Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Safety_of Blood Products in New Zealand
Wellington
December 1992
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Department of Health TETARI ORA Mr. J. C. Lovelace Director-General of Health Department of Health Wellington
Dear Mr. Lovelace,
In accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Inquiry into matters relating to the safety of blood products in New Zealand, we have the honour to present our report.
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Dr Sue Morey Hon. Stan Rodger Member of the Inquiry Member of the Inquiry
WELLINGTON 15 December 1992 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO MATTERS RELATING TO THE SAFETY OF BLOOD PRODUCTS IN NEW ZEALAND
1 Issue which led to the Inquiry On 17 November, an article in the "Dominion" newspaper raised concern about the continued supply, after HCV screening was introduced in July 1992, of the blood product Factor IX (Prothrombinex) which was manufactured from blood unscreened for Hepatitis C, resulting in potential risk of Hepatitis C infection for haemophiliacs using Factor IX.
2 Establishment of Inquiry and Tennis of Reference The Director-General by letter dated 23 November 1992 appointed the Inquiry under Section 7 of the Health Act 1956 and Section 90 of the Area Health Boards Act 1983. Dr Sue Morey, Chief Medical Officer, New South Wales Department of Health, Australia and the Honourable Stanley Joseph Rodger, retired Member of Parliament and former Minister of the Crown, were charged as follows:
"Now pursuant to section 7 of the Health Act 1956 and section 90 of the Area Health Boards Act 1983 you are appointed and requested to do the following:
1 To determine the circumstances surrounding the continued supply after 1 July 1992 of a blood product which potentially exposed the users of that product to the risk of infection with Hepatitis C; and
2 To investigate what are the responsibilities and functions of the Office of the Minister of Health, the Department of Health, the Blood Transfusion Advisory Committee and the Regional Blood Transfusion Services and how those functions and responsibilities inter- relate in respect of: 2.1 The provision of policy advice to the Minister of Health regarding the risk of infection with Hepatitis C resulting from receipt of fractionated blood products; and 2.2 The facilitation of the efficient and effective and safe acquisition and distribution of fractionated blood products in New Zealand.
3 Report to the Director-General of Health on the results of your inquiry making recommendations as appropriate regarding: 3.1 Any changes to processes for the preparation and submission to the Minister of Health of policy advice relating to blood and blood products; and 3.2 Any changes to the responsibilities and functions between the office of the Minister of Health, the Department of Health, the Blood Transfusion Advisory Committee and the Regional Blood Transfusion Service and their inter-relationships that are necessary to facilitate the acquisition and distribution of blood and blood products in an efficient and effective and safe way (bearing in mind the Government s proposals for the reorganisation of the Blood Transfusion Service). 3 Procedure Adopted b y the Inquiry
3.1 The Inquiry reviewed the functions and responsibilities of the Office of the Minister of Health, the Department of Health (including changes arising from departmental restructuring), the Blood Transfusion Advisory Committee and the Regional Blood Transfusion Services. The roles and inter-related responsibilities of the Communicable Disease Control Advisory Committee and the Medicines Adverse Reactions Committee were also considered.
3.2 The Inquiry examined departmental files for all relevant correspondence, background papers and briefing papers to Ministers, the Minutes of the relevant advisory committees and interviewed departmental and ministerial office staff, in order to establish a chronology of events.
3.3 A number of interviews were held and submissions were received from a variety of organisations and individuals.
4 General Observations
Funding for screening of donated blood for Hepatitis C was provided from 1 July 1992. As a result of timing of approval and time required for the tendering process and implementation, screening of blood for Hepatitis C was not in place throughout the country until 27 July 1992.
Because the time difference between plasma collection and product return for Factors VIII and IX is up to nine months, from 1 July until 30 November 1992, blood products supplied for clinical use in patients with haemophilia continued to be that made from blood unscreened for Hepatitis C. In the case of patients with Haemophilia A, as the products had been subjected to high heat treatment (80°C), any Hepatitis C virus in the plasma used to make the product would have been inactivated. However, for patients with Haemophilia B (Factor IX deficiency) there was no - readily available product which could guarantee absence of potential exposure to the Hepatitis C virus.
