Failure of State and Democracy Building Experiment in Post Taliban Afghanistan

FAILURE OF STATE AND DEMOCRACY BUILDING EXPERIMENT IN POST TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN

A Dissertation Submitted to

The School of Politics and International Relations Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By SAIRA SALEEM 2016

Aquil and Taimur to whom I owe so much

Contents

Acknowledgements...... …...i Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………...ii List of Abbreviations and Acronyms……………………………………………………………..iii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………….vi

Introduction

The Problem……………………………………………………………………………………...1

Research Questions………………………………………………………………………………2

Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………………….2

Significance of the Study………………………………………………………………………...2

Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………...3

Organization of Study …………………………………………………………………………...16

Research Methodology…………………………………………………………………………..20

Chapter 1: Concept of a Failed State: Theoretical Approaches

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………...24

1.1 Theoretical Debates on Failed State……………………………………………………..27

1.2 Repairing the Failed States: External State and Democracy Building Processes…………………………………………………………………………………33

1.3 Afghanistan: An Exogenous Experiment…………………………………………….….45

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….47

Chapter 2: State Formation in Afghanistan: From Tribal Confederacy to a Weak State (1747-1978)

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………...49

2.1 Formation of Pashtun Tribal Confederation to a Segmentary State…………………….49 2.2 Transition to Unitary Afghan State under Iron Amir: Amir Abdur Rehman…………...54

2.3 State-building in the Twentieth Century: Modernization Project, Constitutional Monarchy, and Resistance……………...……………………………………………….56

2.3.1 Decade of Democracy (1963-1973)……………………………………………..61

2.3.2 Daoud in Power: Emergence of Republican State……………………………....69

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….74

Chapter 3: Decomposition Process of Afghan State: Soviet Intervention, Afghan Civil War, and Taliban Regime

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….….76

3.1 PDPA in Power: State Building and State Fragmentation………………………….…...76

3.1.1 State under Khalq: Taraki-Amin Rule…………………………………………..77

3.2 Soviet Occupation: Rebuilding of Party State (Karmal and Najibullah Years)………....82

3.3 Mujahideen Regime: Civil War and State Collapse……………………………………..90

3.4 Ascendency of Taliban: Emergence of a Failed State…………………………………...93

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….....99

Chapter 4: Exclusionary Democratization Process in Post Taliban Afghanistan: An Analysis

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..100

4.1 Phase One: Bonn Process: An Exogenous Exercise for Democratizing a Failed State...102

4.2 Phase Two: Transition towards Procedural Democracy……………………………....107

4.2.1 Emergency Loya Jirga…………………………………………………………………107

4.2.2 Crafting of Constitution and Approval by Constitutional Loya Jirga………….110 4.2.3 National Elections and Electoral Engineering…………………………………114

4.2.3.1 Comparative Analysis of Presidential Elections (October 9, 2004 – August 20, 2009)……...……………………………………..….………………115

4.2.3.2 Comparative Analysis of Wolesi Jirga Elections : ( September 18, 2005- September 18, 2010)…………….….…………………………………..122

4.3 Afghan Parliament: Putting the Institution into Practice..……………………………...128

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...130

Chapter 5: Impediments in the State and Democracy Building Processes: U.S. Contradictory Policies and Security Dilemmas

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….132

5.1 Conflicting Objectives…………..……………………………………………………...132

5.2 Warlordism : A Precarious Challenge………………………………………………...145

5.3 Rule of Law…………………………………………………………………………….153

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...160

Chapter 6: Taliban Insurgency: Internal and External Dynamics

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….163

6.1 Resurgence of Taliban: Internal Factors……………………………………………....164

6.2 The Pakistan Context: Transnational Factor………………………………………….. 174

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...185

Chapter 7: Limitations in Statebuilding Process: Effects on State Coercive and Socio-Economic Capacities

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….187 7.1 Constructing a New State: Concept of Stateness………………………………………188

7.2 Limitations of Coercive Capacity and Governance……………………………………191

7.3 Lack of Extractive Capacity and Exogenous Aid Dependencies……………………….197

7.4 Corruption Eats Away the State Capacity and Legitimacy…………………………….202

7.5 Social Constraints………………………………………………………………………208

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...213

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………..215

Postscript The Contemporary Context: Afghanistan 2014 and Beyond………………226

Bibliography ...... 239

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I am grateful to Allah, the most merciful, for the well-being, courage, and the strength that were necessary to complete this dissertation. This thesis could not have been successfully completed without the invaluable contribution of my supervisor. I express my sincere gratitude to Professor Dr. Tahir Amin for his guidance, motivation, and patience. He nurtured this project with his insightful suggestions and encouraging comments. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my dissertation. I am extremely grateful to the faculty of School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) for their support and academic guidance. The SPIR director Professor Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal has always been supportive and cooperative.

I am indebted to Professor Florian Khun for his encouragement and constructive comments on my preliminary research draft. His comments enabled me to give clarity to the theoretical argument of the thesis. I also owe gratitude to Professor Dr. Razia Sultana for her encouragement and guidance in our collaborated research articles.

Writing a PhD dissertation is not an easy task. It cannot be completed singlehandedly or without the encouragement and support of friends, colleagues, and family. Whilst working on the dissertation, I have gained a lot from the exchange of ideas with my friends and colleagues and their suggestions. I am thankful to Asma Faiz, Dr Sadia Suleman, Dr. Sannia Abdullah, and Saweeda Nadeem for their support and encouragement.

My parents and siblings have always been supportive. I owe special thanks to my parents and siblings for their unceasing support, prayers, and encouragement, which made it possible for me to complete the thesis. Finally, I must acknowledge that without constant support and encouragement of Aquil and Taimur, it was impossible for me to complete my thesis. Both kept my spirit high and provided me with an opportunity to take my time and concentrate on the work.

Abstract

This study focuses on the failure of state and democracy building experiment in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The aforementioned experiment is the first test case of militarized intervention after 9/11 under the banner of the war on terrorism to build a failed state on liberal democratic lines. This dissertation includes an in-depth study of the processes and their nexus to give a broader theoretical understanding of the failure of the experiment in the transitory phase. The sources of the failure were not only located in the flawed design and an asymmetrical interaction pattern, but the challenges originated from the gaps in the processes also negatively affected the linkage between democracy and stateness. Both processes suffered from the legitimacy deficit and failed to bring transition in the institutions whilst the contradictions and ambiguities in the principal intervener‘s policies negated the spirit of liberal values in the experiment. Competing agendas of the interveners and lack of coordination among them contributed to the failure of processes. The principal intervener (U.S.) de-politicized and de-contextualized its policies to address the failed state conditions.

The intervener preferred stability to democratization and facilitated narrow power-sharing arrangements. The intervener and its local allies excluded the opposition forces, mainly Taliban, and neglected the aspirations of the Afghan society in Bonn conference I. This exclusion went in favor of Tajiks, the new state elite, and thus exacerbated ethnic tensions and power struggle between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The processes, therefore, created a fragile state with weak and dependent institutions. Lack of accountability and public participation made these institutions fragile and provided the new and old state elites with an opportunity to nurture their patronage networks. This is why the post-U.S. Afghanistan appears engulfed with insurgency and violence, which have increased civilian casualties. Violence continues to dominate the Afghan domestic politics whereas the coercive, capital, and administrative capacities of the Afghan state remain limited and confined to major provincial capitals. Pervasive corruption in the state institutions is a continuing trend with no signs of reduction. The incumbent [unity] government, a product of an intra-elite bargain, so far appears incapable of garnering public support in its struggle against the Taliban insurgency and other turbulences in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfPak Afghanistan-Pakistan

AIA Afghan Interim Authority

AIEC Afghan Independent Election Commission

AIG Afghanistan interim government

ALP Afghan Local Police

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police

ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

ATA Afghan Transitional Authority

BSA Bilateral Security Agreement

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COIN Counter-Insurgency

CLJ Constitutional Loya Jirga

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

EUEAT European Union Election Assessment Team

ECC Electoral Complaints Commission

ELJ Emergency Loya Jirga

iii

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FY Financial Year

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HIG Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin

IBL Institutionalization Before Liberalization

IEC Independent Election Commission

IOM International Organization for Migration

ITBP Indo-Tibetan Border Police

IR International Relations

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Russian)

KHAD Khidamate Aetilaati Daulati

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MP Member Parliament

NA Northern Alliance

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS National Directorate of Security

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NUG National Unity Government

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

PDPA People‘s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

P2K Paktia, Paktika, and Khost

ROL Rule of Law

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SNTV Single Non Transferable Vote

TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

UAE United Arab Emirates

UN United Nations

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWII World War II

List of Figures

Figure 6-1 Afghan Civilian deaths (2001-2013)……………………………………168

Figure 6-2 U.S Troops Deaths in Afghanistan…………………………………….. 170

Figure 6-3 U.S Troops in Afghanistan…………………………………………….. 172

Figure 7-1 U.S Aid to Afghanistan…………………………………………………193

Figure 7-2 Strength of Afghan National Security Forces…………………………..194

Figure 7-3 Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan 2001-2013……………...... 201

Figure 7-4 Afghanistan Corruption Index………………………………………….205

Figure 7-5 Afghanistan Ethnicity Population Ratio……………………………….. 210

Introduction

The Problem

The US invaded Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 incident and quickly overthrew the Taliban regime.1It embarked on an intrusive, well-funded, and ambitious mission of building up a liberal democratic state in Afghanistan. Making a successful transition from failed state to a sustainable democratic state was an important part of the principal intervener‘s (U.S.) policy in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the US-led state and democracy building experiment proved unsuccessful in building a liberal democratic state in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Today‘s Afghanistan is experiencing the fragility of state institutions, which lack the capacity to deliver public services and security to the masses. The insurgency has intensified and there is a considerable rise in civilian casualties due to the excessive use of force by both interveners and insurgents.

Flawed design and policies of statebuilding and democratization resulted in the erosion of local legitimacy.2 Warlords, who had penetrated in the processes while making alliances with external builders, captured power and filled the vacuum left by the external forces. The conflicting and conservative dynamics of state and democracy building processes consolidated the ethnic cleavages and domestic factionalism and thus showed a stark failure of the intervener in transforming the relationship between the state and society. Similarly, the intervener‘s unconditional foreign aid and funneling of money to the Karzai regime for stability and control of the dynamics of war also proved a flawed strategy, which exacerbated corruption in the state apparatus.

1 Taliban emerged as ruler of Afghanistan, and controlled almost 90 percent of Afghan territory before the US led intervention in Afghanistan. However, latter under the Taliban was widely perceived as a failed state. 2 State building and democratization processes are closely interwoven with each other at theoretical and empirical level. Statebuilding is fused with democratization and this fusion has significant impact on both processes and outcome of it. In regard to exogenous statebuilding means to establish legitimate state institutions to provide security and economic wellbeing to its citizens, and to make a successful transition from conflict to peace. The statebuilding process is to build the state capacity through institution building in order to maintain political authority on the monopoly of legitimate violence and taxing the locals. On the other hand, democratization process is to construct legitimate political institutions through participatory politics which establish a linkage between state and citizens. Latter grant political legitimacy to the state apparatus. Consolidation of a liberal democratic state requires a complementary linkage between the two processes whereas weakness and limitations in any one of the process could result in the building of fragile state institutions and vulnerability of political regime sliding into failure or authoritarian tendencies would creep into the regime.

The quest to understand predicaments in the US-led state and democracy building project in Afghanistan leads to revisiting the processes. This study investigates the multi-causal factors that were responsible for the external power‘s failure in building a liberal democratic state in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Research Questions

1- Why did the principal intervener (U.S.) fail to build a liberal democratic state in the post- Taliban Afghanistan? 2- What were the limitations and gaps in the exogenous state and democracy building processes? 3- How did the impediments in the exogenous state and democracy building processes affect the intervener‘s experiment of fixing the failed state?

Hypotheses

1- Contradictions and ambiguities in the US statebuilding policies, such as from minimalist to a maximalist approach, created a semi-authoritarian state with fragile institutions. 2- The US-led state and democracy building processes lacked liberal values and suffered from legitimacy deficit. 3- Trade-offs between counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and liberal democracy building failed to create conditions conducive for the success of the processes. 4- The asymmetrical interaction pattern between the intervener and local elites amid the state and democracy building processes, resulting in bargaining for the protection of power and self-interest, made the processes not truly democratic.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in empirical as well as theoretical realms. At the empirical level, it helps us to understand the principal intervener‘s strategies pursued to achieve the state and democracy building processes amidst the conflict. It shows the complex and conflicting nature of the processes, which led to the failure of the intervener‘s policies to build a liberal democratic state in post-Taliban Afghanistan. It also provides an opportunity to understand the asymmetrical interaction pattern between the local elites and external power during the

2 processes. An analytical view of the failure of state and democracy building effort in Afghanistan is also a part of this study.

The intervener rationalized the processes as a solution to the ills of the failed state by pursuing them in the aftermath of militarized intervention. Both processes are intertwined with each other, but both suffered from the absence of openness and citizens‘ input in the construction of state institutions. At the theoretical level, it helps us to understand the flaws in the designing and execution of the processes. It provides us with an opportunity to investigate the deviant nature of this case study and compare it with the previous cases of rebuilding of states in post- conflict societies. We will be able to address the questions: Why did the processes based on liberal assumptions transform themselves into stabilization projects in targeted society? How did the intervener‘s policies create fragile state institutions in the conflict-prone society?

Literature Review

A bulk of the scholarly literature has been produced on the international intervention in the post- Taliban Afghanistan to understand the weaknesses and challenges in the externally-led ―state and democracy building processes‖ during the transitory period (2001-2013). A majority of the studies is focused on statebuilding and democratization processes in the post-conflict period, although both processes have also been pursued during the conflict. Even so, most of them are focused on the security transition in the post-intervention period because the military operations and insurgency attained special attention due to the external powers‘ coercive investment in the targeted country and changing dynamics of the conflict.

The majority of studies conducted on state and democracy building processes are aimed to analyze the success and failure in the external rebuilding processes and find the reasons of failures in the project. A few of them focus on linking the strength and weakness of the exogenous state and democracy building processes with the prevailing failed-state conditions, which made the experiment unsuccessful and precarious. These studies have also addressed the complexities and colossal errors in the principal intervener‘s policies and strategies while using the theoretical lenses of ―imposition of democracy‖ and ―construction of state institutions‖ on the north-centric template based on neo-liberal ideology. In spite of the extensive production of literature on the subject, most of the studies are either limited in scope or only cover a specific

3 period. Available literature on the subject nevertheless helps to categorize the scholars‘ opinions in different camps besides identifying multiple contending perspectives on the state and democracy building processes.

There are three broader understandings on the challenges which have plagued the military-led state and democracy building experiment in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. According to the paramount narrative, the externalized state and democracy building experiment cannot be declared a success story or that it has achieved the desired results. The militarized intervention in a failed state followed by state and democracy building processes is riddled with contradictions, which have undermined the transition of the failed state into a liberal democratic state.3 Failure in the processes is attributed to multiple reasons, so the IR scholarship has given different arguments to determine primary and secondary variables of failure in the processes.

The empirical debate on the external state and democracy building processes in the post- Taliban Afghanistan can be divided into three camps: optimists, pessimists, and conditionalists. Scholars and policy makers belonging to the first camp have shown optimism in the success of the process to transform Afghanistan from a failed state into a democratic state. One of the principal advocates of this argument was U.S. President George W. Bush. Initially, he opposed the idea of massive U.S. investment in nationbuilding4 but wanted limited militaristic and civilian engagement in Afghanistan.5 Later on, the Bush administration‘s attitude toward

3 Failed state concept is vague and biased. But the former is a significant concept in the state reconstruction literature. Moreover state and democracy building processes are considered as prescriptions to failed state conditions. Failed state concept has taken a new dimension after the 9/11 events in the international politics debate where the failed state has become a place harboring international terrorist organization and supported by local oppressive regime. Failed state lack all the positive aspects of state ranging from providing political goods to having writ of state on the territory. Former lack coercion, capital, and legitimacy and engulfed in internal conflict. With the collapse of the modern state institutions; the society is ruled by the local warlords and patronage networks in the anarchic environment. 4 During the presidential election campaign (2000), Bush assured the American citizens that US would not be involved in external nationbuilding projects and he would be caution about using his soldiers for nationbuilding. See for instance, George W. Bush remarks, ―And so I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war. I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow the dictator when it's in our best interests.‖, quoted in Commission on Presidential Debate, Bush-Gore presidential debates,3 and 11 October, www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript; See, for instance, Condoleezza Rice, Afghanistan Declaratory Policy, Unclassified Document, The White House, Washington D.C, September 27, 2001, http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/1502/2001-09- 27%20from%20Condoleezza%20Rice%20re%20Declaratory%20Policy%20on%20Afghanistan- %20Memo%20Attachment.pdf; Donald Rumsfeld , Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Penguin, 2011),481-482. 5 Bush administration deployed minimum amount of soldiers and resources from November 2001-June 2003 in post- Taliban Afghanistan pursuing ―lightfoot print‖ policy envisaged by UN special representative Lakhdar Brahimi.

4 nationbuilding changed and it started considering that the statebuilding process was in the strategic interest of the US.6 Therefore, the administration crystallized nationbuilding as ―building of stable and democratic state and stability was linked with security, the rule of law and a legitimate government.‖7 The US officials attached the notion of a legitimate government with the promotion of democracy in the post-conflict environment and divided rebuilding activities into two overlapping phases: stabilization and institutionalization.8 They linked their success with building political and security institutions and enhancing economic liberalization. However, they soon realized that the mission was far more complex and vexing than what they initially perceived.

Policy makers portrayed the US-led intervention as an endeavor to liberate the Afghan people from oppressive and terrorists-sponsored Taliban regime. Bush also showed optimism about quick success against the Taliban and advocated building of democratic institutions with long-term reconstruction commitments, particularly the state security apparatus. In his televised address on October 11, 2002, he highlighted his commitment to nationbuilding as:

Since liberating the people of Afghanistan, America has accomplished a great deal. The United States has provided the Afghans with food, medicine, and new schools, and in helping to establish democratic institutions. American will continue to fund short term relief and long term reconstruction projects to rebuild the country.9

He made a similar argument in his memoir Decision Points where he wrote, ―Afghanistan was the ultimate nationbuilding mission. We had liberated the country from a primitive dictatorship,

6 George W. Bush, Decision Points (US: Virgin Books, 2010), 205. 7 In US policy circles, the term nation building and statebuilding have been operationalized interchangeably without illustrating the meaning and context of the terms. In practice , it is statebuilding to construct institutions in targeted society. Moreover, implantation of democracy after regime change in failed state .Scholars like K.Von Hippler describes nationbuilding in the context of state. She argues that ―the term ‗nation‘ is often confused with ‗state‘ particularly in the United Sates. Although . the term nationbuilding incorrectly depicts what the U.S government is attempting to do, as it rarely strives to create a nation inhabited by peoples of the same collective identity, this term has become synonymous with statebuilding.‖ quoted in K. Von Hipple ―Democracy by force: a renewed commitment to nation-building,‖ The Washington Quarterly 23, no.1 (2000): 96. 8 William B. Taylor. Jr. ―Accelerate Reconstruction in Afghanistan,‖ State Department Coordinator for Afghanistan, Testimony before the U.S Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, (Washington,D.C,27 January 2004), in Nation- Building: A Reference Handbook, ed. Cynthia A .Watson (California:ABC-CLIO,Inc,2004), 197. 9 George W. Bush, ―The United States Has Contributed to Afghanistan‘s Stability and Progress,‖ in Is America Helping Afghanistan, ed. Jann Einfeld (MI: Green heaven Press, 2005), 11.

5 and we had a moral obligation to leave behind something better…A democratic Afghanistan would be a hopeful alternative to the vision of the extremists.‖10 His advisers and policy makers shared the same level of optimism in pursuing the nationbuilding project. For instance, in 2005, Zalmay Khalilzad wrote that the Bush administration‘s ―quick victory‖ against the Taliban raised the bar of optimism among the policy makers and scholarship that the US nationbuilding efforts would create a successful democratic state.11 He also endorsed the multilateral nature of the rebuilding process and maintenance of stability in the country.

In 2002, during his speech on the US aid to Afghanistan, Bush elucidated the role of international community in building Afghanistan‘s security institutions and progress made in a short period as:

We are helping Afghanistan to establish public order and safety –even while the struggle against terror continues in some corners of that country, there are still al- Qaeda killers roaming around Afghanistan. We are working closely with the government to root them out, not only to make sure that Afghanistan is safe, as well. A year ago, it was really hard to find security and safety anywhere in Afghanistan. Just ask the citizens who were there. Now, America is helping to form a new Afghan national army. We are committed to an Afghan national army. The idea is to train 18 battalions of over 10,000 soldiers and finish the task by the end of next year. I‘m proud that Germany is helping, as well, to bring civil order by helping to build a police force. The International Security Assistance Force, what they call ISAF, led by coalition countries, is helping to keep the streets safe in the city of Kabul. Security is a requirement for recovery and development. Can‘t have recovery and development unless there is a secure environment.12

10 Bush, Decision Points, 205. 11 Zalmay Khalilzad, ―How to Nation-Build: Ten Lessons from Afghanistan,‖ The National Interest 80 (summer 2005):19-29. See also Zalmay Khalilzad,speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC (4 April,2004), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/040405_afghanistan_transcript.pdf. 12 George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on the US Humanitarian Efforts in Afghanistan (Presidential Hall, Dwight David Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Washington D.C, October 11, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021011-3.html.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz also affirmed the Bush administration‘s commitment to the nationbuilding project while describing the principal intervener‘s aims as:

The crucial factor in sustaining representative government in Afghanistan is, first and foremost, sustaining a stable and secure environment in which a government can gain a firm hold and ultimately flourish….We support President Karzai and the Afghan Transitional Authority, and we continue to look for ways to help Afghanistan build a secure and unified country. Our emphasis is on helping Afghans establish the means to provide their own stability and security. We know very well that we have a huge stake in Afghanistan‘s success. We remember the steep price that we had to pay when Afghanistan was a failed state. Having come this far and done so much, we must not walk away.13

Other policy makers, scholars, and U.S. allies also adopted positive tones while explaining the initial successes of the intervention and meeting the benchmark set in the Bonn Agreement.14 British Prime Minister Tony Blair also supported the US mission of rebuilding the failed state through intervention and change of regime. In his address to the US Congress in 2003, he stated, ―How hollow would the charges of American imperialism be when these failed countries are seen to be transformed from states of terror to nations of prosperity; from governments of dictatorship to examples of democracy; from sources of instability to beacons of calm.‖15

There is a category among the optimists, the reluctant optimists, whose optimism transformed into skepticism about the experiment with the passage of time. Reluctant optimists highlighted accomplishments of the processes and gave policy recommendations after

13 Paul Wolfowitz, ―Building a Better World: One Path from Crisis to Opportunity,‖ speech delivered at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 5 September, 2002,quoted in Richard Rupp, ―High Hopes and Limited Prospects: Washington‘s Security and Nation-Building Aims in Afghanistan,‖ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 2 (June 2006):287; Bulent Aras and Sule Toktas, ―Afghanistan‘s‘ Security: Political Process, State Building and Narcotics,‖ Middle East Policy XV, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 39-52. 14 Phillip Kurata, ―Envoy to Afghanistan on Bonn Agreement Success,‖ Scoop Independent News, October 7, 2005, http://article.wn.com/view/2005/10/07/Envoy_to_Afghanistan _on_Bonn_Agreement_Success/>. In this State Department press release, Dobbins cites five reasons for Bonn‘s success: the high level of competence displayed by international civil servants and Afghan leaders, war weariness of the Afghan people, the presence of an internal resistance movement, the active support of Afghanistan‘s neighbors, and ―modest, limited U.S. objectives.‖; See, also, Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (Congressional Research Service(CRS), RL30588) (Washington, DC: CRS, July 25, 2011), 6. 15 “Transcript of Blair's speech to Congress”, July 18, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/07/17/blair.transcript/.

7 identifying problems to enhance the prospects of the intervener‘s success in the processes.16 They did not question the external‘s commitment to the processes but explained that the ―reconstruction model had ingredients of modernity with a focus on human development, representative institutions, and an effective statehood.‖17 They placed their confidence in the political transition envisaged in the Bonn agreement. However, they also highlighted the irritants.18 They opined that the Taliban insurgency and resulting deteriorating security situation would put limitations on governance capacity and affect its legitimacy and warned that the failure to counter the drug problem would make Afghanistan a narco-state. They also gave policy recommendations to reverse the path of security deterioration.

Analysts belonging to the second category (the pessimists) argue that erroneous strategies and flaws in the principal intervener‘s strategies have resulted in the fragility of Afghan political institutions.19 Their narrative is based on two assumptions: first, the US lacked a coherent strategy and resources and the second argument was based on a phrase ―more is less‖. This phrase suggests that the surge in numbers of international troops and money has caused harm to

16 S.Frederick Starr, ―U.S Afghanistan Policy: It‘s Working,‖ Policy Paper, ( Central Asia-Caucasus Institute;Paul H.Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University), http://www.silkroa dstudies.org/CACI/Starr_Afghanistan.pdf.Federick . His optimism is linked with the Bush administration change in policy in the second year of intervention to address the statebuilding policy ―birth defects‖. See, for detail account, S. Frederick Starr, ―Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building,‖ in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq ,ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press,2006),120. 17 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18; Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ―Giving Afghanistan a Chance,‖ The News, June 15, 2002; Ali A. Jalali, ―Afghanistan in 2002: The Struggle to win the peace,‖ Asian Survey 43, no.1 (January/February 2003):174- 185; see ,for instance ,Robert I.Rotberg, ― Renewing the Afghan State,‖ in Building a New Afghanistan ,ed. Robert I.Rortberg (Cambridge, Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation,2007):vii; most scholar see the success of Afghanistan rebuilding project in the context of making gains in the building of coercive institutions and providing limited public goods like health, education, free media in the urban centers. See for instance, Michael O Hanlon, ―A Far Cry From Failure in Afghanistan,‖ http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/ 2013/10/23-afghanistan-not-a- failure-ohanlon#.VHTAMZ70s.;Anja Manuel and P. W. Singer, ―A New Model Afghan Army,‖ Foreign Affairs 81, no.4 (July/August 2002):47. 18 William Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan,(London: C. Hurst & Co.(Publisher)Ltd,2006) , 37;Amin Saikal, ―Afghanistan after the Loya Jirga,‖ Survival 44, no.2 (2002):47-56;Thomas H. Johnson, ―Afghanistan Post Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war,‖ Central Asia Survey 25, no1-2 (March-June 2006): 1-15; see, for instance, Marvin G. Weinbaum , ― Rebuilding Afghanistan :Impediments, Lessons, and Prospects,‖ in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq , ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, Press,2006):125-135; see, for instance ,Paul D Miller , ―Finish the Job: How the War in Afghanistan Can be Won,‖ Foreign Affairs 90, no.1(January/February 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67028/ paul-d-miller/finish-the-job. 19 Matt Waldman, ―System Failure: the underlying causes of US policy-making errors in Afghanistan,‖ International Affairs 89, no.4 (2013):825-843; see, for instance, Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation building in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008).

8 the project.20 The intervener‘s strategy to address the challenges through spending money has made the country a ―rentier state.‖21 In fact, the troops surge strengthened the insurgents‘ determination to fight and resulted in more violence and civilian casualties.

Astri Suhrke argues, ―Mounting setbacks and greater costs in both money and lives on all sides only led to more determined efforts to succeed, rather than a critical scrutiny of the assumptions, structures and overall realism of the project.‖22 Therefore, more investment to reverse the path of failure was futile because the US strategy lacked a ―people-centric‖ approach. Later on, the Obama administration‘s endeavor to introduce a military-led population-centric approach also did not improve the situation but made it a stalemate where a political agreement with the Taliban was the only feasible option.23

Mark Berger and Justin Reese argue that the ―nationbuilding‘s (statebuilding) possibility of success is only an illusion. The US and its allies require termination of direct commitment to Kabul while understanding the Afghan history and the contemporary crisis of the nation-state system.‖24 Robert Gates also made a similar assertion when he stated, ―If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose…because

20 See, for instance, Astri Suhrke , When more is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press,2012);Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 2012). 21 Florain P.Kuhn, ―Aid, Opium ,and State of Rents in Afghanistan: Competition, Cooperation, or Cohabitation‖, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no.3(2008):309-327; Astri Suhrke, ―Exogenous state-building: The Contradictions of the international project in Afghanistan,‖ in The Rule of Law in Afghanistan :Missing in Action, ed. Whit Mason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2011), 225-249 22 Suhrke, When more is less, 221. 23 With the ISAF troops withdrawal on the horizon in post Taliban Afghanistan shows the signs of military strategy have failed in counterinsurgency operations and required a political solution to end the conflict. Failure is often describe as a stalemate situation due to international community reluctance in accepting defeat in the war. See for instance, James Sperling and Mark Webber, ―NATO‘s Intervention in the Afghan Civil War,‖ Civil War 14, no.3 (2012):344-355. Ashley Tellis, Reconciling with the Taliban (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 35, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/reconciling_with_taliban.pdf; James Shinn and James Dobbins, Afghan Peace Talks: A Primer (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2011). See, for instance, Frederic Grace,William Maley, and Amitabh Mattoo, ―Beyond the Great Game: Towards a National Political Process in Afghanistan Post -2014,‖ , Chamakya Papers (The Australia India Institute,13 May 2014), 1-30. http://www. aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/Chanakya%20%201.pdf. 24 Mark T. Berger and Justin Y. Reese, ―From nation-states in conflict to conflict in nation-states: The United States of America and nation building from South Vietnam to Afghanistan,‖ International Politics 47, no.5 (2010): 452.

9 nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience, and money.‖25 Likewise, Barnett Rubin argues, ―The Bonn agreement created a government, but it did not create a state.‖26 The agreement suffered from serious deficiencies and failed to include the benchmarks for building the state institutions. The Bush administration officials ―misjudged their own capacity to carry out major strategic change on the cheap.‖27

Fatima Ayub argues that the principal intervener had ―no intentions and strategies for long-term stabilization, statebuilding or development.‖28 The statebuilding process was set to be failed since its beginning due to the Bush administration‘s lackluster attitude toward nationbuilding (statebuilding) and keeping the project under-resourced, under-financed and under-human militaristic power.29 The policy objectives were narrow and a ―minimalist policy‖ was adopted to pursue the nationbuilding project. The intervener wanted to build yet ―on the cheap.‖30 Its initial approach after ousting the Taliban regime was ―uninterested and ignoring.‖ Putting Afghanistan at the lowest among the agenda items on Bush‘s policy list caused strident challenges in the later years of intervention.31

Thomas Barfield wrote that the administration‘s limited understanding of the Afghan society and history convinced it to form an ―over-centralized and under-resourced‖ state apparatus, which had frequently failed in the past.32 Secondly, the intervener‘s agents thought that quick political transition toward democracy after holding elections would be enough to

25 Quoted in Alex Spillius,‘Barack Obama defense secretary warns Afghanistan hopes needed to be lowered,’ The Telegraph, January 27,2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/4362311/Barack-Obama-defence-secretary- warns-Afghanistan-hopes-needed-to-be-lowered.html. 26 Barnett Rubin, ―(Re)building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy,‖ Current History 103, no 672 (April 2004):168. 27 Barnett Rubin, ―Saving Afghanistan,‖ Foreign Affairs 86, no.1 (January/February 2007):78. 28 Fatima Ayub and Sari Kouvo, ―Righting the course? Humanitarian intervention, the war on terror and the future of Afghanistan,‖ International Affairs 84, no.4 (July 2008): 641-657. 29 Ibid., 641. 30 Michael Bhatia, Kavin Lanigan and Paul Wilkinson, ―Minimal investments, minimal results: the failure of security policy in Afghanistan,‖ AREU Briefing Paper (Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 29, 2004), 1-15; http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ reliefweb_pdf/briefingkit- d6acf0d7a33b6ca8aa3b44e75fbc6c10.pdf. 31 See James Dobbins, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (February 26, 2009), http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/February/Dobbins%2002-26-09.pdf; R.N Haass, War of Necessity: War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 196. 32Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 301-302.

10 acquire legitimacy for the Karzai government and acceptance from the society for use of force against the insurgents. They failed to realize that the Afghan society ―judged the legitimacy of a state by its actions rather than the process that created it.‖33 They also failed to understand that legitimacy deficit caused ―the breakdown in relationships and, in fragile societies, deteriorating governance means abuse of power, declining security, corruption, exclusion and failure to serve the public.‖34 In addition, the intervener‘s exclusionary strategy also contributed to the exacerbation of challenges to the democratization process.

The analysts belonging to the second camp (the Pessimists) argue that the adoption of exclusion-inclusion formula in the process of political institution building aggravated the feeling of alienation among the majority ethnic group, Pashtuns. The intervener‘s decision to keep Taliban and Pashtuns out from the Bonn arrangement and interim setup provided an impetus to ethnic factionalism and converted the electoral process into an inter-ethnic competition among the new and old elites. The statebuilding project consolidated ethno-religious fractionalization in Afghanistan.35 Ethnic fractionalization consequently influenced the process of institution building.36 Hamish Nixon and Richard Ponzio wrote in International Peacekeeping that ―democratic political system building‖ under the auspices of the US and the UN was a technical process without a broader political process.37 Centralization of power and the warlords‘ emancipation in the cabinet and parliament showed that the external power preferred stability to democracy while building political institution building and neglected the local content and its connection with the process.38 The external power‘s dominant role in statebuilding process

33 Ibid., 302. 34 Lucy Morgan Edwards, ―State-building in Afghanistan: A Case Showing the Limits?,‖ International Review of the Red Cross 92, no.880(December 2010):984. 35 Timor Sharan & John Heathershaw, ―Identity Politics and Statebuilding in Post-Bonn Afghanistan: The 2009 Presidential Elections,‖ Ethnopolitics 10, no 3-4 (September-November 2011):297-319; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, ―Ethnicising Afghanistan?:Inclusion and Exclusion in Post-Bonn Institution building,‖ Third World Quarterly 25, no.4 (2004): 707-729. 36 Ibid., 297. 37 Hamish Nixon and Richard Ponzio, ― Building Democracy in Afghanistan: The Statebuilding Agenda and International Engagement,‖ International Peacekeeping 14, no.1 (January 2007): 36. 38 Ibid.,36;Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Michael Schoiswohl , ―Playing with Fire? The International Community‘s Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan,‖ International Peacekeeping 15, no.2 (2008):252-267; See,for instance, the warlords transformation of role from gun holders to political octopus explained with mixed opinions in chapter five.

11 exposed contradictions and conflict in the state and democracy building processes and caused more de-stabilization, de-legitimization and derailment of the mission.39

The empirical evidence shows that the pessimists‘ arguments are more valid than those of optimists are and they reflect the ground realities, such as prospects for establishing a democratic political order in the post-conflict societies. These studies suggest that the principal intervener‘s contradictory policies created endemically weak state institutions, which even lacked the liberal content. There is no universal template applicable to every militarily intervened society (where state and democracy building experiments are taking place),40 although some aspects of the model, such as restructuring the society through institution building, are practiced in most of the cases. Both optimists and pessimists have several bases in common. For instance, they deal with the statebuilding process in Afghanistan as a specific case. However, conditionalists and sequentialists give strong theoretical views with empirical case studies.

The third camp can be divided into two categories: conditionalists and sequentailists. Conditionalists assume that externally-led state and democracy building experiment can only succeed if the interveners put in political institutions with functioning capacity, human rights regime and a certain level of socio-economic development, although ethnic homogeneity and past account of liberalism also enhance the chances of democratic consolidation. Structural prerequisites and post-intervention domestic and regional conditions also contribute to the sustainability of the externally-designed democratization process.41 For instance, James Dobbins

39 Astri Suhrke, ―Democratizing a Dependent State: The Case of Afghanistan,‖ Democratization 15, no.3 (2008): 630-648; Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Coral J. Riphenburg, ―Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan,‖ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no.1 (April 2007):1-15. 40 Rebuilding experiment taking place in failed states. Conceptual approaches on failed states are vague and biased. Scholars have given various indicators and degree of them to explain the failed state phenomena. Latter has made a special place in the rebuilding state literature with reference to external intervention in the states harboring international terrorist organizations. Afghanistan has being the first ―test case‖ in addressing the failed state conditions. In simple term, state with negative attributes ranging from absences of state institutions and high level of violence; ruled by non-state actors and a direct threat to the international order are prescribed to military-led statebuilding and democratization processes. See for instance, J. Milliken and K. Krause, ―State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies,‖ Development and Change 3, no.5 (2002): 753-774;Robert I Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of nation-states: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2003); Ted Galen Carpenter, ―The Imperial Lure: Nation-Building as a US Response to Terrorism,‖ Mediterranean Quarterly 17, no.1 (Winter 2006): 35-36; Jessica Stern, ―Being Feared in Not Enough to Keep US Safe,‖ Washington Post, September 15,2001. 41 See, for instance, Seymour M. Lipset ,―Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,‖ American Political Science Review 53, no.1(March 1959): 69-80; Thomas Carothers, ― Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror. Foreign Affairs 82, no.1 (2003):84-97.

12 argues, ―The salient one is the level of effort the United States and the international community put into their democratic transformation….This higher level of input accounts in significant measure for the higher level of output measured in the development of democratic institutions and economic growth.‖42 Conditionalists also argue that the motives of intervention43 and intervener‘s policies44 are significant variables in determining the outcome of the project. The positive motive is likely to result in a positive democratic change.

On the other hand, the sequentialists‘ debate rests on two prevailing opinions. One camp advocates the ―democratic nature of the state‖ whilst highlighting the significance of holding free and fair elections, crafting a constitution, and human rights. Adherents of the second camp emphasize the importance of state institutions over democracy. In simple words, the sequentialists debate on the question of priority between the processes. Some exponents of statebuilding put ―security first‖ for democratic political order.45 Thus, in statebuilding, establishing the government‘s monopoly on violence is followed by democratization and economic liberalization processes.46 In this regard, Francis Fukuyama argues, ―Those countries in which democracy preceded modern statebuilding have had much greater problems achieving high quality governance than those that inherited modern states from absolutist times.‖47 He links political order with institution building for consolidation of the liberal democratic state. Deriving his argument from Samuel Huntington‘s Political Order in Changing Societies, Fukuyama

42 Dobbins et .al, America‟s Role in Nation-Building, xix ; Jason Brown, ―Can America Nation-Build?,‖ World Politics 59, no.2 (January 2007):316. 43 Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny, ―Forging Democracy at Gunpoint,‖ International Studies Quarterly 50.no.3 (September 2006):539-560; James Meernik, ―United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy,‖ Journal of Peace Research 33, no.4 (November 1996): 391-402; Margaret G Hermann and Charles W Kegley, ―The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record,‖ International Interactions 24, no.2 (1998):91-114. 44 J. Michael Greig and Andrew J.Enterline, ―The Durability of Imposed Democracy,‖ International Interaction 40, no.2 (2014):166-190. 45 Amitai Etzioni, Security First: For a Muscular, Moral, Foreign Policy (New Haven, London: Yale University Press,2007); Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair , ―States at Risk and Failed States: Putting Security First‖, Policy Outlook, (Washington D.C, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , September 2004) , http://www.swp- berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/statesatrisk_ks.pdf; Barnett R .Rubin, ―The Politics of Security in Post Conflict State Building,‖ in Building States to Build Peace, eds. Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,2008), 25-47. 46 See, for instance, Francis Fukuyama, ― Liberalism versus Statebuilding,‖ Journal of Democracy 18, no.3 (July 2007):10-13; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, ―The Sequencing "Fallacy", Journal of Democracy 18, no.3 (July 2007):5-10. 47 Quoted in Sheri Berman , ―Global Warning: Francis Fukuyama ‗s Political Order and Political Decay,‖ review of Political Order and Political Decay, by Francis Fukuyama, New York Times, September 11,2014 ,Sunday Book Review, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/books/review/francis-fukuyamas-political-order-and-political- decay.html?_r=0.

13 argues, ―The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.‖48

The argument that ―there must be a state with coercive capacity, capital and legitimacy before even having a regime‖ further strengthens the view that institutions are the key to stability and the fundamental purpose of statebuilding process is to construct the state institutions. Ronald Paris has given a similar theoretical understanding in his debate, ―Institutionalization before Liberalization (IBL).‖49 The advocates of IBL argue that the external statebuilders need to prefer institution building, particularly market economics, to pursue early elections in the war-torn states, even though both go abreast amid the external (re) building process. Another important aspect of institutions is the nature of the institutions. The exogenous statebuilding process derives its ideological orientation from liberalism; therefore, the statebuilders emphasize consociationalist arrangement while pursuing the statebuilding process in the divided societies.

However, the sequentialist discourse has stressed the priority between the state and democracy building processes. Yet some scholars have further stretched the theoretical debate to explore the potential relationship between state and democracy to assess the success and failure of the experiment.50 Success in the latter is attributed to the functioning state apparatus in the war-torn societies. The coercive and administrative capacities of a state are consequential for the consolidation of democracy. However, legitimacy is another important element of stateness. It is directly linked with the citizenship agreement for the external statebuilding and democratization processes. Public approval enhances the legitimacy of political institutions and provides acceptance of ruling the public. Nonetheless, the linkage between the processes is complex and plagued with challenges in the conflict-ridden society.

Even at their best, the external state and democracy building processes have not produced stable and democratic states in the post-intervention environment. The proponents of critical statebuilding place the debate in challenging the design and execution of the external state and

48 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale, 1968), 1. 49 Roland Paris, At War‟s End: Building Peace after Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),7-8. 50 David Andersen, Jorgen Moller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, ―The State-Democracy Nexus: Conceptual Distinctions, Theoretical Perspectives, and Comparative Approaches,‖ Democratization 21, no.7 (2014):1203-1220.

14 democracy building processes.51 They argue that the Western intervention and imported statebuilding template violate the societal realities and sovereignty of the targeted state and the locals are kept secondary while pursuing the processes. Therefore, the IR scholarship has attempted to answer a question, ―Why did the intervener fail to build a liberal democratic state in the targeted country, especially the failed state?‖

The most relevant theoretical debates are of failed state and the ―problem-solving‖ approaches of state and democracy building processes in the post-conflict environment. The intervener‘s Weberian state model requires legitimacy and coercive power, which is usually acquired at a faster pace than democracy. In the case of Afghanistan, the intervener assumed that the ―success formula‖ consisted of security followed by economic development and democracy. In this process, however, ambiguities and contradictions were visible. The external power was unable to restrict the state‘s coercive authority and promote popular perceptions about the state rule. It was also unable to set up ―sustainable democratic state institutions‖. The external power‘s aforementioned failures show that even the best practices are always not helpful in statebuilding and acceptable to the locals.

The intelligentsia is of the view that the intervener‘s policy misjudgments, miscalculations, and flawed statebuilding strategies led to the failure of the processes. Instead of bringing changes in its flawed strategies, the intervener brought minor changes in the [then] current strategies, such as increasing aid and the numbers of troops and broadening the spectrum of war by including drones and Pakistan.52 Its focus on addressing the structural failures instead of political entitlements kept the locals‘ concerns unacquainted and unresolved. As a result, there exists a fragile state with procedural democracy dependent on the external capital and support. For this reason, the larger failures in the processes were attributed to the aforementioned flawed

51 See, for instance, Oliver Richmond, ―Jekyll or Hyde: What is Statebuilding Creating? Evidence from the ‗field‘,‖ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 27,no.1(2014):1-20;John Heathershaw , ― Conclusions: neither built nor formed-the transformation of States under International Intervention,‖ in Statebuilding and State-formation: the Political Sociology of Intervention, ed. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (London:Routledge,2012);David Chandler, ―International Statebuilding and the Ideology of Resilience,‖ Politics 33,no.4 (2013):276-286;Nicolas Lemay-Hebert ―Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach,‖ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no.1 (2009):21-45. 52 Oz Hassan and Andrew Hammond, ―The Rise and Fall of American‘s freedom agenda in Afghanistan: counterterrorism, nation-building and democracy,‖ The International Journal of Human Rights 15, no.4 (May 2011): 532- 551; Graham E. Fuller, ―Obama‘s Policies making situation worse in Afghanistan and Pakistan,‖ Huffington Post, May 10, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/global-viewpoint-obamas-p_b_201355.html.

15 assumptions of the intervener on which it had designed and nurtured the state and democracy building processes.

Weberian state institutions are like empty shells. Their limited administrative, representative, and executive capacities expose the flaws and delegitimize the transitory phase of the state and democracy building processes. The implementation of this model in Afghanistan enhanced the coercive capacity of the state but failed to defeat the insurgency and provide security to the citizens. An overwhelming focus on building the state‘s capacity but nothing on the state responsibilities and keeping the society out of the processes made the rebuilding process an ―outsider plan‖. The society, in response, took no interest in the rebuilding process or building a linkage with the new regime in power. This type of estrangement of the society reduced the state‘s revenue capacity. In addition to this, fraudulent elections, unaccountable government, and the external power‘s dominance in decision-making on election results hindered the transformation of the process from exogenous into endogenous. Therefore, the external power still seems far away from developing ownership of the processes among the locals.

This study strengthens a theoretical explanation that the statebuilding project failures were located in the processes of the state and democracy building. The intervener‘s objectives and practices were contradictory and negated the political assumptions of representative democracy, rights of individuals, and state‘s regulatory power. Its militarized statebuilding and illiberal policies did not augment the pursuit of liberal democracy, but rather created institution without life and entrenched authoritarian tendencies in the nature of the state. The statebuilding process in Afghanistan was parochial in nature and focused on establishing security and sovereignty over the territory. The intervener‘s failure in managing the implementation process made the rebuilding efforts more complex and challenging. Its preponderant influence in the process and the emancipation of local warlords thus challenged the consolidation prospects of the liberal democratic state because the externally designed processes were hardly analogous with the local context. Above all, the exclusion of locals from the processes eventually made the experiment a technical rather than a political endeavor.

Organization of Study

This thesis is mainly concerned with the exogenous state and democracy building experiment in post-Taliban Afghanistan in twelve years (2001-2013). It seeks to investigate the causes and outcome of the state and democracy building processes and explains the impediments arisen from limitations in the processes, which took the experiment on the path of failure. To explain the argument within the framework of theoretical traditions, chapter one deals with theoretical approaches that will enable us to understand complexities, ambiguities, and limitations in the theoretical debates while explaining the processes. The analytical debate has been kept flexible to give a thorough understanding of the failed state and state and democracy building processes as a solution to fix the former. The latter debate in the Anglo-Saxon tradition has also been elaborated with reference to nationbuilding.

Chapter two comprises the historical formation of the Afghan state dominated by power struggles among the tribal rulers, heterogeneity of the Afghan society, and external influences. All factors ultimately left a significant impact on the making of the Afghan state. Power struggle among the ruling elites provided the imperialist powers with an opportunity to increase their influences in the royal families‘ courts, which eventually resulted in the Anglo-Afghan wars. The British authority subsidized the Afghan state in the nineteenth and early twentieth century that was later replaced by the Soviet aid until 1992. This chapter also elaborates the political dynamics of the state formation in historical context while highlighting the political processes such as conveying of ‗Loya Jirga‘ (traditional institution), crafting of constitutions, elections, and selection of the leadership. Afghanistan has experienced dynastic rule for almost two centuries (1747-1978), yet the ethnic Pashtuns have managed to keep the lever of powers in their hand for centuries. However, the role of external influences in the changing political dynamics of the country is significant.

Chapter three traces the process of the state decay with reference to the external factors interacting with the internal political dynamics of Afghanistan, which had a particular role in starting and intensifying the conflicts and the process of state decomposition. The political and security environment of Afghanistan under the People‘s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime deteriorated and became violent during the Soviet-Afghan war. Subsequently, the withdrawal of Red Army and the failure of international community in consolidating peace in Afghanistan led to the anarchic political environment, civil war, and eventually fall of Afghan

State. The degeneration into anarchy provided an opportunity to the Taliban to create their own regime in the country, which put the country under the label of failed state with collapsed state institutions.

Chapter four focuses on the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, demise of the Taliban regime, and the start of the democratization project. This chapter consists of a detailed study of the US role played during the various phases of democratization− for instance, Bonn Conference I (2001), constitution crafting, and presidential and parliamentary elections. This study scrutinizes the interaction pattern between the intervener and Afghan elites and raises a question ―how this asymmetrical interaction cultivated a weak and fragile democratic regime in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.‖ The primary objective of this chapter is to explain the phases of democratization and the crafting of political institutions during those phases while following the formula of inclusion-exclusion that falls under the theoretical domain of ―power sharing‖. The chapter also identifies the limitations of public voices and preponderant influence of the principal intervener in the Bonn conference I and the ensuing parochial political settlement. The driver of democratization process adopted a ―top down‖ approach in the state and democracy building processes. The US committed several mistakes in the formative phase of democratization process, which negatively affected the process. The intervener dictated the framers of the constitutions to design a government based on the centralization of power where power rested in the executive office and thus made the parliament a powerless political institution. The fragmented nature of legislature bolstered the power of the president and regional power brokers. The adoption of ―party less‖ and ―Single Non Transferable Vote‖ electoral mechanism for the elections also contributed to the inefficacy of system.

Moreover, the presidential and parliamentary elections cemented the ethnic divisions and enhanced the significance of patronage networks in democratization process. Electoral malpractices and fraud challenged the slogan of free and fair elections and transparency highlighted by the intervener and Karzai regime amid the process. Concisely, the process failed to produce democratic political institutions by giving legitimacy to the unaccountable acts of legislatures and executive. Electoral failures and dysfunctional legislature made the entrenchment of democratic values in Afghan society a distant reality. Therefore, the process resulted in the emergence of a Kabul regime with authoritarian tendencies.

In an ongoing conflict situation, the failed policies in the US-led state and democracy building processes increase the challenges to the process. Chapter five and six give a detailed account of impediments, which proved consequential for the processes. The failure of processes can be attributed to the intervener‘s policies riddled with contradictions and paradoxes. Mistakes provided opportunities to the non-democratic forces to exploit and gain from the contradictory U.S. policies, strengthen their power base in the post-Taliban Afghanistan, and challenge the power of the elected government. The statebuilding process heavily suffered due to the intervener and its allies‘ competing agendas, missing coordination, and erroneous strategies. These factors further exacerbated the security dilemmas faced by the nascent regime.

The continuity and change in the intervener‘s policies, from Bush administration to Obama administration, exposed the militarized nature of statebuilding. Locals‘ agreement to the changing numbers of external troops and increasing level of violence was not a matter of concern for the intervener and Kabul regime. Ambiguities and contradictions were not limited to the security arena, but rather spread across the entire state and democracy building processes. For instance, the intervener had a policy of building nexus with the warlords to get a quick victory against the Taliban and transform the former into political actors in order to achieve success in state and democracy building experiment. However, the inclusion of warlords contaminated the processes and excluded the locals and opposition from the processes. On the other hand, the flawed nature of processes resulted in the fragile rule of law in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The [fragile] rule of law thus constrained the power of the state and failed to give guarantee for the protection of citizens. Therefore, in the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the state justice system remains weak, corrupt, lacks appropriate physical infrastructure and professionals and serves the needs of the rich and state elite.

In chapter six, the security dilemma debate continues to investigate the internal and external factors, which contributed to the resurgence of Taliban and increased the scope and durance of the insurgency against the coalition and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The intervener‘s decision to shift the approach toward external and internal troops surge failed to stop the resurgence of Taliban and insurgency. The rise of insurgency explains how the gaps in state-and democracy building processes bolstered the support for Taliban and helped them in establishing shadow governments in the provinces. The external power‘s extensive use of

19 firepower and the Taliban reaction resulted in civilian casualties. The civilian causalities sharply increased with the troops surge and Karzai regime‘s failure to establish an effective state coercive apparatus to maintain law and order in the conflict-ridden society. The deficiencies amid the construction of effective state institutions are elaborated in the chapter seven. This chapter explains the limits of the statebuilding process and resulting inability of the state to expand its writ beyond Kabul and other urban areas that proved detrimental for stability of the regime. In the context of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the state building process failed to build the coercive, administrative, and capital capacity of the state, which could transform the exogenous process into a locally owned process. Available empirical data demonstrates that the rise and fall of the government revenue and absence of the state administrative and coercive authority beyond urban areas negatively affected the revenue collection and delivery of public goods in the society. Moreover, functioning of the state apparatus depended on the external aid. Aid empowered a new state class that exploited the intervener‘s money and limited knowledge about the war-torn society. Lack of state‘s coercive and extractive capacity made the Afghan economy a rentier economy with a new rentier state class. It also resulted in legitimacy deficit making the society irrelevant in the process. Pervasive corruption further eroded the capacity and delivery of the state institutions in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

The state failed to implement policies and carry out the core objectives, including the collection of taxes, protection of civilians, and delivery of political goods. This failure hampered the consolidation of democracy in a conflict-ridden society. Therefore, it became an erroneous task for the fragile state to deal with ethnic, tribal, and religious cleavages while pursuing the democratization process. Ethnic fractionalization influenced the process and challenged the effectiveness of the state in transition period. Mid-range conclusions and the future research avenues for state and democracy building endeavors in post-intervention states are part of the concluding chapter.

Given the time frame limitations, this study also includes a postscript. The postscript consists of a description and an analytical explanation of important events in Afghanistan, notably the presidential election, withdrawal of foreign forces and rise in the insurgency. Starting from the last months of the Karzai government, the postscript also covers the controversy over signing of the BSA, fraud in elections and ensuing political gridlock between Ghani and

Abdullah, the intervener‘s meddling, current position/state/of the Afghan forces, and fragility in the state institutions.

Research Methodology

This study is based on qualitative research, single case study, and process tracing method. The importance of qualitative research is explained in its quality of ―generally unearthing enormous amounts of information from their studies.‖53 Qualitative methods are mainly concerned with the ―text-based answers that are often historical or include personal reflection from participants in political institutions, events, issues or processes.‖54 Qualitative research gives an in-depth attention to the past accounts and unfolds the complexities of the processes in the construction of the political institutions in a conflict-prone environment. To investigate the processes, the research seeks to pay attention to single or comparative case studies method to have a thick explanation about the subject under inquiry in order to understand the outcome of the cases. The outcomes are understood by ―reverse construction‖ of the event or processes to elaborate why and how a certain event or process took place in a given place and time.55 Understanding the causality of the phenomena is the foundational trait of the qualitative research. It can also be explored by the ―process tracing‖ technique, which ―involves the mechanism and capacities that lead from cause to an effect while quantifying the causal outcomes.56

The case study researchers share a conviction that the usage of process tracing method to study hypothesized causal mechanism in individual cases is an important means of developing and testing historical and theoretical explanations. The casual mechanism provides more fundamental explanation than a general explanation for a particular phenomenon. Process tracing method can identify paths to an outcome and point out the variables that were left out or not given importance in the initial studies. This method effectively explains how an issue, situation,

53 Gary King, Robert O.Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994),4. 54 Ariadne Vromen, ―Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches ,‖ in Theory and Methods in Political Science ,eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),249;See,for instance John Gerring, ―What is a Case Study and What is Good for?,‖ American Political Science Review 98, no.2(May 2004):341-354. 55 Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe, Encyclopedia of Case Study Research: L-Z, vol 2 (California: SAGE Publication Inc,2010),734-735. 56 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ―Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods,‖ Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 457-458.

21 or pivotal event happens, especially when the focus of the case is subject to the dynamics of change, and time is an organizing variable. Therefore, it is important for the researcher to give starting and ending points of the process tracing method and define the choice of period.57

I have selected the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan on the base of its complexity and uniqueness. It is first ―field test case‖ of liberal democratic statebuilding in a non-western state after 9/11. The state and democracy building processes pursued during the conflict under the banner of war on terrorism make it a peculiar case as compared to other post-conflict societies experiencing the reconstruction of the state and society. Trade-offs between constructing liberal democratic political institutions and the war on terror make this case significant in its own way. Process tracing method helps to disaggregate the phases of both processes, intertwined with each other, with a theoretical understanding of the processes. Case studies are significant to understand the complex causal relationship between the failed state conditions and the intervener‘s strategies of state and democracy building processes as a prescription of addressing the symptoms of failure in the targeted society. In this course, the asymmetrical interaction pattern between the local elites and intervener (when the gaps in the former pattern are filled and exaggerated by the local warlords) also helps to identify the path of success and failure in the (re)building processes. The intervener kept making trade-offs at every phase of the state and democracy building processes and within them. In fact, the trade-offs had been more visible in achieving security through war and downplaying the democratic factor. Process tracing method helps us to study the systematic trade-offs between the political and technical aspects of externally-led state and democracy building processes in the twelve years (2001-2013) period. The researcher, therefore, moves through time and space to understand the causal mechanism of failure in the state and democracy building processes.

The strength of the process tracing method requires the collection of data from various sources. Therefore, both primary and secondary sources are used in this study to investigate the subject. The data used in the process tracing (case study) method is largely qualitative in nature, but minor quantitative data has also been used to explore the path of failure in the state and democracy building processes. This study includes graphs to give validity to the explanation and

57 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T.Checkel, ―Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices,‖ in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool , eds. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2015),26-28.

22 lower the subjective bias. At the qualitative level, the consulted data includes official and non- official documentation, policy makers‘ memories, speeches, congressional research service reports, reports of UN Secretary General on Afghanistan, and interviews. This study uses direct quotations of the policy makers to capture the experience and changing nature of the processes under study. It also includes documents produced by the policy making agencies, international organization such as U.N., Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Semi-structured interviews of experts, scholars and Afghan elites have also been conducted and quoted. In terms of secondary sources, plentiful literature has been produced on statebuilding and democratization processes in post-Taliban Afghanistan. However, I have utilized the prominent theoretical and empirical narratives on the subject, which are directly linked with the puzzle.

Chapter One Concept of a Failed State: Theoretical Approaches

Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide a conceptual framework that is useful for understanding the exogenous state and democracy building processes in the militarily targeted states, particularly the failed states. It addresses the following questions: What is the concept of failed state? What are the key attributes of a failed state? Why are the failed states at the center of the international agenda for coercive intervention by the US-led international community? Which solutions the US-led international community has given to address the failed state problem? What were the policies and interaction pattern the principal intervener adopted to pursue the state and democracy building processes in a failed state, Afghanistan, during the transitory phase?.

This chapter argues that the failed state quandary has occupied the center stage of the international politics, as it has established a direct nexus with the national security of the Western nations. The failed state quandary has gained the direct attention of the scholarship and policy makers in international relations because the failed states can prove perilous for the international political order.58 Therefore, the repairing of failed states and addressing the failing states suffering from institutional decay and diminishing monopoly on force, causing and spreading the anarchic situation beyond their border, require immediate response of the international community.59

58 Leonardo Figueroa Helland and Stefan Borg , ―The Lure of State Failure: A Critique of State Failure Discourse in World Politics,‖ Interventions: International Journal of Post Colonial Studies 16, no.6 (2014): 877; according to Michael Ignatieff, ―it was also, in the 1990‘s, a general failure of the historical imagination, an inability of the post- cold-war West to grasp that the emerging crisis of state order in so many overlying zones of the world-from Egypt to Afghanistan-would eventually become a security threat at home.‖ quoted in Michael Ignatieff, ―The Burden,‖ New York Times Magazine, January 5,2003, 162; ― Failed and Collapsed States in the International System,‖ Report, (The African Studies Centre, Leiden; The Transnational Institute ,Amsterdam; The Center of Social Studies, Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center –CIP-FUHEM, Madrid, December 4, 2003), 3-24, http://www. tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/reports/failedstates.pdf. 59 Humanitarian emergencies caused by state failure illustrated in the form of human rights atrocities, massive influx of refugees in neighboring countries with the collapse of state institutions and rise of warlords in anarchic environment. Former can result in contingency effect for bordering states. Recent examples of state failure are those countries experienced total collapse of state institutions and internal conflict , for example ,Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Liberia, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan. For the state failure process in the above mentioned countries, see for example. Ken Menkhaus, ―Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism,‖ Adelphi Paper, no.364

Therefore, the primary goal of international community‘s state and democracy building initiative is to make the failed or failing states successful ones.

The 9/11 event provided an impetus to the discussion of failed state both at theoretical and policy levels. As a result, building of functioning state institutions with liberal democratic features in the failed states acquired maximum attention of the practitioners and the academicians in the post-9/11 era, though state-centric global system had a poor track record in creating stability and democratic accountability.60 States shaped by the interveners remained weak and dependent on international efforts for their sustainability. The society in newly built state remained disconnected with the process of liberal democratic institutions building in the [failed] state. The external powers‘ approach to transform the failed state into an effective state failed to capture the essence of public legitimacy and consolidation of the state institutions. Although the failed state conditions stimulated the rebuilding framework, the challenges to external processes in the case of Afghanistan made newly built state institutions fragile and a candidate for failure.

State failure and statebuilding are major concerns of the international community. Both require a better theoretical understanding to formulate effective policies to prevent the collapse of state institutions and cultivate efficacious strategies to rebuild the state institutions. There are multiple views on the failed state concept. Policy makers and theorists link the concept with the security of the Global North, threatened by the non-state actors residing in the failed states.61 The

(London: Oxford University Press for IISS, March 2004), 7-84; Barbara Crossette, ―Inquiry Says U.N. Inertia in 94 Worsened Genocide,‖ New York Times, December 17, 1999, A1, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/17/world/ inquiry-says-un-inertia-in-94-worsened-genocide-in-rwanda.html. 60 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, ―Failed States, or the State as Failure,‖ The University of Chicago Law Review72, no.4 (Fall 2004): 1159; Minxin Pei, Saima Amin, and Seth Garz, ―Building Nations: The American Experience,‖ in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq ,ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 64-86. 61 Policy document such as National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002) implies that existential threat to US emerging from failing states and requires attention towards the casual linkage between internal state collapse and the proliferation of global terrorism. Other policy documents produced by the US office of the Director of National Intelligence (2005), US National Security Council (2006) highlighted the failed states and terrorist sanctuaries nexus because the failed states provide conducive conditions to the transnational terrorists. Similar understanding given by the Commission on Weak States and US National Security, ‗Weak and failed government generate instability, which harms their citizens, drags down their neighbors and ultimately threatens US interests in building an effective international system, providing the foundation for continued prosperity, and, not least, protecting Americans from external threats to our security.‖ The US Center for Global Government, ‗Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security‘ created a bi-partisan panel of thirty former government officials, senior business leaders, academics, and NGO representatives to issue a report. Jeremy M. Weinstein, Stuart E. Eizenstat and John Edward Porter, On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security (Centre for Global

25 terrorists‘ sanctuaries thus inevitably become a target of the intervention of industrialized nations. Nevertheless, the failed state discourse evolved by the intelligentsia and practitioners remains vague and contradictory in nature. And the scholars disagree on almost all dimensions of the concept, ranging from definitional issues to its theoretical utility. Policy circles have constructed the concept of failed state in a way that it poses a significant threat to the Western nations. Their interpretation of the concept and its impact on the global order thus seems a subjective representation to protect and expand the financial benefits gained from magnifying the threat. International organizations and industrialized nations have heavily invested in the ―failed states projects‖ pursued by the leading think tanks and government agencies.

The practitioners‘ overemphasis on the subject has also produced ‗material consequences‘ for the international community.62 In most of the cases, the pre-intervention efforts, such as diplomatic and economic pressures through sanctions placed for regime change or ending the internal conflict, have resulted in human suffering and deaths. Yet, in some cases, the US and its allies have militarily intervened to remove the errant regime and restore the law and order. It shows that if the stringent measures adopted by the international community fail to produce adequate results, the probability of military intervention remains high. The post-Cold War interventions of the international community in Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia depict a similar pattern of reaction toward the situations threatening the world order.63

The scholars‘ construction of failed state paradigm also faces critical challenges. Conflict and cooperation have new meaning and understanding in the modern era. Scholars analyze the internal conflicts such as civil war, ethnic conflict, and insurgencies in a manner that the conflicts can pose a direct threat to the North. They consider the internal conflicts in the South to be peripheral issues or proxy wars. However, the Western nations‘ response to those conflicts

Development: Washington D.C., 2004), 6-7, http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weakstates/Full_Report.pdf; For scholars arguments see, for instance, Jessica Stern, ―Being Feared Is Not Enough to Keep Us Safe,‖ Washington Post, September 15, 2001; Francis Fukuyama argues that ―the chief threats to security come from failed states,‖ quoted in his article, ―Nation-Building 101,‖ The Atlantic Monthly (January/February 2004):161; Alternative view challenge the strong linkage between the failed states and international terrorism. See, for instance, Aidan Hehir, ―The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom,‖ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no.3 (November2007): 307-322; David Chandler, Empire in Denial ( London: Pluto Press, 2006), 189-190. 62According to Newman material consequences are linked with the financial, diplomatic attention and military action. Edward Newman, ―Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-West-phalian World,‖ Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 3 (December 2009): 437. 63 Karin von Hippler and Michael Clarke, ―Something Must Be Done,‖ The World Today, March 1999, 4.

