RECALL The Governor’s Recall By Thad Kousser

California’s recall election gave voice to voter dissatisfaction with the state’s direction and resulted in a return to the type of moderate Republican governor that had led the state throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s. While exciting, it does not represent a sea change in California politics.

After providing the nation with a summer’s worth tive session to pass a package of education reforms. of amusement, California’s recall—which was at Quickly, however, his relationship with his natural once a bold new use of an old Progressive institu- allies soured. When Davis felt that the Democrati- tion, democracy taken to its logical extreme, and the cally-controlled Legislature was being insufficiently greatest show on earth—turned into a fairly typical cooperative, he famously announced that the houses two-candidate race for control of the state. The ma- were there “to implement my vision.”3 Cruz jor issues became the incumbent’s performance and Bustamante, the independently-elected Democratic personality, set against the promises of an unproven lieutenant governor, held a press conference on the but talented outsider to return California to great- capitol steps criticizing Davis for his stance on an ness. Just as polls had predicted for months, Demo- immigrant rights lawsuit, and promptly saw his staff cratic Gov. was recalled by a fairly nar- lose their parking permits. row margin in a vote that split mostly along party Such actions had repercussions for Davis when he lines. He was replaced by Republican Arnold ran into his own difficulties. The first obstacle was Schwarzenegger, who performed better than pundit the state’s energy crisis, brought by the delayed predictions and nearly captured a majority of the vote implementation of a bill proposed by Republican in a 135-candidate field. Gov. and passed by Democrats in a Leg- What sent Davis, whose fellow Democrats hold islature that Davis had long since left. Though this an eight percentage point edge in party registration1 was not a problem of his own making, Davis was and control all seven other statewide political offices, slow to react and publicly criticized by legislators into the record books as only the second American who would not simply do his bidding. The plan Davis governor ever to be recalled? Clearly, the public’s eventually proposed avoided catastrophe, but cost the poor review of his record in five years leading Cali- state billions in long-term energy contracts and drove fornia had much to do with his downfall. his job approval ratings from 56 percent to 43 per- A Stanford-educated lawyer and Vietnam War vet- cent in the first half of 2001.4 Shortly afterward, eran, Davis spent most of his political career trying Davis’ prodigious fundraising activities drew scru- to find his way into the governor’s office. After serv- tiny from the public and from legislators. In particu- ing as Gov. ’s chief of staff, Davis won lar, his acceptance of a $25,000 donation from the a -area state Assembly seat in 1982. software company Oracle just after it secured a large Though he did not break into Speaker Willie Brown’s state contract brought an investigation by the Joint powerful inner circle, Davis held his seat until 1986, Legislative Audit Committee. when he moved up the ladder to be elected the state’s As Davis’ 2002 reelection neared, California’s fis- controller, and then, in 1994, its lieutenant governor. cal situation—like that of nearly every state—looked Davis came from behind in a primary against two worse and worse. For a state that relies heavily on self-funded candidates to become the Democratic income taxes, the decline in revenues coming from nominee for governor in 1998. Davis swept to an stock options that “dot bombed” was disastrous. Be- impressive 58 percent to 38 percent victory over At- cause Davis and the Legislature had committed to torney General . He succeeded by bal- expansions in primary education and health care ancing his pro-choice, environmentalist, and pro-gun spending during boom years, the bust opened up a control stances with an aggressive emphasis on his large deficit hole. By the November general elec- tough-on-crime credentials.2 tion, Davis’ approval had dropped to 39 percent de- Gray Davis’ tenure began well enough, with a hon- spite his attempts to downplay the state’s fiscal prob- eymoon period in which he called a special legisla- lems. Yet Davis was able to survive because of a strat-

