Regulating Storage Overhead in Existing PoW-based Blockchains Frederik Armknecht Jens-Matthias Bohli* University of Mannheim Mannheim University of Applied Sciences Germany Germany
[email protected] [email protected] Ghassan O. Karame Wenting Li NEC Laboratories Europe NEC Laboratories Europe Germany Germany
[email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT so far. This resulted in a sharp variance in the number of Proof of Work (PoW) blockchains regulate the frequency and blockchain replicas over time. Namely, during the early years security of extensions to the blockchain in a decentralized of PoW blockchains, every miner was also a \full-node" and manner by adjusting the difficulty in the network. However, stored a full copy of the blockchain. As a result, the blockchain analogous decentralized measures to regulate the replica- witnessed an unprecedented level of replication (>200,000 tion level of the associated transactions and blocks data are replica) until early 2014 [14, 15]. Nowadays, the current completely missing so far. We argue that such measures are difficulty level of PoW mining is prohibitively high enough required as well. On the one hand, the smaller the number that miners do not have incentives to operate solo. Instead, of replicas, the higher the vulnerability of the system against joining a mining pool emerges as an attractive option for compromises and DoS-attacks. On the other hand, the larger miners to receive a portion of the block reward on a consistent the number of replicas, the higher the storage overhead, and basis. Here, workers do not connect directly to the blockchain; the higher the operational blockchain cost are.