26 has had remained limited and ineffectual. This thinking pattern has changed in the post-Cold War era particularly after 9/11. The aforementioned nations have shifted their focus to the concept of failed state in the contemporary political discourse embedded in the changing nature of conflict, threat perception, and flaws in the Westphalia model.64

The following section comprises an analytical review of the existing literature on the concept of failed state and externally given solutions of repairing the failed states through state and democracy building processes in the post-intervention period. This study highlights serious differences among the social scientists on the definition of failed state. It identifies a predicament that there is no consensus on the types of failed states, degree of failure, and the failed state criteria. It exposes the theoretical hollowness of the concept and suggests that stretchable qualities of the concept further give it a loose definition and thus leave its usage subject to the choice of user. Such vagueness in the concept ultimately affects the response of the policy makers in designing the policies for fixing the failed state.

1.1 Theoretical Debates on Failed State

The IR scholarship has put enormous attention on the concept of failed state, even though the analytical vigor of the concept is challenged and debatable. Policy and academic circles alike have criticized the concept due to its broadness and lack of operationalization.65 Tobias Hagmann and Markus V. Hoehne argue that ―the state failure debate is confronted by…shortcomings of considerable proportions.‖66 In spite of differences among the scholarship on defining the nature of the failed state, the entrance of this concept in U.S. foreign policy agenda has made it pivotal in the policy circles. Apart from theoretical complexity, the reconstituting of democratic [sustainable] state institutions in the failed state is complex and extremely difficult.

I have divided the prevalent discourse on the concept of failed state into three categories. Scholars belonging to the first category have not questioned the analytical weakness of the

64 Newman, ―Failed State and International Order,‖ 432. 65 Natasha M. Ezrow and Erica Frantz, ―Revisiting the Concept of the Failed State: bringing the state back in,‖ Third World Quarterly 34, no.8 (2013): 1323-1338. 66 T. Hagmann and M. Hoehne, ―Failures of the state failure debate: evidence from the Somali territories,‖ Journal of International Development 21, no.1 (January 2009): 44.

27 concept and supported its significance in the international politics. They argue that the failed state concept has transformed the meaning of insecurity in global politics and ―weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order.‖67 They associate the concept with global insecurity, i.e. threats emerging from the failed states can damage the global order because the former poses an existential threat to the Western nations. According to Paul D. Miller, ―Failed states may eventually present a systemic risk to the liberal world order, of which the United States is the principal architect and beneficiary.‖68 Global disorder of the new millennium suggests that the ―weak and failing state threat‖ is more perilous than the bottom billion living under strain pressures and may cause internal conflicts.69

Several scholars have endeavored to establish a link between the failed states and terrorism. They argue that it is far easy for the terrorists to operate in a dysfunctional state where government institutions are in disarray or collapsed. Failed states are fertile grounds for the growth of terrorist organizations because they allow the influx of terrorists and sponsorship of international terrorism.70 Stephen Van Evera argues, ―Al-Qaeda and other terror groups grow and thrive in failed states, using them as heavens in which they can establish secure bases to mass produce trained, motivated killers.‖71

Scholars belonging to the second category have raised their concerns over methodological and analytical deficiencies in the concept. They link the weakness of concept with the absence of an objective definition and lack of consensus on its impact on security.72

67 Francis Fukuyama, Statebuilding: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 24; Chester A. Crocker, ―Engaging Failing States,‖ Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 32–44; Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual , ―Addressing State Failure,‖ Foreign Affairs 84, no.4 (July–August 2005): 153–63; Marla C. Haims, David C. Gompert, Gregory F. Treverton and Brooke Stearns Lawson, Breaking the Failed-State Cycle (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008); Derick W. Brinkerhoff, ―Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies,‖ Public Administration and Development 25, no. 1 (2005): 3–14; Rachel Stohl and Michael Stohl, ―Failing the Failed: The Bush Administration and Failed States,‖ Harvard International Review 29, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 56–65; Daniel Thurer,―An Internal Challenge: Partnerships in Fixing Failed States,‖ Harvard International Review 29, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 42–45. 68 Paul D Miller, ―The Case for Nation-building: Why and How to Fix Failed States,‖ Prism 3, no.1 (December 2011): 65. 69 See, for instance, Brad Amburn, ―The Failed State Index 2005,‖ Foreign Policy, October 22, 2009, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/the-failed-states-index-2005/. 70 Gary King and Langche Zeng, ―Improving Forecasts of State Failure,‖ World Politics 53, no.4 (July 2001): 623. 71 Stephen Van Evera, ― Bush Administration, Weak on Terror,‖ Middle East Policy xiii , no.4 (Winter 2006): 431. 72 Eka Ikpe, ―Challenging the Discourse on Fragile States,‖ Conflict, Security and Development 7, no. 1(April 2007): 85–124; Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, ‗Fixing Failed States: A Cure Worse than the Disease?,‖ Harvard

They argue that it is incorrect to highlight the significance of homeland security when the concept itself is vague and inadequate in explaining the indicators of a failing state. They disagree on the relative importance of the failed and failing states that which one requires more attention. Arguably, the failed states require more attention than the failing states.73

Scholars belonging to the third category have extended their punitive criticism on the concept. They refer to the nature of the concept as highly ethnocentric and argue that hegemonic powers use their agenda to challenge the legitimacy of a state and declare it a threat to the global political order. The concept is described in the respective context and used accordingly. For instance, it may precede development, reforms, military intervention or economic sanctions on the state.74 They also believe that the exaggeration of the concept espouses muscular foreign policy against the failing states. The complexity of the concept is not only confined to the definitional issues, but the political, economic, security, and social indicators determining the state failures are also dubious since a state can fail in different ways.75

Maass and Mepham argue that the ―causes of state failure are extremely diverse. Every state has its own [complex] history of internal and external influences, so an attempt to generalize conceptualization will necessarily omit some particular factors that are relevant and important to the individual case.‖76 All states have a different level of capacities, capabilities, and hierarchy in the international system. These differences determine the nature of a state, i.e.

International Review 29, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 62–66;Charles T. Call, ―The Fallacy of ‗Failed State,‖ Third World Quarterly 29, no.8 (2008): 1491-1507; William Easterly and Laura Freschi, ―Top five reasons the ―failed state‖ is a failed concept,‖ Aid watch, January 13, 2010, http://aidwatchers.com/2010/01/top-5-reasons-why- %E2%80%9Cfailed-state%E2%80%9D-is-a-failed-concept/. 73 Stefan Mair, ―A New Approach. The Need to Focus on Failing States,‖ Harvard International Review 29, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 52–55. 74 Adam David Morton, ―The ―Failed State‖ of International Relations,‖ New Political Economy 10, no.3 (September 2005): 371–379; Morten Boos and Kathleen M. Jennings, ―Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the ‗Failed State‘,‖ The European Journal of Development Research 17, no. 3 (2005): 385–395; Clement Eme Adibe, ―Weak States and the Emerging Taxonomy of Security in World Politics,‖ Futures 26, no. 5 (June 1994): 490–505. 75 Important to note, there is no defined pattern of state failure. State can experience dysfunctionality in a certain aspect of state but at the same time able to perform in other areas. In some cases, failure is difficult to describe as state never reached the effective or consolidation stage after decades of independence in accordance to western standards of successful states. See, for instance, Pierre Englebert and Denis M Tull, “Post conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States,‖ International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 106-139. 76 Gero Maass and David Mepham, Promoting Effective States: A Progressive Policy Response to Failed and Failing States (London: Research Institute for Public Policy Research and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004), 7, http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=900.

29 strong, weak, fragile, failing, failed, and the collapsed state. Capacities of the state are associated with their strength in coercive, capital, and legitimate authority in a given territory. Their strength is also linked with their institutions. Thus, the decay of state institutions not only changes the status of a state in the international system but also exacerbates internal challenges. The inability of a state in fulfilling its primary responsibilities makes it fragile. Stewart Patrick argues, ―Fragile states, however, fall along a continuum of performance between the extremes of effective statehood and outright failure.‖77 The state‘s capacity to deliver public goods is the basic indicator to differentiate between weak and strong states. Declining state capacity buttresses the state‘s fragility, reduces the authority of its institutions, and thus may cause its collapse.

Those who endorse the failed state concept base their theoretical understanding of state failure on two approaches. They describe the characteristics of strong and weak states to distinguish among the strong, weak, failed, and collapsed states. Robert I. Rotberg and William I. Zartman explain the strengths of a strong state in delivering uninterrupted public services and political goods to their citizens.78 According to Rotberg:

Strong states unquestionably control their territories and deliver a full range and a high quality of political goods to their citizens. They perform well according to indicators like GDP per capita, the UNDP Human Development Index, Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House‘s Freedom of the World Report. Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. The rule of law prevails. Judges are independent. Road networks are well maintained. Telephones work… Overall, strong states are places of enviable peace and order.79

77 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 8. 78 Robert I Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2-3; William Zartman, ―Introduction: Posing the problem of State Collapse,‖ in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. William Zartman (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1-10. 79 Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 3.

In contrast, he describes the weak states as:

Weak states (broadly states in crisis) include a broad continuum of states: they may be inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints; or they may be basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent… In weak states, the ability to provide adequate amounts of other political goods is diminished or is diminishing…. Weak states usually honor rule of law precepts in the breach. They harass civic society. Weak states are often ruled by despots, elected or not.80

Nevertheless, the weak states do not necessarily become failed states because the failed states do not have functioning state apparatus and their internal and external legitimacy is lost. One may refer to a state as a failed state that appears unable to carry on with the Hobbesian Social Contract. Jean Germain Gros explains the phases of state failure as:

Five types of failed states are thus identified. First, there are anarchic states, which by definition have no centralized government whatsoever… A close cousin of the anarchic state is the phantom or mirage state, of which today‘s Zaire is an excellent example. The difference between an anarchic state and a phantom one is that while all anarchic states are ipso facto phantom states, not all phantom states are anarchic…Third, there are anemic states whose status stems from two sources. States may be anemic because their energy has been sapped by counterinsurgency groups seeking to take the place of the authority that is formally in power… States may also be anemic because the engines of modernity were never put in place; as a result as population growth puts increasing demands on archaic structures, state agents are in no position to assert effective control. . . Fourth, there are captured states, which typically have a strong centralized authority but one that is captured by members of insecure elites to frustrate—and in the

80 Ibid., 4.

extreme eradicate—rival elites… Fifth, and finally, there are states that are failed in vitro (they are called aborted states), meaning that they experienced failure even before the process of state formation was consolidated.81

Zartman argues that the collapse of a state occurs when it fails to perform its ―basic functions required for them to pass as states.‖82 The state collapse is exhibited as the breakdown of relationship between state and society because the collapse causes evaporation of public legitimacy, occurrence of domesticated financial activity and politics with lowering of the center‘s status as a periphery.83 He argues, ―State collapse is both the cause and the result of internal or civil wars, as weak and illegitimate order permits violence, and violence consumes legitimacy and order. Although no two cases of state collapse are the same and ―collapse‖ can take on a variety of specific manifestations, the fundamental fact of the disappearance of state institutions, law, and order creates inhumanities and insecurities that affect the surrounding countries.‖84

Zartman and Rotberg differentiate and arranged public services in a sequence provided by the state. The order of the services is security, rule of law, public participation in political events, and social services. There is a sequence in the state services for public, especially placing security on the apex of services. However, both perspectives lack analytical vigor. Secondly, even the successful states are not in a position to provide all public services to the entire population. Another narrative on the concept of failed state deals with the Weberian approach, thus depending on the state authority on the monopoly of violence. This narrative also deals with the legitimacy of authority and remains a dominant approach in international politics. The proponents of this narrative emphasize ―sovereignty‖ in international relations and argue that the breakdown of sovereignty can result in the failure of the state.85

81 Jean-Germain Gros, ―Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti,‖ Third World Quarterly 17, no. 3(September 1996): 458-461. 82 I. William Zartman, ―Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse,‖ in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 5. 83 Ibid., 6-7. 84 I. William Zartman, Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 7. 85 See, for instance, Robert Jackson thesis arguing that there are two kind of states ,one having positive sovereignty and other negative sovereignty and both are the part of international system. States with positive sovereignty has the

The aforementioned debate suggests that the academic discourse is yet struggling to give a precise and analytic understanding of the failed state concept and no blueprint of state failure is available hitherto. However, the scholarship and practitioners alike have paid attention to rebuilding of the failed state through external state and democracy building experiment preceded by militarized intervention.

1.2 Repairing the Failed States: External State and Democracy Building Processes

Scholars and practitioners have given more attention to rebuilding of the failed states than the military intervention followed by exogenous statebuilding whose most prominent aspect is the creation of liberal democratic state institutions. The external powers have done extensive political engineering amid the formation of the new state in the post-conflict societies. The existing literature on statebuilding in the post-war environment, therefore, focuses on the establishment of state institutions, which are necessary for democracy and peace.

For some scholars such as Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, statebuilding means building of legitimate and effective institutions that can sustain themselves after the withdrawal of foreign troops.86 The advocates of IBL argue that it is important for the external peace builders to prioritize institution building, particularly market economics, over pursuing early elections in intervened states.87 Given the fact that the difference occurs on the priority list of reconstruction of institutions in the statebuilding process, the majority of scholars emphasize that the principal task in the statebuilding process is to achieve security after conflict through pursuing ―security sector reform agenda‖ and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) to foster

structural features of stateness whereas the other lacks the control on their territory, confronted with non-state actors armed struggle, and lack capacity to implement the political, socio- economic policies. States with negative sovereignty describe as ―Quasi state‖ by the author. For details, see, Robert. H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991); For various type of sovereignty, see, Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 86 In practice, external statebuilders pursued grand vision of statebuilding with its one size fit all approach is likely to meet resistance. Structural weakness can be witness in the post conflict environment .External builders want a quick and cheap creation of state institutions .This approach actually create shallow institutions with less ability to sustain themselves after the withdrawal of foreign builders. See, for example, Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, ―Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas and Failed States,‖ International Security 32, no.4 (Spring 2008): 110. 87 Roland Paris, At War‟s End: Building Peace after Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7-8.

33 democracy.88 The institutions of police and army are rebuilt to provide security from internal and external threats. Although security is not the only prerequisite for consolidation of democracy and comes on the long list of statebuilding activities, the sequentialists put security first for democratic political order.89 However, the coercive capacity of a state in the post-conflict societies remains a rare commodity.

Statebuilding is not limited to the security content in the post-conflict societies. Instead, the adherents of ―institution matters‖ highlight the significance of the decision-making institutions including executive, parliament, judiciary, and constitutional and election processes. For Weber, Fukuyama and Held, an important aspect of statebuilding is ―stateness‖ that suggests establishment of state‘s authority through capacity building process in several areas, including the use of force and revenue generation, to minimize its dependence on foreign aid.90 The precarious environment in a post-conflict state reduces the avenues attractive for foreign investment and thus makes it ripe for informal economic activities such as smuggling, drug trade, and extortion.91 Mineral trade attracts the foreign investors whilst the unconditional and unaccountable foreign aid converts the local economy into a reinter economy and causes the emergence of a new kind of rentier state elites. In addition, growth in drug trade negatively

88 See, for example, Paul Jackson, ― Security Sector Reform and State Building,‖ Third World Quarterly 32, no.10 (2011): 1803-1822; Eleanor Gordon, ―Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding, and Local Ownership: Security the State or Its People?,‖ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8, no.2-3 (July 2014): 126-148; for Afghanistan case study see, for example, Mark Sedra, ― The Hollowing-Out of the Liberal Peace Project in Afghanistan: The Case of Security Sector Reform,‖ Central Asian Survey 32, no.3 (2013): 371-381 . 89 Barnett R. Rubin, ―The Politics of Security in Post Conflict State Building,‖ in Building States to Build Peace, eds. C.T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 30-35; Stephen John Stedman, ―Introduction,‖ in Ending Civil War: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 1-4; Francis Fukuyama, State- Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 1-20; Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States; A Framework of Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 115-125. 90 See, M. Weber, Economy and Society, 2 vols, edit and trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley and Los Angles : University of California Press, 1978); David Held, ―Introduction: Central Perspectives on the Modern State,‖ in States and Societies, eds. David Held, James Anderson, Bram Gieben. etal (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1985), 34-36; Hendrik Spruyt, ―War, Trade, and State Formation,‖ in The Oxford Handbook of Political Science ,ed. Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 567-568. 91 Virginia Haufler, ―Private Sector and Governance in Post Conflict Societies,‖ in Governance in Post Conflict Societies: Rebuilding Fragile States, ed. Derick W. Brinkerhoff (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 144-148; For a general discussion on the selective nature of state‘s retreat, persistence, and reassertion in relations to the illicit global economy, see, for instance , H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,1999).

34 affects the development of state economy and rampant corruption damages the growth of state institution. These economic processes ultimately damage the growth of the legal economy.92

The designing of the institutions is also a core aspect of post conflict statebuilding. Exogenous statebuilding process derives its ideological orientation from liberalism. Therefore, the external statebuilders emphasize ―power-sharing arrangement‖ among different factions during the process. The proponents of power-sharing arrangements support the usage of power- sharing phenomena in all phases of the project, ranging from peace process among warring parties to the end of the war. The building of state institutions, which contribute to peace and establish democratic political order, follows the aforementioned project. It also gives internal legitimacy to the external state and democracy building processes.

Pippa Norris argues that the ―power sharing arrangements are the best chance of success for sustaining democracy‖ and ―that reforms which promote and implement power sharing constitutional arrangements should be more widely recognized as one of the most promising avenues to contribute toward lasting peace settlements and sustainable democracy.‖93 She does not argue that power sharing ceases the conflict forever but suggests that one cannot ignore the chances of relapse of war in fragile peace times. Nevertheless, it ameliorates the sustainability of democracy and peace in the post-war period. Arend Lijphart‘s ―Consociational Democracy‖ illustrates that inclusion of all conflicting parties in the state apparatus and autonomy for each ethnic group is not in the common interest.94 Minority rights are only protected when democracy is not a majoritarian democracy. Elected and non-elected institutions, instead of veto and proportional rights, are a necessary part of political institutions of the state, pre-designed by the post-war actors.

92 See, for example, Florian P. Kuhn, ―Aid, Opium, and the State of Rents in Afghanistan: Competition, Cooperation or Cohabitation,‖ Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding 2, no.3 (November 2008): 309-327; Michael Herb, ―No Representation without Taxation: Rents, Development, and Democracy,‖ Comparative Politics 37, no.3 (April 2005): 297-316. 93 Pippa Norris, Driving Democracy: Do Power Sharing Institutions Work? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 222-223. 94 Arend Lijphart, ―Consociational Democracy,‖ in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. Joel Krieger (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press,1993), 188-189; Arend Lijphart, ―Consociational Democracy,‖ World Politics xxi, no.2 (1969): 207-225.

However, some scholars still highlight the strength of power-sharing formulas in eliminating the ethnic divisions by giving representation to every group in the state structure.95 The inclusion of all warring parties in the statebuilding process is the only way to achieve peace because the left outs may become spoilers and [re] start a civil war. Skeptics of consociationalism argue that the latter is hardly implemented in its true sense because, in most of the cases, this mechanism remains limited to the parties selected by external powers or major conflicting parties winning post-conflict elections. Thus, it keeps out the minorities from the rebuilding process and exacerbates the issue of legitimacy.96 Thus, the power-sharing arrangement may have a negative impact on the democratization process, as it seeks to protect group rights. In this way, individual and citizenship rights may lose their significance in the new arrangement.97 A similar situation emerges in the post-intervention societies where the intervener or the UN administration keeps the transitional authority, although for a short period, to bring stability.

Nevertheless, the external statebuilding projects are focused on institution building from the top and link stability with ―nurturing and consolidation of elites‖ in a nascent democracy, thus ignoring the role of the people in the processes. The societal traits in the post-conflict statebuilding are a missing factor in the project. Their entry in the project is often late or occurs when the [external] technical approach of statebuilding fails to bring stability in the post-conflict societies. Weak or ill-executed policies of the external builders aggravate the already troublesome societal differences in the conflict-ridden societies. In this situation, the technical aspects of nationbuilding may hamper the liberal powers‘ ambition of building a nation-state.

The contemporary post-conflict rebuilding cases have become a complex and ―ambiguous theoretical enterprise‖ and ―ambitious technocratic enterprise‖ of statebuilding and

95 See, for example, Sven Gunnar Simonsen, ―Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases,‖ Security Dialogue 36, no.3 (2005): 297-318; Katharine Belmont, Scott Mainwaring and Andrew Reynolds, ―Introduction: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy,‖ in The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1-11 . 96 Anna K. Jarstad,―Power Sharing: Former Enemies in Joint Government,‖ in From War to Democracy Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, eds. Anna. K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 110-128; Anna K. Jarstad, ―The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace,‖ Africa Spectrum 44, no.3 (2009): 41-62. 97 Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, ―A Tale of Three Constitutions: Ethnicity and Politics in Fiji,‖ in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation, ed. Sujit Choudhry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 313-314.

36 nationbuilding. In spite of an overlap in the processes, they are different in features because the latter represents the building of a common identity in the newly liberated societies. Marina Ottoway argues that both processes are contradictory to each other in means and ends.98 Instead of building a common identity, today‘s nationbuilding projects are employed to pursue the path of democratization in post-conflict societies.99

The vagueness of the concept and its association with statebuilding has enfranchised the policy makers to define the concept according to their own preferences and strategic interests. Andrea K. Talentino argues that the nationbuilding process in the war-torn societies is employed to create a common nationhood to mitigate the socio-political fractionalization and bring peace and stability in the targeted country.100 The concept of common nationhood embedded in the modernization theory illustrates the significance of modern nation-state whereas the US interventionist foreign policy links the nationbuilding paradigm with the establishment of political order in the intervened society. However, much has changed since the heyday of nationbuilding a century ago.101

98 Marina Ottaway, ―Nation Building,‖ Foreign Policy, no.132 (September-October 2002): 16-18. 99 Nation-building was originally associated with the assimilation of various ethnic groups into a single identity at the expense of localism and particularistic identities. It was primary task for the newly decolonized states to create a common identity in order to avoid internal conflict among various identities and establish a nation-state. Therefore the phenomena of nation-building originated in studies of postcolonial development and modernization , as political scientists analyzed e domestic processes through which nation-states (of varying regime types) emerged. Democracy consider as by –product of the above mentioned process. Furthermore, in the academic discourse, nation building is explained as a process of ―socio-political development, which ideally-usually over a longer historical time span –allows initially loosely linked communities to become a common society with a nation-state corresponding to it.‖ quoted in Jochen Hippler, ―Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-Building - Terminology and Political Concepts,‖ in Nation-Building – A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?, ed. Jochen Hippler (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 3; Some consider the process need to be indigenous ―not only projects a meaningful future but also draws on the existing traditions, institutions, and customs, redefining them as national characteristics in order to support the nation‘s claim to sovereignty and uniqueness.‖ quoted in Armin von Bogdandy, Stefan Häubler, Felix Hanschmann, and Raphael Utz, ―State-building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches,‖. in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Vol 9, eds. A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, (2005), 586; For detail discussion, see, Jason Brownlee, ―Review Article: Can America Nation-Build,‖ World Politics 59, no.2 (January 2007): 314-340; Pal Kolsto, ― Nation-building and Social integration theory,‖ in Nation- building and Ethnic integration in Post Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan, ed. Pal Kolsto (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 49. 100 Andrea Kathryn Talentino, ―The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and Identity,‖ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no.3 (October 2004): 558-559; Wayne Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 23-46. 101 Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism , and Secession in the Multinational State, xiii.

The US nationbuilding policy seeks to build the post-intervention societies on democratic lines. Nationbuilding objective is linked with both military operations and civilian activities, but the former has superseded the latter in a majority of the cases. It seeks to create a stable, centralized and cohesive state that represents a definable community. Statebuilding is considered the foundation pillar of nationbuilding followed by identity building, although identity building is no longer on the US statebuilding agenda in the post-intervention societies. Rather, attention is given to political stabilization in the context of transition to democracy and market economy.102 Similarly, the liberalization strategy remains a common factor in the international nationbuilding cases. After 9/11, several scholars have advocated the inclusion of nationbuilding in the US foreign policy agenda, previously neglected by the Bush administration. They argue that it should be an instrumental aspect in countering terrorism in a dysfunctional state, which is considered a security threat to U.S.103

The critics of external nationbuilding projects argue that influential policy makers‘ narrative on nationbuilding has downplayed the importance of culture, history, and identity.104 They have pursued a quantitative and technocratic approach to elaborate the nationbuilding paradigm. For the policy makers, the nationbuilding process means formation of political institutions on democratic lines. The policies and strategies employed to pursue statebuilding objectives significantly add to the building of state institutions. However, in the contemporary nationbuilding experiments, the externals have only been interested in pursuing democratization and ignored transformation of the divided societies into nation-states. They have only shown interest in establishing a legitimate government through electoral politics. Instead of focusing on the political engineering to forge a collective identity in the divided and war-torn societies, the

102 James Dobbins etal., eds., America‟s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003); Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force :US Military Intervention in the Post Cold War World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12-18. 103 See, Jessica Stern, ―Being Feared in Not Enough to Keep US Safe,‖ Washington Post, September 15, 2001; Max Boot, ―The Case for American Empire,‖ Weekly Standard, October 15, 2001; Sebastian Malley, ―Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire,‖ Foreign Affairs 8, no.2 (2002): 2-7; Ted Galen Carpenter, ―The Imperial Lure: Nation-Building as a US Response to Terrorism,‖ Mediterranean Quarterly 17, no.1 (Winter 2006): 35-36. 104 Oliver Richmond, ―The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding,‖ International Spectator 44, no. 1 (2009): 149-169; Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, ―Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach,‖ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 31, no.1 (2009): 21-45; Mark T Berger, ―From Nation-Building to State-building: the Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order,‖ in From Nation-Building to State-building, ed. Mark T. Berger (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 1-22.

38 majority of the US-centric scholars expound the US nationbuilding projects in the context of building legitimate democratic institutions.105 Nonetheless, this conception seems absent in the modern day nationbuilding projects. External powers, therefore, find statebuilding easier than nationbuilding.

Both academic discourses on statebuilding and nationbuilding elucidate the significance of the democratization process.106 They emphasize the intertwined nature of processes. Emergence of democracy in the post-war society is characterized as ―transition period of democracy‖ and a period of uncertain business due to the absence of institutional behavior and regularized pattern of interactions between the breakdown of the rogue regime and installation of another regime. The process of transition and consolidation phases of democracy has occupied a central place in the democratization discourse. This debate has been expanded to understand the process of the creation of democratic political institutions in the post-conflict societies. Scholars have tried to explain the features of a democratic regime emerged after the external intervention and ouster of the rogue regime.107 International aspects of the democratization process are also a prominent feature of the contemporary democracies. Transition whether through ―elite pact‖ or ―imposition‖ shapes the nature of democracy whilst the structural conditions such as stateness, rule of law, and human rights are the guarantors of democracy consolidation. The absence or limited presence of the aforementioned variables ultimately results in neither an authoritarian

105 Minxin Pei, Saima Amin, and Seth Graz, ―Building Nations: The American Experience,‖ in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 64-86; James Dobbins et.al., America‟s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq ,(Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2003); Francis Fukyuama, ―Nation Building 101,‖ 159-162. 106 Policy makers and scholars do not always appreciate the difference between state building and nation building. Both discourses focus on the democratization process a significant pillar of reconstruction process in post conflict societies. Simon Chesterman uses only the term statebuilding, because, he claims, nation-building is specific to postcolonial situations. James Dobbins and his co-authors at RAND solve the problem in an equally sweeping, but opposite fashion by declaring all US investments in post-conflict reconstruction, from Germany to Iraq, to have been exercises in nationbuilding. Francis Fukuyama acknowledges that there is a distinction between statebuilding and nation-building but his usage of both terms would suggest that he regards nation-building as a term employed in the language of politics describing what he – in academic discourse – calls state building. See J. Dobbins et al., America‟s Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq, 2003; S. Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and Statebuilding, 2004; F. Fukuyama, State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 2004. 107 See, for instance, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, ―Intervention and Democracy,‖ International Organization 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 627-640; Marina Ottaway, ―Promoting Democracy after Conflict: Difficult Choices,‖ International Studies Perspectives 4, no.3 (August 2003): 314-322; Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul F Diehl, ―Caution in What You Wish For: The Consequences of a Right to Democracy,‖ Stanford Journal of International Law 48, no. 289 (2012): 289-300.

39 reversion nor a full democratization but a different form of the democratic regime, hybrid political regime, with limited liberalization aspect.108

I have divided the theoretical discourse on the externally imposed democratization process in the post-war societies (with reference to the US) into two groups. The democratization scholars argue that if the regime change is a prerequisite for initiation of the liberalization process in the targeted country, the consolidation of a democratic regime is probable unless the local political support for the intervener‘s democracy experiment is available.109 Regime change can eliminate the abusive security and power structures (ruled without public legitimacy), delegitimize the elite in power and pave the path for new elite bargains for the building of a democratic political system.110 However, the skeptics of ―imposed democracy‖ (brought through ―big bang‖ approach) raise their concern about the acceptability and sustainability of the exogenous democracy building agenda. They argue that it causes local resistance against the imposed political institutions during the transitory period. Imported institutions remain depended on the intervener and thus fail to transmute the society on liberal lines.111

The externally imposed democratic regime debates parameters have been extended to the ―pre-conditionalists‖ and ―universalist‖ approaches to understand the outcomes of democracy in the intervened societies. Structural conditions, which explain the success and failure of democracy in the intervened societies, play an important role in making the experiment of democracy a story of success. Proponents of the prerequisites of democracy argue that the presence of certain structural conditions such as political institutions with functioning capacity, level of socio-economic development, ethnic homogeneity, human rights regime, and the past account of liberalism enhances the chances of democracy consolidation and ensures that fewer

108This kind of political regimes have attributes of autocracy and liberalism which has the electoral feature of elections but scope of public participation in state affaires remains limited and under state scrutiny. 109 James Meernik, ―United States Military Intervention and the promotion of Democracy,‖ Journal of Peace Research 33, no.4 (November, 1996): 397-398; Mark Pency,‖ Forcing Them to Be Free,‖ Political Research Quarterly 52, no.3 (September 1999): 549-582; Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegely Jr., ―The U.S Use of Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy,‖ Journal of Peace Research 33, no.4 (November 1996): 391-402. 110 Nancy Bermeo, ―What the Democratization Literature Says-Or Doesn‘t Say-About Postwar Democratization,‖ Global Governance 9, no.2 (April-June 2003): 159-177; Guillermo O‘ Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1986), 64-84. 111 Fukuyama, Statebuilding: Order and Governance, 37-39; Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, ―Intervention and Democracy,‖ International Organizations 60, no.3 (Summer 2006): 627-649.

40 challenges confront it.112 Conversely, the adherents of transitional democracy are not much concerned about the absence of conditions required for democracy consolidation. Rather, they argue that democracy can emerge and flourish in any kind of circumstances.113

The Universalist view has become prominent after the third and fourth waves of democratization.114 Records show that new democracies have suffered in terms of quality phenomenon and failed to address the core aspects of democracy consolidation, such as rule of law and individual rights, but continued the electoral politics.115 Similar trends are visible in the external democracy building experiment in the war-torn societies. The intervener confronts challenges from the targeted population whilst implanting democracy through force and money. Therefore, the experiment appears tough and complex for the external power in the failed state, particularly when favorable conditions are absent and there is a historical baggage of protracted conflict resulting in the eradication of state institutions and emergence of multiple power structures.116 In these circumstances, the intervener finds it difficult to construct the state from the scratch and play an overwhelming role in the statebuilding and democratization processes. Nonetheless, the entire democratization process remains under the dictation of the external power in the post-conflict societies, even though the UN [theoretically] has supervised the democracy building exercise in most of the contemporary post-conflict reconstruction cases.

Therefore, in practice, the liberal powers‘ strategies from intervention to rebuilding phases clash with the declared objectives of nurturing peace and promoting liberal values whilst pursuing policies to enhance the local technical capacities to stabilize the war-torn society. Opening up of the democratic window means that undemocratic forces can also come in power through democratic means, i.e. participation in the power-sharing pacts and free and fair elections can give them legitimacy. Nevertheless, well-crafted democratic institutions can enhance the prospects of democracy consolidation and strengthen the fragile state. The external

112 Sheri Berman, ―Lessons from Europe,‖ Journal of Democracy 18, no.1 (January 2007): 28-29; Fareed Zakaria, ―The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,‖ Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (November-December 1997): 22-43; See, for detail, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, ―Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strengthen, and War,‖ International Organization 56, no.2 ( Spring 2002): 297-337. 113 Dankwart A. Rustow, ―Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,‖ Comparative Politics 2, no.3 (April 1970): 362. 114 Thomas Carothers, ―The End of the Transition Paradigm,‖ Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 5-21. 115 Marc F. Plattner, ―Introduction,‖ Journal of Democracy 16, no.1 (January 2005): 5-9. 116 See, for detail discussion, Larry Diamond, ―Promoting Democracy in Post- Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges,‖ Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2, no.2 (December 2006): 93-116.

41 power‘s ―institutional choices‖ in crafting of political institutions also play an important role in democracy transition from the initial phase to the consolidation phase. Its wrong choices and paradoxical policies may weaken the statebuilding and democratization processes in the targeted society, particularly in the formative phase. Intervener‘s ―democratic liberal choices‖ may become contained and illiberal when it tries to pursue the democratization process in an ―ongoing conflict‖ without termination of the war because the war leaves severe consequences on the process. The aforementioned cases, however, show that intervener‘s interest remains in the technical aspect of political institutions, especially elections. Fareed Zakaria argues that the international community‘s democratization experiment in the societies without any history of liberalism can get into trouble.117

External forces usually push for ―fast track democratization‖ in the post-conflict societies and justify their intervention as ―liberating people from tyrants‖. Marina Ottaway refers to international community‘s efforts to promote democracy in the war-torn societies as ―coercive democratization‖. She enumerates the prospects of success as, ―Coercive democratization can succeed only in those countries where stateness is already developed and the population is extremely homogenous.‖118 Although she does not challenge the democratization-cum- nationbuilding in the post-conflict societies outright, her blueprint of democratization appears enormously complex. The societal attributes, in contrast to external actors‘ agendas based on strategic interests and lack of commitment toward statebuilding, represent multiple challenges to the nascent democracies.

The success of elections depends on the presence of structural conditions and national offices with authority in the targeted society.119 As the crafting of constitution and holding elections is a prerequisite in establishing democracy in the post-war environment, its consolidation requires the institutional structure and mechanism, potentially the rule of law. Rule

117 Fareed Zakaria, ―The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,‖ 22-33. 118 Marina Ottaway, ―Is Democracy the Answer,‖ in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamella Aall (Washington D.C: USIP Press Books, 2007), 611. 119 Democratization process can only promote peace and recovery from conflict conditions when certain kinds of institutions are relatively strong. Security institutions and political institutions are significant in the given context. See, for example, Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin, ―The Effect of Elections on Post Conflict Peace and Reconstruction,‖ The Journal of Politics 74, no.2 (April 2012): 558-570.

42 of law is the ultimate guarantor of democracy.120 Thomas Carothers explains that there is a profound relationship between rule of law and liberal democracy. He argues, ―The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone.‖121 The legal system is comprised of formal and informal courts, prosecutors, and the police.

Rule of law in the post-conflict societies has become a burgeoning industry for the government and non-government agencies. Donors have heavily invested in the law experts to design and build the rule of law programs in the post-conflict societies. However, in most of the cases, the rule of law seems a secondary objective of the externals builders. Richard Sannerholm argues that the rule of law has failed to seek importance in the external power‘s agenda of statebuilding in the post-conflict societies. Promoters of the rule of law do not deal with the concept in a holistic manner. They divert attention toward criminal law and avoid areas like state-individual interaction under the banner of the rule of law.122 In most of the post-conflict statebuilding cases, the external powers introduce those laws that can create conducive environment for market liberalization, enhance human rights protections and help to maintain peace.123 Hence, justice is of pivotal importance for the survivability of democracy in the post- conflict societies.124 Democratization theorists have also shifted their attention toward the relationship between the rule of law and democracy in the post-intervention environment.

In fact, the way democracy is cultivated in the post-conflict environment also reveals the quality and legitimacy of the democratization process. The post-war democracy has emerged in multiple shapes. However, in most of the cases, the external powers have considered democracy merely an electoral exercise. For policy makers, genuine liberal democracy is no longer a pivotal objective. Nominal democracy is rather acceptable as long as the regime is inclined to the intervener‘s objectives and follows the rules of the international system. Institutional aspects of

120 Neil J. Kritz, ―The Rule of Law in the Post Conflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace,‖ in Turbulent Peace :The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C ,United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 801-803. 121 Thomas Carothers, ―The Rule of Law Revival,” Foreign Affairs 77, no.2 (March-April, 1991): 10. 122 Richard Sannerholm, ―Beyond Criminal Justice: Promoting the Rule of Law in Post Conflict Societies,‖ in Globalization and Challenges to Building Peace, eds. Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer and Joakim Ojendal (London: Anthem Press, 2008), 62. 123 Ibid., 55. 124 Charles T. Call, ―Democratization, War, and Statebuilding: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador,‖ Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no.4 (November 2003): 827.

43 the democratization process in the transitory period dominate the external power‘s agenda, but the entrenchment of the democratic values in the war-torn societies seems to have lost its importance in the externally led democracy building process.125

As far as the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan is concerned, scholars and technocrats have tried to explain the various aspects of exogenous statebuilding in the targeted society. Different narratives have emerged to assess the success and failure of the project. However, there is a general perception about the project that it has failed to achieve the desired result. Scholars have produced a plethora of theoretical and empirical studies about the challenges in the implementation of the project. They argue that the US‘ contradictory policies, lack of coordination among allies, and the protracted war on terror had put Afghanistan in a situation of flux.126 The Afghan statebuilding project lacked local content and legitimacy and the benefits of the project remained limited to the elites. Realist objectives had overwhelmed and negated the liberal peacebuilding agenda and emphasis remained on building of institutions rather than transformation of the society on liberal lines. They explained the democratization process in the comparative narrative, although the Afghan democratization process was unique, complex, and heavily interwoven in the statebuilding process.127 This is why it seems necessary to investigate the failures of externally led state and democracy building processes in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.

125 Institutional aspects of the democratization process deals with crafting of constitution, electoral structures, legislature and executive offices. Constitution gives a road map from conflict to peace. The process of constitution- building can provide a forum for the negotiation of solutions to the divisive or contested issues that led to violence. It gives a detail plan for statebuilding. Flaws in the making of constitutions results in the reemergence of the conflict among adversaries .The content of the constitution decides the future of democracy and creation of functional state apparatus on democratic lines. See, for example, Kirsti Samuels, ―Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution- Making,‖ Chicago Journal of International Law 6, no.2 (Winter 2006): 5. 126 Stephen. M. Waltz, ―The Top Ten Mistakes made in the Afghan War,‖ Foreign Policy, February 3, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/03/the_top_ten_mistakes_made_in_the_afghan_war. 127 See, for theoretical understandings and empirical case study of Afghanistan , Larry Diamond, ―Promoting democracy in post conflict and failed states,‖ 93-116; Jochen Hippler, ―Democratization after Civil Wars-Key Problems and Experiences,‖ Democratization 15, no. 3 (2008): 550-569.

Conversely, the democratization process had included electoral politics, but participation in the political system seemed a ―no go‖ area for the locals. Citizens living in the rural areas considered the state and its processes detached from their domestic living.

The intervener‘s myopic understanding of the tribal politics and cultural traits of the failed state led to the failure of democracy consolidation in the Afghan society. Additionally, the ruling elite considered themselves above the law, which represented the absence of practical check and balance system. The intervener‘s inability in establishing strong institutions, managing societal differences, and controlling rampant corruption also weakened the state and thus made it a serious candidate of failure.

1.3 Afghanistan: An Exogenous Experiment

Afghanistan was the first test case of exogenous state and democracy building project after the 9/11. It seems necessary to mention this event because it has paved the path of the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan. The US emerged as the principal intervener in the post- Taliban period despite putting the construction of political institutions under the aegis of the UN. The former predominantly influenced the democratization process. Initially, the Bush administration‘s intervention cause was based on parochial objectives such as removing the Taliban from power, capturing Al Qaeda leadership, destructing its network, and eradicating its sanctuaries from the targeted society. The administration showed least interest in expanding its military and financial mandate and decided to keep a ―light footprint‖. The ―light footprint‖ policy constrained the intervener to make an alliance with the opposition forces in Afghanistan.

The US‘ reliance on the ―illiberal‖ warlords belonging to different ethnic groups and opposing the Taliban regime linked the establishment of democratic institutions with the power sharing arrangements. Principal intervener‘s conflicting objectives and paradoxical policies damaged the designing and framing of the democratic institutions in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In addition, the shift from a narrow coercive agenda of war on terror to a broader statebuilding agenda did not balance the inadequacies in the process. The new [Obama] administration expanded the spectrum of the war on terror by including Pakistan as part of the solution to the problems of the Taliban resurgence and deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. In addition to strengthening the ―militarized approach‖ by sending more troops to Afghanistan, The

45 administration gave a timeframe for withdrawal and shifted the war responsibility to the local coercive apparatus. Obama‘s AfPak agenda did not implement any substantial democratic reform. Instead, he admitted the deficiencies in democracy, accepted that ―Afghanistan can‘t have Jeffersonian democracy‖ and kept the process limited to the electoral practice with no politics.

The pursuit of the war on terror and democratization process together proved a counterproductive strategy for the democratization process. War restrained the growth of democracy and created insurmountable obstacles to the creation of a sovereign democratic regime in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. For the principle intervener, the notion of democracy in the context of Afghanistan was apolitical exercise based on designing and implanting (manufacturing) the institutional aspects of democracy. The intervener‘s overwhelming military and financial powers and the support of its illiberal allies forced the targeted population to accept the political system designed by the outsider. Keeping the public voices outside the realm of democratization process resulted in the disenfranchisement of locals in the process. Precisely, force rather than the choice made the introduction of democracy possible in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.

The external power‘s policies of transforming a failed state into a democratic liberal state focused on bringing stability through coercive approach and co-opting the warlords, tribal chieftains, and religious leaders in the newly designed system. In practice, the liberal [ideological] content of democracy remained absent virtually throughout the democratization process. The local elite joined the procedural democratic process to maximize their own power and take advantage of the shifting policies of the intervener. The interaction pattern between the local elite and the external power was asymmetrical in the crafting of political institutions. Therefore, the democratization process did not include all parties in the state and democracy building processes. The exclusion of Taliban from the Bonn process is an example of the intervener‘s missteps.

The Bonn pact provided a way forward to construct the state institutions and hold the traditional ‗Loya Jirga‘ meetings to get legitimacy for the externally designed democratic institutions, which in reality, lacked democratic spirit. Principle intervener‘s formation and manipulation of Loya Jirga showed that the real authority lied with the outsider rather than the

Kabul government. The financial and coercive power limitations of the central administration reflected the external power‘s ill-conceived and flawed policies. The local warlords exploited and maneuvered the fragile situation in their favor by joining the interim government and becoming a part of the democratization process that provided them with an opportunity to gain international legitimacy besides enhancing their power through foreign aid and resources. For them, it was a democratic way to achieve their realist objectives. The public voices remained absent throughout the transitory phase of the processes. Except elections, the public participation, one of the most significant features of democracy, was neglected in almost every important step including crafting of the constitution.

Framers of the constitution crafted a centralized, presidential, and majoritarian regime in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Presidential powers made Karzai the focal point in dealing with the international community and gave him the authority of appointment of the administrative positions in the center and provinces. Similarly, the legislature, consisted of multiethnic composition, had no substantial power except vetoing the executive cabinet nominees. The ensuing imbalance of power between executive and legislature hindered the progress of democracy in the war-torn society.

The electoral politics further cemented the ethnic polarization in Afghanistan. During the presidential elections of 2004 and 2009, the ethnic factor remained a decisive factor in campaign and voting. Similar trends remained visible in the lower house elections. Apparently, the intervener‘s sole purpose to hold elections was to get local legitimacy for the leader of its choice and continue its war efforts in the country. Elections were certainly significant in the democratization process, yet they did not play any substantial role in bringing peace and nurturing democratic political culture and behavior. Thus, they became a mere exercise to maintain the status quo in the country. Electoral frauds reduced the transparency of the process and challenged the notion of free and fair elections amid the transitory phase of democracy. Power struggle among the contestants and Karzai‘s refusal to accept the election results also damaged the already weak state.

Narrow statebuilding agenda, selected delegates, and the missing local input challenged the rightful intentions of the principal intervener to construct a liberal democratic state in Afghanistan. The repercussions of narrow and closed political settlement for the construction of

47 new state institutions negatively affected the state and democracy building processes. Lack of anticipation on the part of the policy makers about the direction of experiment and upcoming challenges caused by conflicting objectives and hasty decisions also harmed the processes. The provision of unconditional aid for a decade hampered the progress toward an open democratic system and led to parochial statebuilding.

Conclusion

The US policy makers have failed in making Afghanistan a liberal democracy and an inclusive state. The Afghan state apparatus appears unable to function without foreign aid and military support. Although the agreement drew the roadmap for the statebuilding and democratization processes, especially the institutional aspects of the processes, it failed to craft an agreement that could make a successful transition from war to peace. The ―coalitions of willing‖ did not make any substantial progress to achieve victory in a decade-long struggle against the Taliban. Rather, the war entered in a stalemate situation that required a political solution to end the war. The political solution, however, requires ―political will‖ that seems absent in this process of statebuilding.

The designing of the political institutions and the process, through which the institutional choices were made, seems not truly democratic and represents challenges to the ideological content of liberalism. The intervener‘s wrong choices and paradoxical policies produced a procedural democracy in Afghanistan because the [democracy] consolidation stage required frequent free and fair elections, participatory politics and accountability of the ruling elite. Conversely, the democratization process included electoral politics, but participation in the political system was a ―no go‖ area for the locals. Citizens living in the rural areas considered the state and its processes to be detached from their domestic living.

The principal intervener‘s myopic understanding of the tribal politics and cultural traits of the failed state led to the failure of democracy consolidation in the Afghan society. Additionally, the ruling elite considered themselves above the law, which reflected the absence of a practical check and balance system. The intervener‘s inability in establishing strong institutions, managing societal differences, and controlling rampant corruption seems to have weakened the state and thus make it a serious candidate of failure.

Chapter Two State Formation in Afghanistan: From Tribal Confederacy to a Weak State (1747-1978)

Introduction

This chapter presents historical formation of the Afghan state dominated by a power struggle among the tribal rulers, heterogeneity of the society, and external influences. These factors left a significant impact on the making of the state. Power struggles among the tribal leaders provided the imperialist powers with an opportunity to increase their influences in the royal families‘ court. In fact, throughout the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, the imperialist powers, Russia and Britain, determined the status of Afghanistan as a buffer zone between them. The state formation process in Afghanistan remained complex and confronted several challenges due to its societal attributes and geographical location. Therefore, the rulers of the country remained unsuccessful in creating a strong nation-state.

In this chapter, I will address the political dynamics of the state formation process in historical context emphasizing the political processes, such as conveying of Loya Jirga, crafting of constitutions, elections, and selection of the leadership. Secondly, I will highlight the historical development of Afghan state apparatus and the resulting challenges, which led to the state intrusion. Lastly, I will be focusing on the forces of change and modernization in Afghanistan and their impact on the Afghan political landscape.

2.1 Formation of Pashtun Tribal Confederation to a Segmentary State

Pashtuns‘ Durrani rulers, who took advantage of the circumstances prevailing in the powerful neighboring empires, laid the foundation of the Afghan state. Dissolution of the Persian and Mogul empires in the west and east respectively and power struggles among the feudal elites in Central Asia in the north paved the way for the Pashtun tribes to form their own state.128 The state formation also provided an opportunity to the Pashtun landlords and religious clerics to

128 Hafizullah Emadi, Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan: The British, Russia, and American Invasions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11.

49 save a large amount of tax money, which they paid to the ruling empires.129 War making and conquest, the factors that shaped the Afghan state in its early years of confederation,130 resulted in ascent of a Sadozai Pashtun Ahmed Shah Abdali as a king with the consent of a Loya Jirga held in 1747.131

Ahmed Shah ruled Afghanistan for twenty-six years by starting with the kingdom in Kandahar. In later years, he conquered vast territory in the north and south and ultimately transformed it into an empire. His ruling style exhibited his reliance on the tribal chiefs and Lashkars because he gave them authority in their areas and distributed resources and money among them. The statebuilding process in the Abdali reign was based on the ―patrimonial authority‖.132 He ruled the state through Jirga, consisted of tribal chiefs who chose him without any external pressure,133 and there was no state bureaucratic procedure involved in declaring him the ruler of Afghanistan

In the context of the Afghan state, patrimonial authority was ―to maintain equilibrium‖ between the ―ruler and the ruled‖.134 Tribes accepted the authority of ruler originating from an interaction pattern based on reciprocity between the ruler and the ruled.135 This system, however, was not strong and stable because it encouraged power struggles among the elite and resulted in palace revolts. After his selection, Abdali convened a meeting of the tribal leaders who had agreed to break their relations with the Iranian empire and declare the territories under their control as the part of an independent state. He formed a ―Meli Shore‖ (National Council), which consisted of the most powerful tribal leaders who worked as his advisers throughout his reign. Consultation with the council members helped him to maintain authority and control over the

129 Ibid., 11. 130 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand, ―Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, and the ‗Post- Conflict‘ Challenge in Afghanistan,‖ Development and Change 33, no.5 (2002): 892. 131 Nabi Misdaq, Afghanistan: Political Frailty and Foreign Interference (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 42. 132 Ibid., 48. 133 Loya Jirga means assembly and played a vital role in the decision making process at national level. Jirga is an instrument to settle down national and local disputes. 134 Ibid., 48. 135 Patrimonial authority can be explained in the context of personalized state. Attributed as a personalized state exercising power and showering his family and clan members with gifts and money; important portfolios in government are given to brothers and uncles, family loyalists in the in the patrimonial state, Max Weber, Economy and Society, (1922), www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1088-patrimonialism.html; Nabi Masdiq, Afghanistan, 49.

50 state. He extended personal favors and booties to the tribal chiefs and tribal militias as they established their territorial hegemony on the new land.

Ahmed Shah kept the state centralized and enforced his authority on local and foreign affairs from Kandahar. Keeping his grip on the power, he accepted the heterogeneous formation of the Afghan society. An amalgamation of various Pashtun and non-Pashtun linguistic and ethnic groups worked on the tribal mechanism. Accession and retention of non-Pashtun areas in his empire were based on the state‘s respect for their distinct socio-cultural beliefs. He ―recognized the autonomy of the conquered people and nearly always appointed one of their own rulers back to his position to administer in the name of Durrani.‖136 In brief, the decentralized [Pashtun ruled] Afghan state was like a tribal confederation where harmony existed among various ethnic identities. However, not all non-Pashtuns accepted Abdali‘s authority without any dissent. Therefore, the king kept Pashtuns in the state apparatus and settled them in the victorious north and west, occupied by other ethnic groups, to suppress the resistance from non-Pashtuns.137

At large, the majority tribes agreed to be the part of Durrani Empire. Unification of the tribes under Abdali‘s rule brought political, economic, and security advantages for the tribes. The strong center provided autonomy to the landowner tribal chiefs and Maliks in their areas, especially regarding the collection of taxes and war booties. However, the presence of a strong center could not enable the state to extend its authority in the peripheral areas. The center only intervened in the non-Pashtun disputes to solve them. In contrast, Pashtuns had the autonomy to resolve their disputed matters themselves. Seeking help from the center could have exposed the weakness of a tribe and vulnerability vis-à-vis the external invasion.138

The tribal mechanism and ethnic factor proved a resistant to the state structures representing the modern world. Pashtuns resisted the foreign control despite admitting themselves into the category of statehood whilst maintaining a hold on their local tribal structure and mechanism. They represented the nation-state concept in a ―non-literal sense‖. Dupree

136 Nabi Masdiq, Afghanistan, 49. 137 Hafizullah Emadi, Dynamics of Political Development, 12. 138 Ibid., 55.

51 explained it as ―special relationships between a central government and collection of tribal, ethnic, or linguistic…groups within a set of boundaries.‖139

The end of Abdali‘s regime instigated a power struggle among the [royal] family members and conflict between the Sadozai-Popalzai and Muhammadzai-Barakzai clans of the Pashtun Abdali-Durrani Confederacy.140 The latter conflict continued for next two centuries (1773-1973). After Abdali, the Afghan state remained fragile and lost a large amount of territory due to the unsettled power struggle between his grandsons. His son Taimur Shah succeeded him and ruled Afghanistan for next twenty years. During his reign, Taimur shifted the capital from Kandahar to Kabul. Taimur‘s death also instigated power struggle among his sons who allied themselves with the colonial British and provided the imperialist power with an opportunity to ensconce its influence in the court of Kabul for next two centuries. ―Afghanistan thus entered the nineteenth century a politically disunited, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, tribal state.‖141

The Afghan state faced internal rivalries, differences, and turmoil on the throne in the first half of the nineteenth century. For instance, a Muhammadzai Pashtun Amir Dost Muhammad Khan ruled Afghanistan twice (1826-1839, 1843-63). Although the Sadozai clan also ruled the country for eight years (1818-1826), the power essentially remained with the Muhammadzai clan. During the first tenure of Dost, the British, who felt threatened due to the Russian expansion toward the Indian Ocean, tried to challenge the increasing Russian and Iranian influences in the court of Kabul.142 Dost‘s denial to acquiesce the British demands led to British intervention, which ousted Dost from power and installed Shah Shuja (1839-1842) as the premier. Shuja signed an agreement with the British representatives that Britain would determine the parameters of the Afghan foreign policy and provide training to the Afghan army. In practical terms, the British controlled the levers of power by making Shuja and his family political prisoners of their empire.143

139 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 569. 140 Pasthun Abdali-Durrani Confederation made of the following major tribes: Popalzai, Barakzai, Alikozai, and Achakzai. 141 Richard Tapper, ed., The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 14. 142 Hafizullah Emadi, 12. 143 Hafizullah Emadi, 13.

A British political representative in Afghanistan Sir William H. McNaughton appointed and dismissed the Afghan government servants, thus restoring to coercion in the country. The colonial rulers suppressed the dissent voices. The British army remained deployed in Afghanistan under Shuja‘s rule, even though he wanted the withdrawal of foreign troops. The imperialists restored to ―divide and conquer policy‖ in the heterogeneously divided society to remain the dominant political force in the country.144 Shuja remained extremely unpopular among the masses due to his dependence on the foreign power. The Afghan populace‘s hatred for the colonizers became visible with the attacks on the foreigners. The killing of the mission head Alexander Burnes led to the first Anglo-Afghan war (1839-1842). The British suffered heavy casualties that paved the way for the end of war and Dost Muhammad‘s return to the Kabul court. The British also agreed to give him weapons and money to consolidate his regime. After Dost‘s death, his son and successor Shir Ali Khan cautiously attempted to modernize Afghanistan by establishing schools and printing the first newspaper ―Shams al-Nahar‖ (Morning Sun).145 In his two terms of the rule, his father‘s male siblings and their sons constantly chased him to capture the throne. The power struggle for throne once again provided the British with an opportunity to exert influence.

Shir Ali‘s close relationship with Russia provoked the British to invade Afghanistan in 1878. The invasion led to the accession of Mohammad Yaqub Khan to power. Yaqub signed ―Gandamak Treaty‖ with the colonizers to transform Afghanistan into a British protectorate.146 However, the initial successes were followed by a massacre of the British mission in Kabul in September 1879. The British won many battles under General Roberts‘ command, occupied Kabul along with the southern Afghanistan, and abdicated the emir.147 Yet, they soon left Afghanistan after reaching an agreement with Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. They considered him a strongman to bring political stability and control the opposition forces residing in the peripheral areas. Russia also supported Abdur Rehman who had lived in Russia for last twelve years. It had sent 200 fighters to fight the British forces because it wanted its man to remain in power. With Abdur Rehman taking over the country, the state made a transition from segmentary state to a

144 Ibid., 14. 145 Ibid., 15. 146 Ibid., 15. 147 Anthony Hyman, ―Nationalism in Afghanistan,‖ [Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia International] Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 2 (May 2002): 307.

53 unitary state. However, the process of making Afghanistan a unitary state required stringent steps to break the monopoly of tribal power.

2.2 Transition to Unitary Afghan State under Iron Amir: Amir Abdur Rehman

Aidan Southhall argues that a ―unitary state is a structure in which there is a central monopoly of power, exercised by a specialized administrative staff within defined territorial limits.‖148 On the political front, Abdur Rehman created a powerful center essential for a nation-state. He crushed every ethnic and tribal rebellion that tried to challenge his rule, yet he did not confront any strong inter-tribal or ethnic war during his rule. The non-Pashtuns disliked him for his imposition of central authority on them because he took strident actions against the challengers by either eliminating them or forcing them to exile.149 He conquered Hazarajat region, inhabited by the Shia Hazara. Hazaras‘ retaliation against the conquest instigated sectarian tensions between Sunni majority Pashtuns and Shia minority. Sunni religious authorities issued a fatwa to take legal action against the Hazaras. Amir also proclaimed that the Shia were no longer Muslims and thus labeled them Kafir.150 He encouraged the Pashtun tribes to settle in the vacant Hazarajat areas and used the settlers as an ―auxiliary force to maintain his authority in the region.‖151 He also encouraged the relocation of Pashtun sub-tribes in the north in order to strengthen the assimilation process.

The unitary statebuilding process included the creation of a modern army for crushing rebellions and securing northern borders from Russian incursions. It invited the westerners to explore the untapped mineral resources and formulate domestic and foreign policies to transform the Afghan state into a nation-state. The king introduced a single monetary unit, the Kabuli rupee, and ―replaced a number of regional currencies that had been artificially inflated to the Kabuli rupee.‖152 He also created a spy network to maintain law and order in the country.

Despite keeping a tight grip on the power, the monarch created two political advisory bodies: the Supreme Council and Loya Jirga. The council encompassed religious leaders and

148 Aidan Southall, Alur Society: A Study of Processes and Types of Domination (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons Ltd, 1956), 260. 149 Hafizullah Emadi, 16. 150 Ibid., 16. 151 Ibid., 17. 152 Mir Munshi, ed., The Life of Abdur Rehman, Amir of Afghanista , 2 vols (London: John Murray, 1900), 203.

54 heads of the government bureaus and departments. The king kept the prerogative to select the members of Loya Jirga, which acted like a modern day version of parliament. Loya Jirga members were the elite of different segments of the society. The Jirga included tribal leaders, ethnic groups, certain members of the royal lineage, and provincial religious leaders.153 Amir did not appoint his family members as governors to the provinces. Instead, they were advisers to the king and oversaw some government departments. He withdrew the privileges given to the tribal chiefs and royal clan. Thus, nobody was above the state law that sought to promote equality among the privileged and unprivileged. The king tried to eradicate the tribal system and assimilate the land into a sovereign Afghan state, but his policy never reached its culmination. Although the tribal leaders showed their defiance to the statebuilding process, the king‘s authoritarian rule and strong security network curbed almost every challenge to his rule. This is why he was able to lay the foundation of a nation-state.

The Amir followed the guidelines of Gandomak treaty in foreign policy. According to the treaty, ―Afghan foreign policy was in the hands of the British. They represented Afghanistan in the international forums and delineated its borders with its neighboring countries Iran, Russia, and British India.‖154 Border demarcation in the north and west remained calm, but the delineation with British India known as ‗Durand Line‘ proved a cause of disagreement. The Afghan authorities kept challenging the legality of border first with the colonizers and then its successor state, Pakistan. Later on, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations further deteriorated due to the border dispute and Afghan monarchs‘ support to Pashtunistan cause in Pakistan. Amir‘s endeavors to create a strong state helped him ensuring a smooth transition of power to his son Habibullah. Habibullah also pursued his father‘s policies, especially centralization of the power, and strengthened the institution of the army. He introduced a public schooling system on the French pattern, established military college, and the state‘s first printing press.155 Extension of highways, building of motels, and the development of a hydropower project showed his tendency to modernization and development. However, unlike his father, he acknowledged other ethnicities and tribal chiefs in the political and physical arenas of Afghanistan.

153 Nabi Misdaq, 59. 154 Nabi Misdaq, 60. 155 Nabi Masdiq, 61.

During Habibullah‘s reign, Mahmud Trazi‘s family came back to Afghanistan after living in Syria for twenty-seven years. After his arrival in the country, Trazi started a bi-monthly newspaper Seraj-ul Akhbar that contributed to the emergence of a reformist class in Afghanistan.156 In the later years, his daughter married Amanullah who was the son and successor of Habibullah. Amanullah‘s reign was the era of modernization. He established a constitutional monarchy and held first parliamentary elections in the country. The statebuilding process in the twentieth century Afghanistan confronted several political, economic, and security challenges emanating from changing internal and external political environment.

2.3 Statebuilding in the Twentieth Century: Modernization Project, Constitutional Monarchy, and Resistance

Afghanistan became a sovereign state at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially under the rule of Amanullah. He brought significant changes in the political system of Afghanistan. He embarked on modernization of the state and society and attempted to bring radical transformation in the approach and mechanism to rule. His modernization program was an imitation of the Turkish model and the Iranian modernization project, which were influenced by European imperial influences on their lands. He adopted a top-down approach, bolstering the centralization of power, and repudiated to accommodate ―local hierarchies and power structures‖.157

Throughout the modern history of Afghanistan, Kabul‘s modernization policies faced tremendous criticism and challenges from the traditional and religious forces of the society, which resulted in either regime change or external intervention. Amanullah‘s modernization project consisted of political, economic, and social reforms. His adviser Tarzi introduced a cabinet system to end the ‗darbars‘ of the royal family members.158 Tarzi got the position of foreign minister whilst Abdul Qodus became the prime minister. The king decreed creation of new ministries to perform the duties previously done by the darbars. This development brought significant changes in the tax system besides establishing a banking system and national

156 Ibid, 62. 157 Yunas Samad, The Pakistan-US Conundrum: Jihadists, the Military and the People: the Struggle for Control (London: Hurst & Company Ltd, 2011), 71. 158 Nabi Misdaq, 62-63.

56 currency.159 The statebuilding project also required a strong professional army, so he focused on modernization of the army. However, during the course of modernization, he confronted severe resistance that ultimately led to the collapse of his regime. Senior officers resisted his reform package in army formation and recruitment. They did not want changes in the traditional mechanism of the army, based on tribal loyalties, and recruitment method.

Amanullah‘s major accomplishment was the crafting of first written constitution.160 The constitution adopted liberal tendencies with respect to the Afghan women and provided them with citizenship status and equal rights besides giving more rights to the religious minorities within the framework of Islamic governance.161 Yet, the constitution labelled Hazaras as Kafir (infidel). However, Amanullah assured that every Afghan belonging to any religion or sect would be treated equally. His constitution ―abolished torture, slavery, and forced labor‖ and created a legislature.162 Amir would go on to appoint the prime minister and many of the cabinet members,163 and decreed that the followers of other religions were entitled to protection of the state.164 He made primary education compulsory in Afghanistan.

Inspired by Kamal Ataturk‘s revolution, Amir introduced women reforms. The women had the opportunity to uplift their status in the society and remove their veil. However, his constitution maintained the supremacy of Islam, especially in deciding the cases and disputes. It also maintained that the Afghan Court of Justice would decide the matters in accordance with the principles of Sharia and general civil and criminal laws.165 Amir also abolished polygamy and underage marriages that were a common phenomenon in the Afghan society. These reforms instigated a fierce backlash from the conservatives and religious elite who denounced the reform agenda and modernization program. The traditional elite and tribal leaders were unhappy with education rights to women in the country and abroad. They also disliked the liberty to unveil at

159 Yunas Samad, 72. 160 Hafizullah Emadi , 21. 161 Hannibal Travis, ―Freedom OR Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq,‖ Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights 3, no.1 (Spring 2005): 3. 162AFG. CONST. OF 1923, art. 10, http://www.institute-for-afghanstudies.org/Constitutions/king_amanullah/ THE%20CONSTITUTION%20OF%20AFGHANISTAN%20APRIL%201923.htm. 163 Ibid., Afghan Constitution, 26-28. 164 Ibid., 2. 165International Crisis Group, Afghanistan‟s Flawed Constitutional Process (Asia Report No 56, Kabul/Brussels, June 12, 2003), http://www.icg.org// library/documents/report_archive/A401002_12062003.pdf; see also, Peter N. Sterns, ed., The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval and Modern ( 6th. ed. 2001), http://www.bartleby.com/67/2346.html.