The Council of State Governments 307 RECALL

Table A: Final Campaign Contribution Totals: $80 Million for a 77-Day Contest

Candidate Money raised in each fund Contribution totals

Gray Davis $2.37 million, Taxpayers Against the Governor’s Recall $16.97 million $14.6 million, Californians Against the Costly Recall of the Governor $18.5 million, Candidacy Fund $21.9 million $3.4 million, Pro-recall Fund Cruz Bustamante $5.7 million, Candidacy Fund $12.4 million $5.54 million, Anti-Prop. 54 Fund $525,773, Anti-recall Fund $667,703, Old Campaign Fund Peter V. Ueberroth $3.95 million Tom McClintock $1.67 million $812,560 Jr. $588,309 Independent expenditures $10.1 million by casino-owning tribes $24.1 million $10 million by organized labor $4 million combined by Democratic and Republican Parties Overal l Contributions $82.4 million

Source: Data collected from the California secretary of state and reported in Dan Morain and Joel Rubin, “Financially, the Recall Was Business as Usual,” , October 10, 2003.

egy that he and his canny advisors had pursued in Article II, Section 13 of the constitution defines the the state’s March primary: picking a weak opponent. recall simply as “the power of the electors to remove By spending $10 million of his war chest on adver- an elective officer,” giving no specifics about the tisements attacking ,5 the moderate conditions in which it should be used. An offense former mayor of Los Angeles, Davis was able to help warranting recall in California need not be a high conservative businessman Bill Simon defeat Riordan crime or misdemeanor. Instead, it is whatever a num- for the Republican nomination. Davis narrowly beat ber equal to 12 percent of the voters in the last gu- Simon in a general election marked by low turnout bernatorial election willing to sign a petition say it and much support for minor party candidates.6 He is. After the November, 2002 election, this figure was then turned his attention to the budget deficit, which 986,874,10 which became the goal for Abernathy, by May, 2003 grew to $38.2 billion.7 Costa, and the other conservative and Republican Party activists who joined them. Putting the Recall on the Ballot Although Davis’ approval rating continued to slide While Davis and his team congratulated each other down to 25 percent by March 2003, collecting this on a close victory, Republican strategists quietly dis- many signatures was a daunting task. After all, re- cussed the option of a recall. Mark Abernathy, who call petitions have been circulated for every Califor- would later run DavisRecall.com, began discussing nia governor in recent memory, but none in state his- the idea with anti-tax activist Ted Costa on Novem- tory had garnered sufficient support to qualify for ber 17, 2002. Convinced that Davis could be defeated the ballot. The key to getting an initiative or a recall if voters had a better option, Abernathy had an Arnold on California’s ballot, at least over the past two de- Schwarzenegger candidacy in mind “from day one.”8 cades, is money. Recall activists drew much atten- California’s recall provision places the question of tion in the spring of 2003 with their public campaign, whether to remove a governor on the same ballot as launched February 5, but it was initially unable to the election of a replacement. Added to the state’s attract significant organizational support or resources. constitution in 1911,9 the recall was part of Gov. Although outgoing Republican Party Chair Shawn Hiram Johnson’s triumvirate of Progressive institu- Steel backed the recall, real party powering Califor- tions—the initiative, the referendum and the recall. nia resides in legislative leaders. The Senate and

308 The Book of the States 2004 RECALL

Figure A: Support for Recall Polarized Along Party Lines

Republican support for recall (%) Overall support for recall (%) Democratic support for recall (%) 100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0% 3/3/2003 4/6/2003 6/1/2003 7/2/2003 9/7/2003 7/13/2003 8/13/2003 8/17/2003 8/21/2003 9/10/2003 9/17/2003 9/29/2003 10/1/2003 10/4/2003 10/7/2003

Source: Data collected from pre- and post-election opinion polls by Gary C. Jacobson, University of California, San Diego.

