Native Americans, Europeans, and the Raid on Pickawillany

Home , Erie people, George Croghan, Great Miami River, Kekionga, Logstown, Miami people

ABSTRACT

“THE LAND BELONGS TO NEITHER ONE”: NATIVE AMERICANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE RAID ON PICKAWILLANY

In 1752, the Miami settlement at Pickawillany was attacked by a force of Ottawa and Chippewa warriors under the command of a métis soldier from Canada. This raid, and the events that precipitated it, is ideally suited to act as a case study of the role of Native American peoples in the Ohio Country during the first half of the eighteenth century. Natives negotiated their roles and borders with their British and French neighbors, and chose alliances with the European power that offered the greatest advantage. Europeans were alternately leaders, partners, conquerors and traders with the Natives, and exercised varying levels and types of control over the Ohio Country. Throughout the period, each of the three groups engaged in a struggle to define their roles in regards to each other, and to define the borders between them. Pickawillany offers insights into this negotiation. It demonstrates how Natives were not passive victims, but active, vital agents who acted in their own interest. The events of the raid feature a number of individuals who were cultural brokers, intermediaries between the groups who played a central, but tenuous, role in negotiations. It also exhibits the power of ritual violence, a discourse of torture and maiming that communicated meanings to friends and rivals alike, and whose implications shaped the history of the period and perceptions of Natives.

Luke Aaron Fleeman Martinez May 2011

“THE LAND BELONGS TO NEITHER ONE”: NATIVE AMERICANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE RAID ON PICKAWILLANY

by Luke Aaron Fleeman Martinez

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the College of Social Sciences California State University, Fresno May 2011

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We, the undersigned, certify that the thesis of the following student meets the required standards of scholarship, format, and style of the university and the student’s graduate degree program for the awarding of the master’s degree.

Luke Aaron Fleeman Martinez Thesis Author

Brad Jones (Chair) History

Ethan Kytle History

William E. Skuban History

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X I grant permission for the reproduction of this thesis in part or in its entirety without further authorization from me, on the condition that the person or agency requesting reproduction absorbs the cost and provides proper acknowledgment of authorship.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I feel somewhat sheepish in offering acknowledgments for my thesis, as I don't feel I have yet earned the right to thank everyone in such a way, and I will invariably leave someone out. Nonetheless, I am going to attempt this, because I welcome the opportunity to thank the people I treasure. May the gods of history not punish me for my presumptuousness. First and foremost I must acknowledge and thank my advisor, Professor Brad Jones, without whom this thesis would not have been possible. Dr. Jones read and re-read the many pages of this thesis more times than I can count, each time offering insightful and useful commentary that improved the entire project. His patience and generosity have overwhelmed me; he has done more for me as a student, writer, scholar and historian than I could have ever hoped for. It embarrasses me that all I have to offer in return is this acknowledgment. I can never properly express how truly and deeply thankful I am for his tutelage and mentoring. A number of professors and fellow graduate students have made my experiences at Fresno State enriching, enjoyable, educational, and fun. Professors Mark Arvanigian, David Berkey, Dan Cady, Lori Clune, Michelle DenBeste, John Farrell, Melissa Jordine, Ethan Kytle, Maritere Lopez and William Skuban made it a joy to learn, and made going to class every day easy. Fellow students Rowena Bermio, Ryan Brunkhorst, Ernesto Guevara, Armando Hernandez, Maria Lorenzo, Amy Noel, Tiffany Polfer, Charles Slaght, Stephanie Strejan-Hamblen, Michael Tercero, Alicia Wolfe and Emily Wolfe made difficult days much easier, and

vi offered me friendship and support in many ways, some not publishable. I cannot thank them enough for their support and friendship. At home I have been blessed to have the love and companionship of a close-knit group of friends who I could not have survived without. Paul Siebuhr, Joseph Schuster, Joe Sousa, Chris Myers, Michael Neer, Steven Dempsey, Kevin Lurz, Andrew Snow, Mark Clark, Chris Lyell and Eric Dillard all are giants among men, wonderful individuals who I am very thankful to for their support and friendship. My life has also been made better, livelier, and more enjoyable by the addition of two stray dogs who now dominate me, Bambi and Thumper. Writing this thesis has been difficult at times, and I could always turn to them for some fun and a break. I am the product of the love, hard work, determination and sacrifice of my family. One reason I was drawn to History as a discipline was the experiences of my grandparents, and the opportunity to write about such impressive people. Orvil Casey, Maxine Burgess, Charles Martinez and Rufina Falcon all endured hardships I could not imagine to make a better world for their children and grandchildren. My parents, David and Louise Martinez, are the greatest parents anyone could dream of, and my achievements belong to them, as they would be impossible without their patience and love. My sister Kellyn has been everything a brother could hope for, a sibling I love so dearly and feel so close to that I have often told others that we are twins - no other description would do us justice. Most importantly, I must thank the love of my life, Natalie Hernandez. She has been my strength, my faith, and my reason for living for a long time now, and I am ecstatic that I am going to spend the rest of my life with her. I can do

vii anything with her in my life, and I hope that I can achieve enough to justify the faith, love and patience she has shown me. She deserves all I can offer, and more.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION: DEATH AND DESTRUCTION ON THE MIAMI RIVER ...... 1 CHAPTER 1: NATIVE DIPLOMACY AND AGENCY IN THE COUNTRY BETWEEN ...... 17 CHAPTER 2: RITUAL VIOLENCE AND CONFLICTS OF OWNERSHIP ...... 41 CHAPTER 3: A PARADOX OF INFLUENCE: CULTURAL BROKERS AS AGENTS AND PAWNS ...... 61 CONCLUSION ...... 83

INTRODUCTION: DEATH AND DESTRUCTION ON THE MIAMI RIVER

“Fathers [the French], both you and the English are white, we live in a Country between; therefore the Land belongs to neither one nor to other... so Fathers, I desire you to withdraw.”  Tanaghrisson, Seneca War Leader, as reported by George Washington in 1753

The great conflicts between the French and British Empires in the eighteenth century stretched across the world, and expressed themselves on many fronts, with a panoply of peoples being drawn between the two belligerents. One such theater of action was the Ohio Country in North America. The French and their Native allies defended the Ohio Valley and its environs as their inviolable territory. British American colonists constantly probed at its frontiers, frequently through trade and their own Native intermediaries. In this “country between” lived a vibrant, active Native American population that played a vital role in the conduct of an imperial conflict that began in Europe. In the Ohio Country lay the Miami village of Pickawillany. Situated on the Great Miami River amongst extensive cornfields, the village frequently hosted British traders from Pennsylvania, as well as contingents from other Native nations. Pickawillany’s location was a threat to the French, as the village was in close proximity to many Native peoples allied to the French, and brought British rivals far into territory the French considered theirs. To make matters worse, the nearest French outpost, Fort Detroit, was almost two hundred miles away; too far to exercise effective control over the area. Leading the village was Memeskia, a

Miami who had repeatedly defied the French and rejected their allegiance, and who instead courted the British. His affection for the British was so great that they referred to him as “the Old Briton,” while the French had given him the derisive title “La Demoiselle.”1 By 1752, Memeskia and Pickawillany had become an irritant to the French. The village was hosting the rivals of the French, giving the British access to new allies and goods, and eroding French influence. The Miami subsequently rejected the French alliance, and the ensuing political fallout led to conflicts between the Miami and nearby Natives still faithful to the French. Ultimately, the Miami from Pickawillany would even kill and scalp Frenchmen, and unthinkable proposition not long before Memeskia’s ascension to power. The French resolved to do something about Pickawillany, but were in a difficult position. They wanted to disperse the British traders and secure their borders, but hoped to do so without igniting a full-scale war among the Native Americans of the Ohio Country, who were bound to each other in alliance. French leadership intended to use their own troops to achieve this, and hoped to avoid the involvement of other Native

1 William Trent, The Journal of Captain William Trent, From Logstown to Pickawillany, AD 1752 (New York: Arno Press and New York Times, 1971), 84-86. Trent was a British trader who did business at Pickawillany, and provided an important account of the village before and after the raid. For Memeskia's nickname and standing among the British, see New York Mercury, 20 November 1752, p. 2; among the French, Macarty to Vaudreil, 2 September 1752, Huntington Library Mss., Loudoun Coll., 376. Documents pertaining to the Miami often refer to them as “Twightwees,” a name given to them by other Natives. I will refer to them as the Miami. Unless further distinction is necessary, I will refer to all Miami sub-groups, such as the Piankashaw and Wea, as Miami as well. The documents from the Huntington Library were accessed via the Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology at Indiana University, specifically the Ohio Valley-Great Lakes Ethnohistory Archives: Miami Collection, which are digitized online. Other sources drawn via that collection will be noted as such with the abbreviation GAB.

peoples. The trepidation of the French would enable the Miami village to become the center of dissension.2 While the French pondered their strategy, the situation was drastically altered by Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade, who led a force of Ottawa and Chippewa warriors to attack Pickawillany. Langlade was a metis, the child of a French trader and an Ottawa princess. His mixed heritage gave him the unique opportunity to act as a cultural intermediary between the French and their Native allies. Langlade understood the motives and plans of the French, but also understood the intentions and goals of his Native relatives. Langlade had fought alongside his Ottawa cousins since his youth, and the intensifying situation on the Miami River provided an opportunity for them to do a favor for the French. Before the French could commit troops or decide on a course of action, Langlade attacked.3 On the morning of June 21st 1752, Langlade arrived at Pickawillany with a combined force of some 200 to 250 Chippewa and Ottawa warriors. Langlade’s raid on the village was fast and unexpected. His forces surprised the inhabitants of the village, isolating three British traders in a house outside of Pickawillany’s main fort and capturing four Miami women. Langlade’s forces besieged the fort and the house where the British traders took refuge. By the afternoon, the Miami negotiated their surrender, giving up all of the traders in return for their women.

2 Rouille to Duquense, 9 July 1752, Archives Nationales, Ministere des Colonies, B95:246 in GAB, discusses French feelings and intentions. Longueuil to Rouille, 18 August 1752, Archives Nationales, Ministere des Colonies, C11A 98:350 in GAB, offers further details on French frustration and planning. 3 Jospeh Tasse, Memoir of Charles de Langlade, from Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Lyman Copeland Draper, ed. (Madison, WI.: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1908), 124-126. This biography is an incarnation of the traditional telling of Langlade's life by his family from the mid- Nineteenth century.

They also agreed to give up their fort and village, and to surrender Memeskia to the Chippewa and Ottawa.4 Langlade’s men plundered the British goods and dispersed the people of the village. First, though, they sent a message to the Miami. A wounded British trader was slain, his scalp taken and his heart eaten by the victorious Natives; his death in this episode of ritual violence atoned for the death of Ottawa warriors in the attack. The Ottawa and Chippewa then boiled and ate Memeskia within sight of his followers, symbolically returning the wayward Native to the French alliance in death. With £3,000 worth of goods and five British traders as prisoners, Langlade’s forces departed. While unplanned, the destruction of the village and the death of Memeskia was welcome news to the French. They were confident that this attack would be the final blow to disperse the British, and hoped that it would return the Ohio Country to its previous tranquil state. While they hoped for peace, they prepared for the contingency that the Miami would summon their allies.5 News of the raid proceeded slowly back to the British colonies, not appearing in colonial newspapers in Boston and New York until November. Information had been relayed by a British man in the Ohio Country, and was corroborated in a letter from a trader, William Trent. Of great importance to the colonists were the “acts of barbarity” perpetrated by the French-allied Natives, testament to the savagery of their enemies, both French and Native. The newspaper stories were fixated on the cannibalism of the Ottawa and Chippewa,

4 Trent, 87-88, Longueuil to Rouille, 18 August 1752, and De Ligneris to Vaudreuil, 3 October 1752, in Huntington Library Mss., Loudoun Coll. 398 in GAB, detail numbers and the surrender. 5 See previous reference for details of the battle. Du Quesne to Maurepas, 25 October 1752, Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 128-131 in GAB, and Longueuil to Rouille, 18 August 1752 for French hopes that the raid would disperse the British and bring peace to the Ohio Country, and further expectations.

and expressed revulsion at the treatment of their countryman and their allies. The articles were also concerned with the response of the Six Nations and other Native allies of the British, who promised to “eat every Frenchman they can lay their hands on.” The British were aware of the implications of the raid, and used print media to reorient the event, claiming it for their own uses and placing it in a new context. The colonists and Natives engaged in a struggle for ownership of the raid with the each other, an important contest that speaks to the power of Langlade’s message and the consequences of the raid.6 * * * The raid on Pickawillany is ideally suited to act as a case study of the way that Native peoples negotiated their roles and borders with Europeans in the Ohio Country during the first half of the eighteenth century. Natives frequently aligned themselves with the European power that offered the greatest advantage, and parlayed those alliances into power among other Natives. Europeans were alternately leaders, partners, conquerors and traders with the Natives, and exercised varying levels and types of control over the Ohio Country. Throughout the period, each of the three groups engaged in a struggle to define their roles in regards to each other, and to define the borders between them. This struggle was ultimately a negotiation, as each party had to give and take to assure their place. Pickawillany offers insights into this negotiation. It demonstrates how Natives were not passive victims or fodder for armies, but active, vital agents who acted with awareness and in their own interest. The raid features a number of individuals who were cultural brokers, intermediaries between the groups who

6 New York Mercury, 20 November 1752, New York Gazette, 27 November 1752, and Boston Evening Post, 27 November 1752. The initial report in the Mercury, by an unnamed trader, is supplemented by Trent's addition in the latter two papers.

