UNIVERSITY*OF*CALIFORNIA* Los*Angeles
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
UNIVERSITY*OF*CALIFORNIA* Los*Angeles* * * * * * Construction*Through*Conflict:* Computational*Models*of*State*Formation*and*National*Identity* * * * * * * A*dissertation*submitted*in*partial*satisfaction*of*the*requirements*for*the*degree** Doctor*of*Philosophy*in*Political*Science* * by* * Stephen*Palley* * 2015* * * * ABSTRACT!OF!THE!DISSERTATION! ! Construction!Through!Conflict:! Computational!Models!of!State!Formation!and!National!Identity! by! Stephen!Palley! Doctor!of!Philosophy!in!Political!Science! University!of!California,!Los!Angeles,!2015! Professor!Susanne!Lohmann,!Chair! ! The surface of the Earth is divided into over 200 internationally recognized states, but only a fraction of these are what could be called nation-states—that is, states whose people generally agree that they are members of the same national group first and foremost, and therefore consider themselves related to one another on an ideological level. What binds people from different backgrounds into a cohesive nation that is capable of effective collective action? In this dissertation, I develop two computational models—the Territorial Resources Model and the Ideological Alliances Model—and use them to test conflict-based theories of nation-state formation. I find these models generate complex patterns of national consolidation similar to the historical record in both the ancient and early Modern eras, suggesting that intergroup conflict is a good candidate explanation for variance in modern state formation outcomes. ! ii! The dissertation of Stephen Palley is approved. Robert Trager William W. McKelvey Arthur A. Stein Susanne Lohmann, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2015 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! iii! ! ! ! ! ! TABLE!OF!CONTENTS! Chapter 1: Introduction....................................................................................................................1! ! Chapter 2: Literature and Historical Review.................................................................................10 Chapter 3: Modeling Physical Conflict's Effects on Group Formation........................................ 28 Chapter 4: Modeling Political Conflict's Effects on National Identity......................................... 47 ! Chapter 5: Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 64 Appendix A: Territorial Resources Model (TRM) Technical Description .................................. 73 Appendix B: Ideological Alliances Model (IAM) Technical Description ................................... 80 Appendix C: Additional Territorial Resources Model (TRM) Results ........................................ 87 ! Appendix D: Additional Ideological Alliances Model (IAM) Results......................................... 88 ! Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 89 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! iv! ! ! ! ! ! ! LIST!OF!TABLES! Table 3.1: TRM Experiment Treatment Variables........................................................................36 Table 3.2: TRM Model Response Variable Summary Statistics...................................................36 Table 3.3: TRM Experiment OLS Results .................................................................................. 37 Table 3.4: TRM OLS Results: Mechanisms .................................................................................40 Table 4.1: IAM Experiment Treatment Variables........................................................................ 56 Table 4.2: IAM Experiment Logit Results ................................................................................... 56 Table C.1: TRM OLS Results: Average Starting Wealth of Tribes After 100 Model Cycles ..... 87 Table D.1: IAM OLS Results: Average Wealth in System.......................................................... 88 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! v! ! ! ! ! ! ! LIST!OF!FIGURES! Figure 3.1: Effects of Territorial Resource Distribution on Average Number of States After 100 Model Steps ...................................................................................................................................39 Figure 3.2: Effects of Territorial Resource Distribution on Average Number of States Over 100 Model Steps ...................................................................................................................................41 Figure 3.3: Average Percentage of Hillfolk in System Over 100 Model Steps by Std. Dev. Resources and Initial Population Density......................................................................................42 Figure 3.4: Average Number of Hillfolk-on-Hillfolk Kills Over 25 Model Steps by Std. Dev. Resources and Initial Population Density .....................................................................................43 Figure 3.5: Probability of Hillfolk Hegemon Over 100 Model Steps By Std. Dev. Resources and Initial Population Density............................................................................................................. 44 Figure 3.6: Hegemon Size After 100 Model Steps By Percent Hillfolk and Hillfolk Hegemon . 44 Figure 4.1: IAM System Outcomes.............................................................................................. 59 Figure 4.2: IAM System Consolidation........................................................................................ 61! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! vi! ! STEPHEN!PALLEY!CURRICULUM!VITAE! EDUCATION University of Chicago, Committee on International Relations MA with Honors, 2008 Specializations: Security studies, nuclear strategy, qual. methods Thesis (Honors): U.S. Extended Deterrence as a Non-Proliferation Tool Advisor: Charles Glaser Dartmouth College, BA Magna Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa, 2003 Major: History Specializations: 20th century history, military history PUBLICATIONS AND WORK IN PROGRESS “Food Insecurity’s Effect on Protest in Africa, 1990-2010.” “Food Insecurity’s Effect on Leadership Turnover in Africa, 1990-2010.” INVITED AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS April 2012 APSA, Chicago; October 2011 ISA, University of California Irvine. “Food Insecurity’s Effect on Protest in Africa, 1990-2010.” HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS 2012 “Food Insecurity’s Effect on Protest in Africa, 1990-2010” nominated for UCLA Political Science Dept.’s Swarr Prize for Outstanding Graduate Publication 2011 Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS), Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Summer Fellow “Revisiting the Pacific War” nominated for UCLA Political Science Dept.’s Swarr Prize for Outstanding Graduate Publication 2009 Edwin W. Pauley Fellow, UCLA (until 2014) ! ! vii! 1. Introduction As of 2013, the surface of the Earth is divided into over 200 internationally recognized states, practically all of which enjoy representation at the United Nations, have embassies in Washington D.C., and possess many other symbolic trappings of statehood. However, despite a large degree of institutional isomorphism on the international level, the facts on the ground inside each of these states vary wildly. Only a fraction are what could be called nation-states— that is, states whose people generally agree that they are members of the same national group first and foremost, and therefore consider themselves related to one another on an ideological level. It is probably not coincidental that most of these countries are in the developed world, which raises additional questions about the relationship of national identity to economic and political development. The development of a fundamental political identity shared between the individuals dwelling within a set of borders is critically important to the process of state formation. The job has gotten far more difficult in modern times, where the identities of individual people can span a very large number of characteristics, such as ethnicity, culture, geographic origin, religion, language, gender, sexuality, class, tribe, occupation and education, to name but a few possibilities. Thus a central challenge of modern state formation is to reduce the political salience of all of these attributes in favor of nationality. When this job is done well, the state's borders align with national identity in the form of the modern nation-state, and most citizens willingly subordinate their many preexisting and competing loyalties to the greater national good. This in turn facilitates many vital forms of ! 1! cooperation, such as compliance with national law, timely payment of taxes, and voluntary service in a national military. In the best cases, those citizens are then able to justify the compromise by peacefully expressing the other facets of their identity while protected under the rule of law. Tensions over those sub-identities never completely disappear, of course—and they may grow quite heated on occasion—but they are generally confined to the realm of democratic identity politics, where the combatants whip votes and exert media pressure instead of shedding blood. By contrast, states where people do not share a national identity tend to have difficulties with collective action. In some developing countries, an incomplete nationalism is combined with incomplete formation of critical state institutions like central governance and the rule of law. These unlucky states can go on to suffer from many serious developmental pathologies, including pogroms, riots, terrorism, warlordism, civil war, and other forms of political