FAILURE OF STATE AND DEMOCRACY BUILDING EXPERIMENT IN POST TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN A Dissertation Submitted to The School of Politics and International Relations Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy By SAIRA SALEEM 2016 To Aquil and Taimur to whom I owe so much Contents Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................…...i Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………...ii List of Abbreviations and Acronyms……………………………………………………………..iii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………….vi Introduction The Problem……………………………………………………………………………………...1 Research Questions………………………………………………………………………………2 Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………………….2 Significance of the Study………………………………………………………………………...2 Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………...3 Organization of Study …………………………………………………………………………...16 Research Methodology…………………………………………………………………………..20 Chapter 1: Concept of a Failed State: Theoretical Approaches Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………...24 1.1 Theoretical Debates on Failed State……………………………………………………..27 1.2 Repairing the Failed States: External State and Democracy Building Processes…………………………………………………………………………………33 1.3 Afghanistan: An Exogenous Experiment…………………………………………….….45 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….47 Chapter 2: State Formation in Afghanistan: From Tribal Confederacy to a Weak State (1747-1978) Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………...49 2.1 Formation of Pashtun Tribal Confederation to a Segmentary State…………………….49 2.2 Transition to Unitary Afghan State under Iron Amir: Amir Abdur Rehman…………...54 2.3 State-building in the Twentieth Century: Modernization Project, Constitutional Monarchy, and Resistance……………...……………………………………………….56 2.3.1 Decade of Democracy (1963-1973)……………………………………………..61 2.3.2 Daoud in Power: Emergence of Republican State……………………………....69 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….74 Chapter 3: Decomposition Process of Afghan State: Soviet Intervention, Afghan Civil War, and Taliban Regime Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….….76 3.1 PDPA in Power: State Building and State Fragmentation………………………….…...76 3.1.1 State under Khalq: Taraki-Amin Rule…………………………………………..77 3.2 Soviet Occupation: Rebuilding of Party State (Karmal and Najibullah Years)………....82 3.3 Mujahideen Regime: Civil War and State Collapse……………………………………..90 3.4 Ascendency of Taliban: Emergence of a Failed State…………………………………...93 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….....99 Chapter 4: Exclusionary Democratization Process in Post Taliban Afghanistan: An Analysis Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..100 4.1 Phase One: Bonn Process: An Exogenous Exercise for Democratizing a Failed State...102 4.2 Phase Two: Transition towards Procedural Democracy……………………………....107 4.2.1 Emergency Loya Jirga…………………………………………………………………107 4.2.2 Crafting of Constitution and Approval by Constitutional Loya Jirga………….110 4.2.3 National Elections and Electoral Engineering…………………………………114 4.2.3.1 Comparative Analysis of Presidential Elections (October 9, 2004 – August 20, 2009)……...……………………………………..….………………115 4.2.3.2 Comparative Analysis of Wolesi Jirga Elections : ( September 18, 2005- September 18, 2010)…………….….…………………………………..122 4.3 Afghan Parliament: Putting the Institution into Practice..……………………………...128 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...130 Chapter 5: Impediments in the State and Democracy Building Processes: U.S. Contradictory Policies and Security Dilemmas Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….132 5.1 Conflicting Objectives…………..……………………………………………………...132 5.2 Warlordism : A Precarious Challenge………………………………………………...145 5.3 Rule of Law…………………………………………………………………………….153 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...160 Chapter 6: Taliban Insurgency: Internal and External Dynamics Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….163 6.1 Resurgence of Taliban: Internal Factors……………………………………………....164 6.2 The Pakistan Context: Transnational Factor………………………………………….. 174 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...185 Chapter 7: Limitations in Statebuilding Process: Effects on State Coercive and Socio-Economic Capacities Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….187 7.1 Constructing a New State: Concept of Stateness………………………………………188 7.2 Limitations of Coercive Capacity and Governance……………………………………191 7.3 Lack of Extractive Capacity and Exogenous Aid Dependencies……………………….197 7.4 Corruption Eats Away the State Capacity and Legitimacy…………………………….202 7.5 Social Constraints………………………………………………………………………208 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...213 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………..215 Postscript The Contemporary Context: Afghanistan 2014 and Beyond………………226 Bibliography ..............................................................................................................................239 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I am grateful to Allah, the most merciful, for the well-being, courage, and the strength that were necessary to complete this dissertation. This thesis could not have been successfully completed without the invaluable contribution of my supervisor. I express my sincere gratitude to Professor Dr. Tahir Amin for his guidance, motivation, and patience. He nurtured this project with his insightful suggestions and encouraging comments. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my dissertation. I am extremely grateful to the faculty of School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) for their support and academic guidance. The SPIR director Professor Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal has always been supportive and cooperative. I am indebted to Professor Florian Khun for his encouragement and constructive comments on my preliminary research draft. His comments enabled me to give clarity to the theoretical argument of the thesis. I also owe gratitude to Professor Dr. Razia Sultana for her encouragement and guidance in our collaborated research articles. Writing a PhD dissertation is not an easy task. It cannot be completed singlehandedly or without the encouragement and support of friends, colleagues, and family. Whilst working on the dissertation, I have gained a lot from the exchange of ideas with my friends and colleagues and their suggestions. I am thankful to Asma Faiz, Dr Sadia Suleman, Dr. Sannia Abdullah, and Saweeda Nadeem for their support and encouragement. My parents and siblings have always been supportive. I owe special thanks to my parents and siblings for their unceasing support, prayers, and encouragement, which made it possible for me to complete the thesis. Finally, I must acknowledge that without constant support and encouragement of Aquil and Taimur, it was impossible for me to complete my thesis. Both kept my spirit high and provided me with an opportunity to take my time and concentrate on the work. i Abstract This study focuses on the failure of state and democracy building experiment in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The aforementioned experiment is the first test case of militarized intervention after 9/11 under the banner of the war on terrorism to build a failed state on liberal democratic lines. This dissertation includes an in-depth study of the processes and their nexus to give a broader theoretical understanding of the failure of the experiment in the transitory phase. The sources of the failure were not only located in the flawed design and an asymmetrical interaction pattern, but the challenges originated from the gaps in the processes also negatively affected the linkage between democracy and stateness. Both processes suffered from the legitimacy deficit and failed to bring transition in the institutions whilst the contradictions and ambiguities in the principal intervener‘s policies negated the spirit of liberal values in the experiment. Competing agendas of the interveners and lack of coordination among them contributed to the failure of processes. The principal intervener (U.S.) de-politicized and de-contextualized its policies to address the failed state conditions. The intervener preferred stability to democratization and facilitated narrow power-sharing arrangements. The intervener and its local allies excluded the opposition forces, mainly Taliban, and neglected the aspirations of the Afghan society in Bonn conference I. This exclusion went in favor of Tajiks, the new state elite, and thus exacerbated ethnic tensions and power struggle between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The processes, therefore, created a fragile state with weak and dependent institutions. Lack of accountability and public participation made these institutions fragile and provided the new and old state elites with an opportunity to nurture their patronage networks. This is why the post-U.S. Afghanistan appears engulfed with insurgency and violence, which have increased civilian casualties. Violence continues to dominate the Afghan domestic politics whereas the coercive, capital, and administrative capacities of the Afghan state remain limited and confined to major provincial capitals. Pervasive corruption in the state institutions is a continuing trend with no signs of reduction. The incumbent [unity] government, a product of an intra-elite bargain, so far appears incapable of garnering public support in its struggle against the Taliban insurgency and other turbulences in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. ii Abbreviations and Acronyms AfPak Afghanistan-Pakistan AIA Afghan Interim