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Border Fixity: When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors by Boaz Atzili B.A.,International Relations The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1997 Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Ph.D. in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology September 2006 © 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved Signature of AAuthoruthor ............ •............................................................ ... .. ... .. Department of Political Science / August 12, 2006 19f/ Certified by......... ................. ........................ S ephen. W...Van . E.vea Stephen W. Van Evera Professor of Political Science Thesis Supervisor Accepted by......................... ................................................ Roger Petersen MSSAM Associate Protessor of Political Science OF TECHNOLOGY Chairman, Committee for Graduate Students CSE nn 2006 ARCHV LIBRARIESLIBRARIESL Border Fixity When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors by Boaz Atzili Submitted to the Department of Political Science on August, 12, 2006 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Ph.D. in Political Science ABSTRACT Since the end of the Second World War, a norm of "border fixity" - a proscription of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory - has become prevalent in world politics. Such practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Has the international norm of border fixity made international conflict less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues have been among the major causes of war, many observers might assume that the norm of "border fixity" has made war less common. This dissertation argues that the opposite conclusion is true as far as socio-politically weak states - states that do not possess a reasonable level of legitimate and effective governmental institutions - are involved. In a world in which it is illegitimate to change international borders by force, and in which socio-politically weak states are widespread, international conflict and instability may actually be more common. The border fixity norm, moreover, perpetuates and exacerbates the weakness of already weak states thus making a significant decrease in conflicts unlikely. This dissertation examines the question of the effects of the international norm of border fixity by studying and comparing four cases. Two cases are taken from the era prior to the establishment of the border fixity norm: Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640 to 1740, and Argentina from 1810 to 1880. Two cases are taken from a world in which the norm of border fixity is present: Lebanon from 1943 to 2005, and Congo from 1960 to 2005. Despite some variations, the case studies and the comparison between them largely confirm the argument stated above: Border fixity perpetuates state weakness and, in regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, good fences often create bad neighbors. Thesis Supervisor: Stephen W. Van Evera Title: Professor of Political Science Acknowledgments Dissertation writing is not an individual project. Although only one person receives the degree at the end, the project is very much one of a community. Many people loaned me their shoulders and their pens along this long and winding road. Their support was invaluable and I owe them a great deal. First, I would like to thank my dissertation committee. Steve Van Evera has been a true mentor to me. Steve's critical eye and persistent support enabled me to reach this point. Ken Oye was the one who often saved me from drowning in the details and, time and again, insisted that I see the big picture and the relation of my arguments to even broader themes of world politics. Roger Peterson was my connection to comparative politics. His insights always made my thinking clearer and my arguments stronger. Apart from my committee, many of my teachers throughout my university education provided ample knowledge, advice and great scholarly role models. I would like to thank my B.A. and M.A. Hebrew University mentors, in particular Emanuel Adler, Arie Kacowictz and Benny Miller. At MIT, in addition to those mentioned above, Kanchan Chandra, Thomas Christensen, and Barry Posen also greatly contributed to my understanding of international relations, security studies, and comparative politics. Along the way, many colleagues, some of them faculty and others scholars I met in various situations, have read parts of the dissertation, either as chapters or as papers in various forms, and were kind enough to give me their constructive comments. Some of these are from MIT: Suzanne Berger, Kanchan Chandra, Thom Christensen, Nazli Choucri, Taylor Fravel, Chap Lawson and Richard Locke. Scholars from other institutions