Neither the Minister of Health nor senior officers of the Department of Health had been specifically alerted to the fact that, despite introduction of screening of blood donations, there was a small group of patients, ie those with Factor IX deficiency, who had not been previously infected with Hepatitis C (a total of between 10 and 15 patients) who were potentially exposed to the virus if they received Factor IX. This is clearly a small subsection of a very vulnerable group of patients, already carrying a significant burden of illness, and they warrant special attention.
Even if they had been specifically alerted to the fact that blood products derived from blood unscreened for Hepatitis C were still in use, no clearly defined and completely satisfactory alternative was available. High heat treated Factor IX (Prothrombinex H-T, PTX H-T) has not been available to either Australian or New Zealand patients because it is a new product which has not yet been approved by the Australian Drug Evaluation Committee, and there is a prohibition on the export of products which are not licensed. (This unlicensed product was however made available to New Zealand on 30 November 1992 at the request of the New Zealand Department of Health).
While the letter of 31 July 1992 to the Minister of Health written by Dr E W Berry on behalf of the Medical Advisory Panel of the New Zealand Haemophilia Society referred to the potential
2 problem for Factor IX deficient haemophiliacs associated with the lack of PTX-HT, the primary purpose of the letter was to request funding to import products from overseas. The Minister s reply of 4 September 1992 referred to the fact that Area Health Boards have the responsibility to provide services for the health needs of the people of their region. While any Area Health Board has the ability to buy commercial products which have been high heat treated (or equivalent new products) from overseas, the fact that these products are derived from unknown plasma which may contain unrecognised viruses is a cause for concern in scientific communities.
There is no doubt that much of the media attention to this issue has been inaccurate and misleading and has led to unnecessary anxiety for the New Zealand public.
Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding events subsequent to 1 July 1992 can only be placed in perspective by acknowledging that there has been widespread community concern and debate regarding testing of donated blood for Hepatitis C in New Zealand since early 1990.
The Blood Transfusion Advisory Committee advised the Department of Health in June 1990 and the Communicable Disease Control Advisory Committee advised the Minister of Health in August 1990 that screening of donated blood for Hepatitis C should be introduced. The matter was refel-red to the Department of Health which commissioned a number of cost-effectiveness studies. The Department was apparently concerned that the sensitivity and specificity of the available test were not sufficiently high for this to be introduced at a time of significant budgetary problems for Area Health Boards. Approval in principle for the provision of central funding for the introduction of Hepatitis C screening was given by the Minister of Health on 30 July 1991. Additional funds were sought through normal budgetary processes, but this application for funding was rejected, with approval of funding only recommended if funding was available from reprioritisation within the Health Budget. Funds were withheld centrally from AHB Budgets to allow screening to commence in the 1992-93 financial year.
This two year delay was a cause of considerable concern to transfusion services, clinicians and the general community, and was the subject of ongoing representations to the Minister and the Department. It is not difficult to see how the larger group of transfusion recipients in general detracted attention from the greater risk posed to the much smaller number of potential recipients of unscreened, non high heat treated Factor IX . At no time was it clearly articulated that even the second generation screening test was only 98% sensitive, and would not detect 2 of every 100 infected donors. • Therefore, when up to 6,000 donations were pooled to make one batch of Factor IX, given the estimated prevalence of 0.31% of Hepatitis C in the donor population, 33% of batches are likely to contain Hepatitis C virus. In the absence of super heat treatment, over a period of time, all recipients of Factor IX are likely to become infected.
It is obvious that the complexities of the problem are unlikely to be recognised by those without a medical and scientific background. The fact that the Department of Health was undergoing a number of major restructures during the period and that there was no medical or epidemiological input from within the Department at decision making level, no doubt contributed to the delay in introducing screening. There was no clear channel of communication between the Minister s expert Advisory Committees and the Minister, and the Departmental structures for providing advice to the Minister on competing priorities lacked clinical input.
