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The Future of Peace Support Operations

Paper Submitted to the ISROP Programme at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada

March 2003

By Jane Boulden

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of peace support operations since the end of the Cold War and on that basis to discuss the possible form future operations might take and the context in which they might be carried out. To do this the paper has five sections. The first section provides background by briefly describing the provisions for peace support in the United Nations Charter, and the nature of the Cold War experience in peace support. In the second section the paper outlines the evolving nature of peace support operations by first tracing the changing nature of peace support operations in the post-Cold War era, and then discussing the accompanying changes in the approach to peace support – the way in which peace support was pursued. The nature and pursuit of peace support is inextricably connected to the international context that generates it. The third section, therefore, examines the political changes that have occurred in the international system and the related changes in the perceptions of threats to international security and the priorities given to those threats. In order to provide a base from which options for future Canadian policy can be discussed the fourth section briefly details Canadian policy on peace support. The fifth and final section of the paper draws on the preceding analysis to discuss what the future might hold for peace support and what policy options are available to Canada in that future.

It is difficult to examine the evolution of post-Cold War peace support operations without telling full and detailed stories of the decisions and operations in question. As a result, in some instances the implications of important events are discussed but their context is not explained in full. In these cases footnotes with references providing further information are provided. For the purposes of this paper analytical divisions are established with respect to time lines and issue areas. These are rough delineations with considerable overlap. They are not meant to represent hard and fast categorizations rather they are general distinctions used to aid discussion and analysis.

What is meant by peace support operations? The expansion of the United Nations’ approach to international peace and security beyond traditional peacekeeping brought with it a debate on terms and definitions. The phrase “peace support operations” is indicative of that expanded approach by implying that UN operations in pursuit of international peace and security may include operations that precede and follow conflict as well as work to “keep” peace in conflict situations. Analysts and policy makers use a variety of terms in discussing operations which are carried out in pursuit of international peace and security objectives. For its part the United Nations has recently taken to using the all-encompassing phrase “peace operations”. For the purposes of this paper “peace support operations” are taken to include all operations undertaken in pursuit of the international peace and security objectives established by the United Nations Charter short of full-scale enforcement operations of the kind provided for in Article 42 of the Charter.

It is a fundamental assumption of this paper that the United Nations Charter should remain the foundation of international efforts to deal with international peace and security issues and that Canadian policy is and will be based on this assumption. This assumption is open to debate and challenge. The very fact that this is so is indicative of the extent and nature of the changes that have occurred in the post-Cold War era.

In its origins this paper was intended to provide an overview of peace support operations in the post-Cold War era that focused on the nature and scope of peace support and whose conclusions were an extension of that analysis, providing a look into the future which focused on ways in which peace support might develop on that basis. The events relating to the war against Iraq, and the accompanying impact of those events on the United Nations have raised questions about the very future of peace support. As those events are ongoing while this paper is being completed it is as yet too early to provide the kind of detailed analysis about peace support that was originally envisaged. Instead the conclusions deal with the much broader preliminary questions relating to the nature of the United Nations’ future role in peace support and the extent to which it will have a role to play.1 This is not to suggest that there is a level of disconnect between the post-Cold War experience with peace support and the recent decisions about how to deal with Iraq. If anything the discussion and analysis that follows makes the point that both the importance attached to Security Council authorization for action on Iraq, and the decision to use force against Iraq without a direct Security Council authorization for such action, are not a bolt from the blue but a product of the international community’s experience with peace support in the post-Cold War period.

I. Background

The primary purpose of the United Nations, as delineated in Article 1 of the charter, is to maintain international peace and security. To that end, Article 1 of the Charter states that the United Nations shall “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression… and to bring about by peaceful means, … adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” In Article 24 the Security Council

1 For example there is an inherent argument in this paper about the desirability of developing an ability to link the nature of conflict responses to the nature of the conflict in question in carrying out peace support. But the possibility of pursuing this is limited by the decreased likelihood that that level of fine tuning is going to be available in the near and medium term decision-making about the future of peace support. is given the primary responsibility for fulfilling the Organization’s primary goal – the maintenance of international peace and security.

Reflecting this framework of prevention and action, Chapters VI and VII of the Charter establish the ways in which the Security Council will pursue the peaceful settlement of disputes and actions it will take to deal with threats to or breaches of the peace.2 Under Chapter VI states that are parties to any dispute likely to endanger international peace and security are required to “seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice (Article 33). The Security Council can call on states to undertake these actions, can investigate any dispute, or, at any stage, may “recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment” (Article 36). If states fail to settle a dispute by the various means outlined, they are to refer the dispute to the Security Council. The Security Council will decide whether to recommend other procedures or methods, or to recommend terms of settlement.

In contrast to Chapter VI, which deals with situations that may lead to a breach or threat to international peace and security, Chapter VII deals with the existence of such threats, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. Under this Chapter, the Security Council is given the power to determine the existence of a threat to or a breach of international peace and security (Article 39). Once such a determination is made, the Security Council may take or call for provisional measures in order to “prevent an aggravation of the situation,” (Article 40) and has at its disposal various options short of armed force to use in response to a situation (Article 41). In Article 42, Chapter VII gives the Security Council the power to use force if necessary to deal with international peace and security problems. To support the Security Council in its work Chapter VII also provides for member states to supply armed forces to the Council, in accordance with agreements made between the Council and member states (Article 43). This whole structure was then to be supported by a Military Staff Committee, established in Article 47, to assist the Security Council in carrying out its international peace and security tasks.3

The framers of the Charter, therefore, sought to establish a system that would be comprehensive in both its scope for dealing with situations before they become conflicts and its ability to respond when conflict is imminent or breaks out.4 Almost immediately, however, their plans were waylaid by the advent of the cold War. The resulting antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States had a direct and negative impact on the Security Council. The unwillingness of the Soviet Union and the United States to agree to anything supported by or of import to the other power, meant that the Security Council was unable to take action relating to most international peace and security issues, except those few that were out of the range of superpower competition.

2 This description of Chapters VI and VII draws on Jane Boulden, Peace Enforcement, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 3 For more on this see, Jane Boulden, Prometheus Unborn: A History of the Military Staff Committee, Aurora Papers 19, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993. 4 For more on the development of the Charter and the negotiations leading to its creation see, Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1958).

It was in this context that the concept of peacekeeping was created.5 The Suez crisis in 1956 involved Britain and France, both permanent members of the Security Council. As a consequence of their involvement the Council could not agree on a course of action and the issue passed to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution.6 For their part, both the Soviet Union and the United States had an interest in diffusing the conflict before it escalated into a regional crisis that would prompt a serious superpower confrontation. Intense and spirited discussions in the General Assembly led to a proposal for a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to be deployed to the area. With the agreement of the parties involved the mandate of the force was to supervise the cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces, and by interposing itself between the warring parties, to act as a buffer between them while political negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict continued.7

The principles that were developed to guide UNEF became the founding principles for all peacekeeping missions. The principles are: consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self defence. The overall purposes of the UNEF operation were also carried forward into other missions. Almost all of the Cold War peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations involved observation and monitoring tasks relating to ceasefires or other agreements, and sometimes the establishment of buffer zones or lines or demarcation.8 UNEF was the beginning of a long career for the UN in peacekeeping. Between 1956 and 1988, the UN undertook thirteen peacekeeping operations.9

II. Post-Cold War Trends

The Changing Nature of Peace Support

The post-Cold War era at the United Nations can be broken down into three roughly defined phases. The first phase begins in 1988 and extends until the UN-authorized enforcement operation against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The second phase begins with the successful conclusion of that operation in 1991, and extends to the failure of the UN operation in Somalia and the non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994. The third phase begins in 1994 and extends until the present, with the failure of the Security Council to agree to

5 Several good histories and analyses of the development of peacekeeping and its evolution are available. Among the best is: William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 6 For background on the creation of UNEF and the politics of the time see, E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1962); Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, Documents and Commentary, vol. 1, The Middle East (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969); Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold, (New York: W.W. Irwin & Co., 1994). 7 The General Assembly resolutions establishing UNEF are: A/RES/997 (ES-I), 2 November 1956, A/RES/998 (ES-I), 4 November 1956, A/RES/1000 (ES-I), 5 November 1956, A/RES/1001 (ES-I), 7 November 1956. 8 With the notable exception of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which was authorized in 1960 with a mandate to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries and later to prevent civil war. 9 Different people use different end points for the Cold War. This statistic reflects the cut-off period established by Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, p. 8. authorize a resolution directly authorizing the use of force against Iraq.10 The fact that this relatively short period of time involves such different phases of action reflects the significantly increased level of activity of the United Nations in the post-Cold War era, the changing nature of that activity, as well as the degree to which that greater involvement had significant and unforeseen consequences for the Organization. These three phases are not exact and are used to frame the overview that follows in order to provide a sense of action and response that is part of the evolution of Security Council practice in relation to peace and security operations in the post-Cold War era.

Phase One

With the end of the Cold War came a new willingness on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States to work together on international peace and security issues and to use the United Nations to that end. Not only were the superpowers now prepared to countenance a more active United Nations but their own interests in conflict areas also changed, meaning that they were also now willing to involve the UN in conflicts previously protected from UN involvement by the superpower veto.