57 the public places. Liberal reforms caused protests and subsequently a rebellion, which almost toppled Amir‘s government.

To protect his regime, he convened a Loya Jirga to amend the constitution to address the concerns of the opposing religious voices. The radical modernization policy of socio-economic development, land reforms, and educational reforms damaged the interests of several segments. Afghanistan‘s religious elite and the tribal leaders did not accept Amir‘s agenda of reducing their autonomy, especially within their own spheres of influence.166 They showed defiance to his nationbuilding project, based on modern lines, and publicized it as contradictory to the Islamic code. Renowned religious circles such as ―the Mujaddadi family and the family of Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani were engaged in turning the public opinion against Amanullah on the grounds.‖167 Ultimately, Amir was unable to crush the rebellion and had no choice but to abdicate the throne and go into exile in Italy.

A non-Pashtun Habibullah Kakkari, also known as Bacha Saqia, replaced Amanullah. Kakkari ruled for a short period. Both external powers did not consider his regime effective. At the local level, he garnered the support of religious circles due to his imposition of the Islamic code of life and abolishing reforms in the socio-economic sector. His rule was nonetheless unacceptable to the Pashtun ―who had been in power since 1747 and they showed resentment to the usurpation of the throne by a non-Afghan [non-Pashtun], a low and illiterate Tajik bandit.‖168 Internal conflicts among the Musaheban and financial problems led to the collapse of his nine- month long regime. Nadir Shah declared himself the monarch of Afghanistan and thus the regime change again shifted the power balance in the favor of Pashtuns.

Nadir created a personalized regime by appointing his relatives and male siblings at key positions in the state apparatus. He gave important portfolios to the British Indian nationals in and outside the government due to the British support for seizing power from Habibullah.169 He established a council of state and appointed members on an oligarchic pattern of approval and denial. He brought the religious leaders in the network of loyalty by giving them key positions in

166 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 7. 167 Hafizullah Emadi , 25. 168 Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 280. 169 Hafizullah Emadi, 37.

58 the government. To secure legitimacy among the ordinary Afghans and conservative religious circle, the king portrayed himself as the guardian of Islam and promoted the religious ethos in every sphere of life.170 He pursued the policy of ‗divide and conquer‘ to avoid the alignment of opposite tribes and supported Pashtun nationalism and tribalism to secure Pashtun tribes‘ allegiances to his regime.171 He appointed Pashtuns in the administration to administer non- Pashtun areas and deployed [loyal] Pashtun tribal armies to curb and crush a non-Pashtun revolt against his regime. Nadir pursued a laissez-faire economic course and maintained normal relations with the Soviets and the British. He brought structural changes in the system but failed to envisage that the coercion-based approach could lead to political instability.

He divided the land into nine administrative areas that included five major provinces: Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, Mazar-Qataghan, and Badakshan.172 Central authority appointed the heads of provinces and sub-provinces. Although the Pashtun appointees were in a majority, the authorities also appointed non-Pashtuns loyal to kingship. The state promoted capitalism and private investment in the industrial area. These developments inevitably made legitimacy among the masses a key goal for the regime. In this regard, the monarch convened a Loya Jirga in September 1930 to legitimize his authority as the sovereign of Afghanistan. The participants agreed to craft a new constitution during the meeting. The new constitution, promulgated in October 1931, included several changes. For instance, it abolished all liberal reforms introduced by Amanullah in the favor of women and religious minorities. It decreed that the [future] King would belong to Hanafi faith and Pashtun ethnicity and accession must remain within the royal family. It also included the creation of a legislative assembly comprising two chambers, House of Representatives and House of Elders or Senate,173 whose membership criteria were based on age, years of local residence, and conduct. Although the prime minister and cabinet were technically accountable to the legislature, practically they were answerable to the King.

All educational institutions came under the state control. The state authorities gave clerics a task to make changes in the curriculum in accordance with the Islamic teachings. Women educational institutions were closed and female students acquiring education abroad were called

170 Hafizullah Emadi, 37. 171 Ibid., 37 172 Ibid., 40 173 Ibid., 39

59 back home, although the royal family children kept studying in Europe. The state imposed Islamic restrictions on women, reinstated polygamy, and banned alcohol selling and consumption. Nadir ruled through coercion and co-option for four years. After his assassination, Shah Mahmud put his son Zahir Shah on the throne. Zahir‘s uncles Hashem Khan (1926-46) and Shah Mahmud (1946-53) and brother-in-law Mohammad Daoud (1953-63) played a key role in running the state for next three decades.

Shah Mahmud established a ―Liberal Parliament‖ in 1949.174 The legislature did not act as a rubber stamp, but rather actively participated in the state affairs and made government officials questionable for their acts. Although the 1931 constitution gave ministers freedom to act independently, there were certain checks on them regarding the performance of their ministries. The main reason for an active parliament was the inclusion of a large number of reform-minded members of the parliament.175 Legislature passed laws to give political freedom to the people and printing press, which resulted in the publication of many liberal newspapers that criticized the government policies and religious circle. However, later on, the state banned newspapers and students unions besides outlawing the Movement of Awakened Youth, formed in 1947, which demanded political freedom and reforms. The state heavy-handed approach against the political groups exposed its weaknesses and inability to establish its roots among the Afghans. Internal power struggles, assassination of the royal family members, and the USSR intervention further exposed fragility of the regime.

Political liberalization remained limited throughout Daoud‘s first phase of power (as a PM, 1953-1963). During his tenure as a defense minister in Shah Mahmud‘s government, Daoud established his reputation as a strong leader who could do things in no time. However, he became conscious of his own moves after becoming the premier. He declared Afghanistan a non-aligned country to get development aid from both the US and the USSR during the cold war. Daoud ―played on the country‘s renewed status as a buffer-now between the USSR and U.S.‖176 He aggressively pursued the ―Pashtunistan policy‖ that soured Afghanistan‘s relations with Pakistan.

174 Nabi Misdaq, 75. 175 Ibid., 75. 176 Burnett Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 21.

Yet, the king and his advisers did not agree with Daoud‘s hawkish approach toward Pakistan because they wanted normalization of relationship between the two neighbors.

The soured relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan further isolated the country in the international political system. Daoud realized Zahir Shah‘s reservations on his foreign policy decisions and tried to adopt a softer line on the issue. He gave a proposal of establishing a political party and shifting the monarchical powers to the party. The king, however, considered it an attempt to curtail the interference of royal family in the government affairs.177 Shah rejected the proposal and left Daoud with no option except resign. Daoud wanted a political system based on the principle of separation of powers among the executive, legislature, and judiciary. The unlimited power of the monarch to dislodge the prime minister constrained him to articulate the proposal of democracy. His resignation led to the end of the authoritarian regime and started the openness of political system known as the decade of political liberalization.

2.3.1 Decade of Democracy (1963-1973)

Statebuilding in Afghanistan entered a new phase of participatory politics, which led to the emergence of various political groups belonging to different ideological lineages. After promulgating the new constitution in 1964, the state allowed restructuring of public and political activities in an open manner with fewer restrictions. In theoretical terms, the constitution opened up the Afghan politics and gave space to alternative voices in the system. It introduced new press laws allowing the political groups to publish magazines and newspapers to present their perspectives on the domestic and foreign policies of the country.178 The liberal constitution, drafted with the French assistance and later endorsed by the Loya Jirga, led to elections and an experiment of democracy.

The new constitution ―limited the monarch‘s absolute power through the creation of a parliament and separation of powers.‖179 The monarch could only ratify those laws that were endorsed by the legislature.180 However, the constitution gave him the executive powers ―to

177 Hafizullah Emadi, 66. 178 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 7. 179 ―The Sound of the Sixties,‖ The Economist, October 26, 41. 180 AFG.CONST.OF 1964, art. 69. All the Afghan constitutions are available at the website of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), www.unama-afg.org/docs/constitution.

61 declare war and command the army, appoint Prime Minister and one-third of the Afghan Senate, dissolve the parliament, veto legislation, and appoint the member of the Supreme Court.‖181 The legislature consisted of two chambers: upper and lower chambers. One-third of the senate was to be elected for four years, but the King had the power to dissolve the parliament before it completed its tenure and held new elections.182 The constitution declared Islam as the official religion of Afghanistan but did not give Sharia a status equivalent to Afghanistan‘s general civil and criminal law.183 Despite having authoritarian tendencies,184 it gave women the right to vote and contest elections, work in the government offices, and hold the portfolio of a minister.185

The legislative assembly election provided an opportunity to various informal political organizations to pursue their political agendas. Nabi Misdaq explains, ―From Afghan nationalists and Islamists to the social democrats and many different shades of leftist movements, all were making their debut on political stage.‖186 The introduction of new reforms in the political system did not affect the traditional power structure in Afghanistan. Election results, however, showed the grip of tribal leaders on their constituencies and the mindset of the countryside Afghans. The tribal chiefs and Islamists won the majority of assembly seats and thus legitimized their power in the Afghan society.187 They heavily relied on their patronage networks and money to run for the office. On the other hand, the entrance of the new [urban] progressive leftists in the assemblies was a product of modernization programs. Another key feature of the electoral process was the women voting, which contributed to the induction of women in the legislature and ministries. For instance, a woman took the portfolio of Minister of Public Health in 1965.188

Election results also showed the existence and power of the autonomous local power structures operating parallel with the central power. Local leaders maintained a patron-client relationship with the monarch and his family members whilst participating in the political system

181 Ibid., art .9. 182 Ibid., arts 43-45. 183 Ibid., art 21. 184 Ibid., art 69. 185 ―The Sound of Sixties,‖ The Economist, October 26, 71. 186 Nabi Misdaq., 80. 187 Fred Halliday, ―Revolution in Afghanistan,‖ New Left Review 112 (November-December, 1978): 19. 188 Ariane Brunet and Isabelle Solon Helal , ―Seizing an opportunity: Afghan women and the constitution-Making Process,‖ Rights & Democracy Mission Report (Montreal ,Quebec, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, May-June 2003), http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/ groups/public/documents/ APCITY/ UNPAN016657.pdf.

62 to maintain the status quo in their respective localities. However, the composition of parliament disturbed the young progressive students and the middle class emerged after the establishment of modern schooling system in the urban areas of Afghanistan. They started considering radical options to break the monopoly of powerful elites operating at every level of the state apparatus and lost confidence in the participatory politics.189 New political groups originated from the modern schooling system propagated ideologies and ideas that did not coincide with old power groups. They highlighted a new intellectual discourse focusing on socialism, equality, democracy, and Islamism.190

Political openness led to the foundation of a Marxist political organization, People‘s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), whose agenda was based on the ―practical experience of Marxism-Leninism‖ and ―the vanguard of the working class and all laborers of Afghanistan.‖191 Because of its Marxist ideological orientation, the Soviet Union supported PDPA. Three PDPA candidates secured seats in the first Wolesi Jirga. Nearly all of the future Khaliqis including Taraki and Amin were defeated,192 although Karmal won the election and Dr. Anahita Rateebzad secured a reserved seat.

The state held elections on the non-party basis. Although the king did not ratify the law related to political parties, the authorities allowed political parties to campaign. The absence of political parties left a vacuum for the locals to use their influences to win elections, especially in the periphery areas. Candidate‘s reputation and personality were the main characteristics for voting. The election also surfaced from ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions in the Afghan society. Similarly, ―traditional authority structure‖ in the Afghan society remained intact.193 The traditional power structures adhering the tribal, religious, and ethnic leaders enjoyed unprecedented respect and obedience from the locals. Therefore, the local elite often challenged the central government. Their existence and roots in the Afghan society kept the central regime weak throughout the history. Above all, the dual pattern of authority also created hurdles to the

189 Willem Vogelsang, The Afghans (2002), 296. 190 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 9. 191 Ralph H.Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Colorado: Westview Press, 2002), 110. 192 Ibid .,110. 193 Christine F. Ridout, ―Authority Patterns and the Afghan Coup of 1973,‖ Middle East Journal 29, no.2 (Spring 1973): 165.

63 creation of a national identity because the locals showed compliance with the traditional elite rather than the state.194

The traditional elite‘s power constrained the monarchs to incorporate them in the central government to remain in power and subdue the opposition voices. Parliamentary elections of 1965 and 1969 reflected the local acceptance for the traditional elite. People voted for the candidates whom village elders and traditional leadership embraced.195 Candidates belonging to the traditional elite secured seats in the assembly. Candidates with ―village elder support, class, initiative, and the fight of gab‖ were also elected because the masses rarely voted on the political orientation of the candidate.196

Economically well-off members dominated the parliament whereas lack of resources barred the educated middle class to enter the Wolesi Jirga.197 The composition of parliament favored the traditional elite, including former bureaucrats and religious and tribal leaders, who were interested in expanding their influence in national politics and recovery of the campaign expenditure. They showed least interest in debating the political issues and problems of Afghanistan. The state‘s cautious political liberalization reforms brought conservatives to the forefront and pushed back the educated progressive class in domestic politics.198The parliamentarians‘ incompetence and lack of interest in the legislative process caused a failure in establishing a positive relationship between the government and assembly. The assembly nonetheless passed several important laws.

The lower house legislated Political Parties Act, Municipal Councils Act, and Provincial Councils Bill, although the king refused to ratify these laws. King‘s refusal showed that he was not ready to give political freedom to his people and jeopardize the rule of Mohammadzai dynasty. One way of maintaining his grip on power and not paving the way for the educated and newly emerged middle class was to control the levers of the state power. This policy left a negative impact on the promotion and success of democracy in the country. In fact, throughout

194 Ibid., 165-175. 195 ―How are the Elections Held Here,‖ Kabul Times, September 20, 1969, 3, http://content.library.arizona.edu/ cdm/ref/collection/p16127coll6/id/25037. 196 Ibid. 197 Hasan Kakar, ‗The Fall of Afghan Monarchy,‖ International Journal of Middle East Studies 9, no. 2 (April 1978): 201. 198 Ibid ., 200-201.

64 the democratic experiment phase, the governments failed to sustain themselves for a longer period. Government after government fell because they failed to win the vote of confidence from the parliament.199 Virtually all governments were unable to cultivate positive relations with the legislature because the sitting MPs were more interested in their personal benefits and showed their frustration in response to the induction of veteran bureaucrats in the cabinet. The parliamentarians registered their opposition by vetoing the monarch designated prime ministers and his cabinet members. Cabinet ministers followed the monarch‘s instructions during the democratic phase. Nevertheless, a handful of the ministers formulated policies and worked independently in their respective departments. However, the monarch had the central role in the new democratic political setup, which hindered the growth of powerful executive and legislature branches in Afghanistan.200

The quasi-constitutional regime led to the emergence of new political forces, with different ideologies, on the Afghan political landscape. Political consciousness became the hallmark of the era. Numerous political groups emerged including PDPA, Sazmani Demokratiki Navin-e-Afghanistan (The New Democratic Organization of Afghanistan), Afghan Millat (Social Democratic Party), and Sazmani Jawanani Musulman (Islamic Brotherhood).201 The majority of political parties endorsed the new constitution, but Navin-e-Afghanistan (also known as Shula-e- Jawid) wanted a revolutionary change in the state structure. Therefore, it refused to accept the status quo Afghanistan. Similarly, the newly emerged educated political class also wanted to transcend the traditional state structure.

The educated class believed in the supremacy of the parliament and showed their open defiance to the mechanism through which the king and military secured the vote of confidence for Prime Minister Mohammad Yusuf and his cabinet. Initially, the lower house rejected both nominees, yet the monarch forced the parliament to reconsider its decision and give consent in favor of the government. In reaction, students and academics marched toward the parliament vicinity and confronted open fire by the police, which resulted in several casualties. Consequently, Muhammad Yusaf resigned from his position and Shah appointed Mohammad

199 Nabi Misdaq, 80-81. 200 Hasan Kakar, 200; Hafizullah Emadi, State, Revolution, and Super Powers in Afghanistan (Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1997), 43-52. 201 Hafizullah Emadi, 44-45.

Hashim Maiwandwal as the [new] prime minister.202 During his tenure, Hashim formed his own political party ―The Progressive Democratic Party‖, also known as Musawati, to subdue the opposition political voices. Musawati became the hub of state officials.203 However, the accusations on Hashim of tacit relations with the CIA eventually led to his resignation in October 1967.204

After Hashim‘s resignation, the king appointed Noor Ahmad Etemadi as the new Prime minister who remained in office until October 1969. Etemadi also failed to provide a stable political regime because of the prevalent socio-economic problems in the country. In addition, the newly organized political groups such as Shula-e-Jawid supported the student and labor demonstrations against the regime‘s inefficiency to deal with the economic crisis. Demonstrations and strikes intensified with the passage of time and constrained Prime Minister Etemadi to resign in 1971. His successor Abdul Zahir, appointed by the monarch, could manage to stay in power for only one year. The drought and resulting famine in Afghanistan weakened Zahir‘s position and ultimately led to his resignation, although his government had several differences with the Wolesi Jirga.

Later on, Zahir Shah designated Mohammad Musa Shafiq as the new prime minister to maintain political stability in the country. Musa took strident actions against the opposition groups and passed a law to curtail the political freedom of the citizens. He banned all anti-regime political activities and allowed the publication of only those newspapers that supported the government. He built an alliance with the religious forces to legitimize his regime. In this context, he also tried to establish close relations with Iran and Pakistan. He also tried to maintain a balanced relationship with the Soviet Union despite having a clear understanding of the Soviet policy toward Afghanistan and support for the groups in the country.

Musa faced daunting challenges on the economic front because decreasing foreign aid had a negative impact on the economy that was dependent on the foreign aid. His administration tried to expand the tax base by implementing taxes on the land and livestock. The sitting

202 ―His Majesty Decree,‖ Kabul Times 4, no.183 (November 3.1965): 1,http://digitalcommons. unomaha.edu/ kabultimes/1138/. 203 Hafizullah Emadi, 45. 204 ―Yaftali Acting Premier, Maiwandwal Flies to US,‖ Kabul Times 6, no 164 (October 12, 1967): 1, http://digital commons.unomaha.edu/kabultimes/1604/.

66 parliamentarians, however, refused to endorse the tax increase. As a result, the unemployment among the graduates grew and they started joining the opposition groups working for revolutionary changes in the state structure.205 The weakening economy and unparalleled activism of opposition political forces provided the former Premier Daoud with an opportunity to launch a coup against the King. Daoud ended the monarchy and declared Afghanistan a republic.

The democracy decade expanded the state legitimacy in the peripheral areas. The Afghans learned about political freedom that led to the emergence of new political groups in the country. Press freedom, regular elections, and constitutionalism played a vital role in the political consciousness of the people, but the experiment of democracy also exposed the patrimonial nature of the state. The king created institutions like bureaucracy and army to serve his interests and strengthen his rule. Personal loyalties to the king connected with material rewards were also a significant feature of his reign.206 He promoted and excluded individuals from the state apparatus on trust and likeness instead of merit. The fall of six civilian governments in a decade showed that real authority resided with the king. Similarly, he did not completely implement the liberal constitution of 1964. For instance, he never ratified the Political Parties Act.

Political activism was only limited to the urban areas of Afghanistan because the modern education system was a part of urban life. Rural areas nonetheless remained under the influence of traditional authorities. The democracy decade also highlighted the ethnic, tribal, and religious differences in the society.207 Ethnic minorities started raising their voices against the dominance of Pashtuns in the state apparatus. However, the election results gave rise to the numbers of conservatives and traditional elite in the parliament and excluded the urban educated class and women from the electoral processes.

Similarly, the Afghan army remained under the command of Muhammadzai Pashtuns. Civilian governments had no authority to intervene in their administrative affairs. The Army was a powerful institution, under the command of king‘s son-in-law General Abdul Wali, and acted above the legislative authority. By the end of 1960s, the discontent voices were becoming strong in the junior cadre and the officers‘ allegiance to Daoud continued even after his resignation. The

205 Amin Saikal, 157-158. 206 Steve Hess, ―Coming to terms with Neo-Patrimonialism: Soviet and American nation-building projects in Afghanistan,‖ Central Asian Survey 29, no. 2 (June 2010): 172-173. 207 Nabi Misdaq, 82; Hasan Kakar, 213.

67 army was so powerful that some analysts called it a state within the state.208 In a nutshell, the bankrupt economy, drought, corruption, royal rivalries, tensions between the legislature and executives, and the middle class grievances provided an opportunity to Daoud to stage a bloodless coup against King Zahir Shah during his absence.209

Although domestic politics no longer remained under the influence of the royal dynasty, the democratic process had very limited functionality when it attempted to shift the loyalties of the educated class to the new political groups, particularly PDPA. The newly emerged leadership, a product of western education system, remained at loggerheads with the alliance consisted of traditional forces and monarchy. Yet the intra-party and inter-party rivalries made them inefficient and weak. The king did not sign the Political Parties Act and thus obstructed the legal activism of the political parties participating in the elections.210 He also did not ratify the provincial assembly law. The upper house of the parliament thus remained incomplete due to the absence of provincial assembly, ―since one-third of its members were to be elected by provincial assemblies.‖211

For the crafters of the constitution, the provincial assemblies were an important component in the process of political liberalization, especially in building a formal cord between Kabul and provincial politics. They envisioned that the rural people would be actively participating in the electoral politics and the local elite would find themselves in a better position to solve their issues. The unavailability of provincial assemblies made the rural people disinterested in the liberal political process, which consolidated the local elite power in the new [partially opened] political system. Therefore, the local conservative leadership and the urban modernist elite stayed at opposite poles in ideological orientation and interests.212

The decade of democracy left both negative and positive effects on the Afghan state. For instance, political liberalization provided different groups with an opportunity to formulate their organizations and even contest the elections, but this era did not substantially improve the lives of the populace. The political system lost its legitimacy because the voter turnout in the elections

208 Hasan Kakar, 213. 209 Hasan Kakar, 195-214; Amin Saikal, 133-168; Louis Dupree, 648-658. 210 Nabi Misdaq, 81. 211 Ralph. H. Magnus, Eden Naby, 114. 212 Ibid ., 114.

68 remained limited. Similarly, the members of Wolesi Jirga did not wholly participate in the assembly sessions that showed their interest in the system.213 Rampant corruption, nepotism, and mediocracy made the government ineffective. In addition, the aforementioned factors provide Daoud with an opportunity to gain the sympathy of the opposition forces within the government institutions. This phenomenon was particularly visible in the army, which supported the coup. Daoud also secured the support of Moscow by assuring it that he would share the power with PDPA.

2.3.2 Daoud in Power: Emergence of Republican State

The new regime aspired to change the outlook of the state by adopting policies to legitimize its rule. In order to garner public support and justify the overthrow of the monarchy at the time when king Zahir Shah was abroad and the decade of democracy had failed to deliver, Daoud addressed the nation:

Democracy or the government of the people was changed into anarchy and the constitutional monarchy to a despotic regime. All these forces struggled against one and another and the people, and in pursuing the principle of divide and rule, fire was lighted throughout the country. So in this turbulent and dark atmosphere impregnated with misery, poverty, and misfortune they [the ruling class and official bureaucrats] were able to attain their material and political ends. The patriots, wherever they were, watched with deep sorrow and anguish this horrible state of their nation. But they were constantly aware of the situation, especially the Afghan armed forces who felt this agony more than anyone else exercising extreme patience hoping that today or tomorrow the vile and rotten system in Afghanistan would become aware of the misery of the nation and endeavor to reform itself. But the result proved that these hopes are impertinent, and the regime and system became so corrupt that no hope or expectation for its reform existed. Consequently all patriots, especially the patriotic armed forces of Afghanistan, decided to put an end to this rotten system and deliver nation from this plight…the system has been overthrown and a

213 Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 5.

new order which is the republican regime has been established which conforms to the true spirit of Islam.214

The Khalq faction of the PDPA endorsed Daoud‘s coup. Nevertheless, a few of its military members decided to stay away from the regime without showing their defiance to the incumbent regime. They did not join the opposition camp but emphasized the reunification of the party to create a socialist Afghanistan.215 The pro-Soviet Afghan intelligentsia also endorsed the republican regime. The General Secretary of Khalqi faction Noor Muhammad Taraki supported the new regime by arguing:

We thought that maybe Daoud will take some action in the interest of the oppressed class of people….He delivered a speech called ―Address to the Nation‖ which, compared to the objectives of the monarchical regime, was progressive. We were satisfied with this speech and we were right in supporting Daoud in the light of this speech.216

The PDPA supported Daoud‘s coup to oust monarchy and establish republican power on an assumption that it was the fastest way to came into power because they lacked the capacity for a grass root revolution.217 The Parchamis also supported Daoud and played a vital role in bringing him into power. They were also aware of the fact that to get legitimacy for their party and its ideological orientation, working ―with Daoud would provide the party with public acceptability and that a figurehead leader with no socialist credentials would be more acceptable in a traditional conservative society.‖218

The members of both PDPA factions, serving in the Afghan army, played an effective role in the July coup. Later on, Daoud included them in his cabinet. He promoted file and rank officers and sent young Parchami and Khalqi members to the provincial areas to propagate policies of the republican regime. Another purpose of sending the young lot was to prevent a counter-coup against the regime.219 He used this tactic to win the support of students and intelligentsia for his regime. However, later on, he adopted a number of policies at domestic and

214 Text of the Speech by President Mohammad Daoud via Radio Afghanistan, September 24, 1973, 3. 215 Ralph H.Magnus, and Eden Naby, 118. 216 Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan‟s Annual 1979 (Kabul: Government Printing House, 1979), 380. 217 Hafizullah Emadi, Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan, 87. 218 Ibid., 87. 219 Louis Dupree, ―A Note on Afghanistan: 1974,‖ AUFS Reports 8 (September 1974), 7-8.

70 foreign policy fronts that made him unpopular among the people. His policies also antagonized the Soviets and thus resulted in a bloody coup.

President Daoud adopted strident policies against the opposition political forces. He banned political parties, private newspapers, imprisoned the opposition political figures, and even ordered the killing of religious leaders.220 Yet he uncovered several rebellions and coups, including the one initiated by Radical Muslim Youth Movement (RMYM) in 1973. The RMYM instigated a plot in the army in 1973. Key leaders of this movement fled to Pakistan whom prominent Islamist figures Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar joined later.221 Daoud abrogated the 1964 constitution and disbanded the parliament.222 His policies made a large segment of the Afghan society realize that his emergence to power would not bring any revolutionary change in the political system, which would address the socio-economic problems of Afghanistan.223 They also realized that it was only the change of face because the royal family was still in power. In one way, this argument was true because Daoud gave monthly allowances to king Zahir Shah and his family and gave key government positions to distant family members of the king.224

Daoud‘s ambition to establish a republican state proved merely a rhetoric. In reality, he ruled in an authoritarian manner. For a short period, he held four ministries in addition to his presidential and premiership posts.225 In his first cabinet, he gave almost half of the positions to Parchamis or those who were close to them and accommodated the party members in the state apparatus.226 Initially, the Kremlin was also comfortable with the way Daoud and Parcham were managing the government affairs because Daoud maintained a pro-Soviet policy and put Pakistan in the category of enemies. He labelled Pakistan as the only country with which

220 Nabi Misdaq, 90. 221 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan: A Study of the Constitutions, Matrimonial Law and the Judiciary (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1985), 53. 222 Amin Saikal, 172. 223 Hafizullah Emadi, 88. 224 Ibid., 69. 225 Nabi Misdaq, 89. 226 Arnold, Afghanistan‟s Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 44.

Afghanistan had a political dispute. His government also supported the Pashtunistan issue. However, Daoud‘s stance toward Pakistan changed in the later years of his rule.227

Daoud‘s domestic and foreign policies took a new direction in the last two years of his rule. He started purging the Parcham members from the state apparatus.228 By 1975, all key Parcham members in the government were ousted from the power structure. He made a notable shift in foreign policy by reducing tensions with the neighboring countries, Iran and Pakistan, and curtailing the Soviet influence. With reference to Pakistan, he adopted a policy of rapprochement.229 In other words, Afghanistan started exploring options beyond the Soviet Union and its bloc. He expanded the canvass of Afghan foreign relations with other countries, such as Egypt, the UAE, and the US. Despite the opposition of the PDPA and Soviets, he extended relations with the western countries, particularly the US. This shift in Daoud‘s approach toward the west incited a discord between the pro-socialists and pro-capitalist forces in the power structure.230 Similar sentiments of dissonance started emerging in the armed forces. In response, the president started removing the Parcham members from the armed forces, although Khalqis‘ recruitment under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin continued even after 1973 coup.231 The Khalq faction, however, remained out of power in the post-coup years.232

Daoud‘s change of approach toward the Soviets and its client faction Parcham resulted in the reunification of the two factions. Henry S. Bradshen explained the greater picture that ―the Communist party of India acted as a mediator.‖233 Daoud‘s approach toward Soviets and their communist supporters alarmed the former.234 Kremlin was not probably ready to jeopardize its investment of more than two decades in Afghan communist political elements and secret cadres created in the administration and armed forces.235 The reunification of Khalq and Parcham under the banner of PDPA in 1977 was also an outcome of the Soviet efforts. Taraki assumed the role

227 Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 172. 228 Ralph H.Magnus and Eden Naby, 118-119; Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004), 176-177; Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 131. 229 Ralph H.Magnus and Eden Naby, 119. 230 Hafizullah Emadi, 69-77. 231 Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2005), 65. 232 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 102-104. 233 Henry S. Bradshen, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), 69. 234 Hafizullah Emadi, 77-78. 235 Ralph H.Magnus and Eden Naby, 120-121.

72 of party secretary and Babrak Karmal became the secretary of the central committee.236 However, both factions gained equal membership in the central committee.

By mid 1970s, Daoud was struggling to strengthen and legitimize his regime. In January 1977, he convened a Loya Jirga to approve the new constitution and elect him as the president for another six years. The new constitution, approved by the Loya Jirga, was a replica ―of an authoritarian state‘s documents that provided for a presidential system of government within the framework of a single party system.‖237 Daoud‘s political party Hizbi-Enqilab-e-Milli, created in 1975, was the only functional and legal party in the political process.238 The constitution banned the Communist Party in Afghanistan and thus reflected the autocratic nature of regime that was not ready to accept the existence of opposition forces. The new constitution legalized a unicameral parliament elected by ―universal, secret and direct elections‖, but empowered the party to nominate the candidates.239 The constitution also focused on the socialist and revolutionary rhetoric whilst illustrating reforms in economic and social sectors.240 The document also chartered land reforms and nationalism. Nevertheless, Daoud wanted to give an impression that he was seeking approval of the constitution and electoral process in a democratic way. In practice, the Jirga was an undemocratic institution to elect because the incumbent president himself selected the Jirga members belonging to armed forces, urban intellectuals, small farmers, factory workers, and women.241 Louis Dupree explained the ―Loya Jirga as a grand assembly of tribal leaders elected him president of the country as well as prime minister, defense minister, and supreme commander of the armed forces.‖242

The Approval of constitution by the grand assembly provided Daoud with an opportunity to adopt an aggressive policy toward PDPA. He banned their political activities and escalated the process of removing the Parcham members from the government positions. Daoud‘s acrimonious behavior toward PDPA and shift in policy toward the Soviet Unions, Pakistan, and the US instigated the deadly ―April coup‖, which resulted in the assassination of Daoud and his entire extended family members in April 1978.

236 Ibid., 121. 237 Hafizullah Emadi, 69. 238 Ibid., 69; Amin Saikal, 181. 239 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, 120. 240 Martin Ewans, 132. 241 Ibid., 131-132; Hafizullah Emadi , 69. 242 Louis Dupree, ―Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan,‖ AUFS Reports 14 (1978), 2.

Daoud significantly changed the orientation of the Afghan foreign policy. His stance toward the Marxist elements in the state apparatus (and outside) worried Moscow. Moscow considered his purge as an attempt to shift the policy from supporting and incorporating the progressive elements in the government institutions. Afghanistan expert Amin Siakal argues that the internal political developments led to Daoud‘s demise. His actions such as overthrowing the monarchy, alienating the Islamists, and underestimating the power base of PDPA caused his demise.243 According to William Maley‘s characterization, ―The Coup of April 1978 was fundamentally the product of the emergence of severe division within the national elite.‖244

Secondly, he attempted to formulate an independent foreign policy and establish reliance on the oil-rich Muslim states whilst reducing dependence on the Soviet political and economic aid.245 Some of his decisions, such as the removal of Soviet advisers working with the Afghan army units, exasperated Moscow and strengthened its suspicions about the strength of its alliance with Daoud. Within the country, contradictions and tensions between the PDPA and the incumbent regime intensified, especially after the assassination of a leading Parcham member Mir Akbar Khyber in April 1977, and resulted in an armed struggle between the Daoud loyalists and PDPA supporters in security institutions.246 The armed struggle ultimately led to the replacement of Daoud‘s republican regime with a Marxist regime.

Conclusion

Powerful tribal [Pashtun] leaders transformed Afghanistan into a segmentary state from a cluster of tribes. The state system represented and served the interests of the ruling Pashtuns. Ethnic factor determined the political power at the expense of minor ethnic identities. Amir Abd al Rahman nonetheless tried to establish a centralized system of rule, which the following monarchs also continued. However, the Afghan state was never able to completely entrench itself in the heterogeneous society. The independent structures of local authority existed parallel

243 Amin Saikal, 184-186. 244 William Maley, ―The Dynamics of Regime Transition in Afghanistan,‖ Central Asian Survey 16, no.2 (1997), 169. 245 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, War Without Winners: Afghanistan Uncertain Transition After the Cold War (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 46. 246 Peter Marsden, Afghanistan, Aid, Armies and Empires (London: I.B. Tauris &Co Ltd, 2010), 34; Hafizullah Emadi, 101-103; Barnett R. Rubin, 104-105.

74 to the state and blocked the autonomization of the Afghan state. The traditional authority, religious clerics, and the tribal chieftains also restrained the political power of the ruling elite.

The ruling elite‘s dependence on the imperialist powers limited their independence in managing the state affairs and the external powers played a key role in the Afghan politics. The turbulent, authoritarian, and dynastic characters of the state transformed it into a buffer zone between the imperialist powers. The great powers, Russia and Britain, delineated Afghanistan‘s borders and supported the ruling [political] elite in terms of providing ideologies, organizational models, and financial resources. The ruling elite were also interested in forging alliances with the external powers to manipulate political developments in the country for their own benefits because both great powers wanted to consolidate their control in the court of Kabul. However, Britain remained successful in installing and influencing the rulers until 1919. Even after the independence, the British influence prevailed in the political affairs of monarchical regimes and it supported the leadership‘s policies. However, in the post-WWII era, the Soviet Union filled the power vacuum left by the British. Moscow maintained its dominance over Kabul by establishing a client party PDPA, which seized power in 1978. At that time, the US connection with the Afghan ruling elite remained limited to foreign aid and technical assistance in development projects.

On the other hand, the modernization of state apparatus and political process resulted in the emergence of new political groups. This development divided the country into two political camps, Islamists and modernists. While entering the post-war international political system, the monarch attempted to transform the regime into a constitutional monarchy by limiting the press freedom and participation in elections. This is why political liberalization remained unsuccessful in breaking the monopoly of the traditional leadership and reducing their influence in the local disputes. As a result, the reform agenda of the successive regimes instigated a spark and, later on, resistance to the state authority. The process of state fragmentation started with the emergence of the Marxist regime. However, the Soviet intervention, however, accelerated the process.

Chapter Three Decomposition Process of Afghan State: Soviet Intervention, Afghan Civil War, and Taliban Regime

Introduction

This chapter traces the process of state decay with reference to the external factors interacting with the internal political dynamics of Afghanistan, which had a particular role in starting, intensifying, and transforming the war and the process of state decomposition. The political and security environment of Afghanistan under the PDPA regime further deteriorated after the Soviet intervention. The withdrawal of Red Army from Afghanistan and failure of the international community in consolidating peace in Afghanistan resulted in the anarchic political environment, civil war, and eventually collapse of the state. The state‘s degeneration into anarchy provided the Taliban with an opportunity to establish a regime in the country. In this chapter, I would analyze the Taliban regime with reference to the failed state concept and explain contending perspectives on the Taliban government whilst associating it with the failed state phenomena. I would also examine the failed state concept in lieu of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan, especially the 9/11 attacks, which brought ―failed states‖ into the top tier of international community‘s security interests.

3.1 PDPA in Power: State Building and State Fragmentation

Statebuilding under the PDPA regime challenged the traditional authority of the Afghan society and attempted to transform it through coercion from top to bottom. The regime‘s radical transformation program of state and society on socialist lines was unacceptable to a large part of the Afghan rural society, tribal elites, and religious clerics. This program caused the emergence of a resistance movement that led to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The PDPA history in power is important in the context of statebuilding and its limitations.247

247Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin, ―The Communist Regime in Afghanistan 1978-1992: Institutions and Conflicts,‖ Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 8 (1998): 1357.

Barnett Rubin refers to the period following April 1978 as ―the failure of revolution from above.‖ The transformation agenda pursued by the radical regime in a weak state where society is a product of ethnic, religious, and tribal fault lines could result in a clash between the state authority and locals.248 As resistance from below becomes tougher and violent was exacerbated by external intervention overtly and covertly.249 Afghanistan underwent a similar change that contributed to the failure of externally backed statebuilding project. The Marxist regime in Afghanistan explained in the context of ―revolution from above‖ means that the PDPA regime introduced and attempted to impose modernization agenda on the society. This attempt, however, antagonized the society and constrained them to pursue armed resistance against the regime. Prior to the Saur Revolution, the majority of analysts put Afghanistan in the category of weak state because the state writ was only limited to urban areas and lines of communication.250 In contrast, a large segment of Afghan population worked in the rural areas. The state made nexus with the local elite to maintain stability in the peripheral areas or subdue the local opposition movements. Similarly, the state‘s inability to generate taxes made it dependent on foreign aid and thus affected its control on the people, frontiers, and the monopoly on the means of violence.

3.1.1 State under Khalq: Taraki-Amin Rule

The revolution was not a nationwide event but only occurred in Kabul; therefore, the state institutions were relatively intact. The new regime inherited the institutions in virtually same condition and kept the provincial power structures unchanged.251 Restructuring of the state institutions took place after the Soviet intervention. The state apparatus and armed forces were ―built up with considerable Soviet help but little commitment to Soviet communism.‖252 Both Parcham and Khalq maintained links with Moscow before the reunification, but the new regime composition went in the favor of Khalq faction. The latter declared themselves leaders of the revolution and captured nearly all of the important portfolios in the government.

248 Ibid.,1357. 249 Ibid.,1358. 250 Ibid.,1359. 251 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 112. 252 Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin, 1360.

The Khalqis claimed that they had the right to monopolize power.253 Taraki was President and Prime Minister, Babrak Karmal became the first deputy Prime Minister, Amin assumed the portfolio of foreign minister and second deputy prime minister, and Abdul Qader took defense ministry in reward for directing air attacks on the Arg Palace.254 The Khalqi got all those ministries that had direct linkage with the Soviets. None of the non-party members was able to get a significant government position. The Parcham leaders were merely supporting allies of the regime before their ouster from the government.255

Khalqi rejected any alliance with existing political parties and used repressive measures to curb the opposition voices. They demonized other political groups and declared them enemies, including Parcham, Islamists, Maoists, Setam-i-Melli, and Afghan Mellat.256 Khalqi intended to use the policy of ―target repression‖ and ―reform‖ to get rid of those groups that could pose a threat to its regime. They also used the aforementioned policies to neutralize the contenders for national power, especially tribal aristocracy, rival intelligentsia, and the local elite.257 However, the regime used people‘s security and revolution success as the justification for its repressive measures against the enemies.

Another consequence of the regime change was the shift in inter and intra ethnic relations.258 The Saur revolution ended the domination of Muhammadzai Pashtuns who ruled the state through a coalition with Persian speaking bureaucrats and professionals.259 Ghilzai and Paktia Pashtuns were dominant in the Khalq regime. According to Barnett Rubin, ―It was the most-Pashtun and the least-Durrani government Afghanistan had ever had.‖260 The regime was not successful in maintaining stable relations with Pashtun tribes despite having Pashtun dominated state apparatus. The tribes had refused to accept certain reforms introduced by the regime.

253 Ibid., 1360. 254 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, 124. 255 In July 1978 Taraki send Babrak Karmal and five other Parcham leaders close to him in exile as ambassadors. In August the Khalqis arrested others for plotting a coup, and in November they purged all Parchami leaders from the party and state apparatus. 256 Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin, 1360. 257 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 115. 258 Ibid., 115. 259 Fred Hallliday and Zahir Tanin, 1360. 260 Barnett Rubin, 115.

Nonetheless, the revolutionary regime attempted to modernize the society and break monopoly of traditional leadership in the interior through reforms. The Marxist policy makers neglected a fact that King Amanuallah‘s modernization program in 1929 led to the formation of an alliance between the traditionalist and imperial British, failure of the program, and execution of the king.261 Similar circumstances emerged after the decrees because implementation process was inefficient and unacceptable to the locals. The ensuing anarchy in the society provided the Soviets with an opportunity to intervene Afghanistan to protect the communist regime.

The government‘s policy to transform the traditionalist Afghan society into a socialist society was an unrealistic plan because the historical, socio-cultural, and economic realities of Afghanistan did not coincide with the Soviet communist society by any means.262 Khalq leadership wanted to get social control of the rural areas by issuing the decrees. They also wanted to replace the rural elites, considered as the power holders, with central regime authority.263 In reality, the regime had directed reforms toward the rural sector. The revolutionary authority designed the reform agenda without taking in account the public opinion.264

The decrees abolished Daoud‘s constitution, established civil-military courts and procedures for the promotion of civil service personnel and teachers, and changed color of the flag. Decrees reduced loans and mortgages and put an end to centuries-long feudal practices.265 These decrees were a symbol of revolution, yet they alienated a majority of the Afghans. The state got a new role in the agriculture sector by introducing land ceiling and expropriating of the surplus lands and placed them under the authority of Land Reform Department.266 The reforms did not contribute to the state power but led to breakdown of the state.

The Soviets gave significant economic assistance to the Khalq regime. The client regime also accepted the Soviet technical and military advisers in the government

261 Ralph H. Magnus, and Eden Naby, 126. 262 Hafizullah Emadi, Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan, 104. 263 Barnett Rubin, 116. 264 Ibid., 116. 265 Hafizullah Emadi, 105. 266 Barnett Rubin, 117.

79 institutions.267 The Afghan security apparatus was under the control of KGB. Most of the civilian Soviet advisers were Persians, Uzbeks, and Turkmens who concentrated on non- Pashtun areas in the north.268 The Soviets were nonetheless not happy with Amin‘s policies and repressive measures against the opposition groups, but it was in the Soviet interest to support the Khalq regime.

The PDPA regime promulgated a new constitution on March 27, 1979, that consisted of thirty articles.269 The constitution gave legitimacy to the revolutionary council as the supreme authority and ceded it the power to approve or reject the constitution, issue order on the state affairs, appoint the first minister (prime minister), and confirm treaties and agreements with other states. In a way, the revolutionary council would do the job of Loya Jirga.270 The revolutionary political steps of Khalq to radicalize the Afghan state and society on socialist lines continued to weaken its regime.

Growing opposition, defections to the opposition, and flee of citizens further constrained the regime to pursue coercive policies. The regime‘s reliance on violence affected its popularity among the Afghan citizens. The government tracked down officers suspected of sympathy for the Islamist opposition.271 Popularity of the Islamists, however, increased in reaction to the regime‘s repression and reform agenda. Thus, the revolt became persistence and mutinies started breaking out in several major garrisons in 1978 and 1979. Amin tried to suppress the mutinies with the help of Soviets. The regime also continued to arrest people after every revolt. Yet it also started removing the counter-revolutionaries from armed forces and placing loyalists in the key positions.272

Amin‘s growing power, intra party bitterness, purge of Parcham members from the government posts, and reducing Taraki as a figurehead were great concerns for the Soviet advisers deployed in Afghanistan.273 Therefore, the Soviets decided to remove Amin from power and reunify the both factions under the leadership of Taraki. Moscow was also worried

267 Hafizullah Emadi, 108. 268 Ralph H. Magnus,and Eden Naby, 125. 269 Hafizullah Emadi, 109. 270Ibid.,109. 271 Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin, 1361. 272 Ibid.,1362. 273 Rasul Bakhsh Rais , War Without Winners, 79-80.

80 about the expansion of resistance movement against the regime, which would be more detrimental for consolidation of the socialist regime. They believed that Amin‘s autocratic behavior was isolating the people; therefore, his removal from power would be the first step toward the start of a reconciliation process with the insurgents and dissent voices in the country. Yet before his removal from power, Amin disposed Taraki and killed him.

Amin faced stiff resistance against his transformation of Afghan society and state. It became impossible for the Khalq regime to extend its administration in the peripheral areas. The regime, however, continued repressive policies against the rural people, forcing them to migrate to neighboring countries.274 The leftist elements felt disillusioned and turned against the regime. Importantly, Amin‘s policy for grabbing power in his office whilst persecuting the Parcham hierarchy made the Marxists hostile toward his regime.275 The Soviets also became uncomfortable with his performance in suppressing the resistance movement and widespread unrest in the country. Ostensibly, they accepted Amin as the head of state and kept providing economic and military assistance to the regime for socialist reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations against the mujahedeen.276 Yet they realized that the Amin regime had become internally weak and the state apparatus were in disarray. The regime was not in a position to counter the insurgency because the Afghan army facing defections and insurrections in nearly all garrisons.277

These events revealed that the state lacked internal coherence and the then incumbent regime had lost its popularity among the masses. The state institutions tried to protect their own coherence, but the army defections exposed the internal legitimacy crisis in combination with the external crisis. Amin made certain attempts to reverse the trend of state and party disintegration by introducing a new constitution, the defense organization, claiming leniency

274 Ibid., 83. 275 Anglo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (London:I.B.Taruis&Co.Ltd,2003),78-79; Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), 110-121. 276 Amin statements expressed by him to show his gratitude to the Soviet Union. Radio Kabul, November 7, 1979, in FBIS/MS, November 9, 1979, 51-53; ― Amin Congratulates Brezhnev, Kosygin on 62nd year of October Revolution,‖ Kabul Times 17, no. 190 (November 7,1979), http://content. library.arizona.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ p16127coll6/ id/39346. 277 Barnett Rubin, 120; Fred Halliday & Zahir Tanin, 1362; Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 143-145.

81 toward political prisoners, and giving gestures to appease conservative Islamic elements.278 On the foreign policy front, he tried to mend fences with Pakistan and Iran, even though the Afghans blamed Pakistan for unrest and providing safe heavens to the insurgents. Amin thought that the Soviets were planning to overthrow his regime, so he adopted a softer approach toward the neighboring countries.

Amin‘s efforts could not stop the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He relied on repression throughout his hundred days rule. His rule eroded the state power from most of the Afghan territory because the state presence could only be felt in the cities and district centers. Meanwhile, the Afghan state apparatus appeared nothing more than a client state of the superpower. In reality, the Soviets ran the Afghan state. According to a research report, ―The Afghans had lost control of the essential levers of power to 15,000 or more Soviet officials in the civilian ministries and between 3,500 and 4,000 Soviet officers and technicians in the armed forces.‖279Amin‘s personalized rule had serious consequences for the state-society relations. It provoked a massive resistance movement against the Khalq regime and subsequently led to the assassination of Amin and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

3.2 Soviet Occupation: Rebuilding of Party State (Karmal and Najibullah Years)

After the intervention, the first step Soviets took was the installation of Babrak Karmal as the president of the revolutionary council, general secretary of the PDPA, and prime minister of the government.280 Sultan Ali Keshtmand became the prime minister in the subsequent years. However, the new regime faced the challenge of rebuilding or reorganizing the state institutions that were in the process of disintegration. The Afghan state was on the path of anarchy. Within the party, the intra-party power struggle had destroyed the party. Khalq‘s discriminatory acts against the Parcham led to the disintegration of the party. The Soviets wanted to build a unified party to play a leading role in the transformation of the Afghanistan

278 ―150 Political Prisoners Released in Ghzani,‖ Kabul Times xiv, no 173 (October 15, 1979), 1. http://content.library.arizona.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p16127coll6/id/39256/rec/1; ―Over 84 Mosques Repaired,‖ Kabul Times xvii, no. 192 (November 10, 1979), 1, http://content.library.arizona.edu/cdm/ compoundobject/collection/p16127coll6/id/39351/rec/1. 279 ―A Chronology of Soviet Afghan Relations: April 1978-January 1980,‖ Radio Liberty Research, RL 17/80,2 January 1980; the Soviet personals presence was significant higher than mentioned in various reports. 280 Barnett R.Rubin, 122.

82 whereas the PDPA was compounding from social, ethnic, and personal rivalries.281 Soviets had this idea, so they tried to incorporate the Khalq elite leadership and cadres into the party, but the power-sharing arrangement was partial because the Khalq had a secondary role in the state apparatus.282 Secondly, the enmity between the two factions also remained unresolved.

The Soviets divided the politburo and central committee membership between Khalq and Parcham to unify the party, but ―Parcham received about two-thirds of the seats on the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Revolutionary Council.‖283 The military apparatus was under the control of Khalq. It had a large number of supporters in the party and an overwhelming majority in the military.284 The Khalq also got the interior ministry285 but did not approve the inclusion of non-PDPA members in the power structure.286 Later on, the membership of the party and politburo was expanded and a new generation of the Soviet-trained officials were included in it.287 In terms of the party membership, the inclusion of army personnel, police officers (Sarandoy), low-rank government employees, and militia (Khad) increased the numbers.288

The regime also produced a shift in the inter-ethnic relations. Historically, the balance of power in ethnic context remained in favor of Pashtuns, but the new regime incorporated non-Pashtun elements in the power structure. A Hazara community member Sultan Ali Keshtmand became the prime minister under the leadership of Karmal.289 President also appointed a non-Pashtun defense minister but reversed the decision after a short period. Although the Ghilzai Pashtuns were dominant in the new power structure, the party composition reflected the entrance of Tajiks comparatively higher with reference to the Afghan demographic realities.290

281 Rasul Bakhsh Rais , War Without Winners,141. 282 Angelo Rasanayagam , 94-101. 283 Barnett .R. Rubin, 126. 284 Ralph H. Magnus , and Eden Naby, 130. 285 Barnett R.Rubin, 127. 286 Anthony Aronald, Afghanistan‟s Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 111. 287 Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin , 1362. 288 Barnett R.Rubin , 128. 289 Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin, 1363; Barnett R.Rubin , 126-127. 290 Fred Halliday and Tahir Zanin, 1363.

The Marxist regime emulated the Soviet government style based on fusion of the state leadership and party leadership. The Babrak regime was a reflection of party-state. Theoretically, the concept of party state existed only in communist regimes where the party had an absolute power. Party was the vanguard of the country and system. According to Marxist-Leninist tradition, the party represented interests of the proletariat. In the case of Afghanistan, the PDPA was an elite party. Party leaders became party bureaucrats and held core positions in the state apparatuses.291 The party-state elite monopolized state power and controlled the economic environment of the state that was already dependent on the Soviet aid. The influx of external aid provided the leadership with an opportunity to abuse the aid because the political environment was non-competitive and unaccountable to the people. The state officials diverted the Soviet finances toward the strengthening of security apparatus to counter the resistance movement. Nepotism and corruption became the hallmark of Babrak administration that was controlling the levers of powers under the Soviet directives.

The party members established an entrenched linkage with the state machinery. While following the Soviets political-military arrangement, the new regime launched a similar model to unite the party and armed forces.292 This system put the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the Interior, and Khad (Khidamate Aetilaati Daulati) under the authority of the party and its general secretary.293 The PDPA represented in the bureaucracies of all three armed forces ministries. Khad became one of the most important institutions in maintaining control on the internal security and political dynamics of Afghanistan. The Soviet KGB played the vital role in the development of Khad whose leader was a Parchami, Najibullah.294 The regime also developed irregular military forces to control and maintain order in the state. These groups were PDPA militias, self-defense groups, tribal battalions, and pact groups.295

291 In Babrak regime, two-thirds of the ministers were PDPA Central Committee members, and nearly all of the rest were party members. Seven of eight members of the government core leadership were members of the Central Committee. Over four-fifths of the members of the Revolutionary Council were members of the Central Committee, and only three of sixty-six members came from outside the ranks of party. All the above mentioned PDPA representation in DRA institutions are given in Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 128-129. 292 Oleg Sarin and Lev Dvoretsky, The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union‟s Vietnam (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1993), 76. 293 Fred Halliday ,and Zahir Tanin ,1364. 294 Rasul Bakhsh Rais ,145. 295 Fred Halliday, and Zahir Tanin, 1367

Soviets also realized that pervious Marxist regimes were unpopular among the Afghans and the Babrak regime could face the similar circumstances if he continued with the old policies of repression and reform. Nonetheless, the Soviets and Parcham described the Babrak regime as the ―new phase of Saur Revolution‖ and asserted continuation of Marxism in the country.296 Yet he distanced himself from the Marxists in order to gain legitimacy among the Afghans. He mentioned almost all occupations to win the hearts and minds of the masses.297

For the time being, the Soviets and Babrak wanted to put aside their Marxists ideological pursuit to gain the public support. Soviets wanted to rebuild political order around the Kabul regime. Therefore, Moscow decided to pursue an integrated approach based on three principles of restructuring, coercion, and co-option.298 Furthermore, the Soviets advised Karmal to highlight a slogan that he believed in broader front of all national democratic forces.299 However, this approach outraged the Khalq. Legitimacy required changes in the regime‘s approach toward different segments of the society including the clergy and religious scholars. In April, the regime published ―fundamental principles‖ of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), which was to be the constitution before the crafting of the final document.300

On the interim constitution, Karmal argued that the ―DRA will ensure ―respect, observance and preservation of Islam as a sacred religion‖.301 The DRA also mentioned private ownership and observed all political, economic, and social rights of the people.302 Karmal introduced changes in the land reforms directed toward mullahs, tribal leaders, and local chiefs to build a linkage with the population.303 He also changed the color of Afghan flag to garner the public support. Nonetheless, the regime could not dissipate the locals‘ support for the mujahedeen.304

296 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, 130-131. 297 ―Text of DRA Fundamental Principles,‖ Kabul New Times 18,no.26 (April 20,1980),1-3, http://content.library.arizona.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p16127coll6/id/11496/rec/1 298 Rasul Bakhsh Rais ,140. 299 Ibid.,141. 300 Anthony Arnold, 107. 301 ―Karmal on Fundamental Principles,‖ Kabul New Times 18,no.26 (April 20,1980),4, http://content.library.arizona.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p16127coll6/id/11496/rec/1 302 Ibid. 303 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 141. 304 ―DRA, Tricolor Flag reflects the will, traditions of our people,‖ Kabul New Times 18, no.27 (April 22, 1980), 1, http://content.library.arizona.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p16127coll6/id/11501/rec/1.

Babrak‘s quest for legitimacy led to the convening of Loya Jirga in 1985. The purpose of Jirga was to win the support of tribal chieftains through money and patronage. Similarly, in September 1985, the regime called on a grand Jirga of the Pashtuns, Baluch, and Nuristani delegates belonging to the border areas of Pakistan.305 The main reason for inviting those chieftains was to get the support of the border regions elite to stop the mujahedeen. He also provided the tribes with weapons and money because he wanted to create problems in the frontier region of Pakistan. Kabul was also able to penetrate in the tribal areas of Pakistan with the help of KHAD.

The Soviet statebuilding project not only sought to reorganize the political institutions of Afghanistan but also aimed at reconstructing the state security apparatus. Soviets invested heavily in the development of the Afghan security forces. The regime established border troops and armed police and introduced universal military service.306 The Soviet intervention weakened the Afghan armed forces. Few commanders joined the resistance movement, but the Khalqis pursued an independent authority and command structure.307 The decision to keep the military under the Khalq leadership was to gain the Pashtun officers‘ allegiances to the regime. Yet the factional conflict in the military and other state institutions continued to threaten the efficiency and unity of the armed force.

The Soviet efforts to reconstruct the state and society under the leadership of Karmal did not produce any significant results in their favor. The latter was able to accumulate the military strength, but it failed to gain the popular support. In 1985, Soviets were openly criticizing Karmal regime for its failure in winning the hearts and minds of the people. Societal support for the regime was limited whilst the majority of the Afghans considered Karmal to be a puppet of Soviets because the real power rested with CPSU. Secondly, he did not have power in the volatile Pashtun tribal areas. Therefore, he failed to establish the state writ beyond main districts. Only a minority of people supported the regime. In addition, the revolution did not change the lives of the rural populace.

305 Ibid.,144. 306 Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin, 1364. 307 Ibid.,1364.

The inauguration of Mikhail Gorbachev regime in 1985 also contributed to the decision of change of man in Kabul. Gorbachev reviewed the Afghan situation and decided to promote a political compromise-based national reconciliation in Afghanistan and withdrawal of the Soviet troops.308 According to Gorbachev, Afghanistan had become a bleeding wound.309 Najibullah replaced Karmal in a manner that first he was elected as the Secretary General of the PDPA by the Central Committee and later appointed as the president of the revolutionary council. From 1987, another phase of the PDPA rule started that lasted until the collapse of the Marxist regime in April 1992.

Najibullah‘s first objective was to launch the Soviet devised policy of national reconciliation that consisted of the following points: ceasefire, power sharing in the national government with other political parties or personalities, amnesty for thousands of political prisoners, and official recognition of the local control exercised by field commanders of the resistance movement.310 The reconciliation process was a mutual and consensual process and it could only be successful when conflicting parties agreed to establish a harmonious relationship in every sphere of life. In this way, it would have a spillover effect on every sector of the society. This process required a significant change in beliefs, ideologies, and emotions of the elite involved in the process. Therefore, achieving reconciliation was a herculean condition because rival parties could agree on termination of the conflict, but the path toward stable peace depended on the reconciliation process.

The Soviets chose Najib to pursue the national reconciliation program and widen the government support base. Najib convened a Loya Jirga in November 1987 to ratify the new constitution crafted by the Soviet adviser.311 New constitution changed the name of Afghanistan from Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to Republic of Afghanistan and introduced a multi-party system, direct elections for lower house and upper house, an independent judiciary, and a council of ministers responsible to the legislature. Islam was the official religion of Afghanistan. The constitution prohibited all those laws that were contradictory to sharia.312 Initially, the PDPA Fatherland Front got a legal role in the 1987 constitution. Later on, the 1990 constitution eliminated the particular article by highlighting the

308 Barnett R.Rubin, 147; Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin,1367; Rasul Bakhsh Rais,150; Amin Saikal , 200. 309 Ibid. 310 Barnett R.Rubin, 146-147. 311 Barnett R.Rubin, 147 312 Barnett R.Rubin, 153.

87 importance of political pluralism in Afghanistan.313 Najibullah became the president of Afghanistan with holding all executive powers. He continued the practice of holding Jirga for making changes in the constitution.

Najib took an important step by including some non-PDPA members in the state civil apparatus. The regime also dissolved the revolutionary council, playing a role of legislative and representative authority, in 1988 and replaced it with the Afghan legislature.314 The non-party members were included in the process to make progress in the reconciliation process. Najib co- opted the leaders of rural areas in the revolutionary council. He also co-opted the ulemas favoring the government and other minority ethnic groups residing in the northern areas, which were under a stronghold of the regime. The Najib regime also held elections in the controlled territory. On the eve of the national assembly elections in 1988, he appealed to the seven major field commanders by name to contest elections and take their seats in the legislature.315 He wanted to deal with commanders as members of assemblies rather heads of armed groups. The election results exposed unpopularity of the PDPA among the urban population. PDPA secured only 27 percent of the seats whilst the National Front, an umbrella organization, won 28 percent. Other major parties were the Peasants Justice Party, Islamic Party, and the Workers Revolutionary Party.316

Changes made by the regime for the conciliatory purpose proved futile because they did not win over the support of opposition groups or weaken the mujahedeen resistance against the government. Meanwhile, the intra-party conflict did not subside, but rather intensified between the two factions in the late 1980s.317 The intra-party rivalry resulted in the removal and arrests of the central committee members. Meanwhile, Najib thrived on the Soviet aid to create division in the party and groups. In fact, the Soviet assistance ensured the survival of regime for another three years after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Interestingly, Najib tried to

313 Marxist regime created the National Fatherland Front (NFF) in 1981 to organize nonparty support . The primary purpose of this organization was to attract the population to get organized and participated in pro- government activities. Karmal regime claimed in the mid-80s that the membership of the government sponsored cooperatives and councils reached 760,000.NFF also established councils at village and districts levels but the effectiveness of this front in the peripheral area was very limited. Latter were under the control of Mujahedeen‘s. It had limited impact in the areas controlled by the regime. 314 Barnett Rubin, 153. 315 Ibid., 174. 316 Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response (London: Routledge, 2002), 223. 317 Abdul Kardar H.Sinno, Organizations At War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), 202.

88 establish a political system similar to the liberalization period in the 1960s. He moved from single party-state to a multiparty system and organized elections.318 His policy of allowing the entry of non-party member in the state apparatuses, except the security apparatus, demoted the PDPA in Afghanistan.

The state control on the rural areas continued to erode notwithstanding Najib‘s efforts to legitimize the Marxist regime through changing stance toward Islam, agreeing on limited political liberalization, and offering ceasefires and a long running truce. The regime was coherent until 1990. Afterward, it faced daunting challenges like inter-factional conflicts, successive coup attempts from within the armed forces, and military resistance.319 The Afghan economy also weakened due to the Soviet disintegration. This development, however, proved consequential for the regime. Najib recycled PDPA into Watan Party (homeland Party) that had begun to split into two camps. One group wanted status quo whereas the other group pressurized him for political liberalization. After the Soviet disintegration, it was impossible for the regime to give huge sums of money, food, and weapons to the tribal militia who had joined Najibullah camp after deserting the mujahedeen camp.320

Amin Saikal argues that the ―recycled PDPA and army were disintegrating; provincial governors, various warlords and field commanders were busy carving up autonomous principalities, striking alliances of convenience with a healthy disregard for ideological differences.‖321 Najib exacerbated ethnic tensions for the survival of his regime. However, the Afghan state was no longer a coherent entity at that time. It was divided among various Islamic groups supported by foreign countries and a new type of strong men who supplanted the traditional authority of leadership in rural areas. The central authority was in disarray and the most powerful state institution of the military was at the verge of collapse due to defections of commanders and alliances with the mujahedeen parties.

Najibullah lost his power in the center. The UN Secretary General‘s office held meetings with Najib to work out a political settlement among the political factions to bring peace and political

318 Angelo Rasanayagam , Afghanistan : A Modern History, 121. 319 The Afghan secret police arrested 127 suspects from the armed forces in December 1989. Muslim, January 1, 1990. 320 Dilip Hiro, 230. 321 Amin Saikal, 206.

89 stability in the country. Najib gave his consent for ―transitional mechanism‖ to transfer all powers of the executive to the interim political set-up even on first day of the transition period.322 However, his declaration of ceding powers to the interim set-up provoked a conflict between the regional coalitions in Afghanistan to fill the power vacuum.323 The UN had to streamline the transition plan in a quick manner, as the threat of disintegration of state hastened even before the implementation of plan. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali approved the ―pre-transition council composed of impartial personalities‖ chosen from the list submitted by the traditional, nationalist parties, and Hizb-i-Wahdat.324

The UN-brokered deal suggested shifting of powers to the Council that would hold a Shura in Kabul to choose the interim government. The US, Pakistan, Afghan Mujahedeen, Najibullah, and the core leadership ratified the UN plan. However, some Parchami rebels, allied with the resistance groups, sabotaged the process of power transfer to the pre-transitional council in order to capture Kabul. The armed competition for the takeover of Kabul resulted in the assassination of Najibullah.