3 The devolution of responsibility and funding to Area Health Boards resulted in a failure to acknowledge that there are some clinical areas, blood transfusion being one, where strong national policy and national standards are essential. It is clear that at least in the foreseeable future, New Zealand will remain dependent on other countries for some blood products or recombinant products as they become available and that responsibility for negotiating and purchasing should be vested in an organisation with a clearly defined national responsibility in this area.
5 Findings
5.1 First Term of Reference
Blood and blood products can never be 100% safe - that is, there can never be a zero-risk blood supply.
HCV screening of blood reduces, but does not completely eliminate the risk of HCV infection in blood.
Supply of Prothrombinex, a complex Factor IX blood clotting product, which was made from plasma unscreened for Hepatitis C, continued after 1 July 1992.
Screening of blood for HCV, begun on 27 July 1992, would have reduced the risk but not eliminated the possibility of infection. As the screening test will not detect 2 in every 100 infected donors, and as up to 6,000 donations are pooled to make one batch of PTX, in the absence of super heat treatment, 33% of batches are likely to contain HCV.
HCV in Factor IX is partially inactivated if the blood product heated to 60°C and more fully inactivated if the product is high heat treated to 80°C.
No approved and licensed alternative Factor IX product (heated to 80°C) was available in either Australia or New Zealand on 1 July. An unregistered Australian product was provided under special conditions on 1 December 1992.
• The fact that Prothrombinex made from blood unscreened for Hepatitis C continued to be used after July 1, 1992 was not known either to the senior management of the Department of Health or to the Minister of Health or his office.
• There is no evidence of a deliberate attempt to withho ld information relating to this situation.
5.2 Second Term of reference
• There are no clearly defined lines of communication for transmission of policy advice to the Minister on issues relating to blood transfusion.
• BTAC was left without a Chairman or access to senior levels of the Department of Health or to the Minister of Health.
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• As a result of numerous departmental reorganisations, there was no senior departmental officer with a knowledge of clinical issues, who was aware of the problems faced by BTAC and the complex scientific problems involved in maintaining a safe and effective supply of blood products in New Zealand.
• Responsibility for negotiation with CSL for the acquisition and distribution of fractionated blood products in New Zealand was loosely delegated to the Director of the Auckland RBTS.
• There is no formal contract between CSL and New Zealand for the supply of blood products worth over $6 million per year.
5.3 Third term of reference
• There should be a Committee charged with the development of national policy and standards for the Blood Transfusion Service. This Committee should comprise representatives from blood transfusion service directors, clinical haematologists, Regional Health Authorities, the Principal Medical Advisor, Department of Health and a consumer.
• The Committee should more appropriately advise the Director-General of Health rather than the Minister of Health in order to ensure that appropriate policy can be developed taking into account other competing priorities.
• Nevertheless, the Committee should retain the option to approach the Minister of Health directly on matters of concern.
• There are some distinctive features about Blood Transfusion Services which require them to be considered in a somewhat different context from most other health services.
• There is a need for the services to retain a local focus, firstly to facilitate donor recruitment and retention, and secondly to maintain close relationships with clinicians, the users of the products, in order to ensure appropriate usage and quality control.
There is also a need for a strong national focus.
- National standards for good manufacturing practice of blood and blood products need to be adopted and monitored.
- Decisions on policy for issues such as screening need to be made at a national level.
- There needs to be a clearly identified body which takes total responsibility for all issues relating to the acquisition and supply of blood and related products for New Zealand.
- There are likely to be financial as well as quality advantages in purchasing blood products nationally.
5 Transfusion medicine is a highly specialised and rapidly advancing field. It is important to limit responsibility for transfusion services to a small number of appropriately qualified staff whose expertise can be maintained and developed
Links should be maintained between any body charged with the development of national blood transfusion policy and the Principal Medical Advisor to the Department to ensure that senior departmental officers are aware of any developing issues requiring a policy response.
. A contract should be signed with CSL, with regular review at appropriate intervals, to formalise the arrangements between Australia and New Zealand.