As a consequence, the United Nations became involved in missions in areas previously deeply entrenched in the superpower struggle: Afghanistan, Namibia, Angola, Central America and Cambodia. The expansion in activity that this represented also brought with it a change in the nature of the peacekeeping operations undertaken. Whereas previously peacekeeping operations had been primarily associated with overseeing the military elements of ceasefires in anticipation of the achievement of broader political settlements or peace agreements, the United Nations now became involved in overseeing peace agreements, drawing it into a situations in which it was not just monitoring interim arrangements but was overseeing agreements whose terms were comprehensive in scope. This comprehensiveness meant that the United Nations was now participating in a wide range of tasks associated with the transition to post-conflict situations, including election monitoring, human rights monitoring, disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and political reconciliation.

This shift began with UN operations in three areas – Central America, Namibia, and Cambodia. In Central America, in 1989 the Security Council established ONUCA as a verification mechanism for the Esquipulas II agreement and subsequent declarations. This was then followed by a UN operation in El Salvador beginning in 1991, ONUSAL, which was mandated to monitor the post-conflict election, government re-structuring and human rights.11 In Namibia, the UN took on the task of overseeing the transition of Namibia to independence from South African rule. The plan for this transition was developed in 1978, but agreement on implementation was not possible until after the Cold War. In 1989, the Security Council established UNTAG and mandated it to oversee

10 The draft resolution sponsored by the Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States was withdrawn on 17 March 2003. 11 The United Nations and El Salvador, 1990-1995, Blue Books vol. IV, (New York: United Nations 1996). the transition. The tasks involved included monitoring elections, monitoring the activities of the police force during the transition period and monitoring the ceasefire.12

These two operations lay the foundation for greater UN involvement in post-conflict transitions, which found full expression in UNTAC, the UN operation to oversee the 1991 Paris Accords bringing an end to the conflict in Cambodia. As part of the Accords, the parties to the conflict agreed to confer “all powers necessary” to UNTAC to ensure the implementation of the agreement. UNTAC’s mandate was, therefore, broad in scope encompassing civilian tasks including the supervision of elections, the repatriation of refugees, the supervision of the existing four factions, and monitoring human rights. Militarily, UNTAC oversaw the cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces, and managed the disarmament and demobilization of troops.13 UNTAC was the UN’s first full-scale multi- dimensional peacekeeping operation. At its height it involved 22,000 military and civilian personnel and remains one of the largest UN operations on record. Its successful conclusion in 1993 was seen as a significant achievement for the United Nations and was held up as a model of what the UN might be capable of achieving in the post-Cold War era.

Phase Two

In January 1992, the Security Council met for the first time at the level of heads of state and, inter alia, asked the Secretary-General to undertake a study as to how the United Nations might be strengthened in its international peace and security undertakings. The request for such a report reflected a new optimism at and about the United Nations that was a product of the initial post-Cold War experiences, culminating in the successful US- led, UN-authorized military operation to liberate Kuwait from Iraq in 1991. The Secretary-General’s report, titled An Agenda for Peace, outlined a series of ways in which the Organization could take on a greater role in dealing with international peace and security issues.

The Secretary-General was expansive in setting out the goals:

[The Security Council,] once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. Our aims must be:

- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before

12 The original mandate was established in Security Council Resolution 435, 29 September 1978. UNTAG was authorized by Security Council Resolution 632, 16 February 1989. For overviews see, Virginia Page Fortna, “United Nations Transition Group in Namibia,” in Durch ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 353-375; Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger, (London: John Murray, 2002). 13 UNTAC was created by Security Council Resolution 745, 28 February 1992, based on a mandate outlined by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council, S/23613, 19 February 1992. For more on the operation see, Trevor Findlay, Cambodia, The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report No. 9, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Also see, United Nations, The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, (New York: United Nations, 1995). violence results; - Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict; - Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers; - To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war; - And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this Organization.14

To fulfill these goals, the Secretary-General outlined a variety of new ideas as well as proposing the resuscitation of some aspects of Chapter VII of the Charter that had been left untouched during the Cold War.15 The scope of the proposals and vision of An Agenda for Peace reflected the level of optimism about the Organization at that time, and the associated willingness to consider new methods and movement beyond previous explicit and implicit constraints in UN roles in dealing with conflict. The ideas in An Agenda for Peace were quickly, even simultaneously, overtaken by events. While the report was being written the Security Council was already moving the Organization into new territory in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

During this next phase of post-Cold War UN operations, four significant inter-related shifts occurred in the Security Council’s approach: a focus on humanitarian aspects of conflicts; an expansion of the concept of international peace and security; a greater willingness to authorize the use of force beyond self defence; and, a greater willingness to move beyond the traditional constraints of state sovereignty to address matters internal to states.

Humanitarian Focus

Beginning in the spring of 1992, the Security Council began expressing its concern about the humanitarian situation in Bosnia in the context of the ongoing conflict there. In response to the continued deterioration of the situation, on 13 August 1992, the Security Council linked the delivery of humanitarian aid to international peace and security, noting that “humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important element in the Council’s effort to restore international peace and security in that area.”16 A few months later, on 3 December 1992, the Security Council determined that the humanitarian situation in Somalia, although self-contained within the country, in and of

14 An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277, S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 15. 15 For example the Secretary-General proposed reactivating Article 43 of the Charter. 16 Security Council Resolution 770, 13 August 1992. itself represented a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 794 found that “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”17 In both conflicts concern about humanitarian assistance remained a persistent theme in the Security Council’s approach.

In Somalia, having determined the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, once the initial crisis aspect of the humanitarian situation was overcome, the Council moved to become more deeply involved in the internal situation there. On 26 March 1993, noting that it was “convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as the rehabilitation of Somalia’s political institutions and economy,” the council authorized a new UN wide-ranging operation to, inter alia, contribute to the resolution of the conflict and the reconstruction of Somalia as a functioning state.18

While the United Nations had previously been involved in situations where it oversaw the transition of a state to a post-conflict status, these had always been in the context of a peace agreement under whose terms the parties to the conflict agreed to end the war and to the modalities of the transition. This was the first time, therefore, that the Security Council had ventured wholesale into the internal politics of a state in the midst of an unresolved civil war before the terms of the transition to peace had been agreed.Speaking before the Security Council after the authorization of the UNOSOM II operation US Secretary of State Madeline Albright described the scale of the effort, stating that the Security Council was about to “embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations.”19

In contrast to Somalia, in Bosnia, humanitarian aid, rather than the specifics of the conflict itself, was the central theme of the Security Council’s response. In spite of any number of broken ceasefires and attempts at peace agreements the Security Council through more than seventy resolutions on the crisis the Security Council kept its focus on dealing with the humanitarian consequences of the conflict rather than the conflict itself. The well-publicized decisions to establish safe areas, for example, as well as the various decisions to use force were all directed at ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid and the protection of civilian populations.20

Democracy

In 1994, the Council once again moved into new territory with its authorization of an operation to reinstate the democratically elected government in Haiti. In its authorizing resolution the Council made reference to its concern about the “significant further

17 Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992. 18 Security Council Resolution 814, 26 March 1993. 19 S/PV.3188, 26 March 1993. 20 For more on this see, Boulden, Peace Enforcement. deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by the de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties, [and] the desperate plight of Haitian refugees”. In conjunction with the existence of the “illegal” regime the Council found that the situation in Haiti “continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region.”21 This concern for democracy seemed to be a one-time event and was portrayed that way at the time. In its resolution authorizing the creation of a multi- national force the Council noted the “unique character” of the situation and its requirement for an “exceptional response”.22

The Use of Force

The expansion of the Security Council’s view of what constituted a threat to international peace and security, its commensurate focus on humanitarian issues and its willingness to become involved in the internal affairs of states were accompanied by a new readiness to use force in implementing these changes. In deciding to respond to the humanitarian situation in Somalia the Security Council invoked Chapter VII and authorized the use of force to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia under the auspices of UNITAF, and then later to facilitate the peace-building mandate of UNOSOM II. In Haiti, the Council’s decision that international peace and security required the restoration of the democratically elected government there led them to authorize “all necessary means” in pursuit of that objective.

The UN’s experiences with the use of force in Somalia and in Bosnia were problematic at best. In Bosnia, in spite of the Chapter VII authorization, the practicalities of operations on the ground meant that UN troops continued to be subject to the willingness, or lack of willingness, of the warring parties to allow them to carry out their mission. This resulted in a constant thwarting of the mandate. In some instances, the Bosnian Serbs took UN troops hostage by way of expressing their displeasure over some aspect of the operation and giving them a further bargaining chip with which to undermine the mission. Over the course of the three years of the UNPROFOR operation, in spite of the frequent invocation of Chapter VII and authorization of the use of force beyond self defence the operation faltered rather than strengthened. By 1994 the operation was on the verge of collapse and withdrawal before the last minute focused involvement of the United States led to a significant strengthening of the enforcement side of the mission and a resultant peace agreement.23

As with events in Bosnia, the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia experienced its own crisis with respect to the use of force. Attacks on Pakistani peacekeepers within weeks of the commencement of the operation led the Security Council to call for the arrest of “those responsible”.24 In pursuing this additional aspect of the mandate, on 3 October 1993, US troops (not under UN command) involved in a raid on a meeting at a hotel became involved in a lengthy battle with local Somali militia. Not having prior notice of

21 Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994. 22 Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994. 23 For background on this see, Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, (New York: Random House, 1998). 24 Security Council Resolution 837, 6 June 1993. the US raid, UN troops took some time to respond with assistance. The battle lasted throughout the night and resulted in the death of 18 US soldiers. The body of one soldier was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, an event that was captured by television crews and broadcast widely on international newscasts. The battle and the accompanying media coverage transformed the hotel raid into an apocryphal event with an impact that reached far into the future. The result was a scaling back in the level of implementation of the mission and an eventual decision to end the mission altogether. The last UN troops left Somalia on 31 March 1995, leaving the country minus a severe humanitarian crisis but otherwise much as it had been when they arrived – without a functioning government and in the midst of a civil war.