6 played a central role in their negotiations. It also gives us an opportunity to see how Native violence and warfare informed the process of negotiation, simultaneously offering a psychological advantage and a cultural disadvantage, which would both imperil and empower Natives. * * * Pickawillany is positioned on the periphery of different historiographies. It always appears on the edge of the discussion, a tangential event which is not central, but provides evidence for an existing argument. Each treatment of the raid fits into the author’s greater narrative, but the village and its fate slips into the mist as the narrative proceeds past. Pickawillany needs to be reoriented, placed at the center of an examination and discussed as an event unto itself. The historiography is telling in that it limits the interpretive potential of Pickawillany, especially in prefiguring it as part of the Seven Years’ War. The raid on Pickawillany lends itself to study of the North American frontier. European colonists in North America stood at the edge of a vast continent, an extensive borderland with the Natives that would be integral to their colonial experiences. The Ohio Country was just one of these borderlands, a relatively limited geographical area where both European powers frequently interacted with Natives. It was part of the pays d’en haut, an extensive area surrounding the Great Lakes first delineated by Richard White. This shared zone was at the center of the original negotiations of roles and borders among Europeans and Natives. Primarily it served as the fertile ground for a French collaboration and cooperation with the Natives. The cooperative fecundity of this

area produced the original alliance between the French and Natives, which the Miami of Pickawillany departed from.7 White frames Pickawillany as an important location where rebellious French-allied Natives found opportunities to court British suitors. He identifies the fears of the French, which were realized in the power of Memeskia at Pickawillany. This place provides an example of allied Franco-Native forces correcting errant nations who have violated their shared community. Other studies concerning the Ohio Country tend to return to this theme, as Pickawillany is useful in discussing the struggle for the Ohio Country. Historians have identified the raid as a traumatic event which extended French influence and solidified alliances among Natives and Europeans, and it is particularly useful because the role of Native Americans is apparent. This approach, however, reduces the attack to a minor event, which is useful to the narrative, but otherwise limited. These analyses fall short of using the event to its full potential; the raid is individually capable of explaining the aforementioned process of negotiated roles and borders, and can yield valuable insight if explored in greater detail.8 The raid on Pickawillany has frequently been featured as part of the escalation to the Seven Years’ War. Francis Parkman,the great historian who extensively covered the Seven Years’ War, argues that the attack forced the Natives of the Ohio Country to return to the French fold, as British weapons and goods could no longer be counted on. Additionally, Parkman calls Pickawillany,

7 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 8 See Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its peoples, 1724- 1774 (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 98-100, and David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L Nelson, eds., The Sixty-years War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814 (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1998). In particular, Michael A. McDonnell's essay on Charles Langlade from the latter volume is useful.

and the entire French effort in the Ohio Country prior to the War, a “master-stroke, and laid the axe to the very root of disaffection.” Langlade’s attack threatens any nation claiming membership in the French coalition with violent dispersal if they go astray. This interpretation is not necessarily divergent from White’s, but is still problematic. For one, Parkman often deprives Natives of agency in this process. Additionally, it restricts the raid to the actions of one individual in an imperial conflict, and not as the multifaceted event that it was.9 Fred Anderson’s treatment of the war is much more nuanced, but he still sees the raid primarily as an event of the Seven Years’ War. He concurs with Parkman, seeing “Langlade’s bold stroke” as driving British traders away and reinforcing the Native alliance. In these histories the raid on Pickawillany is a dress rehearsal to the larger ultimate conflict. Langlade’s attack induced rebellious Natives from the French alliance to reaffirm their allegiance, lest the same fate befall them. Properly pacified, the Natives were free to act as French allies in the coming conflict. This positioning of the raid as a preliminary battle of the coming war is limiting, reducing it to a prelude, anachronistically placing it in the Seven Years’ War narrative without seeing it as a unique event, ideally situated to explain the complex nature of the borderlands in Early America.10 It has been well-established that Native Americans possessed agency in the ongoing border conflicts with Europeans. Traditional accounts of an unoccupied North America, or one peopled only by noble savages or Indian bogeymen have been long abandoned. The paucity of sources and information on the Native

9 Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 883-885 and 901-903. Parkman is by no means alone in underestimating the agency of Native participants; he is merely indicative of a larger trend in the historiography in the early period of study. 10 Fred Anderson, The Crucible of War: the Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766, (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).

American experience, however, can prove difficult to overcome. It has therefore fallen to historians to look to existing sources, and locate the voice of the Native, effectively interpreting them back into activity by the inference of their actions. The most persuasive and important author in this effort has been Daniel K. Richter, who has explained how historians can (and must) do just this to create a complete historical record. Historians are able recognize agency by coupling such interpretations with the sources that do represent the Native experience.11 This proper identification of the Native American as agent and participant in the history of Colonial America enables historians to create a far more nuanced portrait. Scholars have explored how interactions between Natives had far- reaching implications for other Natives and their European neighbors, a result of the “ongoing, ever-changing relationship” between peoples.12 Many encounters between Natives and Europeans have defined and refined this relationship. Especially noteworthy was Native American trade with the French and British was part of a process of negotiation, which had widespread effects on all three populations. As Eric Hinderaker wrote, “Native Americans actively participated in the European imperial systems that connected them with France and Britain.”13 The vibrant history of the Ohio Country is fraught with Native Americans acting

11 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001); one example of this effort in practice is the previously cited work by Richard White. 12 Daniel K. Richter and James H Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), xiv. 13 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires:Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi. Other notable examples of interconnectedness and roles in trade can be found in Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: an Introduction to Canadian Economic History (Toronto, 1956) and Francis Jennings, The Ambigious Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes from its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York, 1984).

10 intelligently, willfully, and in their own interest; Pickawillany is but one such instance, but an especially useful one. Amidst the many Native agents existed a special breed, the cultural broker. Cultural brokers were “men with the cross-cultural knowledge and linguistic skills to interpret and influence transactions between the Indians and outsiders.” Cultural brokers were absolutely necessary for both Europeans and Natives, and acted as intermediaries between peoples. Europeans relied on them to relay orders to Native warriors and coordinate plans during conflicts, while Natives required them to express the pertinence of Native rituals or actions. Properly utilizing these individuals was of great importance, and they were key in European-Native diplomacy.14 Cultural brokers could be bilingual traders, European missionaries among the Natives, and mixed-race individuals with proper relational links. The historiography of the colonial period often relies on these people to translate the actions of Natives to Europeans, and vice versa. From their experiences we can discover how various groups interpreted their rivals, and we can understand what compelled Native Americans to action. For example, Alan Taylor illustrates the problems with borders and boundaries by introducing two such individuals, a European missionary with linguistic skills and a Native versed in British political culture.15 Kathleen DuVal describes the way in which Native interpreters and guides used their skills to direct Spanish forces towards their enemies, and take

14 Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 7-8. For further discussion of the importance of these cultural liaisons, see also Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the people Between in North American History.” American Historical Review (June 1999), 814-41. 15 Taylor, 8.

advantage of Spanish resources.16 Across many histories of Colonial America, such cultural brokers give us insight into the motivations and perceptions of Native Americans and their neighbors. A contradictory result of Native American actions was the European perception of their style of warfare. This perception increased their value to those Europeans while simultaneously creating distance between the two in the cultural arena. Natives fought differently than their European neighbors, and had different goals. Native violence, particularly ritualistic violence like torture and cannibalism, was fundamental to Native warfare but not indicative of any innate savagery on the part of the Natives; rather, ritual violence was understood as a necessary part of warfare. The strength of a foe could be absorbed through cannibalism; a death could be atoned for with the violent death or torture of a prisoner. These sometimes gruesome practices were an accepted part of a larger litany of Native practices, seen as no greater or different from any other ritual. Natives used these practices to properly conduct a war, so that they would be prepared to fight again in the future. The dichotomous treatment of enemies by Natives confused and scared Europeans, who could not understand how warriors could viciously scalp and devour some prisoners, and then lovingly adopt others into their tribe. The practice of scalping itself became such an act of terror that Europeans would eventually appropriate it for their own use.17 Native American warfare in general was seen as abhorrent by British colonists, who derided it as cowardly or sneaky. Combat was usually on a small scale and ambushes and raids were more common than battles. Warfare was not

16 Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 17 White, 245.

confined to territorial expansion, but often had deeper meanings, such as establishing dominance, gaining valuable captives, and avenging wrongs. A raid offered an opportunity to prove personal bravery or valor, or to make a family whole again. Battles could end quickly, leaving behind maimed or tortured victims and mass confusion. This style of warfare, coupled with ritual violence, made Natives feared combatants, but also had a collateral effect on the perception of Natives by British colonists.18 The British desired the Natives as allies for their ability to engage in this kind of warfare, especially against other Natives, but were also disgusted by it, seeing it as barbaric. Jill Lepore argues that the disgust Europeans expressed for Native actions was a way to differentiate cultures, and was a tactic British used to separate themselves from Natives. This use of ritual violence was integral to the relationship between Natives and Europeans, and encouraged the creation of stereotypes and idealizations of Natives that were often incorrect, flawed or overly simplistic.19 Ultimately, for the British, the potential uses of this violence were more important than the intentions of the violence. Peter Silver has argued that “any Indian could inspire contagious terror among the rural Europeans” who were their neighbors and trading partners. Natives loomed large as bogeymen to the Europeans, strange and frightening savages who needed to be kept as allies, or made docile by conversion to Christianity. British perceptions of Native warfare created a “discourse of fear that

18 Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War: Technology and tactics Among the New England Indians (New York: Madison Books, 1991). An entire book covering the collateral effects of this style of warfare is Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2008). 19 Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 12, and Silver.

13 they [colonists] refined” and used to direct debate and participation in conflicts with their non-British neighbors. In episodes such as Pickawillany, the British condemned the savagery of French-allied Natives, while condoning similar behavior from their own allies. They configured each instance differently, casting the French as dangerous antagonists who provoked Natives to brutality, and justified the terrible actions of their own allies. The warfare of the Natives decisively placed them in a particular context for colonists, who worked to understand and narrate these forms of warfare in a manner that was most beneficial to them.20 * * * The raid on Pickawillany offers insight into aspects of the experience in the Ohio Country that are instrumental in understanding Colonial American history. A proper review of Langlade’s attack and its consequences will yield insights that make it ideal for explaining the themes recurrent in the struggle for the Ohio Country. I will place Pickawillany at the center of this discussion, as opposed to using it as a point of evidence for a larger argument, which will reveal the intricate details and implications of the event. By doing so, we can see how Pickawillany is ideally suited to act as a case study, an examination of the way that Native Americans negotiated their roles and borders with Europeans in the Ohio Country during the first half of the eighteenth century. To construct this argument I will be relying on a relatively limited number of sources. The Miami, like many Native peoples, did not keep written records and thus do not have an apparent voice in the matter. There are, though, a number of

20 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2008).

European sources which can be used to reconstruct that voice. To do so I will be using the technique put forth by Daniel Richter in Facing East from Indian Country to use the negative spaces or reactions of European sources to recreate the Native voice. French government officials wrote letters which are still available in the archives, and from their materials we can see how their enemies viewed the Miami, and in the nuances of their negative assessment we can discern the actions and possible motives of the Miami in the matter. Accounts by British traders taken from Miami allies, as well as Council minutes from colonial governments which include Miami speeches or messages, provide a closer approach to the voice of the Miami, but are more limited in scope and availability. I will use these sources together to find the motives, actions, and reactions of the Miami to the events covered by this thesis. Many of the documents I will use, especially the letters of French colonial officials, are from collections held by the Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology at Indiana University, especially the Ohio Valley- Great Lakes Ethnohistory Archives: Miami Collection. This collection is an online database of primary sources drawn from a wide variety of other collections, including those typically difficult to access; I have relied heavily on this database for otherwise inaccessible documents. Chapter 1 will discuss the methods of Native American diplomacy practiced by the European powers. This was a very nuanced, culturally complex proposition which had to consider a vast array of interlocking Native alliances and sociocultural practices. It was not a process of imperial lieges dictating to their savage vassals, but a complicated relationship that alternated between coequal alliance and misunderstood cooperation. Nonetheless, these partnerships were integral to the power structures and conducts of both peoples. Specifically

15 important are the recurring themes of this diplomatic process. Economic considerations, the symbiotic relationships between leadership, Native agency and the politics of power defined the diplomatic efforts of Natives and Europeans. Pickawillany illustrates these tropes, and is an excellent example of how the process would play out. Chapter 2 will cover the role of Native ritual violence and the contest for ownership of such instances. The events leading up to and including the raid on Pickawillany featured repeated expressions of ritual violence by the Miami, Ottawa, Chippewa, and others. The trajectory of the entire affair was informed and mutated by these acts, which were a vital component in the conduct of the Native participants. In the aftermath of the raid, Natives and Europeans worked to own these acts and give them further meaning. The raid is indicative of a process of communication that included both ritual violence and responses that sought to declare ownership of such violence. Finally, chapter 3 will examine the role of cultural brokers. These cultural intermediaries and interracial liaisons were incredibly valuable in the process of negotiating roles and borders. Coordinating with allies was nearly impossible without the aid of educated and experienced men who knew the culture of their partners. Furthermore, the ability to employ and ally with Natives often required the aid of such men. Pickawillany presents similar issues. The destroyer of the village, Charles de Langlade, was an incredibly important cultural broker for the French. The British contact with Pickawillany, George Croghan, represents the British economic interests which often forged ties with Native peoples. In both cases, a fragile and complex web of relationships predicated on a position between rival powers fostered their influence, but also exposed them to danger and the

16 possibility of being used by the benefactors. Both men represent archetypal brokers, and Pickawillany offers an opportunity to see them at work, playing a central role in the process of negotiation in the Ohio Country. * * * The raid on Pickawillany is an exceptional example of how Natives negotiated their roles and borders with their European neighbors. The Ohio Country was populated by a multiplicity of Native Americans, and the French and British contended for influence and dominance among those people. Understanding the processes involved is integral to understanding Colonial America. By focusing on Pickawillany, we have an opportunity to see how a single, historically overlooked event can demonstrate what was at stake for Native Americans in the Ohio Country.

CHAPTER 1: NATIVE DIPLOMACY AND AGENCY IN THE COUNTRY BETWEEN

“They do not cease working to make war on us by means of the Indians.” -Charles de Raymond, regarding the British

When Charles de Langlade and his warriors descended on Pickawillany, it was in response to a vast array of factors and competing causes. The Native peoples allied to the Europeans did not act in a vacuum, and not at the behest of their European allies. Diplomacy between the Natives and the Europeans was a complicated, multifaceted process of compromise and negotiation. The factors that had compelled Langlade and his men into action were a reflection of this diplomatic process. Understanding the many aspects and nuances of diplomacy between the European colonists and Native Americans is integral to the story of Pickawillany. There is no way to grasp the importance of this event independent of the larger narrative of Native diplomacy, and the raid simultaneously displays the most important factors of this diplomacy for historical discussion. Analyzing the intersecting factors in this event illustrates the larger currents in European-Native interaction during this era in the Ohio Country and elsewhere in North America. Natives and Europeans both adhered to certain standards and behaviors in their relations with each other. Both groups had certain expectations of the other that informed their diplomatic efforts, for good or ill. Specific motifs and trends would repeat themselves throughout their shared history. Accordingly, diplomacy with Native Americans displayed four consistent aspects: a symbiotic relationship

between Native and European leadership; Native American agency; the primacy of commercial considerations; and a zero-sum political power philosophy. There was a symbiotic relationship between Native and European leadership. Native leaders could not assert their role unless they were able to secure concessions and goods from Europeans, and counted on their partnership with Europeans to maintain their position. Similarly, Europeans could not maintain positions of authority without the ability to negotiate with nearby Native populations. The British were primarily concerned with the consistency of their borders and procuring trade goods, while the French were concerned with maintaining Native alliances for both military and commercial reasons.1 The most well-known example of symbiotic leadership in Colonial America was the Iroquoian Covenant Chain. An alliance between the Five Nations of the Iroquois and the English settlers of New England in the late seventeenth Century, it was prototypical of the future alliances between the British and Native Americans. The Covenant Chain was understood to represent friendship, a link of “clasped hands” between the leadership of the English colonies and the Iroquois tribes. Early New Yorker Robert Livingston, the head of Indian Affairs for the colony, pushed governors to maintain and participate in the Covenant Chain for military security and financial success, which earned him a seat on the Provincial Council and enriched his own trade in furs. Simultaneously, the Iroquois required the public power of the Covenant Chain to reinforce their own leadership,

1 White's Middle Ground and Taylor's Divided Ground are two of the better examples of literature covering this relationship.

particularly because it provided them with the requisite gifts to solidify their own power in the tribe.2 The Covenant Chain also exhibited a flaw in the connected command structures. While both sides were using the symbiosis to develop and expand their own relationship, it could be ambiguous and difficult to define to both sides. The Iroquois saw their friendship as a partnership akin to the Native alliance style, with a mutual flow of gifts and assistance. The British, on the other hand, saw it as vassalage, and the goods were purchasing fealty. Nonetheless, it was useful and important to both parties, even if they both misunderstood what exactly it meant to the other, because it fostered cooperation and provided opportunities for leaders to take or secure power, and it improved the standing of leaders in both communities.3 The Covenant Chain is but one example of this aspect of Native- European diplomacy, and it is archetypal for the period and the parties involved. As we shall see, the same features of this symbiotic leadership structure are in play at Pickawillany and in the events of the raid. Second, Natives were active agents, just as their European counterparts. They made efforts to improve their alliances and act in the interest of their allies, but did so of their own volition. Despite occasional attempts at coercion, negotiation proved far more effective. For one, it was more akin to the expectations of the Natives. More importantly, Europeans could not demand obedience or force the Natives in to action because they needed their assistance, and because they could not risk alienating these valuable allies and sending them