Assembly Minority Leaders, Jim Brulte and Dave a mere plurality of the vote, and anyone who casts a Cox, were initially cool to the idea. So were national ballot can participate in this contest, regardless of party leaders. According to “Rescue California” whether they voted for or against the recall. A rela- leader David Gilliard, “there was no interest, zero, tively new member of Congress who had not per- of the White House.” The recall move- formed well in his first statewide run, Issa saw an ment had the support of activists and a vulnerable opportunity to lead an anti-incumbent revolt and be target, it had few potent backers and little money. rewarded by grateful voters with a prize that he might That changed when approached re- otherwise be unlikely to win. He began making con- call leaders. A Republican Congressman from the San tributions to the petition drive that would eventually Diego area, Issa had built a personal fortune from total nearly $3 million.12 his car alarm business and used this money in suc- Recall proponents used this money to pay signa- cessful runs for the House and a failed bid for Bar- ture gatherers to supplement the efforts of volunteers bara Boxer’s Senate seat. On April 24, Issa an- who gathered an estimated 100,000 signatures by the nounced that he would help fund the drive to qualify time Issa stepped in. The presence of a patron also the recall for the ballot, and that he was interested in caused Gov. Davis’ political team to take notice. “I running for governor.11 The structure of California’s don’t think we took it at all seriously until Darrell recall ballot likely tempted him into the race. The Issa gave the money,” said Davis advisor Steve race to replace a recalled governor can be won with Smith. Once the recall drive was flush with cash,

The Council of State Governments 309 RECALL however, it took off. The petition, accusing Davis of and again used his own money to tout his fiscal con- gross mismanagement of state money, raced around servatism. Still, scandals from his business practices the internet and developed into the leading topic on dogged him, and his inability to defeat Davis the pre- talk radio. According to recall strategist Sal Russo, vious year left many wondering why he would try the architect of Bill Simon’s 2002 gubernatorial bid, again. “The recall became possible because we had a tool Veteran state Sen. Tom McClintock joined the field we never had before, and that is the marriage of the on August 5. After many years of experience in Sac- internet with talk radio.” Qualification for the ballot ramento as an articulate leader of the state’s fiscally went from being a possibility before Issa’s cash in- and socially conservative forces, he had barely lost fusion to a probability and then, once the “Rescue in his 2002 race to become the state’s controller. California” website received 25 million hits, an in- McClintock was convinced that the state’s budget evitability. By July, organizers said they had collected problems made his fiscal positions more important 2,160,000 signatures: 1,319,000 through paid gath- to Californians than his less popular social prescrip- erers and direct mail, and 841,000 through volun- tions. Also in the race was Peter V. Ueberroth, a so- tary means.13 cial moderate who emphasized fiscal responsibility. On July 23, Democratic Secretary of State Kevin Another candidate with a significant personal for- Shelly announced that the recall had qualified, after tune, Ueberroth hoped to parlay his success as the a month’s worth of lawsuits from both sides alleged organizer of Los Angeles 1984 Summer Olympics signature gathering improprieties and unlawful de- and his experience as baseball’s commissioner into lays in the counting of signatures. Then it was up to support for his sound stewardship of the state. Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante to set the timing of the The highest Republican hopes focused, of course, election. Because the drive had progressed so quickly, on bodybuilder-turned-movie star turned political constitutional provisions required that the recall be activist Arnold Schwarzenegger. While he may have held during a special statewide election rather than been new to the national political scene, Hollywood’s put off until the March 2004 primary. Bustamante highest-paid action hero was also one of show busi- could choose any day between 60 to 80 days after ness’ leading political voices. After considering a run Shelly certified the recall. for the governorship in 2002, Schwarzenegger in- Since the state’s election code requires that candi- stead led the drive for a ballot initiative that provided dates file no later than 59 days before an election, after school programs for California students. He won some recall backers worried that Bustamante and raves for his campaigning, and Proposition 49 won Shelly would collaborate on a quick qualification and passage by a 57 percent to 43 percent margin, though short filing window. Instead, the October 7 election the state’s deficit has prevented it from being imple- set by Bustamante—who declared that “there’s noth- mented so far. Still, Schwarzenegger remained hesi- ing Machiavellian going on”14—gave potential can- tant to launch his own candidacy, and his political didates plenty of time to make their choice. Both advisor George Gorton arrived at NBC’s “Tonight Democratic officials had dual roles, setting the rules Show” studios on the night of August 6 expecting to of a game that one of them would soon enter, but watch Schwarzenegger endorse another Republi- took pains to be views as fair because they were con- can.15 Instead, the former Terminator announced his strained by public opinion. candidacy and immediately became the top GOP contender. Schwarzenegger fits the same mold that The Field Takes Shape has led other Republicans to statewide success in In the first weeks of August, experienced officials, California: he is a social moderate and a fiscal con- high profile newcomers, and local gadflies alike con- servative, with the added bonus of substantial cha- sidered entering the race for the governorship. All risma and financial resources. Like Pete Wilson, the that was required to join the race was $3500 and 65 Republican governor from 1990 to 1998, Schwarz- signatures from members of the candidate’s party. enegger favors abortion rights. He is even more cen- Many Republicans, outraged by Davis’ handling of trist than Wilson on issues such as domestic partner- state finances and well aware that he was vulnerable, ship and gun control, which put him closely in line could not resist entering the race. Issa, whose mod- with California’s electorate. erate policy stances and personal fortune made his Another factor that gave Schwarzenegger’s can- candidacy credible, had openly declared his atten- didacy immediate legitimacy was his willingness to tions to run during the petition drive. Bill Simon use his personal fortune. Requiring investments in quickly reassembled his 2002 campaign apparatus five major media markets, California campaigns

