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21St Century Reconnaissance by the Ellis Group

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21St Century Reconnaissance by the Ellis Group WEB EDITION (DOCTRINE) 21st Century Reconnaissance Battlefield key component of maneuver warfare by The Ellis Group he ubiquity and availability mean units on the battlefield can be surfaces and gaps and counterrecon- of surveillance assets on the detected in a variety of ways, not just naissance to prevent enemy forces from modern battlefield is unprec- visually. As precision-guided munitions doing the same will not change, but the edented in the history of war- proliferate, units that can be detected means and capabilities required to be Tfare. The “unblinking eye” of satellites will be fired upon. The “battle of the effective will. Indeed, that change has orbiting the globe and observing every signatures” cannot be won simply by already occurred. Maneuver warfare in inch of its surface is available to anyone, mitigating our own emissions—recon- the 21st century demands a modern not just military forces. Aerial surveil- naissance forces must be detectors and concept of reconnaissance and coun- lance systems are available off-the-shelf the MAGTF must actively and passively terreconnaissance operating alongside in department stores. The battlefields of counter both enemy reconnaissance and units tailored to fight and win the battle the 21st century will occur on a global the impact of social media. The ability for information. stage with an audience of billions. De- to detect, analyze, and understand com- spite this quantum leap in the capability plex terrain, especially in urban megaci- Horses and Tanks and presence of surveillance, the need ties and among local populations, will For centuries before and after the for military forces to conduct reconnais- not end with U.S. involvement in Iraq gunpowder revolution, horse cavalry sance and prevent enemy forces from and Afghanistan. Such information will performed two general tasks: 1) recon- doing so will not diminish. In fact, the be vital for Marine commanders in ev- naissance and counterreconnaissance, ability of such forces to interrupt or ery future fight. Reconnaissance forces and 2) direct shock via a charge to deceive enemy surveillance measures are ideally suited to lead the fight for break the enemy line and the exploita- will become even more important. information. tion thereof. Traditionally, the cavalry Simultaneously, advancements in The use of reconnaissance to find arm was simultaneously the eyes of a electronic warfare and cyber warfare and enable the exploitation of enemy general and a striking force. It was not coincidence that the Romans carefully selected their general’s second-in-com- mand, his Master of Horse. Reconnais- sance and counterreconnaissance was of the utmost importance. As gunpowder firearms improved in lethality, however, the ability of cavalry to perform these missions began to decrease. During the Crimean War, the famous “Charge of the Light Brigade” heralded the end of horse cavalry’s effectiveness as a shock force. By World War I, cavalry could not reli- ably perform reconnaissance nor conduct charges. During August 1914, both Ger- man and French cavalry reconnaissance units proved unable to operate in their traditional roles. As the war dragged on, the tank was developed and eventually filled the shock role while aircraft began to fill the reconnaissance role. In some ways, reconnaissance and Do we choose unity of command over information collection? (Photo by LCpl Brianna Gaudi.) counterreconnaissance capabilities Marine Corps Gazette • February 2017 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE1 WEB EDITION (DOCTRINE) vastly improved as aircraft began to fill surveillance could not locate. Hezbol- lection does not provide enough deci- the role. More ground could be covered lah teams use both caves and buildings sive information to drive operations and faster than ever before—and in a much while employing low signature weapons depends wholly on the enemy to make safer manner—as aircraft could avoid systems in order to avoid detection.2 mistakes in protecting their informa- ground units by simply flying higher. To further minimize their signature, tion. The Marine Corps requires both Military forces, however, lost some of teams did not communicate with each a concept and a force tasked with the the detail that cavalrymen were able other; each team leader was charged proactive reconnaissance and counter- to acquire on horseback. The defeat of with fighting the fight as he saw fit reconnaissance fight. enemy reconnaissance units, now that within his assigned area. The IRGC In 2014, just such a concept was they were aircraft, became the business plans to replicate Hezbollah’s success on proposed in the Marine Corps Gazette. of air forces. Motorized and mechanized the Iranian shore of the Persian Gulf. In an article titled “Operate to Know,” reconnaissance units proliferated before This so called “mosaic” defense can- LtCol Drew Cukor, Col Matthew L. and during World War II, but they have not be accurately mapped and analyzed Jones, Capt Kevin Kratzer, and 2ndLt largely remained unchanged