DOCSLIB.ORG

The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets This Page Intentionally Left Blank the Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets This Page Intentionally Left Blank the Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets This page intentionally left blank The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours Princeton University Press Princeton and Oxford Copyright © 2008 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Boeri, Tito. The economics of imperfect labor markets / Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN: 978-0-691-12449-0 (alk. paper) 978-0-691-13735-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Labor market. I. Ours, J. C. van. II. Title. HD5706 .B648 2008 331.12–dc22 2008062104 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available This book has been composed in Times Roman Printed on acid-free paper. ∞ press.princeton.edu Printed in the United States of America 10987654321 Contents Preface xi Symbols and Acronyms xvii 1 Overview 1 1.1 A Few Key Definitions 2 1.2 A Competitive Labor Market 4 1.2.1 Labor Supply and the Reservation Wage without Hours Restrictions 4 1.2.2 Aggregate Labor Supply 7 1.2.3 Labor Demand and Wage Determination 9 1.2.4 Equilibrium 11 1.3 Labor Market Institutions 14 1.3.1 Acting on Prices 14 1.3.2 Acting on Quantities 15 1.3.3 Institutional Interactions 17 1.3.4 Why Do Labor Market Institutions Exist? 18 1.3.5 Product Market Competition and Institutional Reforms 21 1.4 Technical Annex: A Simple Static Framework 24 1.4.1 A Competitive Labor Market 24 1.4.2 Labor Market Institutions 25 1.4.3 The Wedge 26 1.4.4 Product Market Competition and the Employment Bias of Institutions 27 2 Minimum Wages 29 2.1 Cross-Country Comparisons 30 2.2 Theory 33 2.2.1 A Competitive Labor Market 33 2.2.2 A Noncompetitive Labor Market 34 2.3 Empirical Evidence 38 2.3.1 Studies Based on Firm-Level Data 38 2.3.2 Studies Based on Natural Experiments 39 2.3.3 Studies Based on Workers’ Histories 43 2.4 Policy Issues 44 2.4.1 Should the Minimum Wage Be Reduced or Increased? 44 2.4.2 Is the Minimum Wage Effective in Reducing Earnings Inequality and Poverty? 45 2.5 Why Does a Minimum Wage Exist? 46 vi Contents 2.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 47 2.7 Review Questions 47 2.8 Technical Annex: Fine-Tuning of the Minimum Wage 48 3 Unions and Collective Bargaining 51 3.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 52 3.1.1 Union Density 52 3.1.2 Coverage and Excess Coverage 54 3.1.3 Coordination 56 3.2 Theory 56 3.2.1 Collective Bargaining 57 3.2.2 Endogenous Membership 61 3.3 Empirical Evidence 66 3.3.1 Effects of Unions on Wages 67 3.3.2 Bargaining Coordination, Union Density, and Unemployment 71 3.4 Policy Issues 72 3.4.1 Do Unions Increase Efficiency? 72 3.4.2 Should Collective Bargaining Be Decentralized? 74 3.5 Why Do Unions Exist? 75 3.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 76 3.7 Review Questions 76 3.8 Technical Annex: How Strong Should Unions Be in Order to Be Efficient? 77 4 Payroll Taxes 81 4.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 82 4.2 Theory 86 4.3 Empirical Evidence 90 4.4 Policy Issues 92 4.4.1 Negative Income Taxes or In-Work Benefits? 92 4.4.2 Tax Credits or Wage Subsidies? 96 4.5 Why Do Payroll Taxes Exist? 97 4.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 98 4.7 Review Questions 98 4.8 Technical Annex: Taxes and Benefits in a Competitive Labor Market 98 5 Regulation of Working Hours 101 5.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 101 5.2 Theory 102 5.2.1 Regulating Weekly Working Hours 104 5.2.2 Part-Time Work 107 5.3 Empirical Evidence 109 5.3.1 Working Hours 109 5.3.2 Part-Time Work 113 5.4 Policy Issues 116 5.4.1 Should Governments Regulate Working Hours? 116 5.4.2 Should Governments Stimulate Part-Time Labor? 117 5.5 Why Does Regulation of Working Hours Exist? 117 5.