3.3 Mujahedeen Regime: Civil War and the Sate Collapse

The Soviet intervention ended with the UN-sponsored Geneva Accord, but the peace agreement did not address the question of political order in the post-Soviet Afghanistan. The accord that led to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan left the cardinal question of internal stability in the country unanswered. Peace was only possible after addressing the issues of conflict between the armed political groups fighting against the Soviet Union and its client regime in Kabul and intra-party conflict within the PDPA. Secondly, Moscow left a cache of weapons in the occupied territory and continued to supply weapons to the Marxist regime even after the withdrawal. DDR also remained outside the agenda in Geneva negotiations. On the other hand, the US was only interested in the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It showed least interest in the post-Soviet Afghanistan statebuilding process. Political reconciliation among the warring factions was also not in the agenda of Geneva talks. Only formal parties Afghanistan and Pakistan conducted negotiations whereas the US and the

322 Barnett Rubin, 266. 323 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, 180-181. 324 Barnett R. Rubin, 268.

Soviet Union were officially consulted. However, Iran refused to participate without the inclusion of the Afghan resistance.325

The international actors participating in the talks had their own strategic interests in the post-Soviet Afghanistan, although the US lost its interest in the country after the Soviet withdrawal. The changing dynamics of world politics shifted its attention toward the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Afghanistan vanished from the US radar after the end of Cold War. All of the parties involved in the conflict– U.S., the Soviet Union, mujahedeen, and the Afghan public– were anticipating the collapse of Marxist regime immediately after the Soviet withdrawal.326 However, the predications were wrong and the regime survived for another three years. Yet the alliance against the Soviet Union and its client regime started to wither away.

Mujahedeen‘s ultimate objective of unity was the removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Their forces began to split along factional lines and compete with one another for power and influence.327 The split among mujahedeen groups resulted in a civil war. The PDPA years and the intervention period had already destroyed the state structure. Demise of Najibullah and start of another civil war further weakened the country. According to Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ―Political capacity of the Mujahedeen parties to govern Afghanistan together and revive its old traditions and build new institutions to sustain peace and economic reconstruction would have prevented the outbreak of the costly civil war that followed the collapse of the Najibullah regime.‖328

The civil war proved a decisive factor for the state collapse. The Afghan state was not in a position to deliver political goods to the citizen.329 According to Robert I. Rotberg, ―A

325 Rosanne Klass, ―Afghanistan: The Accords,‖ Foreign Affairs 66, no.5 (Summer, 1988): 927. 326 Steve Hess, ―Coming to terms with Neo patrimonialism: Soviet and American nation-building projects in Afghanistan,‖ Central Asian Survey 29, no.2 (July 2010): 179. 327 Ibid., 180. 328 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 59. 329 Political goods concept deals with state capabilities and capacity to provide security, political freedom, social services, and economic opportunities to its citizens. States inability to provide the crucial political goods especially reasonable security shows state weakness. It is predictable that weak state could plunge into an internal conflict, eventually leading to the collapse of the state.

91 collapsed is a rare and extreme version of a failed state.‖330 Afghanistan was a collapsed state after the fall of Kabul because the security of citizens was dependent on the strongest actors. The absence of a central authority created a vacuum that was filled by the warring groups, warlords, and international militant organizations. Civil war also constrained the elite leadership and civilians to migrate into the neighboring countries. A large number of Afghans migrated to Pakistan and Iran during the civil war (1992-1996). The elite leadership either migrated to the neighboring countries or became the victims of civil war.331

The civil war gave rise to the power of warlords and their fiefdoms. The latter controlled a chunk of the country.332 They devised their own security mechanism and means of money generation. They also built nexus with the criminal syndicates to increase their power in the vicinity.333 On the other hand, the mujahedeen factions also strove to grab power and control of Kabul. Thus, several groups emerged in Afghanistan, but they lacked national representation. The ethnic factor played a decisive role in the split. Many of the mujahedeen groups split into two and thus empowered the non-Pashtuns.334 Therefore, they were not ready to let their recently acquired power go to the century old Pashtun hegemonic system.335

Intensity of civil war diminished the limited authority of the Afghan Interim government formed by the virtue of Peshawar Accord.336 The agreement had certain structural and fundamental problems, but it was a way forward to bring political stability in the country.

330Robert I. Rotberg, ― Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,‖ in Why States Fail: Causes and Consequences , ed. Robert I. Rotberg (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 9. 331 According Amnesty International report published in 1995 revealed that 30,000 civilians were killed and 100,000 were wounded in the civil war (1992-1995). 332 Ibid., 9-10. 333 Olivier Roy, Afghanistan : From Holy War to Civil War (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995). 334 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, War Without Winner, 225. 335 Dilip Hiro, 233. 336 Peshawar Accord attempted to resolve the issue of representation in the transitional regime and allocation of cabinet posts to various political parties. Important provisions of the accord were the following: Established a fifty member council spearheaded by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi for two months and later the power would be transfer to Burhanuddin Rabbani as head of the state; Although Mujaddedi would remain the head of the fifty member council or the ruling council;Ruling council composition was based on thirty field commanders, ten Ulema, and ten members of the Mujahideen parties. Accord also created the portfolio of the Prime Minister ,heading the transitional government for four months afterwards it would establish an interim government for eighteen months ;objective of the government to create an environment in which elections could be held and power transfer to elected regime. The prime minister would be nominated by the Hizb-e-Islami of Hikmatyar, and the first deputy prime minister by the National Islamic Front of Sayyid Ahmad Gaillani, he would also be the Foreign minister. The second deputy prime minister would be appointed by the Hizb-e-Islami of Younis Khalis also be the education minister and the third deputy prime minister would belong to the Ittehad-i-Islami in addition holding interior minister post. Ahmad Shah Masud was made defense minister.

New regime attempted to introduce reforms in accordance with Islam, but the reforms proved short-lived after the eruption of fighting between the warring factions. Burhanuddin Rabbani violated the agreement, even though he had taken two months extension from the ruling council, as his tenure was about to finish. Rabbani‘s action infuriated Hikmatyar who launched an attack on Kabul with shells and mortars.337 It was difficult for him to accept the dominance of the Tajiks in the power structure. In response to Hikmatyar‘s shelling, Rabbani convened a Jirga of his cronies to consolidate his rule for another two years. Ahmed Rashid argues that ―the Rabbani regime was increasingly isolated, controlling a small area around Kabul and the northeast. It was largely discredited among non-Tajiks Afghans and was loathed by the Pashtuns.‖338 In brief, the Afghan civil witnessed many phases where multiple power contenders were fighting with distinct areas of concentration.

Zalmay Khalilzad argues that total power contenders were five, but two of them were involved in fierce armed struggle to gain the control and political authority of the Centre.339 The external powers supported the warring groups to safeguard their own interests. The foreign support proved instrumental in increasing the intensity and time of the conflict.340 Afghan civil war thus became an internationalized civil war with the support of Iran, Russia, India, and some of the Central Asian Republics. On the other hand, Pakistan and Gulf states supported Hekmatyar. Later on, both changed their alliance and directed their material support toward the Taliban. The Taliban entered the civil war and quickly overpowered the ―sub-state collectives having state like coercive powers in the country.‖341 The involvement of the external powers ended the independent decision power of warring factions.342

3.4 Ascendency of Taliban: Emergence of a Failed State

Numerous factors contributed to the Taliban rise. Larry Goodson identified five factors explaining the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan.

337 Dilip Hiro, 234 338 Ahmed Rashid, ―Back With a Vengeance: Proxy War in Afghanistan,‖ The World Today 52, no. 3 (March, 1996): 63. 339 Ibid., 147. 340 Kristian Berg Harpvikew, ―Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan,‖ Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (August 1997): 271-287. 341 H.Sidky, ―War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978- 2001,‖ Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 4 (July 2007): 849-885. 342 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ―Afghanistan and the Regional Powers,‖ Asian Survey .33, no. 9 (September 1993): 905.

First and most telling has been the shared Pashtun ethnicity of the Taliban and the majority of the noncombatant population in most of the area they have come to control…The next two factors in explaining the rise of the Taliban are interrelated. These are their emphasis on religious piety and the war-weariness of the Afghan civilian population…A fourth factor that explain the rise of Taliban is money. Numerous knowledgeable observers of modern Afghanistan report that the Taliban used money to induce opposing commanders to switch sides or surrender…Finally, the fifth factor that explains the success of the Taliban is Pakistan support. Support for the Taliban within Pakistan‘s government, army, and society is deep and multifaceted. Indeed, it is not incorrect to say that the Taliban are Pakistan‘s proxy army in Afghanistan, even though the Taliban leadership has not always followed Pakistan‘s preferences.343

Other observers explain the Taliban ascent in Pashtun-majority areas with reference to their religious and ethnic credentials and the pursuit of Islamic law based on sharia. The collapse of the central authority led to the rise of criminal gangs, bandits, and smugglers. The populace tired of conflict and war and desired for law and order. The Taliban presented their movement as motivated by Islam and aimed at unifying and purifying Afghanistan. External support and internal political realities helped them to gain control of Spin Buldak in October 1995, Kandahar in November 1994, Hashkargh in January 1995, and eventually Kabul in 1996.

The Taliban movement consisted of young Pashtuns who had experienced the war as rank and file mujahedeen or small unit commanders. The core leadership of the movement consisted partly of traditional, privately educated Ulema, Islamic scholars from the southern Pashtun tribes, and students educated at traditional Sunni madrassas in KPK and Baluchistan.344 The Deobandi religious discourse heavily influenced them. Saudi Arabia provided them with finances. On the other hand, Pakistan‘s pursuit of strategic depth required a

343 Larry Goodson, Afghanistan‟s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 262. 344 Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 139.

94 friendly regime in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Afghanistan watchers attributed initial victories of Taliban to Pakistan‘s intelligence, logistic, and technical support.345

Rise of the Taliban transformed the political landscape of Afghanistan. They either absorbed the other major Pashtun players (for example, Muhammadi and Khalis) or drove them off the Afghan stage. In contrast, other minority ethnic groups tried to resist the Taliban regime. They made an alliance, known as Northern Alliance (NA), which was a combination of Massod, Dostum, and Khalili groups. Iran played a pivotal role in the formation of the NA. In addition to Iran, the Central Asian states also supported their co-ethnic cousins against the Taliban rule. Saudi Arabia also pursued its regional rivalry with Iran in Afghanistan by funneling money in the Taliban regime.346

The Afghan state under the Taliban authority was an interesting puzzle for the theoreticians and practitioners. Scholars termed the Taliban rule authoritarian and extremist because they exercised authority from above without recognizing the aspirations and consent of the society. They pursued the policy of repression against the opposition forces and political liberty. The Taliban neglected the political realities of Afghanistan and resorted to brutal policies such as banning music, arts, and literature.347 Their fundamentalist thinking was also visible in the guise of ―apartheid-like treatment of women and, later the destruction of historical symbols like the statues of Buddha of Bamyan.‖348

It is noteworthy that the clerics had never ruled Afghanistan, nor was it a cleric state. The Taliban labeled their rule as the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. A self-proclaimed Amir-ul-Mumineen Mullah Omar headed the government and changed the name of country to ―Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan‖.349 Taliban institutionalized Islamism from top to bottom within the state bureaucracy and society. Mullah Omer‘s orders were binding and

345 Zalmay Khalizad and Daniel Bayman, ―Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State,‖ The Washington Quarterly 23, no.1 (Winter 2000): 68. 346 Anwar-ul- Haq Ahady, ―Saudi Arabia, Iran and the conflict in Afghanistan,‖ in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, 1998), 127. 347 Neamatollah Nojumi, ―The Rise and Fall of Taliban,‖ in The Taliban and The Crisis of Afghanistan ,eds. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 107. 348 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil war, and the Future of the Region (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 171. 349 Amin Saikal, 222.

95 unchallengeable. In fact, there was no space for defiance.350 Their political rule was a negation of the modern political system and contradicted the prevailing structure of states in the international system.351

The Taliban regime did provide security but negated the principle of political, social, and economic freedom. They used terror and violence against their own citizens. The collapse of education and health system, rising level of infant mortality, declining life expectancy, food shortages, and lack of international legitimacy put the Afghan state in the category of failed states. The Taliban regime‘s policy toward the west and a close nexus with Al Qaeda made Afghanistan a breeding ground for terrorism. According to Rotberg, ―failed states are reservoirs and exporters of terror.‖352

However, there is a competing perspective on the Taliban regime, which negates the claim that the regime was not interested in building state structures and accelerated its decomposition process. Gilles Dorronsoro argues, ―From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban gradually reconstructed various institutions, especially the administrative structures and the judicial system.‖353 They posted ulemas in the administration structures, judiciary, and shuras.354 Religious education superseded the technical education in the new regime. The Shuras worked as advisory bodies to Mullah Omer. Thus, all powers were concentrated in one office or one person, Amir-ul-Mumineen. Mullah Omer‘s orders covered all aspects of Afghan state and society. He had an absolute authority in all affairs of the state. After the fall of Kandahar in 1996, an assembly of ulemas belonging to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran gave legitimacy to his rule. The aforementioned assembly was the first step in the ‗routinisation of his charisma‘.355

Personalization of power had been a common trait of the Afghan political. Mullah Omer was no different from other Afghan leaders. However, he discarded political activities in

350 Ibid., 222; Neamatollah Nojumi ,108. 351 Robert I Rotberg, ―Failed States in a World of Terror,‖ Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 158. 352 Ibid., http://www.cfr.org/fragile-or-failed-states/failed-states-world-terror/p4733. 353 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unendin : Afghanistan:1979 to the Present (London: C. Hurst & Co Ltd, 2005), 278. 354 Ibid., 278. 355 Ibid., 280.

96 the form of electoral politics or political parties.356 Nonetheless, he established administrative structures at the regional level and appointed governors whilst ensuring that the appointee did not belong to the area where he would be appointed. He adopted a formula of rotation and appointment of the officials in alien areas to avoid rivalry and clashes. He formed local shuras and gave authority to commanders for security purpose and respect for Islamic morals.357 Reinhard Schagintweit quoted different scholars who believed that Taliban had a good reason to consider their rule legitimate and demand loyalty and recognition.358 Several other people augmented this argument primarily who profited from the stable conditions created by the Taliban, protection against looting and arbitrary violence, and a better supply of foods.359

Interestingly, the US government also expressed supportive views about Taliban during the first Clinton administration years. The US officials thought that the Taliban would be able to restore stability in Afghanistan, which would help the former to secure economic interests in Central Asia. The Taliban reportedly promised to open doors for construction of giant gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan through Afghanistan.360 The US, however, changed its policy toward the Taliban regime due to their policies regarding gender issues and providing protection to Osama Bin Laden and his cadres in Afghanistan. Only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the UAE recognized the Taliban regime. The international community also showed serious concerns about Taliban‘s nexus with Al Qaeda and their indiscriminate policies against the Afghan women and minorities.

Mullah Omer‘s decrees also reflected Osama‘s vision about Islam. Omer also allowed him to establish training camps for jihadists. The UN pressurized the Taliban regime to handover Osama to the US.361 Al Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Africa and later the

356 Ibid., 278. 357 Ibid., 281. 358 Reinhard Schagintweit, ―Afghanistan‘s Road to Failure,‖ in Afghanistan: A Country Without a State , eds. Christine Noelle-Karimi, Conrad Schetter, Reinhard Schlagintweit (Lahore: Vanguard Books (PVT) Ltd, 2003), 171. 359 Ibid., 171. 360 Richard Mackenzie, ―The United States and the Taliban,‖ in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. Willliam Maley (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1998), 96. 361 Riaz Ahmed in his book, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity, explained Security Council Resolution 1267, illustrate that the Taliban ‗turn over‘ Osama to a country where he had been indicated or where he could be effectively brought to justice. It also barred air flights from Taliban controlled areas and froze financial resources of Taliban. Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000) further tightened the noose around Taliban and AL Qaeda putting arms embargo on the former., 86.

USS Cole provoked imposition of sanctions on the regime.362 However, the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon transformed the view of international community on terrorism and ushered a new era of global war against terrorism. The 9/11 event also brought the policy makers and academicians together to analyze the phenomena of failed state. The Western world shifted its attention toward Global South where a large number of states were on the verge of collapse or causing a security threat to the former. The international community also believed that the failed states were a security threat that needed to be dealt with militarized response. The military intervention must be followed by international statebuilding efforts to bring back the state into an ambit of the liberal democratic nation-state system.

Multiple perspectives exist on the Taliban regime in the context of the failed state theoretical debate. A constellation of scholars has characterized the Taliban-dominated Afghan state as a failed state because the latter refused to follow the norms of the international nation- state system and provided sanctuaries to Al Qaeda and its leadership. The Taliban regime abused human rights– particularly the rights of females and religious minorities. It also abandoned several key functions of a national government including public representation and welfare. Several Afghan ministries were dysfunctional because they lacked capability and capacity. The national government did not make any effort to revert the cataclysmic humanitarian situation due to the protracted civil war resulting in migration and killing of the populace.363 The continuity of armed conflict between Taliban and coalition of minor Pashtun and non-Pashtun tribes also challenged the legitimacy of Taliban regime that claimed to unite the Pashtun tribes. The regime nonetheless failed to bridge gaps between Durrani and Ghilzai tribes.

At the same time, some scholars argue that the Taliban regime was able to provide stability to its people. It was also able to establish its control on a substantial chunk of Afghanistan. Bose and Jennings argue, ―Institutionally, Afghanistan was less a failed state under the Taliban than preceding regimes: the Taliban re-established a central government, restored some law and order –albeit based on a brutal interpretation of sharia law- and even decreased poppy cultivation, a feat that has not been replicated by western forces despite

362 Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), 133. 363 Larry Goodson, 200.

98 concerted efforts.‖364 They also argue that the fall of Taliban regime cannot be attributed to the state failure but the regime‘s link with Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist organization. The 9/11 attacks and subsequent intervention, however, did not fracture the alliance between the two parties. Subsequently, the interveners ousted the Taliban regime from power and started the statebuilding process.

Conclusion

One can attribute the Afghan state‘s decomposition to multiple factors such as rival political factions trying to capture power, ethnic and tribal differences, personalization of power, rentier economy, and the Marxist policies. The Marxist regime tried to garner the public support with the co-option of non-Pashtuns in the state structures, making alliances with the tribal leaders, and putting the Soviet hardline ideological content aside to gain allegiance of the religious leadership. Its reforms in the political system proved futile. The ensuing Soviet intervention in Afghanistan further truncated the regime‘s authority in the peripheral areas.

The process of state decay accelerated after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and eruption of civil war among the mujahedeen factions. Disunity between the latter and their failure in establishing themselves as the legitimate power holder in post-Soviet Afghanistan provided the Taliban with an opportunity to capture power in a larger part of Afghanistan. The power struggle among multiple groups, divided on ethnic and religious lines, further fractured the war-torn society. However, the Taliban were able to establish peace and security in their territory, but certain aspects of their rule violated human rights and rules of the global political order. They ruled through coercion and sharia and denounced the modern nation-state system. Their alliance with Al Qaeda and decision to provide the latter with sanctuary in the wake of 9/11 attacks resulted in a US-led militarized intervention and consequently the ouster of the regime. Thus, Afghanistan became the first test case of militarized intervention under the banner of the war on terrorism where the interveners attempted to construct the state on liberal democratic lines.

364 Morten Boas and Kathleen M. Jennings, ― ‗Failed States‘ and ‗State Failure‘: Threats or Opportunities?,‖ Globalizations 4, no. 4 (December 2007): 479.

Chapter Four Exclusionary Democratization Process in Post-Taliban Afghanistan: An Analysis

Introduction

Democratization is a political process that transforms the political system of the state into a democracy. It is comprised of many stages or phases. Larry Diamond argues, ―This is a process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among citizens that it is very unlikely to breakdown.‖365 However, the democratization process introduced in conflict-prone and war-torn societies faces insurmountable challenges. It is a daunting task for the promoters of democracy to design and pursue the democratic process and structure it in a way that it should have the capacity to sustain itself on its own after the exit of the external power (promoter of democracy) from the targeted society.

This chapter explains the democratization process pursued by the US in the post-Taliban Afghanistan and the limitations in the process besides addressing the nature of democracy amid the transitory phase. I would be investigating the US role in the various phases of democratization, beginning from Bonn Conference I, and the processes delineated in the Bonn accords, ranging from the formation of a transitional regime to constitution crafting and electoral politics. While examining the external power‘s role as an intervener in the imposition of democracy in the post 9/11 Afghanistan, I would scrutinize the interaction pattern between the intervener and Afghan elites that how this asymmetrical interaction cultivated fragile political institutions through the democratization process in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.

The intervener has applied the standard democratization model of post-conflict societies in Afghanistan with an addition of local traditional institution, Loya Jirga. However, in the case of Afghanistan, the intervener and its allies have not completely implemented the characteristics of democratization model. Limitations in the model have resulted in the emergence of a fragile

365 Larry Diamond, ―Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation: Building a Culture of Democracy in a New South Africa,‖ in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s: Challenges to Democracy and Development, ed. Rukhsana A. Siddique (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc., 1997), 4.

100 political system constantly facing upheavals. The democratization model is comprised of three phases. First phase is known as ―liberalization phase‖ in which the liberal powers intervene in the targeted state to throw out the rogue regime. It leads to the cession of hostilities among the warring factions and eventually makes them agreed to a peace agreement based on power- sharing arrangements. This phase is completed under the supervision of the intervener or international organizations such as the UN.

Second phase is known as ―transition phase‖ in which the external, with the help of allies and international organizations, attempts to rebuild democratic institutions, frame a constitution, and hold competitive elections at national and sub-national levels in the post-conflict society. Third phase is identified as the ―consolidation phase‖ of democracy where all stakeholders in the local political arena accept that the only legitimate means to gain power is ―free and fair‖ elections or participatory politics.366

One Two Three The Liberalization Phase Transition Phase Consolidation Phase

Rebuilding of Democratic Establishment of Intervention by Liberal Institutions democratic culture Powers Interim Political Setup Acceptance of democratic Removal of Authoritarian practices by all stakeholders Crafting of Constitution Regime or Rogue Regime To gain power by the "only Holding of Competitive Cession of Hostilities game in Town" is through National Elections Peace Agreements Among "Free and Fair Elections" or Parliament in Action the Warring Factions "participatory politics"

366 See, Guillermo O‘ Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3-33.

101

4.1 Phase One: Bonn Process, An Exogenous Exercise for Democratizing a Failed State

The US-led intervention in Afghanistan quickly ousted the Taliban from power and embarked on the statebuilding process. From the beginning of the process, the US‘s priority was to defeat the Taliban and eradicate the Al Qaeda elements. The war on terrorism was leading the state and democracy building agenda in Afghanistan. The intervener, however, considered the building of democratic political system a response to counter Islamic radicalism and terrorism in order to transform the failed state into a more orderly country developed on democratic lines. After the creation of the nascent democratic political system, the continuation of the external intervention project along with the war against Taliban and Al Qaeda in the following decade showed that ―democracy was an afterthought.‖367

With this background, Bonn Conference I was convened under the auspices of the UN and the US to fill the power vacuum emerged after the defeat of Taliban. The Bonn process charted a political course of the future Afghanistan. Even before ―the first phase of airstrikes started on Afghanistan, the US was in negotiations with various Afghan groups about the future political process.‖368 The US and the UN invited elite expatriate Afghan political groups and the NA to attend the conference. Both parties agreed to sign an agreement on Provincial Arrangements in Afghanistan, Bonn Agreement, pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) endorsed the agreement on 7 December 2001 and authorized deployment of a peacekeeping force with a limited mandate.369 The former drafted an internationally-supported ―four-year political process‖ consisted of holding an emergency Loya Jirga in December 2002 to elect the interim president

367 Sidney Blumenthal , ―Democracy was only an afterthought,‖ The Guardian, July 21, 2005, www.guardian.co.uk/ print/6,3858,5243844-10377,00.html; James Dobbins the US envoy at Bonn Conference I also admitted that for the white house promotion of democracy in post Taliban Afghanistan was a secondary objective. It had little utility for Afghans. 368 Zalmay Khalilzad, ―How to Nation-Build: Ten Lessons from Afghanistan,‖ The National Interest 80 (Summer 2005): 20. 369 Bonn Accords was endorsed by the Security Council on December 6, 2001, Security Council Resolution 1383, (S/RES/ 1383 (2001), http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7234.doc.htm;and an international peace keeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1368, (S/RES/1386 (2001), http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/ mandate/ unscr/resolution_1386.pdf.

102 who could lead the transitional government and ratify a new constitution in 2003 followed by the presidential (October 2004) and legislative elections (2005) subsequently. The policy makers and academicians showed optimism about the process and accords and considered them a modest attempt of the principal intervener and UN. They considered them a success for the Afghans to have a road map in order to rebuild their state institutions.370 Yet the whole process was questionable, especially in the context of political settlements and the overwhelming influence of the external powers, particularly U.S., throughout the deliberation process. Secondly, it was a parochial political settlement between the NA group, Rome Group, Cyprus Group, and Peshawar delegates. Except the NA, none of the groups had strong constituencies in Afghanistan.

Therefore, it was not a peace agreement because the real opposition, the Taliban was not invited to the negotiations. Only four Afghan factions defined the democratic reconstruction process, yet three among them lacked popular legitimacy among the Afghan populace. Only the NA represented ethnic minorities of Afghanistan. The former played a vital role in defeating the Taliban with the US financial and military aid. The US-NA alliance in the military campaign against the Taliban also gave the NA an advantageous position in the negotiations. Secondly, victory against the Taliban provided an advantage to the external power and its local partner to ―push the interested parties to seek a timely political solution rather than drawn-out and inconclusive peace talks.‖371

The Bush administration, however, was not happy with the NA‘s decision of taking over Kabul. It rather encouraged them to move southward.372 The NA‘s ―Kabul occupying version‖ was different and it claimed that the capturing of the capital was based on the directives of Americans. The conquerors restored the pre-Taliban bureaucracy, dominated by the Shura-i- Nazar Tajiks, instantaneously.373 This victory also put the NA in a strong position, in fact in the

370 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125-126. 371 Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, ―A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan,‖ Strategic Perspective , no.8, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Nov 2011): 8. 372 Tahir Mirza and Masood Haider, ―Musharraf, Bush oppose Alliance‘s Kabul takeover,‖ Dawn, Islamabad, November 11, 2001. 373 Shura-i-Nazar, Supervisory council was formed by the late Ahmed Shah Masood in the Northern Eastern Provinces of Afghanistan within the predominantly Tajik Jamat-i-Islami (Islamic society) party.Much of the groups strength were based in the Punjshir valley, Masoud‘s home district.

103 driver seat, whilst negotiating the future political system with other locals and the intervener. The resulting asymmetry was also reflected in the interim government power-sharing arrangement. The exclusion of Taliban from the process had a negative impact on the liberalization process and created gaps in the democratization process.374

At Bonn, the power-sharing arrangements among the invited Afghan factions were based on an asymmetric power structure. The NA and Rome group had eleven delegates each as compared to five from Cyprus and Peshawar Group respectively.375 The weaker parties and some leaders left the process in the middle as a protest against the imbalance and lack of representation in the interim government.376 In addition, the asymmetric power relations between the intervener and Afghan factions were also visible before and after the Bonn process. In brief, both Bonn process and Bonn accords reflected the intervener‘s interests and policy rather than those of the Afghan population.

The political power-sharing arrangement constituted by Bonn process brought a shift in the ethnic power balance by providing the NA with seventeen government positions out of total thirty. The NA also got the most powerful ministries of defense, security, and foreign affairs in addition to retaining control of the intelligence services.377 Numerous governors and staff members were also Tajiks, mainly from the Panjshir valley. The Rome group got finance ministry and the interim presidency. The balance of power, however, shifted in the favor of Tajiks whilst the Pashtuns were excluded from the new ruling elite in Kabul. The new setup created further distrust among the Pashtuns serving in the transitional setup.378 This process set

374 Personal interview with Pir Syed Hamid Gillani, a member of Peshawar Delegation in Bonn Conference I revealed that they requested the presence of Taliban in the Bonn negotiations to have a long term political stability in Afghanistan but NA and US were not ready to talk to them. Winners (NA) want to take all in the future Afghan set up. Interview took place in Berlin, Germany, September 10, 2013. 375 Timor Sharan, ―The Dynamics of Elite Networks and Patron-Client Relations in Afghanistan,‖ Europe-Asia Studies 63, no.6 (August 2011): 1115-1117. 376 A number of Mujahideen factions and even some Warlords expressed their reservation on the Bonn accords, lack of representation and partisan distribution of portfolios in the AIA. Haji Abdul Qadir, a Pashtun member of NA walkout from the Bonn Process due to lack of Pashtun representation in the newly set up government. Rasheed Dostum and Karim Khalili made similar statements on the Uzbeks and Hazaras presence in AIA. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar accused America of imposing a deal on Afghan people. 377 S. Frederick Starr, ―Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building,‖ in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 110-111. 378International Crisis Group, Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation (Asia Report No 62, Kabul/Brussels, August 5, 2003): 8, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/062%20Afghanistan% 20The%20Problem%20of%20Pashtun%20Alienation.pdf.

104 the stage for fierce competition among the elites within the government and cemented the ethnic divisions in the society. In effect, the democratization process further politicized the ethnic differences. Bonn accords supported a ―Kabul Centric‖ approach and reasserted the authority of the center.379 The participants wanted to curtail the power of regional power brokers who emerged as dominant actors in Afghan politics after the collapse of Najibullah‘s communist regime (1992) and the following civil war. However, the Kabul centric approach did not deliver as it was perceived during the Bonn process. Rather, it made the central administration weak because of its failure to establish the state writ throughout the country. It also had a negative impact on the democratization process whilst creating a grey zone in every phase of the process.

Political settlements among the Afghan factions and international interests put the success of the democratization process in jeopardy. The US and its local Afghan allies failed to understand the significance of cessation of hostilities, which could have helped the society to move from a volatile past to a democratic and peaceful future. Excluding the Taliban from the process resulted in an ongoing war and security deficit while the flaws in the Bonn process had a trickle-down effect on the democratization process. The latter ignored several root problems, most notably ethnic fractionalization and narcotics production. This is why most of the regional warlords remained outside the democracy-building agenda. It also did not address the questions regarding the nature of the state. The US approach, based on the ―inclusion and exclusion formula,‖ to keep the losers Taliban outside the process proved a mistake and its impact on the democratization process was visible in the following years.

Brahimi‘s statement explains it in a better way:

You also need to have…a more consistent, substantive, long-term, national reconciliation process. For example, all the Taliban should have been in Bonn. I call it the original sin. The absence of the Taliban was a big, big hole in the process. But it was not possible to

379 Hamish Nixon and Richard Ponzio, ―Building Democracy in Afghanistan: The State building Agenda and International Engagement,‖ International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (January 2007): 28.

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have, because of September 11, because of the behavior of the factions...380

The process that led to the Bonn accords was a result of the intervener‘s diplomatic and military power, which was applied before and during negotiations among the Afghan factions in order to decide the political set-up of the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The primary objective of the US was to install an interim political set-up acceptable to the Afghan people to move to its next intervention project.381 However, the culmination of the Bonn agreement was intelligent tackling of the multilateral negotiations done by the US envoy James Dobbins and the UN representative Lakhdar Brahimi. During the nine days of rigorous rounds of deliberations, both external representatives (Dobbins and Brahimi) exchanged views and were able to establish a mutual understanding about the structure of the Afghan government and the process to democratize a failed state.382 After all, the success of negotiations was necessary, as failure was not an option.383

The principal intervener was in a hurry to produce an agreement to set the future course of the state. It made the negotiating parties clear that a political settlement in Bonn was a prerequisite for foreign aid and development of Afghanistan.384 Bonn accords set certain benchmarks to establish new democratic governing institutions. By the end of the process, virtually all of the formal benchmarks of the agreement, creation of the interim government under the chairmanship of Hamid Karzai followed by Emergency and Constitutional Loya Jirga to hold Afghanistan‘s first democratic presidential and parliamentary elections, were met. Since then, the country has witnessed two presidential, provincial council and parliamentary elections and is preparing for presidential and provincial elections in 2014.

380 Lakhdar Brahimi, interview by Mary Sack and Cyrus Samii, Journal of International Affair 58, no.1 (Fall 2004): 244. 381 See, for detail account on Bush administration decision to intervene in Iraq which caused shifting of principal intervener attention from post Taliban Afghanistan, Bob Woodward , Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2004). 382 Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, ― A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan,‖ Strategic Perspective, no.8, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C National Defense University Press, November 2011): 5. 383 Ibid., 5. 384 Margaret Coker, ―Fractious Afghan factions start negotiations today,‖ Cox News Service, November 26, 2001, http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Fractious-Afghan-factions-start-negotiations-today- 1072829.php.

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4. 2 Phase Two: Transition toward Procedural Democracy

The transition phase started with the creation of interim authority, consisting of a thirty-member cabinet led by Chairman Hamid Karzai, selected in the Bonn Conference I. There were certain tensions and challenges at every step toward democratization, which affected the democratization process and made the [democratic] consolidation process complex and unattainable.

4.2.1 Emergency Loya Jirga

The Bonn accords provided a base for holding the Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) before the end of the interim authority‘s six months tenure to elect the head and key personals of a two-year transitional government in order to prepare the country for a new constitution and general elections.385 For this purpose, an independent commission charged with convening the ELJ was established. The staging of ELJ was based on three phases. According to an International Crisis Group repot, ―In stage one of the indirect elections, representatives of communities gather on a given day to select a group of electors. In stage two, these electors gather in a regional center between 21 May and 5 June to choose delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirga. That meeting, in Kabul, will then select the Transitional Administration that is to replace the Afghan Interim Authority.‖386

In stage three, the principal intervener outmaneuvered the Afghans aspirations and made the process illegitimate. The participating parties in Bonn Agreement decided that the ―concept of Loya Jirga was to root the state-building exercise in the Afghan tradition to furnish the democratization process with a measure of participation in furtherance of generating legitimacy.‖387 Therefore, it was a general perception among the locals and outsiders that Loya

385ICG, Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation, 8. 386 ICG, The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward (Asia Briefing N°17, Kabul/Brussels, May 16, 2002), 1, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/The%20Loya%20Jirga%20One% 20 Small %20Step%20Forward.pdf. 387 Michael Schoiswohl, ―Linking the International Legal Framework to Building the formal foundations of a ―State at Risk: Constitution-Making and International Law in Post- Conflict Afghanistan,‖ Vanderbilt Journal of

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Jirga would not only broaden the base of the government but also encourage the democratic process and be able to assert authority over the regional power wielders.388 The Jirga took place six months later (from 11-19 June 2002). Former king Muhammad Zahir Shah convened it.389 More than 1,500 delegates (160 of them were women) including teachers, engineers, aid workers, provincial government, political leaders, and former mujahedeen came from across the country to participate in the Jirga that was supposed to elect the head of the state and a government for the transitional period.

The intervener, however, did massive wrangling before the convening of Loya Jirga. The US meddling in the Loya Jirga was visible, notably regarding the selection of Hamid Karzai as the interim government chairman and later the head of the transitional regime. Hamid Karzai was acceptable to the US due to his Pashtun ethnic credentials yet no affiliation with any powerful mujahedeen faction.390 The US policy makers and officials thought that he would be able to garner support from southern and eastern Pashtun belts, a stronghold of the Taliban. Therefore, the US openly interfered in the ELJ working sessions to ensure the selection of Hamid Karzai as the head of state, although Zahir Shah was an available alternative to Karzai. The selection of Karzai was a serious breach of freedom and violation of the independence of the Jirga. The US special advisor to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad dashed the hopes of Zahir Shah to become president by not only entering into the ELJ debate, but he also announced in the press conference that the king had decided not to seek a position in the interim administration.391 As a result, the ELJ delegates were left with no other option except voting for Hamid Karzai.

Transnational Law 39, no.3 (2006): 832. 388 Loya Jirga terminology employed for the tribal assembly; the Loya Jirga was designed to reach its decision on the basis of a majority vote rather than consensus. For detailed discussion, see ChristineNoelle Karim,‖ The Loya Jirga- An Effective Political Tool? A Historical Overview,‖ in Afghanistan: A Country without a State, eds. ChristineNoelle Karim, Conard Schetter, Reinhard Schlagintweit (Lahore; Vanguard books, 2002), 43-59. 389 Zahir Shah was born in Kabul in 1914, and educated in France. He was only 19 when in 1933 he became king following the assassination of his father. During World War II, he succeeded in maintaining both Afghanistan‘s neutrality and its borders. In his rule, he introduced a series of reform, in 1964, a new constitution promulgated. He was overthrown in a coup planned by his cousin Mohammad Daoud while he was having vacation in Italy. Since then, he had lived in exile in Rome, later arrived in Afghanistan after the oust of Taliban regime. 390 Rahimullah Yusufzai, ―Pashtun background led to Karzai‘s ascendancy,‖ The News, Islamabad, December 6, 2001. 391 S.Frederick Starr and Marin J.Strmecki , ―Afghan Democracy and Its First Missteps,‖ New York Times, June 14, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/14/opinion/afghan-democracy-and-its-first-missteps.html.

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Secondly, there was a proposal to invite the Taliban in the ELJ, which the principal intervener rejected. This rejection had drastic consequences in the following years for the state and democracy building processes. In this way, another opportunity was lost to bring peace in the Afghan society. Thirdly, Karzai and the intervener decided that International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) would provide security to the ELJ tent and its delegates. However, later on, the responsibility was shifted to Amniat-e-Milli, National Directorate for Security controlled by Panjshiris, which caused a stir among Pashtun delegates to accept the domination of the NA in the power structure.392 The decisions taken in the process ensured the exclusionary process and further strengthened the power imbalance in favor of the non-Pashtuns. Fourthly, the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) also maneuvered the numbers of elected delegates for ELJ by increasing one hundred government posts, including 32 provincial governors.393 This decision sent a negative message to the adherents of democracy; after all, the ELJ was a place of dialogue, deliberations, and criticism.

The selection process was undemocratic and suffered from serious deficiencies. For instance, during the Loya Jirga negotiations, the majority of Pashtun delegates complained that the NA leaders pressurized them to give endorsement to the nominations decided by the Khalilzad-Brahimi-Karzai trio.394 Serious differences emerged between the Pashtun and non- Pashtun delegates on the legislature elections criteria. Non-Pashtuns wanted equal representation in every province in the national parliament whereas the Pashtun demanded representation based on districts and population. As a result, both demands were embedded in the ethnic mosaic of the Afghan society and majority formula.

Another objective of the ELJ was to give consent on the Karzai cabinet members for the transitional government. Karzai tried to overrun it and impose his discretion, but Khalilzad rejected his demand and relied on getting the approval from Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ). It was a strenuous task, but ―intensive negotiations of Khalilzad and Brahimi with the leaders of

392 Anders Fänge, The Emergency Loya Jirga; Hopes and Disappointments (Afghanistan Analysts Network, –E Book, July 2012), 2, http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/2_Fange_ The Emergency_Loya_Jirga.pdf. 393 ICG, The Afghan Transitional Administration, Prospects and Perils (Asia Briefing No 19, Kabul/ Brussels, July 30, 2002), 6. 394 ―Afghan Loya Jirga: Too Much Interference, Little Achievement,‖ Executive Intelligence Review 29, no.25 (June 28, 2002): 44-46, http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2002/eirv29n25-20020628/eirv29n25-20020628.pdf.

109 delegates and bargaining a preliminary list of fourteen ministers was finally agreed upon.‖395 In this trio, Karzai was a non-entity because the real decision-making power rested with the principal intervener‘s agent Khalilzad.396 Theoretically, such forums provide an opportunity to various ethnic groups, regional leaders, and tribal elites to express their views, listen to others, and try to compromise and reconcile with each other. However, the open interference of the US, AIA, and the NA besides the presence of the intelligence agents in the main hall of the debate violated the code of non-interference and democratic procedures.397 In this significant stage of the democratization process, the principal intervener relied on short-term objectives. It adopted an undemocratic method and relegated the spirit of democracy to achieve those objectives.

4.2.2 Crafting of Constitution and Approval by Constitutional Loya Jirga

The next important step amid the transition phase was the crafting of constitution. The process of framing a constitution significantly contributes to the building of a democratic political system. Legal frameworks provide foundations to the democratic institutions, particularly ―in the aftermath of non-democratic regimes, the constitution making is as important as the product, the constitution itself.‖398 An inclusive and transparent constitution making process has the potential to manage conflict and facilitate bargain, reciprocity, and collaboration while the exclusion of key actors from the crafting process and external pressure may challenge the endurance of the document and reduce its legitimacy.

Although the Afghan transitional administration and the UN created a process to prepare the constitution, this process lacked transparency and participatory element. For instance, the members of the constitutional drafting commission and constitutional commission, charged with writing a preliminary text and consulting the public on it respectively, were appointed without any public involvement process, even though the latter was responsible for building

395 Anders Fänge, The Emergency Loya Jirga, 3. 396 Ibid. 397 Astri Suhrke, Arne Strand and Kristian Berg Harpviken, Conflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years After Bonn (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2004), 29, http://www.cmi.no/publication/?1763= conflictual – peacebuilding; Anders Fange, The Emergency Loya Jirga, 5. 398 Schoiswohl, ―Constitution-Making and International Law in Post- Conflict Afghanistan,‖ 831.

110 confidence.399 After all, the dominant group (Shura-e-Nazer) in Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) had heavily influenced the selection of the constitutional commission members.400

The constitution-making process was kept secret due to anticipated security threats concerns for the members of the constitutional commission and the risk that the extremist groups might hijack the process. This secrecy, however, questioned the legitimacy of the process as the public remained outside the whole process.401 The UNAMA played an important role amid the constitution-making process. Nonetheless, this process substantially suffered from factionalism. The commission was reportedly divided into two factions and thus lacked consensus.402 Both factions made their drafts, but ultimately the Vice-President Neamat Ullah Shahrani‘s draft was forwarded to the commission.

The draft was submitted to transitional President Hamid Karzai and the former ―paved the way for the appointment of the Constitutional Review Commission in April 2003.‖403 This commission was comprised of thirty-five members including seven women (belonging to different ethnic, religious, and tribal backgrounds) to legitimize the constitution making process. The drafting of constitution progressed with the most pressing issue of ―form of government‖ back and forth. The earlier draft incorporated a position of Prime Minister and the majority in the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) had endorsed it. The final draft, however, excluded the position and included positions of two vice-presidents who were to be appointed by the president. The candidate for the presidency needs to declare the names of vice presidents. The National Security Council (NSC) made this move in a joint review. On the other hand, the framing commission concentrated all powers in the executive office and ―the appointment of the cabinet members who would not be serving legislators was subject to approval of the parliament.‖404

The copies of the draft constitution were distributed throughout the country. The draft, which consisted of 160 articles and 12 chapters, attempted to reconcile Islamic values with those

399ICG, Afghanistan‟s Flawed Constitutional Process (Asia Report No 56, Kabul/Brussels, June 12, 2003), 1, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/056%20 Afghanistans%20 Flawed%20 Constitutional%20Process.ashx. 400 ICG, Afghanistan Flawed Constitutional Process, 16-17. 401 J. Alexander Thier, ―The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan,‖ New York Law School Review 51 (2006/07), 558, http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2013/11/51-3.Thier_.pdf. 402 Ibid., 566. 403 Schoiswohl, ―Constitution-Making and International Law in Post- Conflict Afghanistan,‖ 833. 404 Barnett R. Rubin, ―Crafting of Constitution for Afghanistan,‖ Journal of Democracy 15, no.3 (July 2004):12.

111 of the Western democracy. The main purpose for making it public was to acquire positive response from the Afghan populace. However, the whole exercise of getting opinions of the public on the draft constitution through questionnaires could not prove fruitful. The process of constitution making was flawed in many aspects. Firstly, the drafting commission was selected in accordance with the wishes of ATA and UNAMA. Secondly, the Afghans were given little time to give their opinions. It was merely an exercise to get the public involved in the process. The Afghan people needed to be educated about the constitution because the rural Afghans had no knowledge about the constitution process, according to a survey conducted in 2004.405

Thirdly, some issues such as ―form of government‖ raised debate and conflict. The framers of the constitution proposed a presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature and vested all powers in the executive. The constitution included centralization of power, unitary form of government, unprecedented rights for minorities, and an Islamic legal system safeguarded by a Supreme Court with powers of judicial review. The history of Afghanistan, however, shows that the Afghan rulers have always faced opposition from the strong peripheral forces, which challenged the control of the center throughout the country.406 Fourthly, there was a large gap between the aspects of constitution and practice, especially the interpretation of Islamic provisions and liberal content of the constitution did not coincide with each other.407 J. Alexander Their, a legal adviser to Afghanistan‘s judicial reform and constitutional commissions, argues:

Afghanistan‘s new Constitution is mostly a model of moderation, guaranteeing many rights and freedoms for men and women. But it has a very dangerous loophole: it states that no law can be contrary to the ―beliefs and provisions‖ of Islam.(This formulation replaced the more replace, ―principles of Islam,‖ in last minute politicking at the Loya jirga, Afghanistan‘s constitutional convention.)

405 Shahrbanout Tadjbakhsh and Michael Schoiswohl, ― Playing with Fire? The International Community‘s Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan,‖ International Peacekeeping 15, no.2 (April 2008):256. 406 MN Shahrani, ― ‗Not ―Who?‖ but ―how?‖ :governing Afghanistan after the conflict,‖ Federations, October 2001, http//:www.forumfed.org. 407 See, for instance, the Kabul apex authority declared a women singing performance on State TV channel against Sharia. Gaps in Constitution regarding the interpretation of acts accordance to Islam given power to apex court judges to abolish any by declaring it unIslamic in nature. See, for details, J. Alexander Thier, ―Attacking Democracy from the Bench,‖ New York Times, January 26, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/26/opinion/26THIE.html .

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―Provisions‖ can be interpreted by extremists to allow for the imposition of Sharia, or strict Islamic law. Another section of the constitution gives the Supreme Court [in Afghanistan] the power to determine whether laws and treaties made by the government are in accordance with the constitution. Together, these two articles give the Supreme Court the power to reject virtually any law or treaty as un- Islamic.408

The framers of constitution affirmed that Afghanistan would be an Islamic state, but they avoided giving any reference to Sharia in order to accommodate the Shiite Afghans.409 The new Afghan constitution, with all of its deficiencies, was presented in the CLJ in December 2003 and was approved in January 2004. The CLJ, consisting of 400 men and 100 women (450 elected delegates and 50 Karzai appointees), was convened to decide the constitution for post-Taliban Afghanistan. These delegates, before entering the CLJ, made alliances on certain key articles of the constitution that led to a stalemate and daily standoffs in the CLJ proceedings. Ethnic divisions in the society also became a prominent feature of the CLJ and ―escalated around the issues of parliamentarism versus presidentialism, official language of the state, reformism or secularization versus traditionalism and centralism versus de-centralization.‖410

The majority of the delegates were ambivalent about the presidential system given in the constitutional draft and they sought a parliamentary system with a strong parliament and greater provincial autonomy.411 Ethnic minorities also showed open defiance to the presidential and unitary form of government. Karzai, however, strongly favored the centralization of power. The US diplomats and Karzai adherents bargained with the delegates who were opposing the presidential system. Eventually, they succeeded in neutralizing sentiments in favor of centralization of power and thus the delegates approved the constitution with its main features: Afghanistan as a republic with unitary and presidential system upheld. In order to provide hope to the delegates belonging to the northern bloc, Karzai proposed a decentralized parliamentary system and more powers for the local government. In a speech to the CLJ, he said:

408 J. Alexander Thier, ―Attacking Democracy from the Bench,‖. 409 Barnett R. Rubin, op. cit., 14. 410 Schoiswohl, op. cit., 835-836. 411 Ahmed Rashid, ‗Let‘s make a Democracy,‖ Far Eastern Economic Review (December 25, 2003): 21.

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[T]he constitution is not the Koran. If five or ten years down the line we find that stability improves, proper political parties emerge, and we judge that a parliamentary system can function better, then a Loya Jirga can at a time of our choosing be convened to adopt a different system of government. The other aim behind opting for a presidential system at present was the fear that, under a parliamentary system, the country may be divided among political parties which are formed along ethnic lines, or split into small parties, which are disposed to forming alliances and coalition along ethnic, sectarian or regional lines in order to be able govern. This would limit the possibility of the emergence of national, inclusive political parties.412

The US, with ―light foot‖ policy, ensured that it influenced every step ranging from constitution making to its approval by the CLJ. Washington was in favor of a presidential system and considered the parliamentary system to be based on deadlocks, bargain, and political stalemate.413 According to Barnett Rubin, ―Presidential system showed there would be no uncertainty about who held legitimate executive power in Kabul, and Washington would retain the benefit of having a clear identifiable Afghan partner whom it would be known well and indeed preferred.‖414

Although framing the constitution and securing its approval were challenging tasks, the real test came with the implementation of the clauses written in the constitution. After the completion of the constitutional making process, next phase in the political transition was to conduct the presidential and parliamentary elections respectively. According to the constitution, the presidential and parliamentary elections needed to be held simultaneously (within six months) after the convening of Loya Jirga. These elections were the culmination of the Bonn accords.

412 Hamid Karzai, President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, ―Address to the Closing Session of the Constitutional Loya Jirga,‖ January 4, 2004, http://www.kabul-reconstructions.net/images/KarzaiCLJClosing Address.pdf . 413 Astri Suhrke, The Democratization of a Dependent State: The Case of Afghanistan (Madrid: Fride Working Paper 51, December 2007), 9. 414 Barnett Rubin was involved in the process and an occasional advisor to Karzai, adherent of presidentialism, citing the need for unifying leadership to build a central state. Barnett R.Rubin, ―Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,‖ 5-19.

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4.2.3 National Elections and Electoral Engineering

Elections are considered to be the key pillar of the democratization process. They are vital because making a decisive break from the past stimulates the development of democratic politics and building of a new [peaceful] political order. Most importantly, free and fair elections are significant in legitimizing the new government and its decisions, which are assumed to be contributing to the environment of political stability.415 Throughout the history of Afghanistan, the country has never experienced full-scale direct elections whether national or local. Therefore, the staging of elections represented a ―whole new ball game compared to the preceding stages (that is the terms of the interim and transitional administration, and the enactment of the constitution).‖416 In the given context, the presidential and parliamentary elections in post- Taliban Afghanistan did not precipitate the movement of stability and consolidation of democracy, but rather provided an impetus to illiberal and undemocratic practices in pre and post elections situations amid the transitory period. Therefore, it is necessary to have a comparative analysis of the national elections held in twelve years (2001-2013).

4.2.3.1 Comparative Analysis of Presidential Elections (October 9, 2004 –August 20, 2009)

Afghanistan held its first presidential election on October 9, 2004. Hamid Karzai was the leading contestant and thus became president. According to the constitution, the presidential and parliamentary elections were supposed to be held in June 2004, but they were delayed twice due to electoral wrangling and worsening security situation in the south and east of the country. The security situation negatively affected the voter registration process, which was further bolstered by ―extensive illiteracy and the fact that perhaps most cities and towns do not have streets or addresses.‖417 In addition, there was a common view among the Afghans that the commencement of presidential election was premature and only serving the objectives of the principal

415 Beatrice Pouligny, ―Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post Conflict Societies: Giving Diversity a Chance,‖ International Peacekeeping 7, no. 3 (2000): 17-35. 416 Kinichi Komano, ―The Role of Elections in the Peace-Building and Reconstruction of Afghanistan,‖ Asia-Pacific Review 12, no.1 (2005): 6. 417 Steven R.Weisman, ―U.S. Aids Hint Afghan Voting May Be Put Off,‖ New York Times, February 16, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/16/international/asia/16AFGH.html.

115 intervener.418 Similarly, the principal intervener and local conductors of the elections also did not provide them with any guarantee of fairness in the electoral process.

The scholarship showed their concerns because Afghanistan did not have the prerequisites for consolidation of democracy.419 Yet, it was vital for the Bush administration to hold elections to uphold its liberal credential while focusing only on the technical aspects of the democracy. The aspirations of ordinary Afghan citizens were more directed toward the availability of public goods than democratization. However, a public survey conduct by Asia Foundation showed that a high number of locals approved the decision to conduct elections. According to the constitution, the president and two vice-presidents are elected for five years term. If any of the presidential contestants fails to secure 50% of the vote or above, the second round of election would take place between the two leading candidates. A long list of candidates contested the first presidential elections, but the leading candidates were Hamid Karzai (a Pashtun) and Yunus Qanuni (an ethnic Tajik), who was the closest rival of the former. Other key candidates were General Abdul Rashid Dostum (a warlord) and Muhammad Mohaqiq (a Hazara Shia). Both had a poor human rights record in the past. Interestingly, a woman Dr. Masooda Jalal also contested the elections. Voter registration was a complex process, but the people hoped that the democratic system would address their problems. Therefore, approximately 10 million voters registered their votes.420

―Out-of-Country‖ voter registration took place in the refugee camps located in Iran and Pakistan. These votes proved instrumental for Karzai and put him a step closer to the victory stand.421 The registration of Afghan refugees residing in Iran and Pakistan was done under the

418 Keith B. Richburg, ―Afghan complains of hastily set elections,‖ Dawn, August 3, 2004; similar argument given by Rahimullah Yusufzai, ―Challenges ahead,‖ The News, August 29, 2004. 419 "It's paradoxical that the international community, especially the United States, has invested a lot in the electoral process but has not put in the resources to guarantee it's free and fair," said by Vikram Parekh, senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based research organization. "Quoted in Keith B. Richburg, ― Afghan complains of hastily set elections,‖ Dawn, August 3, 2004. 420 IDEA, Voter Turn-out Data for Afghanistan (International Institute For Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, Sweden, 2015), http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=4; ―Afghan Presidential Elections 2004,‖ IPRI FACTFILE (IPRI, Islamabad, November 2004), 13. 421 Andrew Reynolds, Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 116; ―Refugee may account for 10 pc votes in Afghan Poll,‖ Dawn, September 29,2004; See, for instance, Catinca Slavu, ―External Voting for Afghanistan‘s 2004 Presidential Election,‖ in Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan‟s Decade of Assistance (2001–2011),eds. Martine'van Bijlert and Sari'Kouvo (Afghanistan Analysts Network, E-Book, July 2012), http:// www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/4_Slavu_External_Voting.pdf.

116 supervision of International Organization for Migration (IOM) to enable them cast votes in the first presidential election. In Pakistan, the registration offices were established in refugee camps and provincial capitals in NWFP, renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Baluchistan.422 However, the voting registration camps were not set up in North and South Waziristan agencies due to security reasons. An estimated 740,000 Afghans registered their votes while 27% of the vote represented the female population.423 On the election day, it was the largest refugee balloting in any of the neighboring countries. Even the presidential candidates were allowed to campaign in the refugee camps. However, out-of-country vote casting was abandoned in the next presidential elections due to lack of resources and security concerns.424 In the first presidential election, the voter turnout in Pakistan was almost 80% because the Afghans hoped for a better future after the election.425

In the context of state and democracy building experiment, the external votes made no significant impact on the processes. The external votes were included because of two reasons. First, the refugees were given space in ELJ and CLJ; therefore, the trend needed to be continued in the first presidential election. Secondly, the inclusion of external votes increased the prospects of Karzai‘s victory because the majority of refugees in Pakistan were Pashtuns. The real purpose of the out-of-country voting was realpolitik rather than the creation of favorable conditions for the return of refugees. Ethnic card was visible amid the election campaigns and voting. Pre- election presidential campaigns focused on ethnic politics and tribal loyalties, although Karzai repeatedly denied the use of ethnic card and promoted himself as a nationalist during his election campaign.

However, the Afghan electoral trend based on ethnic affiliation and tribal loyalty remained intact even in next elections. With the encouragement of the US, Karzai tried to ―undercut support for the Taliban by inviting ―moderate supporters‖ of the Taliban, who also happened to be mostly ethnic Pashtuns, to join the democratic political process in an exchange

422 ―Registration of Refugees for Afghan Polls from October 1,‖ Dawn, September 3, 2004. 423 ―Registration of Afghan voters Completed,‖ Dawn, October 5, 2004. 424 Daud Khattak, ―2m Afghan Refugees to Miss Presidential Polls,‖ The News, August 3,2009 ; See ,details for the additional amount required to conduct out of country voting, Zulfiqar Ali, ―Refugees may not Cast Vote in Afghan Polls,‖ Dawn, July 2, 2009. 425 Slavu,―External Voting for Afghanistan‘s 2004 Presidential Election,‖ 4.

117 for their agreement to cease fighting the government.‖426 The European governments and U.S. endorsed and funded his campaign, thus violating the Afghan electoral law.427 The evidence shows that Karzai was the ultimate choice of the interveners. The US wanted the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections together, notably before the US presidential elections in November 2004. However, it did not push for elections after the UN revelation that insufficient preparation for conducting both elections simultaneously could cause failure of elections and legitimacy crisis.428 The principal intervener, however, wanted Karzai to cut deals with the intimidating rivals by offering them space in the state apparatus to ensure his victory in elections.429

On the voting day, a large number of Afghans cast votes to elect a candidate of their choice. Initially, there were reports of some technical problems and minor violent incidents, but the major problem occurred when apparently all candidates except Hamid Karzai boycotted the election due to the issue of poor quality of indelible ink used for marking on the thumb of the voter after casting vote. They alleged that the system to prevent the voting fraud had failed.430 The quality of the ink was indeed poor. Even the international (foreigners) election monitors accepted that the charge was true. Therefore, virtually all of the 15 opponents boycotted elections and refused to accept the result.431 The election was held peacefully, but fraud allegations challenged the fairness of the electoral process. Karzai refused to listen the calls for new election by his contenders. The aforementioned boycott and Karzai‘s behavior raised a question about the transparency of the election.

To address the reservations of the candidates regarding voting irregularities, the UN formed a three-member team to investigate the issue. Key rivals accepted the report of the fact- finding commission that the election was generally fair. They also announced that Hamid Karzai got the highest percentage of votes and declared him as the winning candidate. The international

426 Nicholas Kramer, ―U.S backs intention to work with ex-Taliban,‖ Washington Times, June 15, 2004. 427 M. Nazif Shahrani, ―Afghanistan‘s Presidential Elections: Spreading Democracy or a Sham?,‖ Middle East Report Online, October 8, 2004, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero100804.html. 428 Kinichi Komano, op. cit., 7. 429 Andrew Reynolds, ―A test for Afghan Democracy,‖ Dawn, September 27, 2004; Shoiab Najafizada, ―Afghan Vote reflects ethnic fault lines,‖ Dawn, October 27, 2004. 430 Ahmed Rashid, “Peaceful Afghan Elections marred by irregularities,” The Nation, Islamabad Edition, October 13, 2004; Declan Walsh, “Boycott row hits Afghan election over fraud claims,” The Guardian, October 10, 2004, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/10/afghanistan.declanwalsh 431 ―US urges Afghans to accept result,‖ Dawn, October 11, 2004.

118 community congratulated the Afghans for making the election a success in the country. In his press statement on the presidential election, Richard Boucher said:

This election is the latest milestone on the Afghan people‘s road to democratic government and vibrant civil society. In the spring, they will take another major step in charting their political future when they return to the polls to select members of Parliament and local governments. The United States and the international community will continue to support them as they work toward this brighter future.432

Contrary to the first presidential election, the second presidential election was marred by fraud and turbulence. The election, held in August 2009, was riddled with problems. It exposed the failure of democratization process amid the transition phase. The IEC failed to stop fraud on the voting day. Fraud was widespread in the areas affected by insurgency. However, none of the presidential candidates acquired an absolute majority in the elections, which created a political discontent among the public. In this regard, the Afghan constitution stipulates, ―If no candidate receives an absolute majority of the vote in the first round of balloting may final run-off ballot is to be held between the top candidates.‖433 The two-round system has certain disadvantages for the war-torn societies or societies experiencing ―on-going conflict‖. A war-torn state cannot spend a major portion of its resources on elections. On the other hand, the second round often lowers the voter turnout that can lead to electoral deadlock, which could be detrimental for the democratization process.434 A similar scenario emerged in Afghanistan when hundreds of people filed complaints in IEC regarding the electoral process.

The final [uncertified] total was released on September 16, 2009, which showed Karzai at 54.6% and Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Ramazan Bashardost and Ashraf Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9% and 3% respectively).435 Nevertheless, tensions rose after the fraud complaints

432 ―Afghan Presidential Election 2004,‖ 44. 433 See, for detail, ―The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan,‖ NDI Report (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2010), 1-101, https://www.ndi.org/files/Elections_in_Afghanistan_ 2009.pdf. 434 Carol J. Riphenburg ,―Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan,‖ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no.1(April 2007): 15-16. 435 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance (CRS Report No RS21922) (Washington. D.C: Congressional Research Service, January 12, 2015), 21, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RS21922.pdf.

119 and allegations on Karzai that he attempted to manipulate the results with the help of IEC. The substantial numbers of complaints filed during and after the polling day reflected the public mistrust in the electoral process. Most of the complaints were related to polling irregularities, ballot stuffing, ghost polling stations, and fraud.436 The ECC found that at least 1391 polling stations had held entirely fraudulent voting and at least 452 polling centers and 23 entire districts had fraud in at least half of their polling stations.437 After a thorough scrutiny of the votes, the ECC rejected 1.2 million cast votes and thus reduced Karzai and Abdullah‘s votes to 49.67% and 30.59% respectively. After the announcement, the second round of election became inevitable.438

After the election, the IEC was accused of favoring the incumbent president Hamid Karzai because the power of selecting the commissioners rested with the executive office. However, the IEC announced a runoff election between the top candidates. But the latter decided to quit from the second round due to the external power‘s pressure. The principal intervener played a vital role in breaking the standoff situation in Afghanistan. The breakthrough efforts of the chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator John Kerry defused the post- election crisis.439 The senator accompanied by the US ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry met Karzai several times to resolve the crisis. Throughout the deliberation process, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Adviser James L. Jones remained informed about the candidates‘ perceptions on settling of the post-election crisis.440 The Obama administration had certain images about Karzai before moving into White House. For instance, it considered the Karzai government ineffective and corrupt.

436 See, for detail on fraud in elections, Joshua Partlow and Pamela Constable, “Accusations of Vote Fraud Multiply in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August 28, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/ 08/27/AR2009082704199.html. 437 “2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections,” Electoral Complaints Commission ( Final Report), (Kabul, Afghanistan, 2010):9; It is important to mention that UNAMA member Peter W. Galbraith was fired because he openly criticized the role of UN on electoral fraud and keeping a lid on it . He expressed his understanding on the massive electoral fraud in Peter W. Galbraith, “Peter W. Galbraith -- U.N. Isn't Addressing Fraud in Afghan Election,” Washington Post, October 4, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/02/ AR2009100202855.html. 438 ―2009 Presidential and Provincial Council,‖ 10. 439 Farah Stockman, ―Kerry pushes Afghan runoff,‖ The Boston Globe, October 19, 2009, http://www.boston.com/ news/nation/washington/articles/2009/10/19/kerry_pushes_for_runoff_election_in_afghanistan/. 440 Karen De Young and Joshua Partlow, ―Afghanistan‘s Karzai accepted runoff election only after hours of tense talks,‖ Washington Post, October 21, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/ 10/20/AR2009102001071.html.

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Therefore, Karzai was skeptical about the new administration‘s position on the run-off election and accepting him as the president for next term. The former opined that the criteria used by the complaint panel to reject a million Pashtun votes cast in his favor were unacceptable.441 John Kerry convinced Karzai for the run-off election and reached a deal with Abdullah. However, the latter decided to drop out from the second round of the election.442 According to Lafraie, the principal intervener was ―outmaneuvered by Karzai. The Obama administration did not have any choice but to congratulate him and to accept his election victory as fait accompli.‖443 Even so, the electoral stalemate caused a legitimacy crisis, increased ethnic tensions in northern Afghanistan and strengthened de facto authority of Tajiks in the northern provinces.

Election results made it clear that voting was done on ethnic lines. Both candidates used ethnic and national cards to garner the support of people during the campaign. Despite publicly yearning for national unity, the underlying campaign addressed the identity issues of every ethnic community.444 Policy debates and agendas based on political inclusion, governance, and political justice lacked substance.445 Karzai adopted a result-oriented strategy during the campaign to forge political deals with powerful warlords across Afghanistan‘s ethnic spectrum to solidify his winner slot against Abdullah.446 He made deals with Muhammad Qasim Fahim, Mohammad Mohaqeq (Hazara leader), General Dostum, and Gul Agha Sherzai. Nonetheless, Abdullah‘s election campaign had a strong ethno-regional context. His position on the minority struggle against the hegemony of southern Pashtuns significantly affected Karzai‘s position in non- Pashtun areas.