while aerial through aerial surveillance alone. To be Sy Poggmeyer proposed a four-point surveillance has changed dramatically. overcome, it will need to be probed by concept designed to ascertain and utilize the MAGTF and forced to react. intelligence to drive operations. The Drones and Satellites article states, Aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, Fighting for Information We effectively ask our most important and satellites are now the dominant In late 1950, Chinese forces streamed expeditionary combat forces to operate means for reconnaissance. As advanced across the border between China and nearly blind, relying primarily on lim- as the technology is, however, ground North Korea straight toward Ameri- ited theater and national surveillance commanders are still bereft of the feel can lines on the peninsula. Despite capabilities to develop a meaningful for the ground provided by a cavalry daily surveillance flights, American picture of the battlespace.5 commander that knows his business. aircraft never spotted the incursion. Aerial surveillance is an excellent, but In late October and early November, Such tools are important but can never insufficient, capability. Chinese forces attacked Republic of in and of themselves unveil the entire Unmanned systems are proliferating Korea and U.S. Army forces in the picture of an operating environment. at a rapid rate; in any future conflict, west and the 1st MarDiv in the east.3 The four aspects of the concept in- they will be in use by our adversaries as Then, the attacks stopped. In late No- tended to alleviate this problem are: 1) well as ourselves. Even non-state actors vember, they attacked again, this time intelligence and operations integration, now possess sophisticated unmanned flowing around American strong points 2) pervasive and persistent surveillance aircraft systems’ capabilities. In October and then attacking from the rear. The and reconnaissance, 3) a continuous op- 2016, Islamic State militants used an initial attacks had located surfaces and erations and intelligence picture, and 4) armed drone to kill two Kurdish fighters gaps in the American positions. integration with the global knowledge and injure two French Special Opera- The Chinese forces, by attacking environment (GKE).6 tions troops in Iraq.1 Unmanned sys- the American forces for a short time, The key is a multifaceted approach tems will increasingly be employed like were fighting for information. The that analyzes both the enemy and a line of skirmisher’s—simultaneously Chinese military was new and had the environment through a variety observing and preventing the enemy never faced Americans before. After of means: aerial and satellite surveil- from observing. Part of reconnaissance the initial phase of fighting, Chinese lance, reconnaissance, interaction with and counterreconnaissance then will leaders wrote a pamphlet about how the the human terrain, the electromagnetic be to punch holes in that line. Marine Americans had reacted and distributed spectrum, signals and human intelli- Corps reconnaissance units will not it to their forces.4 Then they attacked gence, and the GKE. Once the infor- just need the ability to operate against again, this time with a plan designed for mation from those means is analyzed, an enemy on the ground but across all their strengths and American weakness. it then needs to influence the decision domains. By fighting for information and then making of commanders. Currently, Potential adversaries are well aware planning based on that information, the MAGTF has no one unit that can of American over reliance on aerial sur- Chinese forces pushed the U.S. Eighth leverage all of those different means veillance. The Iranian Revolutionary Army all the way back to the 38th par- and then disseminate the knowledge Guard Corps (IRGC), for example, has allel and forced the U.S. X Corps to resulting from the analysis thereof. copied the success of Hezbollah when it trek through the Chosin Reservoir to The MAGTF does, however, have a comes to the camouflage and masking be evacuated by the Navy. variety of means available to conduct of positions. During the 2006 Israeli The First and Second Phase Of- reconnaissance and counterreconnais- offensive into Southern Lebanon, the fensives—as the above attacks were sance. MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Opera- Israeli Defense Force was confronted named—are an excellent example of tions, defines reconnaissance as, with a defense-in-depth of squad-sized how intelligence can, and should, drive A mission undertaken to obtain, by anti-tank and rocket teams that aerial operations. But passive intelligence col- visual observation or other detection WE2 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • February 2017 wars” or counterinsurgency fights, there is a need for effective reconnaissance to map the human and urban terrain and assess insurgent actions. While recon- naissance assets must surely be prepared to fight, their proper role is much less “shoot, move, and communicate” and more “sense, make sense, and commu- nicate.” Such assets are not currently employed and equipped to accomplish the latter.
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