310 The Book of the States 2004 RECALL

race. According to top consultant Richie Ross, “I think [Bustamante’s decision] was Table B: Initial Results of Recall based on a sense that someone should do and Replacement Elections it, and he took his shot.” Did this amount

Question/candidate Number of votes Percentage of the vote to a betrayal of the Democratic Party and muddle its “No on the Recall” message? Support for recall 4,851,398 55.4% Lockyer certainly thought it did, leading Opposition to recall 3,917,508 44.6 him after the election to criticize Arnold Schwarzenegger (R) 4,107,851 48.6 Bustamante’s ethics and work habits when Cruz Bustamante (D) 2,668,473 31.6 explaining why he as a lifelong Democrat Tom McClintock (R) 1,129,402 13.4 voted for Schwarzenegger.17 Peter Miguel Camejo (Grin) 235,286 2.8 Other candidates without a major party Arianna Huffington (Ind) 46,678 0.6 label sought the support of the 21 percent Pever V. Ueberroth (R) 24,645 0.3 of Californians who do not register to vote Source: Semifinal Official Canvas of the Vote reported by the California secre- as Republicans or Democrats. Arianna tary of state, as of October 28, 2003, at http://vote2003.ss.ca.gov/. Huffington, the former wife of a Republi- can Senate nominee whose career as a po- litical columnist had taken her from con- regularly see expenditures of tens of millions of dol- servatism to anti-SUV activism, entered the race as lars. Self-financed candidates have done quite well an independent. Peter Miguel Camejo carried the over the last decade, with one-term Congressman banner of the Green Party, just as he had done when Michael Huffington and political novice Bill Simon he captured 5.3 percent of the vote in the 2002 nearly pulling off upsets in statewide elections against governor’s race. Rounding out the field of 135 can- Diane Feinstein and Gray Davis, respectively. Arnold didates were those who gave the recall its circus at- Schwarzenegger’s money gave him the resources to mosphere. Former child actor Gary Coleman, porn start a professional operation quickly and the inde- star Mary Carey Cook, Los Angeles billboard queen pendence to attack Gray Davis for his reliance on Angelyne, and Hustler publisher Larry Flynt quali- interest group contributions. Though Schwarz- fied for a ballot that was seven pages long. enegger would go on to raise a total of $11.9 million from real estate, farming, insurance an other inter- Campaigns, Contributions and the Courts ests to supplement the $10 million that he gave him- Once he entered the replacement contest, Arnold self, he contended throughout his campaign that these Schwarzenegger began to be asked specific policy were not the same sorts of “special interests” that questions that the press had refrained from asking had corrupted Sacramento politics. previously. In a televised interview, The Today Show’s The state’s most popular Democrat, U.S. Sen. Matt Lauer quizzed a surprised Schwarzenegger Diane Feinstein, felt strongly that recall was wrong about his positions on California’s workers’ compen- and that the best strategy to defeat it was not to run a sation program. Schwarzenegger’s avoidance of such replacement candidate at all. This formula had al- concrete queries became the topic that the main- lowed her to defeat a recall attempt when she was stream political media seized upon in the early days ’s mayor. She reportedly put tremen- of the campaign. They challenged his assertions that dous personal pressure on the state’s high-profile he could solve the budget mess without raising taxes Democrats to resist the temptation—made obvious or cutting education. by internal polls showing majority support for the Yet this criticism did not greatly trouble recall—to jump into the race.16 Attorney General Bill Schwarzenegger’s circle of strategists, a group that Lockyer and Treasurer , potential can- combined his longtime advisors with former Gov. didates for the governorship in 2006, stayed out of Pete Wilson’s aides and Wilson himself.18 The team the race. had designed a creative media plan that bypassed tra- Yet on the same day that Schwarzenegger would ditional news outlets for appearances on shows with enter the contest, Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante declared Jay Leno, Oprah Winfrey, Larry King and Howard his candidacy. Though Bustamante had publicly Stern shows. “We ran away from the established pledged on June 19 to stay off the ballot, his rocky media,” explained aide Sean Walsh. “We went to the relationship with Davis and his poor prospects in a real mass media. It gave us five, seven, eight min- crowded 2006 primary field tempted him into the utes of unfiltered opportunities to get out our mes-