The critics, however, opined that the country was divided into two parts dominated by Pashtuns and Tajiks and the probability of a civil war would increase if none of the candidates

441 Ibid. 442 See, for details, reasoning of Abdullah dropping out from run -off elections, Jon Boone, “Afghan Election Chaos as Abdullah Pulls Out of Run-off,” The Guardian, November 1, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2009/ nov /01/abdullah-withdraws-afghanistan-election. 443 Najibullah Lafraie, ―Insurgency and Democratization: Taliban Real Winners of Elections in Afghanistan,‖ Global Society 25, no. 4 (October 2011): 487. 444 Timor Sharan and John Heathershaw, ―Identity Politics and State building in Post-Bonn Afghanistan: The 2009 Presidential Election,” Ethnopolitics 10, no.3-4 (September-November 2011): 303-304. 445 Ibid., 304. 446 ―A new approach to Afghanistan: Rigged vote sharpens strategic challenge,‖ IISS Strategic Comments 15, no.7 (September 2009), http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2009-12ef/a-new-approach- to-afghanistan-45fe.

121 secured absolute majority in the run-off election. Ethnic power was associated with the victory in the election. Overall, the fraudulent election not only damaged the prospects of democracy but also the internal and external legitimacy of the Afghan government. Yet, it was also a lesson for the interveners that ill-crafted elections in Afghanistan could easily reverse the gains of democracy into a loss.

4.2.3.2 Comparative Analysis of Wolesi Jirga Elections: (September 18, 2005- September 18, 2010)

Parliamentary elections were held twice after the Bonn Agreement. First lower house election was held on 18 September 2005 under an Afghan-UN joint electoral management body.447 According to the constitution, the legislature is comprised of lower and upper houses. The lower house consists of 249 members with a fixed number of delegates from each of the 34 provinces.448 The upper house (or Meshrano Jirga) consists of 102 members; one delegate from each provincial assembly, one to represent the district assemblies in each province, and 34 appointed by the president. It seems important to mention that 25 percent of the delegates should be females.449 The constitution sets up a quota requiring minimum two female delegates from each province. In this way, sixty-eight seats are allocated to women in the lower house. Reserved seats are considered a direct advantage to the Afghan females to present their voices and concerns in the [highest] directly elected participatory forum.

Electoral system plays a pivotal role in the promotion of democracy and management of conflict. Thus, it is a matter of utter importance for the intervener to craft electoral rules astutely while keeping in view the contextual realities of the targeted society.450 Electoral engineering and introduction of various electoral mechanisms are important to contain the possibility of the relapse of conflict or reduce the societal divisions through electoral laws in the post-conflict

447 ―Afghan Elections were more challenging than in Bosnia, Iraq: JEMB Chief,‖ The News, October 7, 2005, 16. 448 Kinichi Komano, 13. 449 Carol J. Riphenburg, ―Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan,‖ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no.1 (April 2007):17. 450 Benjamin Reilly, ―Electoral systems for Divided Societies,‖ Journal of Democracy 13, no.2 (April 2002):156.

122 societies.451 Several scholars and practitioners have also accepted the significance of electoral engineering in promoting democracy in the divided societies.

In the context of Afghanistan, the selection of electoral mechanism for voting was based on the preference of the US and choice of Hamid Karzai. In terms of the electoral system, the debate initially focused on the electoral system that awarded seats to different forces in proportion to their electoral support.452 Karzai rejected the proportional representation proposal and endorsed single non-transferable vote (SNTV) method under which the voters ―cast ballots for individual candidates rather than political parties.‖453 ―Each voter casts one vote for the many seats; and the candidates with the most votes win and occupy the available seats. In the absence of census, the number of seats per constituency, e.g. a province, can be determined after the elections by the number of valid votes cast.‖454

This voting pattern further exacerbated the ethnic divisions in the conflict-prone society. It enhanced the power of warlords and traditionalists. Candidates relied on the political clientelism455 and thus offered bribes to get definite vote besides using the power of weapons and coercion. This trend gave a major setback to the growth of political parties in the nascent Afghan democracy. It blocked the development of political parties. All dominant parties supported their candidates despite the fact that the elections were officially declared the non-party elections. Conversely, the SNTV favored Karzai by negatively affecting the parliament and making it weak and fragmented.

The estimated turnout was 50 percent in the first Wolesi Jirga election, around five percent less the presidential election (55.4%).456 The decrease in voter turnout was attributed to complex ballot papers consisting of several pages and provincial council elections, which were

451 See, for detail, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,1977); Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into structures, Incentives and Outcomes (London:Macmillian,1994); also see, Benjamin Reilly and Andrew Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies (New York: Lexington Books,1991), 451-76. 452 William Maley, ―Elections are not enough,‖ The World Today, April 2005, 2, www.theworldtoday.org/april2005. 453 Andrew Reynolds, ―The Curious Case of Afghanistan,‖ Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (April 2006): 105. 454 Carol J. Riphenburg, 16.; It is important to explain that Afghanistan's 34 provinces serve as multi-member districts that elect members to the Wolesi Jirga. Each province is a single electoral district and the number of seats is proportional to its estimated population. Candidates run ``at large" within the province without respect to any smaller constituency boundaries. The rules declare winning candidates as those who receive the most votes relative to each province's seat share. 455 Candidates offering material goods to locals for electoral gains in elections. 456 Bernd Burwitz, op. cit., 218.

123 held on the same day. It was a difficult task for the majority of [illiterate] voters to find the candidates of their choice.457 Despite security concerns and logistics hurdles, the elections took place and considered by and large acceptable by the international community. The women won 28% seats458 and Pashtuns emerged as the largest ethnic group in the lower house.

As for the voter turnout, it decreased due to security situation and legitimacy factor, especially regarding the performance of the Karzai government. Secondly, all members of Wolesi Jirga were officially designated as ―non-partisans‖. The international community and Karzai government supported SNTV on an assumption that it would be easy for Karzai to handle a highly fragmented parliament with limited powers. Non-party election system further bolstered the politicization of ethnicity and enhanced the power of regional power brokers. Similarly, the weak opposition in parliament was also a product of Karzai‘s electoral engineering. Therefore, both Wolesi Jirga elections produced little positive results in terms of reconciliation and acceptance of new democratization process.

A minority of moderate Taliban or former Taliban commanders separated themselves from the militant wings and joined the participatory politics. They secured seats in both houses of the legislature and provincial council. Their entrance in participatory politics opened a small window of dialogue and reconciliation. Some of the pro-Karzai leaders were also former militia and Taliban leaders including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province) who had gained fame for leading the Afghan component of assault on Al Qaeda at Tora Bora in December 2001, Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who reportedly helped Osama bin Laden flee Tora Bora and Mullah Abdul Salam (Mullah Rocketi) from Zabol.459

Similar voting trends were witnessed in the second Wolesi Jirga election. However, before the election, Karzai signed an election decree that superseded the 2005 election law and governed 2010 parliamentary elections.460 Although, the constitution forbade adoption of any electoral law less than one year before the elections on which the law would be implemented. Some clauses of the new election decree attempted to make the Election Complaints

457 Astri Suhrke, The Democratization of a Dependent State: The Case of Afghanistan, 9. 458 Bernd Burwitz., op. cit., 218. 459 Kenneth Katzman, ―Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance,‖ CRS Report for Congress, RS21922, October 14, 2008, 2, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112043.pdf. 460 Joshua Partlow, ―Afghanistan‘s Government Seeks More Control over Elections,‖ Washington Post, February 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/14/AR2010021401698.html.

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Commission (ECC) an inclusive Afghan body. However, later on, Karzai agreed with the UNAMA that the external observers would occupy two seats in the ECC. In addition, the Afghan Interior Ministry introduced national identity card system to curb the voter registration fraud and avoid mistakes made in previous elections.461 According to the IEC, over 375,000 new voters were registered and 2,500 candidates contested the legislative election for 249 seats in which 69 seats were allocated to women.462 The election was held on 18 September 2010 and results were announced one month later. SNTV remained the electoral rule and thus provided an opportunity to the conservative forces with strong patronage networks to contest and win the elections. Voter turnout declined to 40% due to the security situation in the rural areas. Around 4.3 million Afghans cast their votes.463 Yet, the electoral malpractices and violence marred the election.

Before the elections, the Taliban threatened to attack polling stations and voters showing at the polling station. Intimidation kept the voters away from the polling stations, especially in the Pashtun populated areas.464 Hundreds of polling stations reportedly remained close and witnessed rocket attacks, explosion, and killings in Kandahar and Helmand provinces.465 The IEC, however, tried to lower the impact of Taliban attacks and emphasized opening of the majority of polling booths on the voting day. Cynicism and disillusionment about the political institutions, delivery of public goods, and bad performance of the government were consequential for lower turnout in lower house election. Pervasive corruption and absence of check and balance on elites also kept the Afghan populace away from ballots.466 The worsening security situation and introduction of village militias, which challenged the authority of central government and openly intimidated the opposition ethnic groups for voting their respective candidates, for upgrading the local security also kept the locals away from polling stations.467 Warlords interfered in the voting process and used intimidating methods on the polling day.

461 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance (CRS Report No RS21922) (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, July 28,2014) , 23, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 230155.pdf. 462 ―Afghanistan reports over 3,000 complains about vote,‖ Daily Times, September 22, 2010, A5. 463 ―More than 4.3 m Afghan Cast Vote: Commission,‖ The News, September 22, 2010. 464 ―Taliban Vow to disrupt Afghan Elections,‖ The Nation, September 6, 2010. 465 Rod Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin, ―Afghan Vote Marked by Light Turnout and Attacks,‖ New York Times, September18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/world/asia/19vote.html?_r=2&hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx =1284818440-GiXLcXHPoKTPePQMeVaSjg&. 466 ―Graft, poverty keep many Afghans away from polls,‖ Daily Times, September 19, 2010, A5. 467 Jason Motlagh, ―Could local militias shape the Afghan elections?,‖ TIME, September 18, 2010, http://content. time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2019986,00.html.

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The electoral malpractices were the outcome of fragile electoral institutions. For instance, the IEC was the apex authority for holding elections and it was the responsibility of IEC to hold elections, count the vote, aggregate, and certify the winner. Lack of a credible mechanism to check the corruption of IEC members led to changes in the voting results. Pre-existing political connections among the state polling agents and candidates contributed to bogus voting and rigging of votes at polling booths.468 The electoral corruption reflected the endogenous nature of the Wolesi Jirga elections and limited interest of the principal intervener in holding fair elections.

The principal intervener practiced a top-down approach whilst keeping more interests in the presidential election than the Wolesi Jirga election. Tiny Karon rightly argued before the second parliamentary elections that ―don‘t expect a firestorm of protest in Western capitals over any proven ballot fraud. The outcome and transparency of the poll is of diminishing interest to the US and its allies, whose focus is now on halting the Taliban‘s momentum and creating conditions to expedite closure in a war that appears increasingly unlikely to be won.‖469 The constitution changes the balance of power in favor of the president; therefore, the parliament remains weak in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The principal intervener‘s interest in the Wolesi Jirga election remained limited to providing assistance for holding free and fair elections of the lower chamber. It merely played a role of spectator amid the post-election crisis scenario and kept the bar of success low in the elections.470

Around 60% members of the lower house were first-time members of the legislature.471 The numbers of Karzai loyalists decreased because the numbers of Pashtuns reduced to 94 as compared to 124 in the out-going Wolesi Jirga.472 Some local militia commanders with notorious human rights record also won the election. In this context, Rizwan Asghar wrote that ―every time people who involved in war crimes win elections and this is a travesty of democracy and good governance.‖473 Female parliamentarian Malalai Joya showed audacity and openly remarked in

468 See, for instance, Michael Callen and James D. Long, ―Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan,‖ http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/papers/em_eday_final.pdf. 469 Tony Karon, ―Bullets trump ballots in Afghanistan,‖ Daily Times, September 21, 2010, A8. 470 Jon Boone, “Afghan elections marred by violence but pronounced a success,” The Guardian, September 18, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/18/afghan-election-success-despite-violence. 471 Katzman, ―Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,‖ 27. 472 Katzman, 27. 473 Rizwan Asghar, ―They will change nothing,‖ The News, September 16, 2010.

126 an interview that the new parliament would be ―the same like the last one, most of them will be lawbreakers not lawmakers.‖474

The election results triggered a political crisis regarding the reduction of Pashtun seats in the lower house. Karzai further complicated the crisis by forming Special Tribunal to review fraud complaints. His decision started a tussle between the winning candidates and executive office. This stalemate, however, showed that elections were marred by fraud, irregularities, and ambiguity.475 An independent watchdog claimed that Karzai had no legitimate power to form a special tribunal to address the fraud complaints because the UNAMA had certified election results provided by the IEC.

Karzai‘s delaying tactics regarding the inauguration of Wolesi Jirga forced the wining candidates to take their seats in the legislature without his consent. Political gridlock between the executive and winning candidates affected the legitimacy of elections and participatory politics. Although he gave his blessings to the winning candidates, he remained consistent with the working of the tribunal. The tribunal ruled in June 2011 that 62 lawmakers, a quarter of the Wolesi Jirga, should be expelled. However, this decision was unacceptable to the sitting members and election authorities.476

It is also important to note that the ethnic Pashtuns pressurized Karzai to declare the parliamentary elections as invalid.477 Pashtuns‘ demand was based on the logic that the southern and southeastern areas remained uncontested due to the poor security situation and Taliban threats. They became furious after the UN-backed ECC scrapped 1.3 million votes, thus disqualifying 24 winners.478 People‘s reinstatement and departure from the Wolesi Jirga virtually brought the parliament on a standstill position. Previously, Karzai had often bypassed the parliament because he considered it a weak and divided house with minimum powers. However, the incumbent Wolesi Jirga showed no flexibility toward Karzai in the selection of the lower house speaker.

474 Quoted in C Bryson, ―Are lawmakers or lawbreakers winner of Afghan poll?,‖ Daily Times, September 25, 2010, A5. 475 ―Widespread fraud in Afghan parliamentary polls: NYT,‖ The News, September 26, 2010. 476 ―Afghan Election body throws out nine lawmakers,‖ Dawn, August 22, 2011. 477 Hasan Khan, ―Afghan Assembly Stalemate,‖ Dawn, February 15, 2011. 478 Ibid; See, for instance, ―Afghan Election Body Cancels One Quarter of Votes,‖ Daily Times, October 21, 2010.

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Martin van Bijlert of Afghanistan Analyst Network described this situation as a tug of war between the state organs:

This last chapter of the scuffle is likely to be messy as the various sides are mobilizing their people and using increasingly heated language. The standoff has harmed the legitimacy of all the three powers of government, who now feel justified to consistently contest each other‘s authorities.479

Mostly, the election process was not a success for the opposition groups contesting to counterbalance the executive power. The fraudulent elections, entrance of human right violators, drug barons, and fascists in the lower house exposed the flawed nature of the democratization process. Elections did not contribute to establishing a truly representative government in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Noah Coburn and Anna Larson also presented a similar understanding on electoral process whilst arguing:

Elections were not really about representative governance. Rather, they were places for different patronage networks to compete with each other, where resources were transferred, where different ethnicities and other local groups renegotiated local balance of power, and where the ruling elite attempted to solidify their control of the national level political system.480

Therefore, the local elites reaching the Afghan national legislature were only interested in their own welfare rather than serving and addressing the problems of the targeted population. Few set the example of community service and upheld the democratic values whereas the majority wrestled on resources in their constituencies and showed lackluster attitude in attending sessions and debating the performance of the regime.

4.3 Afghan Parliament: Putting the Institution into Practice

An effective parliament is necessary for consolidation of democracy. Parliament is the true representation of all components of the society. It offers a national platform for a free and open exchange of views. A strong parliament has the capacity to address the daunting challenges to

479 ―Afghan Election body throws out nine lawmakers,‖ Dawn, August 22, 2011. 480 Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 4-5.

128 rule of law, security, justice, and economy. Yet the Afghan parliament has limited capacity to address the internal and external challenges. The Afghan parliament is a weak house with limited powers. Lack of institutionalized political parties in the legislature has made the forum less relevant in strengthening the democratization process. Nonetheless, the majority of Afghan parliamentarians want more powers to address the challenges confronted by the fragile state institutions.481

In addition to institutional weaknesses, several ethnic, ideological and issues-oriented blocs have emerged after two successive lower house elections; for example, pro-Karzai versus anti-Karzai blocs, traditionalists versus liberals, and Pashtuns verse non-Pashtuns.482 The parliament, therefore, remained a sharply divided house. Under the umbrella of democratization, warlords with worst human rights record successfully secured seats in the parliament.483 The lack of institutionalized political parties in the parliament negatively affected the governability.484 Prevalence of parochialism and patronage networks also had negative effects on the working of the legislature.

Furthermore, the relationship between the Karzai office and legislature had remained complex and strained. The Wolesi Jirga members had used their veto power to block the nominations of the Karzai Cabinet members. Even they vetoed for their removal from the cabinet. Controversial role of Karzai in the second parliamentary election led to the rejection of two-thirds of his cabinet nominations by the Wolesi Jirga. However, the parliament started acting like an active forum while using its constitutional powers to reject the president‘s cabinet choices and directed political attacks from the floor of the house.485

481 Min Zaw Oo and Jed Ober, ―A Survey of the Afghan Parliament: Key Findings,‖ USAID Survey, (Bethesda, MD: Democracy International Inc., July 2012), 3-34, http://democracyinternational.com/sites/default/files/MP% 20Survey%20Report%20Final%20Web.pdf. 482 Discussion on the divided house is drawn from Andrew Wilder, ―A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan Elections, (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, December 2005); See, for facts, Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance (CRS, RS21922) (Washington. D.C., Congressional Research Service, October 14, 2008), 2-3, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112043.pdf. 483 Joshua Wright, ―Warlords in Parliament: How it Happened,‖ February 17, 2006 .www.tcf.org/list.asp?type= NC&pubid=1371. 484 Hamish Nixon and Richard Ponzio, ―Building Democracy in Afghanistan: The State building Agenda and International Engagement,‖ International Peacekeeping 14, no.1 (January 2007): 30. 485 Joshua Partlow, “Afghanistan parliament's rejection of Karzai cabinet picks signals,” Washington Post, January 04, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/01/03/AR2010010301970.html.

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Meanwhile, the MPs were not satisfied with the functioning of the government. They wanted an increase in the legislative powers because Karzai kept on ignoring the recommendations given by the parliament to improve governance. Accountability of the executive acts remained outside the domain of the legislature. This kind of complex interaction and imbalance of powers between the two elected institutions showed the absence of liberal democratic tendencies. The process thus failed to produce democratic political institutions by giving legitimacy to the unaccountable acts of the legislature and executive.

Conclusion

The democratization process in Afghanistan was technical and apolitical in nature. The intervener failed to materialize its vision of a liberal democratic regime due to the flawed design of democratization process and privileging stability over the process. The whole process was a mere imposition of democracy rather than making it an inclusive affair. Flaws in the democracy building process diminished the chances for the creation of democratic political culture, which could chalk out the path to reconciliation. Afghanistan had occupied a precarious middle ground amid the democratization process and it could have easily reverted to authoritarianism. In effect, the Afghan government had transformed itself into a hybrid regime. The Karzai government had established authoritarian tendencies because of the unprecedented powers rested with the executive office. The legislature, however, had limited powers and check on the president. The president thus used the state organs in an autocratic way. In addition to the power imbalance, clientelism also remained an important feature of the Afghan political landscape.

As far as the principal intervener was concerned, its decision to prioritize counterterrorism and security goals left a negative impact on the democratization process and failed to generate reconciliation mechanism in the process. Its narrow political agenda and light footprint policy slowed the democratization process and, in fact, created more problems. For instance, the failure of Bonn Agreement to address the nature of the Afghan state and power sharing among factional groups led to elite disunity and exacerbated ethnic tensions in the post- Taliban Afghanistan. The ensuing competition between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns at every stage of the process was thus inevitable.

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The democratization process remained elusive throughout the transition phase. The principal intervener had an upper hand in determining who controlled the resources and agenda. The intervener‘s electoral engineering in favor of the SNTV system failed to develop ―national vote,‖ but rather strengthened the ―ethnic vote‖ in the national elections. Moreover, it also provided an easy path to the warlords, criminals, drug lords, and clergy to secure seats in the parliament through fraudulent elections. The cardinal error was to allow Karzai to rig the second presidential election. In particular, Karzai‘s one-time rigging substantially diminished the prospects of democracy and the whole pretext of creating a full democracy fell aside. Over the course of twelve years, the objective to establish democracy was replaced by stability. Political stability meant that the Kabul regime would preserve the interests of the principal intervener while putting the societal aspirations at the back burner.

Continuation of the war and the principal intervener‘s conflicting and ambiguous state and democracy building policies brought insurmountable challenges to the building of a liberal democratic state. Challenges originated from the flaws in the intervener‘s state and democracy building policies. In brief, the worsening security situation, high rate of civilian casualties, limited state capacity, deepening social divisions, pervasive corruption, warlordism, and conflicting rule of law were key obstacles to the creation and consolidation of democratic state institutions. The aforementioned factors paved the path to failure.

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Chapter Five Impediments in the State and Democracy Building Processes: U.S. Contradictory Policies and Security Dilemmas

Introduction

The chapter seeks to identify the challenges arisen from the state and democracy building processes in post-Taliban Afghanistan.Twelve years have passed by since the US-led intervention brought a regime change in Afghanistan. The principal intervener‘s efforts to rebuild the political system of the failed state on democratic lines met with strident challenges resulting in the failure of the processes. One can attribute this failure to the intervener‘s policies riddled with contradictions and paradoxes. Contradictory U.S. policies provided opportunities to the non-democratic forces to strengthen their power base and reducing and challenging the power of elected government in the conflict-ridden society. However, the fraudulent national elections, lack of security, warlordism, and the absence of rule of law affected the internal legitimacy of the regime. The aforementioned problems in combination with the interveners‘ competing agendas and missing coordination for a longer period further exacerbated the challenges faced by the state and democracy building processes.

In this chapter, I would address why the challenges to state and democracy building processes are viewed as a failure of the intervener‘s (re)building policies in the war-torn society and how the conflicting objectives affected the processes.

5.1 Conflicting Objectives

External powers always found it a daunting task to arrange and coordinate their interests and objectives with each other while pursuing the agenda of rebuilding a conflict-ridden society. Rebuilding a war-torn society in the intervention period became an enterprise for the international actors. It also led to a clash of interests among the rebuilders, thus lowering the chances of success in the project. In most of the cases, the external rebuilders tried to make trade-offs between ―security, stability, peace and democratization as well as between the

132 diverging norms, concepts, and instruments applied in democracy promotion.‖486 The Interveners attempted to propagate/highlight the importance of the imposition of liberal democracy in the post conflict societies, however, the consolidation of democracy couldn‘t be possible without stateness. So, the consolidation of liberal democracy rested on the correlation between the state and democracy building processes.

The processes, however, faced complex realities of the international actors‘ competing agendas and goals in the targeted society. A plethora of objectives, external actors, and complex socio politico environment of the targeted country caused unprecedented challenges for the society. The targeted society experiencing continued violence in the pre and post intervention phases forced the principal intervener to change its objectives in accordance with the post- conflict [internal] political settings. A war-like situation throughout the intervention period hindered timely achievement of the objectives, such as rebuilding a sustainable, functioning, and inclusive democratic state.

The intervener‘s contradictory policy objectives negatively affected the state and democratization processes. The Bush and Obama administrations kept on making strategies to first ―win the war against Al Qaeda‖ and later ―defeatism for Taliban‖. The ensuing shifts and turns in policies and strategies showed the complexities of war-torn societies and ambivalence in the interveners‘ rebuilding policy. After ousting the Taliban regime from power, the interveners attempted to hold ―free and fair elections‖ in the early phase of transition process without a fair power-sharing arrangement among the contending parties. They also excluded the opposition forces, the Taliban, from the Bonn process. The exclusion of Taliban from the process too proved costly for the democratization process in the later years. Taliban became the drivers of insurgency and forced the interveners to change policies, increase defense spending, and investment in the statebuilding process.

Astri Suhrke explains that the Bush administration‘s approach on Afghanistan regarding establishing the new Afghan state based on democratic principles was marked with reluctance.487

486 Sonja Grimm and Julia Leininger, ―Not all good things go together: conflicting objectives in democracy promotion,‖ Democratization 19, no. 3 (June 2012): 392. 487 Astri Suhrke ,When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (New York : Columbia University Press, 2012), 19; See, for instance, Oz Hassan and Andrew Hammond , ―The Rise and Fall of American‘s freedom agenda in Afghanistan: counter-terrorism, nation-building and democracy,‖ The International Journal of Human

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President Bush‘s approach clearly reflected this reluctance. Putting fewer troops on the ground and avoiding nationbuilding was part and parcel of his second presidential election campaign. He stated in a debate:

I don‘t think our troops ought to be used for what‘s called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win the war. I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow a dictator that‘s in our-and it‘s in our-when it‘s in our best interests.488

The Bush administration also maintained a similar stance after intervening and ousting the Taliban regime. Its mission remained focused on capturing and killing Al Qaeda members and Taliban. The core members of the administrations also shared a similar understanding regarding taking the responsibility of building the state institutions and democratic political system in Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld elaborated this view:

The United States of America, and certainly the United States military…are simply doing exactly what the president indicated, trying to root out terrorists…because we have that concern and we go in and root out terrorists, I don‘t think [this]leaves us with a responsibility to try to figure out what kind of government that country ought to have…. I don‘t know people who are smart enough from other countries to tell other countries the kind of arrangements they ought to have to govern themselves.489

From 2001 to 2003, Washington showed restraint in pursuing the pro-nationbuilding or pro- democratization agenda in post-Taliban Afghanistan. However, later on, the Bush administration dwelt upon the idea of creating a democratic and pro-free market regime in the failed state whilst shifting the responsibility of nationbuilding to its allies and the UN. According to Bush, ―It would be a useful function for the United Nations to take over the so-called ―nation-building,‖ – I would call it the stabilization of a future government– after our military mission is complete. We‘ll participate; other countries will participate. I‘ve have talked to many countries that are

Rights 15, no. 4 (May 2011): 532-551; Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America‟s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2010), 112-113. 488 CNN/All Politics, Presidential Debates Transcript, October 11, 2000, http:/www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/ debates/transcripts/u221011.html. 489 Donald Rumsfeld, ―DOD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers,‖ US Department of Defense, October 9, 2001, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2034.

134 interested in making sure that the post operations Afghanistan is one that is stable, and one doesn‘t become yet again a haven for terrorist criminals.‖490

From 2001 to 2003, the Bush administration‘s strategy remained focused on achieving the security objectives. The administration envisaged limited investment and presence in the local affairs and relied on the concept of ―light footprint‖ given by the UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. The principal intervener distanced itself from the nation-building project in addition to keeping light footprint. Yet this approach changed as the security situation deteriorated in Afghanistan. The absence of a robust international peacekeeping force made the security situation uncertain enough to threaten other dimensions of the nation-building process, especially statebuilding.491 The intervener‘s light footprint policy went wrong with the entrance of warlords, drug smugglers, criminal syndicate , neoTaliban ,and other armed opposition groups in the targeted society. In addition, pervasive corruption plagued the country.492 After the inauguration of a new administration (Obama administration) in White House, the principal intervener surged the numbers of troops in Afghanistan to address the challenge of the Taliban insurgency. Not only did the intervener decide to surge troops but also declared a time frame for the withdrawal. In June 2011, the administration declared, ―Situation in Afghanistan has improved and time has come to bring our soldiers back home.‖493 Another shift in policy, from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism policy based on shifting the responsibility to Afghan security apparatuses, was on its way. The interveners, therefore, substantially cut down the numbers of their troops and operational responsibilities.

After the demise of Taliban regime in 2001, the limited occupation of intervener in terms of time and territory and inadequate interest in leading the statebuilding responsibility exposed the inherent flaws of its Afghan policy. From late 2003 onward, the intervener responded with a

490 George W. Bush, President Holds Prime Time News Conference (Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, October 11, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.htm1. 491 Larry P. Goodson, ―The Lessons of Nation-Building in Afghanistan,‖ in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2006), 151. 492 Ibid. , 148. 493 Vice President Biden in first term of President Obama made a proposal while deliberating on the AfPak policy in NSC meeting .He proposed what he called counterterrorism plus. All attention should be on al Qaeda in Pakistan and with enough number of NATO and US troops the Al-Qaeda would not make Afghanistan again its sanctuary and keeping Taliban insurgency at bay. Not required more troops on the ground. Mentioned in Bob Woodward, Obama‟s War (New York: Simon& Schuster, 2010), 102. Obama in his second term is stick to counter terrorism plus policy with the drawdown of troops completed in December 2014.

135 number of adjustments in its policy by increasing the number of troops, creation of PRTs and pursuing the international community to increase its investment in rebuilding Afghanistan. It filled the security vacuum by increasing numbers of the troops, a slow and gradual surge, in the later years. The Taliban victories in the next three years, however, continued posing an existential threat to the central government and it became clear to the intervener that it required a new and robust strategy to confront the Taliban insurgency. In March 2007, the Bush administration decided to dispatch 3,500 troops to Afghanistan, thus increasing the numbers to 27,000. The Republican administration laid down a plan to reverse the rise of Taliban that emphasized the role of the NATO and advocated expansion of its mandate in Afghanistan. This idea was highlighted in President Bush‘s speech that ―they must provide commanders on the ground with the troops and the equipment they need to do their jobs.‖494 He also remarked, ―For NATO to succeed, allies must make sure that we fill the security gaps. In other words, when there is a need, when our commanders on the ground say to our respective countries, we need additional help; our NATO countries must provide it in order to be successful in this mission.‖495

In September 2008, the security situation in Afghanistan was a reflection of the flaws in the intervener‘s strategy. The British Ambassador to Afghanistan Sherard Cowper-Coles warned that the US strategy was doomed to failure and ―the coalition presence− particularly the military presence−is part of the problem, not the solution More NATO troops would have ‗a perverse effect‘.‖496 The intervener, in the sixth year of intervention, brought a shift in its approach toward Afghanistan in order to address the growing threat of Taliban to the government, although there was lack of coordination among the external forces and various security structures run by the coalition forces were existent in Afghanistan. In addition to the aforementioned circumstances, the countries contributing troops in the ISAF also faced national caveats; for instance, what they can do and where they can go.

494 ―Bush presses NATO for more Afghan Troops,‖ NBC News , February 15,2007, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 17168462/ print/1/displaymode/1098/; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ―Pressing Allies, President warns of Afghan Battle,‖ New York Times, February 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/16/washington/16prexy.html?fta=y&_r=0 Mark Tran, ―Bush urges countries to commit more troops to Afghanistan to Afghanistan,‖ The Guardian, April 2, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/02/nato.afghanistan1. 495 www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070215-1.html. 496 Julian Borger and Simon Tisdall, ―Our man in Kabul says US strategy is failing,‖ The Guardian, October 2, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/02/afghanistan.usforeignpolicy.

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The principal intervener was the largest donor and contributor of the troops in Afghanistan. However, six years after the intervention, the level of violence and insecurity showed the flaws in the intervener‘s militarized approach. Shedding away from development and governance activities provoked the insurgency. From 2003 to 2007, the absence of a joint mechanism to plan and coordinate the actions of national and international forces in managing security issues proved to be a major hurdle in bringing synergy to stability operations.497 Whilst giving testimony to U.S. House Armed Services Committee in November 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates showed annoyance toward the NATO countries for ―not supplying urgently needed trainer, helicopters and infantry for Afghanistan as violence escalates there.‖498 He stated, ―I am not ready to let the alliance off the hook in Afghanistan at this point‖499 and raised his voice on the performance of the NATO troops by saying that ―our allies not being able to step up to the plate.‖500

It is noteworthy that the bulk of ISAF was based in Kabul until 2006. The limited coercive capacity of the Karzai regime forced the intervener to persuade ISAF to assume more responsibility in providing security beyond Kabul and Kandahar.501 The ISAF‘s role, therefore, evolved parallel with the nature of conflict. 502 The continuity of conflict directly affected the role of ISAF as the command and control of ISAF was shifted to NATO August 2003. This shift eventually stopped the rotation pattern of bringing a new driver of the external forces after every six months.503 The principal intervener provided troops for both security structures until their unification under the command of a US General, Stanley McChrystal.504

497 Ali A. Jalali, 43. 498 Ann Scott Tyson, ―Pentagon Critical of NATO Allies,‖ Washington Post, December 12, 2007, http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/11/AR2007121102428.html. 499 Ibid. 500 Ibid. 501 ISAF had been formed by the 2001 Bonn agreement, also endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1368 (2001).Resolution limited the ISAF mandate od security in ‗Kabul and its surrounding areas‘ but (UNSCR) 1510 (2003) Resolution expanded its authority to provide security and permissive context for reconstruction assistance throughout all Afghanistan. ISAF mandate further shifted in accordance of UNSCR 1776(2007)and 1833(2008) resolutions instructing the ISAF and OEF to cooperate with each other and address the threat posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. 502 Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, ―War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,‖ CRS Report for Congress (CRS Report No R40156) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), December 3, 2009, 13, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/133925.pdf. 503 Larry P. Goodson, 151. 504 Bowman and Dale, CRS Report for Congress, 13.

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As for the NATO strategy, it also adopted the concept of PRTs by deploying forces in northern and western regions and moving toward south and east to extend the authority of the central government and facilitate the development process and security.505 Nevertheless, the performance of PRTs was not satisfying because the majority of coalition forces‘ PRTs lacked staff, resources, and knowledge about the local political and cultural dynamics. These deficiencies made the foreign troops less effective in facilitating long-term sustainable reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. They rather focused on security sector reforms and stabilization efforts. The US PRTs, however, remained engaged with their troops during the military operations. Ali A. Jalali rightly pointed out that ―PRT became more a means of serving the provider than the customer.‖506

Another blow to the US Afghan strategy was the Bush administration‘s decision of military intervention in Iraq, which shifted the attention and resources from Afghanistan to Iraq. Iraq became the focal point of the intervener‘s foreign policy. Although invading Iraq was a wrong decision of the intervener, the quick success in terms of regime change in Afghanistan proved an impetus for the Bush administration that Iraq would be akin to Afghanistan. However, later on, the good war became a bad war. The war negatively affected Afghanistan where the Karzai regime was not in a position to provide security to the people beyond Kabul, which provided the Taliban with an opportunity to regroup themselves in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan.507 Major regions without international peacekeepers lowered the legitimacy of central regime and its external supporters. Insecurity ―vitiated both statebuilding and nationbuilding projects, undermined every conceivable recovery initiative and made the four years (from 2002 to 2006) seem like a bubble of opportunity that had been burst by the US‘ failure to extirpate the Taliban remnants and locate Osama bin Laden and his protectors. Furthermore,

505 PRTs are composed of soldiers ,civil affairs, representatives of the US and other government agencies focused on reconstruction, and Afghan government personnel .The main objective was to extend the authority of central government into the countryside, provide security, and undertake projects (such as infrastructure development to boost the Afghan government. But the performance of PRTs received mixed review. PRTs reconstruction activities seem less productive for the locals. Important to note Pakistan blocked the idea of the formation of Indian PRTs in Post Taliban Afghanistan, information revealed by Dustin Dehez (Global Advisors) in an interview with author. 506 Ali. A. Jalali, ―The Legacy of War and the Challenge of Peace Building,‖ in Building A New Afghanistan, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge, Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation, 2007), 37. 507 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Culture and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 327.

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Karzai government‘s refusal or inability to take full charge appears credible to villagers and warlords alike.‖508

The Bush administration‘s militarized approach remained an important component of the Obama administration‘s Afghan policy. However, under the Obama administration, the Afghan war was no longer a forgotten war. The US officials conducted a comprehensive review of the Afghan policy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen revealed in a meeting with Obama that ―the Afghanistan war has been under resourced for years, no strategy for years, and almost no resources on the civilian side, and the US embassy has very bad relationship with just about everybody, even the military.‖509 However, even before entering the White House, President Obama was clear about putting Afghanistan and Pakistan in a single category. He assured the US public regarding the limited scope of new Afghan strategy. In an interview given to NBC‘s Matt Lauer after assuming the presidency, Obama stated:

We are not going to be able to rebuild Afghanistan into a Jeffersonian democracy…what we can do is make sure that Afghanistan is not a safe haven for Al Qaeda. What we can do is make sure that it is not destabilizing neighboring Pakistan.510

Not only the administration decided to pursue the troops surge policy in Afghanistan but also assured the world that its commitment was not open-ended. Afghan war would not be an indefinite war and troops would start withdrawing from Afghanistan by the end of 2011. The [troops] drawdown started and continued during his second term. Obama‘s ―Af-Pak‖ policy shifted the focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The policy objectives focused on ―to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.‖511 Innovation in the policy was to refocus on the reconstruction of the

508 Robert I. Rotberg, ―Renewing the Afghan State,‖ in Building A New Afghanistan, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge, Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation, 2007), 2. 509 Bob Woodward, Obama‟s Wars (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2010), 34. 510 Barack Obama, ‗Interview with Matt Lauer of NBC‘s ‗Today‘,‖ American Presidency Project, 1 (2009), http://www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85729; similar narrative on democracy shared by President Obama with Bob Woodward mentioned in his book, Woodward, Obama‟s Wars, 34. 511 Barack Obama, ―President Obama‘s Speech on Afghanistan and Pakistan: The President announced a new strategy,‖ U.S .News, Washington D.C, March 2, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2009/03/27/president- obamas-speech-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan?page=2.

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Afghan security forces, especially the Afghan Army and Afghan police, in order to bring the US troops back home. He mentioned in his speech:

We will accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan Army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011 - and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward.‖512

However, the policy review also suggested understanding the significance of the civilian part of the strategy. A part of the review required more attention to stability in Afghanistan. Yet, Obama mentioned his decision to put more fuel in the civilian reconstruction processes undermined by rampant corruption and inability to control drug trade that were cutting the advantages of already sluggish national economy apart from providing financial support to insurgency and crimes.513 He mentioned a bottom-up approach in the new strategy:

To advance security, opportunity, and justice- not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces- we need agricultural specialists and educators; engineers and lawyers. That is how we can help the Afghan government serve its people, and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs. That is why I am ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground….514

The critics nonetheless argued that Obama‘s policy had failed to address the underlying causes and drivers of the conflict and intended to manage the conflict rather than finding a long-term solution. Scholars and practitioners came up with mixed understandings on the reviewed policy. For instance, Rasul Bakhsh Rais argued, ―there is recognition of some inherent limitations of the use of force to win wars in complex societies like Afghanistan. In fact, wars like the on going on, and in a socially complex situation like in Afghanistan cannot be won.‖515 CIA station chief in Kabul Graham Fuller also made a similar comment that the ―military force will not win the day in either Afghanistan or Pakistan; crises have only grown worse under the U.S. military

512 Ibid. 513 Ibid. , 3. 514 Barack Obama, ―President Obama‘s Speech on Afghanistan and Pakistan,‖ http://www.usnews.com/ news/ articles/2009/03/27/president-obamas-speech-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan?page=4. 515 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ―The New Afghan Strategy,‖ Daily Times, March 31, 2009.

140 footprint.‖516 He also stated, ―It would be heartening to see a solid working democracy established in Afghanistan or widespread female rights and education− areas where Soviet occupation ironically did rather well. But these changes are not going to happen even within one generation, given the history of social and economic devastation of the country over 30 years.‖517

Sending additional troops on the ground and pouring billions of dollars did not guarantee success in the war and bringing stability in core areas of counterinsurgency operations. As described by Malou and Christopher:

Washington‘s hope for nation-building and counterinsurgency, particularly in the context of Afghanistan, is not so much misguided as it is misplaced. Containing al- Qaida and disrupting its ability to carry out future terrorist attacks does not require a massive troop presence on the ground. Committing still more U.S. personnel to Afghanistan undermines the already weak authority of Afghan leaders, interferes with our ability to deal with other security challenges, and pulls us deeper into a bloody and protracted guerilla war with no end in sight.518

There were several challenges and problems in the implementation of this strategy. Rajiv Chandrasekaran gave a relevant example in his book Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan. ―Most of the surge troops were deployed in the south and east, particularly Helmand where the intervener military commanders pursued their strategic objectives through local strongman, corrupt thugs, who were part of an entrenched Kleptocratic system that stretched all the way to the top of the Afghan government.‖519 In most of the cases, the Afghan officials did not want to take political authority of the region to avoid the Taliban attack after the US forces started drawdown after 2011.520 The absence of legitimate [central government] authority converted the military success into a civilian failure and provided the Taliban with an opportunity to regain their influence in the area.

516 Graham E. Fuller, ―Obama‘s Policies making situation worse in Afghanistan and Pakistan,‖ Huffington Post, May 10, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/global-viewpoint-obamas-p_b_201355.html 517 Ibid. 518 Malou Innocent and Christopher A. Preble, ―U.S Must Narrow Objectives in Afghanistan,‖ World Politics Review, Sep 16, 2009, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-must-narrow-objectives-afghanistan. 519 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 2012), 262. 520 Maleeha Lodhi, ―Limits of Military Action,‖ The News, Islamabad edition, May 18, 2010.

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The Obama administration gave a framework for ending the military intervention by the end of 2014. Not only the intervener decided to surge troops in Afghanistan but also realized that the end of the war was linked with the reconciliation process.521 The only political solution would end America‘s longest external intervention. Obama recognized the importance of reconciliation process in his AfPak strategy whilst arguing:

In a country with extreme poverty that has been at war for decades, there will also be no peace without reconciliation among former enemies. I have no illusions that this will be easy. In Iraq, we had success in reaching out to former adversaries to isolate and target al Qaeda. We must pursue a similar process in Afghanistan while understanding that it is a very different country.522

The intervener recognized that the political process based on negotiations and conciliation was the only way to achieve peace and security in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel argued, ―Reconstruction of state institutions in conflict-ridden societies was an arduous task and reconciliation and confidence-building processes are therefore a vital element in establishing legitimate functioning institutions.523 In this context, Timothy Donis wrote, ―The political settlements must be embedded in local social realities to achieve enduring political stability in the war-torn societies. In majority of the post-conflict rebuilding cases, the intervener has the primary role and locals are considered a secondary partner in the rebuilding exercise. However, the local power structure has the capacity to thwart or weaken the meticulously designed policy reforms…. External imposition of reconciliation cannot transform the post-conflict societies‘ culture of violence into a culture of peace. 524

From 2001 to 2007, the intervener pursued a policy of war along with the democratization process. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Michael Schoiswohl wrote, ―Promoting

521 ―Taliban Key to Afghanistan‘s future: US Defense Secretary,‖ Daily Times, October 8, 2008. 522 ―President Obama Speech on Afghanistan and Pakistan: The President announced a new strategy,‖ http://www. usnews.com/news/articles/2009/03/27/president-obamas-speech-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan?page=1-5. 523 Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel, ―Introduction: Recovering from Civil Conflict,‖ in Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development, eds. Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (London: Frank Cass, 2002). 524 Timothy Donais, ― Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post Conflict Peace building,‖ Peace & Change 34, no.1 (January 2009): 10-11.

142 democracy in wartime was necessary to win the peace.‖525 Negotiations with the Taliban at this moment were in rudimentary form and converted to find a political solution of the deteriorating security situation and bring good Taliban in the power structure. Before the start of negotiations between the principal intervener and Taliban, the coalition allies had already opened covert channels of communication with the Taliban. For instance, the Daily Telegraph reported that MI6 agents had held secret talks with Taliban leaders despite Prime Minister Gordon Brown‘s pledge that Britain would not negotiate with the terrorists.526 In 2008, even UNAMA sought to spearhead a ―process of reconciliation and peace building through political outreach to include those Afghans who felt excluded from current institutions and make them part of development and rebuilding.‖527

The principal intervener remained clenched to ―non-negotiation‖ policy for seven years. Obama made shifts in the US policy and opened the option of negotiations with the Taliban. The US military commanders, however, opposed diplomacy in the Afghan theater. They talked about pouring more money and soldiers in Afghanistan to reverse the insurgency tide. Pentagon viewed negotiations with Taliban as deliberating with the terrorists. However, Special Representative of AfPak Richard Holbrooke emphasized the importance of negotiations with the Taliban. He argued, ―Reconciliation should be the ultimate goal, and fighting the means to facilitate it.‖528 In the intervener‘s perspective, the reconciliation was meant to chalk out a peace deal with the Taliban to assure a gentleman exit of the US military and maintain status quo in Afghanistan. As Vali Nasr also supported negotiation by writing, ―The outcome talks with the Taliban had no bearing on the course of the war. War would wind down with or without a peace deal.‖529

The UN and Karzai regime also took steps toward reconciliation with Taliban to reduce the disparity of views and mistrust between the intervener and Taliban regarding the intervener‘s

525 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Michael Schoiswohl, ― Playing with Fire? The International Community‘s Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan,‖ International Peacekeeping 15, no. 2 (April 2008): 261. 526 Thomas Harding and Tom Coghlan, ―Britain in Secret Talks with the Taliban,‖ Daily Telegraph, December 26, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1573687/Britain-in-secret-talks-with-the-Taliban.html 527 www.globalscurity.org/military/library/news/2007/12/mil-071203-irin01.htm. 528 Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation : American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Doubleday, Random House,Ins, 2013), 35. 529 Ibid. , 56.

143 presence and interests in Afghanistan.530 Taliban considered the presence of coalition forces Afghanistan an encroachment upon the Afghan sovereignty. However, the process experienced many hiccups and proved less result-oriented due to certain events and misconception among the intervener, the Afghan government, locals, regional and extra regional actors, and the Taliban. International community showed their commitment to the peace process in Afghanistan on several occasions, such as London Conference 2010, Kabul Conference July 2010, Bonn Conference 2011, NATO conference (Chicago) 2012, and Tokyo Conference (―From transition to transformation‖) July 2012. In every conference, the member states reaffirmed the significance of peace and reconciliation to end the armed conflict in the country. The withdrawal strategy and shifting of security responsibility to the Afghan forces became the most important topics in some of the aforementioned conferences.531

Moreover, the negotiating parties decided that the reconciliation process would remain ―inclusive, represent the legitimate interests of all Afghans and be Afghan-led and Afghan owned. The participants reiterated the importance of reconciliation principles such as the renunciation of violence, abandonment of ties with international terrorism, and respect for the Afghan constitution, including its human right provisions particularly the rights of women. They emphasized the region‘s respect and support for the peace process and its outcome.‖532 The Karzai regime created a High Peace Council to make the reconciliation process Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. Yet, the perceptions of Karzai and the intervener often overrode the objectives and significance of the council in the process. So far, the reconciliation process remains an open- ended process with no time frame and set agendas consequential for peace prospects. This deadlock in the process is creating difficulties for the fragile political institutions to take the path of consolidation.

530 Security Council showed its firm commitment to support the Government of Afghanistan in its efforts to advance the peace and reconciliation process, in line with the Kabul Communiqué and the Bonn Conference Conclusions, and within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and application of the procedures introduced by the Security Council in its resolutions 1988 (2011) and 2082 (2012), as well as other relevant resolutions of the Council. S/RES /1988(2011), June 17, 2011; S/RES /2082 (2012) December 17, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1988(2011); http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2082(2012). 531 Robert Marquand, ― At London Afghanistan Conference, a developing script of withdrawal,‖ The Christian Science Monitor, January 28, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0128/At-London-Afghanistan- conference-a-developing-script-of-withdrawal. 532 ―Participation for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan. From Transition to Transformation,‖ The Tokyo Declaration (July 8, 2012), 3.

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5.2 Warlordism: A Precarious Challenge

The external statebuilding project focuses on the establishment of the democratic political system. The statebuilder attempts to ensure security whilst pursuing strategies to establish the nascent state‘s monopoly on violence. However, this project confronts two major challenges in the pursuit of the aforementioned objectives: warlordism and insurgency. The intervener‘s strategies to ―create a more powerful and effective central state, in essence a largely top-down and externally driven approach to state-building, appear to flounder at the local level when confronted by warlord politics and regional interference.‖533 Yet, the influence of warlords remains enduring in most of the post-conflict societies and thus an overwhelming focus of the statebuilding approach on centralization of power may result in the eruption of tensions between the center and peripheries.

The intervener‘s experiences of the state and democracy building processes in the failed state demonstrated the complex nature of the project. It was difficult for the intervener to execute its strategies in those states, which were home to strong war commanders and politically charged leaders, prescribed as warlords. The presence of warlords in an anarchic environment enabled them to control the various instruments of power and maintain their hold on the levers of power while becoming a part of the newly built political system introduced by the intervener. They were also able to ―exploit resources−private security companies, elements of international forces and even ruler of weak states.‖534 They tried to fill the ―power vacuum‖ that remained unfilled during the pursuit of state and democracy building project initiated after the external intervention. Therefore, in today‘s Afghanistan, the warlords have become a key factor in making the externally led democratization project successful and bringing stability in the war- ridden society.

The international community spent less time in subduing the warlords, but rather tried to tame them to participate in the construction of the state institutions. Nevertheless, the warlords had negative repercussions for the latter agenda, particularly in the context of security. However, it is important to define warlords before analyzing the role of warlords in state and democracy

533 Danielle Beswick, ―The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State building: The Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo,‖ The Round Table 98, no. 402 (June 2009): 333. 534 John Mackinlay, ―Defining Warlords,‖ International Peacekeeping 7, no.1 (November 2007): 59.

145 building processes in post-Taliban Afghanistan. According to Kimberly Martin, ―Warlords are powerful and autonomous individuals not member of organization…who control small piece of territory using a combination of force and patronage.‖535 The term has a negative connotation, describing them as ―parasitic creatures of state.‖536 However, the warlords‘ description as the leaders involved in racketeering, violence, and use of force against the local population is probably narrow and subjective. Paul Jackson argues that the ―warlords are not irrational and anarchists, but an alternative form of governance system that has historically emerged during the periods of the central political collapse, either from an empire, or a ‗state‘.‖537

Today‘s warlords have the ability to operate with full independence (economically and politically) and without the intrusion of the residing state.538 Globalization has transcended the nature of warlords in the contemporary political order. It has also changed the modus operandi of the warlords by extending their influence and trading accounts at international level and increasing their wealth and power through connections with transnational criminal syndicates. Their emergence is attributed to the governance gap or collapse of the [central] state apparatuses resulting in the devolution of power to the regional level. The absence of legitimate and effective security structures provides the warlords with an opportunity to provide ―localized protection‖ to the people.539 William Reno explains the process of their ascent to power as ―the triumph of informal (shadow state) networks to the near exclusion of state bureaucracies.‖540 At the economic front, the warlords maintain an exploitative and coercive relationship with the society, but the societies linked with the warlords are based on a strong demand for security.

The warlord debate has taken new turns with the failure of states and role of the warlords in causing internal conflicts in the world, particularly in Global South. A majority of the academic debates deal with the characteristics and personalities of the warlords with reference to their behavior and strategies to keep their political influence intact during and after the conflict. Less intellectual attention is placed on the political, economic, and social contexts that play a

535 Kimberly Martin, Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in Weak States (Ithaca &London: Cornell University Press, 2012), 2-4. 536 Ibid., 3. 537 Paul Jackson, ―Warlords as alternative forms of Governance,‖ Small Wars &Insurgencies 14, no. 2 (2003):132. 538 See, Mark Duffield, Post Modern Conflict, Aid Policy and Humanitarian Conditionality (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1997). 539 Paul Jackson, ―Warlords,‖ 132-133. 540 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 2-3.

146 pivotal role in the endurance of the warlord system. The latter is comprised of three elements: ―resources, legitimacy and support and the weakness of the state.‖541 Warlords have multiple means to generate wealth to maintain sufficient armed forces in order to run their businesses, ranging from extractive policies to smuggling activities. They multiply their wealth by securing control of the strategic communication points at border areas to sustain their iron power base. They also try to legitimize their rule by gaining the support of their clan, religion or identity.542 The ―warlords are often associated with the states under stresses.‖543 They assume the role of state and provide public services and security. If the state‘s weakness reflects its inability in addressing the phenomena of human security, the warlords attempt to undermine the state consolidation process. However, the ―warlords who become state leaders are no longer warlords.‖544

This study seeks to provide an analytical account of warlordism in the context of exogenous state and democracy building processes in Afghanistan. It also provides an explanatory account of the warlords‘ shifting role in statebuilding project and meanwhile becoming a part of the democratization process. Despite their transformation into political actors, the rivalries among the warlords and security challenges posed by them have persisted even after the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. The principal intervener developed a nexus with the northern alliance warlords to defeat the Taliban. This alliance transformed them into political competitors in the newly established democratic political system. The tacit American support to the warlords continued in the transition period. Yet, the predatory character of warlords could not be fully tamed and it posed a threat to the fragile state. However, they gained legitimacy by securing the external power‘s support and contesting presidential and parliamentary elections despite using all possible tactics to get the popular allegiances through coercion due to the absence of legitimate security agents in the peripheral areas.545

541 Roger Mac Ginty,― Warlords and the liberal peace: state-building in Afghanistan,‖ Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 4 (September 2010): 583. 542 Ibid., 584. 543 Ibid., 584. 544 Kimberly Martin, ―Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,‖ International Security 31, no.3 (Winter 2006/07): 47. 545 Susan L. Woodward, ―Failed States, Warlordism and ―Tribal‖ Warfare,‖ The Naval War College Review (Spring 1999): 55-68.

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The Afghan warlords are a product of both indigenous and exogenous factors.546 During the Soviet-Afghan war, the American decision to provide weapons and money to a number of Afghan commanders facilitated warlordism.547 Later on, the civil war period in the country led to the dissolution of the Afghan army and left ―Afghanistan with a fragmented control of armed forces, a characteristic of failed states.‖548 Meanwhile, the Taliban established their monopoly of violence and control on the territory. Yet the US-led intervention in Afghanistan broke down their coercive power. The US built an alliance with the warlords who had lost their power during the Taliban regime. It approached and accepted the ―warlords, particularly with non-Pashtun ethnicity, and relied on them because they shared its objective of removing Taliban from power.‖549

Secondly, the victory against Taliban was significant for the warlords and perhaps they lacked lucrative alternatives. The intervener struck a bargain with the local warlords who agreed to support a political settlement and giving Hamid Karzai a presiding position in the transitional government based on the power centralization formula. The aforementioned bargain led to the creation of a weak central government that was not capable of disrupting the warlords‘ control over their local districts.550 The alliance with the warlords, therefore, brought only short-term successes for the intervener. Yet it weakened the state capacity and made it more difficult to give any assurance of transformation of warlords into model citizens. Even the Bonn agreement between the victors of the war failed to specify a time frame for implementation of the solutions, e.g. the process of demobilization and reconstitution of a new national army.551

The inclusion of warlords in the AIG and their important portfolios in the first three years of the OEF shows that the intervener had accepted the realities of the battlefield. Amid the first phase of transition, the old guards of NA assumed ministries, provincial governorships, and bureaucratic positions in the new regime. Mohammad Fahim was awarded defense ministry,

546 United States Institute of Peace, Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony (Special Report 105, USIP, April 2003), 1, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr105.pdf. 547 Ibid. , 1. 548 Barnett R. Rubin, ―Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty for whose security?,‖ in From Nation-Building to State-Building , ed. Mark T. Berger (Oxon:Routledge,2008), 176. 549 Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan, 141. 550 Mark Peceny and Yury Bosin, ―Winning with warlords in Afghanistan,‖ Small Wars& Insurgencies 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 604. 551 Astri Suhrke and Arne Strand, ―The Logic of Conflictual Peacebuilding,‖ in After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War, ed. Sultan Barakat (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2005), 144.

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General Dostum was given the (largely symbolic) position of chief of staff to the commander in chief and Ismail Khan was appointed as the governor of Heart. Gul Agha Sherzai became the governor of Kandahar due to his front line role in capturing Kandahar from the Taliban with the assistance of American Special forces and Hamid Karzai.552 The US policy makers considered the inclusion of warlords in the statebuilding process a viable option in making the process successful and hoped that it would ultimately lead to taming the warlords.

The external support for warlords tacitly supported them in retaining their power and autonomy in their respective regions. As Suhrke argues, ―Karzai had to co-opt to survive.‖553 A number of warlords kept their private militias intact for a certain period and generated money through levying taxes. In the first stage of statebuilding process, the coalition forces‘ reluctance to deploy their troops outside Kabul resulted in legitimizing the authority of warlords.554 They controlled the means of violence amid the nascent statebuilding process. As suggested by Conard Schetter, Rainer Glassners, and Masood Karokhial, ―The relationship between warlords and the state can be described as a process in which the former take over state positions and simultaneously fail to fulfill functions and obey the state rules.‖555

Contrary to the US strategy, the communist regime in the country (1980-1992) engaged itself with the warlords but did not make them a part of the state‘s central apparatus.556 According to the state rule, ―They were appointed military commanders or received honorific and ceremonial positions, such as senator or Loya Jirga (tribal council) delegate but no direct contamination of the state administration was allowed.‖557 Conversely, not only the intervener made them an important part of the statebuilding project but also allowed them to attend the Loya Jirga and constitutional Loya Jirga that guaranteed their permanent space in the new political process. It was thus difficult for the Karzai regime to deepen its roots in the society and

552 Antonio Giustozzi, ―Respectable warlords? The Transition from war of all against all to peaceful competition in Afghanistan,‖ Crisis States Working Paper Series 1, no. 33 (London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science), (January 29, 2003), 4-5. 553 Astri Suhrke and Arne Strand, 145. 554 Antonio Giustozzi, ― ‗Good‘ State vs. ‗Bad‘ Warlords? A Critique of State building Strategies in Afghanistan,‖ Crisis States Working Paper, no.1 (London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2004), 3. 555 Conard Schetter, Rainer Glassners and Masood Karokhial,― Beyond Warlordism: The Local Security Architecture in Afghanistan,‖ (IPG 2/2007), 136. 556 Giustozzi, ― ‗Good‘ vs ‗Bad‘ Warlords?A Critique of State building Strategies in Afghanistan,‖ 11. 557 Ibid., 11.

149 extinguish the influence of the warlords who had private militias and refused to submit their weapons in accordance with the DDR program.

On the security front, the warlords were also locked in fighting, particularly in northern Afghanistan. Most of their conflicts were ethnic in nature. They fought for control on territory and resources, often fueled by old enmity.558 Despite fighting against the Taliban as a united force, the NA faced a split with low-level clashes among Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras.559 The inclusion of warlords in the government structure also made them a party in the clashes. They forced Karzai to support one warlord against the other to keep the situation under control. For instance, the Tajik-dominated Karzai government supported Ustad Atta Mohammad in his power struggle against Abdul Rashid Dostum and Haji Mohammed Mohaqiq.560

From 2003 to 2006, the Karzai administration was able to put some restrictions on the warlords and stop the fighting between the leading warlords with the intrusion of leading intervener. The intervener helped Karzai to sideline the warlords in the government structure and create space for western educated liberal technocrats. The warlords nonetheless maintained close relations with Karzai and actively participated in the electoral politics. Election process helped them in securing seats in the law making body (legislature) at national and provincial levels. In early 2004, only four warlords or militia leaders (out of 27 ministries) Mohammad Fahim, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Sayed Hussain Anwari, and Gul Agha Sherzai had ministries. At least three more could be considered deeply involved in the warlords system. For instance, Mirwais Saddiq was the son of Ismail Khan (the warlord of Heart) and both Yunus Qanooni and Abdullah Abdullah were close associates of Mohammad Fahim.‖561

It is noteworthy that a number of warlords recycled themselves as politicians or hybrid authorities in the statebuilding process whilst establishing conformity with the norms and values of the international system. They became the leading political figures of post-Taliban Afghanistan (illustrated as ―political octopus‖). They contested elections and rendered support to

558 Astri Suhrke and Arne Strand, 146. 559 Maqsud Ul Nuri, ―Need for Afghan National Army,‖ The New, September 2, 2002. 560 Ibid. 561 A.Giustozzi, ―Respectable Warlords? The Politics of Statebuilding in Post Taliban Afghanistan,‖ Crisis States Working Paper, 33(London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2003); Rahimullah Yusufzai, ―Warlords Are Going to Remain a Fact of Life in Afghanistan,‖ The News, March 7, 2005.

150 the contesting figures that proved pivotal for the winning candidates. General Dostum supported Hamid Karzai in 2009 despite maintaining an army and facing accusations of human rights violations.562

By 2006, the threat posed by the Taliban resurgence to the externally driven Afghan state was clear. In order to prevail against the Taliban, the intervener poured financial and military resources in the rural areas where the warlords were confident to exploit the resources.563 By late 2009, the intervener announced a $1.3 billion Community Defense Initiative (CDI) to create and support anti-Taliban militias to counter the Taliban in their areas.564 NATO allies did not support this initiative, so it was exclusively a US special force project. The principal intervener and Karzai regime had already launched a number of local defense initiatives in the violent areas, i.e. the Afghan Auxiliary Police and the Afghan Public Protection Program.565 The most prominent version of these efforts in the contemporary Afghanistan is Afghan Local Police (ALP).566

The intervener did not bless all tribal militias with weapons and money, but the corrupt and ethnically factionalized Ministry of Interior supported certain groups, thus exacerbating the predatory nature of self-defense units.567 The US commanders in Iraq also adopted a similar strategy to defeat Al Qaeda and forged an alliance with the Sunni tribal leaders. The core objective of this alliance (also known as Sunni Awakening Policy) was to make them end their support to Al Qaeda, guard their communities, and back the incumbent Iraqi government.568 The intervener‘s agents paid those tribal leaders whose support substantially contributed to decreasing violence. However, the surge showed that those gains were short-term. Soviets also faced a similar problem when they used this strategy during the late 1980s for their exit from Afghanistan.569

562 Rod Nordland, ―Warlords with Dark Pasts Battle in Afghan Election,‖ New York Times, February 24, 2014, http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/world/asia/warlords-with-dark-pasts-battle-in-afghan-election.html?ref= abdulrashiddostum&_r=0 . 563 Roger Mac Ginty, 590. 564 J. Boone, ―US Pours Billions into anti-Taliban Militias in Afghanistan,‖ Observer, November 22, 2009. 565 Vanda Felbab-Brown, ―Afghanistan Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police: ―It‘s Local, So It Must Be Good‖- Or Is It?,‖ Foreign Policy Trip Reports, no.40 (Washington D.C, Brooking Institute, May 9, 2012): 2. 566 Ibid., 1. 567 Ibid., 2. 568Marten Kimberly, ―The Danger of Tribal Militias in Afghanistan: Learning from the British Empire,‖ Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): 157-158. 569 Vanda Felbab-Brown, 2.

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After the US intervention, the creation of tribal militias proved a two-edged phenomenon: it either created a new breed of warlords or transformed the existing warlords and allowed their militia members to join the US-backed tribal militias. The US provided them with ammunition and flour bags.570 However, it was difficult to gauge the performance of tribal militias in a positive way because financial and coercive powers and external backing empowered the rival tribes and ethnic groups. In brief, the intervener‘s support to tribal militias triggered clashes between the rival tribes.571 Similarly, the ALP abuses against the public made it unpopular in certain areas. It was comprised of rival communities or supported by rival warlords who turned on each other instead of fighting the Taliban.572

Even after the announcement of external power‘s withdrawal, the Afghan government had no mechanism to disarm the local militias who could easily challenge the weak central regime and increase violent activities.573 The government was already facing problems in controlling and guiding the tribal militias. Paying less money to the ALP and other militias meant that they would strengthen their independent character to establish their monopoly on violence.574 On the other hand, the central government had no policy insight on ―how to roll back the self-defense units.‖575 The ―localized militias‖ project focused on short-term stability and security but impinged the state‘s coercive power and long-term security.576

Warlords kept on shifting their roles and sides with the changing political environment of Afghanistan. They forged alliances with the interveners to defeat the Taliban, assumed an important position in the rebuilding of the state structures and joined the fragile political system. Yet they were entrenched in the socio-cultural politics of Afghanistan and thus could not be transformed even in the new [statebuilding] era. They demanded their rearming from the external

570 Ben Farmer, ―US ‗Supplying anti-Taliban tribal militias with ammunition‘,‖ The Telegraph, November 22, 2009. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/663144/US-supplying-anti-Taliban-tribal-militias-with- ammunition.html; Jon Boone, ―US keeps secret anti-Taliban militia on a bright leash,‖ The Guardian, March 8, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/08/us-afghanistan-local-defence-militia. 571 Vanda Felbab-Brown, 3. 572 Ibid., 6. 573 ―Afghanistan: Rein in Abusive Militias and Afghan Local,‖ September 12, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/ 2011/09/12/afghanistan-rein-abusive-militias-and-afghan-local-police. 574 They have become quasi warlords in their respective areas. People recruited in Afghan Local Police been implicated in killings, land grabs, and abductions. 575 In one case President Hamid Karzai ordered the US forces to leave the area of Wardak partly because their support for tribal militias accused of torturing, harassing, and murdering ordinary citizens. 576 Roger Mac Ginty, 590.