The combined effect of the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia was to prompt a scaling back of the Security Council’s enthusiasm for involvement in conflict and its sense of what could be achieved. The most notable evidence of this was the Security Council’s response, or non-response, to the situation in Rwanda. When the situation began to deteriorate in Rwanda in April 1994, the Security Council scaled back the existing UN mission, decreasing the authorized troop commitment from 2500 to 270 personnel.25 The Security Council’s lack of response to the situation in Rwanda, even once the scale of the genocide became clear, is a hallmark for the extent to which the political atmosphere had changed in the United Nations.26

Phase Three

Although it did not cease activity completely, beginning roughly in the mid-1990s the Security Council scaled back both the level and scope of its involvement in peace support operations. After the achievement of the Dayton peace accords establishing a framework for peace in Bosnia the UN remained engaged in the region but delegated the military tasks to NATO. In Bosnia, for example, NATO was responsible for the Implementation Force (IFOR) and then the Stabilization Force (SFOR), mandated to oversee the implementation of the Dayton accords.27 On 31 December 2002, the UN mission in Bosnia (UNMIBH) drew to a close. UNMIBH was tasked with, inter alia, overseeing the law enforcement aspects of the peace accords and at its height involved 2,057 personnel.28 SFOR remains in place, and as of January 2003, with approximately 13,000 troops.29

The Security Council continued to authorize operations in Africa, after Somalia and Rwanda, but the nature of its involvement changed. The Security Council authorized

25 Security Council Resolution 912, 21 April 1994. 26 For more on the Rwanda crisis see Bruce Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 27 The IFOR operation began on 20 December 1995. SFOR took over from IFOR a year later, on 20 December 1996 and remains in place. 28 United Nations, Bosnia and Herzegovina – UNMIBH - Facts and Figures, United Nations website, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibh/facts.html (20 March 2003). UNMIBH was established by Security Council Resolution 1035, 21 December 1995. 29 These troops are from NATO as well as non-NATO states. For more details see, http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm. operations in Angola,30 the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Although some of these operations involved the monitoring of transitions to post-conflict situations, including elections, with the exception of the operation in Sierra Leone they were of a much smaller scale than the operations of the immediate post-cold War period. The operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) is the most traditional peacekeeping operation of the group, with a mandate to monitor the cessation of hostilities between the two states.

The record of achievement in these operations is mixed. The operations in Angola ended unsuccessfully, with the closure of MONUA in 1999 and the country left to deal with the unresolved conflict. In Sierra Leone, most of the first UN operation, UNOMSIL, was withdrawn when the fighting resumed. The follow-on operation, UNAMSIL, ran into trouble when an upsurge of fighting in May 2000 led to the near collapse of the UN operation when 500 UN troops were taken hostage. The operation was rescued by the arrival of UK troops who stabilized the situation. By contrast, however, UNMEE and the UN operation in the Central African Republic have been relatively successful in achieving their goals. And, after being stabilized the operation in Sierra Leone has continued, with British assistance, to work towards the fulfillment of its mandate.31

During this period the Security Council also became involved in East Timor, authorizing three successive operations there beginning in June 1999. The first operation, UNAMET, was mandated to assist and oversee the “popular consultation” on whether East Timor should become independent. After the results of the referendum were announced on 30 August 1999, armed militias opposed to the result of the referendum began a violent destabilization campaign within the country, forcing UN personnel to withdraw to their compound and pushing the operation to near withdrawal. With Indonesian consent the Security Council authorized an Australian-led coalition, known as INTERFET, to restore security in the country and ensure that UNAMET could carry out its remaining tasks. UNAMET and INTERFET were later replaced by UNTAET, a multi-dimensional UN operation whose mandate was to oversee the transition of East Timor to independence, and to administer the country during that transition.32

On 10 June 1999, in the aftermath of the non-Security Council authorized NATO operation to force the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, the Security Council authorized the establishment of two linked operations to deal with the situation there.33 The two operations reflect a delineation between military and civilian mandate tasks. UNMIK deals with the civilian side of the equation, acting as the civilian administration for Kosovo. KFOR is a NATO-led operation that is responsible for the military aspects of the mandate. Authorized under Chapter VII, KFOR is responsible for establishing a

30 In May 1995, the Security Council authorized UNAVEM III in Angola, followed by MONUA, which ran from 1997 to 1999 in Angola. 31 For good background to the early stages of the Sierra Leone conflict see, John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone, Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2001); also see, Ade Abejabo, Building Peace in West Africa, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 32 For background see an account of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ian Martin, Self- Determination in East Timor, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 33 Security Council Resolution 125454, 10 June 1999. secure environment, ensuring the demilitarization of armed groups, monitoring the implementation of existing agreements and assisting UNMIK in carrying out its tasks.

Summary Overview

Beginning with the initial post-Cold War period the United Nations approach to peace support expanded from its peacekeeping roots to include multi-dimensional operations that involved a wide range of post-conflict tasks such as monitoring elections, human rights and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. This involved two significant shifts. The first is the greater involvement in non-military tasks marking a move away from the traditional military focus of Cold War peacekeeping. The second is the willingness to address issues that might otherwise be classified as internal or domestic matters. Although each of the operations in question was linked to international peace and security issues beyond state borders, the nature of the operations indicated that when it comes to international peace and security issues the Security Council was now willing to consider moving inside the bounds of state sovereignty.

Early successes in these operations, combined with the success of the international coalition’s operation in the Persian Gulf, contributed to encouraging the Security Council to continue down this road. In Somalia and Bosnia the Security Council expanded its conception of security to include humanitarian and human rights concerns, and, in Haiti, it added democratic transition to the equation. In pursuing this broader agenda the Council was also increasingly willing to authorize the use of force to ensure implementation of its mandates. These trends came together in Somalia. In its UNOSOM II mandate the Security Council outlined an ambitious peace-building agenda, accompanied by an authorization to use force to pursue it.

The UN’s failure in Somalia and near-failure in Bosnia prompted the Security Council to retrench and re-think the nature of peace support operations. In the period that followed, the Security Council demonstrated more caution and distance in its approach. It authorized fewer operations, and when challenged in existing operations it withdrew or reduced its presence. The Council also tended to limit its own activities to monitoring and observation, of the kind associated with traditional peacekeeping, along with civil administrative tasks, while delegating the difficult military tasks to regional organizations or coalitions of willing states.

Having established the evolution of the Security Council’s thinking and decisions relating to peace operations the next section addresses the nature and implications of these post- Cold War trends in terms of how the Security Council sought to carry out peace support operations.

Changes in the Approach to Peace Support

The trends outlined in the preceding overview reflect a combination of Security Council decisions made in the context of post-Cold War optimism about the United Nations, and the impact of the resulting lessons learned in the context of those experiences. The product is a change in the nature of the United Nations’ involvement in peace support operations and in the way it seeks to put peace support into action. What has remained constant since the beginning of the post-Cold War period is a willingness to deal with intra-state or internal conflicts and to take on civilian tasks as part of peace support operations. What has changed during the course of the post-Cold War period is the Security Council’s sense of what is possible in terms of peace support objectives, and how best to pursue those goals.

Changing Nature of Involvement

The changing nature of the mandates of peace support operations from complex multi- dimensional operations to operations more limited in their scope is not as clear cut as this statement indicates. The Security Council’s shift back to more limited mandates did not mark a return to traditional peacekeeping. While the Security Council scaled back its engagement in large-scale multi-dimensional operations it maintained its willingness to be involved in matters internal to states. It has remained willing to pursue civilian and administrative goals when taking on peace support responsibilities, and to do so on a significant scale. The ongoing full administration of Kosovo, and the administration of East Timor until its independence are evidence of this. Nonetheless, while the Security Council retained a readiness to continue to define international peace and security broadly to include intra-state conflict situations34 that readiness is heavily conditioned by the nature of its early post-Cold War experiences. Expansiveness and optimism were replaced by distance and hesitation. The result was a deliberate decrease in the number of operations authorized, a reluctance to take on significant military tasks directly, and a consequent increase in the delegation of those tasks to regional organizations or coalitions.

Contracting Out

The idea of greater cooperation with regional organizations has its roots in Chapter VIII of the Charter. During the Cold War this idea was never put into practice. This was due in part to the stalemate at the Security Council and the consequent absence of enforcement operations as envisaged by the Charter framework. It was also due to the fact that the concept of traditional peacekeeping as developed during the Cold War was based on a level of impartiality that was simply not available by involving regional organizations. The idea received new attention in An Agenda for Peace in 1992 when the Secretary- General suggested that consideration be given to greater cooperation with regional organizations as a way of lightening the burden of the Security Council by expanding the level of participation in operations.35 The idea was quickly put to the test with NATO’s

34 As evidenced by its continued involvement in Sierra Leone and its authorization of ONUC in the DRC. 35 The Secretary-General said that “regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.” An Agenda for Peace, para. 64. involvement in Bosnia,36 and was already effectively being tested through the initiative taken by ECOWAS in responding to the conflict in Liberia.37

When the events in Somalia and Bosnia prompted the Security Council to re-think direct UN involvement in new situations, the idea of greater regional involvement in conflict management proved attractive, not as originally envisaged by An Agenda for Peace, as a way of sharing the burden in a situation in which the United Nations was already broadly and heavily engaged, but as way of ensuring action was taken in situations where the Security Council was unwilling to risk UN troops.

