General Operators for PDF, Common to All Language Levels
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
RECALL The California Governor’s Recall By Thad Kousser California’s recall election gave voice to voter dissatisfaction with the state’s direction and resulted in a return to the type of moderate Republican governor that had led the state throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s. While exciting, it does not represent a sea change in California politics. After providing the nation with a summer’s worth tive session to pass a package of education reforms. of amusement, California’s recall—which was at Quickly, however, his relationship with his natural once a bold new use of an old Progressive institu- allies soured. When Davis felt that the Democrati- tion, democracy taken to its logical extreme, and the cally-controlled Legislature was being insufficiently greatest show on earth—turned into a fairly typical cooperative, he famously announced that the houses two-candidate race for control of the state. The ma- were there “to implement my vision.”3 Cruz jor issues became the incumbent’s performance and Bustamante, the independently-elected Democratic personality, set against the promises of an unproven lieutenant governor, held a press conference on the but talented outsider to return California to great- capitol steps criticizing Davis for his stance on an ness. Just as polls had predicted for months, Demo- immigrant rights lawsuit, and promptly saw his staff cratic Gov. Gray Davis was recalled by a fairly nar- lose their parking permits. row margin in a vote that split mostly along party Such actions had repercussions for Davis when he lines. He was replaced by Republican Arnold ran into his own difficulties. The first obstacle was Schwarzenegger, who performed better than pundit the state’s energy crisis, brought by the delayed predictions and nearly captured a majority of the vote implementation of a bill proposed by Republican in a 135-candidate field. Gov. Pete Wilson and passed by Democrats in a Leg- What sent Davis, whose fellow Democrats hold islature that Davis had long since left. Though this an eight percentage point edge in party registration1 was not a problem of his own making, Davis was and control all seven other statewide political offices, slow to react and publicly criticized by legislators into the record books as only the second American who would not simply do his bidding. The plan Davis governor ever to be recalled? Clearly, the public’s eventually proposed avoided catastrophe, but cost the poor review of his record in five years leading Cali- state billions in long-term energy contracts and drove fornia had much to do with his downfall. his job approval ratings from 56 percent to 43 per- A Stanford-educated lawyer and Vietnam War vet- cent in the first half of 2001.4 Shortly afterward, eran, Davis spent most of his political career trying Davis’ prodigious fundraising activities drew scru- to find his way into the governor’s office. After serv- tiny from the public and from legislators. In particu- ing as Gov. Jerry Brown’s chief of staff, Davis won lar, his acceptance of a $25,000 donation from the a Los Angeles-area state Assembly seat in 1982. software company Oracle just after it secured a large Though he did not break into Speaker Willie Brown’s state contract brought an investigation by the Joint powerful inner circle, Davis held his seat until 1986, Legislative Audit Committee. when he moved up the ladder to be elected the state’s As Davis’ 2002 reelection neared, California’s fis- controller, and then, in 1994, its lieutenant governor. cal situation—like that of nearly every state—looked Davis came from behind in a primary against two worse and worse. For a state that relies heavily on self-funded candidates to become the Democratic income taxes, the decline in revenues coming from nominee for governor in 1998. Davis swept to an stock options that “dot bombed” was disastrous. Be- impressive 58 percent to 38 percent victory over At- cause Davis and the Legislature had committed to torney General Dan Lungren. He succeeded by bal- expansions in primary education and health care ancing his pro-choice, environmentalist, and pro-gun spending during boom years, the bust opened up a control stances with an aggressive emphasis on his large deficit hole. By the November general elec- tough-on-crime credentials.2 tion, Davis’ approval had dropped to 39 percent de- Gray Davis’ tenure began well enough, with a hon- spite his attempts to downplay the state’s fiscal prob- eymoon period in which he called a special legisla- lems. Yet Davis was able to survive because of a strat- The Council of State Governments 307 RECALL Table A: Final Campaign Contribution Totals: $80 Million for a 77-Day Contest Candidate Money raised in each fund