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 118 5.7 Review Questions 118 5.8 Technical Annex: Reduction of Standard Working Hours 119 Contents vii 6 Retirement Programs 121 6.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 122 6.2 Theory 124 6.3 Empirical Evidence 125 6.3.1 Age and Employment 125 6.3.2 Age and Productivity 132 6.4 Policy Issues 134 6.4.1 Should the Mandatory Retirement Age Be Increased? 134 6.4.2 Should Early Retirement Programs Be Phased Out? 135 6.5 Why Do Early Retirement Programs Exist? 136 6.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 136 6.7 Review Questions 136 6.8 Technical Annex: Optimal Retirement Age 137 7 Family Policies 139 7.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 140 7.2 Theory 142 7.2.1 Child Care Facilities 142 7.2.2 Parental Leave 142 7.3 Empirical Evidence 144 7.4 Policy Issues 150 7.4.1 Can Work and Family Life Be Balanced? 150 7.4.2 Is There a Trade-off between Fertility and Employment? 151 7.5 Why Do Family Policies Exist? 153 7.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 153 7.7 Review Questions 154 7.8 Technical Annex: Child Care Facilities and Hours of Work 154 8 Education and Training 157 8.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 158 8.2 Theory 160 8.2.1 Schooling 160 8.2.2 Training 163 8.3 Empirical Evidence 165 8.3.1 Returns to Schooling 165 8.3.2 On-the-Job Training 169 8.4 Policy Issues 170 8.4.1 Should Governments Subsidize In-Company Training? 170 8.4.2 Should There Be a Compulsory Schooling Age? 171 8.5 Why Do Governments Provide Education and Training? 171 8.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 172 8.7 Review Questions 172 8.8 Technical Annex: Schooling and Training 172 8.8.1 Optimal Years of Schooling 172 8.8.2 Who Pays for General Training? 174 9 Migration Policies 175 9.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 176 9.2 Theory 178 viii Contents 9.2.1 A Competitive Labor Market 179 9.2.2 An Economy with Wage Rigidities 180 9.2.3 Wage Rigidities and Unemployment Benefits 181 9.2.4 What Drives Migration Decisions? 182 9.2.5 Effects on Income Distribution of Skill-Biased Migration 183 9.3 Empirical Evidence 184 9.3.1 The Labor Market Performance of Migrants 189 9.3.2 Fiscal Effects 190 9.4 Policy Issues 191 9.4.1 Closing the Welfare Door? 192 9.4.2 Adopting a Points System? 193 9.5 Why Do Migration Policies Exist? 194 9.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 195 9.7 Review Questions 195 9.8 Technical Annex: Net Gains from Migration and the Option Value of Waiting 195 10 Employment Protection Legislation 199 10.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 200 10.2 Theory 204 10.2.1 A Neutrality Result 204 10.2.2 Removing Risk Neutrality 206 10.2.3 EPL with Rigid Wages 206 10.2.4 EPL as a Tax 209 10.2.5 Two-Tier Regimes 210 10.3 Empirical Evidence 211 10.3.1 Cross-Country Analyses 211 10.3.2 Within-Country Studies 213 10.3.3 Endogeneity of EPL 214 10.4 Policy Issues 215 10.4.1 How Much Protection Should EPL Provide? 215 10.4.2 Whom Should EPL Be Protecting? 218 10.5 Why Does Employment Protection Legislation Exist? 220 10.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 220 10.7 Review Questions 221 10.8 Technical Annex: EPL in a Search-Matching Model 221 10.8.1 A Simple Dynamic Framework 221 10.8.2 Present Discounted and Flow Values 221 10.8.3 Behavior of Workers 222 10.8.4 Matching 222 10.8.5 Firms 223 10.8.6 Wage Bargaining 223 10.8.7 Introducing EPL 223 10.8.8 Baseline Parameters 224 11 Unemployment Benefits 225 11.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 226 11.2 Theory 230 11.2.1 A Competitive Labor Market 230 11.2.2 An Imperfect Labor Market 234 Contents ix 11.3 Empirical Evidence 238 11.3.1 Effects on Reservation Wage 238 11.3.2 Effects on Unemployment Duration: Aggregate Data 239 11.3.3 Effects on Unemployment Duration: Microeconomic Data 240 11.3.4 Effects of Unemployment on the Generosity of UBs 243 11.4 Policy Issues 244 11.4.1 Why and When Should UBs Be Publicly Provided? 