One of the inherent disadvantages to cooperation with regional organizations is the potential loss of oversight and coordination. Under the terms of Chapter VIII of the Charter stipulates that no enforcement action can be taken by regional arrangements “without the authorization of the Security Council” (Article 53). And when such action is undertaken, regional arrangements are required to keep the Security Council fully informed of actions “undertaken or in contemplation” (Article 54). The purpose of these articles was to ensure the primacy of the Security Council with respect to international peace and security activities. They require a closely monitored relationship between the Security Council and the regional arrangement undertaking the action. In practice, however, the Security Council has been quite laissez-faire about protecting that primacy when it comes to regional activities.

The relationship between the UN and regional organizations in the post-Cold War period has taken three forms: regional action has been taken and then received a Security Council mandate after the fact; regional action that has occurred without a Security Council mandate, and situations in which the UN has established operations whose purpose is to monitor ongoing regional peace support operations.

All three of these situations have contributed to and been representative of the general trend of delegation and distance on the part of the United Nations. There are some positive aspects of this experience from the point of view of UN peace support. In Bosnia, for example, there is little doubt that the UN would not have been able to mount an operation of the size, scope and duration of IFOR/SFOR in order to oversee the Dayton peace accords. Similarly, operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone,38 Georgia and Tajikistan39 undertaken by regional organizations were initiated in situations in which the United Nations was unable or unwilling to generate its own response.

On the other side of the coin, however, the situations in which regional action received Security Council authorization either after the fact, or not at all, have contributed to a

36 Initial NATO involvement came in July 1992, when NATO provided maritime monitoring of the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council on the former Yugoslavia. This was followed by NATO contributions to monitoring and enforcing the no-fly zone and later the safe areas created by the Security Council. For more on this background see Dick Leurdjik, … 37 See, Jane Boulden, ed., Dealing with Conflict in Africa, The United Nations and Regional Organizations, New York: Palgrave, in press. 38 ECOWAS intervened in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 39 The Commonwealth of Independent States fielded operations in the conflicts in Georgia and Tajikistan. questioning if not an undermining of UN credibility. ECOWAS decided to intervene in the conflict in Liberia in August 1990 with the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Within weeks the situation deteriorated and ECOMOG effectively became an enforcement force heavily involved in the conflict. It was five months before the Security Council made any form of statement about the conflict40 and two years before a resolution was passed.41 After the conclusion of a peace agreement in Liberia the Security Council established UNOMIL, which was primarily an observation mission with a mandate, inter alia, to monitor ECOMOG’s implementation of the peace accord.42 The fact that the United Nations waited until a peace agreement was in place and then responded with a relatively limited mission did not contribute to strengthening perceptions about the legitimacy of the Organization with those on the ground. There was a certain level of resentment on the part of regional troops of the fact that the United Nations troops arrived after the high risk difficult work of establishing a peace agreement was done, and then were only there to monitor the work of those who had risked their lives to bring the peace agreement about.43

The absence of a significant UN response, both when the regional enforcement action was undertaken and then in the efforts to consolidate the peace contributed to a sense within ECOWAS and other African regional organizations that a certain degree of freedom of action was both possible and necessary. In conjunction with the UN’s withdrawal from Somalia and its non-response to the genocide in Rwanda, this contributed to a sense that a UN response could not be assumed, either in response to conflict or to regional actions.

NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo directed at enforcing a withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo was significant for a variety of reasons. NATO’s actions were taken without Security Council authorization, a fact that generated considerable controversy.44 The fact that the operation was undertaken in pursuit of humanitarian goals and the protection of human rights inside a sovereign state was also controversial. The nature of the objectives of the operation and the fact that they were in keeping with the overall goals of the UN Charter, contributed to an eventual description of the operation as illegal but legitimate.45 For many the action was seen as a further positive step in the development of a norm of humanitarian intervention. For others, however, the actions confirmed a perception first that the United Nations operated on the basis of a fundamental double standard – why expend so much in the way of political and military

40 S/22133, 22 January 1991. 41 Security Council Resolution 788, November 19, 1992. The resolution authorized a special representative of the Secretary-General and imposed an arms embargo on Liberia but did not respond to an ECOWAS request for UN observers. 42 Security Council Resolution 866, September 22, 1993. 43 See, for example, ‘Funmi Olonisakin, “Liberia,” in Boulden, ed., Dealing with Conflict in Africa, (in press). 44 The Kosovo crisis and NATO’s response have been debated extensively. For good background see, Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Kosovo and the Challenge to Humanitarian Intervention, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000); Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Also see, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002). 45 Get reference. resources in Kosovo and not in the DRC, Sierra Leone or any number of other conflicts – and second that the strength of US power in the UN system meant that western states could violate the Charter with impunity when it suited them to do so.46

The combined effects of these experiences suggest that while greater cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations is desirable and offers some important advantages, the way in which that cooperation occurs is important and has the potential to generate serious disadvantages for the Organization ranging from a lack of coordination and control to undermining the UN’s legitimacy and credibility.

Changes in the Use of Force

One of the most notable changes in the Security Council’s approach to peace support in the post-Cold War era has been its increased willingness to authorize the use of force in pursuit of its goals. The authorization of the use of force beyond self defence in peace support operations has taken two forms: a blanket authorization for the mission as a whole, or task-oriented authorizations relating to specific aspects of the mission’s mandate. Of the former case there are three examples. In Somalia the Security Council gave a full use of force authorization to the Unified Task Force and then to UNOSOM II. In Haiti, the Security Council authorized the use of “all necessary means” in the mandate for the multinational force established to ensure Haiti’s transition to democratically elected government.47

In Bosnia, and later in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Council’s invocation of Chapter VII and authorization of the use of force came in support of mandates that were primarily peacekeeping in their origins. In these instances the use of force was authorized in an effort to ensure the compliance with some specific aspect of the mandate. In some instances the use of force was added to the mandate in response to changed circumstances on the ground. In Bosnia, for example, the use of force beyond self defence was authorized in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and later to enforce respect for the safe areas. In Sierra Leone and the DRC, a limited authorization of the use of force beyond self defence was given to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel.

As mentioned above, the UN’s experience with the use of force during this period was problematic. The negative experiences associated with the use of force in Somalia and Bosnia contributed to the decline in the numbers of missions authorized by the Security Council and generated a strong degree of hesitation about involving UN troops in situations where the risk of the use of force was high. The experiences associated with the use of force contributed to a change in perception and response on the part of the Security

46 See Jane Boulden ed., Dealing with Conflict in Africa, The United Nations and Regional Organizations, (New York: Palgrave, in press). 47 Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992 (UNITAF). Security Council Resolution 814, 26 March 1993 (UNOSOM II). In authorizing UNOSOM II the Security Council did not use the phrase “all necessary means” nonetheless the Chapter VII authorization was applied to the mandate as a whole. Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994 (Haiti). Council that reflected a recognition of the implications of a number of factors relating to peace support operations in the post-Cold War environment.

First, the experiences with the use of force revealed the problems inherent in the nature of post-Cold War conflicts. These conflicts proved to be intractable, often involving ethnically based divisions within the state. In some instances, a large number of different warring factions were involved who were pursuing different goals and using different methods to achieve them. These conflicts did not lend themselves readily to state-based conflict management mechanisms. Warring parties gave consent to a UN presence and then withdrew it, or found that not all members of their group complied with the decision. They violated cease-fires at will and did not respect or give moral weight to the presence of the United Nations. The tenuous nature of consent in these situations raised the likelihood that UN forces would have force used against them. The result was either to slow implementation of the mission because UN forces were unable to respond with force, or where force was used to involve UN forces in battles with local forces.

In situations where the UN troops are authorized to use force only in self defence, or only to use force in specific situations, the use of force by warring factions slows or stops the implementation of the mission, and in some situations can threaten undermine it altogether. The examples here are Bosnia and Sierra Leone where warring factions refused to allow UN troops to carry out their mission or took UN troops hostage. In both cases the mission was only stabilized by the intervention of a major power.48 These situations contribute to the weakening of the credibility of the Organization and put the UN in a very difficult position. If it responds with force, it undermines perceptions of the mission’s impartiality, if it responds by withdrawing or downscaling the mandate it undermines the credibility of the mission, and of future UN missions elsewhere.

Together these experiences and the Security Council’s response to them contributed to the re-thinking and hesitation discussed above. On operational issues the resulting Security Council response has been twofold. First, to wait for a peace agreement before becoming involved in a situation and to be as sure as possible about the level of compliance with that agreement before committing troops to the situation in any large- scale way. Second, rather than involve UN troops directly in such situations they have also tended to contract out the more difficult operations – those with the higher risk of the use of force -- to regional organizations or coalitions of the willing.

This last development has contributed to a division of labour in peace support operations in which western states are primarily involved in coalitions or regional operations, while developing states take on the bulk of the peace support operations that are directly run by the United Nations. As of February 2003, there were a total of 39,001 personnel involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Of those the top ten contributors are all developing states, and the top three contributors, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria, contribute 11,788 between them, or 30% of the total.49 By comparison, the combined

48 The United States in Bosnia. The United Kingdom in Sierra Leone. 49 Figures are from United Nations, Monthly Summary of Contributions, February 2003. United Nations website, www.un.org. number of troops involved in the Balkans under the NATO-led SFOR and KFOR operations is 51,000.50 The panel commissioned by the Secretary-General to examine ways of improving peace support operations notes that “no developed country currently contributes troops to the most difficult United nations-led peace-keeping operations from a security perspective, namely the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Organization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).”51

While operations such as SFOR and KFOR are UN-authorized and contribute to UN objectives, this division of labour in which western states contribute to operations in their own region while leaving conflicts in the developing world to developing states, contributes to a sense in the developing world of a double standard, These perceptions confirm a sense, begun in the early 1990s after Somalia, that western states were unwilling to risk the lives of their troops for non-western lives. This perception has been reinforced by the fact that these western-led operations have involved a significantly higher level of financial, military and political resources than Western countries have given to operations in other regions such as Africa.

