Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs August 17, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary The Obama Administration and several of its partner countries are seeking to reduce U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan while continuing to build Afghan governing and security capacity to defend the country by the end of 2014. To secure longer term U.S. gains, on May 1, 2012, during a visit to Afghanistan, President Obama signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement that will likely keep some (perhaps 15,000—20,000) U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014 as advisors and trainers. Until then, the United States and its partners will continue to transfer overall security responsibility to Afghan security forces, with Afghan forces to assume the lead nationwide by mid-2013. As lead responsibility shifts, the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 99,000 in June 2011, will be reduced to 68,000 by the end of September 2012. President Obama has said that “reductions will continue at a steady pace” from then until the completion of the transition to Afghan lead at the end of 2014. In keeping with the Strategic Partnership Agreement, on July 7, 2012 (one day in advance of a major donors’ conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo) the United States named Afghanistan a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” further assuring Afghanistan of longterm U.S. support. As the transition proceeds, there is increasing emphasis on negotiating a settlement to the conflict. That process has proceeded sporadically since 2010, and has not, by all accounts, advanced to a discussion of specific proposals to settle the conflict. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups worry about a potential settlement, fearing it might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing. The Administration view is that, no matter the U.S. and allied drawdown schedule, Afghan stability after the 2014 transition is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for 2014, will be free and fair. Afghan anti-corruption institutions have been established since 2008 but, thus far, have lacked effectiveness. To promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement in Afghanistan, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resources. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs have begun or are beginning. As part of this economic strategy, U.S. officials also see greater Afghanistan integration into regional trade and investment patterns—referred to as the “New Silk Road (NSR).” Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success. Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of FY2011, the United States has provided over $67 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $39 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2011, the Afghan intervention has cost about $443 billion, including all costs. For FY2012, about $15 billion in aid (including train and equip) is to be provided, in addition to about $90 billion for U.S. military operations there, and $9.7 billion in aid is requested for FY2013. As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, U.S. economic aid requests are likely to continue at current levels through FY2017, according to the Administration. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background...................................................................................................................................... 1 From Early History to the 19th Century..................................................................................... 1 Early 20th Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1 Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period..................................................................................... 2 The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities............................................... 3 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal........................................................................ 3 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban................................................................ 4 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)...................................................................... 5 U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence................................ 5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6 Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 ................................................................................................. 7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................... 7 Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts ............................................................................... 9 U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure............................................................... 11 Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition, and Beyond”.................................................................. 13 Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others............................................ 13 Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)................................................................. 13 Al Qaeda/Bin Laden.......................................................................................................... 14 Hikmatyar Faction............................................................................................................. 15 Haqqani Faction ................................................................................................................ 15 Pakistani Groups ............................................................................................................... 17 Insurgent Tactics................................................................................................................ 17 Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods....................................... 18 The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008 ............................................................................... 19 Perception of “Victory,” Followed by Setback and Deterioration..................................... 19 Obama Administration Surge .................................................................................................. 20 Review and December 1, 2009, Surge and Transition Announcement ............................. 21 NATO Converts July 2011 “Deadline” to “Transition” by the End of 2014..................... 22 Surge Implementation and Results.................................................................................... 23 Progress of the Transition and Drawdown .............................................................................. 24 Tranches of Territory in Transition:................................................................................... 24 Unwinding of the Surge Announced June 22, 2011 .......................................................... 24 Faster Transition to Afghan Combat Lead by Mid-2013 .................................................. 25 Beyond 2014: U.S. Troop Presence/Strategic Partnership Agreement.................................... 26 Likely Size and Structure of Post-2014 Force................................................................... 26 Strategic Partnership Agreement ....................................................................................... 27 Threats to Long-Term U.S. Presence: Civilian Casualties and Quran-Mishandling Protests........................................................................................................................... 29 Alternatives for the Post-Transition Period....................................................................... 30 Transition Pillar: Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .............................. 31 Current and Post-2014 Size of the Force........................................................................... 32 ANSF Funding .................................................................................................................. 32 Training Overview ............................................................................................................ 33 The Afghan National Army (ANA)................................................................................... 34 Afghan Air Force..............................................................................................................

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