6 Recommendations
There is a need for a national committee to take responsibility for the development of policy and standards, the monitoring of standards and the provision of advice to the Department and the Minister of Health on issues relating to blood and blood products.
2 The Principal Medical Advisor to the Department of Health should be responsible, within the Department of Health, for overseeing issues relating to blood and blood products.
3 A contract should be formalised with CSL for the supply of blood products for use in New Zealand.
4 The Department of Health should request the manufacture and supply of high heat treated Prothrombinex, sourced from New Zealand plasma screened for HCV, from CSL at the earliest practicable opportunity.
5 Steps should be taken by the Department of Health to ensure appropriate medical and technical input into health policy. To: The Director-General of Health
REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO MATTERS RELATING TO THE SAFETY OF BLOOD PRODUCTS IN NEW ZEALAND
Issue which led to the Inquiry
On 17 November, an article in the "Dominion" newspaper raised concern about the continued supply, after HCV screening was introduced in July 1992, of the blood product Factor IX (Prothrombinex) which was manufactured from blood unscreened for Hepatitis C, resulting in potential risk of Hepatitis C infection for haemophiliacs using Factor IX.
2 Establishment of Inquiry and Terms of Reference
The Director-General by letter dated 23 November 1992 appointed the Inquiry under Section 7 of the Health Act 1956 and Section 90 of the Area Health Boards Act 1983. Dr Sue Morey, Chief Medical Officer, New South Wales Department of Health, Australia and the Honourable Stanley Joseph Rodger, retired Member of Parliament and former Minister of the Crown, were charged as follows:
"Now pursuant to section 7 of the Health Act 1956 and section 90 of the Area Health Boards Act 1983 you are appointed and requested to do the following:
1 To determine the circumstances surrounding the continued supply after 1 July 1992 of a blood product which potentially exposed the users of that product to the risk of infection with Hepatitis C; and
2 To investigate what are the responsibilities and functions of the Office of the Minister of Health, the Department of Health, the Blood Transfusion Advisory Committee and the Regional Blood Transfusion Services and how those functions and responsibilities inter-relate in respect of:
2.1 The provision of policy advice to the Minister of Health regarding the risk of infection with Hepatitis C resulting from receipt of fractionated blood products; and
2.2 The facilitiation of the efficient and effective and safe acquisition and distribution of fractionated blood products in New Zealand.
INQUIRY REPORT 3 Report to the Director-General of Health on the results of your inquiry making recommendations as appropriate regarding:
3.1 Any changes to processes for the preparation and submission to the Minister of Health of policy advice relating to blood and blood products; and
3.2 Any changes to the responsibilities and functions between the office of the Minister of Health, the Department of Health, the Blood Transfusion Advisory Committee and the Regional Blood Transfusion Service and their inter-relationships that are necessary to facilitate the acquisition and distribution of blood and blood products in an efficient and effective and safe way (bearing in mind the Government s proposals for the reorganisation of the Blood Transfusion Service).
The Inquiry was assisted by Mr Patrick Hoy, Auditor - Major Projects Group, Office of the Controller and Auditor General, Wellington.
Support was also provided by the following officials of the Department of Health, Dr Sharon Kletchko, Wendy Edgar, Alison Brieseman and Gina Inglis.
We record our warm appreciation for their strenuous efforts in assisting to bring this report to the stage of presentation at very short notice.
INQUIRY REPORT 2 3 Procedure Adopted by the Inquiry
3.1 The Inquiry reviewed the functions and responsibilities of the Office of the Minister of Health, the Department of Health (including changes arising from departmental restructuring), the Blood Transfusion Advisory Committee and the Regional Blood Transfusion Services. The roles and inter-related responsibilities of the Communicable Disease Control Advisory Committee and the Medicines Adverse Reactions Committee were also considered.
3.2 The Inquiry examined departmental files for all relevant correspondence, background papers and briefing papers to Ministers, the Minutes of the relevant advisory committees and interviewed departmental and ministerial office staff, in order to establish a chronology of events.