When considered in the context of the willingness of NATO to undertake action in Kosovo outside of Security Council authorization, and now the invasion of Iraq without Security Council authorization, this division of labour has significant political repercussions. In particular it encourages a sense that western countries operate with one set of standards for themselves and another for the developing world, thereby undercutting the universal application of the Charter provisions on collective security issues. In a report to the General Assembly the Secretary-General makes note of this problem:

I must once again emphasize, in this regard, that the developing countries must not be the only ones expected to shoulder the burden for the deployment of formed military units to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The participation of both developing and developed countries in United Nations peacekeeping is critical from a political perspective.52

Internal Efforts to Improve Peace Support

Beginning with the Secretary-General’s report An Agenda for Peace the United Nations has undertaken studies and commissioned reports as a way of developing proposals for strengthening the UN’s ability to carry out its international peace and security mission. These efforts fall roughly into two categories, those which look at the broad environment and questions involved, and those that focus more specifically on operational issues relating to peace support. The first category includes An Agenda for Peace as well as the

50 www.nato.int 51 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, para. 104. 52 A57/711, 16 January 2003, para. 31. Secretary-General’s Millennium Report, to the extent that it addresses peace and security issues.53

An Agenda for Peace took a broad view of the international peace and security objectives of the United Nations in the context of new optimism about what might be achieved in the post-Cold War period. The report broke down the UN’s peace support activity into four main areas: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building, thereby recognizing the extent to which the post-Cold War era had drawn the United Nations into the full spectrum of conflict-related activity. The An Agenda for Peace proposals were given consideration by the Security Council54 and the four categories of the framework of analysis it established have continued to guide thinking on these issues. The various proposals the report contained, however, were very quickly overrun by events in Somalia, Bosnia and then Rwanda. In a supplementary report issued in January 1995, the Secretary-General attempted to take account of the quantitative and qualitative changes that had occurred since An Agenda for Peace was published.55 The supplementary report pursued some of the initial Agenda for Peace proposals in more detail, such as the potential for cooperation with regional organizations, but it primarily focused on raising critical questions that needed to be addressed as a result of recent experiences rather than putting forward new ideas about the implementation of peace support, emphasizing the need for the Organization itself to address these challenges.

The re-thinking prompted by these experiences led to further study and proposals. In March 2000, at his own initiative the Secretary-General convened a panel of international experts to examine how the conduct of UN peace and security activities could be improved and to make “frank, specific and realistic recommendations” to that end.56 The panel established three key conditions that it determined were critical to the success of peace operations: political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture, and a sound peace-building strategy.57 Known as the Brahimi report, the report’s recommendations were geared, therefore, to suggesting ways in which those three conditions could be met by the United Nations. As a result, the report’s concentration is primarily operational rather than conceptual, focusing on ways in which the process of peace support should be improved. The report was well received by the Organization and its recommendations are in the process of being implemented. In January 2003, the Secretary-General reported that the implementation of the recommendations relating to

53 ‘We the Peoples’ The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, March 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/index.html. The report established general objectives, including the need to strengthen the UN’s capacity to carry out peace operations. This was the basis on which the Secretary-General established the high-level international panel on peace operations, known as the Brahimi Report. 54 For more on the UN’s follow-up of the report see, David Cox, “Exploring An Agenda for Peace: Issues Arising from the Report of the Secretary-General,” Aurora Papers 20, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993. 55 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995. 56 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/. 57 Ibid., para. 4. UN headquarters was complete and that the focus should now shift to recommendations relating to field-oriented aspects of peace support.58

The Brahimi report built on and supported the discussion and recommendations made over the years by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (SCOPK). The SCOPK continues to work on these issues as well as to provide a forum in which member states can raise and debate issues of concern to them and those that have arisen in response to ongoing events. In addition to ongoing discussion about how to improve the UN’s peace support capabilities, it is in this arena that concerns about issues such as the trend towards developing states taking on the bulk of the peacekeeping tasks while developed states operate under NATO or coalitions are most often discussed.59 Training for peacekeeping operations, the strengthening of the Organization’s ability to respond rapidly in deploying missions, and greater cooperation with regional organizations continue to be key themes in the committee’s deliberations as issues which are priorities for strengthening the UN’s peacekeeping capabilities generally.60

Two other reports are worth mentioning. In 1994, the Canadian government sponsored a project aimed at determining ways in which the United Nations capability to respond rapidly to conflict situations could be improved. The resulting recommendations have played an important role in UN decisions on this issue, providing the basic framework for moving ahead in developing such a capability.61

In 2000, in an effort to address the implications of the Security Council’s recent activities in the field of humanitarian intervention and in response to a call from the Secretary-General to develop a consensus on the principles associated with intervention, the Canadian government created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Commission produced a report, The Responsibility to Protect, which proposed that rather than thinking in terms of intervention the concept of a responsibility to protect be used to be the foundation for the development of principles of action for the United Nations.62

58 Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/711, 16 January 2003, para. 90. 59 For example, in discussing the role of regional organizations the SOCPK emphasized the need to have Security Council authorization, and also noted that capacity-building of African peacekeeping was not “intended to replace the engagement of non-African countries in peacekeeping operations on the African continent.” A/56/863, 11 March 2002, para. 128, 131. 60 The deliberations of the SCOPK receive little attention in the academic and policy-related work, in part because verbatim records of its deliberations are difficult to access. Nonetheless the Committee’s reports offer a good sense of the issues of focus in a given year and the different viewpoints offered by members of the Committee. The most recent report is: A/56/863, 11 March 2002. 61 Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, 1996. Many of the proposals from this study have been incorporated into UN procedures, including the idea of developing a generic mission headquarters that could be deployed on short notice. See the update in Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, A/56/863, 11 March 2002, para. 75-88. 62 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001.

III. Changes in the Peace Support Environment

Having discussed the post-Cold War changes in the nature of peace support and the way in which the United Nations has pursued peace support, this section discusses the recent changes in the international environment in which peace operations are carried out. The first significant change is the advent of non-state actors as a threat to international peace and security as a result of the attacks of 11 September, and the nature of the UN response. The second is the Security Council debate about how to deal with Iraq, the eventual failure of the Council to agree to a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, and the US-UK decision to go to war against Iraq without a Security Council resolution. Together these two events have contributed to a sea change in the politics of the Security Council and the international arena generally, which has important consequences for the future of peace support operations.

Terrorism Post-11 September

As an issue terrorism has long been a subject of negotiation and debate in the General Assembly. It was not until the early 1990s that the issue was dealt with by the Security Council when the Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya in 1992. The Security Council then imposed sanctions against Sudan in 1996 and against Afghanistan in 1999, again in response to those states’ involvement in terrorist attacks.63 The attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September brought terrorism on to the Security Council agenda in a new and different way.

The Council’s response to the attacks of 11 September took two forms. On 12 September 2001, the day after the attacks, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368, recognizing “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” as a legitimate response to the events of 11 September, stating that it regarded these acts, “like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security.” The recognition of the right of self defence, the first time that self defence was formally recognized as a legitimate response to terrorism, gave UN sanction to the US action against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and, by extension, the ambiguously named “war on terrorism”.

While leaving the military response to the US-led coalition, the Security Council moved to take a very comprehensive approach to dealing with terrorism through state controls. On 28 September 2001, the Security Council passed a comprehensive resolution, which outlined a series of wide-ranging measures to be undertaken by states to “prevent and suppress” terrorist acts. Resolution 1373 is remarkably strong in its wording. Two of the three operative paragraphs begin with wording that states that the Security Council

63 The sanctions against Libya were in response to its connection to attacks on two commercial airliners in 1988 and 1989. The action against Sudan was in response to its unwillingness to extradite suspects in an attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. And, the sanctions against Afghanistan related to the connections between the Taliban government and al Qaeda and the bombings of US embassies in East Africa in 1998. For more on this see, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “The Role of the Security Council,” in Jane Boulden, Thomas G. Weiss, eds., The United Nations and Terrorism: Before and After September 11th, (Indiana University Press, forthcoming). “decides that all states shall…”, thereafter listing a sequence of steps to be implemented by states.64 This represents a very rare blanket directive to member states and it is doubly remarkable because the measures being prescribed relate directly to national domestic policies and institutions.

There is an inherent contradiction in these two responses. By recognizing the self- defense option, and then refraining from taking further measures with respect to the use of force, the Security Council effectively removed itself from further decision-making about the nature and scope of the continued use military force in Afghanistan. In contrast to this distancing, the various measures outlined in Security Council resolution 1373 are detailed in their requirements and necessitate significant actions by member states. This poses a remarkable dichotomy. The Security Council chooses to exercise no control or oversight on the use of military force in response to terrorism but is vigilant and arguably intrusive when it comes to dealing with terrorism through national mechanisms and controls.

