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Playing the Sectarian Card : Identities and Affiliations of Local Communities

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Playing the Sectarian Card : Identities and Affiliations of Local Communities PlayingPlaying thethe SectarianSectarian CCardard IdentitiesIdentities andand AffiliationsAffiliations ofof LocalLocal CommunitiesCommunities inin SyriaSyria Playing the Sectarian Card -IdentitiesandAffiliationsofLocalCommunitiesinSyria Playing theSectarianCard Playing the Sectarian Card Identities and Affiliations of Local Communities in Syria Edited by Friederike Stolleis Imprint Published in 2015 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung P.O.Box 116107 Riad El Solh Beirut 1107 2210, Lebanon Not for sale Ó Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung All rights reserved. No parts of this publication may be printed, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original authors. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Translation: Ali Barazi, Karam Nashar et al. Language editing: Linda Mayes Cover design: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Printing: Dakroub Printing Press s.a.l. TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ....................................................................................................... 6 1. Discourses on Minorities and Sectarianism in Syria Friederike Stolleis ........................................................................................... 7 2. The Alawite Dilemma (Homs 2013) Kheder Khaddour.......................................................................................... 11 3. A Government City‘‘ amid Raging Conflict (Tartous 2013) Kheder Khaddour.......................................................................................... 27 4. A Static Revolution: The Druze Community (Sweida 2013) Mazen Ezzi ................................................................................................ 39 5. Attitudes of Christians in the Syrian Capital (Damascus 2013) Rand Sabbagh ............................................................................................ 71 6. Tension in the Christian Valley (Wadi al-Nasara 2013) Samer Masouh............................................................................................. 90 7. Ismailis: a Minority-Majority in Syria (Salamiya 2014) Abdallah Amin al-Hallaq ................................................................................ 102 About the Authors........................................................................................ 114 5 Preface The current conflict in Syria is often traced back the various religious communities in Syria as a to a revolt by a Sunni ‘‘majority’’ against a ruling counterpoint to that portraying them as unified Alawite ‘‘minority’’ which could count on the sup- blocks supporting the regime. port of other religious ‘‘minorities’’. Another inter- Given the sensitivity of the topic, large-scale opi- pretation invokes a conservative, religious nion polling was impossible. The research population rising up against a secular ruler. While needed to be done on a small scale within a both are crude simplifications of a complex mat- restricted circle of people in order to put neither ter, the core ideas are not completely false. But the interviewees nor the researchers at risk. Some they allude to general tendencies rather than interviews were conducted face-to-face and al- clearly defined population groups fighting each lowed a certain degree of ‘‘participant observa- other. With the uprising in 2011, most Syrians had tion’’ within the respective community. Others to position themselves somehow as being ‘‘with’’ needed to be conducted via Skype and accom- or ‘‘against’’ the regime, ‘‘with’’ or ‘‘against’’ the panied by internet and social media research revolution, with little space between the two cate- because the researcher had been forced to leave gories. These political divisions cut through fa- the country. All names of interviewees are pseu- milies - separating parents and children, siblings donyms. and spouses - and drove stakes between neigh- bours and friends. The different ‘‘minorities’’ - The results are rather personal accounts which such as Alawites, Christians, Druze and Ismailis, describe a certain place at a certain time in the to mention the most important groups - are no Syrian conflict. When scientific research is risky exception to these internal divisions. and situations change quickly, narratives are as fragmented as the country itself. This collection of The aim of the articles in this publication is to articles is representative of a moment in Syrian provide an inside view of how members of differ- history when issues of collective and individual ent religious communities in Syria experienced identity and affiliation are in flux and being rede- the years 2011 to 2014. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stif- fined. The articles may not always meet the cus- tung asked a number of young researchers to tomary standards set for international academic write about their home communities based on research, but they will hopefully inform the discus- interviews with people from various backgrounds. sion on the spread of sectarianism and the situa- The interviewees did not have to be experts on tion of local communities in Syria by contributing politics or history; the spotlight was on their perso- first-hand accounts and analysis from the ground. nal views on and interpretations of current devel- opments. The guidelines for questioning This publication would not exist without the con- included: What were the main changes that the tinous support of numerous people. I thank them interviewees witnessed taking place around them for their suggestions of authors, follow-up through and how do they interpret them? What are their the writing process as well as their contributions hopes and their fears concerning the future of to translation and editing of the texts. Not all wish their community? To which conclusions do they to be named here, but they know who they are. come, and what makes them be ‘‘with’’ or ‘‘against’’ what is going on? In short, the aim of Friederike Stolleis the articles was to portray a more subtle, differ- Berlin, December 2015 entiated picture of the current situation of some of 6 1. Discourses on tities are never absolute categories. They often form as a result of a mixture of recollections of Sectarianism and certain founding myths and crucial historical events and, in no less measure, the current poli- ‘‘Minorities’’ in Syria tical and economic situation. Sectarian identities Friederike Stolleis have the flexibility to adapt to changing circum- stances, very often in a local, not national context. They also leave room for individual choices, Syria is undergoing profound changes: some of meaning that the degree to which someone iden- its borders have become irrelevant, new power tifies him or herself as belonging to a certain relations have developed, interstate and transna- religious groups may vary considerably from per- tional conflicts now overlap. Social, economic son to person and change according to the in- and political order and stability have collapsed, dividual context. bringing down with them the framework that for- merly enabled the state to maintain - some say To reduce the war in Syria to a "sectarian conflict", enforce - the coexistence of its diverse population an uprising of a ‘‘majority’’ against ‘‘minority rule’’ groups. Consequently, identities and affiliations of or even to a war about the "true interpretation of local communities are today assuming an unpre- religion" is misleading and ignores the complexity cedented importance. While concepts of ethnicity of other, much more decisive factors in this con- in Syria are a highly relevant topic (the role of flict. But at the same time, to ignore the power of Syrian Kurds, to name the most prominent exam- sectarian identity, as has been done by many ple) as well as questions of national identities Syrian activists and observers, especially at the (such as the Palestinians) this publication fo- beginning of the conflict, would be naı¨ve and cusses on religious - or sectarian - communities. portray only part of the picture either. Membership of a religious community in Syria is usually determined by birth. Precise statistic data Talking about identity in Syria before on the demographic share of the different groups 2011 is unavailable, and estimations vary: Members of the Sunni community represent the ‘‘majority’’ (64- Topics such as sectarian identity or the relations 74%),(1) followed by the two larger ‘‘minority’’ between the various communities have not been groups, Alawites (11-18%) and Christians (10- openly discussed in Syria for a long time. Never- 12%). Smaller, but politically relevant ‘‘minorities’’ theless, they have conventionally been a subject are Druze (3-5%) and Ismailis (1%).(2) Other small of private conversation and often represented ‘‘minorities’’ are Shiites, Yezidis as well as very important information on occasions when a situa- few Jews remaining in Damascus and Aleppo. tion had to be judged, a person or group needed to be understood, or professional and personal Statistics of this kind may provide a broad orienta- opportunities and constraints needed to be as- tion, but are of limited use to understand the sessed. But although sectarianism seemed not to reality of multi-religious societies. Sectarian iden- exist - often in a very agreeable way - in many situations, it was often an underlying theme and (1) Not all Sunnis are Arabs. Most of the Kurds, who are rarely completely absent. estimated to make up 9% of the population are
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