3.3 A number of interviews were held and submissions were received from a variety of organisations and individuals. A list of those interviewed or who made submissions is attached as Appendix 1.
4 Clinical and Scientific Background Information
4.1 Transfusion-transmitted Infection and Reduction of Risk
Transfusion of human blood is not without risk. Certain infectious agents including malaria, syphilis, hepatitis A, B & C, HIV and cytomegalovirus can be carried in the blood and therefore transmitted during the transfusion process. In addition to these (described in Appendix 4), at different times it has been alleged that morbilli, varicella, variola, epidemic parotitis, influenza, filariasis, toxoplasmosis, Q-fever, tuberculosis, leptospirosis and "Chagas" disease have been transmitted by blood transfusion.
The number of infections that are potentially transmissable by blood transfusion seems daunting, however, the incidence of most of these infections in the general population is low.
Five key measures help improve the safety of blood transfusions:
Selection of donors - it is important that donors are interviewed in private by experienced interviewers, who will question the potential donor on relevant areas of their history and lifestyle. It is also important that there is an opportunity for a donor to request anonymously, subsequent to donation, that the blood not be used.
INQUIRY REPORT 3 2 Use, wherever possible, of autologous blood, that is blood donated by a person for their own subsequent use. This would include salvaging and re- infusion of blood during surgical procedures.
3 Education of providers to minimise use of blood transfusions as a treatment option unless the situation is life-threatening.
4 Screening of blood for known infections. Laboratory-testing can identify markers of infectious agents in donated blood. Tests include those for syphilis, hepatitis B and C viruses, HIV types 1 and 2, and human T-cell lymphotropic virus (HTLV) types I and II; in addition, selected blood components may be tested or processed to prevent the transmission of cytomegalovirus to susceptible patients.
5 Pooled plasma products can be subject to viral-inactivation procedures and research is under way on recombinant products and viral inactivation for cellular blood components.
The safety of the blood supply continues to improve. New screening tests are introduced from time to time. The sensitivity of current tests continues to improve. There is also an increased awareness amongst the donor population of their responsibility when donating blood.
The chances of contracting a serious disease or dying from transfusion are now much lower than with many other therapeutic interventions. However a zero-risk blood supply is virtually unachievable. Each step towards the goal of achieving a zero-risk blood supply absorbs more resources that, if diverted elsewhere, might have a greater impact on the health of the public.
There is no consistent approach to dealing with this difficult question, but there remains a responsibility to educate the public about the risks and benefits associated with blood transfusion.
Patients are at a much greater risk if they do not have transfusions when they genuinely need them than they are from the possible complications of transfusion.
4.2 Hepatitis C
Hepatitis is an inflammation of the liver commonly caused by viruses and toxic agents such as alcohol and other drugs. Recent advances in the identification of the causative viral agents of hepatitis have clarified some of the issues and associated problems. The group of viruses causing hepatitis includes a range of very different and unrelated human pathogens. Hepatitis A, hepatitis B, Epstein-Barr. hepatitis (associated with glandular fever) and cytomegalic hepatitis were until recently the major identifiable forms of viral hepatitis. A further group was given the uncomfortable name of non A, non B hepatitis viruses.
INQUIRY REPORT 4 One of the major viruses causing non A, non B hepatitis is now designated Hepatitis C. It is the most common form of hepatitis following blood transfusion and can be spread in ways other than through blood. Hepatitis D virus (also referred to as Delta agent) can cause infection only in association with hepatitis B and therefore is of special significance because of the high level of hepatitis B infection in New Zealand. The most recent advance is the successful identification of the virus causing enterically transmitted non A, non B hepatitis, provisionally named hepatitis E virus (which has epidemiological and clinical features similar to hepatitis A).
The importance of sexual and perinatal transmission of Hepatitis C is uncertain. It is clear, however, that it is transmitted through blood and blood products in the same way as other blood-borne viruses, such as hepatitis B and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Hepatitis C occurs only occasionally in people who have received blood transfusions. It is a more common problem in people receiving a lot of blood and blood products. Since the end of July 1992 all donated blood in New Zealand has been screened for Hepatitis C, so blood transfusion has become safer.