Absent from both elements of the Security Council response is any attempt to define terrorism or terrorist acts. Indeed, there is not even the sense that an attempt need be made. Both resolutions 1368 and 1373 refer simply to terrorism and terrorist acts as if the term were self-explanatory. In the context of the use of force and the provisions in resolution 1373, this lack of definition allows wide latitude for interpretation. In conjunction with the Security Council’s acceptance and authorization of self-defense, it compounds the expansiveness of the mandate. Both the response (self-defense) and the subject of the response (terrorism) remain undefined and, by extension, unlimited.65

After the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan the Security Council authorized two missions to assist in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement establishing the provisions for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. On 20 December 2001, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a European-led force, not under UN command, with a mandate to assist the interim authority in Afghanistan in establishing a secure environment. The Bonn Agreement had requested a UN force to establish security in the country as a whole but the Security Council authorization was specific to security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, and instead of creating a UN force the Council contracted out the mission to a European-led coalition.66 On 28 March 2002, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with a mandate to assist in the implementation of tasks established in the Bonn Agreement relating to human rights, the rule of law, national reconciliation and humanitarian assistance.67 These operations are occurring at the same time as the ongoing US-led operation undertaken in response to the 11 September attacks (Operation Enduring Freedom). The situation in Afghanistan

64 The usual language, as evidenced in the third operative paragraph is “calls upon states to…” 65 For more on this issue see: Jane Boulden, Thomas G. Weiss, eds., The United Nations and Terrorism, Indiana University Press, forthcoming. 66 Security Council Resolution 1386, 20 December 2001. 67 Security Council Resolution 1401, 28 March 2002. As of November 2002, there were approximately 443 members of the mission. http://www.unama-afg.org/about/index.html. remains tenuous, and the ongoing US operation in the country and the fact that ISAF is focused only on Kabul mean that the security situation in the country remains unstable.68

Although not directly related to peace support operations the Security Council’s response to the events of 11 September is important because it represents a shift in the Council’s thinking and priorities in responding to international peace and security issues, and because in its response the Security Council has continued its tendency to distance itself from direct involvement in situations involving the use of force while using peacekeeping as a way of dealing with post-conflict situations.

The Security Council and Iraq

During 2002-2003, the question of Iraq’s compliance with the various Security Council resolutions passed in the wake of its enforced withdrawal from Kuwait was the subject of considerable and high-tension debate at the Council. Although the United States had been signaling its thinking on Iraq for some time, the issue became a central one for the Security Council after US President Bush’s speech to the General Assembly on 12 September 2002. In that speech President Bush called on the United Nations to meet the challenge presented by Iraq’s non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, pledging the United States’ commitment to working with the Security Council to bring about Iraqi compliance. At the same time, however, President Bush made clear that the United States intended to ensure compliance with those resolutions one way or another, noting that the purposes of the United States “should not be doubted.”69

This began a process of negotiation at the Security Council that resulted in the unanimous approval of Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002. Resolution 1441 provided Iraq with “a final opportunity” to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions and set in motion a new inspection process, which began on 19 November 2002.70 Although the United Kingdom and the United States had hoped to include a provision in this resolution authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to comply, or was discovered in breach of its obligations, they were unable to get the agreement of other Security Council members to this provision. Resolution 1441 warns instead of “serious consequences” for Iraq if it continued to violate Security Council resolutions.

As the reports of the inspections came in to the Security Council it became evident that there was serious disagreement within the Council as to what conditions constituted justification for a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.71 On 24 February 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted a draft

68 See, for example, the Secretary-General’s latest report on the situation. A/57/487-S/2002/1173, 21 October 2002. 69 “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” 12 September 2002, New York. Text available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html. 70 The inspections were carried out by UNMOVIC, previously established by the Security Council in Security Council Resolution 1284, 17 December 1999, and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 71 The extent and nature of this disagreement has been heavily covered in western media. resolution to the Council finding Iraq in breach of its obligations.72 The draft resolution received little support from other Security Council members, and France and Germany took a determined stance against any shift to military action, with Russia and China supporting their views.73 On 17 March, after various attempts to bring about agreement on their resolution failed, Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew the resolution without putting it to a vote. On 19 March 2003, the US and the UK began a military operation against Iraq without Security Council authorization.

Overview

Since the end of the Cold War, the politics of peace operations have changed significantly along with the changes in the nature and scope of the operations. The Security Council has remained committed to defining international peace and security broadly to include the new attention to human security issues such as humanitarian questions, human rights and democracy. But as that change has been occurring and has taken root, the nature of the Security Council approach to implementing peace and security operations and the political dynamics of the Council itself have changed considerably.

In terms of implementation the Security Council has tolerated an increasing tendency for enforcement activity to occur without a Security Council mandate. The Security Council has also used and facilitated greater cooperation with regional organizations, and coalitions. This tendency towards devolution and distance in its approach to peace operations is now compounded by the shift in the political environment brought about by the events of 11 September and the US-UK decision to go to war against Iraq. Even though the Security Council remains engaged in peace operations in a variety of locations the overall international peace and security environment has shifted to one in which there is a much greater focus on issues associated with traditional state-oriented security concerns. This is evident in the response to 11 September, the response to which has been under the rubric of self defence and of state-based control measures, and in the focus on compliance and weapons of mass destruction with response to Iraq.

Through it all, for the Security Council there is the added dynamic of the role being played by the United States. In the early years of the post-Cold War era there was a sense of the United States as the sole superpower, but it is only in recent years that the sheer scale of the difference between the United States and the other great powers has come to play a pivotal role in the Security Council. In the context of the resultant focus on traditional state security issues, the trends of distance and devolution on the part of the Security Council, and a division of labour in which developing countries take on the bulk of UN-run operations while developed countries take on the contracted out and non-UN authorized missions, the scale and impact of the US position has created a new and difficult political situation for the Security Council and for the United Nations as a whole. The questions about the Organization’s credibility and legitimacy, which began surfacing

72 The text of the draft resolution is available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2795747.stm. 73 In addition to statements covered by the media, the positions of the various member states can be found in the Security Council’s open deliberations on the issue. with respect to operational issues in the early 1990s, place the Security Council in a tenuous position vis a vis the primacy of its role in international peace and security.

IV. Canadian Policy on Peace Support Operations

The main strength in Canadian UN policy is also its driving force – its longstanding commitment to peace and improving the lives of others in the world. Canada’s role in contributing to peace support dates back to its role in the creation of peacekeeping in 1956 and its longstanding military commitment to UN operations of all kinds. Until 1988 Canada was able to claim that it had participated in every peacekeeping operation authorized by the United Nations.74

As part of its overall commitment to peace support operations Canada has advocated and supported various efforts to bring about improvement and change in the way the UN undertakes its various operations. It has done this in a variety of ways: through its work in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, its various tenures on the Security Council, as well as at the bilateral and multilateral levels. As discussed above, in response to both An Agenda for Peace and the events of Rwanda, in 1994 the Canadian government initiated a study on improving the United Nations’ capability to respond rapidly. The recommendations of the resulting study, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations have been the foundation of the discussion and efforts taken to this end at the United Nations. Canada was also the driving force behind the response to the Secretary-General’s proposal in his Millennium Report that the implications of the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention be studied and debated. The resulting International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) issued its report, A Responsibility to Protect, in 2001.

While on the Security Council in 1999-2000, Canada encouraged and participated in the Security Council’s new tendency to debate issue areas relating to conflict, as opposed to just dealing with specific conflicts. Canada took the lead at the Council in focusing on the issues of sanctions, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and on the issue of the role of children in combat.75

Participation

At present, government policy relating to Canadian participation in peace support operations continues to be based on the criteria established in the 1994 Defence White Paper. The White Paper stated that multilateral operations should have the following characteristics:

-There be a clear and enforceable mandate. -There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.

74 The first UN peacekeeping operation to which Canada did not contribute was the first UN verification mission in Angola (UNAVEM I) in 1989. 75 For more on these issues see the Department’s website at: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca. -The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among missions partners. -In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibility and agreed operating procedures. -With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada’s participation be accepted by all parties.76

Canada has contributed to all forms of UN operations, ranging from the full-scale Chapter VII enforcement operations in Korea and Kuwait to complex, multi-faceted peacekeeping operations such as in Cambodian and Namibia, to small-scale military observer missions. Canada has also been involved in UN operations under the auspices of NATO in the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia. Given the expansion in number and scope of UN missions since the end of the Cold War and Canada’s declining capability to contribute to those missions, the Canadian government has been increasingly selective about the missions to which it contributes Canadian forces.77

Along with other western developed states, Canadian contributions have increasingly been to non-UN operations or in UN-authorized NATO or ad-hoc coalition operations, rather than to UN-run operations. For example, as of March 2003, 230 of a total 2,748 Canadian Forces personnel were serving in UN missions, with the remaining 2,518 personnel were serving in non-UN-run missions such as SFOR and to the US Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.78 On 12 February 2003, the government announced its decision to commit 3,000 Canadian troops to the ISAF in Afghanistan, a contribution that will further diminish the percentage of Canadian troops serving UN operations.79 These non-UN-run missions are in support of UN mandates or goals (although technically Operation Enduring Freedom is a self defence mission), so this shift in emphasis does not necessarily reflect anything more than a shift in contributions. From a UN perspective, however, it means that Canada is unable to commit those soldiers to other UN operations that may otherwise have trouble generating troop commitments.