2 Richard L. Haan, “Covenant and Consensus” in Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and the Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, Daniel K. Richter, ed. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 41-57. 3 Ibid.

over to their enemies. Natives moved to secure alliances, to improve friendships, and to aid their European friends, but always with the goal of securing their own interests, and never as vassals or servants. This theme is repeated in the broader scope of the diplomatic arena throughout the period. To choose but one example of such independence aside from Pickawillany, we can look to one of the opening skirmishes of the Seven Years’ War. A young George Washington encountered a company of French soldiers at Jumonville’s Glen while accompanied by Mingo warriors under the command of a warrior called Tanaghrisson. The mixed force of Mingos and British approached an encampment of Frenchmen, and overwhelmed the French. Surrounded by hostiles, the French commander Jumonville attempted to parlay with Washington. In a moment of opportunity, Tanaghrisson approached the French commander and killed him, ceremonially washing his hands in the dead man’s brain matter. Tanaghrisson’s warriors then slaughtered the wounded French, heedless of the wishes of Washington. This was in accordance with their own military practices, and a consequence of their enmity with the French. Washington’s positions or orders mattered not, because he did not command the Natives, he only worked alongside them. Tanaghrisson and his men did what they pleased by their own methods.4 These were not the hapless servants and scouts of the British, but a force of Natives who killed the Frenchmen because that was how they dealt with surrendering enemies, and they did so in a manner befitting their cultural expectations. The concerns and motives of the Europeans were shared as allies or confederates, but they were not imperatives that overrode Native sovereignty. At

4 Anderson, The Crucible of War, 3-7.

Pickawillany, Native agency was at play on both sides of the conflict, as obviously as it appeared at Jumonville’s Glen, and countless other incidents throughout the period. Commercial interests were vital to Native-European interactions, and the flow of goods was an integral part of diplomacy. Europeans coveted items that the Natives could bring from the interior, particularly furs, that could be trafficked with their Imperial homelands. These items increased the wealth, utility, and prestige of the European Colonies. Natives wished for finished goods, such as worked metal items and firearms, provided by Europeans. They needed these items to distribute to their warriors and affiliates to maintain alliances, and to remain competitive with their enemies. The exchange of goods and the politics of commerce informed all the diplomatic efforts of both Europeans and Natives, who needed the goods of their partners to aid their efforts among their own people.5 The French and British Empires were “empires of commerce,” political entities that connected broader worlds through trading networks.6 Commercial concerns of colonists and Natives shaped the way they interacted with each other, and simultaneously reshaped the cultures of those groups as well. These “empires of commerce” were delineated by a “mutable process, responsive to the choices of individuals.” When French traders first appeared in the Ohio Country and its environs in the seventeenth century, they connected with the Illinois tribes there. Their connection to the Illinois immediately boosted that tribe’s power and influence; the Illinois had previously been a tribe “in decline” but were now a “considerable power in the region.” This connection and access to trade

5 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), is the most pertinent discussion of this phenomenon. 6 Ibid.

empowered them within their own relationships with other tribes, and in their relationships with Europeans.7 Finally, Native-European diplomacy was exemplified by a zero-sum political power philosophy. Natives were allied with the British, or the French, and were rarely neutral. Neutrality was impractical because the British and French were at almost constant war with each other from the seventeenth century onwards. The shift of allegiance from one side to the other was taken as an insult or attack by the spurned party, because any loss by one was a gain for the other. All diplomatic actions negotiated a new relationship between two groups, and were always at the expense of the odd party out. Pickawillany was one such instance of the zero-sum game at work, but it would be repeated throughout the history of Native-European diplomacy. This would be clearly echoed and proven in the conduct of the British, and then the Americans, in the years following the Seven Years’ War. After the conclusive expulsion of the French from the Ohio Country, there was still a zero- sum total of power between the Europeans- but there was only one group. With the British as the sole European power, the Natives could no longer alter or change the balance of power between Europeans to assert their own rights until the Americans appeared to recreate the zero-sum struggle. Natives would attempt to “exploit the rivalry between republic and the empire, and hoped to remain intermediate and autonomous.”8 Ultimately, the tangle of borders between the British and Americans would strangle the Natives, and dispossess them of their

7 Ibid., 1-18. 8 Taylor, 10.

land. The subsequent American republic was even less sympathetic to Native needs or rights.9 Each of these four aspects is illustrated in the events surrounding the raid on Pickawillany. The circumstances of the raid were not entirely unique in the history of the period; Pickawillany was archetypal of the process. Because of this, it functions as an ideal window into how that process worked and the unique details of the event illustrate specific variations of the aspects of diplomacy. It speaks to larger themes, a property so useful that it should not be overlooked or confined to footnotes. The lessons we can learn from Pickawillany are broadly applicable and therefore useful to studying the entire period. * * * French contact with Algonquian peoples (such as the Miami) began as early as 1658, and commenced with the immediate posturing between leaders to determine their role in the new relationship. Initially, the French were regarded as manitou, a spirit-being, and were afforded a degree of reverence. Their efforts to broker trade deals and aggressive commercial pursuits changed them, however, into something altogether different. The French instead became onontio, or father. The European perspective was that being a father would provide a measure of control or leadership; they were mistaken. In the Native societies the French were encountering, a father was a negotiator, a giver of gifts, or a facilitator, but not the patriarchal dictator he was in Europe.10 This placed the French in the position of constantly defining their relationship with the Natives via their ability to provide gifts and material goods,

9 Ibid. 10 White, 1-33, for the arrival of the French and the nature of onontio.

as well as their ability to act as an intermediary in diplomatic affairs between Native peoples. Onontio, as the French leadership, specifically the Governor, was known, was a title that meant father. Despite the patriarchal and dominant connotations that title carries, in Algonquian societies the father was not a figure of authority, but a negotiator; he facilitated relationships between others. It was a position of power and influence, but not of coercive or dominant power.11 Onontio created and maintained that power and influence through commercial goods. Many of the Algonquian societies they were in alliance with understood gifts as integral to diplomacy, and without an exchange of goods, there was no true alliances. “Goods that originated in French society were distributed according to customs that originated in Algonquian society.” The mutual alliance between the French and their Native allies was conducted in a mercantile space, where goods were both currency and the language of diplomacy.12 The Miami people, who were integral to the incidents at Pickawillany were led in the 1730s and 1740s by Le Pied Froid (or Cold Foot), a stalwart ally of the French. Le Pied Froid was believed to have healing powers, and during a smallpox epidemic among the Miami, ascended to power through use of his healing qualities. When the tribe survived the epidemic, his position of leadership was reinforced, and he would maintain his position as the primary leader into the late 1740s. Le Pied Froid resided with the majority of the tribe at a village called Kekionga. The village lay on the St. Joseph River, roughly equidistant from Lakes Michigan and Erie, in the area of modern northwestern Ohio.13

11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 36. 13 Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent People, 1654-1994 (Indiana: The Indiana Historical Society, 1996), 29-33.

Much like the prior generations of Miami, Le Pied Froid preferred to operate as part of the larger Native alliance whose chief director and negotiator was the French governor. The many varied nations that inhabited French-claimed North America were kept at peace and in cooperation by onontio’s intervention and through the distribution of his goods. This web of alliances often brought disparate peoples together and melded them into larger conglomerates. The Miami themselves often lived and fought alongside a number of related Miami-speaking tribes, like the Piankashaws and Weas, who were so closely linked that outsiders rarely differentiated between them. The ascent to power of one such man, a Piankashaw named Memeskia, changed the relationship between Le Pied Froid and the French, as Memeskia usurped leadership over a significant population of the Miami.14 Memeskia did this by pushing for a more extensive relationship with the British, whose goods were cheaper and more readily available than those of the French. Positioned as they were in the Ohio Country, far afield from the nearest French outposts, it was difficult for the Miami to receive French goods at a fair price. As the Miami drifted from the French alliance, Le Pied Froid lamented that, “he did not think that they [the Miami] could be made to leave the English, who gave them all their goods at a low price.” A French Military official, Charles de Raymond, sought to secure the return of the “bad Miami” to the French sphere of influence, but had to struggle against this new shift in leadership, affected by Memeskia’s ability to interact with the British. He would ultimately fail because of it.15

14 White, 217-225. 15 Raymond to La Jonquiere (September 4, 1749) in Illinois Historical Collections, French Series, Vol. III, 105-108, in GAB.

As with the French, the British conducted business with their Native allies with an equal understanding of the primacy of gift-giving. Gifts were “critical to the results of a council,” which were the operative meetings used in brokering agreements and alliances. During these councils visiting chiefs “delighted in procuring colonial presents.” The price of doing business with Natives was the giving of gifts; this was not a simple bribe, but an effort by Native leaders to consolidate their own power. “Chiefs sought power within their village by displaying favors from external power.”16 Memeskia tapped into this alternative stream of trade to secure his own power opposite of Le Pied Froid, and began to cultivate it. In 1748 Memeskia took a large portion of the Miami at Kekionga about ninety miles southeast, to the shores of the Great Miami River, to found the village of Pickawillany. To secure the continuing friendship of the British (and therefore, his own primacy) Memeskia needed to make a gesture, a diplomatic overture that would confirm his alliance. This was a dangerous gambit, as the French would no doubt perceive it as a loss of their own prestige and influence, and the British were still distantly located, putting them in poor position to aid the Miami. Via his allies among the Shawnee, Memeskia sent wampum (the physical indication of a commitment to alliance) and thirty beaver skins (an indication of the goods he could offer) to the British in Pennsylvania. When the Shawnee delivered these items, they said that the Miami were “desirous to enter into the chain of Friendship with the English,” and that “You have cleared a Road for Us we assure you we will keep it so, and it shall not be in the power of Onontio [the French] to block up

16 Taylor, The Divided Ground, 27.

or obstruct the passage.” The Miami were added to the covenant chain, and Memeskia’s struggle to surpass Le Pied Froid was complete.17 This prompted the French leadership to dispatch Sieur Pierre Joseph de Celoron to reach out to the Miami, and return them to the family of onontio. Celoron journeyed deep into the Ohio Country, seeking out Memeskia. Bearing his own ceremonial wampum, Celoron was prepared to repair the French alliance with Memeskia’s Miami. On September 17th, 1749, the two sides met, and Celoron invited Memeskia and his band to leave the British, and to officially rejoin the French alliance. Memeskia demurred, politely and elusively refusing to answer directly, instead assuring Celoron that if hunting conditions were favorable, his band of Miami would return. Memeskia acknowledged the traditional alliance with the French, and the Miami promises to Ontonio, but repeated that only if hunting was favorable could they “be faithful in carrying out the promise made.” Memeskia was carefully spurning the French, openly acting diplomatic and refusing to directly rebuff, and therefore anger, the agent of onontio. His political obfuscation led Celoron to respond angrily, saying “you do not answer at all what I said!” Unable to secure further concessions, Celoron departed empty handed; his only guarantee was that the Miami might return, and that seemed unlikely. Le Pied Froid concluded that Memeskia “would be false.” He further apologized for the schism, telling Celoron that “my grief is to be the only one who loves you, and to see all the nations of the south let loose against the French.”18

17 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (July 19-23 & 30, 1748) in Pennsylvania Provincial Council Minutes, Colonial Records, Vol. V, 307-319, in GAB. 18 Celoron, Pierre Joseph, Sieur de in English Translation of Margry, Vol. 6, 710-721.

Celoron wrote an extensive account of his travels for the French governor, which is the only record of his journey that we have. This carries with it some problems, as the account of a French official trying to cajole wayward allies back to onontio’s graces is bound to be biased. However, his troubled account and his exasperation at the conduct of Memeskia is indicative of how deeply the Miami leader had disturbed the French, and how cannily Memeskia was able to avoid trouble by his knowledge of the diplomatic process and the limitations of the French. Namely, he was aware of how difficult it would be for the French to return the Miami via standard channels of negotiation and trade goods, as well as the profitability of trade with the British. Celoron was doomed to failure in his mission to the Miami. When he arrived to negotiate with Memeskia, he was already far too late. The British alliance, and the goods it provided, allowed Memeskia to assert his leadership, and he was now a player in British-Native affairs. Soon after, British trader George Croghan was brokering a treaty with another tribe, the nearby Wyandots. The Miami were present for the negotiations as British allies, signatories to the covenant chain who could stand as friends to both parties. Croghan and company distributed weapons and other goods to the Natives, including the Miami, and courted them; Memeskia’s influence was widening. Celoron arrived the same week, and was obviously unaware of the machinations of the Miami leader. Memeskia was committed to the British during the discussions with Celoron, and had no intention of returning to the French. Offending or upsetting the French at this juncture was not desirable, so he took the diplomatic route.19

19 Conrad Weiser in Pennsylvania Provincial Council Minutes, Colonial Records, Vol. V (containing the Proceedings of Council from December 17, 1745, to 20th March, 1754, both days included. Harrisburg: Theo. Fenn & Co. 1851), 348-358.

Natives dissatisfied with French leadership confessed during the meeting with the British their many complaints. The Wyandots said that the French always wanted the Natives to send “Young Men to go to War against their Enemies, and would use them as their own People, that is like Slaves,” and used this as justification for their defection from the French alliance. They complained in the same breath that the French believed their “Goods were so dear that they, the Indians, could not buy them.” This is a telling statement; the interlocking power structures of European and Native functioned only when goods were properly traded, gifted, or sold, and a disruption of this arrangement could lead to dissent and even conflict. When the French leader stopped acting like onontio, and instead acted like a commander, there was defection from his web of alliances. The improper conduct of commerce disrupted the delicate alliances that goods facilitated, and the Miami and Wyandots were willing and able to take their friendship elsewhere.20 The French were aware of the dangers of the British forming alliances with errant Natives. Memeskia’s example could be followed by others, who could use negotiations with the rival European power to assert their own claims to leadership. Accordingly, Celoron had also delivered a terse order to the British traders to vacate the premises of the Miami settlement, which were technically under French control. Celoron knew the Natives could not be compelled to cooperate under the terms of their relationship, so he went to his European enemy and resorted to their forms of diplomacy. The British operating in the Ohio Country were violating French territorial claims recognized under European law. The British were on dangerous ground if they refused to comply, because legal

20 Ibid., 350.

territorial violations invited direct French intervention. The British grudgingly complied with the French demands. Before they acquiesced, they surreptitiously undermined their foes by affirming their alliance with the Miami, and giving them weapons.21 Pickawillany soon became the center of resistance to the French, largely because it was the primary trading post between the traders of Pennsylvania and Virginia and the Miami. The most persuasive and wealthy of the traders who interacted with the Miami was George Croghan, a man who counted Benjamin Franklin among his friends and wielded significant influence in the two nearby British colonies. When Memeskia moved to Pickawillany he satisfied his goal of being closer to trade opportunities with his British allies. Croghan was often the representative of the British colonial governments among the Natives, and Memeskia could befriend the merchant and benefit from his significant influence.22 The relationship between Croghan and Memeskia led to Croghan frequently being present for the brokering of treaties, and to guarantee Miami friendship in the face of advances by the French. Pickawillany became more prominent due to its role in trade, as it was a contact point for other Natives to bring goods and for the British to disembark, as well as a supplier of corn. Also contributing to its ascendance was its position as a symbol of British encroachment to the French, and a sign of success to the British. To the Natives, this burgeoning trading post offered access to avenues of power and influence – if they knew how to properly court their partners.23

21 Ibid. 22 George Croghan to the Governor of Pennsylvania in Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, Colonial Records, Vol. V, 497, in GAB. 23 Croghan's Transactions with the Indians in N. Y. C. D.:VII, (London Docs.:XXXIV), 267-271, in GAB.