It is thought that the majority of Hepatitis C infection in the community is caught through ways other than transfusion of blood and blood products (e.g. sharing of contaminated needles and syringes by injecting drug users). In many cases it is not possible to ascertain how the infection was acquired.
A great deal of information about Hepatitis C has become available internationally in the last two years. Although several research studies are in progress, there is limited knowledge of the epidemiology and clinical spectrum of the disease in New Zealand.
The majority of cases of non A, non B hepatitis transmitted through blood transfusions and a significant proportion of cases of sporadic (no identified risk factors) non A, non B hepatitis are thought to be due to infection with the Hepatitis C virus.
Modes of transmission of Hepatitis C virus (HCV) in New Zealand are similar to other parts of the world. A number of studies have been carried out to look at prevalence of infection, although no national seroprevalance study has been undertaken. All of the studies have investigated prevalence of antibody to Hepatitis C Virus (anti-HCV). The presence of anti-HCV indicates that the person has been exposed to the virus. It does not identify acute or chronic infection or whether the person is immune.
Some of the results of serological study in NZ population groups provided by the New Zealand Communicable Disease Centre are as follows:
Injecting drug users > 75% anti-HCV reactive (mostly those attending treatment clinics):
INQUIRY REPORT CLARIFICATION TO PARAGRAPH 3 ON PAGE 6 OF THE INQUIRY REPORT
Hepatitis C disease is not specifically listed in the First Schedule to the Health Act 1956 but would be included in the category of Hepatitis non A or B.
People in the Christchurch community 15% anti-HCV reactive with some liver dysfunction:
Patients with chronic liver disease: 10-20% anti-HCV reactive
STD clinic attenders: 7% anti-HCV reactive
Male prison inmates: 20% anti-HCV reactive
There were 585 laboratory-diagnosed anti-HCV positives in the first ten months of 1992. There were also 157 cases found to have HCV RNA (a marker for the virus and therefore of infectivity.) Many of the RNA positive cases will have been anti- HCV positive as well.
Hepatitis C is not a notifiable disease. However up to 31 October 1992, notification of hepatitis non A, non B, Hepatitis C or hepatitis acute type unspecified, numbered 78. The notifications were only 13 in 1990 and 22 in 1991. The increased reporting in 1992 is likely to be due to increased awareness of Hepatitis C.
Australian figures suggest that about 40% of patients with chronic HCV infection referred to clinics acquired the infection from transfusion of blood and blood products; compared with 40% by injecting drug use and 20% other factors (including tattooing and occupational exposure.) In contrast, information from the USA suggests that 10% of cases of non-A, non-B hepatitis is related to transfusion. The proportion of New Zealand cases of Hepatitis C associated with transfusion of blood or blood products is likely to be between these estimates.
Up to 50% of adults who are infected with HCV may become chronic carriers of the virus. This compares with hepatitis B, where up to 10% of adolescents and adults, and 50% or more of neonates and pre-schoolers infected develop a chronic carrier state.
Most patients with chronic HCV infection do not initially show any symptoms of illness (they are asymptomatic) but many gradually develop non-specific symptoms such as fatigue and malaise. Chronic carriers are rarely jaundiced.
Hepatitis C virus carriers have a substantially increased risk of developing chronic liver disease, including chronic persistent hepatitis, chronic active hepatitis, cirrhosis and primary hepatocellular carcinoma. Progression to chronic diseases is usually very slow, occurring over 1-3 decades.
Asymptomatic or symptomatic patients may have normal or intermittently abnormal blood biochemical findings and have specific inflammatory activity in the liver which can only be identified by liver biopsy. The latter is particularly important in relation to monitoring therapy with drugs such as Interferon.
INQUIRY REPORT 6 The outcomes of HCV infection may be influenced by other factors, such as alcohol.