contributed comments as well: Ericka Albaugh, Naomi Chazan, Ram Erez, Tanisha Fazal, Yoav Gortzak, Peter Hall, Arie Kacowictz, Sean Lynn-Jones, Galia Press-Barnathan, and Jacqueline Whitt. I also have received many helpful comments in conference panels of the American Political Science Association (APSA), the International Studies Association (ISA) and the "New faces in Security Studies" conference of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS). To all of them my gratitude is extended. Ultimately, however, it was my fellow graduate students who provided the most helpful, consistent and thoughtful assistance. The two colleagues to which I owe the most were part of our small "dissertation-supporting group," and had to put up with many drafts, versions, and long hours of debate. Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch and Pat Boyd have provided unfailing support and helped me through the emotional and academic travails of the researching and writing process. Many other colleagues were of help in various forms and on various occasions. Among them are David Art, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Rachel Gisselquist, Wenkai He, Sarah Lischer, Reo Matsuzaki, John Payne, Jessica Piombo, Jeremy Pressman, Scott Radnitz, Robert Reardon, and Neil Ruiz. Thank you! The Political Science department personnel at MIT were always helpful and caring. In particular, I would like to thank the three graduate administrators who occupied that office while I have been through the graduate school: Santina Tonelli, Susan Twarog and Monica Wolf. I would also like to thank Pamela Siska for editing and proofreading the dissertation. MIT's Center for International Studies provided institutional support and generous funding and for that the center deserves many thanks. Last, but certainly not least, is my dear family. My parents, Avraham and Eti Atzili, have always believed in me (even, one must admit, when I did not earn it), and have always been loving and supporting. My kids, Carmel and Tomer, are an endless source of joy and inspiration. They have provided me with the right perspective on the really important things in life. Lastly, my wife, Orit, followed my choices to a foreign country and had to go through much hardship, and to head our household, both financially and educationally, throughout my grad school years. Yet, she has always remained supportive and loving. And for that, as well as many other things, I love her. Table of Content Abstract 3 Acknowledgments 4 List of Tables 8 List of Figures 8 Introduction 9 Chapter 1: Perceptions of Borders 17 A. Territories and Borders 17 B. The international norm of Border Fixity 25 Chapter 2: Weak States and Norms of Borders 45 A. The Socio-Political Strength of States 45 B. International Conflict and State Building in a Flexible Borders' World 48 C. State Weakness and International Conflict in a Border Fixity World 59 Chapter 3: Weak States: Preconditions to State Building 77 A. Economic Conditions 77 B. Legacies of Colonialism: Arbitrary Borders 81 C. Legacies of Colonialism: Administrative Capacity 86 D. Population Density 91 E. Conclusions: No Prior Advantage 94 Chapter 4: Brandenburg-Prussia, 1640-1740 96 A. Brandenburg-Prussia in the Mid 17 th Century: Weakness Across the Board 97 B. Territorial Pressures in a Flexible Borders' World: 17 th and 18 th Centuries Europe 100 C. Territorial Pressure and State Building 108 D. Brandenburg-Prussia: Summary 124 Chapter 5: Argentina, 1810-1880 125 A. Buenos Aires and Rio de la Plata in 1810: A City Aspires to be a State 125 B. Territorial Pressures in 19th Century South America 131 C. Territorial Pressures and State Building 141 D. Argentina: Summary 159 Chapter 6: Congo, 1960-2005 162 A. Congo 1960: Elements of Weakness and Potentials of Strength 162 B. Border Fixity and the Absence of Territorial Pressures in Congo 165 C. Border Fixity and the Perpetuation of State Weakness 168 D. State Weakness, Civil Conflict, and Conflict Spillover in Congo 180 E. Congo: Summary 198 Chapter 7: Lebanon, 1943-2005 200 A. Lebanon 1943: Elements of Weakness and Potentials of Strength 201 B. Border Fixity and the Absence of Territorial Pressures in Lebanon 209 C. Border Fixity and the Perpetuation of State Weakness 213 D. State Weakness, Civil Strife, and Conflict Spillover in Lebanon 229 E. Lebanon: Summary 251 Chapter 8: Conclusions 253 A. Comparing the Cases: Norms of Borders and Territorial pressures 253 B. Comparing the Cases: Border Fixity and State Building 256 C. Comparing the Cases: Border Fixity, State Weakness and International Conflict 267 D. Summary and Discussion 272 E. Theoretical Implications 279 F. Policy Implications 281 G. Recommendations for Future Studies 283 Bibliography 286 List of Tables Table 1: Case Studies 11 Table 2: Conquest and Annexation of Homeland Territory,