In 1749 Charles de Raymond wrote of the British “drawing away” the Miami from the French alliance. He could not conceive of the defection of the Miami as a problem necessarily with French mercantile efforts among the Natives, a breakdown of long-held standards of diplomacy. Raymond did not grasp that the consequences of an internal power struggle between Le Pied Froid and Memeskia could have collateral effects on French leadership or alliances. His major failing in both cases was that he did not appreciate the independence of the Miami, who exercised their prerogative to renegotiate their relationship and acted to their own ends – the British were but a means to securing their interests.24 Instead, Raymond saw the British efforts to forge an alliance as nothing less than an aggressive act, remarking that, “they do not cease working to make war on us by means of the Indians,” even though the Miami at this point had not acted aggressively against the French. He saw the British actions as trying to “bring them [the Miami] to a general revolt against the French in pursuance of their plan of making themselves masters of all the upcountry.” From the beginning stages of the conflict, he overlooked how the Miami were using the situation to empower themselves. Raymond was blinded by his conviction that the gains of the British could only be seen as inimical to the aims of the French.25 Memeskia was aware of how valuable his friendship could be, and how fearful Raymond and the French were of losing power to the British. The Miami leader conducted his gambit to align with the British because he understood how dangerous his defection could be to the French.26

24 Raymond to La Jonquiere (September 4, 1749). 25 Ibid. 26 Rouille to La Jonquiere (May 4, 1749) in Illinois Historical Collections, French Series, vol. III, 85-88, in GAB.

Throughout 1750 and 1751, Pickawillany operated as the locus of pro- British activity among the Natives. Unsurprisingly, this coincided with the increase of trouble for the French. Their loss of influence with the Miami was accompanied by an immediate surge in power on behalf of the British. Memeskia’s increasing influence affected a change in his conduct. Where he was once merely resistant to French diplomacy and their attempts to court him during Celoron’s visit, he was now actively moving against the French. He began to remove all Frenchmen from his domain, allowing only his British allies to reside there. Physically, the French were losing land over which they held sway, while simultaneously losing influence with the Natives they once counted as allies.27 Further, Memeskia’s rhetoric became violent and confrontational. He had, according to his rival Le Pied Froid, threatened that, “The autumn would not pass without Frenchmen being killed,” and had initiated “a general conspiracy to destroy all the French so that the Indians may only have on their land their brothers, the English.” The progress of the friendship between the British and the Miami created an evolution in the perception of the French. They were no longer the former ally, but an outright enemy, threatened with death. An obvious and definite loss of French influence and an attendant gain for the British.28 By early 1752, Pickawillany was the center of anti-French action. Prior to Pickawillany it was difficult for the British to reach far into the Ohio Country, because aside from it being French territory, it was inhabited by unfriendly or antagonistic tribes. With a friendly settlement to act as a base, and Native friends to vouch for their good intentions and excellent goods, the British were able to

27 Raymond to La Jonquiere (September 5, 1749) in Illinois Historical Collections, French Series, vol. III, 108-110, in GAB. 28 Ibid.

expand their trade. Other tribes were joining the Miami in alliance with the British, and leaving the French sphere of influence. The French began to agitate amongst their other Native friends for some sort of action. Government officials realized they needed to have “sufficient forces...sent to the Ohio River to expel the English traders,” because only the removal of the British could restore their power. As long as the Miami could utilize the British to maintain their favorable position, the French were in danger of losing more of their allies.29 However, tribes friendly to the French nearby refused to attack the Miami, which was a dangerous sign that allied tribes were no longer so firmly aligned to the French. These tribes assured their European partners that it was not out of disrespect to the French that they refused to act; they claimed to fear only a smallpox epidemic among the Miami. The French saw as a dubious claim by suspect allies, and as though they were now being defied because they had lost influence. While some Natives probably were looking for any excuse not to act, smallpox was indeed a factor, running rampant in the Ohio Country around this period. The French could not be sure, because they could not command the Natives into action. They could only employ their traditional means of negotiation and hope their status had not been so degraded that no one would be an honest ally to them any longer.30 Despite his supposed curative powers, Le Pied Froid died from smallpox in 1752. While he had lived, there was still a Miami leader of note in alliance with the French, a source of information and advice. The leader’s death left Memeskia as the paramount chief of the Miami in the Ohio Country, multiplying his

29 Rouille to Duquesne (July 9, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 648-651, in GAB. 30 Longueuil to the French Minister (April 21, 1752) in Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 104-117, in GAB.

influence and power. Memeskia began to hold councils in his own lands Iroquois and other British-allied nations such as the Shawnee. Friendship with the British was dangerous enough, but Memeskia was now bringing other enemies, enemies who could be very influential with the people of the Ohio Valley, into perilous proximity to those nominally in a relationship with the French. Smallpox or not, the French saw only resistance to their concerns. They recognized the independence of their allies, and were aware that these kind of tactics would only persuade allies to leave.31 The trading contacts and treaties between the Miami and British were a constant irritant to French leadership, and a challenge to their power in the region. As the British position was improved, the French position weakened. The French hoped to “drive the English from that river and to punish the Indians” who were allied with them. They mobilized their various diplomatic tools to entice the neighbors of the Miami to attack Pickawillany and its people. Initial attacks successfully disrupted British trade, but also resulted in Miami deaths, which served to embolden the resistance of Memeskia’s people. This created a problematic situation for the French, who needed to dislodge the British without antagonizing friends in the region. This delicate situation encouraged the French to practice restraint.32 Some Ottawa and Potawotami warriors began hunting scalps and antagonizing the Miami in October of 1751, seeking favor with the French by taking on their rivals.33 As the French feared, this provoked a negative reaction

31 Ibid. 32 Rouille to Duquesne (May 15, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 627-635, in GAB. 33 DeLigneris to Vaudreuil (October 25, 1751), in Huntington Library Manuscript, Loudoun Coll., 318, in GAB.

from Natives living near the Miami, illustrating the difficult path they were navigating. Memeskia drew these offended nations into his alliance, surrounding himself with allies by virtue of his access to British goods. He was seeking out and gathering many new friends, to the extent that the French feared what exactly he might be able to achieve.34 This was not at the behest of the British leadership among his allies, but to secure his own position. He already had the goods to court many of these peoples, but now also had a grievance he could use to justify his actions. With the French seemingly powerless, Memeskia boldly struck again. He avenged the loss of two scalps by killing French soldiers, an action that increased French focus on the situation. Since the cost of a protracted war and the implications of their actions could intensify problems, the French resorted to diplomacy at the British Court35 Into this arena of tentative French procedure entered Charles de Langlade. Langlade was a metis, a man of both French and Native ancestry. His father was a Frenchman, while his mother was a member of the Ottawa nation, a staunch French ally in the area to the Northeast of the Great Lakes. The Ottawa were further allied with the Chippewa and Potawatomi in a confederacy, giving him more allies to work with. Since the bonds of kinship among the Ottawa were established maternally, he was able to rise to a position of influence and leadership among those people while also forging important links with his French kinsmen as well. Langlade was operating outside of the French power structure, but in accordance with onontio’s will, seeking favor for his tribe.

34 Macarty to Vaudreuil (March 27, 1752) in Huntington Library Manuscript., Loudoun Coll., 339, in GAB. 35 Vaudreuil to Rouille (April 8, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 572-586, in GAB.

The French had to avoid complications with the intricate and interwoven alliances in the Ohio Country, and could not act overtly. Far-off or distant native tribes were under no such restriction.36 While any actions taken had to be careful, they would also need to be so completely successful as to not allow an opportunity for reprisal. This offered Langlade and his Ottawa and Chippewa allies an opportunity; Langlade sought to ingratiate himself to the French to empower his people, and removing the Miami threat would certainly do that. The Ottawa and Chippewa were not required to abstain from a conflict with the Miami, and were unknown to the other peoples of the area. The French were not prepared for or aware of Langlade’s plans to take the Miami situation into his own hands, but they would benefit from it greatly.37 The French leadership discussed Memeskia’s actions, and the need to respond, but never suggested inviting Langlade and his kinsmen to intervene. Nonetheless, Natives were well aware of the value intervening would have to the French, but could not be induced to act if they were not interested; they had to resolve to act on their own. The French Governor-General, Charles le Moyne de Longueuil, complained that the conditions in the Ohio Country were becoming “more annoying,” and that it seemed irresolvable. All proposed solutions could “apply no remedy to it.” It was then that Langlade and his forces struck, killing Memeskia, dispersing the British, and sending the remaining Miami back to onontio.38

36 Rouille to Duquesne (July 9, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 648-651, in GAB. 37 La Jonquiere to Celoron (October 1, 1751), in Illinois Historical Collections, French Series, Vol. III, 381-393, in GAB. Prior to the actual raid, there was no record of Langlade being employed to actually conduct the raid, and French leadership seems to have justified their alliance with him after the fact. 38 Longueuil to Rouille (August 18, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 652-653, in GAB.

Unlike previous efforts, Langlade’s victory was so complete that there were no Miami left to resist, nor any left to rally their allies. The Miami had their leader killed, British traders kidnapped, and suffered a humiliating defeat. They attempted to call upon their British allies for some kind of concrete assistance, pleading with them for war and military aid. There was some money and some goods apportioned to them, and to be given to the Delawares, Shawnees and others, but no indication that anyone actually acted. This was far too little, and the victorious French were able to “force them to terms.” With no assistance, the Miami limped back North to their previous territory.39 Upon hearing the news, Longueuil was not immediately aware of Langlade’s actions, only that Natives had been involved; it is apparent that Natives were acting on the behalf of the French but without overt direction or negotiation.40 The French had not been able to coerce Natives to intervene; the situation was solved by enterprising Natives acting to secure their own interests; Langlade and his band knew that there would be prestige and rewards for their actions, which were a currency that had value on many fronts. The French claimed that the Ottawas “have themselves subdued the rebel Miamis.” The only thing the French were left to do for the Ottawa was, “maintain them in their loyalty.” This was precisely what the Ottawa sought to do, knowing that the French would reward them for their actions. They independently moved on the Miami to court the French, and the French understood that they were bound to favor the Natives for

39 William Trent, The Journal of Captain William Trent, From Logstown to Pickawillany, AD 1752 (New York: Arno Press and New York Times, 1971), 49-55. 40 Longueuil to Rouille (August 18, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 652-653, in GAB.

their actions.41 Langlade himself did not get credit for some time, an oversight not addressed by the sources, but he was ultimately awarded money and thanked for his efforts in resolving the situation.42 Charles de Langlade and the Ottawa/Chippewa raid was the decisive restoration of the balance of power. It removed British traders, destroyed an enemy settlement, and killed a perfidious leader. This threefold strike devastated British influence in the Ohio Country, and therefore increased the influence of the French. The Miami clearly saw the attack on Pickawillany as retaliation by (or on the behalf of) the French, and recognized the goals of their attackers; this became more apparent when the Miami gave up the British traders in residence at Pickawillany to their enemies. They traded their British allies for a reprieve from French punishment; this symbolized the balance of power being restored.43 The Miami returned to the French fold after the attack. With Memeskia, “the cause of their rebellion,” dead, they began the process of reconciliation with their former allies. The French concluded that further punitive expeditions would still be necessary among Memeskia’s allies, to “make them feel their fault.” More importantly, actions would have to be taken to “force the English to retire from our lands and prevent them from penetrating further.” Both of these would require further diplomacy to mobilize the allies necessary to achieve French goals. The

41 Bigot to the Minister (October 26, 1752) in Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania, 39-43, in GAB. 42 Du Quesne to Maurepas (October 25, 1752) in Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 128- 131, and Duquesne to Machault (October 10, 1754) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 904-905, in GAB. It is worth noting that Governor Duquesne claimed that the previous governor, La Jonquiere, had dispatched Langlade. But there is no correspondence from La Jonquiere suggesting he had any idea, and he was dead over three months before the raid took place. 43 Macarty to Vaudreuil (September 2, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 682-689, in GAB.

39 blow that Langlade had struck was a reduction of British power and an increase of French power, conclusively ending the threat of Memeskia and asserting a dominance that would not be challenged again until the Seven Year’s War.44 Memeskia’s demise was not the ideal outcome of his conduct, but his rise to power is illustrative of the larger currents in European-Native diplomacy. He was able to reach out to the British and grab hold of their valuable goods for his people. His negotiations with the British increased his own power exponentially, from a splinter of the Miami into the primary faction of that tribe; the British, especially traders like George Croghan, were similarly able to capitalize on his choices to expand their own power. The Miami leader understood how powerful commercial goods could be in his gambit. With the goods he acquired he not only increased his own influence, but also was able to draw in allies who were not satisfied with their access to valuable commodities. The key currency in his conduct and the alliance with the British, as well as his defection from the French, was access to goods. And the French did not intentionally offend him, nor did the British force him into their stead. Memeskia took the path most beneficial to himself and his people, and weighed varying factors and considered competing challenges before making his decisions. The French could not force him back, and the British smartly courted him; but Memeskia acted independently, a recognizable agent in the process. Unfortunately, Memeskia’s choices had implications on the Imperial struggle between the French and British. His decision to leave the partnership with onontio reduced French power, and any such reduction always created an attendant gain in British power. The British gain was at the French expense, and as

44 Vaudreuil to Rouille (September 28, 1752) in Jenison, French Series, III, 725-729, in GAB.

40 the situation became more desperate so did the French, because that power could not be shared or increased, only redistributed. Langlade and his party of Ottawa and Chippewa warriors conclusively redistributed the power by breaking the source of the French loss, and reducing the British gain back to nil. Langlade parlayed his leadership among the Ottawa into favor and prestige with the French, whose leaders were finally able to claim victory after a long, frustrating struggle. Both benefited from their shared victory. For the French it was a happy accident, the lucky result of independent allies taking it upon themselves to fix a problem, a result of their long efforts at diplomacy. Langlade financially prospered as did his allies, an impossible to overlook benefit of his actions. These recurrent themes are evident during the raid on Pickawillany, and integral to the wider understanding of Native diplomacy. Because Pickawillany exemplified the process of this diplomacy, it is incredibly useful as a source of insight and comparison. In each actor and each event we return to the reappearing aspects of Native diplomacy, aspects in play repeatedly in events beyond Pickawillany. The events that drew Charles de Langlade and the Ottawa warriors to Memeskia are emblematic of the process of Native diplomacy; this event is perfect in its ability to act as a focus for this wide-ranging and important process.