152 power due to instability, poor governance, and chances of civil war after its withdrawal from the country in an interview, Ismail Khan pointed out the flawed understanding of the intervener and declared that 70,000 troops were required for maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan. He stated, ―The number was too low! What a huge mistake.‖ Meanwhile, the interveners also realized that the numbers of security forces should be around 350,000 to deal with the Taliban who had already filled the vacuum of security and governance in some villages and districts.577 Former Vice-President Mohammad Fahim and Ahmed Zia Massoud (head of the High Peace Council) also emphasized the need to rearm tribal militias to fight the Taliban insurgency after the withdrawal of intervener.

Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra rightly drew the sketch of U.S. alliance with warlords by arguing that the ―external support to warlords undermined the Kabul‘s authority for many years.‖578 The external power‘s support to the warlords tacitly helped them in extending their authority in the statebuilding process and gave them legitimacy to become a part of the democratization process. The warlords remained strong in several areas of the country due to the intervener‘s conflicting objectives, slow pace of the creation of ANSF, and their entrance in the new power structure in Kabul. In addition to the warlords, one of the most strident challenges to the experiment was to establish the rule of law in war-torn Afghanistan. Rule of law is necessary to bring peace and stability in the society and establish a constructive linkage between the state and society.

5.3 Rule of Law

The establishment of rule of law in a conflict environment is a stark challenge. The intervener tries to ensure the rule of law in a lawless environment but faces a strident and complex context. According to Lakdhar Brahimi, ―Conflicts, more often than not, are preceded by a breakdown in the rule of law. In some cases, the conflict will take place in a country or territory where there was not much rule of law to begin with. But in all cases, the conflict may rapidly lead to a total

577 Christian Neef, ―The West Must Give US Our Weapons Back,‖ Interview of Afghan Warlord Ismail Khan, Spiegel Online, September 25, 2013, www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-former-afghan-warlord- ismail-khan-a-923913-druchhtml. 578 Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, ―Introduction,‖ Adelphi Papers 147, no. 391(Oct 2007):7-10.

153 destruction of the existing security, judicial, and legal systems.‖579 The absence of rule of law can bolster the illicit activities and increase the crime rate. Its void is often filled by the felonious activities. In the contemporary international intervention projects, the intervener is not the sole responsible for ensuring rule of law. It has rather become a multifaceted ―judicial engineering‖ project. Donor states, NGOs, and multinational organizations are part of this process. The intervener‘s investment on local actors not only strengthens the rule of law but also legitimizes the legal system.

The concept of rule of law is complex and often explained in a certain context. Therefore, there is no universal definition of the rule of law. The UN Secretary General has given the most well defined definition that covers almost all aspects of the concept. He states:

Rule of Law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.580

The political foundation of democracy and economic growth also thrives on the rule of law. The former is directly linked with the legal system of the state because transitional justice is the key in building long-term stability in the conflict-ridden societies and it strengthens the democratic processes. Transitional justice initiatives may encompass both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms including individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting, and dismissals.581 It contributes to building institutional capacity by dismantling the abusive power structures and criminal syndicates in order to ensure security, good governance,

579 Lakhdar Brahimi, ―The Rule of Law at Home and Abroad,‖ Dag Hammarskjold Lecture (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 2002), 9. 580 UN Secretary-General's Report, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (S/2004/616-23 August 2004), 4, http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf. 581 UN Secretary-General's Report, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (S/2011/634 - October 12, 2011), 6, http://regnet.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/files/ROL/S-2011-634%20- %20UNSG%20report%20-%20The%20rule%20of%20law%20and%20transitional%20justice%20% 282011%29.pdf.

154 and human rights.582 It also ensures the inclusion of the marginalized communities in the newly formed political order, although the warlords occasionally hijack the transitional judicial process by becoming a part of the post-war regime.

Not only the conflict damages the physical infrastructure of the judiciary but also forces the people attached with this system to either leave the country or become a victim of the conflict. The interveners confront a ―use of force‖ dilemma whilst building formal justice system in the targeted societies. For instance, they persuade the locals to avoid violence to solve their dispute and settle their dispute through the law whereas the former use military force to deal with the opposition forces or non-state actors.583 Secondly, the external powers bring their own version of a judicial system based on the western political thought that does not coincide with the local culture and traditions. Thirdly, the external powers face a challenge of building an independent judiciary because the rulers have had used the legal system to punish their rivals in the post-war societies.584 Fourthly, the donors face several challenges in their interaction with the central government apart from facing the dilemma of coordination. Fifthly, the judiciary may become a hub of nepotism and corruption during the statebuilding process.

The aforementioned challenges are visible in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Three decades of conflict destroyed the concrete structure of judiciary in the country whereas the informal justice system continued to exist even after the US-led intervention. The US statebuilding project included the building of state institutions, especially the establishment of an effective justice system. Yet the newly built judicial system faced ―capacity challenges‖ like other state institutions rebuilt by the interveners. The critics of the judicial system argue that the ―weak rule of law in Afghanistan cannot be analyzed in isolation; rather, it has to be fit in the context.‖ The interveners decided to complete provision of resources and funds for the restoration of the justice system, but it remained an underfunded project. In the first phase of the project (2001-2003), ―only about $25 million had been allocated to the reconstruction of the

582 Ibid., 6. 583 Melanne A. Civic, Ralph Wilde, Colette Rausch, and Jacques Klein, ―Restoring Rule of Law in Post Conflict and Stabilization Operations: Respective Roles of Law and Politics,‖ American Society International Law Proceedings 102 (April 9-12, 2008), 324. 584 Giovanni Bassu, ―Law Overruled: Strengthening the Rule of Law in Post conflict States,‖ Global Governance 14, no.1 (January-March 2008): 21-38.

155 justice sector, by mainly western donors, although the overall request of the Afghan government amounted $190 million up to 2006.‖585

Although the donor nations increased their funding in the later years, the judicial system still received a small slice of financial resources allocated to the security sector. The principal intervener alone poured a substantial amount in the restoration of the formal judicial system in Afghanistan. For instance, civilian expenditures on Rule of law support in Afghanistan increased from an estimated $7 million in FY2002 to an estimated $411 million in FY2010. The intervener spent approximately $904 million from FY2002 to FY2010 for rule of law. However, in 2008, the State Department officials stated in a testimony to Congress, ―Afghanistan‘s justice sector would require more than $600 million worth of additional assistance over the next five years. Other U.S. government reports indicate that $600 million might underestimate the likely costs, given the degradations in the Afghan security environment since the estimate was made.‖586

The pedagogical steps, taken by the interveners, to establish the justice system were limited and incoherent, thus lowering the significance of this component in the statebuilding process. The Bonn Agreement made it clear that the interim legal system in force would comprise the ―lay constitution‖ adopted in 1964 and full compilation of domestic laws and regulations passed since then, although some of the provisions related to the monarchy and contradicting the constitution would not be applicable.587 However, the external powers ignored the significance of transitional justice and bypassed this idea. The former wanted to give a cover to the state elites having a record of war crimes and the human rights violators holding key government portfolios in the center and provinces. According to an Afghan official, a serious effort to pursue transitional justice ―could implicate half the current cabinet.‖588

585 Matteo Tondini, ―Rebuilding the System of Justice in Afghanistan: A Preliminary Assessment,‖ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 3 (November 2007): 335. 586 U.S. Department of State, INL Bureau, Assistant Secretary of State David Johnson Testimony, statement for the record for a hearing on ―Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice Sector in Afghanistan,‖ before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs June 18, 2008. 587 Ibid. , 339. 588 USIP, Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan (Special Report No. 117, USIP, March 2004), 2-18, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/sr117.pdf.

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Thus, the intervener did not address the central problem of impunity and shed away from the need of accountability.589 Similarly, the lack of adequate financial resources and coordination among the donor nations resulted in a weak foundation of the legal judicial system (Supreme Court, Attorney General Office, Ministry of Justice, the police, and the prison service). The donors, however, made efforts to restore courts at the district and provincial centers. Nonetheless, the absence of courtrooms and professional practitioners in law were visible. Yet, the donor also started projects to educate the masses in peripheries about human rights and official laws whilst incorporating the traditional understanding of the law trusted by the populace.590

Rule of law is a core requirement for stability in the country. Yet, several factors have been hampering the restoration and access to rule of law in Afghanistan. These factors (cultural, practical, and physical) made the process complex and difficult to penetrate in the areas undergoing a combat battle, especially rural areas.591 Conflict and provincial areas are not experiencing state rule of law, but rather observing the Taliban code of law based on Sharia. In this way, the traditional method of justice also known as the informal justice system competes with the official system at every level because a majority of the populace thinks that the informal system is legitimate and accessible.592 Therefore, the question is not about the existence of two systems but legitimacy. The fault lines exist in the traditional form of justice adhering to Islamic law, customary, and tribal norms impeaching on the rights of women, minorities and accused of crimes. In addition, some Afghans are skeptical about the western models of justice. Most importantly, they do not understand the formal justice procedure because the level of literacy in the country is extremely low. The Afghan justice system is experiencing a divide between the adherents of secular state law and Islamic jurisprudence.593 Hence, the domination of the warlords who prefer ethnicity to the rule of law, absence of law-oriented regimes in the Afghan

589 Norah Niland, ―Impunity and Insurgency: a deadly combination in Afghanistan,‖ International Review of Red Cross 92, no.880 (December 2010): 8. 590 Matteo Tondini, 341-345. 591 Kara Jensen, "Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice System in Rural Afghanistan," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (2011):929, http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/18/iss2/11. 592 Hamid Khan, ―Clarifying the Role of Islamic Law in Afghanistan Justice System,‖ USIP Report, June 12, 2012. http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/clarifying-the-role-islamic-law-in-afghanistans-justice-system. 593International Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan‟s Broken Judiciary (Asia Report No195, Kabul/Brussels, November 17, 2010), 4.

157 history and social experiences of the populace have seriously affected the prospects of rule of law in the country.594

The Afghan judicial system has had also confronted the political challenge. The constitution (2004) is presidential in nature and hence gives substantial powers to the president, including the appointment of the judges of the apex court. Moreover, ―the lack of a clearly defined arbiter of the constitution has undercut the authority of the Supreme Court and transformed the court into a puppet of President Karzai.‖595 The latter has settled political rivalries and dispute through the court and got decisions in his favor. The political and constitutional set-up thus challenges the independence of the court. Therefore, it seems difficult to create and sustain an independent judiciary. Yet, the Afghan government can strengthen the judicial system with ―self-enforcing equilibrium‖ and a strengthened neo-patrimonial system.596

Corruption and nepotism are pervasive in the judicial sector. This is why the Afghan government‘s lackluster attitude to address the issue of corruption has made it illegitimate in the eyes of the local public. This state of affairs complicates efforts by the international community and Afghan government to enhance the public confidence in the state judicial system. However, corruption is not a new phenomenon in the Afghan judiciary. According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2010 survey report, ―Afghans paid around $2.5 billion dollars in bribes-a figure equivalent to twenty-three present of the Afghanistan‘s gross domestic product (GDP).‖597

In 2009, almost all public offices were involved in taking bribes, yet the judicial department officials were the maximum receivers of the bribery.598 The Integrity Watch Afghanistan 2010 survey further buttressed this disclosure and highlighted:

594 Husaini , 2010, 43 . 595 Nick Grono (Deputy President of the International Crisis Group ) , Rule of Law and the Justice System in Afghanistan ,presentation at the Foreign and Commonwealth London,26 April 2011, http://www. crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2011/rule-of-law-and-the-justice-system-in- afghanistan.aspx. 596 Barry R. Weingast, ―The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,‖ American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 245-263. 597 United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, ―Corruption In Afghanistan: Bribery As Reported By The Victims 25,‖ (2010), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/ Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010- Eng.pdf. 598 Ibid.

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The survey indicates that Afghans perceive the main institutions responsible for security and justice as the most corrupt. 42% of the respondents consider the Ministry of Interior to be the most corrupt, while the Ministry of Justice and the Directorate of National Security are perceived as the most corrupt by 32% and 30 %, respectively. Moreover, households paid the highest numbers of bribes for the provision of security and justice by the police and the courts.599

Similarly, the convergence of the state justice system and non-state justice system has been slow and troublesome. In this context, a synergy of the two competing systems is required, as proposed by a UNDP ―Afghanistan Human Development Report‖ (2007).600 This report provided a model based on the Afghan culture and the religious attributes described as ―a hybrid model of justice,‖ and recommended a bottom-up [practical] approach by creating Alternative Dispute Resolution and Human rights units alongside the official district courts.601

The non-state justice is intertwined with the counterinsurgency strategies. For instance, the US military pursued a COIN discourse focusing on winning the hearts and minds of the locals. The achievement of the task rested with good governance. Improvement in education, health, administration, and justice system were the major goals of the civilian strategy designed to inflict defeat on the Taliban. The Taliban, however, exploited the ―state rule of law gap,‖ in the rural areas. Thus, the intervener had no choice but to continue practicing the informal justice system.

It is noteworthy that the shift in the US position with respect to the informal justice system embedded in the ―COIN, repeating the now conventionalized wisdom that the weakness of formal justice sector in post-conflict areas to provide immediate access to justice in support of stabilization programme.‖602 Yet, the shift in the US position on supporting the non-state justice

599 Integrity Watch Afg., ―Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey,‖ 11 (2010), http://www.iwaweb.org/ Reports/PDF/IWA%20corruption% 20survey%202010.pdf. 600 Centre for Policy and Human Development , Bridging Modernity And Tradition: Rule Of Law And The Search For Justice ,Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/nhdr2007.pdf 601 Ali Wardak, ―State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan: The Need for Synergy,‖ University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 32, no.5 (2011): 1320. 602 Torunn Wimpelmann, ―Nexuses of Knowledge and Power in Afghanistan: the Rise and Fall of the Informal Justice Assemblage,‖ Central Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (November 2013): 416.

159 system politically and financially has not brought any substantial improvement in the rule of law in the peripheries and mitigating the insurgency. The intervener‘s withdrawal and incompetence of the Karzai regime to deal with the challenges to the restoration of justice in the transition period have constrained the public to support and embrace the Taliban-style justice system.

The fragile rule of law in the post-Taliban Afghanistan reveals exposes the errors committed by the external statebuilder in designing and execution of the judicial process. The lack of understanding on the local attitudes toward legal justice system derived from the western political thought, resources, and coordination among the donors in the preparation of the process have led to the failure in establishing a synergy between the state and non-state justice systems. The politicization of the process by the state elites has also exacerbated the locals‘ distrust in the state institutions, especially judiciary. In addition, the Afghanistan watchers label the judicial system as ―notoriously corrupt‖ and incapable of delivering justice. The aforementioned flaws negatively affect the nascent democratic political system in Afghanistan. After all, the absence of rule of law or ―thin rule of law‖ erode the trust of the populace in a political system that is based on the supremacy of law and equality where the constitution secures the fundamental rights of every citizen. If the transgression of government elites and warlords goes unpunished, the judicial process loses its acceptance and legitimacy. For instance, Karzai‘s meddling in the judicial affairs and the external power‘s provision of impunity to the war criminals in the Bonn Agreement led to the failure in terms of ―system consolidation‖ in Afghanistan. The Karzai regime, however, refused to coordinate its actions with the aspirations of citizens.

Conclusion

The US OEF was based on limited goals of conducting the militarized war on terror. The principal intervener was the primary executor of the Afghan intervention and it directed every aspect of the intervention, ranging from military power to finance. Its preference for the war on terror undermined the significance of promotion of democracy, rule of law, and socio-economic development. It continued to derive its policy from the situations and failed to understand the complexities of the war and their impact on the statebuilding project.

160

In the beginning, the principal intervener was highly skeptical about pursuing exogenous statebuilding. Yet, the idea of light footprint subsequently proved expensive and allowed other abusive power structures (warlords and armed groups) to fill the governance and security vacuum. To avoid the label of imperialist, the intervener gave the responsibility of political settlement among the warring factions to the UN, which led to the Bonn Agreement. Yet, it made a fatal mistake by keeping the Taliban outside the agreement, thus leaving them no other option except fighting against the externally supported regime. This agreement established a centralized regime but failed to expand the writ of the state beyond Kabul. This is why the Bush administration realized that statebuilding was the key to stabilization and promotion of democracy in Afghanistan. However, the lack of coordination among the coalition allies and Bush‘s decision to intervene Iraq resulted in another distressing turn for Afghanistan.

However, under the Obama administration, the Iraq war became the ―bad war‖ and the Afghan war transformed into a ―war of necessity,‖ thus again leading to a change in the policy. The US officials labeled the local support as the crux of the new counterinsurgency policy and declared the time frame of withdrawal. The Obama administration also focused on Pakistan to address the counterinsurgency problem in Afghanistan. Overall, throughout the war and processes, the intervener‘s policy remained inconsistent, flawed, and juggled. Therefore, one can attribute the resurgence of the Taliban to the flawed design of the Bonn Agreement, centralized Afghan regime, poor governance, and security issues. In contrast to the practice, ending the war and building a functioning democratic system required reconciliation process that could integrate the moderate Taliban in the democratization process. The intervener failed to realize the importance of peace process with the Taliban when it could have proved beneficial for the processes.

The intervener‘s ambiguous policies negatively affected the rule of law. Therefore, the Afghan regime appears inefficient and weak in establishing the rule of law. The intervener‘s ―top down approaches‖ in the [re] building of state judiciary proved merely a technical exercise and failed to understand that it had no link with the local understanding of justice and rule of law. In fact, the non-state justice system remained the dominant mode of solving disputes among the locals whilst the state justice system remained weak and corrupt. It also lacked appropriate physical infrastructure and professionals and served the needs of the rich and the powerful. The

161

Afghan, therefore, lost their trust in the official judicial mechanism and preferred traditional judicial organs to seek justice.

The intervener‘s endeavors to build a sustainable democratic political system faced several obstacles. It found difficulty in addressing the interwoven challenges to the process. The intertwined issues of security, lawlessness, insurgency, absence of the rule of law, and growing power structures clashed with the power of government. The Afghan government, therefore, remained fragile and could not exert jurisdiction nationwide or enjoy a high level of legitimacy. The government‘s limited capacity to provide human security and dependency on the foreign aid hindered it from establishing the country as a sovereign state. Finally yet importantly, the intervener also played a crucial role in the failure of the newly built Afghan state. It dashed the aspiration of the Afghans by reincarnating and endorsing the warlords in the interim government based on ethnic minorities. The stiff challenges originating from ethnic and tribal fractionalization ultimately led to the failure of the state and democracy building processes in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

162

Chapter Six Taliban Insurgency: Internal and External Dynamics

Introduction

This chapter seeks to investigate the core reasons of resurgence and growth of the Taliban insurgency in twelve years (2001-2013). It explores one of the most significant aspects of the insurgency that is its transnational dimension, especially the role of Pakistan. The principal intervener recognized the Taliban insurgency as the most strident challenge to the state and democracy building processes. The intervener and its allies failed to defeat the Taliban and achieve peace in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In this way, the Taliban insurgency was a consequential factor for the state and democracy building processes during the transitory period.603

Following the US-led invasion, Afghanistan experienced a ―descent into chaos‖ characterized by insurgent violence, crime, and insecurity. The US administration and the ISAF were not well prepared to counter the downward spiral of security and, in some ways, contributed to it. Limited mandate of the international forces, the US‘ diversion to Iraq, and the Bonn Agreement provided the Taliban with an opportunity to regroup themselves in a short period.604 Flawed statebuilding policies of the intervener created a power vacuum outside Kabul that was filled by the Taliban. By 2006, the situation reached a nadir. Growing insurgency and attacks on the international NGOs workers multiplied the absence of the central government security forces in the remote areas. The Taliban occupied territory in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan. From 2006 onward, the scope and strength of the insurgency kept

603 The argument for this chapter is largely drawn from my coauthored articles, Razia Sultana and Saira Aquil ―The Pakistani Pasthuns and the End Game in Afghanistan,‖ International Journal on World Peacexxix, no.4 (December 2012):13-35; Saira Aquil and Tasawer Hussian , ― Pak-US Strategic Cooperation: The Shadows of India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry,‖ Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences 27 (December 2009):14-35. 604 See, for instance, Raiz Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 99-162.

163 growing due to ―amalgamation of several independent opposition groups and recruitment of individuals seeking pride, income, retribution for civilian deaths and a sense of purpose.‖605

Several internal and external factors caused the eruption of insurgency, but some of them played a cardinal role in making the insurgency effective and protracted. Counterinsurgency specialist Seth G. Jones argues, ―The triggering effect of the insurgency is based on the weak governance and a well-articulated cause from insurgent leaders.‖606Geography, low income, and scattered rural population also bolstered the insurgency.607 The study of David Latin and James Fearon about civil wars and insurgencies erupted between 1945 to 1999 concluded that the ―financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices.‖608 The transnational factors, however, also contributed to the resurgence and endurance of insurgency in Afghanistan.

6.1 Resurgence of Taliban: Internal Factors

The aforementioned description explains the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan. The fall of Taliban regime and rise of the rival ethnic groups after the external intervention changed the equation of ethnic power balance in the country. The shift of balance of power in favor of the NA alienated the Pashtuns and caused grievances among them against the AIA. Although the induction of Pashtuns in the cabinet accommodated the ethnic factor, this process did not change the picture for Pashtuns living in the rural areas. In addition, the intervener‘s shortsighted plans with narrow objectives and a long history of conflict in the Afghan society made it far difficult to create national unity in the divided society.

605 Sultan Barakat and Steven A. Zyck, ―Afghanistan‘s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement,‖ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no.3 (2010):194. 606 Seth G. Jones, In the Grave yard of Empire: America‟s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W .Norton & Company,Inc, 2010), 54. 607 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing,1964), 38. 608 James D.Fearon and David D.Laitin, ―Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,‖ American Political Science Review 97, no.1 (February 2003):75-76; See, for instance, Paul Staniland, ―States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,‖ Perspectives on Politics10, no.2 (June 2012):243-264.

164

Ethnic preferences of the national government paved the way for exacerbating violence and insurgency.609 However, Ali Jalali, Adam Roberts, Najibullah Lafraie and Gilles Dorronsoro identified the absence of state institutions in the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan rather than ethnicity as the most significant cause of the insurgency.610 The interveners made an alliance with the local tribal leaders and focused on those areas where they confronted the least of resistance. The external forces‘ presence was minor in the south and east during the preparatory phase of the OEF. They sought to keep the presence and engagement limited that provided an opportunity to the Taliban to regroup themselves and strengthen their hold on the Pashtun majority regions. The principle intervener‘s intelligence officials assumed that the Taliban were a ―spent force‖ and no longer posed a threat to the intervener and its allies.611However, their calculation, based on ignorance and arrogance, proved wrong.

The intervener‘s under-financed and under-manned involvement and lack of governance in the targeted country became more evident with the rise of the Taliban. The Bush administration did not realize its mistake, but rather defended the policy. For instance, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ―I don‘t buy the argument that Afghanistan was starved of resources. And, I don‘t think the U.S. government had what it needed for reconstructing a country. We did it ad hoc in the Balkans, and then in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq.‖612 Conversely, Ambassador James Dobbins challenged her argument and argued, ―Afghanistan was the least resourced of any major American-led nation building operation since the end of WWII.‖613

Fearon and Laitin suggest that a conflict can only be declared a war in a country when at least one thousand deaths occur in the combat per year.614With reference to this definition,

609 Interview with Rahimullah Yousafzai, an eminent journalist and expert on Taliban, January 15, 2015. 610 See, for instance Gilles Dorronsoro, Afghanistan :At the Breaking Point (Special Report ,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,2010), 18-19;Ali A. Jalali, ―The Future of Afghanistan,‖ Parameters (Spring 2006):4- 19;Adam Roberts, ―Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan,‖ Survival51, no.1 (2009): 29-60; Najibullah Lafraie, ―Resurgence of the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan:How and Why,‖ International Politics 46 (January 2009): 102-113. 611 David Rohde and David E.Sanger, ―How a ‗Good War‘ in Afghanistan Went Bad,‖ New York Times, August 12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 612 Quoted in Ibid. 613 Quoted in Peter Bergen, ―Afghanistan 2007,Problems,Opportunities and Possible Solutions,‖ prepared statement submitted for the Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representative, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, Afghanistan On The Brink: Where Do We Go From Here?, (February 15,2 007), 25. 614James D. Fearon and David D.Laitin, ―Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,‖ 87.

165

Afghanistan was not experiencing war from 2002 to 2004. Taliban were defeated, but their losses were not significant because they never had a regular army and dispersed in the rural areas after the invasion. Top Taliban leadership either fled to Pakistani Tribal areas or dispersed in the Pashtun communities in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban ascribed their retreat as a ―tactical retreat‖ and proved later on that they had the ability to adapt and expand in difficult circumstances. They also reorganized their movement to attack the NATO forces in Afghanistan.615 Even immediately after the defeat, they launched several attacks against the international forces and their Afghan allies. For instance, in September 2002, they attempted to assassinate the head of interim set-up Hamid Karzai in Kandahar and later accepted the responsibility.616

The intervener‘s high-handed approach toward the Taliban and Al Qaeda was also an important internal factor that contributed to the resurgence of Taliban and increased feeling of hatred among the Afghan masses toward the international forces. The US troops‘ insensitivity to the Afghan cultural traits also caused defiance toward the external combat forces. Grievances emerged against the foreign troops for violating the Pashtun traditions, supporting warlords, and making them a part of the power structure. The Karzai government failed to establish the state writ in southern and eastern Afghanistan. It did not try to replace the informal power structure with central state features. It also dealt the local governmental affairs through traditional loyalty and nepotism that undermined the significance of the central government authority. Therefore, Taliban took advantage of the political, economic, social, and coercive gaps in state and democracy building processes and established ―shadow governments‖ with ―shadow governors‖ and ―district governors‖ in virtually every province and district of Afghanistan by 2012.617 They created a hierarchy in governance. Their representatives at the district level were answerable to provincial authority and thus connected them with the apex cabinet.

Growing civilian casualties also proved important in the context of insurgency. The intervener conducted most of the military operations and aerial bombardment in the Pashtun majority areas. Its policy led even the moderate Pashtuns to turn against the intervener. The

615 Personal Interview of Dr. Ashraf Ali, President of FATA Research Centre, Islamabad, June 12, 2012. 616 ―Karzai survives attempt on his life,‖ BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2238428.stm. 617 Personal interview with serving Pakistan Military Officer (Military Operations Directorate), February 10, 2015; see, for detail analysis on Taliban Insurgency ,Juergen Kleiner, ―How Many Lives Do the Taliban Have?,‖ Diplomacy & Statecraft 25,no.4(On line Published 21 November, 2014):708-731.

166 death toll caused by US-NATO aggressive air bombardment was higher than the Taliban attacks on the civilian population.618 NATO dropped approximately 3,572 bombs alone in 2007.619Along with aerial bombardment, the foreign troops brutally killed the Afghan civilians.620 Karzai often pleaded to the international forces to coordinate with their Afghan counterparts whilst launching air strikes in the remote areas in order to reduce civilian casualties. However, the numbers kept on rising every passing year.

As shown in Figure 6-1, the numbers of casualties were high in the first two months of US-led militarized intervention. The intervener used indiscriminate bombing and with the help of an ally NA on the ground. The NA forces also did massive atrocities against the Pashtuns (low cadre Taliban) to oust the Taliban regime and eliminate Al Qaeda terrorist network. From 2006 onward, there was a steady increase in the civilian casualties attributed to various factors but primarily the Afghan war. According to the UNAMA reports, the civilian casualties were not only caused by Taliban and other anti-government opposition armed groups but also by the US, ISAF, and ANSF. However, the intensity of fight was instrumental in increasing the numbers of civilians killed amid the counterinsurgency operations.

Taliban resistance gradually gained momentum in the initial years of OEF. From 2002 to 2006, the Taliban launched several attacks, but they were ineffectual to derail the process of electoral engineering. The conflict was largely confined to battles between Al Qaeda and the coalition forces. After 2006, however, the insurgency grew and several other groups such as Jalaluddin Haqqani‘s Haqqani Network, remnants of Hizb-e-Islami, and foreign networks

618 See, for example, Nicholas J. Wheeler, ―Dying for ‗Enduring Freedom‘: Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in the War against Terror,‖ International Relations 16, 2 (2002): 205-225; Jonathan Steele, ―Forgotten Victims. The full human cost of US air strikes will never be known, but many more died than those killed directly by bombs,‖ The Guardian, May 20, 2002 ; Aldo A. Benini and Lawrence H. Moulton, ―Civilian Victims in an Asymmetrical Conflict. Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan,‖ Journal of Peace Research 41, 4 (2004): 403- 422; In 2002, Scott Peterson noted that ―by one estimate, the number of civilians killed per bomb dropped may have been four times as high in Afghanistan as in Yugoslavia,‖ see his article, ― ‗Smarter‘ Bombs Still hit Civilians,‖ Christian Science Monitor (October 22, 2002) ,http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1022/p01s01-wosc.htm. 619 Lt. Gen (Retd.) David Barno, Testimony, statement for the record for a hearing on Strategic Chaos and Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan. before the Sub Committee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee On Foreign Affairs House of Representative,110th Congress, Second Session, April 2,2008 (US Government Printing Office,Washington,2008), .http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg41674/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg41674.pdf. 620 Chris McGreal, “US soldiers 'killed Afghan civilians for sport and collected fingers as trophies',” The Guardian, September 9,2010,http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/09/us-soldiers-afghan- civilians-fingers;for details; see, for instance, Mark Boal, “The Kill Team: How U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent Civilians,” Rolling Stone , March 27,2011, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team-20110327#ixzz3Q3Oc WFf .

167 including Al Qaeda got involved in spreading violence.621 By 2006, the Afghan forces also started their services and entered in the violent security environment and severe combat battles.

Afghan Civilians Deaths (2001-2013)

3500

3,131

2,959

2970

2,792

2,768

3000

2,412

2500

2118

2000

1523

1500 929

1000

478

440

407

400

500

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

(Figure 6-1 Afghan Civilians deaths (2001-2013))

Sources: Susan G. Chesser, ―Afghanistan Casualties Military Forces and Civilians‖, CRS Report for Congress, R41084, December 6, 2012, 1-8,http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41084.pdf;Jack Epstein, Matthew B. Stannard, ―Tally of civilian deaths depends on who's counting / Definitive estimates difficult to obtain,‖ San Francisco Chronicle, May12,2005,http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Tally-of-civilian-deaths-depends-on-who-s-2671420. php; Marc Herold, ―Counting the dead,‖ The Guardian, August 8, 2002,http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2002/ aug/08/ afghanistan.comment; Richard Brian Miller, Terror, Religion, and Liberal Thought,(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), Appendix 2, 174; ―Afghanistan war: every death mapped,‖ The Guardian, June 23, 2011,

621 International Crisis Group, Taliban Propaganda: Wining the War of Words (Asia Report No 158, Kabul/Brussels, July 24, 2008), 15.

168 http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/interactive/2011/jun/23/afghanistan-deaths-mapped; News Update,― Afghanistan civilian casualty figures drop for the first time in 6 years,‖February19, 2013, http://www.unama. unmissions.org/Default.aspx? ItemID=36445&ctl=Details&language=en-US&mid=15756&tabid=12254; UNAMA, ―Afghanistan Annual Report On Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, 2009,‖ Human Rights Kabul, January 2010, 1-43, http://unama.unmissions.org/portals/unama/human%20rights/protection%20of%20civilian%202009% 20report%20english.pdf; UNAMA, ―Afghanistan Annual Report 2013, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict,‖ February 2014, 1-93, http://www.unama.unmissions.org/ Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC- report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf.

Slow and low recruitment of the soldiers in initial years and the principal intervener‘s decision to build an Afghan Army from the ground provided the Taliban with time and space for successful maneuvering. The intervener adopted a ―force protection‖ doctrine to reduce the ―human cost of the war‖.622 As shown in figure 6-2, the numbers of U.S. troops‘ casualties remained low in the first four years of intervention. After 2005, the numbers started increasing. Afghanistan witnessed the highest number of casualties in 2010. In the same year, the intervener made the last effort to defeat the Taliban, but all went in vain. Taliban were hurt but not defeated. In the coming years, the numbers started decreasing due to the shifting of combat responsibility and withdrawal of the foreign forces from Afghanistan.

James Dobbins explained the situation in his hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, ―We speak of Taliban as if it were a united enemy, but it represents only one of a number of insurgents groups headquartered in Pakistan.‖623 Seth Jones portrayed the nature of insurgency as fractured and localized.624 His argument was akin to David Kilcullen‘s argument who explained, ―Although it is often described by the aggregative shorthand term ―Taliban‖, the insurgent coalition in Afghanistan is actually a fragmented series of shifting tactical alliances of convenience, especially in the east.‖ 625

The downward spiral of security situation and an increased level of violence convinced the intervener to adopt a new counterinsurgency strategy. New Strategy, however, further

622 Lorenzo Zambernardi, ―Counterinsurgency‘s: Impossible Trilemma,‖ The Washington Quarterly 3, no. 21 (July 2013): 26. 623 James Dobbins, ―Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,‖ CT-318,Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT318.html. 624 Seth G. Jones, ―U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,‖ CT-324,Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, April 2,2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ CT324.html. 625 David Kilcullen, ―Taliban and Counter-Insurgency in Kunar,‖ in Decoding the New Taliban, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 231-232.

169 increased the casualties and violence, yet the Taliban suffered fewer losses due to the asymmetric nature of insurgency. Conversely, the new ―troop surge‖ policy increased the casualties of U.S. forces and civilians three-fold. An ISAF commander wrote in a classified review of the Afghan security:

600

U.S Troops Deaths in Afghanistan

499

500

414

400

311

310

300

200 155

128

117

98 98

100

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

(Figure 6-2 U.S Troops Deaths in Afghanistan)

Sources: U.S. Military Casualties-Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Casualty Summary by Month, https:// www. dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oef_month.xhtml#; Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―Afghanistan Index, Also including selected data on Pakistan,‖ Brookings Institution, October, 2014, 1-34, http://www. brookings.edu/ ~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20141029.pdf; Susan G. Chesser, ―Afghanistan Casualties Military Forces and Civilians,‖ CRS Report, R41084, December, 2012, 1-8, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/

170

R41084.pdf; Coalition Military Fatalities By Year, http://icasualties.org/OEF/index.aspx;http:// www.defense.gov/ News/casualty.pdf; ―U.S and Coalition Casualties,‖ http://edition.cnn.com/ SPECIALS/ 2004/oef.casualties/ index. html;Allen West, ―US military deaths in Afghanistan skyrocket under Obama,‖ February 13, 2014, http:// allenbwest.com/2014/02/us-military-deaths-afghanistan-skyrocket-obama; Alan Mclean and Archie Tse, ―American Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq: The number of troops in each country since operations began in Afghanistan in late 2001 and in Iraq in spring 2003,‖ New York Times, June 22, 2011, http://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2011/ 06/22/world/asia/american-forces-in-afghanistan-and-iraq.html?_r=0.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious, neither success nor failure can be taken for granted…we face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans in both their government and the international community that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents.‖626 He stressed on the deployment of more troops and resources and support of the local population as a bid to get the support of the Afghan populace required ending the aerial bombardment to avoid collateral damage.

The new strategy included a time frame of the troop surge and withdrawal (as shown in figure 6-3). It also emphasized strengthening and enabling ANSF to take the responsibility for security in the country. In 2011, the numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan were at the highest point, approximately 100,000. By September 2012, the strength was reduced to the pre-surge level, around 68,000.627 In spite of military and civilian efforts, the Obama administration appeared unable to produce positive results. Its critics contended that it had hardly made a noticeable daunt in the Taliban insurgency. The administration, therefore, started considering the option of a political settlement with the Taliban.

New induction in the Taliban movement led to the genesis of a new phrase, neo-Taliban, and divided the latter into two main ideological groups: radical Taliban inspired by AlQaeda ideology and the adherents of Pashtun traditions.628 The economy factor, unemployment and lack of resources, also proved important in recruitment.629In this way, the religion factor adhering the

626 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‗‗ISAF Commander‘s Counterinsurgency Guidance,‘‘August 26, 2009, 2, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/ofﬁcial_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf. 627 Kenneth Katzman, ―Afghanistan: Post Taliban Governance, Security, and US policy,‖ CRS Report, RL-30588, January 17, 2014. 628See, for details, Amin Tarzi, ―The Neo-Taliban,‖ in The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, eds. Robert D.Crews and Amin Tarzi (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 274-310. 629 Shahid A. Afsar and Christopher A. Samples, The Evolution of the Taliban(Master‘s Thesis, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, June 2008), 57-60, http:// www.nps.edu/ programs/ ccs/ Docs/ Pubs/Afsar_ Samples_thesis.pdf.

171 idea of ―Islam under threat‖ complimented the economy factor. The past record shows that during the ―jihad times‖, the power equilibrium titled in the favor of religious authority.630

U.S Troops In Afghanistan

120000

100,000 100,000

100000 89,000

67,400

80000 66,000

60000 33,700

40000 26,500

23,300

17,800

16,700

13,100

9,700

20000

1,300

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

(Figure 6-3 Maximum Number of U.S Troops in Afghanistan Per Year)

Sources: ―Afghanistan Index Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,‖ Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index; Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―Afghanistan Index Also including selected data on Pakistan,‖ Brookings, October 29, 2014, http:// www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20141029.pdf; Hannah Fairfield, Kevin Quealy And Archie Tse, ―Troop Levels in Afghanistan Since 2001: How the American and NATO commitment in Afghanistan has evolved since 2001,‖ New York Times, October 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes. com/ interactive/ 2009/10/01/world/middleeast/afghanistan-policy.html?_r=2&; Barack Obama, ―Message to the Congress-Report Consistent with War Powers Resolution,‖ December 13, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/2013/12/13/message-congress-report-consistent-war-powers-resolution; Mark Duell, ―We've turned a

630 Alia Brahimi, ―The Taliban‘s Evolving Ideology,‖ LSE Global Governance, Working Paper WP 02/2010, July 2010, 5.

172 corner': Obama defends plan to bring home over 30,000 troops after defence chief labels it risky and aggressive,‖ mail online, June24 2011, http://www.dailymail. co. uk/news/article-2007099/Obamas-plan-withdraw-30k-troops- Afghanistan-risky.html; Nick Simeone, ―Obama: U.S. to Keep Nearly 10,000 Troops in Afghanistan in 2015,‖ American Forces Press Service, DoD News, Washington, May 27, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/news/ newsarticle.aspx?id=122340.

Oliver Roy extended a similar understanding by arguing, ―The jihad always implies a shift in power relations in favor of religious leaders and to the detriment of the khan… it is the external threat which gives Islam its energizing power.‖631

Apart from recruitment, the Taliban adopted modern propaganda techniques to project strength and get legitimacy for their movement.632 ―Night letters‖ were the hallmark of their media campaign. They used radio and telephonic interviews of their spokespersons to garner the support of civilians and legitimacy for their actions against the Karzai regime and external troops.633They used media technology to legitimize their actions, agenda, and ideology among the Afghans.634Their propaganda techniques equated their struggle with a coercive struggle against colonizers and their puppet regime in Kabul. They blended Afghan nationalism with religion and declared their struggle a ―resistance movement‖ and at times ―war of liberation‖.635

However, the Taliban needed funds to keep the insurgency movement alive. They had multiple means of generating money. For instance, they made revenue through levying poppy harvest and smuggling drugs.636They provided protection to drug laboratories and the drug traffickers, although the Taliban regime had banned poppy cultivation in the phase of its rule. Yet, in the post-Taliban Afghanistan, poppy cultivation soared with the regime change. According to a Security Council report, ―Revenue extorted from nation-wide enterprises such as narcotics producers and traffickers, construction and trucking companies, mobile telephone

631 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 61-62. 632 ICG, Taliban Propaganda: Wining the War of Words (Asia Report No 158, Kabul/Brussels, July 24, 2008), i . 633 ICG Report; see also Thomas H. Johnson, ―The Taliban: Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah,‖ Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no.3 (September 2007):317-344.; see ,for instance, Tim Foxley, The Taliban‟s Propaganda Activities (Stockholm: SIPRI, June 2007), 6-7,http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/foxley_paper.pdf 634 Alia Brihaimi, 15. 635 Aisbah Allah Abdel Baky, "The Taliban Strategy: Religious & Ethnic Factors," The World in Crisis, http:// 198.65.147.194/English/Crisis/2001/11/article11.shtml. 636Michael Erwin, ‗Key Factors for the Recent Growth of the Afghan Insurgency‘, CTC Sentinel1, no. 9 ( August 2008): 10.

173 operators, mining companies and aid and development projects goes to the Taliban Financial Commission which answers to the Taliban leadership‖.637

Taliban took advantage of the Karzai regime‘s inability in consuming the huge amount of aid transparently in the development projects. For example, a Security Council report mentioned, ―In Farah Province, local officials report that the Taliban take up to 40 per cent of the money coming in to pay for the National Solidarity Program, one of the most successful community reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.‖638Although the Taliban insurgency was resilient in nature, the deficiencies in the exogenous statebuilding experiment also supported the movement. However, the transnational factor also played a significant role in the resurgence and resilience of Taliban insurgency. The involvement of the regional countries, especially Pakistan, deteriorated the security situation and strengthened the insurgency. Barnett Rubin blamed Pakistan for providing the Taliban with sanctuaries in its tribal areas and helping them to reconstitute their command structure, finance, and logistic bases.639 The transnational links and interactions across the Durand line between the co-ethnic Pashtuns substantially influenced the movement. Similarly, the identity factor was corresponding with the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan that found a new war theater, the post-Taliban Afghanistan. This rivalry had a precarious impact on the security of the post-Taliban Afghanistan.

6.2 The Pakistan Context: Transnational Factor

The insurgency in Afghanistan was a product of multiple internal and external factors, but the intensity of insurgency seemed to be closely linked with the Pakistani Pashtuns and the Pakistani state‘s response to the Taliban insurgency.640The OEF achieved its main objective with the

637 Security Council Report, First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, (S/2012/683), September 5, 2012,13,http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C- 8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_683.pdf. 638 Ibid.,15 639 Barnett R. Rubin, ―Saving Afghanistan,‖ Foreign Affairs 86, no.1 (January/February 2007): 58. 640 A November 2005 follow-on report by 9/11 Commissioners warned that Pakistan ‗remains a sanctuary and training ground for terrorists.‘‘ In a February 2006 review of global threats, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told a Senate panel that Pakistan ‗‗remains a major source of extremism that poses a threat to President Musharraf, to the United States, and to neighboring India and Afghanistan.‘‘ In June, State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator Henry A. Crumpton told a Senate panel that elements of Pakistan‘s ‗‗local, tribal governments‘‘ work in collusion with the Taliban and Al Qaeda—but the United States has ‗‗no compelling

174 removal of Taliban from power and forcing them to retreat from the power centers. The Taliban leader Mullah Omer allegedly found a sanctuary in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and the mid-rank leaders made FATA their home.641The Taliban exodus from Afghanistan and their refuge in the tribal region made the area a hub of radical militants who were pursuing an anti- state agenda.

The tribal region of Pakistan became the center of counterinsurgency operations launched by Pakistan army. The US continuously pressurized Pakistan to mitigate the strength of Afghan Taliban, although it also continued to question the impartiality of the army in conducting the military operations. For instance, Pakistan had reportedly airlifted trapped Taliban forces, Pakistani military and security personnel, and other fighters from Kunduz in January 2002.642 S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly argue:

The Pakistanis did not wholly abandon their erstwhile allies (Taliban), however, for despite assuming a central role in the global war on terror, Pakistan had not altered its Afghan agenda; as before, the Pakistanis desired a friendly regime in Kabul to facilitate their acquisition of strategic depth, access to Central Asia, training of militants, exclusion of India from the area, and favorable resolution of border issues.643

Pashtuns proved to be the key actors in insurgency movement. This is why they had a decisive role in the escalation of conflict and peace in Afghanistan. The ethnic, religious, racial, and tribal

evidence‘‘ that Pakistan‘s major intelligence agency is assisting militants. The Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. Abizaid, reiterated this point last August, saying he believed the Pakistani military and Musharraf are fully committed to combating regional terrorism. 641 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, ―No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan- Afghanistan Frontier,‖ International Security 32, no. 4 (spring 2008): 42. 642 See, for instance, Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 90–93; Seymour M. Hersh, ―The Getaway: Questions Surround a Secret Pakistan airlift,‖ New Yorker, January 28, 2002, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/ 01/28/the-getaway-2; and Press Trust of India, ―India Protests Airlift of Pak Fighters from Kunduz, Fears They Will Enter Kashmir,‖ Indian Express, January 2002, http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid =6813. 643 S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, ―The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia,‖ International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 131.

175 affinities strengthened the connections between the co-ethnics. Shared borders and cultural affinities thus made the Pakistani Pashtuns the ―villains of Afghan war‖.644

The Afghanistan watchers attributed the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan to the support of co-ethnic Pashtuns in border regions and alleged support from Pakistan‘s security apparatus. The international community also claimed that Pakistan‘s involvement in the Taliban resurgence was directly proportional to the increase of violence and deadly attacks on the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan was also blamed for having close relations with the Haqqani network and providing it with sanctuaries in North Waziristan. According to Seth G. Jones, ―There is significant evidence that the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), Al-Qaeda, and other insurgent groups use Pakistan as a sanctuary for recruitment and support. In addition, there is virtual unanimity among US, NATO, UN, and Afghan officials that Pakistan‘s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has continued to provide assistance to Afghan insurgent groups.‖645

The relationship between Haqqanis and the ISI was complex and covert. There are two contending views on the Haqqani group. According to the first view, the Haqqani network conducted attacks against the ANSF and the coalition forces independently, generated money on its own and was no longer under the influence of ISI.646 A significant feature of the Haqqani Network was its wealth capacity, which distinguished it from other insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan. The group‘s money generation network, based on legal and illegal economic activities, extended beyond the region and into the Persian Gulf.647 Because of its diversified and robust revenue streams, the Haqqani Network was able to afford a powerful and growing fighting force in Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, the coalition forces extensively targeted the Haqqani network but failed to dismantle it completely due to its fiscal capacity and independence from other state and non-state

644 Razia Sultana and Saira Aquil ―The Pakistani Pashtuns and the End Game in Afghanistan,‖ International Journal on World Peace xxix, no.4 (December 2012): 15. 645 Seth G Jones, ―Pakistan‘s Dangerous Game,‖ Survival 49, no.1 (Spring 2007):15. 646 Personal Interview of Rahimullah Yousafzai; Jeffrey Dressler, Combating the Haqqani Terrorist Network, (Written Testimony), (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, September 13, 2012), http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA18-WState- DresslerJ-20120913.pdf. 647 Ibid., 2; Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink(Viking, NY: 2012); Gretchen Peters, ―Haqqani Network Financing: the Evolution of an Industry,‖ Combating Terrorism Center- West Point, July 2012.

176 influences.648 Its leadership considered Mullah Omer the ‗Amir-ul-Momineen‘. Its primary area of control was in southeastern Afghanistan in the provinces of Khost, Paktika and Paktia, known as P2K.649 The network retained significant influence on the security environment, Afghan government, and the population in the southeast. Yet, they also expanded their zone of attacks outside the P2K.

After 2005, the expansion of the network in areas such as Logar, Wardak, Nangarhar, Laghman, and Kapisa enabled it to plan, resource, and execute spectacular attacks in Kabul that became its hallmark.650 Haqqanis launched their most lethal and well-coordinated attacks in the green zone of Kabul(ISAF headquarters in April 2012 and the US diplomatic mission in September 2011).651 Following the September 2011 attacks on U.S. embassy in Kabul, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mullen testified before Senate Armed Services Committee on 22 September 2011 that the Haqqani network acted ―as a veritable arm‖ of the ISI.652

Similarly, Pakistan‘s relationship with the Taliban had a historical and strategic connection.653The former drove this relationship on the base of its national interest in the

648 Joshua Partlow, ―In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is‗Resilient‘ Foe,‖ Washington Post, May 30, 2011. 649Kenneth Katzman, ―Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,‖ CRS Report, RL30588, December 2, 2014, 15. 650Isaac Hock, ―Fact Sheet: The Fight for Eastern Afghanistan,‖ March 16, 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org/ reference/fact-sheet-fight-eastern-afghanistan. 651Mirwais Harooni and Hamid Shalizi,“Taliban attack across Kabul, target U.S. Embassy,” Reuters, September 13, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/13/us-afghanistan-blast-idUSTRE78B61S20110913. 652Jalaluddin Haqqani came to prominence as one of the leading ―mujahideen commanders‖ during the anti-Soviet ―jihad‖ of the 1980s. Since at least the 1980s, he has forged long-standing ties to Arabs who have been fighting in the area and providing funding for the same. While he has at times been opposed to the Afghan Taliban, he currently supports them with his militant operations. Based in Pakistan‘s North Waziristan Agency, he is one of the most formidable foes of the U.S. He has robust ties to Al-Qaeda and various Pakistan-based militant groups, in addition to the Afghan Taliban. Because of his advanced age, Jalaluddin‘s son Sirajudin Haqqani is increasingly in charge of the network.It is alleged that the ―Haqqani Network,‖ remains one of the most important assets of the Pakistani state in Afghanistan. See Jeffrey A. Dressler, The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan (Institute for the Study of War, October 2011), http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Haqqani_Network_Compressed.pdf.;Kenneth Kartzman ,21.; E. Schmitt, ‗US Tries to Cool Admiral‘s Fire toward Pakistan,‘ International Herald Tribune, September 30, 2011;For detail discussion see, for instance ,Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan: 2001-2014(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2014) ; see M. Waldman, ‗Between the Sun and the Sky: the Relationship between Pakistan‘s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,‘ Discussion Paper 18, (Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2010). 653 See, for instance, ―Pakistani agents funding and training Afghan Taliban,‖ BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/10302946. In one of the largest single disclosures of such information in US history, WikiLeaks, a self-described whistleblower organization, released more than 91,000 classified documents in July 2010, largely consisting of low- level field reports. These documents merely confirmed the long held belief that Pakistan‘s intelligence agency continues to guide the Afghan insurgency even as it continues to receive more than $1 billion a year from Washington to combat the extremists.

177 neighborhood. Several Western scholars and policy makers portrayed Pakistan‘s role as a double game in dismantling and eliminating the Taliban leadership and their sanctuaries in the tribal belt. According to Carlotta Gall, ―Pakistan is the main antagonist behind the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and it has not distanced itself from the Afghan Taliban.‖654 He also claimed that the Pakistani leadership had not buried the strategic depth policy. Pakistan‘s tribal belt was not only a sanctuary for Taliban but also the madrassas located in FATA and its adjacent localities provided fresh recruits for the Taliban insurgency.

The US accused Pakistan of not taking stringent actions against the insurgent groups entrenched in FATA. Pakistan‘s role in addressing the security situation in the post-Taliban Afghanistan and collaboration with U.S. and Afghanistan in targeting the Taliban and their affiliates was described as ―dubious.‖655Even so, the Pakistani military started counterterrorist operation in the tribal areas as early as 2004. It launched several military operations to eradicate the Taliban and Al Qaeda who were reportedly regrouping in the area. Military operations costed lives of soldiers and civilians but did a considerable damage to the non-state actors residing in the Pakistani territory. With the passage of time, Pakistan expanded the scope and target of these operations, even though the principal intervener continued to criticize its counterterrorist strategy and pressurized it to ―do more‖ to address the militancy predicament.

To address the militancy predicament, President Bush ordered drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan to eliminate the top hierarchy of Al Qaeda and Taliban. The US drone strikes in the tribal areas inflicted heavy losses on the Pashtun community. The Obama administration, under the guise of the AfPak policy, escalated the pace of drone strikes that caused deaths of innocent civilians in the FATA region. The US drone strategy or ―covert action program authorized by President Bush targeted Al Qaeda leadership and other groups inside Pakistan.‖656 Bush‘s decision to use predators was linked with the intelligence report showing ISI‘s link with Siraj Haqqani, whose network was allied with the Afghan Taliban.657

654Patrick Cockburn, ―Double Game: ‗The Wrong Enemy,‘ by Carlotta Gall,‖ New York Times, April 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/books/review/the-wrong-enemy-by-carlotta-gall.html?_r=0. 655 Personal Interview with Najmuddin Shaikh, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (1994-1997), January 24, 2015. 656 Bob Woodward, Obama‟s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 4. 657 Leslie A. Gelb, ―What‘s Wrong with Panetta,‖ The Daily Beast, July 13, 2011, http://www.thedailybeast. com/articles/2011/07/13/defense-secretary-leon-panetta-s-uncharacteristic-verbal-gaffes.html.

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From 2004 to 2009, the Bush administration ordered 44 strikes in the tribal areas. In contrast, the Obama administration accelerated the pace of attacks.658 The effectiveness of the drone strike in eradicating the militants was paradoxical in nature. Several reports suggest that a large number of militants killed in the drone strike were from low cadres. The intervener was able to target only a few important insurgents. However, the targeted masses particularly Pashtuns raised their voice against the drone strikes. In this context, David Kilcullen wrote, ―The drone strikes are counterproductive because they stoke anger against the United States among the Pakistani public, potentially adding to the pool of militant recruits.‖659 According to the latest report on security data, the US carried out 370 drone strikes in Pakistan‘s tribal areas between June 2004 and December 2013 killing around 2287 to 2377 suspected militants.660However, there was a decline in drone strikes after the resistance of international organizations. They put pressure on the principal intervener to avoid collateral damage and violation of state sovereignty. Although Pakistan‘s government publically showed its reservations on the drone attacks, there seemed a tacit understanding between U.S. and Pakistan on the strategy. Therefore, drones are likely to remain in the airspace of Pakistan because they are a vital part of Obama‘s strategy to fight against the insurgents and Al Qaeda in FATA, even after the US exit from Afghanistan.

Apart from Pakistan‘s interest in Afghanistan, the shifting of India-Pakistan enduring rivalry in the ―Afghan war theater‖ also provided an impetus to the Taliban insurgency. Pakistani defense planners were not comfortable with the growing Indian role in the reconstruction of the post-Taliban Afghanistan. India adopted the policy of ―soft power‖ by increasing its influence in the new power structure through civilian efforts.661Yet, the Indian involvement in post-Taliban Afghanistan statebuilding activities was not only based on humanitarian grounds. The policy objectives seemed beyond humanitarian concerns. It was rather strategic in nature, even though India had a historical relationship with Afghanistan. The Indo-Afghan ties go back to King Zahir Shah‘s period. The former also maintained close ties with Sardar Daoud, Taraki and Najibullah

658 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ―Washington‘s Phantom War: The Effects of the US Drone Program in Pakistan,‖ Foreign Affairs 90, no.4 (July/August 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67939/peter-bergen- and-katherine-tiedemann/washingtons-phantom-war. 659 Quoted in Ibid. 660 See, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis. 661 Harsh V. Pant, ―The Afghanistan Conflict: India‘s Changing Role,‖ Middle East Quarterly18, no.2 (Spring 2011):32.

179 regimes.662 India supported the NA against Taliban during the civil war. Later on, it cemented its position after the US-led intervention and subsequent overthrow of the Taliban regime. After the inauguration of the Karzai regime, it maintained close ties with Punjsharies who were holding important positions in the country.

India‘s relations with the NA stretch back to 1990s when the Indian assistance to the latter was channeled through Farkhor airbase (located near Tajik-Afghan border) to send military equipment and strategic advisors and transport the injured fighters to an Indian hospital based in a Tajik border region.663 The new set-up thus provided India with an open window to pursue a proactive and broader policy toward Afghanistan. India‘s interests were not only confined to the economic rebuilding of the targeted state but also to increase its sphere of influence in every aspect of the state and democracy building experiment in order to diminish Pakistan‘s influence and preserve its status as a regional hegemonic power.

On the developmental front, India invested a large amount in the construction of physical infrastructure, health, and education. It was the fifth largest donor to Afghanistan and committed around $2 billion of aid to remain influential in the country. It also signed a ―Strategic Partnership Agreement‖ with Afghanistan to formalize and strengthen its partnership with the Karzai regime. This agreement covered several domains ranging from security cooperation to trade, diplomacy, and cultural ties.664 Noteworthy Indian projects were a 220 km road linking Afghanistan to an Iranian port, construction of Salam Dam project in Herat province, building of the Afghan parliament and construction of 218km Zaranj-Delaram highway.665

India also established a strong niche in the communication sector by operationalizing a modern TV studio, 1000W TV transmitter in Jalalabad, setting up a mobile TV satellite uplink and five relay centers in Nangarhar province bordering Pakistan‘s tribal belt.666In education and public sector, the Indian investment was not limited to building the infrastructures. It gave

662 Nauman Asghar, ―India-Afghanistan nexus,‖ The Nation, May 31, 2009. 663Sudha Ramachandran, ―India makes a soft landing in Tajikistan,” Asia Times online, March 3, 2007, http://www. atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IC03Df01.html. 664 Azizullah Khan, ―India in Afghanistan,‖ Daily Times, May 22, 2012. 665 Ibid. , Dr. Manzur Ejaz , ―Competing in Afghanistan,‖ Daily Times, August 12, 2009; Gareth Price, ―India‘s Policy towards Afghanistan,‖ Asia ASP 2013/04, August 2013,Chatham House, 5-6, http://www.chathamhouse. org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/0813pp_indiaafghanistan.pdf . 666 Manzur Ejaz, ―Competing in Afghanistan,‖.

180 training and grants to young civil bureaucrats and scholarships to the Afghan students to study in its universities.667 It established an agriculture university in Helmand province in addition to small-scale development projects near the Durand Line, especially in the restive southern and eastern regions.668 Although the Indian reconstruction activities and investment of the Indian companies in Afghanistan had a long history and broad base, they made Pakistan skeptical about the Indian reconstruction activities in the border region.

The Indian government‘s initiative to train the Afghan army and police further complimented the Indian position in Afghanistan. Karzai regime‘s major requirement of coercive institutions and intelligence sharing also proved beneficial for India. Not only did India secure a toehold in the Afghan army by training the Afghan soldiers,669 but it also succeeded in projecting Pakistan to the young Afghan recruits as an originator and facilitator of the Taliban. In this regard, Karzai‘s duplicity was explicit. He referred Pakistan and Afghanistan as ―conjoined brothers‖ but blamed ISI, during his meetings with the Indian counterparts, for orchestrating attacks against the Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan, Afghan people, and forces and exporting terrorism to Afghanistan.670 Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta referred Pakistan in his joint statement with his Indian counterpart Pranab Mukherjee as, ―Afghanistan believes that there are some entities in our region that are using terrorism as a tool for foreign policy, we have to give that an end.‖ 671

India-Afghanistan nexus was well entrenched because the Afghans showed a great level of reliance on the Indian commitment in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Indian commitment to capacity building of the Afghan security personals doubled in 2013.672 Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)gave protection to the Indians working on various construction projects in Afghanistan despite the fact that there was no agreement for the deployment of Indian troops in

667 ―Indian Rethinks Policy to Keep Afghan influence,‖ Dawn, February 2, 2010; ‗Indian involved in Afghanistan:WSJ,‖ The Nation ,August 20,2009. 668 Interview of Rahimullah Yousafzai. 669 Khalid Hasan, ―India to Train Afghan Army,‖ Daily Times,April14, 2008. 670 Rafiq Shirzad, “Attack on Indian Mission in Afghanistan Raises Specter of Regional Struggle,” Reuters, August 3, 2013,http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/08/03/afghan-jalalabad-indian-consulate- idINDEE97202L20130803. 671 Quoted in ―Delhi, Kabul to Increase Security Coop,‖ The Nation, January 23, 2009. 672 Gareth Price, 6; 574 in 2012 to more than 1,000 in 2013.

181 the country.673 The estimated numbers of the ITBP based in Afghanistan were 388 in 2008. Later on, the presence of ITBP increased primarily due to the intensity of attacks on the Indian workers, consulates, embassy, and guest houses. One of the most important reasons of the deployment was India‘s lack of trust in the ANSF‘s capability to thwart the Taliban attacks.674

The growing Indian influence and a pro-India regime in Afghanistan were alarming and worrisome for the Pakistani [defense] policy makers. Indian influence in Afghanistan meant Pakistan‘s encirclement between two hostile nations. Therefore, Pakistan‘s official version was clear regarding Indian development activities in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The establishment of Indian consulates in every major city of Afghanistan caused ―dubiousness‖ among the Pakistani strategic elite. Harsh V. Pant rightly put that ―from the very beginning the prime objective of India‘s Afghanistan policy has been pre-empting the return of Pakistan‘s embedment in Afghanistan‘s strategic and political firmament. And ironically, it is India‘s success in Afghanistan that had driven Pakistan‘s security establishment into a panic mode with a perception gaining ground that India was taking over Afghanistan.‖675

Pakistani policy makers had a firm belief in the ‗pincer movement‘ or strategic encirclement emerging from the Indo-Afghan relationship and directed toward weakening Pakistan‘s influences in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.676 In effect, Pakistan also desired for influence in its backyard and a close relationship with the Afghan regime. It also believed that the growing strategic relationship between Afghanistan and India could be precarious for its survival in the region. It frequently objected to the increasing number of Indian consulates in Afghanistan, yet India maintained a stance that the establishment of consulates was not a new phenomenon. Rather, it had maintained these consulates in the 1960s and after the end of the Taliban regime.677 However, the numbers kept increasing. Unofficial reports imply that almost 107 consulates including 20RAW intelligence units were operating in the post-Taliban

673Sayed Tareq Majidi, ―India to Boost Commando Presence in Afghanistan ,‖ Tolo News, September 1, 2013, www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11764-india-to-boost-commando-presence-in-afghanistan. 674 See, for instance, Robert G. Wirsing,―In India‘s Lengthening Shadow: The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Alliance and the War in Afghanistan,‖ Asian Affairs: An American Review 34, no. 4 (Winter 2008), 160. 675 Harsh V. Pant, ―India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?,‖. 676 Aparna Pande, ―India-Pakistan-Afghanistan Triangle,‖ The Huffington Post, August 22, 2012, http://www. Huffingtonpost. com/aparna-pande/india-pakistan-afghanistan-triangle_b_1819299.html 677 Ibid.

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Afghanistan.678Sajjad Shaukat argued that apart from supporting the Afghan regime to address the issue of Islamic extremism and spreading Talibanization in the targeted society, the Indian consulates operationalized covert activities against Pakistan, especially in Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandahar and other sensitive parts of the Pak-Afghan border.679

The Indian officials endeavored to pursue every possible strategy to block Pakistan‘s influence and enhance the Indian presence in the war-torn society. Islamabad highlighted the issue of Indian support to the insurgency in KPK and Baluchistan with Washington and New Delhi. It accused Delhi of alliance with the Baluch separatists. For instance, Brahumdagh Bugti legitimized the Indian support in an interview to BBC network on July 23, 2008whilst admitting that the Baluchs ―have right to accept foreign arms and ammunition from anywhere, including India‖680 ISPR (Pakistan) officials also made similar assertions in their statements on different electronic and social media networks.

The apex authority of Pakistan military also highlighted this issue at NATO forum. It accused India of interfering in Pakistan‘s internal affairs through Afghan soil with the support of Karzai regime. Pakistan demanded a ―non-interference policy‖ from India in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. In contrast, the Indian officials argued that Pakistan used proxies in the guise of militants to pursue its external objectives in Afghanistan. They pointed out Pakistani security apparatus‘ links with Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami, and Taliban in the context of India- oriented Afghanistan to mitigate the Indian influence and keep it distant from the post-Taliban regime. Opposition armed groups used coercive tactics to put pressure on India to curtail its role in Afghanistan. The public statements of U.S. top brass gave an impetus to the Indian stance. For instance, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen illustrated that Haqqani network and Taliban were ―proxies of the government of Pakistan…hampering efforts to improve security in Afghanistan…spoiling possibilities for broader reconciliation.‖681 Yet, the US remained unable to address Pakistan‘s concerns regarding the Indian activities in Afghanistan.