Security Council Authorization

76 Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1994, pp. 27-39. Or online at: www.dnd.ca/admpol/pol_docs/94wp/six.html. 77 The White Paper states “Our resources are finite. … We will commit forces to such operations if suitable resources are available, and if our personnel can be appropriately armed and properly trained to carry out the task and make a significant contribution to the success of the mission.” Ibid. 78 Canada contributes 1,199 to the operation. The Canadian contribution is known as Operation Apollo. All figures are taken from the Department of National Defence website: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp. Figures listed as current as of 19 March 2003. Also see the policy page at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/defence/peace_supop_1002_e.htm . 79 Get statement to House. At present 8 percent (230 of 2748 troops) are serving in UN missions. With the additional commitment of 3,000 troops to ISAF (assuming no reductions in other missions) that percentage will drop to 4 percent. Canada’s policy, since the creation of the UN, has been the primacy of the UN Charter and its monopoly on the use of force.80 NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo in the absence of a Security Council mandate was the first in which Canada moved from this longstanding policy. With respect to the situation in Kosovo the Canadian government maintained that they, along with other Security Council members, had tried to get a Security Council mandate but that in the absence of such a mandate Canada and its NATO allies could not stand by and let massive human rights violations be carried out by the Yugoslav government. The government argued that this was an exceptional case and that it did not represent a precedent that would be repeated. Nonetheless, NATO’s decision to intervene in defence of human rights and Canada’s involvement in the bombing operation represented a significant and new departure from traditional Canadian policy on the primacy of the Charter.

As the diplomatic negotiations on the question of authorizing the use of force in Iraq became more difficult, Canada worked to try and bridge the gap between the various members of the Security Council by proposing the elements of a compromise resolution. Although aspects of this compromise proposal became the subject of negotiation up until the last minute, the Security Council could not agree on a resolution.81 Once it became evident that the Security Council was unable to agree on a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would not participate or support the US-UK mission. Speaking in the House of Commons the Prime Minister stated:

“We believe that Iraq must fully abide by the resolution of the United Nations Security Council. We have always made clear that Canada would require the approval of the Security Council if we were to participate in a military campaign. Over the last few weeks the Security Council has been unable to agree on a new resolution authorizing military action. Canada worked very hard to find a compromise to bridge the gap in the Security Council. Unfortunately, we were not successful. If military action proceeds without a new resolution of the Security Council, Canada will not participate.”82

The Role of Regional Organizations

Canada has been generally supportive of the trend towards greater UN cooperation with regional organizations, as is evident in its own participation in NATO-led operations in the Balkans. Canada has also been supportive of cooperation with regional organizations in other areas. A main theme of the G8 meeting held in Canada in 2002 was the G-8s response to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In addition to

80 For example, the 1994 Defence White Paper stated: “Canada is strongly in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations, capable of upholding the political values and procedural means set out in its Charter, and believes that situations requiring international military action should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the Charter.” Ibid. 81 For an outline of the Canadian proposal and the Canadian position, see the speech by Ambassador Paul Heinbecker to the Security Council, 11 March 2003. Available online at: http://www.un.int/canada/english.html, under “Canadian Speeches”. 82 Hansard no. 071, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, 17 March 2003. For more on the Canadian policy see: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/middle_east/iraq_relations-en.asp. commitments to specific conflicts in Africa, Canada along with other G8 members has made a commitment to support the development and strengthening of regional organizations in Africa in their efforts to prevent and deal with conflicts.83 This includes a specific commitment to working with African partners to develop an action plan by 2003.84 As a Canadian representative told the SCOPK, however, this is an expensive undertaking and resources are limited, so the “engagement of other donors is critical.”85 As yet it is unclear what specific form Canadian support might take, although contributions to regional training initiatives is likely to be an important aspect of the Canadian contribution.86

V. Conclusions

Looking Ahead at Peace Support

In an effort to deal with a very wide-ranging subject in a reasonably coherent way this paper has focused on the evolving nature of peace support operations and the way in which the Security Council has sought to implement the goals of those operations. The purpose of this approach has been to examine the trends evident in that evolution and on that basis to suggest the different forms that peace operations might take in future. At the time that this paper was first commissioned the Security Council debate on Iraq was just beginning. The paper has been completed in the context of the highly charged debate in the Security Council on the desirability and nature of a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. The failure to achieve such a resolution, the political atmosphere in which that occurred, and the decision of the United Kingdom and the United States to go to war with Iraq in the absence of Security Council authorization, have fundamentally altered the future context for peace support operations.

In the post-Cold War era the question of turning points has been the subject of ongoing debate. What event has marked a shift in international relations? – The end of the Cold War, the expansion of the number of states with a nuclear weapons capability, the attacks of 11 September, or the decision to go to war with Iraq? The debate and its outcome, as is often the case in academic inquiry, will not be resolved for some time and does not offer any conclusive information about what is occurring at present. The very fact that such a debate exists, however, speaks to the unusual breadth and number of significant changes that have occurred in the international system in the short period of time since the end of the Cold War.

83 The final communiqué commits the G8 to “providing technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African countries and regional organizations are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter.” See, section 1.2, of the G8 Action Plan, Kananaskis Summit, Canada 2002. Available online at: http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf. 84 Ibid. 85 Statement by Mr. Glyn Berry, Minister-Counsellor to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, New York, 3 March 2003. Available online on the website of the Canadian Mission to the United Nations: http://www.un.int/canada/english.html. 86 Telephone interview with DFAIT peacekeeping desk officer, 17 December 2002.

In terms of the United Nations and the future of peace support, the only thing that can be said with certainty at this stage is that this is a time of fundamental transformation in international society in which the future role of the United Nations is now less certain than it has ever been in the post-Cold War period, and perhaps since its inception.

Speaking before the Security Council a week after the beginning of the war in Iraq, the Secretary-General outlined the seriousness of the situation.

In the last few months, the peoples of the world have shown how much they expect of the United Nations, and of the Security Council in particular. Many of them are now bitterly disappointed. Their faith in the United Nations can be restored only if the Council is able to identify and work constructively towards specific goals. I urge the five permanent members, in particular, to show leadership by making a concerted effort to overcome their differences. …. we are living through a moment of deep divisions, which, if not healed, can have grave consequences for the international system and relations between states. …you have it in your power to deepen those divisions, or to begin to heal them. I appeal to all of you to choose the latter course, and to reunite around a new resolve to uphold the principles of the Charter. This is essential if the Security Council is to recover its rightful role, entrusted to it by the Charter, as the body with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.87

Much of the foregoing analysis has dealt with the details of UN activity in peace operations – the mandates, methods of implementation and the resulting impact on UN decision-making. The trends in the Security Council’s decision-making and approach that have been outlined in that process must now be considered in the context of a fundamentally changed decision-making environment.

At present the precise nature of the impact of these events on the Security Council’s desire and ability to carry out peace support operations is unclear. A number of inter- related variables are in play:

-the extent to which the United States chooses to remain engaged at the United Nations, and specifically at the Security Council;

-the extent to which member states in general continue to pursue peace and security issues through the Security Council or increasingly deal with them on an ad hoc or regional basis;

-the extent to which, if the Security Council continues to be a focal point for international peace and security issues, the divisions among the permanent members are transferred into other issue areas.

87 Press Release SG/SM/8650, SC/7760, 26 March 2003. With these undetermined factors in mind, a spectrum of possible outcomes can be identified. At one end of this spectrum is a scenario where the Security Council’s ability to act on international peace and security issues is compromised indefinitely. As was the case during the Cold War, the scale and number of operations will be limited to what can be agreed by the permanent members or simply to what exists at present. In this situation peace operations will be minimal. At the other end of the spectrum, it is possible to envisage a situation in which the Security Council re-engages on international peace and security issues in the aftermath of Iraq and works to rebuild its credibility and legitimacy. Such a scenario would, by definition, take time and be gradual in its achievement. It requires a concerted effort on the part of the United States to return to the Security Council for international peace and security issues in a consistent and determined way, and for all of the permanent members to work towards re-establishing the Security Council’s role.

In any scenario two constants are apparent. The first is that there will be a drain of financial, political and military resources to the conflict in Iraq and its aftermath for some time to come, regardless as to whether or not the post-war reconstruction is undertaken by the United Nations. This will limit the ability of the Organization to take on substantial commitments in the area of peace support operations even if the will to do so is there. The second is that the universality of the Charter’s provisions and the primacy of the Security Council have both been undermined. As a consequence, member states’ perception of the Security Council as the actor with primary responsibility for international peace and security can not be assumed. Full recovery from this state if, it is possible, will take time and effort. Much will depend on whether or not the United Nations is given a substantial role in post-war Iraq as this will indicate the extent to which the permanent members are willing to attempt to re-build the Council’s role, and will give the United Nations an opportunity to work towards the resuscitation of its role in the field.

Given the uncertain nature of the situation in the Security Council, and by extension the level of uncertainty about how the Council will deal with peace operations in future, what can be said about that future? In the short term further Security Council action on peace support extending beyond present commitments is likely to be minimal. How long the short term will last, and the nature of the commitments that might occur during that short term will depend on the variables discussed above.

Conditioned by this uncertainty, to the extent the Security Council continues to involve the United Nations in peace operations the following general characteristics may frame that involvement.

1. The number of peace operations authorized by the Security Council is likely to remain constant at present levels, and low in general. Barring an unforeseen crisis or event of sufficient magnitude to prompt the permanent members to agree on the need for a UN response it is difficult to envisage any new major operations in the near to medium-term.

2. When it does decide to become involved the Security Council will continue to focus on ensuring that consent is well in place and that the overall risk to UN personnel is minimized.

3. The desire to reduce the risk to UN troops will mean that the Security Council will continue its current pattern of waiting for a peace agreement before involving UN troops. Intervention in situations before a peace agreement has been achieved, such as occurred in Bosnia and Somalia is unlikely to be repeated.