CHAPTER 2: RITUAL VIOLENCE AND CONFLICTS OF OWNERSHIP

“All the Ohio Indians have declared war against the French and laid themselves under a solemn oath, to eat every Frenchman they can lay their hands on, and not to leave a man, woman, or child of the Tawaw [Ottawa] Nation alive.” -New York Mercury, November 20th, 1752

In the months preceding the raid on Pickawillany, Ottawa warriors allied to the French sent messages to Memeskia and the Miami. They did not speak to their foes personally, did not use words, and did not write letters. Instead, they resorted to an ancient form of communication very familiar to both sides. The Ottawa scalped Miami where they found them, an act of violence whose implications reverberated back along lines of communication to their recipients. The scalping was highly visible and effective at bridging the significant distances between the nations.1 The French, for their part, saw the scalping as allies acting on their behalf, maiming rival tribes for favor and bounties that the French offered. While the French understood that there was a significance to the scalping for the Ottawa, they were only able to view the violence in the context of their own interest. Their letters were a method by which the French claimed ownership of the violence, because as they saw it, it was at their whim and served their interests.2

1 Macarty to Vaudreuil (March 27, 1752) in Huntington Library Manuscript., Loudoun Coll., 339, in GAB. 2 Macarty to Vaudreuil (September 2, 1752) in Huntington Library Manuscript., Loudoun Coll., 687, in GAB.

When Charles Langlade and his Ottawa allies and kin overcame the resistance at Pickawillany, they punctuated their attack with two instances of cannibalism. Memeskia was boiled alive and eaten by the victorious Ottawa and Chippewa, while a wounded British trader had his heart ripped out and devoured. The terrifying news of these cannibalistic acts would travel to the allies of the Miami, a clear message about the cost of leaving onontio’s web of allies. More importantly, it carried an implication: if you do not return to the brotherhood to be reincorporated peacefully, then you would be incorporated figuratively. Memeskia had re-entered the French alliance, via a digestive tract instead of diplomacy. The perpetrators, the victims, and those who would soon hear of the attack were all accustomed to this method of communication.3 In New York and Boston, news of the terrible violence was reported in colonial newspapers. The death of the British-allied Memeskia was taken as a great affront by the British, who saw it as an example of savagery, not just by the Natives but by the French. The newspapers reported that the Six Nations were being summoned to answer this insult. The mobilization of British opinion about the act represents an attempt by the British press to reorient and define the attack, to make it part of the context of Franco-British rivalry. They were less interested in the implications of the attack than they were in owning the event, in making it an action that spoke to them.4 Both scalp-taking and cannibalism were acts of ritual violence, a form of violence which holds a symbolic value for the person enacting it. This form of violence is not a heedless, barbaric frenzy or torture purely for the express

3 Trent, 86-88 for details of the cannibalism; White, 231 for the implications of the act. 4 New York Gazette, 27 November 1752, Boston Post-Boy, 27 November 1752, and Boston Evening Post, 27 November 1752.

43 purposes of terror or intimidation. Instead it is essentially the vocabulary of an unspoken language, a form of discourse which conveys meaning to one’s rivals and allies. Ritual violence, as practiced by the Algonquian and Iroquoian peoples, had to be visible and terrible, so noteworthy that news of the action would travel to other participants in the discourse. It had to be symbolic, conveying an important lesson to both foes and friends alike, a lesson which is culturally valuable to the perpetrator and the victim. Ritual violence conveyed a message when it was employed, but also followed very specific rules. The structured and culturally accepted ways in which the violence could be enacted underlies the very definition of it being a ritual. Only in the context of accepted and clearly delineated forms of conduct could the violence be effective. For example, among Algonquian nations (such as the Miami) killings had to adhere to standards depending on the tribal membership of the victim. An enemy could be killed wherever he was found, a sharp difference from European standards that restricted such killings to the battlefield. The killing of an ally, however, was always forbidden, but could be rectified by similar ritual practices. The Algonquian and Iroquoian participants in the events surrounding Pickawillany therefore subscribed to a very specific and clear body of laws that recognized violence as having acceptable applications, and implied values.5 The Algonquian and Iroquoian peoples shared a number of cultural practices and there was a great degree of familiarity between the two. The expansion of Iroquois power in New England during the 16th and 17th century dispersed the Algonquian nations into Canada and the Ohio Valley, with frequent clashes, treaties, and tribal alliances. This contact meant that ideas and cultural

5 White, 80.

values would be adapted or shared by the two groups, and they were intimately familiar with each other. It was to the Iroquois that the Miami turned to when seeking an alliance with the British. The two cultural groups, despite being frequent enemies, obviously shared a degree of familiarity, and that extended to the realm of ritual violence.6 The Iroquois’ own practices of torture were indicative of values shared by both groups, and illustrates how organized and conceptually important ritual violence could be. Captured enemies would be slowly dismembered over a period of time in the middle of the Iroquois settlement. It was important that that their deaths be prolonged to occur with the rising of the sun, and that the warriors were given the opportunity to die bravely. The resultant corpses had to be disposed of in a very specific manner, because there was a fear that improper burial could produce wandering spirits. Finally, the hearts of the victims were often devoured, to add the power of the deceased to the eater. It is likely that Memeskia’s death also involved this particular ritual, as his power was very great. These were not practices rooted in disorganized cruelty, but in important cultural values.7 A parallel experience of ritual violence is the contest over ownership of the event. As Jill Lepore writes, “wounds and words – the injuries and their interpretations - cannot be separated, that acts of war generate acts of narration.”8 The moment one of these acts were perpetrated, a battle broke out to define and own the event. Native and Europeans struggled with each other to own and control

6 Ibid., 1-3. 7 Richard J. Chacon and David H. Dye, eds., The Taking and Displaying of Human Body Parts as Trophies By Amerindians (New York: Springer Media, 2007), 194. 8 Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), x.

the violence and its implications, to place it in a context of meaning for themselves. Each group pursued ownership in different ways. The French commiserated with one another, confirming events as important to their governance of their lands. The British published accounts in newspapers, interpreting the meanings for the literate public and shaping the perception. Natives used such events to compel their neighbors or European allies to respond to such events, or confirmed allegiance with the evidence. In each case, the parties involved were making it their own. The events leading up to and including the raid on Pickawillany were rife with expressions of ritual violence by the Miami, Ottawa, Chippewa, and others. The trajectory of the entire affair was informed and mutated by these acts and were a vital component in the conduct of the Native participants. Correspondingly, Natives and Europeans worked to own these acts and give them further meaning. To understand the raid on Pickawillany is to understand larger discussions on ritual violence and its implications. * * * Memeskia’s rebellion was dangerous to the French on a number of fronts. The greatest peril came from the potential for other Native peoples in the Ohio Country to be persuaded to join the Miami. As the open resistance of the Miami gained momentum, they became more willing to offend the French. By the summer of 1752, the Miami had outright killed Frenchmen, and allied peoples among the Piankashaws had followed suit. Violence in these Native societies always carried a message, and Memeskia’s message was one of defiance and dissent.9

9 Rouille to Duquesne (July 9, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 648-651, in GAB.

Le Pied Froid had foreseen the trouble, and gave evidence of its increasing intensity as early as September 1749. Even though Memeskia’s band left the camp of Le Pied Froid, they still attempted to lure him and his followers into their fold with wampum and British goods, something they also did with other potential allies. When the Miami were not successful in using goods to shape their alliance, they moved from the symbolic language of trade and gifts to that of violence. After 1750, the allies they courted were drawn by violence and its implications.10 The very overt resistance offered by the Miami continued to draw attention. The bloodshed they had perpetrated against the French was signaling to their neighbors their own power, the power of their British sponsors, and their willingness to dispute ontonio. The death of French people at the hands of the Miami was impossible to overlook, an action of such temerity against French allies that other Natives immediately took notice. Violence spoke in a way far more efficacious and far more extensive than even tribute. The acting governor of New France, Charles de Moyne, said that “not a party of Indians goes to Beautiful river but leaves some there to increase the rebel forces.” Once the attacks had begun, it attracted other dissenters, who desired better, cheaper goods from the British or held their own grievances against the French.11 Memeskia was participating in a discourse of violence, a discussion carried out in ritual and transmitted among others who understood it. There are no records kept by the European participants to indicate that the Miami were engaging in any particularly heinous or bloody cruelty, by European standards, and Europeans

10 Raymond to La Jonquiere (September 5, 1749) in Illinois Historical Collections, French Series, vol. III, 108-110, in GAB. 11 Longueuil to the French Minister (April 21, 1752) in Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 104-117, in GAB.

were always very attentive to such practices. In the French accounts penned by Governor Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the only ritualistic form of violence discussed is the passing and almost dismissive mention of mutual scalp-taking by the various Native peoples. The fact that scalp-hunting had become so commonplace as to be mentioned lackadaisically demonstrates the pervasiveness of the ritual and the prevalence of this particular “phrase” in the language of ritual violence. The efficacy of scalping as a tactic of intimidation and terror is indicative of how a form of violence can become widespread: because it is so remarkably effective in speaking to many participants; the “habit of scalping a slain enemy was seen as a singularly savage way of proclaiming triumph.”12 In the ultimate testament to the effectiveness and power of scalping, Europeans began to adopt and use the tactic as well, both on Natives and their fellow European.13 Scalping, as a practice, was powerful and widespread, because doing it would convey meaning to a disparate population of varying cultural heritage, as well as span long distances. In fact, there is ample evidence suggesting that many Native tribes did not originally engage in the practice. After it became apparent that scalping was effective in communicating to outsiders, it spread to other nations. Cannibalism can trace a similar lineage through the history of ritual violence. One reason it was so effective because of its unrivaled ability to draw attention, and became more frequent because of that effectiveness.14

12 Bernard W. Sheehan, Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 59-60. 13 Lepore, 148. 14 Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 166.

When Charles de Langlade and his band arrived in Pickawillany, and they too were fluent in this discourse of violence. Langlade’s allies and warriors were from the Nations of the Council of Three Fires, the Chippewa and Ottawa. The Council of Three Fires were part of the greater Algonquian cultural group, like the Miami, and understood the value and power of violence, particularly the power of ritualized infliction of pain or maiming to send very specific messages to others. As staunch allies of the French, they needed to do something that would resonate with other allies who were considering defection. Whatever happened that day at Pickawillany needed to convey a clear message to the surrounding nations, and to the British allies of the perfidious Miami. It was intended for multiple audiences, sending different messages to each.15 The Miami fort at Pickawillany was separated into two encampments. There was the larger Miami dominated encampment that had been entrenched and fortified to an extent by British traders to serve as the proper trading post. Near it was a smaller fort inhabited mostly by Piankashaw, one of the allied tribes who were frequently mixed among the Miami. Altogether, the two forts held about 220 people, and frequently hosted British traders, several of whom were present at the time of Langlade’s arrival.16 There was no artillery of any kind at the encampment, something atypical of European trading posts. The ineffective defenses were a cause for concern; George Croghan had tried in vain to expand the defenses at Pickawillany, which contributed to the great success of Langlade’s attack.17

15 James A. Clifton, et al, People of the Three Fires:the Ottawa, Potawatomi and Ojibway of Michigan (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Grand Rapids Inter-Tribal Council, 1986). 16 Macarty to Vaudreuil (September 2, 1752) in Pease and Jenison, French Series, III, 684, in GAB. 17 Wainwright, 44 and Trent, 33.

Of the limited sources available regarding the attack, the account given to Governor Vaudreuil appears the most authoritative, as it draws on reports from both the victorious party of Langlade as well as a number of Illinois who gave their testimony independently. These Illinois were members of the French alliance, but had also remained in communication with Miami. The journal of British trader William Trent further corroborates the account, although with less detail. The one advantage of Trent is that he draws directly on a missive sent by the Miami, giving us a closer approach to an eyewitness from their side of the conflict.18 Langlade’s band fell upon the settlement and killed thirty-two men, losing only four of their own. Considering the prevalence and success of ambushes in Native warfare and the great distance that had thus far insulated Pickawillany from French retaliation, there is no reason to believe the Miami were prepared for this attack. While Memeskia knew he was antagonizing the French and should expect some kind of reprisal, most of the Natives in his immediate vicinity of Pickawillany had been reluctant to act, and other hostile tribes seemed too far afield. The warriors of the Miami were mostly away at the time of the attack, as well, weakening the defenses even further. In the course of the ambush and subsequent combat, most of the Miami retreated to within their fort, and negotiations began.19 In the initial attack, Langlade and company captured four women and used them as leverage; the exchange of prisoners was an old tradition among Natives, and a vital part of warfare. Algonquian and Iroquoian forms of warfare both

18 Macarty to Vaudreuil (September 2, 1752), 659-684, and William Trent, The Journal of Captain William Trent, From Logstown to Pickawillany, AD 1752 (New York: Arno Press and New York Times, 1971). I will be using both sources to create this narrative. 19 Macarty to Vaudreuil (September 2, 1752), 680-681, and Trent, 46-49.

50 concentrated on the taking of prisoners before the inflicting of casualties.20 The Miami were in a difficult position. Their main body of warriors was still away, and the force arrayed against them was significant. The forts had no artillery or other way of dispersing the attackers, meaning that Pickawillany would be under siege unless their warriors managed to return in time. Being inside the fort also separated the Miami from the abundant corn fields they required for food. Furthermore, the fort had no water, which made resisting the siege especially difficult.21 Considering the cultural imperative to negotiate and exchange prisoners, and the unenviable position of the fort, they parlayed with the attackers. The women were offered back to the Miami in exchange for a select group of captives: Memeskia and the British Traders. For the Ottawa and Chippewa, the symbolism of the raid would require both the British foes of the French and the wayward ally of the French, so that is who they sought. Additionally, the French were most interested in British captives. Ultimately, the Miami gave up the six British traders in their fort, as well as Memeskia.22 The Miami openly declared that they saw the hands of the French in play, and Langlade’s band responded that they were willing allies of the French. What followed was the proof of their commitment to the French cause. The time finally came to answer the ritual violence of the Miami with their own, and Langlade’s band needed to reinforce loyalty to ontonio. The surrounding nations would be exposed to this message in an unmistakable way. Memeskia was taken to a spot

20 Lepore, 117. 21 New York Mercury, 20 November 1752. William Trent provided this tidbit about the supplies of the siege in the article in question, but he does no repeat that information in his journal. 22 Macarty to Vaudreuil (September 2, 1752), 682-689, and Trent, 49.

within 100 yards of the fort and devoured by the victorious Chippewa and Ottawa. The gruesome display symbolically reincorporated him into the French alliance.23 They repeated their cannibalistic effort on one of the wounded British traders, which no doubt frightened the remaining British captives and the Miami remaining behind. French records specifically note that “one of these English was eaten by the Chippewa who had lost men.” The wording suggests this first act was purely retributive, to frighten and punish the English who had wronged them and to make up for the loss of warriors in the attack. The French noted as well that this action would “disgust” the English, and ideally make them feel unsafe pursuing further actions.24 The ritual violence visited upon the captured foes from Pickawillany was standard. Tenets of warrior conduct and bravery dictated that those captured or who surrendered were to be treated with little sympathy. They had failed in their duty as warriors and whatever they were exposed to was their proper treatment. Still, the killing of such prisoners had to adhere to ritual, because “War was deeply ritualistic, seeking support from supernatural powers and purification for the unnatural act of killing.” Improper preparation or execution of the prisoners would render the ritual moot.25 Charles Langlade’s exact role in the cannibalism is unknown. The French records do not indicate that he had any part of it, but their mentions of him are mostly restricted to his abilities with the Natives and his successful attack.

23 Ibid. 24 De Ligneris to Vaudreuil (October 3, 1752) Huntington Library Mss., Loudoun Coll. 398, in GAB. 25 Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815 (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 27-28.

