Select Committee on a National Integrity Commission Submission 33
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Table of Contents TERMS OF REFERENCE ............................................................................................................................ 3 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................................. 4 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 5 BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................................... 6 A Serious Crime Necessitating Jail Time ............................................................................................. 7 Neither the time nor place for wilful blindness .................................................................................. 8 The Importance of Hope ..................................................................................................................... 9 A Perpetual Central Blockage Point .................................................................................................. 10 Waiting for Australia's Watergate .................................................................................................... 11 The Price of Democracy .................................................................................................................... 12 Respect for the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers ..................................................................... 14 NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS ..................................................................................................... 16 An Overarching Legal and Moral Obligation ..................................................................................... 16 The Right to Know vs the Right to Confidentiality/Privacy ............................................................... 19 A Paramount Duty ............................................................................................................................. 20 MISCELLANEOUS CONSEQUENCES ASSOCIATED WITH A NATIONAL INTEGRITY COMMISSION .......... 26 Impact on the Exercise of the Reserve Powers of the Crown ........................................................... 26 An Unavoidable Issue Arising ............................................................................................................ 27 INVESTIGATION INTO FEDERAL JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT/MISBEHAVIOR ............................................. 28 2 TERMS OF REFERENCE The establishment of a national integrity commission, with particular reference to: a. the adequacy of the Australian government's legislative, institutional and policy framework in addressing all facets of institutional, organisational, political and electoral, and individual corruption and misconduct, with reference to: i. the effectiveness of the current federal and state/territory agencies and commissions in preventing, investigating and prosecuting corruption and misconduct, ii. the interrelation between federal and state/territory agencies and commissions, and iii. the nature and extent of coercive powers possessed by the various agencies and commissions, and whether those coercive powers are consistent with fundamental democratic principles; b. whether a federal integrity commission should be established to address institutional, organisational, political and electoral, and individual corruption and misconduct, with reference to: i. the scope of coverage by any national integrity commission, ii. the legislative and regulatory powers required by any national integrity commission to enable effective operation, iii. the advantages and disadvantages associated with domestic and international models of integrity and anti-corruption commissions/agencies, iv. whether any national integrity commission should have broader educational powers, v. the necessity of any privacy and/or secrecy provisions, vi. any budgetary and resourcing considerations, and vii. any reporting accountability considerations; and c. any related matters. COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP: Senator the Hon Jacinta Collins (Chair), Senator Skye Kakoschke (Deputy Chair), Senator Derryn Hinch, Senator Barry O'Sullivan, Senator Dean Smith, and Senator Murray Watt. 3 RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDATION 1: That the Commonwealth Government and Parliament ought not to proceed to establish a national integrity commission (in particular if it mirrors Queensland's) until and unless the Heiner affair has been independently and comprehensively examined in public and resolved by an appropriate lawful tribunal (i.e. pursuant to section 61 of the Constitution of Queensland 2001) so that all the lessons flowing therefrom may become known, and appropriately addressed by fresh legislation and structures if and where shown to be deficient in order that such a saga never occurs again anywhere in the Commonwealth of Autralia in respect of public sector governance and the administration of justice more generally. RECOMMENDATION 2: That in the event a national integrity commission is to be established and oversighted by a bipartisan parliamentary committee, safe and sure reasons must be publicly provided beforehand showing why and where the current system of 'policing' of corruption and official misconduct in public administration has so failed as to warrant this new form of "policing". RECOMMENDATION 3: That in the event a national integrity commission is established and oversighted by a bipartisan parliamentary committee, its membership should be made up from 4 senators drawn from the two major parties (i.e. Liberals and ALP) so that all majority decision outcomes are bipartisan by denial also of a casting vote by the Chair. RECOMMENDATION 4: That in the event the bipartisan parliamentary oversight committee cannot reach a majority decision on a matter, its Chair shall report the deadlock to the assembled Parliament by means of a report to (a) the Senate President who in turn, shall make an urgent report to the Senate; and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives who in turn shall make a report to the assembled House for their respective consideration and remedy. RECOMMENDATION 5: That in the event a national integrity commission being established and oversighted by a bipartisan parliamentary committee, a properly constituted expert tribunal of eminently qualified persons and other interested persons drawn from the general community be established to comprehensively investigate all impacts such a national integrity commission and its requisite obligation on principal officers of units public administration (as in the Governor- General of the Office of the Governor-General) to notify all reasonable suspicions of corruption and/or official misconduct which they may become aware of in the perform of their public duty, in particular the exercise of the reserve powers of the Crown. 4 INTRODUCTION 1. On 8 February 2017 the Australian Senate re-established this important Senate Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity Commission ("SSCENIC"). In doing so, it shines the national light on this very important subject again which, since the dissolving of the initial Select Committee on 6 May 2016 when the federal election was granted by His Excellency, the Governor-General, to the present time, coincides simultaneously with a critical time in the governance of Queensland centring around what might be reasonably said to be a conjoined basic question about the true worth of standing integrity commissions. 2. By taking statutory measures to establish an integrity commission to hold governments to account so as to eradicate corrupt conduct in public office, the question has to be asked and convincingly answered if one cannot trust public officials in a 'normal' police force to carry out their sworn duties (i.e. Australian Federal Police, Queensland Police Service et al), why should anyone assume that a standing integrity commission with coercive powers would be any different, particularly against Lord Acton's prescient 1887 warning that power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely? 3. It logically follows what then is the true value of having a standing integrity commission [i.e. the Crime and Corruption Commission ("CCC")] if it cannot be trusted to always act honestly and impartially? And, for that matter, what guarantee is there that the watchdog's parliamentary oversight committee, along with a parliamentary commissioner, will be any better? Another associated question also arises about whether or not there may be a dark anti-democratic side to this form of specialised 21st century public sector administration policing? 4. The answer to these questions, I submit, continues to surface as never before into broad daylight by Queensland's current emerging governance crisis flowing out of "the Heiner affair".1 5. My 20 April 2016 original interim public submission was not published before the Select Committee was dissolved. I resubmit it now for publication by invitation. I respectfully request that with this 21 April 2017 supplementary submission both are accepted into evidence conjointly and made public without redactions by the SSCENIC. Relevantly, I made these final observations at page 13 in my interim submission: (Quote) "42. It is submitted that if the CCC - the so-called independent watchdog of ethical and lawful conduct in public administration - may knowingly engage in such a fundamental alleged egregious breach of public