The Council of State Governments 311 RECALL sage every day. We did it because we could.”19 ers like Schwarzenegger (22 percent), McClintock Schwarzenegger’s personal fortune and successful (12 percent), Ueberroth (7 percent), Simon (6 per- fundraising also gave him the ability to craft his own cent) divided up the rest of the vote. message through television ads. The Republican field did not remain crowded, Gray Davis possessed one advantage in the 77- though. Seeing their poll figures and knowing how day campaign: he was technically running against unpopular they might become if their presence an initiative in his fight to stop the recall. A recent handed victory in the replacement race to a Demo- state campaign finance law, premised on the prin- crat, the trailing Republicans eventually dropped out. ciple that no one can corrupt an initiative, allowed Following Issa’s emotional goodbye on August 7 was unlimited contributions to initiative campaigns but Bill Simon’s August 23 withdrawal and Peter capped donations to individual candidates. Always a Ueberroth’s September 9 exit. The lone major Re- prolific fundraiser, Davis and the committees work- publican remaining on Election Day was Tom ing on his side were able to collect nearly $17 mil- McClintock. His continued presence appealed to lion. The finance law, Proposition 34, imposed un- conservatives who did not trust Schwarzenegger’s expectedly tight constraints on other candidates. qualified “no new taxes” pledge, but infuriated some Written by legislative leaders, Prop. 34 was initially Republicans who feared that it might give the elec- thought to be a sham because it allowed mammoth tion to Bustamante. contributions to parties, who could then spend money As the replacement field took shape, Gray Davis supporting local candidates. Because of the vicissi- did little to help his own cause. He offered a half- tudes of the recall, though, this supposed loophole hearted mea culpa in a televised appearance, though had some bite: no candidate could simply raise money his less publicized town hall meetings across the state through parties, because the major parties were in- drew more favorable reviews. Unpopular all year ternally divided over whom to support. because of his handling of the state’s budget condi- Another provision of Prop. 34 allowed candidates tion, Davis could not even count of the support of all to accept unlimited contributions into accounts from of the state’s registered Democrats. A glance at the their previous campaigns and transfer them to their polling figures over the course of the recall shows recall efforts so long as $21,200-sized chunks of the that a quarter of the Democratic voters consistently transferred sums could be “attributed” to individual favored the recall. Overall support for the recall supporters. Cruz Bustamante attempted to take ad- climbed over 50 percent when Republican voters, vantage of this provision. In September, his 2002 who were tepid to the idea at first, began to back it campaign account accepted nearly $4 million from almost unanimously by October 7. Still, Davis at- Native American tribes that had casinos, and then tracted the visible support of national figures such transferred it to his recall war chest. Under pressure as Bill Clinton, Jesse Jackson, and many of the 2004 from popular condemnation and a lawsuit, presidential candidates. They campaigned alongside Bustamante was forced to give this money to the fight him, and he claimed that his campaign was just gain- against an initiative on the October ballot (to fund ing momentum on September 15, when a three-judge commercials in which he appeared). These TV spots panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals released likely cost Bustamante more in bad press than they a decision that provisionally delayed the scheduled were worth.20 election. Bustamante, who had been a true centrist when The decision ruled in favor of the Southwest Voter he served as Assembly Speaker, also moved to the Registration Education Project in a suit brought on left in an apparent attempt to mobilize the Demo- the group’s behalf by the American Civil Liberties cratic base. His “No on the Recall, Yes on Union (ACLU). Although a slew of lawsuits were Bustamante” campaign included a “Tough Love” filed by both sides, this suit attracted the attention of budget plan raising taxes, and ads that emphasized courts because it invoked the federal constitutional his Latino heritage. He seemed to expect that the rights that had been addressed in Bush v. Gore. The replacement race could be won by motivating the ACLU contended that holding a recall election be- 30 percent of California voters who are staunch fore six counties (which had more minority voters Democrats. After all, only a plurality was required than the rest of California) could switch from obso- to win, and an August 24 Los Angeles Times Poll lete punch card balloting to secretary of state-ap- showed Bustamante leading with 34 percent sup- proved devices would violate the equal protection port from likely voters while the rest of the elec- rights of punch card voters. UC Berkeley political torate was divided between Republican contend- scientist Henry Brady, who had led efforts to study

