pressures on and incentives for military innovation in the international, civil/military, organizational, and cultural planes. Finally, the implications of the innovations on military effectiveness are explored. This paper concludes that the perception of failure in 2006 caused the military and civilian leadership to appreciate the same hybrid threat, and this was the main factor enabling the IDF to innovate successfully after the Second Lebanon War. -
Civil Resilience Network Conceptual Framework for Israel's Local & National Resilience
Israel Trauma Coalition for Response and Preparedness Civil Resilience Network Conceptual Framework for Israel's Local & National Resilience Version B Elul 5769 August 2009 Civil Resilience Network – Version B - 2 - Elul 5769 August 2009 "It's not the strongest of the species that survives nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change" (Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 1859) … "The entire people is the army, the entire land is the front" (David Ben-Gurion, May 1948) … "Israel has nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in the region, but the truth is that it is weaker than a spider's web" (Hassan Nasrallah, May 26, 2000) ... "The durability of spider webs enable them to absorb the concentrated pressure of a weight ten times that of the most durable artificial fiber" (P. Hillyard, The Book of the Spider, 1994) Civil Resilience Network – Version B - 3 - Elul 5769 August 2009 Table of Contents Table of Contents............................................................................................................ 3 Funders: UJA Federation of New York ....................................................................... 5 Partners ........................................................................................................................... 5 THE ISRAEL TRAUMA COALITION: RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS............................... 5 THE REUT INSTITUTE ..................................................................................................... 5 Acknowledgements........................................................................................................ -
IDF Special Forces – Reservists – Conscientious Objectors – Peace Activists – State Protection
Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: ISR35545 Country: Israel Date: 23 October 2009 Keywords: Israel – Netanya – Suicide bombings – IDF special forces – Reservists – Conscientious objectors – Peace activists – State protection This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Please provide information on suicide bombs in 2000 to January 2002 in Netanya. 2. Deleted. 3. Please provide any information on recruitment of individuals to special army units for “chasing terrorists in neighbouring countries”, how often they would be called up, and repercussions for wanting to withdraw? 4. What evidence is there of repercussions from Israeli Jewish fanatics and Arabs or the military towards someone showing some pro-Palestinian sentiment (attending rallies, expressing sentiment, and helping Arabs get jobs)? Is there evidence there would be no state protection in the event of being harmed because of political opinions held? RESPONSE 1. Please provide information on suicide bombs in 2000 to January 2002 in Netanya. According to a 2006 journal article published in GeoJournal there were no suicide attacks in Netanya during the period of 1994-2000. No reports of suicide bombings in 2000 in Netanya were found in a search of other available sources. -
The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare
No. 109 JUNE 2016 The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare Michael B. Kim The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim The Institute of Land Warfare ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER No. 109, June 2016 The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim Major Michael B. Kim currently serves as the Squadron Executive Officer for the 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division. Prior to his current position, he graduated from the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and completed the Art of War Scholars Program. -
The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014
SEPTEMBER 2014 . VOL 7. ISSUE 9 The Combat Performance a clear improvement in performance of medium range and dozens of long since the Hamas-Israel war in 2009.5 range systems capable of reaching as of Hamas in the Gaza War far as Haifa in northern Israel.9 Hamas’ of 2014 Nevertheless, Hamas also showed rocket forces were well prepared for the weaknesses within its military forces. campaign, with a system of underground By Jeffrey White Its rocket offensive, while disrupting launchers spread across Gaza and the life in Israel, and especially in southern means of moving rockets and rocket in its war with israel in the Israel, caused few casualties and little squads to launch areas under cover.10 summer of 2014, Hamas displayed damage. Its offensive tunnel system, a wide range of combat capabilities, while allowing infiltration inside Israel, Hamas expended considerable effort including new offensive and defensive did not lead to successful penetration into the build-up of its ground tactics.1 Hamas’ evolution on the of the border defense system, except forces. These forces were to be battlefield presented serious challenges perhaps in one case.6 Despite the employed offensively against Israel to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and, defensive tunnel system, Israeli forces and defensively to prevent deep when combined with Israeli operations, caused extensive damage to Hamas’ penetrations into Gaza by Israeli made the conflict the most costly in military infrastructure.7 Hamas’ ground ground forces. Hamas organized the terms of casualties and damage to Gaza forces, notwithstanding their upgrades, defensive battlefield by deploying since Hamas seized power in 2007.2 were unable to prevent IDF ground dense systems of improvised explosive operations. -