4. The existing trend towards involvement in overseeing the implementation of peace agreements, including elections and human rights monitoring and the reintegration of combatants will continue. The associated emphasis on democracy, begun with Haiti but continued through later operations will also continue and may increase.

5. The Security Council is likely to remain restrained in its willingness to authorize the use of force beyond self defence. It is unlikely to give blanket Chapter VII authorization to peace support operations falling short of full scale enforcement in which UN troops operate under the UN flag.

This trend must be weighed against the likelihood that in an atmosphere of uncertainty about the Security Council and its commitment to peace support the possibility of attacks and challenges to UN troops will increase. This, in turn, suggests that the authorization of the use of force beyond self defence is likely to be increasingly necessary with respect to specific tasks and the security of UN personnel in the field. As this runs counter to the Council’s desire to minimize the risk to UN personnel and the need to operate on diminished resource levels, the Security Council will need to balance the use of force requirement against the context and objectives of the mission.

6. The Security Council is likely to continue with its willingness to cooperate with and contract out to regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions and their tendency to do this is likely to increase in the immediate future.

7. This last point must be conditioned by the fact that given the nature of recent events and the consequent undermining of Security Council legitimacy, there is likely to be a greater tendency on the part of regional organizations to feel free to engage in enforcement and peace support operations without seeking Security Council authorization.

Beyond the questions relating to how peace support might be carried out in the near term, there remains the question as to the broader role of the Security Council as the primary actor on issues relating to international peace and security and the extent to which it has lost the normative value associated with that role. Participation by the United Nations in a post-war Iraq will help to establish a base from which some attempt at recovery can be made, but at the same time it will also confirm a sense that the United Nations has become an organization whose main role is to assist in post-conflict recovery situations rather than an organization that is able to play an active and viable role in preventing and halting conflict. This shift has been some time in the making. As discussed in the preceding sections, the greater role given to overseeing post-conflict transitions has become the norm in UN operations, while the military side of the equation has been minimized or contracted out. This shift in emphasis has been a product of a variety of factors including the changing character of conflict in the post-Cold War era, the nature of the experiences that have resulted from the ways in which the Security Council has dealt with those conflicts, and the resulting change in the approach of the Security Council. While the importance of post-conflict consolidation can not be underestimated, the fact that it has occurred at the expense of a more proactive role in dealing with imminent or ongoing conflict, in combination with the overall impression of a United Nations that will withdraw on reduce its presence when challenged in peace operations, has contributed to a loss of legitimacy and moral weight that has been confirmed by the events surrounding the war on Iraq.

The fact that it is now difficult to imagine a situation comparable to the Suez crisis in 1956 in which the United Nations could intervene effectively to stave off continued conflict, and in which the parties to the conflict, as well as all other member states, would see the UN as an actor carrying sufficient moral weight and legitimacy to play that role, is evidence of the extent and fundamental nature of the challenge ahead for the United Nations.

Options for Canadian Policy

Given the variables and potential scenarios described above, what are the options for Canadian policy on peace support in this environment?

Based on current and past Canadian policy the following discussion is based on two assumptions. The first is that Canadian policy will be driven by the belief that the United Nations must be maintained and strengthened. The second is that the future of peace operations is inextricably tied to the need to repair the damage done to the United Nations as a consequence of recent events.

To that end, future Canadian policy options can best be described as falling under the general rubric of “reform and recovery,” with the latter reflecting longer-term goals and the former shorter- and medium-term goals.

In the short term, with the focus on recovery, the immediate requirements are to reaffirm the broader importance of the goals of the United Nations Charter, to generate Security Council agreement, if not unanimity, on issues relating to post-war Iraq, and to re-engage the United States in a serious way in Security Council activities. None of these are objectives that will be easily achieved but all are important to building a new way forward for UN operations.

On the first point, it will be important for all of the actors involved to ensure that the Security Council’s failure to reach agreement on Iraq does not send a message to member states that the United Nations is any less committed to its ongoing peace operations or to responding to other situations of need. This involves ensuring that existing commitments to UN operations are maintained and that new commitments to those operations will be forthcoming. Militarily, Canada’s recent decision to commit 3,000 troops to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan limits its ability to provide a significant contribution to a UN operation as a demonstration to other member states of its faith in and the importance of continuing the UN’s role in peacekeeping. Nonetheless, this should not stop Canada from pursuing this goal politically and militarily to the extent it is able. On the political side one way for Canada to proceed is to take the lead in initiating a discussion as to how this objective can be achieved and canvassing member states as to their views while also encouraging them to participate in such a discussion.

The pursuit of the second and third requirements for the recovery phase – encouraging agreement on post-war Iraq, and re-engaging the US – may aid the achievement of the first. The Canadian government has a potentially significant role to play on these issues as its two closest allies are the leaders in the war against Iraq, and Canada played an important part in the efforts of the Security Council to develop a compromise resolution on Iraq. Canada’s tradition of international political commitment and its years of military contributions to UN operations have earned it a position of respect in the international community. This is Canada’s strong card and it should now play it.

Canada also has a role to play in working with regional organizations. Given that the current situation is likely to generate greater action on peace and security issues by regional organizations Canada should work to ensure that this activity is undertaken with continued links to the United Nations in order to guard against a trend towards greater independence of action on the part of regional organizations that will contribute to a further sidelining of the Security Council and make it increasingly difficult for the United Nations to reclaim a central role on peace and security issues. Canada’s commitment to Africa through the G8’s response to NEPAD and its own work with regional organizations in Africa are important and should be continued. This provides Canada with a platform on which to work towards both the goals inherent in those activities and the broader goal of short-term recovery of the United Nations.

The nature of post-Cold War conflict means that situations requiring a peace support response are those in which there are few resources to draw on. One way to encourage continued engagement with the UN process, therefore, is for Canada and other member states to link the availability of outside resources relating to capacity-building of regional actors to the United Nations. This is not an argument for holding back support for regional capacity-building or responses to conflict situations if they do not occur under a UN mandate. Rather it is an argument for using those policies as a way to work towards encouraging continued linkage with the United Nations in situations in which the tendency might be to work outside of the Organization.

Given the nature of Canada’s recent commitments to regional peace support efforts in the Balkans and Afghanistan its own participation in peace support is not likely to change in the near term. The overall context of those commitments, however, has been altered by the nature and implications of the negotiations to achieve agreement on a use of force resolution for Iraq. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the future of NATO except to say that the divisions that have occurred within the western alliance over the question of Iraq raise questions about its future as an organization. For Canada this means there is a need to consider how and in what institutional context its linkage to Europe will be maintained. With specific reference to peace support it raises the question as to which regional organization is the best conduit for regional peace support involving Europe and North America.88

The issue of reform of the Security Council has been the subject of discussion inside and outside the United Nations for many years. The motivation is primarily related to changing the composition of the Security Council to reflect the changed nature of the international community since the Security Council was first established. The present context affirms the need to deal with the question of reform as a priority. Like the recovery aspect of the way ahead, the need to re-engage the United States is both a preliminary requirement and a desired product of this process. Try as we might to escape it, the fact is that the current structure of the international system and the United States’ position of power within it mean that its engagement in the UN peace and security framework is a necessary requirement for success. But the reform question is also a function of the need to re-engage the international community as a whole. Finding a way to integrate these two requirements into the UN structure is a tall order, but it is one that is critical to the long term future of the Organization, and one in which Canada has a role to play as a facilitator of the discussion and as source of ideas about how to proceed.

The discussion in this concluding section has been based on the assumption that the continuation of the United Nations as the central actor on international peace and security issues is desirable. It is certainly possible to argue that international peace and security can now best be pursued outside the constraints of the UN Charter and the politics of the Security Council. Regional or ad hoc coalitions, for example, would have greater freedom to respond and would be likely to do so in a more focused and coherent way. Fewer conflicts might be addressed in this scenario but, according to this argument, they are more likely to be addressed in a way that generates a greater potential for success. The problem with this argument is that what is lost in the process is the ability to monitor and control the way in which peace and security is pursued and the choice of which situations are to be addressed. The threat inherent in this scenario is that failure to exercise this kind of control and oversight will generate situations that fuel further conflict rather than contribute to its prevention or resolution.

Although it contains a variety of provisions that remain fallow or are anachronistic the United Nations Charter has within it a tremendous flexibility that gives the Organization great scope to respond to international peace and security issues. The strength of that

88 By extension this raises the question as to whether the North Atlantic link between North America and Europe is now fading and whether Canada’s “regional” identity will shift to North America. flexibility is evidenced by the fact that neither peacekeeping nor the broader peace support operations that followed it are provided for in the Charter. That flexibility is inextricably tied to the primary role given to the Security Council by the Charter and its ability to determine what situations need to be dealt with and how they should be addressed. At first glance the structure of the Security Council appears to undermine the importance of that flexibility by virtue of the deciding votes given to five permanent members. Compensation for this provision, however, comes in the universality of the Charter’s international peace and security provisions and their application. There was a period of time in the negotiations and debate about UN action on Iraq where it seemed possible that Security Council members would come together on an agreement for future action in a way that would reaffirm the value and centrality of the Charter’s provisions. The pressure to reach such an agreement, the intensity and scope of the negotiations surrounding it, and the depth of the divisions that were generated by its failure are all evidence of the power and importance of the universality of the Charter’s provisions. The power inherent in the United Nations lies in the universality of the values it is intended to pursue as well as their application. If the United Nations is to continue to be the primary forum for peace support in the future the link between universal values and universal application must be reclaimed and reaffirmed.