312 The Book of the States 2004 RECALL punch card voting in Florida, estimated that 40,000 appear to put a dent in Schwarzenegger’s prospects, fewer voters would be counted in the six counties and neither did a Los Angeles Times story detailing than in areas with less error-prone voting machines. allegations that he had sexually harassed six women The three-judge panel accepted Brady’s figures and in graphic ways over a 25-year period. This story, the ACLU’s reasoning, delaying the election and which appeared only days before the recall, was an concluding that “This is a classic voting rights equal independent account that did not rely on any infor- protection claim.”21 mation leaked from opposition campaigns. The election remained in limbo until September Schwarzenegger immediately issued an apology, say- 23, when an en banc panel of Ninth Circuit judges ing “Those people that I have offended, I want to overruled the three initial judges. This panel was less say to them I am deeply sorry.”24 Many of his sup- accepting of Brady’s disfranchisement estimates, and porters saw the independently-researched story as opined that the possibility that punchcard errors another Gray Davis attack, and polls indicate that it would be decisive was outweighed by the costs of may have paradoxically helped Schwarzenegger gal- delay. “If the recall election scheduled for October vanize his supporters and pull in Tom McClintock’s 7, 2003, is enjoined,” the panel declared, “it is cer- backers in the final days. tain that the state of California and its citizens will suffer material hardship by virtue of the enormous A Clear Schwarzenegger Victory resources already invested in reliance on the Schwarzenegger, who had attracted the support of election’s proceeding on the announced date.”22 40 percent of likely voters in the last Los Angeles It is hard to say whether the court-imposed de- Times poll taken before the election, recovered from lay helped or hurt Davis’ efforts, though nearly all the harassment allegations to win the replacement voters told pollsters that it did not affect their de- election with nearly 49 percent of the vote. With cision. One event that clearly hurt Davis was the voters recalling Gray Davis by a 55 percent to 45 re-imposition of the state’s car tax, which began percent margin, Schwarzenegger was sworn in as his to appear in collections made after August 1. In replacement on November 17. Because the margins 1998, legislation signed by Pete Wilson lowered were so large, the ACLU announced that it would the car tax from an average of $204 per vehicle to not pursue its case against punch card ballot machines $66. A “trigger” mechanism in the law provided any further. Comparing the number of abstentions that the tax would return to its initial level when on the recall question in punch card counties with the state could no longer afford to reimburse local abstentions elsewhere, Henry Brady estimated that governments for the revenue they lost when the the votes of 176,000 people were not counted.25 But car tax was cut. Davis invoked the trigger, effec- since nearly a million more people backed the recall tively raising taxes and helping to plug $4 billion than opposed it, voting technology did not swing the worth of the state’s budget hole.23 election. One of the reasons the margins were so large Public outcry when the car tax returned to its 1998 is that turnout was so high. With 61.2 percent of reg- levels was fierce, and Schwarzenegger made much of istered voters turning out, participation in the recall the issue at the only debate in which he appeared. Held exceeded turnout in recent gubernatorial elections— in Sacramento on September 24, this “superbowl of 50.6 percent in 2002 and 57.6 percent in 1998—but debates” provided the candidates with questions in ad- fell well below California’s 71.0 percent turnout level vance and then allowed them to challenge each other. in the 2000 presidential election. Rather than the scripted show many had expected, The most obvious lesson of the election was that the debate turned into a free-for-all that its moderator Schwarzenegger’s strategy of using nontraditional struggled to control. Post-debate polling showed that media and emphasizing his leadership skills over most voters thought Tom McClintock or policy specifics was staggeringly successful. He had performed best, but Schwarzenegger clearly nearly captured a majority in an election that many “won” the debate by exceeding expectations in his at the outset predicted would be won by a candidate most challenging public appearance. with 20 percent of the vote. Schwarzenegger won by Schwarzenegger’s post-debate momentum carried getting support from 76 percent of registered Repub- him to a comfortable lead in the last public polls con- licans, 46 percent of independent voters, and 23 per- ducted before the election. Arianna Huffington, who cent of Democrats, according to exit polling. He at- had sparred bitterly with Schwarzenegger during the tracted 53 percent of white voters, 45 percent of debate, dropped out on September 30 and urged her Asians, 31 percent of Latinos and 18 percent of Af- supporters to oppose the recall. Her move did not rican-Americans. He performed relatively well in all