A CJP Project Inspire & JDC Entwine Trip: Inside India December 18-27
A CJP Project Inspire & JDC Entwine Trip: Inside India December 18-27, 2018 Participants must stay together as a group at all times and cannot travel around unaccompanied. During our trip to India, we will focus on connecting with and learning about the Bene Israel Indian Jewish community; a geographically isolated, ancient Jewish people primarily based in Mumbai, which traces its roots back to 586 B.C.E. We will travel the Mumbai region together, learn about programs initiated by JDC, and engage in cultural exchange with Indian Jewish young adults. This will allow us to gain a glimpse into different Jewish Indian perspectives and understand a little bit more about this historical community. India has a rich history of religious tolerance, and Jews have been able to practice their faith freely here for over 2,000 years. India’s huge population, extensive levels of poverty, and limited government-run social services have created significant social challenges. This has led to a collaboration between the Jewish community and JDC in which they created a community-based social welfare system. We’ll learn how Israel's work is interwoven throughout this hustling and bustling Indian metropolitan and the different ways in which Israel has become involved in humanitarian aid work and development across this region. Israel and India established full diplomatic relations in 1992. However, even before that, Israel had a Consulate in Mumbai, operating since 1953. Today, India is an important partner to Israel in the areas of politics, commerce, science and culture. MASHAV, Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation, was established in 1958 as a manifestation of the Jewish concept of tikkun olam – repairing the world. -
Yoni) Netanyahu
Heroism Science Volume 5 Issue 2 Special Issue - The Downside of Article 5 Heroism 2020 A Lion’s Blues: Heroism, Heroic Self-Representations, and Emotional Distress in the Life and Character of Yonatan (Yoni) Netanyahu Golan Shahar Ben-Gurion University, [email protected] Raz Bauminger Ben-Gurion University, [email protected] Shai Itamar Ben-Gurion University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/heroism-science Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Leadership Studies Commons Recommended Citation Shahar, Golan; Bauminger, Raz; and Itamar, Shai (2020) "A Lion’s Blues: Heroism, Heroic Self- Representations, and Emotional Distress in the Life and Character of Yonatan (Yoni) Netanyahu," Heroism Science: Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. DOI: 10.26736/hs.2020.02.05 Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/heroism-science/vol5/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Heroism Science by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 SHAHAR, BAUMINGER, & ITAMAR YONI NETANYAHU Heroism Science: An Interdisciplinary Journal (ISSN 2573- 7120) https://scholarship.richmond.edu/heroism-science/ Vol. 5 No. 2 (2021) pp. 1-47 A Lion’s Blues: Heroism, Heroic Self- Representations, and Emotional Distress in the Life and Character of Yonatan (Yoni) Netanyahu GOLAN SHAHAR 1 RAZ BAUMINGER SHAI ITAMAR Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel [email protected] Please address correspondence to Golan Shahar, Ph.D., The Stress, Self & Health Lab (STREALTH), Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 800 Ben-Gurion Avenues, Beer- Sheva 84105, Israel. -
From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza
From Cast Lead to Protective Edge Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza Raphael S. Cohen, David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, Shira Efron C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1888 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9787-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise): Nir Elias/Reuters; Amir Cohen/Reuters; Abu Mustafa/Reuters; Tsafrir Abayov/AP Photo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report examines the Israel Defense Forces operations in Gaza from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 through Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 to Operation Protective Edge in 2014. -
Fighting Terror Effectively: an Assessment of Israel’S Experience on the Home Front
FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP NOVEMBER 2016 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT Copyright © 2016 by Friends of Israel Initiative All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law. 2 FIGHTING TERROR EFFECTIVELY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE ON THE HOME FRONT TABLE OF CONTENTS HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP BIOGRAPHIES 6 FOREWORD 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 THE HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT GROUP 19 SECTION A: ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE OF TERRORISM AGAINST ITS HOME FRONT 21 ISRAEL’S HISTORIC EXPERIENCE OF TERRORISM 22 1 1.1 Background 22 1.1.1 A Potentially Existential Threat 22 1.2 The History of Terrorism Against Israel 22 1.2.1 Pre-Statehood Violence and Conventional Warfare 22 1.2.2 Cross-Border Terror Raids 23 1.2.3 The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Globalization of Terror Against Israel 23 1.2.4 The Rise of the Terror-Army Hybrid 23 1.2.5 The First Intifada and the First Gulf War 23 1.2.6 Suicide Bombings and The Second Intifada 24 1.2.7 Rocket Attacks from Gaza and Lebanon 25 1.2.8 Terror at Home and Abroad 26 TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL TODAY: 2 THE SMALL-SCALE TERROR CAMPAIGN -
Parents of Lone Soldiers
LONE SOLDIERS PROGRAM Informational Booklet FOR Parents of Lone Soldiers 1 Table of Contents Preface .......................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 6 Programs for Enlisting in the IDF ...............................................................................................7 Being Drafted to the IDFF Tzav Rishon ................................................................................................................................... 8 Medical Profile ............................................................................................................................. 9 Filing an Appeal and Updating the Military System ................................................................10 Ra’ayon Tash ................................................................................................................................. 10 Process of Classification Process of Classification .............................................................................................................11 Being an Only Child in the IDF ....................................................................................................11 Recruitment Tracks Involving Academic Study .......................................................................12 Determining Job Placement........................................................................................................12 -
The IDF on All Fronts Dealing with Israeli Strategic Uncertainty ______
FFooccuuss ssttrraattééggiiqquuee nn°° 4455 bbiiss ______________________________________________________________________ The IDF on All Fronts Dealing with Israeli Strategic Uncertainty ______________________________________________________________________ Pierre Razoux August 2013 Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non- governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With office in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of the European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-36567-192-7 © Ifri – 2013 – All rights reserved All requests for information, reproduction or distribution may be addressed to: [email protected]. Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27 rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Bruxelles – BELGIQUE Tel : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tel : +32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax : +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] Website : www.ifri.org “Focus stratégique” Resolving today’s security problems requires an integrated approach. Analysis must be cross-cutting and consider the regional and global dimensions of problems, their technological and military aspects, as well as their media linkages and broader human consequences. -
The Combat Ethos Is Alive and Well
The combat ethos is alive and well Gal Pearl / July 31, 2014 An outsider observing the Israel Defense Forces' fighting during Operation Protective Edge will notice right away that brigade, battalion and company commanders make up a large proportion of the wounded and casualties. The Golani Brigade alone has lost a deputy battalion commander, and among its wounded are three platoon commanders and a brigade commander. Three officers are now vying to succeed the fallen commander. This is true not only in the regular army, but also -- maybe even more so in light of their stronger connection to civilian life -- among the reservists. Even those who oppose the scope of the operation cannot ignore the obvious "IDF spirit" of it. This is the spirit that leads the IDF in its best moments. The battles of the 1948 War of Independence established the norm of "Corporals, retreat -- the commanders will cover you!" During reprisal operations carried out by the paratroopers in the 1950s, the officers' command "After me!" became the guide for IDF fighters and commanders. For the first time, general ideas like professionalism, personal example, confronting obstacles, and the rule that "We don't go back until we get it done" became iron-clad rules of thumb. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, too, when reservists in the Paratroopers Brigade left for the Suez Canal Operation in APCs jam-packed with fighters -- many more than orders allowed -- this spirit prevailed and the army, bruised and battered from battles to stop the enemy's progress, sailed across the canal, and didn't stop until it won a military victory.