4.3 Haemophililia
Haemophilia is a term which describes a congenital plasma clotting deficiency or defect which may result in bleeding into muscles, joints and body cavities, hours or days after an acute trauma.
Most of the inherited plasma coagulation disorders are due to defects in single coagulation proteins (those proteins responsible for helping blood to clot).
Two of the disorders, namely factors VIII and IX deficiency, occur in males but are carried by females (X chromosome-linked). These two disorders account for the majority of congenital coagulation disorders. That is, most people with haemophilia in New Zealand have one or other of these disorders. These patients merit special attention since they may have severe bleeding and chronic disability and require specialised medical therapy with pooled plasma products for either prophylaxis to prevent bleeding or to control bleeding.
Prothombinex has been a standard product for the management of patients with Factor IX deficiency for many years. It contains coagulation factors II, IX and X with atrace of VII.
4.4 Estimated Risk from Blood and Blood Products of Hepatitis C
A number of media reports have contained misleading figures regarding the potential risk of infection with HCV to New Zealanders. The following information attempts to put this risk into perspective.
There are 135,000 patients transfused per year who are at risk of infection. This means that 337,500 patients will have been transfused from February 1990 (when Australia began to screen) to 27 July 1992 (when New Zealand began to screen). Approximately 1048 (0.31 %) non-immune patients will have been exposed to a sero-positive unit based on the 1990 prevalence study by Dr D G Woodfield, Director of the Auckland Blood Transfusion Service. Of these approximately 733 (70%) will contract the Hepatitis C virus. Clinical acute Hepatitis C will develop within six to twenty-six weeks in approximately 183 (25%) patients and asnall number. 4.0l %) will develop fulminant Hepatitis C which will lead to death or liver transplant.
Of the 733 infected patients 323 (43.9%) will survive, the remaining 410 patients having died from other causes within two years. 160 patients will have no adverse consequences of the infection, while 163 will develop some liver disease. Of these 130 will have chronic low-grade disease (approximately half will have no adverse effects while the other half will have minimal disruption to daily living.) A total of
INQUIRY REPORT 7 33 patients will develop aggressive liver disease with cirrhosis and some may develop hepatocellular cancer an average of 15 years post transfusion
There are several estimates of the total number of haemophiliacs in New Zealand with the highest estimate being 535 Factor VIII and 95 Factor IX haemophiliacs. Of these, approximately 38% are severe, with a factor level of less than or equal to 5% of normal, thus having a greater use of blood products.
A study conducted in 1990 revealed that 70% of haemophiliacs were HCV positive. That is, infection took place for 70% of the at risk population before any screening tests were available.
It is more difficult to quantify the numbers of haemophilia patients recently exposed as pasteurisation to 60°C of pooled plasma products is effective in reducing the total number of infected batches as indicated by the Karolinska article (in Appendix III Lancet 1992: 340: 305-306). If pasteurisation was not effective at all, then one could expect that of the estimated 50 patients who have Factor IX deficiency and require concentrates on a moderately regular basis, an estimated total of 15 would not have been infected in 1990. Of these 15, 11 are at risk of developing Hepatitis C infection through receiving pooled plasma concentrates. A total of 5 patients would be predicted to develop chronic active hepatitis if there were no deaths from other causes and 2 would go onto developing cirrhosis and possibly hepatocellular carcinoma.
5 Blood Transfusion Services In New Zealand 5.1 Organisation of Services The New Zealand Blood Transfusion Service (BTS), as currently organised, deals with the recruitment of blood donors, the collection of blood (based on voluntary donations), the screening and accreditation of donated blood (eg HIV, Hepatitis B & C), the processing of donated blood into a variety of components, and the storage and dispensing of blood and blood products as requested by clinicians. Plasma separated from donated blood is frozen and pooled prior to dispatch to a centre where it is fractionated2 into specific components. Organisationally the New Zealand blood transfusion services tend to be part of Area Health Board pathology services, they comprise: blood banks in most large hospitals (these store, dispense and provide cross- matching services);
18 sub-regional centres (mainly for blood collection, some testing);