The Council of State Governments 313 RECALL subgroups of voters and motivated his key constitu- 4All approval ratings cited come from the Los Angeles ency, Republicans, to go to the polls. He did not, Times poll. 5 however, mobilize a significant group of new “Ter- Figure cited in “GOP Showdown in California,” posted on CBSNews.com, March 4, 2002. minator Voters.” Only an estimated 4 percent of those 6 Turnout dropped from 57.6 percent of registered vot- who turned out were first-time voters. ers in 1998 to 50.6 percent in 2002, according to tallies The lessons of Gray Davis’ defeat in the recall are released by the Secretary of State. Davis won with 47.3 less certain. That a well-funded campaign against his percent of the vote, while Simon garnered 42.4 percent and recall could fail in a primarily Democratic state is minor party candidates took the remaining 10.3 percent. surprising. So too is the level to which his approval 7 Figure taken from the Governor’s Budget May Revi- sank, 25 percent, and the fact that he performed so sion, 2003–04, available online at http://www.dof.ca.gov/ HTML/BUD_DOCS/May_ Revision_2003_www.pdf. poorly in the 2002 election. In that contest, 47.3 per- 8 Statements made by Mark Abernathy at “California’s cent of voters and 81 percent of Democrats supported 2003 Governors Race: The Recall,” a conference hosted Davis; in 2003, 44.6 percent of voters and 75 per- by the University of California, Berkeley, on October 18, cent of Democrats opposed the recall. Seen in this 2003. light, the recall does not represent a sea change in 9 Current recall provisions also reflect the changes made California politics. Instead, it marks the fruition of by Proposition 9, passed in 1974. 10 voter discontent that had grown since the energy cri- Figure reported in Daniel Borenstein and Dogen Hannah, “Recall Process Befuddles Officials,” Contra sis and the state’s downward fiscal turn. The recall Costa Times, July 23, 2003. allowed Davis’ critics to offer up a stronger field of 11 This and other cited dates are taken from the timeline alternatives, and California voters were happy to included in “An Election Like No Other,” a special section choose one. of the Sacramento Bee on October 12, 2003. And what about the circus that this contest was 12 This figure and all other campaign finance informa- supposed to become, with so many candidates on a tion was collected from the California Secretary of State confusing ballot? There’s an old saw in political sci- and reported in Dan Morain and Joel Rubin, “Financially, the Recall Was Business as Usual,” Los Angeles Times, ence called Duverger’s Law. It says that elections of October 10, 2003. the type held in the —races for a single 13 Quotes and figures in the paragraph taken from state- office in which the top vote getter wins outright— ments made by Steve Smith, Sal Russo, and Dave Gilliard will eventually turn into a two-way race. Voters who at “California’s 2003 Governors Race: The Recall,” a con- support candidates or parties that are running in third ference hosted by the University of California, Berkeley, place or lower soon figure out that their votes will on October 18, 2003. 