678 Nauman Asghar, ―India-Afghanistan Nexus,‖ The Nation, May 31, 2009. 679 Sajjad Shaukat, ―Indian Retreat from Afghanistan,‖ The Post, February 17, 2010. 680 Quoted in ibid. 681 Quoted in, ―The Jihad Paradox,‖ 132.

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Contrary to Mullen, General McChrystal was more open regarding Indian presence in Afghanistan. He argued, ―Indian political and economic influences is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts…is likely to exacerbate regional tensions.‖682The US policy makers gave hints about the Indian subversive activities in Afghanistan against Pakistan, but they did not strongly condemn it. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates shared his understanding with Indian officials and encouraged them to be more transparent in their activities in Afghanistan.683 Gates‘s successor Check Hagel, in a talk on Afghanistan at Cameron University in Oklahoma in 2011, stated, ―India has been using Afghanistan as the second front against Pakistan. India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border, and you can carry that into many dimensions.‖684

Nevertheless, both India and Pakistan became reactionary in the case of Afghanistan, so were their foreign policies. Both were trying to delegitimize each other‘s role. A pro-Indian regime was detrimental for Pakistan‘s national security issues whereas a political dispensation based on religious groups and titled toward Pakistan was not acceptable to India. India did not develop a clear policy on the reconciliation process with the Taliban. Rather, it seemed to have hedged all of its bets on the NA and the new rentier class dependent on the external aid. Re- emergence of Pakistan‘s assertive role in the reconciliation process also worried India because Pakistan became the front runner in the reconciliation process. In addition, the US also started accepting the Taliban as a political entity. In this context, India‘s role in Afghanistan showed several limitations. An Indian foreign policy expert C. Raja Mohan described the Indian failure to address the changing political dynamics of Afghanistan as, ―India had a great run in Afghanistan in Phase one (since 2001until recently). However, the stasis that had gripped India‘s

682Siddharth Varadarajan, “U.S. Sees Rising Indian Influence in Afghanistan as Problem,” The Hindu, December 28, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/siddharth-varadarajan/us-sees-rising-indian- influence-in-afghanistan-as-problem/article23259.ece 683 “Gates discussed Afghan policy with Indian leaders: Pentagon,” The Hindu, January 28, 2010, http://www. thehindu.com/news/international/gates-discussed-afghan-policy-with-indian-leaders- pentagon/article95906.ece. 684 ― ‗India Financed Problems for Pakistan‘ from Afghanistan,‖ The Express Tribune, February 26, 2013, athttp://tribune.com.pk/story/512867/india-financed-problems-for-pakistan-from-afghanistan-chuck-hagel/

184 security policy in recent months and some fine maneuvering by the Pakistani army threaten to marginalize Delhi in Phase Two.‖685

Yet, despite all of the deficiencies in it policy, India does not seem ready to limit its influence in Afghanistan. It may opt for a soft approach toward the Taliban or try to maintain its influence with the help of other regional players whose interests converge with Delhi in order to stop Pakistan to overrun the peace process. Together with the Afghan regime, the Indian officials have continued to blame the Pakistani security apparatus for breeding and exporting terrorism to Afghanistan, but refused to understand that the dynamics of insurgency are linked with the internal politics of Afghanistan.686 Pakistan‘s policy toward Afghanistan is evidently grounded in the Indo-centric framework. Former President Parvez Musharraf has openly labeled the Indian influence in Afghanistan as a ―danger to Pakistan‖ and its policy as an ―endeavor to create an anti-Pakistan‖ Afghanistan.687In brief, both rivals appear ready to pursue their interests even at the cost of security in Afghanistan.

The principal intervener‘s strategic relationship with India and its decision to allow the latter to establish a niche in the post-Taliban Afghanistan have put a shadow on its relations with Pakistan and their partnership in addressing the threat of terrorism together. The intervener seems to have realized that it cannot achieve peace nor can it win the war without the help of Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan‘s involvement appears necessary to vitalize the reconciliation process. However, the intervener‘s paradoxical policies of supporting India in Afghanistan, putting pressure on Pakistan, and undermining Pakistan‘s national security interests in the region have further contributed to the problem.

Conclusion

The principal intervener‘s surge policy failed to weaken the Taliban insurgency. This policy rather gave a new breath to the lower level fighters, known as neo-Taliban, who were more

685 Quoted in Krittivas Mukherjee, “India rethinks policy to keep Afghan influence,” Reuters, February2, 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/idINIndia-45844220100202. 686 See, for instance , William Maley, ―Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,‖ in Pakistan‟s Stability Paradox: Domestic, Regional, International, eds. Ashutosh Mishra and Michael E. Clarke (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 121-137; Bruce Riedel, ―Pakistan‘s Role in the Afghanistan War‘s Outcome,‖ The Economist, May 20, 2010. 687 Harsh V. Pant, ―An Afghan Dilemma for China and India,‖ Yale Global, December 4, 2014, http://yaleglobal. yale.edu/content/afghan-dilemma-china-and-india.

185 ferocious and committed to defeating the coalition forces and the ANSF. Thus, the Taliban are showing no sign of abandoning their political goals.688The insurgency, therefore, remains resilient, even after the intensive military campaign.689 The drawdown of the ISAF and U.S. troops and shifting of the responsibility to ANSF has further strengthened the cause of the Taliban. The latter have also started testing the technique, commitment, and capacity of the Afghan forces.

The US troops‘ insensitivity to the Afghan cultural traits has also caused defiance among the locals toward the external combat forces. The resurgence of the Taliban insurgency is a proof of intervener‘s failure in building a strong liberal Afghan state. The core mission of the external statebuilding was to secure the ―absence of war‖ and establish the monopoly on the means of violence that Karzai regime and its external backers failed to achieve in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Afghanistan appears plagued with violence even after more than a decade of intervention. Lack of security contributes to hindrances in establishing the rule of law in the war- torn society and subsequently makes the state and democracy building experiment a failure. Furthermore, the shifting of India-Pakistan enduring rivalry in the ―Afghan war theater‖ also provided an impetus to the Taliban insurgency. The ―invisible war‖ between the enduring rivals has further deteriorated the security situation in the country. These factors, in combination, have assured the Taliban that the principal intervener has lost the war.

688 Malou Innocent, ―Will America ‗Win‘ in Afghanistan,‖ www.cato.org/publications/commentary/will-america- win-afghanistan. 689See, for instance, Wayne Bert, American Military Intervention in Unconventional War: From the Philippines to Iraq (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2011), 149-152; For NATO role see, for instance, James Sperling and Mark Webber, ― NATO‘s Intervention in the Afghan Civil War,‖ Civil Wars 14, no.3 (September 2012): 344-372.

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Chapter Seven Limitations in Statebuilding Process: Effects on State Coercive and Socio- Economic Capacities

Introduction

The chapter seeks to explain the limits of statebuilding process in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The inability of the Afghan state in expanding its writ beyond Kabul has not only exposed its weakness but also proved detrimental for sustenance of the political institutions. A fragile state is a serious obstacle to the growth and success of economic, political, and social reforms in the war-torn society. Therefore, the success of political openness in the context of the democratization process in Afghanistan remains limited and threatened by the possibility of a reversal to failure of the state. The non-state actors have challenged the administrative capacity to rule the territory and subsequently weakened the legitimacy of the government. The state‘s failure in carrying out the core objectives such as the collection of taxes, protection of civilians, and delivery of political goods has hampered the consolidation of democracy in the conflict- ridden society. Therefore, it appears a difficult task for the fragile state apparatus to deal with ethnic, tribal, and religious differences whilst pursuing the democratic process because ethnic fractionalization undermines the democracy prospects and challenges the effectiveness of the state amid the transition period.690

Stateness is a consequential factor for consolidation of democracy in the post-conflict societies. A capable and legitimate state is vital to the success of democratization process. However, the externally led statebuilding process in a strife-ridden society faces tremendous challenges. The external power‘s flawed policies and lack of understanding of the local context undermine its efforts to create Weberian style institutions in a traditional society. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the ambiguities and limitations in the process. It explains the linkage between statebuilding and democratization processes and how the limitations in the statebuilding process can affect the embryonic democracy in a war-torn society. Why did the concept of liberal statebuilding show antipathy to empirical realities of the post-Taliban Afghanistan? Which

690 For detail study, see, Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972); John Stuart Mill also argued that democracy sustainability is only possible in relatively homogeneous society. See, for instance, John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958 [1861]).

187 constraints emerged amid the pursuit of exogenous statebuilding process? How did pervasive corruption erode strength and legitimacy of the state?

Prior to investigating the constraints in the exogenous statebuilding project and their impact on the democratization process, it seems important to give a brief theoretical understanding of the concepts of state and stateness and the linkage of the latter with legitimacy.

7.1 Constructing a New State: Concept of Stateness

Crafting and consolidating democracy in a failed state is a difficult task. For this purpose, the external powers, in most of the cases, bring the warring parties together to negotiate the future political system and pressurize the opposition groups to give up the power struggle. However, the main objective of the task is not only limited to the construction of a democratic regime with public participation and protection of citizen rights. It also includes creating sustainable state institutions that can survive even after the withdrawal of the external power or reduction in foreign support.691 The indigenous desire for institutions, however, has more chances of success as compared to the imposition of institutions by the intervener in the targeted society.692 The ultimate authority rests with the intervener, so it is up to the intervener whether it establishes a sovereign state or keeps the political power under a tight control until the political order is achieved. Yet, in all scenarios, a capable and legitimate state is significant for advancement of democracy in a war-torn society.

Linz and Alfred argue that democracy is a form of governance of a modern state; therefore, modern democracy is not possible without a state.693 The presence of state is a prerequisite for democracy in the transitory period. The idea of modern state implies that the state has legitimate authority and resources to perform its functions, particularly providing political goods and protection and revenue generation. For this purpose, every state needs efficient bureaucracy.694 However, corrupt bureaucracy aggravates distrust among the masses and thus weakens the capacity of a state to function in the right directions.

691 Larry Diamond, ―Promoting Democracy in Post Conflict and Failed State: Lessons and Challenges,‖ Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (December 2006), 94; Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004). 692 Francis Fukuyama, 35-36. 693 Juan Linz and Alfred Stephen, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 17. 694 Ibid., 143.

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Weber also postulates that the state is a ―compulsory political organization‖ that controls a geographical area in which ―the administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.‖695 A state requires web of agencies and institutions to maintain order and the monopoly of coercion, the extractive capacity of the central government, and the legitimacy of such authority.696 In simple words, the basic characteristics of a state are scope, capacity, and legitimacy and they are essential for increasing the level of democracy.697 However, the formation of state and its attributes may fall under the conceptual notion of statebuilding in the post-intervention societies.

In most of the cases, the external power-led formation of new states has fallen short of the aforementioned attributes. It is ―a more impersonal and public system of rule over territorially circumscribed societies, exercised through a complex set of institutional arrangements and offices, which is distinguished from the largely localized and particularistic forms of power which preceded it.‖698 The conception of a state in the aforementioned definitions suffers from certain problems. Joel Migdal argues that the state objectives are not static ―as the state is not a fixed ideological unit rather it embodies an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of aims as it engages other social forces.‖699 The state‘s interaction with diverse social forces may alter its nature. Nonetheless, the contemporary statebuilding projects pursued by the interveners in the post-conflict societies are based on Weberian criteria of the state. The international community considers the statebuilding process to be the dominant solution for failed states or states that become safe havens for the terrorist. The erosion of state institutions results in the decay of the state and thus provides the armed non-state actors with an opportunity to occupy ―ungoverned spaces‖ in emerging anarchy. The intervener, therefore, opts for a top- down approach to reconstruct the state institutions.

In the post-intervention political environment, the key task of the external power is to build the state. The outsider formulates various statebuilding strategies to execute the task. The latter encompasses ―sustainability and strengthening state institutions in addition to enhancing

695 M.Weber, Economy and Society, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), i. 696 David Held , ―Introduction: Central Perspectives on the Modern State,‖ in States and Societies, eds. David Held, James Anderson, Bram Gieban .etal, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1985), 34-36; Hendrik Spruyt , ―War, Trade, and State Formation,‖ in The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed. Robert E.Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 567-568. 697 Michael Bratton and Eric C.C.Chang, ―State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?,‖ Comparative Political Studies,vol.39, no. 9 (November 2006): 1061. 698 Roger King, The State in Modern Society: New Directions in Political Sociology (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1986), 30. 699 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How State and Societies Transform and Constitute one another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 112.

189 the capacities of state actors for control, regulation and implementation, particularly in the core fields of statehood namely internal security, basic social services, the rule of law and legitimacy of the government.‖700 Fukuyama defines statebuilding in a narrow fashion emphasizing ―the development of certain capacities to provide public goods and assumes that the territorial question is settled.‖ This is why today‘s statebuilding exercises are not confined to sequencing mode, but rather the external statebuilders pursue statebuilding and democratization processes parallel. For instance, the intervener carried out counterinsurgency operations and the processes simultaneously in the case of Afghanistan.701 Yet, these processes do not complement each other. Therefore, the sustainability and consolidation of political institutions remain a distant reality in Afghanistan.

This study focuses on the capacity and legitimacy aspects of the statebuilding process in the targeted society, although both aspects are components of stateness. Stateness refers to the authorization of the central administration in the state and presence of public services and security agencies of the central government in every rural and urban area. In contrast, there exists a wide numerical and quality difference in the presence of public services and security institutions in both localities of Afghanistan. The intervener also finds it easy and safe to establish the central government authorization in the urban areas whilst forging an alliance with the local elite living in cities.

Another aspect of stateness is the state capacity, which illustrates that the state institutions are in a position to perform the assigned tasks. The armed forces and police conduct coercion, which is the cardinal activity of the state.702 Similarly, the military is a determining factor in the state structure and social formation. The formation of armed forces is an indicator of statebuilding, particularly the state‘s coercive capacity over the society.703 Thus, the monopoly of organized and legitimate means of coercion is the most enduring characteristic of the state. According to Charles Tilly, extraction is the most fundamental activity carried out by a state. Modern states have the capacity to regulate and control the economic activities conducted under their jurisdiction. Sustaining the state institutions and their activities requires a revenue

700 Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements, and Anna Nolan, On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of „Fragility (Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 2008), 3. 701 Francis Fukuyama, ―Liberalism versus State-Building,‖ Journal of Democracy,18, no.3(July 2007):13. 702 Charles Tilly, ―War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,‖ in Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985), 170-186. 703Su-Hoon Lee, State-Building in the Contemporary Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 4.

190 generation system. Su-Hoon Lee argues that the ―control of economic resources through extraction is the primary mechanism through which the state can expand other activities.‖704 However, the recent cases of external statebuilding show that the external powers‘ attempt to reconstruct the state capacity while injecting a large amount of foreign aid has resulted in the reconstruction of weak institutions. The ensuing institutions remain depended on foreign aid for their functioning and contribute to the emergence of a rentier economy.705

This state of affairs also affects the state capacity and its acceptance among the public. The external power has utilized the western concept of legitimacy in the conservative society illustrating ―some variant of the Weberian ideal types of rational-legal legitimacy‖,706 legitimacy based on the rule of law, public goods, and security of the state. However, legitimacy has various types and its linkage with the state capacity is derived from the local context. Yet some aspects of legitimacy are universal. According to Barakat and Goodhand, ―Certain countries have been subsequently victim of ‗a dual legitimacy trap‘, which refers to the need for governments in developing countries, particularly post-conflict countries, to be viewed as legitimate both by their own citizens as well as by the international community which supports and protects them.‖707

7.2 Limitations of Coercive Capacity and Governance

The process of the state formation began with the signing of the Bonn Agreement. The interveners and their local allies attempted to establish a western style institutionalized central state. Yet, they created a government but not a formal state.708 According to Barnett Rubin, ―The agreement provided with the time frame and benchmarks for the political processes but failed to address the time and space for building state institutions required for the implementation of the democratic political order.‖709

704 Ibid., 3. 705 Florian P. Kuhn, ―Afghanistan‘s Security Hurdle: Competition and Cooperation amongst Political Rentiers and Drug Rentiers,‖ Paper presented in ECPR Standing Group on International Relations Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Torino, September 12th-15th, 2007; Personal interview of Prof. Florian P. Kuhn, November 12, 2013, Islamabad. 706 Lucy Morgan Edwards, ―State-building in Afghanistan: A Case Showing the limits?,‖ International Review of the Red Cross 92, no. 880 (December 2010): 15, https://www.icrc.org/fre/assets/files/review/2010/irrc-880-morgan- edwards.pdf. 707 Sultan Barakat, ―Understanding Afghanistan,‖ Synthesis Report (London: Department for International Development, 2008). 708 Barnett R. Rubin, ―(Re) Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy,‖ Current History 103, no. 672 (April 2004): 168. 709 Ibid., 168.

191

The principal intervener introduced exogenous institutions after the militarized intervention in Afghanistan. However, informal institutions overlapped the formal institutions. The intervener injected a large amount in the building of security forces. From 2001 to 2013, it invested estimated $100 billion in democratization, security apparatus, and economic development.710 As shown in figure 7-1, it allocated a major chunk of investment in construction of the coercive state institutions. The data, however, does not include the funds for U.S. combat operations in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

According to the available data, the division of aid between security and economic activities remained highly uneven except in the first year (2001) of the intervention because the intervener introduced and gradually increased military aid in the later years (2006-2013). This division clearly indicates the intervener‘s policy of militarized statebuilding process. Similarly, except from 2001 to 2005, the economic sector assistance remained lower than security assistance throughout the intervening years. However, in 2013, there was a little difference in aid to both sectors. Increase and decrease in the US security and economic aid shows the shifts and turns in the statebuilding policies. For instance, the precarious security situation required quick fixes and construction of ANSF. The troops surge policy to address the Taliban resurgence required more militarized approach and money whilst economic aid was only supreme during the distraction years. Military aid was at its peak in 2011. However, after 2011, the US started materializing withdrawal strategy and shifting the combat responsibility to the Afghan Army. These developments reduced U.S. military aid to the post-Taliban Afghanistan, as shown in the figure. Reduction in the number of troops and military aid weakened the fragile state institution dependent on foreign aid. The data also shows that the US approach toward economic transition was secondary, which resulted in detachment of society from the statebuilding process.

710 SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, January 30, 2014, v; Afghan relief & reconstruction aid has been granted an additional $5.4 billion through The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014.

192

13.22

14 12.89

11.75

10.5

9.8

9.56

9.48 9.31

8 7.07

Economic 6.61

6.34

Security 6.32

Total

5.1

4.68

4.7

4.23

3.63

3.33

4 2.97

2.87

2.72

2.57

2.353

2.11

2.09

1.75

1.71

1.52

1.273

1.208

2 0.787

0.643

0.82

0.623

0.65

0.421

0.126 0.126

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

(Figure 7-1, U.S Aid to Afghanistan)

Note: Aid is in Billion U.S Dollars.

Sources: SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, Washington, D.C: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January, 30, 2014, 1-243, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014 Jan30QR. pdf; Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―Afghanistan Index Also including selected data on Pakistan,‖ Brookings, January 10, 2014,1-34, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/ foreign%20policy/ afghanistan%20index/index20140110.pdf; Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke, ―The U.S. Cost Of The Afghan War: Fy2002-Fy2013: Cost In Military Operating Expenditures And Aid And Prospects For ―Transition‖,” May 14, 2012 ,1-13, http://csis.org/files/publication/ 120515 _US_ Spending _ Afghan_ War_SIGAR.pdf; EADS, ―U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Foreign Assistance Data Aid By Country,‖ https:// eads. usaid.gov/ gbk/data/ aid_by_country .cfm;Joel Brinkley; ― Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan‖, World Affairs, January/February 2013, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/ article/money-pit-monstrous-failure-us-aid- afghanistan; Curt Tarnoff, ―Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,‖ Congressional Research Service, R40699, August 12, 2010, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40699.pdf.

193

Afghan National Security Forces

400,000.00 344,108

338,153

323,410

350,000.00

266,389

300,000.00

250,000.00 195,000

200,000.00 147,000 125,000

150,000.00

86,000

66,000 57,000

100,000.00

50,000.00

6,000

0 0

0.00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

(Figure 7-2 Strength of Afghan National Security Forces per year) Note: Maximum numbers in a year. Sources: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―Afghanistan Index Also including selected data on Pakistan,‖ Brookings, July 31, 2014, 1-34, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/ foreign% 20 policy/afghanistan% 20index/index20140731.pdf; United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives , ―Afghanistan Security Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined‖, June 2005, 1-53, http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 250/246956.pdf;William A. Byrd, ―Who Will Pay for Afghan Security Forces?,‖ The South Asia Channel, June 12, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/12/who-will-pay-for-afghan-security-forces/; United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, ―Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined,‖ June, 2005, 1-53, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d05575.pdf; BBC News Asia, ―What kind of Afghanistan will foreign forces leave?,‖ December 17, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-25410582; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ―Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),‖ June 2013,1-4, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_06/20130604_130604-mb-ansf.pdf; U.S Department of Defense, ―United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,‖ June 2008, 1-40, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/United_States_Plan_for_Sustaining_ the_ Afghanistan_ National_ Security_ Forces_1231.pdf; Office Of The Secretary Of Defense Department Of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, ―Justification for FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF),‖ June 2014, 1-82, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/ defbudget/fy2015/FY2015 _ASFF_Justification_Book-Final.pdf; Special inspector general: Afghanistan reconstruction; Report to the united states congress, January 30, 2014,1-28, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/ quarterlyreports/2014-01-30qr-section3- security.pdf;

194

A major portion of the aid was used in building the ANSF. The purpose of aid was to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANA and ANP.711 The US also nurtured the ALP to gain control at the sub-national level. The US and its allies provided salaries to the ANSF and even gave incentives to the employees in a combat role.712 It is noteworthy that the Afghan government and the donors had decided to surge the strength of ANSF to 352,000 and scale it back gradually after 2015. The Afghan government would pay for the cost and sustainability of the ANA and ANP.713

The principal intervener and its allies apparently built reasonable ANA and ANP, yet the quantity never matched the quality.714 The ANSF numerical strength increased gradually before 2009. Yet, the recruitment sharply increased from 2009 to 2012, as shown in the figure (7-2). However, numbers were never a reflection of professionalism in the ANSF. Vanda Felbab- Brown highlighted the problems with quality and argued that the Afghan forces ―continue to suffer from deeply inadequate logistical, sustainment, and other support capabilities and are also deeply pervaded by corruption, nepotism, and ethnic and patronage fissures.‖715 The Afghan security forces faced the challenges of illiteracy, absenteeism, desertion, and high casualty rates after taking the responsibility to fight the Taliban. However, the morale of forces remained low throughout the intervention years. Numerous Soviet-Afghan war and civil war militias penetrated

711 Ibid., Quarterly Report to the US Congress, October 30, 2012 , 77. 712 Ibid. 713 Ibid, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, October 30, 2013, 25; Scaling back of the ANSF decision was taking in Chicago Conference May, 2012, but it will depend on the security conditions in the country. It was decided between the international community and Karzai government to reduce the number to 228,500 security personals; See, for instance, Kiran Dhillon, ―Afghanistan Is The Big Winner In U.S. Foreign Aid‖, Time, March 31, 2014, Http://Time.Com/43836/Afghanistan-Is-The-Big-Winner-In-U-S-Foreign-Aid/; Lydia Poole, ―Tracking major resource flows 2002-2010,‖ Afghanistan Briefing Paper 1, January 2011, http://www.global humanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/gha-Afghanistan-2011-major-resource-flows.pdf; Matt Waldman, ―Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan‖, ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/ files/ ACBAR_aid_ effectiveness_paper _0803.pdf; SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress(Washington, D.C: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January 30, 2013), 1-210, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-01-30qr.pdf. 714 See, for details, Kris Osborn,― Report Finds Afghan Military Shrinking Not Growing,‖ May 02, 2013, http:// www.military.com/daily-news/2013/05/02/afghan-military-20k-short-of-end-strength-goal.html; Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, Brian Grady, The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army (National Defense Research Institute, Published by the RAND Corporation,2009),1-85, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_ MG845. pdf; Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, ―War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,‖ CRS Report for Congress, R40156,December 3, 2009, 1-75, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40156.pdf; Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan, Afghanistan Index, http://www.brookings.edu/ about/ programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan- index. 715 Quoted in Gabriel Domínguez ―Has NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan failed?,‖ DW, October 18, 2013, http://www.dw.de/has-natos-isaf-mission-in-afghanistan-failed/a-17162801.

195 the new Afghan security apparatus.716 The Afghan government was not in a position to address the deficiencies of ANSF, which left a detrimental impact on the coercive capacity of the central government. The ANSF performance and continuity to work in the state institution depended on the salaries paid by the external power. Similarly, the ALP units appeared to be under the influence of the regional power brokers. They could easily become the victim of disintegration in the wake of salaries and logistics cuts and thus reverse to join the warlords‘ private militias.717

On the other hand, the state failed to establish its monopoly of organized violence in the country. Instead, it shared the coercive capacity with various state and non-state actors. The Taliban resistance against the international troops and ANSF also challenged the whole process. The failure of international troops in defeating the Taliban and exit of the majority of the Western troops from Afghanistan made the Taliban perceive that they would be able to fill the growing security vacuum. Other powerhouses including the warlords, regional power brokers, and criminal syndicates also became the part of violence equation. The Afghan government‘s grip on the state security weakened with the rise in problems because it lacked effective coercive capacity.

Another significant aspect of the statebuilding process is governance. In the post-Taliban context, the US helped the Afghan government in establishing bureaucracy, but the country faced shortage of skilled and efficient workers for the state, provincial, and districts offices. Many skilled workers were reluctant to serve in the provincial offices of the central government ministries, particularly in the violent provinces.718 Moreover, the inability of central administration to have an effective coercive capacity substantially affected governance and delivery of public goods. The majority of provincial and district governors were political appointees selected by the executive office. Karzai appointed people for their loyalty to curtail the power of the opposition political forces in the area.

716 Thomas Ruttig, ―Some Things Got Better-How Much Got Good? A Review of 12 years of International Intervention in Afghanistan,‖ Thematic Report, Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 2014, 5, www. afghanistan- analysis.org. 717 Vanda Felbab-Brown, ―Security and Political Developments in Afghanistan in 2014 and After: Endgame or New Game,‖ in Afghanistan: 2014 and beyond, ed. Wolfgang Taucher, Mathias Vogi, Peter Webinger (Austrian ministry of Interior, 2014), 11-12. 718 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance (CRS Report, RS 21922) (Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C, July 8, 2013), 37-38.

196

Philipp Munch argues that President Karzai ―shifted positions to proxies in a ‗divide and rule‘ manner or tried to create counterweights against opposing factions to exert control over the provinces.‖719 Similarly, the provincial councils constructed on the electoral basis proved powerless representative institutions due to the concentration of power in the center and lack of public interest in the political institutions. The provincial councils played a marginal role in expanding the writ of central government at the provincial level because the designing and execution of the development projects was a prerogative of the central government. At the district level, the challenges of security and resources had become an impediment to the expansion of governance. A majority of the district governors were lacking skilled staff and transport facilities. The principal intervener and its allies established District Support Teams (DST) in forty districts to assist in the local level governance and service delivery projects.720

In addition, lack of infrastructure, government officials, and central political and security institutions negatively affected the coercive capacity of the state. State structures in the districts remained weak and embryonic and suffered from the shortage of resources and skilled workers. Overall, the central administration struggled to establish a concrete mechanism of coordination among the various levels of governance. It also lacked effective means to generate revenue for functionality of the state institutions. Thus, it remained dependent on the external aid to complete and initiate development projects.

7.3 Lack of Extractive Capacity and Exogenous Aid Dependencies

The sustainability of the state is subject to financial means that could only be possible through extraction. It is a fundamental activity of the state. Rubinson argues that the ―modern state‘s capacity to regulate and control the economic activities taking place under its jurisdiction and beyond is regarded as the most important of all the rights expropriated to the state.‖721 Operationalizing of the state apparatus requires finances provided by the generated revenue. Therefore, extraction represents one of the most significant aspects of the statebuilding process. The extractive activity is instrumental in carrying out other tasks of the state. The establishment of an effective revenue generation system is a lifeline for the newly created regimes in the post-

719 Philipp Munch, ―Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention: A Review of Developments in Badakhshan and Kunduz provinces,‖ Thematic Report (Afghan Analysts Network, November 13, 2013), 2. 720 Kenneth Kartzman, 38. 721 Richard Rubinson, ―Dependence. Government Revenue, Economic Growth, 1955-1970: Cross-National Analysis,‖ Studies in Comparative International Development 12 (1977): 3-28.

197 conflict societies. However, the influx of massive international aid hinders the growth of domestic revenue and contributes to the establishment of a rentier economy.722 In this way, the state‘s survival depends on the aid whose decline magnifies the chances of the state collapse.

In the case of Afghanistan, the state struggled in terms of tax collection that increased its dependency on the development aid. The dependence on aid also affected the revenue generation mechanism because the state paid less attention to this aspect. For instance, a major portion of the state budget during 1970s consisted of development aid.723 Yet the state policy focused on creating a power balance equation between the Kabul state elite and regional power brokers by distributing aid in a clientelistic way and binding the regional and local potentates in a system of sinecures and allowances.724 Similar trends emerged in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The international community built the state structures on the Western lines by giving financial assistance to the central leadership for building the state institutions.

The US and other donors provided direct and indirect assistance to the Afghan government for reconstruction and development. Direct assistance was to enhance the capacity of the core administration to compose and execute budgets whilst regulating the external aid in accordance with the changing needs of the country.725 Yet this policy could not bring any positive change. It rather increased the graph of corruption in the government offices and diversion of cash to patronage network. The Afghan ministries did not have transparent and mechanized financial system to manage the flow of cash. The state could not use the external aid for development purpose in a right direction whilst fraud, leakage, and abuse of money were common factors of the statebuilding process.

Political stability in Afghanistan depended on growth of economy, reduction of foreign aid, and increase in the revenue collection. Yet the significance of the latter in sustainability of economic growth and political stability became a distant reality in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Although the donor community pledged billions of dollars in the Tokyo Conference (July 2012), the aid was linked with certain benchmarks and conditions. The foreign aid, however, started

722 Michael Herb, ―No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy,‖ Comparative Politics 37, no.3 (April 2005): 297-316. 723 Christine Noelle-Karimi, Conrad Schetter , ―Introduction,‖ in Christine Noelle-Karimi, Conard Schetter, Reinhard Schlagintweit (eds), Afghanistan: A Country Without a State? (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002), 8. 724 Ibid., 8. 725 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, USA: SIGAR, October 30, 2013), 16.

198 declining after 2010, e.g. the US funding declined 41 percent between 2010 and 2013 from $16.7 to $9.8 billion.726 Higher spending and lower revenue generation proved obstacles in increasing the effectiveness of the state.

The Afghan central administration generated revenue from two principal sources, customs and domestic taxation. Persistent conflict and shifting of the responsibility to the Afghan government affected the revenue generation process. Extractive capacity of the government increased after the intervention for a decade, but the tax money made minor contribution in the budget. The World Bank reports suggest, ―85 percent of the Afghan budget comes from abroad and larger part of the budget is spent on the security sector.‖727 Revenue collection reportedly suffered from the operationalization of the transition strategy in 2013. The World Bank reported in October 2013, ―After a decade of strong fiscal performance, revenue collection weakened in 2013, potentially delaying Afghanistan‘s path towards self-reliance.‖ There had been 11 percent decrease in the domestic revenue, meanwhile the government spending increased around 45 percent in the fiscal year 2012.

Indicators show that the Afghan government faced strident challenges in expanding its extractive capacity. Domestic taxation for the core state apparatus was collected at the provincial, district, and village level. However, the tax collection mechanism was subject to regional level power brokers‘ influence and security. The taxation department did not have the coercive capacity to force the people to show compliance with tax law. The state also generated revenue from the corporate sector, yet various individuals did not declare their wealth and resources. The rich state class, emerged on the rentier economy, also did not pay tax because of their partnership with the central administration in abuse of money. Interestingly, 90 percent of the total tax came from Kabul.728 Similarly, the revenue of customs department also improved from $50 million in 2004 to almost $1 billion in 2011.729 However, the department faced ―leakage problem‖ due to fraud and corruption almost at all major checkpoints. Customs officials, local warlords, and criminal patronage networks were part and parcel of the problem. Staff members of inland customs depots told, ―Up to 70 percent of the potential border revenue is lost in corruption.‖730 In addition, the lack of border security also stymied the domestic revenue. SIGAR reported that ―the uncertainty about the Afghan future and weakness of the

726 Ibid., 69. 727 Thomas Ruttig, 8. 728 Katharine Houreld, ―Afghans warned: the taxman is coming after you,‖ Reuters, March 13, 2013. 729 Steve Sternlieb, ―Inadequate Revenue Threatens Afghanistan‘s Stability,‖ Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 3, no.1, (2014): 7. 730 Ibid., 7.

199 government have resulted in the flight of billions of dollars abroad. Illegal transfer of funds has also deprived the regime of tax revenue.‖731

The Afghan government pinned its hopes high on generating revenue from the mineral sector that could contribute in the growth of the Afghan economy and human development and reduce dependency on the external aid.732 However, the US government and the donor community suggested that the benefits of the mineral wealth depended on security, substantial investment for exploration, infrastructure, and approval of mineral law pending in the Afghan legislature for almost a year.733 The revenue generated from the mining sector would take years to become a part of the GDP. However, the incompetence of government was also visible, as it failed to fulfill the commitments made in the Tokyo donor Conference to increase tax revenue from 5 percent to 15 percent of the GDP.734

The weak taxation system had the attributes of the Afghan state in previous regimes. This trend continued in the new Afghan state that, even under the guidance and influence of the intervener, failed to collect tax from the public. Tax collection was a difficult challenge to the Karzai regime because the aid economy had augmented the resources for patronage and corruption. Contract politics also provided an impetus to corruption and strengthening of the rentier class in the country. The transition phase thus made the situation more precarious because the reduction of international troops meant reduction of foreign aid. It also meant the loss of jobs for the people associated with the external security apparatus. The rise of unemployment and land grabbing by the powerful and political elite further contributed to the populace‘s distrust in the exogenous statebuilding process.

Hence, the entire foreign statebuilding exercise resulted in the emergence of rentierism that harmed democracy because unearned money isolated the state elite from the society and vice versa. The new state class also benefitted from drug trade in the country that negatively affected the growth of legal economy in the country. The fluctuations in drug trade depended on the opium cultivation. As shown in figure 7-3, the opium cultivation sharply increased from 2001 to 2003. The cultivation decreased in 2005 but again increased sharply in the following two years. Subsequent two years witnessed minor decline whilst the

731 SIGAR, October 2013, 11. 732 Richard Ghiasy, ―Can Afghanistan‘s Economy Stand on Its Own?,‖ The Diplomat, January 30, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/can-afghanistans-economy-stand-on-its-own/. 733 SIGAR, 155; Steve Sternlieb, 6; Vanda Felbab-Brown, 22. 734 Ibid., 147-148 ; Tokyo Mutual Accountability Frame work (JULY 8, 2012), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/tokyo_declaration_en2.html.

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Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan 2001-2013

250,000 209,000

193,000

165,000

200,000 157,000

154,000

131,000 131,000

123,000 123,000

150,000

104,000

80,000

74,000

100,000

50,000

8,000

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

(Figure 7-3 Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan 2001-2013) Note: The Area is calculated in hectares. 1 hectare is equal to 1 Sq. Km. Sources: UNDCP, Afghanistan: Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001, 1-30, https://www.unodc. org/ pdf/ publications/report_2001-10-16_1.pdf; Vanda Felbab-Brown, ―Counterinsurgency, Counternarcotics and Illicit Economies in Afghanistan: Lessons for State-Building,‖ Chapter 11, http://www.brookings.edu/~/ media/ research /files/papers/2013/04/counterinsurgency%20 counternarcotics%20illicit%20economies%20afghanistan %20 state %20building%20felbabbrown/counterinsurgency%20counternarcotics%20illicit%20economies%20 afghanistan%20state%20building%20felbabbrown.pdf; UNODC, ―The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment,‖ July 2011, 1-162, http://www .unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan _Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013Summary findings, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, November 2013, 1-26, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop- monitoring/Afghanistan/ Afghan _report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf; Dawood Azami,―Why Afghanistan may never eradicate opium,‖ BBC News Asia, February 26, 2013, Last updated at 00:01 GMT, http://www. bbc.com/ news/world-asia-21548230; Liana Rosen and Kenneth Katzman , ―Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition,‖ CRS Report for Congress, R43540, May 9, 2014, 1-25, http://fpc.state.gov/ documents/ organization/228740.pdf.

201 production remained stagnate for two years (2009-2010). Poppy cultivation went up to 5,500 tons in next three years. According to a UNODC report, ―the northern provinces Faryab and Balkh, previously free from opium cultivation, were no longer without poppy cultivation.‖735

The opium cultivation trends show that the principal intervener‘s counternarcotic policies failed to reduce and eradicate the opium cultivation. One can attribute the rise in poppy farming to the principal intervener‘s failure in addressing the opium problem. However, the Taliban regime was able to ban the poppy farming up to 99% in its territory. The ouster of Taliban regime from power increased opium cultivation. Drug trade posed a direct threat to the statebuilding process. It comprised a third to half of Afghanistan‘s economy due to limited governance capacity of the state and rising tide of corruption. Not only the latter sternly affected the prospects of democracy consolidation but also made Afghanistan one of the most corrupt states on the globe.

7.4 Corruption Eats Away the State Capacity and Legitimacy

Corruption is present in every society, but the patterns, causes, and effects of corruption vary from society to society. In general, corruption means ―misuse of the public office, public resources or public responsibility for private-personal or group-gain.‖736 Corrupt activities include bribery, theft, nepotism, and diversion of resources to individuals and groups that lead to the emergence of a new state class in the post-conflict societies. Corruption can prove detrimental for legal economic activity in the fragile state. It reduces the resources poured in by the external power and contributes to the decline of foreign investment. However, the foreign investor has to bribe the entire hierarchy in the post-conflict societies. Therefore, the countries with rampant corruption face a stringent challenge in increasing foreign investment in private and public sectors to generate revenue for government expenditures and delivery of public services. Corruption eventually undermines the state capacity and legitimacy, particularly in the fragile states.

735 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014,Vienna,1-27, https://www.unodc.org/ documents/wdr2014/ World_ Drug_ Report_2014_web.pdf. 736 Morris Szeftel, ―Clientelism, Corruption & Catastrophe,‖ Review of African Political Economy 27, no. 85 (January 2000): 428; See, for instance, SIGAR ―Poppy Cultivation In Afghanistan: After A Decade Of Reconstruction And Over $7 Billion In Counter narcotics Efforts, Poppy Cultivation Levels Are At An All-Time High‖ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Report (SIGAR-15-10-SP, October 2014), http://www.Sigar.mil/pdf/Special%20Projects/SIGAR-15-10-SP.pdf.

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In the case of Afghanistan, the external powers played a significant role in the institutionalization of corruption. The principal intervener did not focus on the corruption issue for almost a decade. Anti-corruption measures were not on the agendas of intervener and Afghan regime for a very long time. Both failed to gauge the impact of corruption on the state and democracy building processes. The Afghan elite had no interest in combating corruption because they did not have any solid engagement with the society. Most importantly, Afghanistan lacked a transparent and effective legal system to reduce corruption.

Afghanistan specialist William Maley argued, ―Donor community flooded the country with money when absorptive capacity was low and bureaucratic complexity was high, exactly the environment in which bribery would be expected to flourish.‖737 Corruption was visible at every level of the state apparatus and even in the aid system. The US SIGAR nonetheless highlighted this issue in its every quarterly report after 2008. According to the assessment of the institution, the reconstruction funds suffered from poor planning, management, and execution and thus resulted in systematic leakage and waste of capital resources allocated for the development projects. The Karzai government‘s response to the problem of corruption was also limited because his associates and relatives were the drivers of corruption.738

The Kabul Bank scandal also exposed the corruption problem in Afghanistan. It showed the alliance between the banking leadership and Afghan state class. This scandal also revealed that the Afghan legislatures and ministries, in a large number, received money from the bank. After its establishment in 2004, the bank quickly established its branches throughout the country. It managed to secure a $1.8 billion annual contract (with international funding through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund) to pay the salaries to around 80 percent of the government employees.739 It also earned money through interest on salaries money and deposits of the Afghan public.740

737 William Maley, ―Statebuilding in Afghanistan: challenges and pathologies,‖ 262. 738 Jade I. Rodriguez and Rebecca Lorentz, ―Civil and Uncivil Society,‖ in Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America‟s Longest War, eds. Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 195-197. 739 Arne Strand, ―Elite capture of Kabul Bank,‖ in Corruption, grabbing and Development: Real World Challenge, ed. T. Soreide and A. Williams (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 177. 740 Dexter Filkins, ―Letter from Kabul: The Great Afghan Bank Heist,‖ New Yorker, February 14, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/02/14/the-afghan-bank-heist; M. Huffman, ―The Kabul Bank scandal

203

The bank leadership used funds for investment in properties, primarily in Dubai, that was a violation of the Afghan banking law. The slump in property prices and global economic recession led to the crash of real estate market resulting in a liability of $160 million for the bank.741 Several notable Afghans reportedly laundered large amounts of capital from Kabul airport to Dubai.742 For instance, in 2009, former Vice-President and incumbent head of the high peace council Ahmad Zia Masood entered Dubai with $52 million in cash. The Dubai airport officials stopped him but later provided him with safe passage.743 This incident exposed the close nexus between the bank and Afghan leadership. It also exposed flexible approach of the international community toward the Afghan elite because the former needed to work with them in the war-torn country. Even President Karzai admitted that the CIA dropped cash at his office to pay the warlords. The intervener and Kabul used the foreign assistance to buy the allegiance of the political opponents, break their monopoly on power, and keep them in the Kabul circle.

Afghan government‘s response to the bank fraud episode was lackluster. In fact, the government tried to protect the offenders. However, the international pressure constrained the Karzai regime to take stringent action against the criminals. Yet the patronage network politics and involvement of the state class in receiving money from the bank executives provided protection to the offenders. The only action taken against them was the removal from the bank. The verdict of a special tribunal on the Kabul Bank case dropped charges against the executives with reference to money laundering and embezzlement.744 The verdict also showed that the state provided protection to corrupt officers and practices, even though the $980 million fraud had severely affected the country‘s embryonic financial system in 2010 that required an international bailout.745 In 2010, the Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) survey showed that ―the everyday bribery of the government officials has doubled since 2007, with ordinary Afghans having to pay an average of $516 in bribes each year to access government services.‖746

and the crisis that followed,‖ http://www.uspolicyinabigworld.com/2011/12/03/the-kabul-bank-scandal-and-the- crisis-that-followed-2/. 741 Arne Strand, 178. 742 Afghan people do everyday business in hard cash .They pay cash for public services. With the fall of Taliban, the principal intervener unleashed billions of dollars in the war torn country. It was reported by the Custom Officers at the Kabul airport that ―money was carried around in ―bricks‖ $100 notes in stacks of 1,000 each totaling $100,000 per packet…flown out of the country in suitcase toted by well-dressed Afghans.‖ quoted in Jamie Tarabay, ― Afghanistan and the bottom line,‖ Al Jazeera, April 2, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/. features/2014/4/afghanistan-and-thebottomline.html. 743 Ibid., 178. 744 Arne Strand,183; 745 Secretary General Report , ―The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,‖ A/67/889-S/2013/350.13, June 2013,10. 746 Aunohita Mojumdar, ―Afghan citizens paid $1 billion bribes for public services last year, study finds,‖ The Guardian, July 8, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/08/afghanistan-bribes-corruption-taliban.

204

Afghanistan Corruption Index

180

179

176 176

175 174

200 172

180 160

140 117

120

100 Data No

80 Data No

60 Data No

No Data Data No No Data Data No 40

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

(Figure 7-4 Afghanistan Corruption Index)

Note: The methodology used by CPI to rank countries on corruption graph is based on the information gathered through surveys, reported information, and legally filed cases regarding corruption in the public sector institution. There are no absolute criteria to measure corruption in the government sector. Perceptions also play an important role in analyzing the data on corruption. Ranks on the graph are based on the formula bottom to top. Country placed on the rank 1 is least corrupt country whereas the countries experiencing more corruption are at the higher ranks on the graph.

Sources: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‘Hanlon, Afghanistan Index Also including selected data on Pakistan (Brookings Institute, Washington D. C: July 31, 2014),1-34; http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/ foreign%20policy/afghanistan% 20index/index20140731.pdf; http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/; The 2013 corruption perceptions index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 177 countries and territories; http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/; The 2012 corruption perceptions index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 176 countries and territories around the world; http://www. transparency.org/cpi2011/ results; The 2011 corruption perceptions index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 183 countries and territories around the world; http://www.transparency.org/ cpi2010/;The 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 178 countries around the world; http://www. transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009;The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 180 countries and territories. A composite index, the CPI is based on 13 different expert and business surveys; http://www. transparency.org/ research/cpi/cpi_2008/0/;The 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 180 countries around the world; http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/ cpi_2007/0/; The 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index looks at perceptions of public sector corruption in 180 countries and territories; http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/ A0781359.html;Only 180 of the world's 193 countries are included in the survey, due to an absence of reliable data from the remaining countries; http://www. transparency.org /research/cpi/cpi_2005/0/; No Data available for Afghanistan. The 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 159 countries around the world.

205

The UNODC reported a substantial rise in bribery in the subsequent years. It reported that in 2012, ―half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service‖ and ―bribes paid to public officials amounted to US $ 3.9 billion,‖ equivalent to 20% of the country‘s gross domestic product‖.747 As shown in figure 7-4, Afghanistan‘s rank in corruption index sharply increased due to increase in foreign aid and the absence of an effective mechanism to check the suggested and fair use of money. Secondly, the frequency of bribery doubled by every passing year. The scope of paying bribery also expanded with the building of new state institutions. Even the education sector also witnessed a steady increase in bribery.748

According to Antonio De Lauri, ―In Afghanistan the phenomenon of corruption is seen as a way of governance rather that works against governance per-se.‖749 It was considered a mode of survival in the war-torn society. The Afghan citizens gave money to the state officials to get public services that were their basic rights. Corruption affected the daily lives of the populace. Pervasive corruption in the post-Taliban regime made the country the third most corrupt state on the globe in 2012, reported by Transparency International.750 The corruption of state officials made the government dysfunctional and provided the Taliban with an opportunity to highlight the amount and scope of corruption to garner allegiance of the locals. According to General R. Allen, ―Corruption is the existential strategic threat to Afghanistan.‖751

At a donor conference in Tokyo, the external builders, therefore, linked aid with reforms and tackling corruption to address the problem. The conference declaration emphasized improvement in governance, rule of law, and human rights. It urged the Afghan government to ―enact and enforce the legal framework for fighting corruption.‖752 Such a framework would include ―annual asset declarations of senior public officials including the executive, legislative

747 UNODC, ―Corruption in Afghanistan : Recent Patterns and Trends,‖ December 2012, 5, http://www. unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf. 748 See, UNODC, ―Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends,‖. 749 Antonio De Lauri, ―Corruption, Legal Modernization and Judicial Practices in Afghanistan,‖ Asian Studies Review 37, no. 4 (2013): 530. 750 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (January 2013), 116 and 152. 751 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “A Transformation: Afghanistan Beyond 2014,” General John R.Allen hearing, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, April 30, 2014, 4, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Allen_Testimony.pdf. 752 ―Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework,‖ July 8, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/tokyo-mutual- accountability-framework/p28675.

206 and judiciary,‖ and ―strengthening counter-narcotics efforts.‖753 The Karzai government nonetheless made little progress in tackling the corrupt officers and corruption in the state institutions. In this regard, he issued a decree also known as ―the office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Decree on the execution of content of the historical speech of 29 July 2012 in a special session of the National Assembly.‖ 754 He labeled corruption along with governance and law enforcement and economic self-sufficiency as the three core challenges to the post-Taliban regime. He gave time frames to deal with the challenges and requested the government officials holding apex positions in the state structures to distance themselves from the corrupt individuals and practices. He also stressed the role of Supreme Court in eliminating the curse of corruption from the Afghan society.755

Critics argue that a state cannot curb corruption when the elite class is above the law.756 After the scandal, the ordinary Afghans lost their interest in the banking sector. Thus, the traditional method of borrowing and keeping the money safe among the relatives and friends never lost its significance even after the introduction of modern banking system in the country. Bribery was institutionalized in the state apparatus and entrenched in the society. This is why virtually all of the legal efforts and international cautions proved ineffective in Afghanistan.

It seems difficult to analyze the political repercussions of corruption on the statebuilding and democratization processes. It is a general understanding that pervasive corruption reduces trust of the populace in the state institutions. It dwindles the effectiveness of public institutions and delegitimizes the regime among the local people. At the critical juncture of transition, growing corruption made the populace question whether they should take stateness as the

753 Ibid., October 2012, 10; Matthias Gebauer, ―Donors Link Billions in Aid to Progress on Reforms,‖ Spiegel Online, July 9, 2012, www.spiegel.de/international/world/donor-nations-pledege-billions-to-afghanistan-a- 843344.html. 754 http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2012/07/the-office-of-the-president-of-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-decree-on- the-execution-of-content-of-the-historical-speech-of-june-21-2012-in-the-special-session-of-national- assembly/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PermanentMissionOfAfghanist anToTheUnInNewYork+%28Permanent+Mission+of+Afghanistan+to+the+UN+in+New+York%29bestth. 755 S. Reza Kazemi,―Karzai‘s Decree to Combat Corruption: Cause for Cautious Optimism,‖ Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 15, 2012, http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/karzais-decree-to-combat-corruption-cause-for- cautious-optimism-2. 756 Michael Johnston, ―Fighting Systematic Corruption: Social Foundations for Institutional Reform,‖ in Mark Robinson (ed), Corruption and Development, (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998); Andras Sajo, ―Introduction: Clientelism and Extortion: Corruption in Transition,‖ in Political Corruption in Transition: A Skeptics Handbook, eds. Stephen Kotkin and Andras Sajo (Budapest, Hungary: Central University Press, 2002).

207 solution or a problem. Corruption undermined the effectiveness of the state institutions and ate whatever the institutions achieved amid the transitory period. It subsequently affected the legitimacy of fragile state institutions in addition to undermining the development growth. Corrupt political environment, therefore, proved detrimental for the investment and external aid in the long run.

Drury, Krieckhans, and Lusztig argue that a corrupt democratic regime paves the way for authoritarian regimes. If democracy fails to mitigate corruption in the political system, the opposition forces exploit the situation and capture the government.757 The purpose of electoral democracy is to evict corrupt politicians from the system and choose honest people through voting.758 However, in the case of Afghanistan, the electoral process could evict the corrupt politicians and thus damaged the state credibility and reduced the locals‘ faith in democracy. In fact, the corrupt elite and warlords had sufficient resources and money to contest the elections and become members of the lower house. These officials did not face any substantial challenge from either the state institutions or Karzai. Even Karzai incorporated and co-opted corrupt and dishonest people in his cabinet and state institutions and kept recycling the removed personals at different positions and spaces in the government set-up.759

7.5 Social Constraints

The pursuit of liberal statebuilding process in post-Taliban Afghanistan based on the philosophy of modern western state, which failed to transform the Afghan society. The western political ideologies were secondary to the Afghan ethnic identity roots because of the pluralistic social mosaic in the country. Conard Schetter argues that the ―heterogeneity of the population of Afghanistan is so great that neither language nor religion nor any other cultural pattern forms a unifying national force for all the country‘s inhabitants.‖760 Although the majority of Afghans are Muslims, Islam has not been available as a force of unity due to some substantial factors such as the Shia-Sunni divide and further sub-divisions in these two sects, influences of pre-Islamic, tribal, mystical, orthodox, and militant tendencies.

757 Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhans, and Michael Lusztig, ―Corruption, Democracy, and economic Growth,‖ International Political Science Review 27, no.2 (2006): 121-136. 758 Ibid., 759 See, for instance, Lorenzo Delesgues and Yama Torabi , Reconstruction National Integrity System Survey Afghanistan 2007 (Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, London: Tiri, 2007), 21-27. 760 Conrad Schetter, ‗Ethnoscapes, National Territorialistion, and the Afghan War,‘ Geopolitics 10 (2005): 57.

208

Generally, the ethnic differences in a society dominate the political landscape of the country. Ethnicity is not a natural object, yet its construction bases on socialization, history, and the design of concrete procedures of administrative classification and political organizations.761 Posner‘s research on the ethnic fractionalization shows that ―the numbers and size of ethnic groups in the political system are central to the outcomes of economic growth rates, political stability, the outbreak and the duration of civil war.‖762 Intellectuals and researchers alike have attempted to find a causal relationship between democracy and ethnicity, arguing that ethnic diversity hardly works for stability of the political system. Robert Dahl also shares a similar assessment about the impact of ethnic differences on the democratization process. Arguably, a high level of ethnic diversity makes democracy less likely, particularly in the countries where one ethnic group can dominate the state.763

Different studies suggest that ethnic diversity can affect democratization process especially when the elite use ethnic card to garner the support of their ethnic group. As a result, the minority refuse to accept outcomes of the electoral process. This development thus increased the possibility of breakdown of the political system.764 However, in the contemporary external statebuilding projects, the intervener introduced democracy by exploiting the ethno-religious differences and shifting the balance of power in favor of opposition ethnic and religious groups. For example, the intervener converted the Pashtun majority into a minority in the post-Taliban Afghanistan whilst drove the Sunni minority out of power by putting the Shia majority into power. In both cases, the change of power guards resulted in displacement, a high level of violence, and civilian casualties.

It is difficult to gauge the role of ethnicity as the dominant variable in the collapse of a system or rise of ethnic violence. However, the differences play an indirect role and contribute to other factors such as low economic growth and large-scale violence.765 In this way, ethnic divisions considerably influence the democratization process. In the case of Afghanistan, one needs to investigate the segmentation of society by elaborating the levels of communal identity. It consists of qawm (solidarity group), tribe, and ethnic group. This categorization depends on the solidarity concept. According to Gilles Dorronsoro and Olivier Roy, ―The emergence of this group has a political purpose by establishing a mechanism to deal with the state through village

761 Carol J. Riphenburg, ―Ethnicity and Civil Society in Contemporary Afghanistan,‖ Middle East Journal 59.no.1 (Winter 2005): 31-32. 762 Daniel N.Posner, ―The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Cleavages: The Case of Linguistic Divisions in Zambia,‖ Comparative Politics 35, no.2 (January 2003): 127-128. 763 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1971), 114-118. 764 See, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972); David Welsh, ―Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict,‖ in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 43–60. 765 Mark R. Beissinger, ―A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization,‖ Journal of Democracy 19, no.3 (July 2008): 87; M. Steven Fish and Rubin S. Brooks, ―Does Diversity Hurt Democracy,‖ Journal of Democracy 15, no.1 (January 2004): 154-166.

209 leader (Malik), meanwhile protecting the qawm from state interference in their routine lives.‖766 However, the internal struggles in a solidarity group to assume the role of a leading voice in dealing with the state provide the state elite with an opportunity to exploit the situation in their favor and reduce effectiveness of the group. Multiple solidarity groups can live together in a certain geographical area or village. The tribal structures, particularly Pashtun structure, are strict and less open for social change.

Contrary to Pashtuns, other ethnic groups such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras do not follow the tribal codes and customs. However, one can find this orientation in Nuristanis, Baluchis, and Persian speaking Aymaq groups.767 It is noteworthy that ethnic identities

Ethnicity Population Ratio 45% 42% 40% 35% 30% 27% 25% 20% 15% 9% 9% 10% 4% 4% 5% 3% 2% 0% Pashtun Tajik Hazara Uzbek Aimak Turkmen Baloch others

(Figure 7-5 Afghanistan Ethnicity Population Ratio)

Sources: CIA, The World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook; Civil Military Fusion Center, Afghan Ethnic Groups: A Brief Investigation, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/ DOCUMENT/ 6393~v~Afghan_Ethnic_Groups__A_Brief_Investigation.pdf. do compete with other local identities. This is why the heterogeneous nature of the Afghan society became more complex with the persistent conflict for the last thirty years. The changing nature of conflict transformed the social interaction pattern and relations among different ethnic identities besides affecting the dynamics of ethnic power relationship in the conflict- ridden society.

766 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present (London, C. Hurst &Co Publishers, 2000), 9-12; Olivier Roy, ―Afghanistan: back to tribalism or on to Lebanon,‖ Third World Quarterly 11, no. 4 (1989 ): 70-82. 767 Olivier Roy, 72.

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The US-led military intervention brought a significant shift in the ethnic balance of power in the targeted society. Historically, Pashtuns dominated the Afghan ethnic landscape and claimed themselves to be the original inhabitants of the geography and state. The term Afghan was considered a synonym of Pashtun. Yet, the principal intervener‘s policies and the statebuilding project altered the ethnic stratification. The exogenous state formation process in the post-Taliban Afghanistan changed the ethnic balance in the favor of a dominant minority, Tajiks.768 Ethnic minorities‘ alliance with the intervener to remove the Taliban (Pashtuns) from power augmented the ethnic divisions. This is why the frequent denial of the external and internal leadership of using ethnic affinities in building the state structures seems baseless.

Today, the ethnic fault lines are predominant in the Afghan state institutions where the dominant ethnic minorities hold the top positions. They are beneficiaries of the external wealth and power in the contemporary state apparatus.769 Within the minority stratification, Hazaras constitute 2.5 to 3 million of the total Afghan population whilst the majority among them is Shia. Amin Saikal makes a rightful argument regarding the social status of Hazaras in the Afghan state and society throughout the Afghan history. ―There is no question that Hazaras, in general, had a deprived, persecuted and exploited past with little share in the power structure, administrative and security apparatus or economic wealth of the country.‖770 However, the US-led statebuilding project incredibly improved the social status of Hazaras. Astri Suhrke argues:

For the first time in Afghanistan‘s history, the 2004 Constitution gives the courts the right to apply Shia jurisprudence in family matters involving Shia Muslims. As the largest group of Shia in Afghanistan, the Hazara consider this a major victory. A Shia personal status law was adopted in 2009. Although some regarded it as an excessive codification of family matters, all Shia MPs supported it as recognition of minority rights. An area populated by Hazara was declared a new province in 2004 (Daikundi in the central region, adjacent to Bamiyan, the other main Hazara

768 Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).Cited in Carol J .Riphenburg article. 769 Milton J. Esman, ―Ethnic Diversity and the Structure of Government,‖ in John D. Montgomery and Dennis A. Rondinelli, Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 156-168. 770 Amin Saikal, ―Afghanistan: The Status of the Shi‘ite Hazara, Minority,‖ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32, no.1 (March 2012): 81.

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province). During the last [2010 parliamentary] elections the Hazara won 59 of 249 seats in the lower house….Individual Hazara have held or holding, high political office….Legal and institutional recognition does not always translate into practice. Like all Afghans, the Hazara live in a country racked by violence, uncertainty and corruption. However, the Hazara have become politically more assertive, are moving into higher education in what appears to be unprecedented numbers, and, in Kabul many have entered the new middle class that has developed around the international presence.771

Hazaras became a part of the Kabul political elite and media moguls. Their spiritual affiliation with Iran further strengthened their position, but they balanced their relationship with the intervener and Iran in a careful manner. They established a strong foothold in the power and security structure of the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Economic uplift and better education provided them with an opportunity to assume a place in the public administration of the state apparatus. A large number of Hazaras nonetheless live in poor conditions in the Hazara- dominated provinces.

Today‘s centralized power structure appears incapable of creating a national identity. This system has rather bred ethnic differences in the government institutions that are now run by the dominant ethnic minorities such as Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. The ethnic base has made inroads in the Afghan Army because Tajiks are holding commanding positions and are overrepresented in the institutions. Karzai‘s efforts to remove the feeling of alienation among the Pashtuns by bringing their ministers, technocrats, and advisers in the government have not substantially mitigated the perceptions of ―majority ethnic community excluded from the regime.‖

Therefore, the statebuilding project could not reduce the ethnic and religious fault lines in the Afghan society over the years. Continuous war rather hardened the differences. The external power‘s so-called liberal statebuilding process could not produce any significant social change in the traditional society. Virtually all political actors identified themselves with their ethnic credentials instead of their commitment to the liberal democratic paradigm introduced by the

771 Astri Suhrkh, ―Life is Getting better for Oppressed Afghans,‖ Sydney Morning Herald, January 1, 2011, 20.

212 interveners. Tribal and ethnic loyalties were supreme whilst allegiance to the state remained weak. The society did not consider the state to be the final and rightful arbitrator in their affairs. This state of affairs exposed the weakness of state and distance between the state and society. Allegiance to the state was significant for the consolidation of democracy, but the change of regime and statebuilding process failed to reconfigure the ethnic relationship in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The US confronted insurmountable challenges in the implementation of a liberal democratic state model in the post-Taliban Afghanistan that became a stabilization project with the passage of time. The intervener remained militarily engaged with the coalition partners in a counterinsurgency campaign. Its major task was the building of coercive and extractive capacities of the Afghan state and reconfiguration of relationship between the state and locals. However, it failed to improve the state capacity in both dimensions.

The external power invested a huge amount of capital in building the coercive arm of the state, but the numbers and ethnic imbalance superseded professionalism and discipline in the institutions. Therefore, the writ of central administration remains limited to the urban areas. Locals are skeptical about the ANP because of its involvement in corrupt activities and imprudent behavior with the locals. The unity and functionality of the Afghan state‘s coercive apparatus appear entirely depended on the external aid, even to pay the salaries. The state‘s coercive arm has also failed to establish its monopoly on violence.

Another vital activity of the statebuilding process is the establishment of the state capacity to extract revenues from economy and exhibit its authority on citizens, particularly power to regulate the economic ventures in its territorial jurisdiction. In the context of Afghanistan, the available empirical data shows rise and fall in revenue collection from 2002 to 2013.The absence of civilian bureaucracy beyond the urban areas negatively affected the tax collection process. The state officials were reportedly involved in bribery and taking rewards from the tribal chiefs and regional warlords to give them a safe exit from tax. The elite also took a chunck of foreign aid. The foreign aid, therefore, could not bring any positive change in the lives of the Afghan populace.

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Economic policies enhanced influence of the global markets in post-Taliban regime, but they did not guarantee the exercise of individual liberty. The foreign investors were primarily interested in the mineral areas that required time, money, and security in the exploration area. Thus, the lack of coercive and extractive capacities made the Afghanistan a rentier economy with a new rentier state class. Nonetheless, the intervener‘s drawdown is likely to be pernicious for the weak and limited coercive capacity of the state. Decline in foreign aid may increase the importance of drug money. Therefore, the role of drug money in statebuilding and survival of patronage network is likely to remain important in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Pervasive corruption in the state institutions erodes the state‘s capacity and legitimacy of the regime. Externally introduced state institutions face legitimacy crisis because they challenge the traditional pattern of authority and attempt to reorient the relationship between state and society. The intervener‘s role thus makes it possible for the new state to secure international legitimacy, but the latter lacks internal legitimacy due to its non-presence and ineffective governance at the national and sub-national levels. Therefore, the legitimacy deficit directly affects the consolidation of democracy.

Reconstruction indicators of economic development and corruption clearly show that the external power prioritized military institutions to the civilian democratic institutions. There was a substantial difference in expenditures of the both institutions. The intervener‘s wealth and physical presence failed to reconfigure the state-society relationship. Social heterogeneity, the hallmark of Afghan society, dimmed the prospects of democracy. The locals were loyal to their qawm, tribe, and family. In this way, the external statebuilding project aggravated the existing ethnic fractionalization in the Afghan society. The state apparatus remained a venue of a tug of war among the traditionalists, expatriate reformists, and technocrats. In brief, the fragile Afghan state is a product of the intervener‘s policies. The exogenous statebuilding process failed to address the demands of the Afghan populace. The fragile state institutions and ethnic differences evaporated liberal spirit of the democratization process. Therefore, the political institutions appear to have lost local legitimacy whilst the deteriorating coercive and capital indicators have made the statebuilding process in the post-Taliban Afghanistan a failure.

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Conclusion

This dissertation has attempted to analyze the statebuilding and democratization processes introduced by the US in Afghanistan after 9/11. State and democracy building experiment in the post-Taliban Afghanistan is a peculiar case. It has not been in congruence with the US‘s primary cause of intervention, nor is it similar to any other case in the recent past. Afghanistan was the first test case of militarized intervention after 9/11 under the banner of the war on terrorism to build a failed state on liberal democratic lines.