244 11.4.2 What Is the Optimal Structure of UBs? 246 11.5 Why Do Unemployment Benefits Exist? 247 11.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 248 11.7 Review Questions 248 11.8 Technical Annex: UBs in a Search-Matching Model 249 11.8.1 Effects of UBs in a Two-Sided Job Search Model 249 11.8.2 Optimal Job Search Intensity 249 11.8.3 Vacancies and the Matching Function 250 11.8.4 Wage Bargaining 251 11.8.5 Labor Market Participation 251 11.8.6 Balanced Budget 253 11.8.7 Numerical Simulations 253 12 Active Labor Market Policies 255 12.1 Measures and Cross-Country Comparisons 256 12.2 Theory 258 12.3 Empirical Evidence 263 12.3.1 Experimental Studies 264 12.3.2 Nonexperimental Studies 268 12.4 Policy Issues 270 12.4.1 Do We Need Public Employment Services? 271 12.4.2 Do We Need Activation Policies? 271 12.5 Why Do Active Labor Market Policies Exist? 272 12.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 272 12.7 Review Questions 273 12.8 Technical Annex: Activating Unemployed Workers 273 13 Institutional Interactions 277 13.1 Taxes and Unions 278 13.2 Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits 280 13.3 Unemployment Benefits and Active Labor Market Policies 282 13.4 Employment Protection and Unions 284 13.5 Taxes and Unemployment Benefits 285 13.6 Education and Retirement Programs 287 13.7 What Future for These Institutions? 288 References 291 Index 313 This page intentionally left blank Preface Is it good for employment to increase the progressivity of taxation? Does it make sense to contrast “active” and “passive” labor market policies? Who gains and who loses from employment protection legislation? Why are minimum wages generally diversified by age? Is it better to have decentralized or centralized bargaining systems in monetary unions? Should migrants have access to welfare benefits? Should governments regulate working hours? Current labor economics textbooks do not address these relevant policy issues.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Evidence from Italian and German Provinces
    WAGE EQUALIZATION AND REGIONAL MISALLOCATION: EVIDENCE FROM ITALIAN AND GERMAN PROVINCES Tito Boeri Andrea Ichino Bocconi University European University Institute and University of Bologna Enrico Moretti Johanna Posch University of California, Berkeley Analysis Group Abstract Italy and Germany have similar geographical differences in rm productivity — with the North more productive than the South in Italy and the West more productive than the East in Germany — but have adopted different models of wage bargaining. Italy sets wages based on nationwide contracts that allow for limited local wage adjustments, while Germany has moved toward a more exible system that allows for local bargaining. We nd that Italy exhibits limited geographical wage differences in nominal terms and almost no relationship between local productivity and local nominal wages, while Germany has larger geographic wage differences and a tighter link between local wages and local productivity. As a consequence, in Italy, low productivity provinces have higher non-employment rates than high productivity provinces, because employers cannot lower wages, while in Germany the relationship between non-employment and productivity is signi cantly weaker. We conclude that the Italian system has signi cant costs in terms of forgone aggregate earnings and employment because it generates a spatial equilibrium where workers queue for jobs in the South and remain unemployed while waiting. If Italy adopted the German system, aggregate employment and earnings would increase by 11.04% and 7.45%, respectively. Our ndings are relevant for other European countries. (JEL: J3, J5) 1. Introduction Wage inequality is large and rising in many countries. Different countries have different labor market institutions to mitigate labor market inequality, including minimum wages, subsidies for low wage workers like the Earned Income Tax Credit, and unions contracts.