14 be wasted if they stick with their top choice, and stra- This quote and the election rules cited in this paragraph were taken from Daniel Borenstein and Dogen Hannah, tegically switch to whichever frontrunner they like “Recall Process Befuddles Officials,” Contra Costa Times, better. Once the electorate sizes up the race in this July 23, 2003. way, the Peter Camejos and the Tom McClintocks of 15 Gorton said that “I was the most surprised person in the world are doomed. So is a frontrunner who, like America” when Schwarzenegger made his announcement, Cruz Bustamante, thinks that a race that starts with in testimony at “California’s 2003 Governors Race: The seven viable candidates will finish that way. Recall,” a conference hosted by the University of Califor- Bustamante seemed to play to his Democratic base, nia, Berkeley, on October 18, 2003. 16 Gray Davis’ chief advisory, , said that, figuring that 30 percent of the vote would make him “It’s fair to say that Senator Feinstein had more to do with the next governor. Schwarzenegger’s centrist strat- efforts to clear the field than the Governor did,” at egy, while risky at first, eventually paid off and made “California’s 2003 Governors Race: The Recall,” a con- him California’s newest governor. ference hosted by the University of California, Berkeley, on October 18, 2003. Notes 17 Lockyer and Ross made their statements at 1 This figure and all voter registration, voter participa- “California’s 2003 Governors Race: The Recall,” a con- tion, and election return figures cited are taken from offi- ference hosted by the University of California, Berkeley, cial reports posted on the California Secretary of State’s on October 18, 2003. website, www.ss.ca.gov. 18Schwarzenegger’s media consultant and his co-direc- 2 Biographical details and election figures taken from tor on communications, Don Sipple and Sean Walsh, has the 1999–2000 California Political Almanac, 6th Edition, served Wilson in similar positions. edited by A.G. Block and Claudia Buck, Sacramento, CA: 19 Quoted in James Steingold, “Celebrity Status Gave State Net, 1999. Schwarzenegger Options,” San Francisco Chronicle, Mon- 3Quoted in Dan Smith, “Schwarzenegger Tells How He’d day, October 13, 2003. A study released on October 13, Clean Up Capitol,” Sacramento Bee, September 19, 2003. 2003 by the UC Berkeley/Stanford Policy Analysis for

314 The Book of the States 2004 RECALL

California Education unit found that Schwarzenegger also edges ‘Offensive’ Behavior, Apologizes,” , received by far the most coverage from the traditional po- October 2, 2003. litical media. 25 Estimate and ACLU position taken from Bob Egelko, 20 A summary of Proposition 34 and Bustamante’s ac- “176,000 bad punch-card ballots, ACLU Says,” San Fran- tions can be found on the excellent recall website provided cisco Chronicle, October 9, 2003. by the UC Berkeley Institute of Politics, at www.igs. berkeley.edu. About the Author 21 Statement taken from page 18 of the Court’s Septem- Thad Kousser is an assistant professor of political sci- ber 15 opinion, D.C. No. CV-03-05715-SVW. 22 Statement taken from page 10 of the Court’s Septem- ence at the University of California, San Diego, and has ber 23 opinion, D.C. No. CV-03-05715-SVW. worked as an aide in the California Legislature and in Con- 23 Details of the “vehicle license fee: taken from a page gress. His book, Term Limits and the Dismantling of Leg- devoted to the issue on www.igs.berkeley.edu. islative Professionalism, is forthcoming from Cambridge 24 Quoted in Erica Werner, “Schwarzenegger Acknowl- University Press.

The Council of State Governments 315