During the course of my research, I discovered interesting patterns of failures of the US in rehabilitating Afghanistan. I observed that the principal intervener dominated and drove the state and democracy building processes to establish a liberal democratic state in the war-torn Afghanistan, but the flaws in the processes led to their failure. U.S. policies caused several deficiencies amid the pursuit of processes whilst the contradictions and ambiguities in the policies undermined the actual spirit of the experiment. The conflicting objectives to make a trade-off between the war on terrorism and building of democratic state institutions paved the way for future failures. Asymmetry of power was visible, but the local circumstances and challenges occasionally changed the bargaining dynamics in the favor of new state elites.

The intervener fused the war with liberalization in the context of democratization amid the formative phase, although, in practice, its policies were in contradiction with liberalism. It opened up the democracy building process amid the initial phase of the construction of political institutions that led to the emergence of a new state and democracy in Afghanistan. The resulting procedural democracy, based on structural features of democracy, proved an empty shell in spite of including all technical aspects such as a constitution, elections, political settlements, presidential office, and legislature.

The democracy building process was undemocratic in nature. The intervener made compromises in the imposition of democracy. It compromised on corrupt leaders, warlords, and non-democratic forces and allowed them to contest and rig the elections. Stabilization and security became the top priorities and it paid little attention to the locals‘ aspiration and choices. On the other hand, the conflict continued throughout the experiment and resulted in the absence of a ―post-conflict political landscape‖ in Afghanistan. The ensuing ―militarized statebuilding,‖

215 portrayed as ―humanitarian‖ in the objective, further exposed the contradictions in the objective and policy.

In addition to contradictions, the sequencing of state and democracy building processes was also absent in the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan. Instead of pursuing state building process followed by democratization, the intervener neglected sequencing and pursued both processes simultaneously. In effect, the democratization process was on the ―fast track‖ whilst the establishment of stateness suffered from a slow pace due to miscalculations and parochial approach of the intervener. Stateness was absent in the peripheral areas while the urban areas came under stress due to the gradual rise of violence, violation of human rights, and pervasive corruption in the fragile state institutions.

The principal intervener lacked a comprehensive plan of state and democracy building processes after the demise of the Taliban regime. Limited objectives of the OED negatively affected the sequencing of the state and democracy building activities and brought implications for even the best practices of the intervener. The intervener‘s conflicting objectives and undemocratic policies to pursue the processes led to failure in building endogenous institutions. The state institutions, therefore, remain dependent on the external power‘s physical and moral support even after twelve years of its engagement in Afghanistan.

The failed efforts of the principal intervener in building a new state and state institutions in Afghanistan negatively affected the local politics and society. The asymmetric interaction pattern between the intervener and locals remained intact after a decade of the intervention. It was one of the most important reasons of the failure. Since the beginning, the intervener had the authority over the decision-making process, ranging from processes designing to institutional choices, and implementation while the locals were targeted population. Instead of bringing both sides closer, its policy kept them at a distance and negatively affected the interaction pattern. The former reduced the prospects of success in the experiment. In simple words, the intervener‘s policies including the creation of state elites proved instrumental in the failure of the experiment. Secondly, during the policy making process, the intervener did not infer any lesson from the Afghan history. It neglected the fact that the formation of Afghan state was not a peaceful and gradual process. Virtually, all attempts of democratization and modernization in the past remained unsuccessful in transforming the tribal political culture into a democratic political

216 culture. Turbulent political crises, uneven development, and the vicious cycle of war repeatedly struck the state, although no invader could ever transcend its territorial boundaries. The state building efforts by either monarchs or authoritarian leadership remained caught between the British and Russian interests. External relations were consequential for the political and economic developments in Afghanistan. External ingress in the state activities exposed dependency and weakness of the regime. However, the Afghan rulers gradually moved toward constitutional monarchy and political space to groups to organize and participate in the elections, but the locus of power remained initially with the monarchy and later the authoritarian leadership. Since its emergence, the state‘s outreach was limited and it struggled to establish its monopoly on violence in the designated territory. However, the successive regimes attempted to remain in power through clientalism, patronage networks, and foreign aid. As a matter of fact, the historical pattern of state building in Afghanistan was centralized and based on external influences and ethnic majoritarian concept. The statebuilding policy based on modernization approach remained in clash with the [local] religious and traditional aspirations. The linkage between the Afghan citizens and state was limited and there were no effective political institutions, which could bridge the gap between the society and state. The distance aggravated with the state‘s poor performance in delivering public goods and factional fighting within the political groups to control the levers of power in Kabul. Consequently, the Soviet-Afghan war and subsequent transformation of war into a civil war changed the pattern of interaction between the state and society. The ensuing erosion of the state authority and resurgence of Taliban and its nexus with Al Qaeda led to the failure of the Afghan state. This failure was addressed by the US-led intervention followed by state and democracy building experiment.

The preceding study offers the following empirical and theoretical conclusions:

1- An in-depth understanding of the contextual realities of peace settlements among the conflicting parties and power-sharing arrangements in the newly built state institutions through the processes can reduce the chances of failure. Power-sharing arrangements, based on the inclusion-exclusion formula, determine the course of the state and democracy building processes in the targeted society amid the transition phase. The

217 arrangements are utilized to quell violence in the aftermath of the militarized intervention and achieve peace to kick-start the experiment of (re) building the intervened state on democratic lines. Yet, in some cases when the intervener tries to restructure the existing power relations and privileges minority ethnic groups over majority group, such a policy further stimulates violence, feeling of alienation, and hatred against the intervener and its local allies. Arrogance of the latter and their hard stance toward the excluded group amid the intervening years negatively affect the state and democracy building processes. In effect, even the partial absence of the group from the processes stretches the boundaries of exclusionism. Inclusive entrance in the state and democracy building experiment is often late when intervener fails to abate violence and starts materializing its exit strategy from the war-torn society. Power sharing is not a magic stick for consolidation of democracy; however, the success in democracy consolidation depends on the broader spectrum of power sharing arrangement in the emergence of democratization process with functioning state apparatus. In the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the principal intervener failed to design a comprehensive power-sharing arrangement among the warring factions due to the exclusion of Taliban from the UN-US directed political settlement in Bonn Conference I. The anti-Taliban delegates in alliance with the principal intervener kept the agreement vague and narrow to protect their group interests and manage the intervener‘s concerns. Most of the statebuilding aspects left for the interim authority and the intervener‘s interpretation paved the path of failure. Deficiencies in the Bonn conference I negatively affected the democratization process at various stages. The conference left several aspects open-ended because the intervener and delegates did not want limitations on their power. Pashtuns felt alienated from the process due to shifting of authority in the favor of the NA; however, Karzai later attempted to address this failing by giving more slots to Pashtuns in his cabinet. The exclusion-inclusion formula, therefore, challenged the spirit of liberal democracy. Secondly, the adoption of a ―Kabul Centric‖ approach to run the state also contributed to the failure as already there were competing power centers in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Framers of the constitution created an imbalance of power between the executive and legislature. It was the choice of the principal intervener to create a presidential system to deal easily with one person rather than persuading the

218 entire legislature. The process failed to create democratic tendencies in the Afghan political culture. Rather, ethnic politics played a pivotal role in squashing opportunities to foster the democratic culture.

Externally crafted democracy building process made Karzai the locus of power. The intervener‘s relationship with Afghanistan remained limited to Karzai. Karzai did not internalize the goal of democracy. He sidelined all other members of the political elite and created obstacles in approving and accepting the results of the national parliamentary elections, which exposed the emergence of authoritarian tendencies in the political system. The office of Afghan presidency enjoyed enormous powers. Another crucial mistake of the intervener was to allow Karzai to rig the second presidential elections by crafting a deal with the leading contestant Abdullah Abdullah and accepting his second term. This step gave a big blow to the process of democratic consolidation. The desire for liberal democracy replaced by the desire for stabilization trumped legitimacy at every stage of the process. It also showed that the objective of the mission had changed and the method of achieving it relied heavily on the coercive approach. Democracy virtually became dysfunctional amid the later phase of the process.

2- The failures were embedded in the principal intervener‘s policy for state and democracy building project in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The Bush administration‘s initial strategy was based on narrow national interest to change the regime and eliminate the Al Qaeda-Taliban network. Its minimalist approach toward state and democracy building not only lowered the standard of the project but also created an authority vacuum in the Afghanistan. Authority vacuum resulted in the deterioration of security and resurgence of Taliban as the external power‘s efforts to speed up the formation of state‘s coercive apparatus (ANSF) and the appointment of state agents in the peripheral areas came late in the project. The ensuing eruption of violence further increased the Karzai regime‘s weakness in establishing the writ of state. On the other hand, DDR also did not produce desired result because it was a top-down approach, without any involvement of the locals, to win the locals‘ trust and provide them with the guarantee of security. To address the security failures, the [new] Obama administration, after an extensive review of the Afghan policy, made a shift toward ―AfPak‖ in order to transform

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the bad war into a good war. Shifts and turns in the US policy showed the limitations of the policy and failed to end the conflict and undercurrent of the violence, as the numbers of civilian casualties in 2013 were similar to those of early years of intervention. The intervener intensified its efforts to counter the Taliban movement, which largely had survived and spread its scope in the southern, northern, and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. The principal intervener adopted ―surge policy‖ that surged the numbers of American and coalition troops. This policy was the result of further militarizing the statebuilding process. Bush was a reluctant statebuilder, but later on he assumed the responsibility of building Afghanistan on democratic lines whereas Obama was not interested in sacrificing American troops in the conflict-ridden society. The shifts and turns in the policy, from light footprint to heavy footprint and reversal to light footprint, happened because virtually all policies failed to address the challenges caused by the limitations in the processes. In addition, humanitarian concerns were secondary for the intervener in the context of failed state. Therefore, for most of the time, the statebuilding process remained confined to controlling the mechanism of violence and security. For the same reason, a larger part of the intervener‘s financial and logistics resources was diverted toward the creation of state‘s coercive apparatus. The intervener introduced private militias primarily because of its apprehension on weaknesses and fragility of the Afghan National and Defense Security Forces. This study shows that the statebuilding process created limited state capacities. The performance of state institutions reflected those limitations due to the inconsistency between the external power‘s lofty objectives and the availability of means to achieve them. The mismatch between resources and goals ultimately derailed the processes. In addition, the uneven input of capital and resources and the intervener‘s interference in the processes created disparities among the state institutions‘ capacities. Pervasive corruption negatively affected the institutional capacities and made the former fragile and reversible. At the same time, the anti-Taliban warlords and new guards of Kabul thrived on external aid without any check and balance. Their independence and empowerment hindered the growth of state‘s economic capacity whilst they used foreign aid to enhance their own power and build financial empires.

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3- Competing agendas of the interveners contributed to the failure of state and democracy building experiment in Afghanistan. The involvement of too many actors increased ―lack of coordination‖ amongst the actors. The principal intervener alone had special representative (Richard Holbrooke), ambassador, U.S. force commander, and Defense and foreign Secretaries who all tried to influence the project. The NATO allies also suffered from this problem. Concisely, there was a cacophony of voices emerging from the US-led coalition of willing.

4- At the theoretical front, this study has not only investigated sequentalism between the processes but also explored the potential linkage between the statebuilding process and democratization process. The sequentailists debated the priority between statebuilding and democratization in the intervened society, but the debate needed to be further stretched in this direction to explore that the processes were interlinked but distinct from each other.

This study has also attempted to explore the causal linkage between the two processes in the case study of post-Taliban Afghanistan whilst highlighting the gaps and limitations in the processes caused by ill-conceived and contradictory policies of the principal intervener amid the processes. Both processes have been disaggregated to understand the causal mechanism. Significant national events, phases, policies, interaction pattern, and outcomes have been explained to understand the limitations in the processes separately and the impact they left on each other. Consolidation of a liberal democratic state requires a reciprocal relationship between the processes. Process tracing approach helps to build a chain connection between the processes; however, in the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the chain connection suffered due to challenges confronted by the processes. The intervener pursued both processes simultaneously. Therefore, the outcome of the processes during the conflict is different from the environment where the conflict is frozen or conflicting parties have agreed to the secession of hostilities.

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5- While tracing the causal mechanism between the processes, the investigation shows that both processes‘ movement and integration in the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan was restricted and limited in nature. For instance, an inclusive democratization process mitigates the opposition forces‘ tendency to an armed struggle against the incumbent regime. In the case of Afghanistan, the elusive democratization process and intervener‘s decision to keep the conflicting party outside the process led to an armed struggle and limited the state writ beyond the capital, thus diminishing the prospects of peace in the targeted society. Secondly, the consolidation of a liberal democratic state is subject to an active linkage between accountability and political competition. The incumbent regime tries to deliver public goods to the citizens in order to win elections again through electoral procedures. Better performance of the state institutions increases the chances for the regime to occupy the echelons of power second time. In contrast, corrupt state institutions and absence of rule of law, violence, and an ongoing conflict resulting in increasing civilian casualties reduce the democratic accountability and political competition, especially when the competition remains within a narrow circle of elites in the war-torn society. Thirdly, the intervener has pursued a thin concept of democracy in the war-torn society, thus putting the success of the democratization process dependent on free and fair elections. Holding national elections in the war-torn society is a complex and sensitive business. The state‘s electoral institutions and agents spread throughout the national territory to do voter registration and set up polling stations on the voting day. In fact, the state stretches its administrative and security capacities in the peripheral areas. It also tests the capacity of its coercive institutions, especially local police and, sometimes, army providing security to the state agents, candidates, and voters. In the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the empirical evidence suggests that the exclusionary democratization process did not contribute to peace. In fact, the decision to keep the Taliban outside the process throughout the intervening period exacerbated violence in the war-torn society. The elusive nature of the process further curtailed the chances of public participation in the process. The evidence also shows that state elite sitting in the legislature and executive office rarely showed defiance to the militaristic

222 approach rather than advocating a political solution in order to deal with the armed Taliban movement. They considered political solution as the last resort due to the failure in counterinsurgency operations. In other words, the reconciliation process was not an offshoot of the democratization process. Limitations in the electoral process and electoral corruption of the state agents had negative effects on the process. Security concerns reduced the voter turnout and the state failed to establish polling stations in the Taliban-controlled and highly insecure areas, primarily located in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan. Fraudulent elections negatively affected the legitimacy of the state electoral institutions, further distanced the locals from the process and ultimately reduced the significance of the elections for the society. Elections became meaningless for the society. In addition to elections, the ruling elites were not accountable for their actions, misuse of power, and failure to deliver public goods. All these factors showed that the process was entering into ―grey zone‖. Functioning state institutions bolster the prospects of the democratic state, but dysfunctional institutions portray themselves as fragile and reversible. In the case of Afghanistan, the ingredients of success were absent in the state and democracy building experiment. Therefore, it was not possible for the principal intervener to build a liberal democratic state in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Fourthly, another important aspect of stateness is administrative capacity, often described as the establishment of bureaucracy in the war-torn society. The administrative capacity of a state affects the democratization process in different ways. Weak administrative structures and lack of skilled employees transform the state apparatus into a place of favorites and then positions are given on ethnic, religious, and tribal affiliations rather than merit. Patronage networks become more entrenched amid the transition periods due to flawed design and policies of the external builder. Available empirical evidence implies that the principal intervener failed to build an effective bureaucracy in the war-torn society because the uninterrupted conflict for the last three decades resulted in the exodus of educated people from the country. Similarly, the intervener‘s reliance on the choices of the NA and Karzai challenged the merit-based process. Lastly, revenue collection is also a measure to gauge the administrative capacity of a state. It is the tangible base of any state. In the case of Afghanistan, the intervener

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pushed the Karzai regime to expand its taxation base to reduce dependency on the external aid, but pervasive corruption and ongoing conflict barred the regime from bringing more people in the tax net. However, the intervener was also responsible in the creation of a rentier economy in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The former failed to stop the explosion of poppy cultivation throughout the intervening years. The absence of political order and citizenship agreement in controlling the drug trade and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan exposed the failure of the statebuilding process.

6- It seems reasonable to argue that liberalism has lost its content in the state and democracy building experiment. This study suggests that there is no ―gold plated formula‖ for making the state and democracy building experiment successful, but contradictions and ambiguities in the processes can quicken the pace of failure. The latter is also a product of the external power‘s failure to rectify the errors in its policies amid the later stages of the state and democracy building experiment.

This dissertation has attempted to do an in-depth study of the processes separately and their nexus in order to enrich our theoretical and empirical understanding of the failure of state and democracy building experiment in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The sources of American failure were not only located in the flawed design and asymmetrical interaction pattern but the challenges created by the gaps in the processes also negatively affected the linkage between the processes. This study deduces that fusion of both processes can only happen when the propositions of processes, based on liberal content and societal input in the making of state institutions, are democratically crafted in the war-torn society.

It is an on-going process and more study is needed in future to understand the dynamics of state- formation. Future avenues of research include the study on the external intervention in the non- western states like Afghanistan. Moreover, the examination of societal divisions and their impact on the processes should also be studied in detail. Contemporary exogenous statebuilding models have failed to construct liberal democratic states; therefore, it seems necessary to scrutinize various ideological contents in the former. The normative aspects of the state and democracy building processes, however, require incorporation of a more solid theoretical ground in the policy-making discourse. More in-depth research can be done on the structural changes and

224 bargaining with the local elites in the external power‘s state and democracy building policies. In addition, the empirical knowledge on local institutions and their link with the externally built national level state institutions would also be helpful to address the weakness in the processes. Finally, the international state and democracy building paradigm has become a global intellectual enterprise. Therefore, multidisciplinary research on the subnational level can be theoretically and practically more useful to design reconstruction models, which can bring long-term peace and strengthen democracy in war-torn societies.

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Postscript The Contemporary Context: Afghanistan 2014 and Beyond

― thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, our combat mission in Afghanistan is ending, and the longest war in American history is coming to a responsible conclusion.‖

(Statement by President Obama on the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, December 28, 2014)772

President Obama brought a ―responsible end‖ to the Afghan war in December 2014. Nonetheless, the war has not ended. It is not a responsible end of the war when ―Afghanistan remains a dangerous place‖ after thirteen years of the war. Obama has also admitted this fact.773 Achievements have been minor, superseded by the failures in combat battle, in making the post- Taliban Afghanistan a liberal democratic state. Nevertheless, Obama has shown commitment to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2016. Around 9,800 U.S. troops are left behind for noncombat activities, which will be gradually reduced in the years to come.774 According to the present plan, only 1,000 U.S. troops will be deployed in Afghanistan before Obama leaves the White House in 2017.775 Although Obama has slowed the pace of drawdown on the request of the incumbent Afghan president Ashraf Ghani, he has shown no intention and plan for rushing back the US troops to Afghanistan, even though the Afghan security forces are showing visible signs of failure in the counterinsurgency operations.

Signs of failure in the state and democracy building experiment were visible amid the final phase of external troops‘ withdrawal from the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The principal intervener escalated the pace of shifting the security responsibility to Afghan National Defense

772 Barak Obama, Statement by President Obama on the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, December 28, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2014/12/28/ statement-president-end-combat-mission-afghanistan. 773 Ibid. 774 Carol E. Lee, and Colleen McCain Nelson, ―U.S slows pace of Afghan Troop Withdrawal,‖ Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-meets-with-afghan-president-ghani-amid-troop-drawdown- concerns-1427209840. 775775 Ibid.

226 and Security Forces (ANDSF) with the dawn of 2014. Combat and violence continued to dominate the Afghan domestic arena while the coercive, capital, and administrative capacities of the state remained limited and confined to major provincial capitals. The intervener prioritized the building of Afghan security institutions because capable ANDSF were linked with the success of rule of law, socioeconomic development, and better prospects for reconciliation with the Taliban. However, the intervener and Karzai together failed to address the challenges of a high rate of attrition, enhancing fighting capabilities, and sustainability of the Afghan military on its own. This trend has continued throughout 2014 and remains visible even today.

As for former President Karzai, he failed to take solid steps to enhance the performance of state institutions. They remained under the control of warlords who had assumed important positions in state institutions and transformed them into ―ethnic exclusive zones‖.776 Karzai maintained a dangerous equilibrium between the local warlords, tribal elders, and former mujahideen whilst addressing the Taliban as Afghan brothers. He openly criticized the interveners‘ counterinsurgency strategies of the troop surge and night raids. He also became critical of Pakistan for not helping to move forward the reconciliation process with Taliban when both war and processes entered into a stalemate situation amid the final phase of the troops exit.

He criticized local militias, a product of the intervener to counter the Taliban takeover at the local level, because they remained beyond the jurisdiction of central regime and ―competed with efforts to build up large and professional military and police forces.‖777 Karzai‘s apprehensions about the Afghan Local Police (ALP) turned into reality, especially after the larger exit of the foreign troops, because there was no effective mechanism to regulate the coercive behavior of the irregular armed units, which were involved in kidnaps, rape, extortion, and extrajudicial killings.778 Leaders of the units transformed themselves into warlords. Their rise showed that the state had failed to establish its monopoly on violence. The ALP became the driver of violence and killing rather than performing pursuing their objectives of maintaining

776 Zaman Stanizai, ―Can We Afford Another Failed State in Afghanistan? Beyond the 2014 Drawdown,‖ The Huffington Post, March 3, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zaman-stanizai/can-we-afford-another- fai_b_4863736.html. 777 Joseph Goldstein, ―Afghan Militia Leaders, Empowered by U.S. to Fight Taliban, Inspire Fear in Villages,‖ New York Times, March 17, 2015. 778 Ibid., For detail discussion, see, ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police (Asia Report No 26, Kabul/Brussels, June 4, 2015), 1-31, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/268-the-future-of-the-afghan- local-police.aspx.

227 security and deterring Taliban from taking over the rural community. The Afghan society, however, showed reluctance to endorse the creation and shifting of local security responsibility to the militias consisted of ex-mujahideen.

As the foreign troops‘ larger withdrawal process started, the Kabul executive office also started showing signs of independence in its decisions regarding Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and releasing Taliban prisoners from Jail.779 Karzai refused to accept the decision of the traditional Loya Jirga to sign the BSA with minor revisions.780 Taliban applauded him for his stance on the agreement.781 Conversely, the intervener‘s criticisms on his decisions also mounted during his last year in the Kabul office. The intervener threatened to pull out all of its troops from Afghanistan. Karzai, however, left the BSA issue unresolved for the new president.

At the political front, Afghanistan was approaching toward third consecutive presidential and provincial council elections in April 2014. The principal intervener wanted a peaceful transfer of power from Karzai regime to winner of the presidential election. Both leading contenders Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah were acceptable to the intervener because of their pre-elections assurances of signing the BSA, which Karzai had refused to sign due to his apprehensions mainly about the intervener‘s counterterrorism policy.782 After 2014 elections, the intervener sought to meet the benchmark of ―exit timeframe‖ besides leaving behind a friendly regime and its troops under the BSA.783

The transfer of power from Karzai to the new [unity] government was not through the democratic electoral process but through a negotiated political settlement between the run-off

779 Dan Roberts, ―Karzai Criticizes Lack of US respect for Afghan Sovereignty as Relations Worsen,‖ The Guardian, February 13, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/karzai-criticises-respect-afghan- sovereignty. 780 Rod Nordland, ―Elders Back Security Pact That Karzai Won‘t Sign,‖ New York Times, November 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/afghan-council-approves-us-security-pact.html?_r=0 781 Vanda Felbab-Brown, ―Afghanistan in 2013: On the Cusp…or on the Brink?,‖ Asian Survey 54, no.1 (January/February 2014): 165. 782 Nordland, ―Elders Back Security Pact,‖. 783 Bilateral Security Agreement provided legal cover and immunity for US residual force actions in post January 2015. It allowed the stay of 9,800 US troops in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of general troops from the post Taliban Afghanistan. Number will gradually reduce in the preceding years. Under this agreement principal intervener reach throughout Afghanistan will remain through land and air bases constructed in Bagram, Jalabad, Kandahar, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Helmand, Gardez and Shindand .They will be used for air operations and drone strikes. According to agreement ―The BSA goes into force on January 1, 2015 and remains in force "until the end of 2024 and beyond" unless it is terminated by either side with two years' notice‖ quoted in Charles Racknagel, ―Explainer: Key Points in US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement,‖ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, September 30, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/explainer-bsa-afghan-us-security-agreement-bsa/26613884.html.

228 election candidates. Intra-elite bargain put an end to the procedural democracy in post-Taliban Afghanistan, thus ending the limited public legitimacy in the technical features of democracy. The path toward ―mediated bargain‖ designed by the principal intervener to avoid post-election conflict and entrance of coercive state institutions in the post-election imbroglio.784 It was John Kerry, a representative of the principal intervener struck a deal between the two leading candidates. He did a similar exercise in the aftermath of second presidential election (2009) to avoid post-election conflict. At that time, John Kerry convinced the runner-up Abdullah Abdullah to accept Karzai as the winner instead of going for the second round of elections.

Political transition was necessary for the fulfillment of the intervener‘s withdrawal agenda. First round of the presidential election resulted in a high level of public participation and a low level of violence. The result of first round placed Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah as the leading vote holders and merited their qualification for a presidential run-off election. The second round results, however, showed a steep jump in the voter turnout that went in favor of Ghani who secured one million more votes than Abdullah. The majority of the votes were cast in the Pashtun majority areas that helped Ghani to secure more votes than his counterpart. The Abdullah-led camp challenged and refused to accept the election results declared by the IEC. They accused the institution‘s agents of staging ―a massive fraudulent election,‖ threatened to stage massive rallies and even set up of a parallel government in Kabul.785

The supporters of Abdullah camp were outraged whilst Abdullah threatened to go for ―extra constitutional means‖ to form a government in Kabul. He had the support of [then] incumbent governors and military personals for the aforementioned move.786 His strident statements and refusal to accept the preliminary results led to the involvement of external power to resolve the post-election standoff between the candidates. President Obama warned Abdullah to devoid any extra constitutional means to acquire power in Kabul. This kind of move could have resulted in the stoppage of external aid to Kabul government.787 In effect, the establishment

784 William A. Byrd, ―Understanding Afghanistan‘s 2014 Presidential Election: The Limits to Democracy in a Limited Access Order,‖ USIP Special Report (Washington, D.C: USIP, April 2015), 1. 785 Erin Cunningham and Ernesto Londono, ―Abdullah mobilizes supporters, vows to challenge Afghan election results,‖ Washington Post, July 8, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abdullah-mobilizes- supporters-vows-to-challenge-afghan-election-results/2014/07/08/3fd4bd0c-0690-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_ story.html. 786 Ibid. 787 Ibid.

229 of a parallel government meant the collapse of state institutions in the war-torn society and start of another yet violent round of civil war.

To resolve the standoff situation, John Kerry convinced both candidates to agree upon a unity government with a new state agent position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and complete audit of the votes cast in the second round of the election under the supervision of UN, IEC, and contesting parties.788 The post-election crisis, however, continued due to a difference of opinions between the candidates on the invalidation criteria of unclean votes. Nevertheless, the external power‘s coercive and political tactics pulled out the country from post-election stalemate. Yet, the external power‘s method was undemocratic because it solved the crisis through negotiations and neglected election results. Negotiations resulted in a power-sharing arrangement between the two candidates. Ghani swore in as president whilst Abdullah became CEO, a post created through presidential decree.789 John Kerry‘s optimism about the power- sharing deal was associated with the strength of democracy. As he writes in his article:

It does not violate the Afghan constitution- it respects Afghan institutions and the role of the president as the head of government. It does not establish a parliamentary system-it creates a new position of chief of chief executive who will report to the president until the president convenes a Loya Jirga to determine whether a permanent change is in the best interests of the country.790

The agreement did not describe the powers of CEO, but it was believed that both president and CEO shared similar powers in the new regime. It was also agreed in the intervener-led agreement that ―within two years the president will convene a Loya Jirga, and initiate a process of amending the constitution, to establish the position of an Executive Prime Minister within two years.‖791 The electoral impasse continued and was resolved through back door deals and bargain on powers and cabinet portfolios. Both blocks wrestled on how to share power at the local level. They agreed to bring electoral reforms to ensure free and fair elections in next parliamentary

788 Byrd, ―Understanding Afghanistan‘s 2014 Presidential Election: The Limits to Democracy in a Limited Access Order,‖ 3. 789 Martine van Bijlert, Elections 2014(44): Key documents underwriting the electoral agreement (Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 13, 2014), 3, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/elections-2014-44-key-documents- underwriting-the-electoral-agreement/. 790 John Kerry, ―Op-Ed From Secretary Kerry,‖ Tolo News, July 30, 2014, http://www.tolonews.com/en/opinion/ 15765-op-ed-from-secretary-kerry 791 Ibid. , 4.

230 elections. However, they also agreed on ―not to make public‖ the results of the run-off election.792

The entire formation of the unity government overrode the technical features of democracy. Principal intervener pursued a ―top-down‖ approach based on the elite bargain and thus threw out the voter choices from the bargaining arena. The latter introduced a new non- elected method to acquire power in Afghanistan because the intervener had resolved the post- election impasse through non-democratic rules. Non-democratic rules became a permanent tool of the intervener and local ruling elite in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The participation of the Afghan society in the first round of presidential elections created euphoria for the electoral procedures, but the systemic fraud in the second round and external intervention disenfranchised the public from the process. Thus, the process lost legitimacy because the intervener‘s interests, asymmetric interaction pattern, and Afghan state elites‘ demands in the post-Taliban Afghanistan determined it. The Chief Observer of European Union (EU) Election Assessment Team (EAT) Thijis Berman made a similar argument while presenting the EU EAT Report on Afghan Presidential elections 2014 before the press. He stated, ―The absence of detailed results deprived Afghan citizens of a full and transparent outcome.‖ He highlighted the negative impact of the US-led power-sharing settlement on the consolidation of democracy and argued:

By accepting a negotiated solution, Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah showed remarkable restraint, and so did their supporters. Nevertheless, the growth of democracy and the credibility of the electoral institutions have suffered a severe blow by the extent of the fraud.793

The course of democratization based on multiple phases lost its progress and gave an impetus to those groups which were inclined to support the authoritarian system. Similarly, the principal intervener-directed power-sharing deal made the electoral process an illegitimate exercise and lowered the prospects of democracy consolidation in Afghanistan. This is why elections have

792 Byrd, ―Understanding Afghanistan‘s 2014 Presidential Election,‖ 3. 793 ―EU-EAT Final Report on the Afghan Presidential Elections Calls for Rapid Anti-Fraud Electoral Reforms,‖ EU- EAT Press Release, December 16, 2014, 1, www.eueat-afghanistan-press-release-1612201.pdf;For detail analysis see the complete final report, http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/FINAL--‐REPORT--‐EUEAT--‐AFGHANISTAN-- ‐2014--‐c_en.pdf.

231 become meaningless for the Afghan society because their participation in electoral process and casting of vote in the favor of their choice for leader become irrelevant when the executive slot has been filled with the externally-led elite bargain. Post-2014 presidential election crisis has accelerated the pace of democratization ―backsliding‖; however, the principal intervener and its international and local allies are yet struggling to save the political status-quo maintained by the external power and ―winning coalition,‖ created in the form of unity government.

The Ghani-Abdullah camps represent a multi-ethnic group. But in pre and post-election scenarios, both groups have utilized the ethnic card to succeed in the elections and subsequent political deadlock. The electoral process, therefore, highlights a sharp ethnic division between Pashtuns and Tajiks on controlling the levers of power in Kabul.794 Ethnic affiliations have superseded the national agenda and preferences. Similarly, the fraudulent elections have not played any positive role in reshaping the country and society.

Principal intervener‘s power transfer method set the course for the working of National Unity Government and its performance. Yet, at the administrative front, the new regime has not shown any improvement. The power-sharing formula has rather led to slow and ineffective government performance in the delivery of public goods to the citizens. Though the power- sharing arrangement has averted the post-election violence, yet the incumbent regime‘s working is based on an intra-governmental bargain on political and economic resources. Bargains are exclusively focusing on group interests rather than the political and economic efficacy of the government in the transition period. For the same reason, the elite bargain on political and economic resources has no content of accountability. Similarly, the ethnic fault lines, electoral alliances, and personalized rivalries are becoming a serious hurdle to appointing capable people in the state apparatus.795 Those who have benefited from the corrupt and fragile state institutions are willing and working on the maintenance and strength of status quo in the system. The notions of change and accountability have already lost their significance due to the role of society as an ―outsider‖ in the formation of government.

794 Kate Clark, Elections 2014 (49): Still deadlock, make or break (September 14, 2014), https://www.afghanistan- analysts.org/afghanistan-elections-2014-49-still-in-deadlock-still-crisis-looms/?format=pdf. 795 Marvin Weinbaum and Meena Yousufzy, ―Political-Cultural Impediments to Reform in Afghanistan,‖ Foreign Policy, March 6, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/political-cultural-impediments-reform-afghanistan.

232

The national unity government has failed to bring any significant change and improvement in the state institutions. The current process cannot be described as transformation but an extended phase of transition where the fragile state institutions are struggling to survive in rapidly changing political and security environment. In addition to drawdown, the combat scope of U.S. forces has been reduced to limited operations. The exit of U.S. and ISAF troops has shifted the security and combat responsibility to the ANSF, which are on now the frontline in the counterinsurgency operations. Their unsatisfactory performance in countering the Taliban attacks and pulling themselves out from the siege situations have shaken up the incumbent government. The dynamics of conflict have shifted in the favor of Taliban after the shift in combat responsibilities. The ANSF have shown a stark failure in the battlefield in the wake of Taliban attacks in the districts left by the foreign troops. At the time of writing, Taliban attacks have exposed serious deficiencies in the capacity of Afghan coercive institutions and their organizational discipline to counter the insurgents‘ attacks moving toward northern Afghanistan. Taliban have nearly doubled the numbers of attacks, kidnappings, and killings of the ANSF recruits after the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Afghan forces have suffered substantial casualties in the course of fighting with the Taliban. For instance, in Helmand, the Afghan security forces suffered 1,300 casualties during seven months (June-December 2014).796 Since the intervener and its allies have ended their larger combat role, the scale of fighting and ensuing institutional response to the situation, i.e. the Taliban ―spring offence‖ since March 2015, have made the weakness visible in the coercive institutions and central regime. Post-withdrawal scenario has also shown the lack of coordination among various state agents at the local and central levels to push back the insurgents from the provincial capitals and district areas. The ANSF do not seem capable of sustaining the Taliban assaults for a longer period. Taliban have increased their assaults in the northern provinces. In April 2015, they besieged the ANA in the regional capital city of Kunduz and displaced a large number of locals from the districts surrounding the area.797

796 Rod Nordland, ―Taliban Push into Afghan Districts that U.S had secured,‖ New York Times, December 22, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/taliban-push-into-afghan-districts-that-us-had-secured.html?hp&action =click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1. 797Mujib Mashal and Jawad Sukhanyar, ―Afghan Troops Rush to Kunduz Amid Taliban Assault,‖ New York Times, April 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/asia/afghan-troops-rush-to-kunduz-amid-taliban- assault.html.

233

Kunduz central city was the first test case after the drawdown of foreign troops. The Taliban attempted to check the strategic and operational capacity of the ANA by surrounding them from every direction. The latter pushed them back with the help of the ALP. Nonetheless, the intense [current] wave of violence started after the withdrawal of the foreign troops has increased civilian casualties.798 According to the UNAMA Human Rights Report on 2014, the civilian casualties have increased sharply in the first eleven months of the year. ―3,188 civilians had been killed and 6,429 were injured in the first 11 months of 2014.‖799 In an interview to DW, the UNAMA Human Rights Director Georgette Gagnon explained the causes of increasing numbers of civilian causalities:

…numbers of Afghan children, women and men killed and injured in conflict- related violence throughout Afghanistan. Intensified offensives by anti- government elements, new military operations by Afghan National Security Forces, and the increased use of tactics that caused a huge number of civilian casualties- particularly improvised explosive devices and mortar rounds impacting civilian-populated areas- led to the highest number of civilian casualties.800

So far, the protection of civilians remains a secondary priority of the Afghan government. The government is rather pursuing a vague and aggressive counterinsurgency policy. It has allowed the Afghan troops to use heavy weapons and night raids to counter the Taliban‘s offensive posture in addition to exempting them from judicial inquiries in case of any violation of human rights of the locals and armed opposition forces.801 Even so, the ANSF counterinsurgency operations have been converted into defensive operations.

Given the circumstances, the trend of ―a high number of civilian casualties‖ is likely to increase in the later half of 2015. The surge in insurgent attacks coincided with the end of the international troops‘ combat mission and reduction of air strikes has already plagued the important provinces of the country. The Afghan lawmakers have openly given harsh remarks on

798 Stephen Watts and Sean Mann, ―Determining U.S. Commitments in Afghanistan,‖ The Washington Quarterly 38, no.1 (Spring 2015): 109. 799 DW, ―Record number of Afghan civilians killed in 2014, says UN,‖ DW News, December 20, 2014, http://www.dw.de/record-number-of-afghan-civilians-killed-in-2014-says-un/a-18143928. 800 Quoted in, ―2014: The deadliest year for Afghan civilians on record,‖ DW News, December 31, 2014, http://www.dw.de/2014-the-deadliest-year-for-afghan-civilians-on-record/a-18164986. 801 Syed Tariq Majdi, ―Afghan Army Chief Lifts Night raids and Heavy Weapon Bans,‖ Tolo News, June 14, 2015, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20012-afghan-army-chief-lifts-night-raid-and-heavy-weapons-ban

234 the failure of security and intelligence agencies in subduing the Taliban assaults and stopping the distribution of weapons among the locals, thus diminishing the chances of peace in post-Taliban Afghanistan.802 The recent attack on the Afghan parliament is a sign of the Taliban‘s growing presence in the capital and escalation in the pace of their attacks.803 Although the coercive state institutions quelled that attack, the civilian death toll and incompetence of the central regime in the security sector exposed the weakness of the regime. In addition, the ISIL‘s entry in Afghanistan has widened the spectrum of war and killings. The ISIL militants have not only challenged the leading Taliban armed opposition movement but also carried out parallel the destruction of the ANSF.804 Yet, the success of ISIL in establishing a niche in the post-Taliban Afghanistan remains a challenge for the newcomer.

Security and administrative failures have engulfed the unity government. Slow delivery of the state services is attributed to the long-delayed completion of the Ghani cabinet. The two camps took six months in developing consensus and finalizing nominees.805 The power-sharing arrangement between the apex authorities strengthened the ethnic fractionalization and patronage networks in the incumbent regime. Therefore, almost all significant appointments at the central and local levels, especially cabinet members, judicial, and key sub-national state positions, have

802 ―Afghan Security Chiefs Answer MPs Questions,‖ Tolo News, June 17, 2015, http://www.tolonews.com/en/ afghanistan/20208-afghan-security-chiefs-answer-mps-questions; See,for instance, ―Badakhshan MPs Concerned about Influx of Weapons,‖ Tolo News, July 12, 2015, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20409-badakhshan- mps-concerned-about-influx-of-weapons. 803 “Taliban Attack on Afghan Parliament in Kabul Ends,” BBC News, June 22, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-33221051; Mathew Weaver, “Afghanistan Parliament Attacked by Taliban Suicide Bomber and Gunmen,’ The Guardian, June 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jun/22/afghanistan-parliament-attack-live-updates. 804 Musa Khan Jalalzai, “The Emergence of IS in Afghanistan,” Daily Times, April 21, 2015, http://www.dailytimes. com.pk/opinion/21-Apr-2015/the-emergence-of-is-in-afghanistan; Raf Sanchez, “ISIL is already sending 'advance guards' to Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani warns,” The Telegraph, March 25, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/northamerica/usa/11495078/Isil-is-already-sending- advance-guards-to-Afghanistan-Ashraf-Ghani-warns.html; Sudarsan Raghavan ,“Taliban in Afghanistan tells Islamic State to stay out of country,” Washington Post, June 16, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taliban-warns-islamic-state-to-stay-out-of- 805 Ayaz Gul, “Long-Delayed Afghan Cabinet in Place Amid Deteriorating Security,” Voice of America News, April 21, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/long-delayed-afghan-cabinet-in-place-amid- deteriorating-security/2728641.html.

235 been decided in accordance with the parity formula agreed in a political framework deliberated between the leading presidential candidates under the supervision of John Kerry.806

At other fronts, the phenomenon of reduced foreign aid has been linked with certain conditionalities such as reduction of corruption, opium cultivation, and reforms in electoral institutions to make the future elections transparent. However, the unity government seems unable to meet the conditions. At the economic front, the unemployment rate has increased and the government has made no concrete efforts to increase the tax net to reduce dependence on foreign aid. Unemployment has also reduced the consumption power of the populace. In brief, the fragility in the creation and affirmation of the national unity government has negatively affected the business in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

President Ghani has purged several state officials at national and sub-national levels to give a clean image of the new regime, curtail endemic corruption, and enhance performance of the government, but he seems unable to find right persons for the jobs. The Afghan entrepreneurship has lost confidence in the national government because the intra-governmental bargain between the two camps has consumed the attention and energy of the executive and CEO. This bargain has proved consequential for the stagnation of Afghan economy. The drawdown of foreign troops has ―brought an end to artificial economy‖ in Afghanistan807 whilst the government has not taken any tangible step to stop the growth of poppy cultivation. According to a UN report, ―Opium production has increased seven percent over last year despite counter-anti-narcotics programmes.‖ 808

Worsening security, floundering economy, and uneasy and time-consuming compromises between Ghani and Abdullah on the appointments of national and sub-national state authorities have brought in severe criticism against the performance of government. President Ghani‘s effort to achieve peace in the country through opening up of peace negotiations with the Taliban and rapprochement with Pakistan has received mixed reviews in Kabul. There have been series of

806 Kate Clark, Elections 2014 (51): Finally, a Deal, but not yet Democracy (Afghanistan Analyst Network, Kabul, September 21, 2014), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/elections-2014-51-finally-a-deal-but-not-yet- democracy/afghanistan/2015/06/16/a88bafb8-1436-11e5-8457-4b431bf7ed4c_story.html. 807 David Loyn, ―Afghan economy stagnates amid political deadlock,‖ BBC News, Kabul, January 29, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31024856. 808 “Afghanistan Sees Rise in Poppy Cultivation,” Al Jazeera, November12, 2014, http://www.aljazeera. com/news/asia/2014/11/afghanistan-sees-rise-poppy-cultivation-20141112115426363345.html.

236 official exchanges between the two governments, ranging from civilian leadership to military apex authorities, since the inauguration of government.809 This shift in the relationship is based on mutual interests of both governments: Afghanistan sought to kick start the negotiation process with Taliban while Pakistan wanted the cooperation of Kabul regime to take stringent actions against the TTP leadership operating from Afghanistan and reduce the Indian influences in the Afghan state apparatus.810

The apex intelligence agencies of both countries have signed an MOU under which both countries would collaborate on counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, and personal training.811 However, Ghani has received criticism from former president Hamid Karzai who demanded the cancellation of the MOU.812 Afghan MPs and former NDS high officials have given similar statements and shown discontent with the new regime‘s move to establish cooperation between ISI and NDS.813 According to some reports, the NDS serving officials are also not happy with the agreement. For instance, the head of NDS Rahmatullah Nabil‘s refusal to sign the MOU caused a serious intra-institutional defiance and inter-institutional rift.814

However, the improvement in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan has opened the door of negotiations between Taliban and High Peace Council members. The US, Chinese, and Pakistani back door diplomacy with the Taliban has opened the channels of communication between the Afghan government and Taliban to restart direct talks. In effect, China has assumed a more direct role in bringing peace in post-U.S. Afghanistan.815 Today, it is difficult to envisage

809 Khalid Homayun Nadiri, ―Explaining Pakistan‘s self-defeating Afghanistan policy,‖ Brooking Institute Blog, April 27, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/04/27-pakistan-self-defeating-policy- afghanistan; Similar argument given by Nadiri in his another published article, ―Old Habits, New Consequences: Pakistan's Posture toward Afghanistan since 2001,‖ International Security 39, no.2 (Fall 2014):132-168. 810 Mohammad Umer Daudzai, ―Afghanistan and Pakistan: The False Promise of Rapprochement,‖ New York Times, March 25, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/opinion/afghanistan-and-pakistan-the-false-promise-of- rapprochement.html?_r=0. 811 Rezaul H Laskar, ―Pak‘s ISI, Afghan spy agency NDS sign MOU on intelligence sharing,‖ Hindustan Times, May 19, 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-s-isi-afghan-spy-agency-nds-sign-mou-afghan- mps-slam-pact/article1-1348631.aspx. 812 Frud Bezhan, ―Afghan Intelligence Deal With Pakistan Sparks Uproar,‖ Radio Free Europe Liberty, May 20, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-pakistan-intelligence-deal-uproar/27027456.html. 813Aimal Faizi, ―Afghan government is sleeping with the enemy,‖ Al Jazeera, May 21, 2015, http://www. aljazeera. com/indepth/opinion/2015/05/afghan-government-sleeping-enemy-150521044826456.html. 814 Jon Boone and Sune Engel Rasmussen, ―Afghan backlash over security deal with Pakistan,‖ The Guardian, May 19, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/afghan-backlash-over-governments-security-deal-with- pakistan. 815 Jeremy Page, Margherita Stancati, and Nathan Hodge, ―As U.S. Exists, China Takes on Afghanistan Role,‖ Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-u-s-exits-china-takes-on-afghanistan-role-

237 the success of negotiations because the process is at the embryonic stage. Similarly, it is a complex and time-consuming process that requires a comprehensive plan with guarantors to reach the acceptance and implementation stage. However, the outcome of reconciliations talks and the US-China financial aid to Afghan state are likely to have a direct impact on the [deteriorating] state institutions. Political solution remains the only option as aggressive use of air power, troops surge, and nexus with anti-Taliban forces have failed to bring success in the war and state and democracy building experiment.

Conclusion

Today‘s Afghanistan reflects the failure of exogenous state and democracy building processes. The current situation shows how three consecutive fraudulent elections have exposed the flawed design and electoral corruption of the state agents during and after the elections. The external power used its financial and coercive power to resolve the political deadlock regarding the election results and keeping political stability in Kabul. It played a decisive role in crafting a power-sharing deal between top contenders to mitigate the chances of the system collapse. However, the intervener-led negotiated settlement nullified the significance of elections in the democracy and voters‘ choice. In effect, this settlement negatively affected the democratization process and failed to reflect the aspiration of Afghans. This is why the new government seems unable to make progress in strengthening the state‘s coercive, administrative, and economic capacities in order to mitigate the chances of institutional failure in the future. The Afghan society also seems skeptical about the unity government‘s slow and ineffective policies to reverse the negative trends, which have plagued the war-torn society.

1423539002; See, for instance, Zhao Huasheng , ―Chinese Views of Post-2014 Afghanistan,‖ Asia Policy 17 (January 2014): 2-5.

238

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Aquil, Saira, and Tasawer Hussian. ―Pak-US Strategic Cooperation: The Shadows of India- Pakistan Enduring Rivalry.‖ Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences 27 (December 2009):14-35.

Aras, Bulent, and Sule Toktas.― Afghanistan‘s‘ Security: Political Process, State Building and Narcotics.‖ Middle East Policy xv, no. 2 (Summer 2008):39-52.

Ayub, Fatima, and Sari Kouvo.― Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan.‖ International Affairs 84, no.4 (July 2008): 641- 657.

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Boas, Morten, and Kathleen M. Jennings.― ‗Failed States‘ and ‗State Failure‘: Threats or Opportunities?.‖ Globalizations 4, no.4 (December 2007):475-485.

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Harpviken, Kristian Berg.―Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan.‖ Journal of Peace Research 34, no.3 (August 1997):271-287.

Hassan, Oz, and Andrew Hammond.― The Rise and Fall of American‘s freedom agenda in Afghanistan: counter-terrorism, nation-building and democracy.‖ The International Journal of Human Rights15, no.4 (May 2011): 532-551.

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Helland, Leonardo Figueroa, and Stefan Borg.―The Lure of State Failure: A Critique of State Failure Discourse in World Politics.‖ Interventions: International Journal of Post Colonial Studies16, no.6 (2014): 877-897.

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Hipple, Karin Von . ―Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation-building.‖ The Washington Quarterly23, no.1 (2000): 95-112.

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Hodes, Cyrus, and Mark Sedra .― Introduction.‖ Adelphi Papers147, no. 391(October 2007):7-10

Hyman, Anthony. ―Nationalism in Afghanistan.‖ International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 2 (May 2002): 299-315.

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Jensen, Kara."Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice System in Rural Afghanistan."Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies18, no.2 (2011): 929-950.http://www.repository.law. indiana.edu/ijgls/18/iss2/11.

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News Papers Articles and Magazines

Nordland, Rod, ―Elders Back Security Pact That Karzai Won‘t Sign,‖ New York Times, November 24, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/afghan-council-approves- us-security-pact.html?_r=0.

―Afghan Elections Were More Challenging Than In Bosnia, Iraq: JEMB Chief‖,The News (Islamabad), October 7, 2005, A16.

―Afghan Security Chiefs Answer MPs Questions,‖ Tolo News, June 17, 2015, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20208-afghan-security-chiefs-answer-mps- questions.

―Afghanistan Reports Over 3,000 Complains About Vote,‖ Daily Times (Islamabad edition), September 22, 2010, A5.

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―Afghanistan Sees Rise in Poppy Cultivation,‖ AL Jazeera, November12, 2014. http://www. aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/11/afghanistan-sees-rise-poppy-cultivation- 20141112115426363345.html

―Afghanistan: Rein in Abusive Militias and Afghan Local.‖ September 12, 2011. http://www. hrw.org/news/2011/09/12/afghanistan-rein-abusive-militias-and-afghan-local-police.

Afghanistan War: Every Death Mapped,‖ The Guardian, June 23, 2011. http://www.theguardian. com/news/datablog/interactive/2011/jun/23/afghanistan-deaths-mapped.

Ali, Zulfiqar. ―Refugees May Not Cast Vote in Afghan polls.‖ Dawn (Karachi), July 2, 2009.

Asghar, Nauman. ―India-Afghanistan Nexus.‖ The Nation (Islamabad), May 31, 2009.

―Badakhshan MPs Concerned About Influx of Weapons,‖ Tolo News, July 12, 2015. http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20409-badakhshan-mps-concerned-about- influx-of-weapons.

Bezhan, Frud. ―Afghan Intelligence Deal With Pakistan Sparks Uproar,‖ Radio Free Europe Liberty, May 20,2015. http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-pakistan-intelligence- deal-uproar/27027456.html.

Blumenthal, Sidney. ―Democracy Was Only An Afterthought.‖ The Guardian, July 21, 2005. www.guardian.co.uk/ print/6,3858,5243844-10377,00.html.

Boal, Mark. ―The Kill Team: How U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent Civilians.‖ Rolling Stone, March 27,2011. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team- 20110327#ixzz3Q3OcxWFf .

Boone, Jon. ―Afghan Election Chaos as Abdullah Pulls Out of Run-off.‖ The Guardian, November 1, 2009. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/01/ abdullah- withdraws-afghanistan-election.

Boone, Jon, and Sune Engel Rasmussen. ―Afghan Backlash Over Security Deal With Pakistan,‖ The Guardian, May 19,2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/afghan- backlash-over-governments-security-deal-with-pakistan.

______. ―US keep Secret Anti-Taliban Militia on a Bright Leash.‖ The Guardian, March 8, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/08/us-afghanistan-local-defence- militia.

______. ―US Pours Billions into Anti-Taliban Militias in Afghanistan.‖ Observer, November 22, 2009.

268

Borger, Julian, and Simon Tisdall.―Our Man in Kabul says US Strategy is Failing.‖ The Guardian, October 2, 2008. http://www.theguardian. com/world/2008/oct/02/ afghanistan.usforeignpolicy.

―Bush presses NATO for more Afghan Troops,‖ NBC News, February 15, 2007, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17168462/ print/1/displaymode/1098/.

Crossette, Barbara.― Inquiry Says U.N. Inertia in 94 Worsened Genocide.‖ New York Times, December 17, 1999, A1. http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/17/world/inquiry-says-un- inertia-in-94-worsened-genocide-in-rwanda.html.

Cunningham, Erin, and Ernest Londono, ― Abdullah Mobilizes Supporters, Vows to Challenge Afghan Election Results,‖ Washington Post ,July 8,2014. http://www.washingtonpost. com/world/asia_pacific/abdullah-mobilizes-supporters-vows-to-challenge-afghan- election-results/2014/07/08/3fd4bd0c-0690-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_story.html.

Daudzai, Mohammad Umer. ―Afghanistan and Pakistan: The False Promise of Rapprochement,‖ New York Times, March 25,2015.http://www.nytimes.com/ 2015/03/23/opinion/afghanistan-and-pakistan-the-false-promise-of- rapprochement.html?_r=0.

―Delhi, Kabul to Increase Security Coop,‖ The Nation (Islamabad), January 23, 2009.

Dhillon, Kiran.―Afghanistan Is The Big Winner In U.S. Foreign Aid.‖ Time, March 31, 2014. http://Time.Com/43836/Afghanistan-Is-The-Big-Winner-In-U-S-Foreign-Aid/.

Duell, Mark. ―We've Turned a Corner': Obama Defends Plan to Bring Home over 30,000 Troops after Defense Chief labels it Risky and Aggressive,‖ Daily Mail online, June 24,2011. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2007099/Obamas-plan-withdraw-30k-troops- Afghanistan-risky.html.

DW. ―2014: The Deadliest Year for Afghan Civilians on Record,‖ DW News, December 31, 2014. http://www.dw.de/2014-the-deadliest-year-for-afghan-civilians-on-record/a- 18164986.

_____. ―Record Number of Afghan Civilians Killed in 2014, says UN,‖ DW News, December 20, 2014. http://www.dw.de/record-number-of-afghan-civilians-killed-in-2014-says-un/a- 18143928.

Ejaz, Dr. Manzur. ―Competing in Afghanistan.‖ Daily Times (Islamabad), August 12,2009.

Epstein, Jack, and Matthew B. Stannard. ―Tally of Civilian Deaths Depends on Who's Counting / Definitive Estimates Difficult to Obtain.‖ San Francisco Chronicle, May 12, 2005. http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Tally-of-civilian-deaths-depends-on-who-s- 2671420.php.

269

Fairfield, Hannah, Kevin Quealy, and Archie Tse.―Troop Levels in Afghanistan Since 2001: How the American and NATO commitment in Afghanistan has evolved since 2001.‖ New York Times, October 1, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/10/01/ world/middleeast/afghanistan-policy.html?_r=2&;

Faizi, Aimal. ―Afghan Government is Sleeping with the Enemy,‖ AL Jazeera, May 21, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/05/afghan-government-sleeping-enemy- 150521044826456.html.

Farmer, Ben .―US ‗Supplying Anti-Taliban Tribal Militias with Ammunition‘.‖ The Telegraph, November 22, 2009. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/663144/US- supplying-anti-Taliban-tribal-militias-with-ammunition.html;

Filkins, Dexter. ―Letter from Kabul: The Great Afghan Bank Heist.‖ The New Yorker, February 14, 2011. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/02/14/the-afghan-bank-heist.

Fuller, Graham E. ―Obama‘s Policies making situation worse in Afghanistan and Pakistan.‖ Huffington Post, May 10, 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/global- viewpoint-obamas-p_b_201355.html.

―Gates Discussed Afghan policy with Indian Leaders: Pentagon,‖ The Hindu, January 28, 2010. http://www. thehindu.com/news/international/gates-discussed-afghan-policy-with-indian- leaders-pentagon/article95906.ece.

Galbraith, Peter W. “Peter W. Galbraith -- U.N. Isn't Addressing Fraud in Afghan Election.‖ The Washington Post, October 4, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/ 10/02/AR2009100202855.html.

Gebauer, Matthias.―Donors Link Billions in Aid to Progress on Reforms.‖Spiegel Online, July 9, 2012.www.spiegel.de/international/world/donor-nations-pledege-billions- to-afghanistan-a-843344.html.

Gilmore, Gerry J. ―U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan Slated to Drop Next Year.‖ American Forces Press Service, DoD News, Washington, December 20, 2005. http://www.defense. gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18492.

Goldstein, Joseph , ―Afghan Militia Leaders, Empowered by U.S. to Fight Taliban, Inspire Fear in Villages,‖ New York Times, March 17, 2015.http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/ world/asia/afghan-militia-leaders-empowered-by-us-to-fight-taliban-inspire-fear-in- villages.html?_r=0.

―Graft, Poverty keep many Afghans away from polls,‖ Daily Times (Islamabad), September 19, 2010, A5.

270

Gul, Ayaz.―Long-Delayed Afghan Cabinet in Place Amid Deteriorating Security,‖ Voice of America News, April 21, 2015. http://www.voanews.com/content/long-delayed-afghan- cabinet-in-place-amid-deteriorating-security/2728641.html.

Harding, Thomas, and Tom Coghlan.―Britain in Secret Talks with the Taliban.‖Daily Telegraph, December 26, 2007. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1573687/Britain-in-secret- talks-with-the-Taliban.html.

Harold, Marc.― Counting the Dead.‖ The Guardian, August 8, 2002. http://www.theguardian. com/ world/2002/aug/08/afghanistan.comment.

Harooni, Mirwais, and Hamid Shalizi, ―Taliban Attack Across Kabul, Target U.S. Embassy,‖ Reuters, September 13, 2011.http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/13/us- afghanistan-blast-idUSTRE78B61S20110913.

Hasan, Khalid. ―India to Train Afghan Army,‖ Daily Times (Islamabad), April 14, 2008.

Hersh, Seymour M. ―The Getaway: Questions Surround a Secret Pakistan Airlift.‖ New Yorker, January 28, 2002. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/ 01/28/the-getaway-2.

―His Majesty Decree,‖ Kabul Times 4, no.183 (November 3.1965): 1. http://digitalcommons. unomaha.edu/kabultimes/1138/.

Houreld, Katharine. ―Afghans Warned: The Taxman is Coming After You,‖ Reuters, March 13, 2013.

―How are the Elections Held Here,‖ Kabul Times, September 20, 1969.

‗Indian involved in Afghanistan: WSJ,‖ The Nation (Islamabad), August 20, 2009.

― ‗India Financed Problems for Pakistan‘ from Afghanistan.‖ The Express Tribune, February 26, 2013. http://tribune.com.pk/story/512867/india-financed-problems-for-pakistan-from- afghanistan-chuck-hagel/.

―India Protests Airlift of Pak Fighters from Kunduz, Fears They Will Enter Kashmir.‖ Indian Express, January 2002. http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/news/fullstory.php ?newsid=6813.

―Indian rethinks policy to keep Afghan influence,‖ Dawn, February 2, 2010.

Jalalzai, Musa Khan. ―The Emergence of IS in Afghanistan,‖ Daily Times, April 21, 2015. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/21-Apr-2015/the-emergence-of-is-in-afghanistan;

Jessica, Stern.― Being Feared in Not Enough to Keep US Safe.‖ Washington Post, September 15, 2001. A 27.

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Kamber, Michael. ―A Troubled Haiti Struggles to Gain Its Political Balance.‖ New York Times, January 2, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/02/international/americas/02haiti. html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A12 %22%7D&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI %3A12%22%7D&_r=0.

Kerry, John. ―Op-Ed From Secretary Kerry,‖ Tolo News, July 30, 2014.http://www. tolonews com/en/opinion/15765-op-ed-from-secretary-kerry.

Khan, Azizullah. ―India in Afghanistan,‖ Daily Times (Islamabad), May 22, 2012.

Khattak, Daud. ―2m Afghan Refugees to Miss Presidential Polls,‖ The News (Islamabad), August 3, 2009. Kinzer, Stephen.― Break Up Afghanistan? Why Not?.‖ New York Times, December 1, 2001. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/01/arts/break-up-afghanistan-whynot.html?module= Search&mabReward= relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A12%22%7D& module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A12 %22%7D.

Kramer, Nicholas. ―U.S Backs Intention to Work with Ex-Taliban.‖ Washington Times, June 15, 2004.

Laskar, Rezaul H. ―Pak‘s ISI, Afghan Spy Agency NDS sign MOU on Intelligence Sharing,‖ Hindustan Times ,May 19,2015. http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-s- isi-afghan-spy-agency-nds-sign-mou-afghan-mps-slam-pact/article1-1348631.aspx;

Lee, Carol E., and Collen Mccain Nelson. ―U.S Slows Pace of Afghan Troop Withdrawal,‖ The Wall Street Journal, March 24,2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-meets-with- afghan-president-ghani-amid-troop-drawdown-concerns-1427209840. Lodhi, Maleeha. ―Limits of Military Action.‖The News (Islamabad), May 18, 2010.

Loyn, David.― Afghan Economy Stagnates Amid Political Deadlock,‖ BBC News, Kabul, January 29, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31024856.

Majidi, Syed Tariq . ―Afghan Army Chief Lifts Night raids and Heavy Weapon Bans,‖ Tolo News, June 14, 2015. http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20012-afghan-army- chief-lifts-night-raid-and-heavy-weapons-ban

Majidi, Syed Tariq.― India to Boost Commando Presence in Afghanistan.‖Tolo News, September 1, 2013.www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11764-india-to-boost-commando-presence- in-afghanistan.

Marquand, Robert.―At London Afghanistan Conference, a Developing Script of Withdrawal.‖ The Christian Science Monitor, January 28, 2010.

272

Mashal, Mujib, and Jawad Sukhanyar, ― Afghan Troops Rush to Kunduz Amid Taliban Assault,‖ New York Times, April 28,2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/asia/afghan- troops-rush-to-kunduz-amid-taliban-assault.html.

McGreal, Chris. ―US soldiers 'killed Afghan Civilians for Sport and Collected Fingers as Trophies'.‖ The Guardian, September 9, 2010.http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2010/sept/09/us-soldiers-afghan-civilians-fingers.

Mclean, Alan, and Archie Tse.―American Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq: The Number of Troops in Each Country Since Operations began in Afghanistan in late 2001 and in Iraq in Spring 2003.‖ New York Times, June 22, 2011. http://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2011/ 06/22/world/asia/american-forces-in-afghanistan-and-iraq.html?_r=0.

―More than 4.3 m Afghan Cast Vote: Commission,‖ The News (Islamabad), September 22, 2010.

Mojumdar, Aunohita. ―Afghan Citizens Paid $ 1 bn in Bribes for Public Services last Year, Study Finds.‖ The Guardian, July 8, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/08/ afghanistan-bribes-corruption-taliban.

Motlagh, Jason. ―Could Local Militias Shape the Afghan Elections?.‖ Time , September 18,2010. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2019986,00.html.

Mukherjee, Krittivas . ―India Rethinks Policy to keep Afghan Influence.‖ Reuters, February 2, 2010. http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/idINIndia-45844220100202.

Nadiri, Khalid Homayun, ― Expalining Pakistan‘s Self-defeating Afghanistan policy,‖ Brooking Institute Blog, April 27,2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/04/27- pakistan-self-defeating-policy-afghanistan.

Najafizada, Shoaib. ―Afghan Vote Reflects Ethnic Fault lines.‖ Dawn (Karachi), October 27, 2004.

Nordland, Rod, and Alissa J. Rubin. ―Afghan Vote Marked by Light Turnout and Attacks.‖ New York Times, September18, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/world/ asia/19vote.html?_r=2&hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1284818440-GiXLcXHPoK TPePQMeVaSjg&.

______. ―Warlords with Dark Pasts Battle in Afghan Election.‖New York Times, February 24, 2014. http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/world/asia/warlords-with-dark-pasts-battle- in-afghan-election.html? ref= abdulrashiddostum&_r=0

______.―Taliban Push into Afghan Districts that U.S had Secured,‖ New York Times, December 22, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/taliban-push-into-

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Nuri, Maqsud Ul Hassan. ―Need for Afghan National Army.‖ The News (Islamabad), September 2, 2002.

Page, Jeremy, Margherita Stancati, and Nathan Hodge. ―As U.S. Exists, China Takes on Afghanistan Role,‖ The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/ articles/as-u-s-exits-china-takes-on-afghanistan-role-1423539002.

Pande, Aparna . ―India-Pakistan-Afghanistan Triangle,‖ The Huffington Post, August 22, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost. com/aparna-pande/india-pakistan-afghanistan- triangle_b_1819299.html

Partlow, Joshua. ―Afghanistan Parliament's Rejection of Karzai Cabinet Picks Signals.‖ The Washington Post, January 04, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/01/03/AR2010010301970.html.

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