However, no British source, nor the testimony of the Miami after the fact, notes that there was a white man among the attackers. Both parties would enthusiastically seize upon any opportunity to identify a specific Frenchman as responsible, but neither did. It stands to reason that Langlade, who was certainly there, must have blended in with his allies and kinsmen, taking on the appearance of an Ottawa warrior. If he were so thoroughly integrated into the Ottawa as to appear as one of them, it is possible that he might of even participated; at the very least, he condoned it. The remaining British captives taken by Langlade were returned to New France. Naval captain and French official Marquis Duquense expressed delight at the prospect of receiving British prisoners from this exchange. Duquense noted that this action gave them prisoners that they could use as they wished, and who they could punish appropriately for their trespass against the French. They were even more pleased by the collateral effects of the raid, as the damage dealt to the English in the raid would “discourage them from trading on our lands.” Ottawa and Chippewa cannibalism had sent a message to the Miami, to the British, and to the French, a multifaceted statement that altered the experience of each group26 The attack demoralized and scattered the Miami, and the severity of the response reached all the way into British colonies, and spread among tribes near the Miami. This was a classic tactic, as “Indian forms of war depended on the multiplication of panic,” which was often engineered by making their actions obvious and unavoidable – like the killing of a king in a gruesome way in the sight of his followers. At other times, warriors would leave slain rivals in the middle of

26 Du Quesne to Maurepas (October 25, 1752)Du Quesne in Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 128-131, in GAB.

well-traveled roads or in other noticeable places so that their declaration in the discourse would be impossible to misunderstand. A single killing in a horrific manner created terror far beyond the extent of that single death. This “multiplication of panic” would carry their acts farther, and therefore their meaning would travel farther as well.27 For the Miami in particular, the power of the ritualistic devouring of Memeskia was overwhelming. After the affair was over, they sent a message to the Provincial Council in Pennsylvania pleading the assistance of the British in taking revenge on the French and their allies. The Miami said that they were “more discouraged for the Loss of our Brother the Englishman...than for the Loss of ourselves.” Without the British, the Miami lacked an ally to provide vital trade goods and a competing European to use as a lever in their affairs with the French; the raid was a serious impediment to their continued dominance and was devastating to Miami ambitions. In claiming that the loss of the British traders was more damaging than the loss of their own populace, the Miami were likely pursuing two motives. First, it was an attempt to convince the British of their continuing amity and devotion by so greatly mourning the loss. Second, it was an appeal to their kinship and mutual loss to convince the British of their own need to respond.28 While entreating the British to aid them in taking vengeance, the Miami lamented that their “great King” was eaten before them, a particular focus of their message. The Miami were prepared for losses suffered in battle, but the death of

27 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: WW Norton and Co, 2008), 42. 28 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (October 16, 1752) in Pennsylvania Provincial Council Minutes, Colonial Records, Vol. V, 599-600.

their leader was exceptionally defeating. The particular way that he was killed was deeply demoralizing. His horrifying death before their very eyes was devastating, as intended, and the Miami said that, “We now look upon ourselves as lost Peoples.” Memeskia had been instrumental in securing British friendship and expanding Miami influence. Without his visionary direction to lead them, and with the loss of the British traders, the Miami felt adrift in the hostile middle ground between the French and British. 29 * * * In the months following the raid on Pickawillany, a second struggle ensued. The French, British, and Miami participants and observers of the raid each began to frame and shape the event to serve their own interests. All of them were trying to own the event, to claim it for themselves and give it a meaning in a context specific to that party. Since ritual violence was so powerful and visible, each group approached it differently; their efforts gave ritual violence a secondary currency beyond that intended by the performers. Most importantly, the portrayal of the event in this struggle for ownership was a reflection of the perceptions and beliefs of the respondent. A New York newspaper was the first to publicize the even on November 10th, 1752. Where the details given to the Pennsylvania Provincial Council and to the French governor spoke of the cannibalism in a general sense – Memeskia and the injured British trader had simply been eaten, The New York Mercury presented a much more horrifying account. Now the Ottawa and Chippewa had “ripped up some of the White Men’s bellies,” instead of eating the single captive. They had

29 Ibid.

not simply consumed Memeskia and the trader, but in a “most cruel act” had “eat[en] their hearts and livers with many other shocking acts of barbarity.”30 It cannot be ruled out that the horrid feast did not include heart or liver, but the account is strangely specific about that particular fact. The cannibalism and the killing were bad enough, but the writer expands the scope (multiple White men instead of the one) and adds on vague but incriminating extensions to the acts, as though something like cannibalism needs to be expanded to be frightening. The specific gory details and the undefined “acts of barbarity” were keying in to British perceptions of Natives, especially French-allied Native peoples, and building upon the accepted view.31 Merchant William Trent, an authority on Pickawillany and the Miami, confirmed that the Ottawa and Chippewa were very keen on getting the British traders as prisoners, reinforcing what was stated above – that the intention of the raid was to capture the source of the problem, the British traders.32 Trent did add a likely event of some trophy taking: the fingers of the dead British trader were cut off and kept by Langlade’s warriors.33 Trent and the anonymous writer of the New York Mercury article were crafting the perception of the event for their readers, explaining its importance to British interests. In and of itself, the tales of Native violence were not new to the British, who understood that Natives often practiced such forms of “savagery” with specific goals in mind. What is more important is that the writer was attempting to reorient the violence solely towards the British. The British traders were an excellent prize for Langlade, but the intent of the raid was to punish and

30 New York Mercury, 20 November 1752. 31 Silver, 30. 32 New York Mercury, 20 November 1752. 33 Ibid.

discipline Memeskia and scare the British and their Native allies. The newspaper repositioned the conflict into a Native raid to capture the British, masterminded by the French. The writer of the article was pursuing an agenda familiar to the reader, constructing the event in terms of the more important Franco-British imperial conflict. Newspapers were influential conduits of information in British North America, and the news they carried across the colonies unified opinion and connected the readers to their fellow colonists, and their interests. The New York Gazette, and two Boston papers ran the story which now included the response to the attack from Iroquoian allies of the British. The Six Nations were “so exasperated with this treatment of their allies” that they were moved to action. The writer of the New York Gazette article confirmed with an almost palpable glee that the “Six Nations have not yet declared war, but have called in all their warriors, and are making preparations.” The ferocity of enemy savages could only be countered with the noble ferocity of their own allied Natives, and the British were prepared for such a thing. Native peoples were being mobilized by the Europeans here, contrary to the reality of the situation. Truthfully, the Covenant Chain moved the Iroquois to action as allies, not as subordinates.34 Especially noteworthy in all of the later accounts was the threat that the Six Nations and allied Indians in the Ohio Country had taken a “solemn oath to eat every Frenchman they can lay their hands on, and not to leave a man, woman, or child of the Tawaw [Ottawa] Nation alive.”35 This is telling about the perceptions of the British in regards to not just the French-allied Natives, but their own allies.

34 These more detailed accounts are drawn from the New York Gazette, 27 November 1752, Boston Post-Boy, 27 November 1752, and Boston Evening Post, 27 November 1752. 35 Ibid.

Native violence was something performed by savages, or savage affiliates like the French. The British, even when excited about the prospect of mobilizing this violence to their benefit, described it so they could also distance themselves from it.36 They could condone, allow, or encourage violence, but the standards of propriety demanded that they at least make a token condemnation of it as being below them, to confirm their own civilized nature in comparison to the other participants. The British, obviously horrified at the prospect of their people being eaten, do not simply want the Six Nations to go to war with the Ottawa and French, but they wanted them to exact the same kind of bloody vengeance on their rivals. War is not sufficient; they need to eat “every Frenchman they can lay their hands on.” Not scalp them, or capture them, but devour them in the same fashion. This vengeful need for reciprocation expressed just how outraged the British were at the insult they had suffered in the depredation of their allies that the only proper punishment was to carry the same terror to their enemies.37 This was not a violation of the Miami, but of the British, and required an appropriate response. Furthermore, just as the Miami had seen the hand of the French in the raid, so too did the British see their rivals as playing an integral role. The incorporation of the French and Ottawa into the same line of punishment is indicative of a conflation of French actions with savagery. The author of the report printed in the New York Gazette emphasized a response from Chippewa not involved in the raid, disdaining the violence of the “French and the rest that assisted them.” The British papers see the raid as not the action of Native peoples, but of the French – the

36 Lepore, 1-6. 37 New York Gazette, 27 November 1752, Boston Post-Boy, 27 November 1752. and Boston Evening Post, 27 November 1752

others are only assisting them. The retribution was to be dealt to the French and the Ottawa as equal responsible parties, as partners in savagery.38 The newspapers are mobilizing the specter of violence to serve their own antagonism towards the French. Nowhere in the articles is there any statement about the action the British themselves will take. The mention of cannibalism and bloodshed is solely associated with the French and the Natives on each side, and the British seem strangely uninvolved with the efforts to take revenge for the wrong they had suffered. From the account in the newspapers, the reader is led to believe that such savagery is only the province of the French and Natives.39 By comparison, the British remain civilized and upright, an aggrieved party violated by an alien and ancient foe. The writer of the newspaper article positions the Native to reflect a genuine British belief in their superiority over the savage, a long-held virtue in British colonial culture.40 These newspaper accounts are not necessarily reflective of the beliefs of all British colonists, but are representative of the way that Europeans attempted to take control of episodes of ritual violence. Using the predominant mode of communication, their perceptions were shaped to place the raid into a context that they controlled, and that held meaning for them. It was important for the British to claim ownership of these events, which reinforced beliefs about the French and

38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Sheehan, ix-x.

their allies. The event as a British military and political occurrence was very useful in shaping colonial perceptions.41 Prior to the raid, Memeskia received British goods and influence, meeting them at Pickawillany or at Six Nations tribal grounds to negotiate his compensation and broker deals. After the raid, with Memeskia dead, the Miami sent pleading missives to the Pennsylvania Provincial Council. The Miami conjured the image of the dangerous Frenchmen to their British allies, speaking of warriors sent by the “Governor of Canada as a commission to destroy us.” They invoked their brotherhood with their British allies, who they were “willing to die for.” The Miami claim they will “perish here” before they capitulate to French demands.42 The Miami were already in a dire position when they sent this. The violence had left them leaderless and deprived them of influence, and they attempted to claim it as their great sorrow to stir the British to action. While the Pennsylvania council did resolve to send some trade goods as aid, they were delayed until the spring, far beyond when they would be useful. Simultaneously, the Ohio County became much more dangerous for British Traders, evidence of their decayed power.43 The Miami were left to depend on other Native nations for support in their last gasp efforts to oppose the French, who saw Miami silence as “proceeding

41 The French also saw the raid as it regarded them, and the letters written by their leadership were attempts to claim the event. French authorities saw a strike against the British and peace restored to “their” alliance. By rewarding Charles Langlade for his service, they took responsibility for the raid and accepted its implications. The violence was reoriented as a French military excursion that restored peace. For more on this, see Chapter 1, particularly discussions of Native agency. 42 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (October 16, 1752) in Pennsylvania Provincial Council Minutes, Colonial Records,Vol. V, 600. 43 Trent, 79.

60 from their weakness.”44 The British did not act to aid the Miami further, leaving them to French devices. Through their Illinois neighbors, the Miami would finally sue for peace with the French, unable to utilize the violence of the raid to their benefit.45 The event was no longer the destruction of the Miami, but an attack on British interests, or a French restoration of power. Even the Ottawa could claim ownership as the vehicles of French vengeance and the subjects of British revulsion. The people of Pickawillany had lost, and the event now belonged to the others, who had asserted their ownership at the expense of the Miami.

44 Macarty to Vaudreil (September, 6 1752). 45 Vaudreuil to Rouille (September 28, 1752) in Archives Nationales, Ministere des Colonies, C13A 36:118, 725, in GAB.

CHAPTER 3: A PARADOX OF INFLUENCE: CULTURAL BROKERS AS AGENTS AND PAWNS

“He is a person to humor from the power he has on the minds of the Indians.” Governor Duquense, on Charles de Langlade

Standing at Pickawillany in the aftermath of the raid, a hypothetical observer could see two images. Looking north, the observer would see the victorious Charles Langlade absconding with British prisoners. The metis warrior had gained respect and esteem among his Native relatives for helping them secure such a valuable prize, and would gain wealth and power among his European countrymen for striking a blow against their great rival. This man of two societies had improved his standing in each. Turning east, the observer would see a defeated George Croghan withdrawing his goods and influence back to the British frontier. The capable Croghan had used his status as a British trader to gain influence and partners among the Natives of the Ohio country. He used the goods and influence he gained there to expand his wealth and position among in British colonial society. The loss of Pickawilany, an important location for trade and diplomacy, would reduce his power among the Natives and correspond with a reduction of his influence among the British. The myriad connections between the Native and European worlds varied in strength and frequency. Among some peoples, like the Iroquois and the British, there were many strong connections, pulling the two societies tightly together and causing them to overlap and intermingle. Other groups, like the Miami, were more

62 tenuously linked through fewer agents due to their distance, located far from European colonists. In both situations, however, those connections were facilitated by people like Charles Langlade and George Croghan. No matter the nature of the connection, these points of contact were vital and without them Natives and Europeans were utterly alien and unapproachable to one another. Their motives and means could vary greatly, but these cultural brokers linked the societies together in commerce—of goods, ideas and influence. Langlade and Croghan came to Pickawillany from separate directions under allegiance to rival powers. They began at different points of origin and participated in the life of the settlement in far different ways. The interaction of Native and European actors and agents was facilitated by their presence, and Pickawillany itself was drawn into a wider world and a broader context by their actions. An examination of their roles reveals not only their catalytic part in the events of the raid, but a wider understanding of the versatility, variety, and power of these individuals. It similarly exposes a second important truth about them: that despite their agency and power, at times they were at the mercy of their sponsors and the very situations which propelled them to positions of influence. * * * Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade is by now a familiar figure. The leader of the Ottawa and Chippewa war party that descended on Pickawillany, Langlade was instrumental in the destruction of the settlement. A more clear and direct picture of the man is indicative of the operation of cultural brokers in this period amongst Natives and Europeans.1

1 Putting together the early details of Langlade's life is difficult. There are virtually no primary sources. The main source called upon by historians is by Jospeh Tasse, Memoir of Charles de Langlade, from Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Lyman Copeland Draper, ed. (Madison, WI.: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1908). Tasse repeats a mixture of family lore, local history, and legend that

Langlade was born in 1729 at Michilimackinac (modern day Mackinac City, Michigan), the son of one Augustin Mouet de Langlade. Augustin’s family was French, tracing its ancestry back to Basse Guyenne, and originally used the surname “Mouet de Moras.” The patriarch of this family, Pierre Mouet, was the landlord of Moras and moved to Canada in 1668, although the sources do not reveal his motivation. All of his children, Augustin among them, were born in the New World. At some juncture before the birth of Charles, Augustin acquired the title of “Sieur,” although sources do not detail how he came by this honorific; he also changed his surname to Langlade. Augustin was a rare colonial noble, with a title and ancestry back to the mother country. Most such men were in the colonial government.2 Augustin became a successful fur trader, a profitable business for French colonists. He obtained a license to trade legally under the French government, making him a legitimate merchant in the eyes of the colonial authorities.3 Augustin’s trade interests ranged throughout the region that would become Michigan, and his efforts proved worthwhile when he acuqired significant wealth and rose to local prominence.4 The island of Michilimackinac, where Sieur de Langlade operated, was located in the midst of territory belonging to many constitutes the inherited knowledge of Langlade's life. Other historians have drawn on this history, specifically Sandra J. Zipperer, “Sieur Charles Michel de Langlade: Lost Cause, Lost Culture” in Voyageur, Historical Review of Brown County and Northeast Wisconsin, Winter/Spring, 1999 and Paul Trap, “Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade” in Dictionary of Canadian Bigoraphy 14 vols (University of Toronto Press, 1966-). A helpful parallel synthesis of this information is in Michael A. McDonnell, “Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade: Warrior, Soldier and Intercultural 'Window' on the Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes” in The Sixty-years War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814, David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L Nelson, eds (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1998). My account here will draw from all of these sources. 2 Tasse, 124. 3 Ibid., 125. 4 McDonnell, 81.