    [Show full text]
  • List of Publications
    List of publications Books Job Matching, Wage Dispersion, and Unemployment (with Dale T. Mortensen), Oxford: University Press, 2011. IZA prize book with a new introduction and postscript, edited by Konstantinos Tatsiramos and Klaus F. Zimmermann After the Crisis: The Way Ahead (with Jean-Paul Fitoussi and others), Luiss International Group of Economic Policy, Rome: Luiss University Press, 2010 Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, second edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000 (reprinted 2007) translated into Polish, Albanian, Macedonian, Simplified Chinese Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990 Labour Market Adjustment: Microeconomic Foundations of Short-Run Neoclassical and Keynesian Dynamics, Cambridge: University Press, 1976 (re-issued in paperback, 2009) Edited: International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2011 (edited by Jeffrey Frankel and Christopher A Pissarides), National Bureau of Economic Research, University of Chicago Press, 2009. International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2008 (edited by Jeffrey Frankel and Christopher A Pissarides), National Bureau of Economic Research, University of Chicago Press, 2009. International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2005 (edited by Jeffrey Frankel and Christopher A Pissarides), National Bureau of Economic Research, MIT Press 2007. Women at Work: An Economic Perspective, (edited by Tito Boeri, Daniela Del Boca and Christopher Pissarides) A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, Oxford University Press, 2005. Journal Articles Equilibrium in the Labor Market with Search Frictions American Economic Review, 101(June 2011) 1092–1105 (the Nobel lecture) Regular Education as a Tool of Countercyclical Employment Policy Nordic Economic Policy Review, 1 (2011) 209-233 (special issue on Labour Market Consequences of the Economic Crisis, edited by Lars Calmfors and Bertil Holmlund) Taxes, Social Subsidies and the Allocation of Work Time (with L.
    [Show full text]
  • PIETRO GARIBALDI Born in Torino
    PIETRO GARIBALDI JULY 2017 Born in Torino (Italy), ██████████August 7, 1968 Addresses Collegio Carlo Alberto University of Torino Via Real Collegio 30 Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche Sociali e Matematiche Statistiche 10024 Moncalieri (Torino), Italy Corso Unione Sovietica 218bis █████████████████████Phone (direct): ++39-011-6705204 Torino, Italy Phone (secretary): ++39-011-6705003 Phone: ++39-011-6706079 ██████████████████████ ███████████████ Email: pietro.garibaldi_at_carloalberto.org████████████████████████ sites.carloalberto.org/garibaldi████████████████ Education 1996 PhD in Economics, London School of Economics 1993 Master of Science in Economics, London School of Economics 1992 Laurea in Economics, University of Torino (110/110 cum laude, honors and Distinction) Present Academic Positions 2005-current Professor, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Torino 2006-current Director, Allievi Program, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Moncalieri (Italy) 2015-current Chairman, VisitInps Scholar Program, research/fellowship program launched by the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) Other Affiliations 2006-current Fellow, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Moncalieri (Italy) 2002-current Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London 2002-current Research Fellow, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn 2000-current Head of Labor Studies, Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, Milano Previous Academic Activities 2016-current Visiting Scholar, Ente Einaudi for Economics and Finance (EIEF), Rome 2015 Visiting
    [Show full text]
  • The New Hazardous Jobs and Worker Reallocation*
    | 1 The new hazardous jobs and worker reallocation* Gaetano Basso (Bank of Italy), Tito Boeri (Bocconi University, CEPR and IZA), Alessandro Caiumi (Bocconi University) and Marco Paccagnella (OECD) Abstract This paper proposes a new classification of occupations based on the extent to which they put workers at risk of contracting a viral infection. We expand on previous work that mainly focused on the identification of jobs that can be done from home by providing a more nuanced view of infection risks and by identifying jobs that, although impossible to be done from home, expose workers to low infection risks. We label jobs that can be done from home or that present a low risk of infection as “safe jobs”. We apply our classification to labour force survey data from 27 countries and find that, in most of them, the share of safe jobs is close to 50%. More variation across countries exists in the share of jobs that can be done from home. We also find that safe jobs are very unequally distributed across different types of workers, firms, and sectors. More vulnerable workers (younger, less educated, on fixed-term contracts, immigrants) are over- represented in unsafe occupations, and therefore more at risk of suffering from the economic consequences of a pandemic. We also consider the distribution of safe and unsafe jobs between essential and non-essential activities involved by the lockdown measures. We finally assess the process of reallocation of workers to jobs that is likely to take place should the pandemic reveal to be long-lasting as well as the policy actions that could ease this reallocation and make it more efficient.