Contribution totals Gray Davis $2.37 million, Taxpayers Against the Governor’s Recall $16.97 million $14.6 million, Californians Against the Costly Recall of the Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger $18.5 million, Candidacy Fund $21.9 million $3.4 million, Pro-recall Fund Cruz Bustamante $5.7 million, Candidacy Fund $12.4 million $5.54 million, Anti-Prop. 54 Fund $525,773, Anti-recall Fund $667,703, Old Campaign Fund Peter V. Ueberroth $3.95 million Tom McClintock $1.67 million Arianna Huffington $812,560 Bill Simon Jr. $588,309 Independent expenditures $10.1 million by casino-owning tribes $24.1 million $10 million by organized labor $4 million combined by Democratic and Republican Parties Overal l Contributions $82.4 million Source: Data collected from the California secretary of state and reported in Dan Morain and Joel Rubin, “Financially, the Recall Was Business as Usual,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 2003. egy that he and his canny advisors had pursued in Article II, Section 13 of the constitution defines the the state’s March primary: picking a weak opponent. recall simply as “the power of the electors to remove By spending $10 million of his war chest on adver- an elective officer,” giving no specifics about the tisements attacking Richard Riordan,5 the moderate conditions in which it should be used. An offense former mayor of Los Angeles, Davis was able to help warranting recall in California need not be a high conservative businessman Bill Simon defeat Riordan crime or misdemeanor. Instead, it is whatever a num- for the Republican nomination. Davis narrowly beat ber equal to 12 percent of the voters in the last gu- Simon in a general election marked by low turnout bernatorial election willing to sign a petition say it and much support for minor party candidates.6 He is. After the November, 2002 election, this figure was then turned his attention to the budget deficit, which 986,874,10 which became the goal for Abernathy, by May, 2003 grew to $38.2 billion.7 Costa, and the other conservative and Republican Party activists who joined them. Putting the Recall on the Ballot Although Davis’ approval rating continued to slide While Davis and his team congratulated each other down to 25 percent by March 2003, collecting this on a close victory, Republican strategists quietly dis- many signatures was a daunting task. After all, re- cussed the option of a recall. Mark Abernathy, who call petitions have been circulated for every Califor- would later run DavisRecall.com, began discussing nia governor in recent memory, but none in state his- the idea with anti-tax activist Ted Costa on Novem- tory had garnered sufficient support to qualify for ber 17, 2002. Convinced that Davis could be defeated the ballot. The key to getting an initiative or a recall if voters had a better option, Abernathy had an Arnold on California’s ballot, at least over the past two de- Schwarzenegger candidacy in mind “from day one.”8 cades, is money. Recall activists drew much atten- California’s recall provision places the question of tion in the spring of 2003 with their public campaign, whether to remove a governor on the same ballot as launched February 5, but it was initially unable to the election of a replacement. Added to the state’s attract significant organizational support or resources. constitution in 1911,9 the recall was part of Gov. Although outgoing Republican Party Chair Shawn Hiram Johnson’s triumvirate of Progressive institu- Steel backed the recall, real party powering Califor- tions—the initiative, the referendum and the recall. nia resides in legislative leaders. The Senate and 308 The Book of the States 2004 RECALL Figure A: Support for Recall Polarized Along Party Lines Republican support for recall (%) Overall support for recall (%) Democratic support for recall (%) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 3/3/2003 4/6/2003 6/1/2003 7/2/2003 9/7/2003 7/13/2003 8/13/2003 8/17/2003 8/21/2003 9/10/2003 9/17/2003 9/29/2003 10/1/2003 10/4/2003 10/7/2003 Source: Data collected from pre- and post-election opinion polls by Gary C. Jacobson, University of California, San Diego. Assembly Minority Leaders, Jim Brulte and Dave a mere plurality of the vote, and anyone who casts a Cox, were initially cool to the idea. So were national ballot can participate in this contest, regardless of party leaders. According to “Rescue California” whether they voted for or against the recall. A rela- leader David Gilliard, “there was no interest, zero, tively new member of Congress who had not per- coming out of the White House.” The recall move- formed well in his first statewide run, Issa saw an ment had the support of activists and a vulnerable opportunity to lead an anti-incumbent revolt and be target, it had few potent backers and little money.