French-allied Native tribes, most notably the Ottawa. Consequently, his fur trade would be highly dependent on his relationship with these people. Charles Langlade’s mother was known in French as Domitilde; she was a member of the Ottawa nation, and her birth name is unknown to us. Domitilde was the sister of the influential Ottawa leader Nissowaquet, known by the French as La Fourche (“the Fork”). The Ottawa were long-standing allies of the French, joined with them in the extensive network of alliances in which the Europeans played the role of mediator and negotiator between rival tribes.5 Domitilde’s marriage to Augustin was not her first dalliance with a French men; she had a family of metis children by her first husband, and who died sometime in the 1720s.6 She married Augustin thereafter, and Charles was their sole offspring together.7 Domitilde’s marriages to European traders were standard practice for Natives who wanted access to European goods or power, which could be parlayed into their own forms of influence. Political affiliations could be underscored and strengthened by the bonds of marriage and through offspring. For the Ottawa, this marriage could provide more connections to the Europeans, and the “successful manipulation of connections” by Native peoples were integral to their diplomatic efforts.8 Spouses and children were a fundamental link to Europeans that could be harnessed for the advancement of a Native people. Furthermore, marriage alliances were a form of connection both peoples understood. Europeans had long used marriages for alliance in the Old World. Similarly, when the French first arrived in North America, the Algonquian peoples

5 White, x-xi, 2. 6 Tasse, 125. 7 Zipperer, 1. 8 Richter, 99.

they encountered were already tied to each other in extensive marriage alliances. Wars with neighbors and changes in environment had forced many Algonquian nations to relocate to the Great Lakes region. In this new arena, the disparate nations reconstituted themselves through intermarriage. It was an especially useful practice because it allowed the Algonquians to turn “dangerous strangers...into symbolic kinspeople.”9 The birth of Charles Langlade was part of a larger process of creating connections between peoples that were cultivated by cultural brokers. This process was even more important in the case of Native-European pairings, as the two parties were so dissimilar and mutual understandings were harder to come by. As a youth Langlade was educated in the world of each of his parents. He was schooled by Jesuit missionaries in the traditional French manner, and even undertook part of his studies in Montreal.10 This grounding placed him in the status of a colonial elite; his education and his ancestry made him the ideal Frenchman in the Canadian world. According to French custom he would stand to inherit his father’s estate and business as his eldest son, a further mark of European legitimacy. The only quality separating him from most of this French counterparts was his mother’s blood, and there is no indication that his mother’s race was ever held against him. The Ottawa, like most Algonquian peoples, were a matrilineal society, and so young Langlade was strongly linked to his mother’s Native relatives. Among the Ottawa the most important relationship one had was with their maternal

9 White, 15. 10 Zipperer, 1.

uncles, who were responsible for their actions and proper training.11 Langlade’s preparation for life as an Ottawa warrior began at the tender age of ten. His uncle, Nissowaquet, was engaged in a rivalry with a band of Chickasaw who resided to the South, along the Mississippi River. Twice previously the Ottawa had been defeated in battle by this band, but their fortunes changed when the young Langlade accompanied them. The Ottawa believed that Langlade brought with him a beneficial spirit, and he was thereafter seen as a figure of luck and success among his mother’s people.12 This acceptance of Langlade into the Ottawa proper, and his prestige among them, was an intentional cultivation of the very links the Ottawa sought to strengthen with the French through intercultural marriages. They were creating their own cultural brokers to plug them in to influential French allies. None of the sources detail the feelings of Domitilde on the matter, but it is unlikely she sought marriage with Augustin Langlade out of love or purely personal feelings; she was doing her duty by creating such a connection. What to the outsider (or even a European) might appear as a conquering white man taking a wife from the Natives was just as much a power play by the Ottawa. Charles Langlade was the result of each people colonizing the other; both now had a member in the other society, an agent they could employ to their own ends. Even as he would attempt to rise in both cultures, they could use him as well to connect to their counterpart.13

11 Tasse, 125; for the nature of matrilineal relationships, see White, 17. For the power of maternal uncles in Algonquian societies, see Allan Greer, Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 12 McDonnell, 81. 13 Richter, 78 for marriage as duty and reverse colonization.

Charles de Langlade was a perfect storm of cultural interchange. Among the patrilineal Europeans he was educated and of a respectable bloodline, a fitting son to a successful father and most importantly, a Frenchman. He was a loyal soldier as well, a cadet in the colonial regulars.14 To his Ottawa kin he was closely associated with Nissowaquet and a successful warrior in his own right, respected and revered. He stood at the ideal location for a man of influence in either society. More importantly, though, his position made him useful for the two societies he belonged to, a tool they could employ to mobilize or influence their ally. Langlade, like all cultural brokers, walked a fine line between broker and pawn. At Pickawillany we see the power of his influence. Langlade was aware of the desires and needs of the French; he was, after all, a Frenchman and a loyal subject of the King. But he was also intimately connected to his Ottawa kin by not just blood, but battle. He could interpret the needs of the French to his Ottawa allies, and improve the standing of all those involved. The French would be rid of an irritating former ally, the Ottawa would be rewarded, and most importantly he would improve his position in both societies. By the time of his death in 1802 at age 73, he was known as “Akewaugeketauso,” by his Ottawa kinsmen, which means “the soldier chief,” and “he who is fierce for the land.”15 The sobriquet “soldier chief” seems appropriate, as his primary way of aiding the French or Ottawa was by taking warriors into battle. Since combat was the means of his ascension, his leadership was rooted in militaristic conceptions that tied both cultures together, as a soldier for the French and a chief for the Ottawa.

14 Trap, 4:563. 15 McDonnell, 86.

The raid on Pickawillany proved just how integral he was to the French. Governor Duquense fought to have Langlade rewarded and promoted, remarking that “he is a person to humor from the power he has on the minds of the Indians.” The Ottawa must of thought the same in regards to the French. Duquense continued, “I beg of you, ask for him a commission as ensign...this will suffice to arouse his zeal when he is needed.” The Governor understood just how valuable such a broker could be, and needed to retain him; such a bridge to Native allies was ever useful. The Ottawa had increased their prestige, and the French had gotten their victory. Just as Langlade had risen in power, he had done the bidding of his two parent cultures.16 For his part, Langlade would continue to cultivate influence as a cultural broker. In the Seven Years’ War, he brought his warriors to bear against the British time and again, including the famous Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759. Until he finally retired to the shores of Lake Michigan, he reappears repeatedly in the colonial records at the head of Ottawa warriors. His influence was “as strong as his reciprocal relationship between the Indians and the French, or British.”17 As long as he could provide a connection between Native and European, he could cultivate it. But his influence was tenuous, predicated on the complicated dynamics of the borderlands he inhabited, dependent on the needs of his parent peoples. * * * Unlike Langlade, George Croghan was not a Native or a warrior, but he was still a cultural broker. Croghan exemplified another form of cultural broker,

16 Duquesne to Machault (October 10, 1754) in Archives Nationales, Ministere des Colonies, C11A 99:273-280, in GAB. 17 McDonnell, 95.

69 the intrepid merchant and frontier trader. The flow of goods and gifts between Europeans and Natives was critical to diplomacy (see chapter 1). It stands to reason, then, that merchants were on the forefront when it came to forging and maintaining cooperative systems between peoples. These merchants can be compared and contrasted with Langlade and his ilk. These men, at serious risk to themselves, made their way into hostile or neutral Native territories and attempted to forge new friendships, instead of beginning with one foot in Native society. Like multi-ethnic leaders, successful merchants could use their relationships with certain tribes to make contact with more allies. In doing so traders became more familiar with the culture and practices of their trading partners, which corresponded with an increase in wealth. Men like Croghan resembled Langlade in other ways, too: when the European colonial leadership needed assistance or direction on how to deal with Natives, they turned to these merchants and traders, as they had experience and relationships that allowed them to mediate. Economically inclined European cultural brokers frequently used political influence for their own gain, but their self-interest did not mitigate their power in negotiating the relationships between the two societies. Both forms of brokers took advantage of the competition between European powers to increase their own standing, with merchants using competitive prices and access to special goods in the place of raids and kidnappings. Unlike Langlade, Croghan was not a man of both cultures; he was a British subject who acted in British interests. While he was a friend to many Natives, his loyalty was not divided between two worlds. This did not preclude him from being a cultural broker, but is worth considering when appraising his conduct.

The historiography is densely populated with these men. William Johnson was a New England trader who used his “immense charm, cunning and ambition,” to build links with the Mohawks in the 1730s. Through trading partnerships he built a personal domain comprising thousands of acres of land and significant wealth, and gained attendant power of such resources. When the British authorities needed someone to officially represent them and oversee negotiations with the Iroquois, his experience and friendships made him a natural choice, and further magnified his power. He ultimately used that power to help force his Iroquois allies off of their lands.18 Similarly, the Pennsylvania trader James Logan built a mercantile empire around his domination of trade. Originally a farmer of modest means, rising debt and fiscal danger led him to switch his priority to trading with Natives and funneling British goods into the Susquehanna Valley. He “profited handsomely” from the trade he established there, but more importantly, parlayed his experience and commercial power into influence with the colonial government. He ultimately became the chief architect of the Indian policy for Pennsylvania, which further expanded his financial gain. As with the Iroquois, the Susquehanna Valley was eventually taken over by European settlers. Once the French threat was gone, and his Native allies could no longer turn to a competitor, he used his connections to harvest their lands.19 George Croghan was cut from the same cloth as these men, pursuing and attaining power because of the important friendships he cultivated with Native trading partners. Through him, the process by which a motivated businessman

18 Taylor, 3-4. 19 Hinderaker, 22-26.

with fluency in both cultures could become a man of power and influence is apparent. At the same time, his experience was integral in educating the British about Native practices, and his presence was indispensable for Natives wishing to join the British in alliance. His power was highly dependent upon the presence of French rivals he could counter with his goods, and who created a danger that made him useful to the British. His usefulness to his British sponsors was defined by this competition; he served at their pleasure. Croghan’s early life is shrouded in mystery. He hailed from Dublin, Ireland and was presumably born there as well. No records of marriage, parents or education remain, although we can discern from his early letters and accounts that he was nearly illiterate. He was a Protestant, which was useful for him in the religiously intolerant and anti-Catholic world of the British Empire. In North America, he worked closely with various relations, including half-brothers and brothers-in-law, heading west to try his hand at the fur trade. In the early 1740s British fur traders had not ventured far into the French-dominated Ohio Country, which made that region particularly ripe for an enterprising businessman.20 The ambitious Irishman quickly found success in the frontier. Within five years of his arrival in the colonies, he was a licensed Indian trader with contacts extending all the way to Lake Erie. He was widely known as the chief merchant of the Lake Erie region, and was the most successful British trader when it came to penetrating the Ohio Country. His first success was with the Senecas, the

20 A.T. Volwiler, “George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 1741-1782” in The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1922), 273-311. Volwiler's account is the most exhaustive of Croghan's life, and a second account, Nicholas Wainwright, George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1959) follows Volwiler's lead and adds to it. Croghan's own accounts of his life prior to the Seven Years' War are sparse, so these secondary accounts and the notes of those who knew him represent the extent of our knowledge about his efforts at Pickawillany.

westernmost of the Iroquois nations, and through them he was able to befriend many groups in the Ohio country, including the Huron, Wyandots, and Miami.21 In a relatively short period of time, Croghan was able to learn a number of Iroquoian languages and develop an acute understanding of Native culture, which improved his position with the Natives immeasurably. Additionally, whereas other British traders were often condescending or rude to Native trading partners, Croghan was known to be very personable and friendly, at least according to other British merchants who knew him.22 Native people felt attached to and trusting towards Croghan, even insisting that their meetings with other British officials take place on his lands with him present.23 By 1747, one of his allies was the Huron leader known as Nicholas. As with the Miami, Nicholas’s Huron followers and Wyandot affiliates were discontented with French conduct and trade, and Croghan acted on that discontent to court them. Nicholas found a use for him promptly, trading for weapons and important trade goods. With Croghan’s support, Nicholas began to agitate his people against the French from his base near modern day Sandusky, Ohio. Croghan sensed an opportunity to empower Natives against the French enemy, and sosolicited Pennsylvania traders for gunpowder and lead to arm the Natives and to encourage their discontent.24 Nicholas was using Croghan to serve his own ends, and the British were using Croghan to counter the French, even as they enriched

21 Volwiler 287, Wainwright 14. 22 Volwiler, 295. 23 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (May 25, 1750) in Pennsylvania Provincial Council Minutes, Colonial Records, Vol. V, 435. 24 Croghan to Thomas Lawrence (Sept. 18, 1747) in Pennsylvania Archives, First Series, vol. I, 770.

him. As with Langlade, it is difficult to tell when he was an influential broker and when he was a pawn; but he did profit, which was his primary concern. From 1747 to the early months of 1749, Nicholas and his allies engaged in frequent raids and battles with the French, fighting them wherever they encountered them. While it never came to extensive warfare, there was reciprocal scalping and some serious episodes of violence. Croghan evidently had made a great impact on Nicholas, who was fervently devoted to his British ally. At one point, some French traders entered the Huron camp without Nicholas’ consent, unaware that he had become so poorly disposed towards them. He had them summarily killed and gave their goods to the English.25 The sources do not say that Croghan was at the camp that day, but they do indicate that there were Englishman present who encouraged Nicholas’ course of action. There were belts of wampum distributed among the Huron by the British traders, damning evidence of a British attempt to urge the Huron to war.26 The subsequent French perception was that Croghan was responsible, because they believed that he “has at all times persuaded the Indians to destroy the French.”27 Whether he was or not, Croghan had positioned himself as an alternative to the French among the Natives of the Ohio Country, and by encouraging their pro- British sentiment he had correspondingly encouraged their anti-French feelings.

25 Trent, 15-16. 26 Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Volume 17 (Madison, Wis. : The Society, 1888-1931), 459. 27 Wainwright, 14.

His intent, as he claimed, was to “preserve the friendship between them [Ohio Country Natives] and us [the British]”28 Croghan’s success in enticing Nicholas and his band to join the British web of commerce led to greater success. By 1747, he was the chief avenue of communication between the provincial council of Pennsylvania and their Native allies in the Ohio Country. Through him, the council arranged meetings with the Huron, and he was employed to communicate with them about the intentions and actions of the council. He was even compensated in his capacity as a liaison to Native allies, thus accruing power and influence in Pennsylvania through his relationship with Nicholas.29 Receiving pay from Pennsylvania tacitly made him an agent of the British colony, a position that relied on his relationship with Nicholas. In turn, his friendship with the Huron was dependent on his ability to get them British weapons. Even as he counted his wealth, Croghan was serving the needs of two powers. He was connecting the two cultures and profiting from it, but was ultimately at their mercy. Simultaneously, his friendship with Nicholas was building a reputation among Huron allies in the Ohio Country, a reputation reinforced by his access to the colonial power structure. In courting the Miami, Croghan slashed his prices on goods, sometimes offering them for as little as half the price the French offered.30 The new alliance forged between the British colonists and the Miami was only possible because of the economic prerogative of Croghan and the dangerous

28 Croghan's Transactions with the Indians (November, 1748) in: N. Y. C. D.: VII (London Docs.: XXXIV), 267. This document is a record written by Croghan of his own interactions with the Natives he courted. 29 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, Volume 5, 214. 30 Trent, 19.

75 presence of the French. Both sides needed to counter French power and this was an avenue by which that could be achieved. Pennsylvania authorities were elated at this turn of events, and wanted to nurture the friendship with the Miami.31 Ongoing antagonism between the Huron and the French was becoming dangerous to his business, so Croghan encouraged Nicholas to move his band closer to British lands, where French soldiers and French allies were less able to intervene. In the same vein, Memeskia’s initiative to relocate the Miami to Pickawillany was also in response to Croghan’s trade. He made Pickawillany the center of his efforts in the Ohio country, turning it to “one of the strongest Indian Towns upon this Part of the Continent.”32 Pickawillany brought in furs and pelts that the British greatly desired, which Croghan conveyed back to the colony. The exceptional quantity of goods Croghan was securing enriched him personally, but also expanded trade in the colony. The Miami benefited as well, as they were now the primary location for securing British goods in the Ohio Country, a position of considerable influence. British and Miami power in the region was expanding by virtue of Croghan’s actions.33 Nonetheless, there were still some tensions that needed smoothing out. As late as 1750, the Ottawa were still trading with the Miami, not being turned away despite their French allegiance. The Miami were open to receiving goods from the Ottawa, who they did not see as being representatives of the French despite being allied, yet Pennsylvania authorities did not agree.34 These fears of French affiliation often caused tensions between the Provincial Council and the Miami.

31 Ibid., 24. 32 Volwiler, 289. 33 Wainwright, 15-20. 34 Ibid., 38.

As trade increased and Pickawillany rose in prominence, the Miami pressured their Pennsylvania allies for a better road to be built between Pickawillany and the colony. As was their custom, Croghan carried their messages and intent to the British; while it benefited them, it certainly had the appearance of being at their behest. Since some Miami, like those under La Pied Froid, were still allies to the French, the colony balked at the proposition of giving more aid.35 Croghan managed to maintain a good relationship with the Miami. The trader understood the value of gifts to the relationship, and consistently asked for, and received, gifts to distribute among his allies at Pickawillany. He was able to appease them by offering the goods they so greatly desired, and pleased his Pennsylvania patrons by maintaining the Miami in alliance.36 The Miami made overtures to convince him of their allegiance to the British, informing him of the French expeditions that tried to woo them back to onontio. He responded by initiating greater bonds of alliance with the British and providing more of the vital trade goods they desired.37 Like Langlade, Croghan was able to anticipate the needs of both groups and wed their motives to each other to improve his position, as well as theirs. In the months leading up to the raid, Croghan began to encounter some problems. The increasing tension between the Miami and the French made it obvious that Pickawillany would require reinforcement. He petitioned the Pennsylvania council for money to expand defenses or to build forts which would provide a British military presence in the Ohio Country. The council was difficult,

35 Trent, 30-32 36 Wainwright, 35-39 and Trent 31-33. 37 Croghan's Transactions with the Indians, 268.

considering the unwillingness of provincial Quakers to fund violence or war, and so for their part the defenses at Pickawillany remained as they were.38 This was an unexpected failure for Croghan, who had been able to move the council to assist him in the past. Their resistance confirms the delicate nature of the cultural broker – while he was a vital agent, he was also at the mercy of those he served. Undeterred, the merchant continued to agitate for the construction of a fort in the Ohio Country, which he believed would help protect his operations, and the alliance he had fostered there. Croghan and his Native allies contended that such a base would protect “them from the insults of the French.” He took the position of his Native allies very seriously, as they had offered him wampum to press their viewpoint. Unfortunately, an unforeseen problem presented itself. Croghan was an expert in Iroquoian languages, the tongues of his first partners around Lake Erie, and those languages had been vital in providing him avenues of connection to the Miami. He did not speak the Miami language and so relied on an interpreter – a cultural broker’s “cultural broker”—a mixed-race alcoholic named Andrew Montour. Croghan regretted his choice of interpreter when Montour claimed that the Natives did not desire greater defenses, and stymied efforts to reinforce Pickawillany. Montour’s motive is unknown, but it hindered Croghan’s efforts. His allies continued to ask for a fort as late as June of 1752.39 Despite these setbacks, in 1752 George Croghan could feel contented, as he had done very well for himself. Using his knowledge of Native languages, culture, and customs he had created a commercial empire that stretched far into the French sphere of influence, courting nations and bringing them into alliance with the

38 Wainwright, 44 and Trent, 33. 39 Croghan's Transactions with the Indians, 269.

British. The merchant had gained power as a negotiator and trader trusted by the colonial government and native leaders to facilitate their relationship. British influence had increased in the West, and French influence had been reduced. The Miami he had partnered with were at their zenith in terms of power. The lack of increased British presence in the Ohio Country did not appear to be a damaging factor to his future.40 Unfortunately, the lack of French success against the Miami not only galvanized the French to act, but also convinced the British not to capitalize on their advantage. Any time one of the rival European powers waned in power or presence, Natives and cultural brokers lost some degree of influence. Then Langlade and his Ottawa allies struck. Pickawillany was destroyed and the people dispersed, and it appeared that Croghan might have overreached himself. His focus on Pickawillany and the Miami had relocated much of his assets and manpower. Not only was his valuable trading post destroyed, but he was now without important trading partners in an area he had come to rely on. His pastures and the corn he grew at the outpost were lost, and more importantly, so was his influence with the Miami. There was no effort by colonial authorities to protect or save them. One cultural broker had undermined another, illustrating the incredibly fragile nature of their power – success could attract other brokers who knew how to handle the situation in their own right. When Langlade swept in, he took away the British traders that the Miami relied on as a lever for their power, and also boldly asserted French dominance. It was in the margins and borders between powers that cultural brokers were most efficacious, and Croghan was now deprived of that.

40 Volwiler, 290.

After the raid, Ottawa warriors continued to harass him, attacking his traders and allies. They pushed him back, ending his operations in the Ohio Country by 1753, although he retained some influence in Western Pennsylvania. By then, the Pennsylvania provincial council had surrendered their rights in the Ohio country to the colony of Virginia, whose Ohio Company would now be the primary vehicle for trade in the region. Croghan attempted to roll with the punches by altering his operations to work through Virginia. For all his influence as a cultural broker, however, the new reality in the Ohio country had drastically reduced his power and fully defined its limits – he needed both a rival and a compliant sponsor.41 The stroke delivered to his power at Pickawillany was too difficult to recover from, however, and after 1754 he rarely traded with the Indians. Instead he became an Indian Agent under William Johnson, helping to sell Native land to British colonists. While his abilities and capacity for cooperating for Natives was still useful, he could only exercise those abilities where allowed.42 Through trade and commercial goods, Croghan had courted Native allies, and become a trusted partner and ally. As a result of this friendship he was able to increase his wealth and power in Pennsylvania. For both parties, Native and European, he was a valuable intermediary who facilitated a valuable partnership, a useful tool in their quest to use the other for their benefits. Ultimately, his fragile power was too easy to disrupt, because it was dependent on competition that could drastically change, and because for all of his independence and initiative he was still ultimately beholden to his colonial suppliers or his Native clients.

41 Wainwright, 49-51. 42 Volwiler, 304.

In 1773, Croghan was interviewed by a scholar to get his opinions and views on Native Americans. The questions were wide ranging, and typical of the European curiosity about Natives. They covered the personal constitution of the Natives (very robust), their cultural practices (marriage rituals, children, religion) and their practice of war (to capture others and prove their vigor). After his many years of interaction with Natives, he was still being consulted for his knowledge about Native peoples, and still translating their actions and culture to other Europeans. He was no longer doing it for power or influence, however, because those things were not possible anymore; not without French rivals or Natives interested in what he had to offer. Croghan was a cultural expert, but had nothing to broker.43 * * * The European and Native American worlds were not seamlessly knit together. Facilitating the connection between the two were a class of people who stood in each realm, bridging the gaps between the two cultures. These intermediaries could be Natives acculturated to European religion and language or Europeans who had forged links with Native nations. No matter who created the bonds, the cultural brokers were vital in the process of negotiation between both parties Their respective roles and borders could only be crafted when these agents provided the necessary channels of communication. Cultural brokers were not disinterested interpreters, but agents motivated by a desire for power or wealth who used their status as a go-between to advance their own agenda. Leadership structures were symbiotic and diplomacy depended

43 “The Opinions of George Croghan on the American Indian” in The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 1947), 152-159.

on mutual empowerment. Since intermediaries were the conduit for this exchange of influence, they could benefit from their catalytic roles and cultivate their own influence, and their self-interested actions were frequently beneficial to the monocultural leaders they served as well. Unfortunately, their power was suspended among a dangerous web of authorities and competitors, depending on rivalry to create connections and sponsorship to maintain them. While these cultural brokers could exercise significant influence and accrue wealth and power, they were unable to do so independently of their conditions and the motives of those they connected The raid on Pickawillany demonstrates the difficult and delicate nature of cultural brokers, and how these individuals were both agents and pawns in the processes of diplomacy and war. The settlement on the Miami river was impossible without an able broker to bridge the gap between British mercantile interests and Miami needs, without a cunning trader who happily used it to gain wealth, unaware of how tenuous his position was. Colonial authorities employed George Croghan to their ends and used him to pursue their interests, and the Miami engaged him to increase their power. Croghan was integral to the process and greatly improved by it, but also completely dependent on those who maneuvered him to be able to achieve his goals. The destruction of the settlement depended on the actions of a canny agent who understood the proper ways to court leadership in two worlds, a mixed-race warrior who could appeal to the leadership of both his nations. Charles de Langlade brilliantly increased the power and prestige of his Ottawa kin, who used metis go-betweens like him to acquire French support. He was the product of an intention by the Ottawa to do just this. The French kept him on hand because he

82 was so influential in recruiting these special warriors who could fulfill their goals as well. But even the “soldier-chief” Langlade was in a difficult position. Should one side cease to need him to approach the other, he would be powerless and orphaned between the two worlds.

CONCLUSION

The raid on Pickawillany has too easily faded into the longer narrative of the eighteenth century. Often it has been prefigured as a part of the Seven Years’ War, as a prelude to the French and British War, a simple battle or opening salvo. It appears in Native American histories as an event that fits quietly into the discussion of Native interactions with one another, noted but cleaved loose of its implications. By removing it from this context and examining it in its own right, the raid acts as a prism that renders the historical facts into larger lessons that must be learned about Native and European history in North America. As the center of a discussion, not a footnote, the raid on Pickawillany is far more useful. The event can then be seen in two ways, first as a case study of the experiences and interactions of Natives and Europeans in the Ohio Country. It is ideally positioned to explain the wide variety of diplomatic responses, culturally defined violence and intercultural agents that defined the period. It is useful as an event unto itself because it can tell us about so much about those involved. The second view is as a herald of the future. The rise to power of Memeskia, Pickawillany, Charles Langlade and George Croghan all depended on the Franco- British imperial rivalry, on two warring factions with goods and power to offer, to play against one another. It depended on the ability to navigate a land between the two. When one power was removed from the location, everyone suffered and all those involved were less able to pursue their agenda as they had before. The raid on Pickawillany was an event in a long chain that repeated certain understandings about the relationship between Natives and Europeans in the Ohio Country. In the country between the French and British, the Natives were

constantly defining and redefining their roles, acting as warriors, partners, traders or savages in turn to control their lands and define their borders. Europeans and Natives alike were struggling to assert their vision and settle on their role, and always did so in relation to one another. The creation of the settlement, the devouring of Memeskia, the actions of Croghan and Langlade all demonstrate this long, unified narrative, confirming what we have come to understand. The raid proves what we know about the processes of diplomacy and violence, and the negotiation of roles between the competing cultures. * * * The “country between” inhabited by the Miami and the Ottawa, Langlade and Croghan was a shifting ground of alliances and interests, a place where European empires and Native nations contended for power. The Ohio Country was a borderland in many senses: between the French and British, Europeans and Natives, Natives and Natives, “civilization” and “wilderness.” Navigating this borderland was a tricky business for all involved. The raid on Pickawillany was unique in its particular events and participants, but also represents a common set of experiences that reoccurred throughout the shared history of Natives and Europeans. The broad strokes of history teach the same principles that were in play there, lessons about diplomacy, violence, and cultural brokers. But very few events can draw all of these lessons together and illustrate them jointly like the events of June 21st, 1752. That is what makes this event so fascinating and compelling, that a battle between two groups of Natives could have consequences so far beyond their borders and tell a tale so much larger than their own. The historiography has correctly positioned it as part

85 of a larger narrative, but by taking it alone we can learn more about the details of that narrative. The settlement and its destruction illustrated the complex nature of diplomacy between two worlds. The French and British were constantly at odds, maneuvering against one another for influence in North America. In between, Native people like Memeskia were prepared to use this rivalry to their advantage, to harness the imperial conflict to expand their own power. French, British and Native agents were all equally active and responsible for the events, each struggling to seize any advantage they could. Every new twist and turn in this diplomatic process reached out to touch participants far beyond the settlement on the Miami River. Memeskia’s horrendous death at the hands of his enemies was part of the narrative of ritual violence that all Natives in the Ohio Country participated in. The power and significance of his death was far greater than a revenge killing by spited allies, but a statement, a multi-faceted message to Natives and Europeans alike. It was a part of a long record of Native conduct that the Europeans had come to understand and anticipate. And it was one of the many forms of Native culture and action that European observers attempted to take control of and bend to their own purposes. The raid on Pickawillany typified the Native use of violence and the European response. The borderlands were populated by more than just Native actors and their European partners. Existing in a physical and cultural borderland were men like Charles de Langlade and George Croghan, men who forged bonds between Native and Europeans. Langlade and Croghan were of a class that could aspire to great wealth and power because they could navigate the treacherous terrain between the

86 two worlds, two individuals who drew great prestige from Pickawillany, in one way or another. They were also highly dependent, however, on the presence of their enemies to be successful, and both were at the service of those they connected, influential in their unique position but powerless alone. This was an echo of the experience of cultural brokers throughout the colonial period in North America, who saw their power wax as the rivalry between Europeans intensified, and saw it wane when this competition ended. The raid on Pickawillany was a glimpse of what was to come when the Seven Years’ War decisively removed the French from the location. After Pickawillany the Miami were abandoned to the French without a British partner to coax more leverage out of, forced to return as grudging allies to onontio. Similarly, after the war Natives found themselves on dangerous ground as British, and then American, citizens were the sole power they had to contend with. In both situations the lack of a third group to maneuver against reduced their power; in both situations the Natives were less effective in countering their European rival, condemned to fight a lonely battle to defend themselves. When Memeskia used British goods and power to distance himself from the French and assert his own influence, he was exemplifying the conduct of Natives in the Ohio Country. When Charles Langlade and a force of Ottawa and Chippewa warriors destroyed Pickawillany and devoured Memeskia, they were participating in an event significant beyond their present concerns. The rise and fall of Pickawillany tells us about the country between these cultures, and the world made by the men of both. We should keep it in the center of this discussion, and not allow it to slip to the margins – it is far too important to overlook.

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