    [Show full text]
  • Andrea Prat Graduate School of Business Columbia University 3022 Broadway, Uris 624 New York, NY 10027-6902 212-854-6176 [email protected]
    June 2015 Andrea Prat Graduate School of Business Columbia University 3022 Broadway, Uris 624 New York, NY 10027-6902 212-854-6176 [email protected] ACADEMIC POSITIONS . Richard Paul Richman Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, Columbia University, 2012 –. Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Columbia University, 2012 –. Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, London School of Economics, 2004 – 2013. Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, Fall 2006. Reader, Department of Economics, London School of Economics, 2002 – 2004. Lecturer, Department of Economics, London School of Economics, 2000 – 2002. Assistant Professor, Tilburg University, 1997 – 2000. OTHER POSITIONS . Program Director, CEPR, London (Industrial Organization), 2012-. Member, Organizing Committee, European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee (ESSET), 2007-. Principal Investigator, Executive Time Use Project, 2008-. Council Member, Royal Economic Society, 2010-2014. Council Member, European Economic Association, 2008-2012. EDITORIAL ACTIVITY Associate Editor, Theoretical Economics. 2007-. Chair, Review of Economic Studies, 2010-13. Managing Editor, Review of Economic Studies, 2005-2009. RESEARCH INTERESTS Organizational Economics Game Theory Political Economy EDUCATION . Ph.D., Department of Economics, Stanford University, June 1997: advisor: Kenneth Arrow co-advisors: Masahiko Aoki, Dimitri Vayanos Thesis: “Team Theory and Information Processing: Organizations in Which Agents Have Endogenous
    [Show full text]
  • How to Gain Political Support for Reforms?
    Structural Reforms Without Prejudices copyright rests with the author Structural Reforms Without Prejudices Edited by Tito Boeri, Micael Castanheira, Riccardo Faini, and Vincenzo Galasso With Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Ste´phane Carcillo, Jonathan Haskel, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Enrico Perotti, Carlo Scarpa, Lidia Tsyganok, and Christian Wey AC AC Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York # Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, 2006 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization.
    [Show full text]
  • Covid Economics: Vetted and Real-Time Papers
    COVID ECONOMICS VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS ISSUE 2 8 APRIL 2020 SWAP LINES Saleem Bahaj and Ricardo Reis SOCIAL DISTANCING AND BUSINESS Miklós Koren and Rita Peto WORK VERSUS SAFETY GROUP TESTING Tito Boeri, Alessandro Caiumi, and Christian Gollier and Olivier Gossner Marco Paccagnella LOCKDOWNS AND SUPPLY FISCAL POLICY CHAINS INSTRUMENTS Hiroyasu Inoue and Yasuyuki Todo Miguel Faria-e-Castro Covid Economics Vetted and Real-Time Papers Covid Economics, Vetted and Real-Time Papers, from CEPR, brings together formal investigations on the economic issues emanating from the Covid outbreak, based on explicit theory and/or empirical evidence, to improve the knowledge base. Founder: Beatrice Weder di Mauro, President of CEPR Editor: Charles Wyplosz, Graduate Institute Geneva and CEPR Contact: Submissions should be made at https://portal.cepr.org/call-papers- covid-economics-real-time-journal-cej. Other queries should be sent to [email protected]. © CEPR Press, 2020 The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) is a network of over 1,500 research economists based mostly in European universities. The Centre’s goal is twofold: to promote world-class research, and to get the policy-relevant results into the hands of key decision-makers. CEPR’s guiding principle is ‘Research excellence with policy relevance’. A registered charity since it was founded in 1983, CEPR is independent of all public and private interest groups. It takes no institutional stand on economic policy matters and its core funding comes from its Institutional Members and sales of publications. Because it draws on such a large network of researchers, its output reflects a broad spectrum of individual viewpoints as well as perspectives drawn from civil society.
    [Show full text]
  • View Full Festival Program
    updated 12 May THE RETURN OF THE STATE Businesses, communities and institutions TRENTO 2021 3-6 June PROVINCIA AUTONOMA DI TRENTO The relationship between the state and the economy has always been something of a seesaw. As a general rule, in times of crisis – and here we need only think of the Wall Street crash in 1929, but also the 2008 international financial crisis – public authorit- ies have had to intervene to sort out the disasters caused by a market without rules, or with rules that are too ineffective. In contrast, in times of expansion, the “invisible hand” of the market is usually left free to act, creating and redistributing wealth. Hence the state is invited to take one or several steps back, limiting itself to “regulating the traffic”, creating the most fa- vourable conditions for economic forces to free all their energy, and their aggression, ultimately considered to be beneficial. The pandemic undoubtedly took us back to the first of the two scenarios, but this time in a particular context: on this occasion the state entered the fray not to deal with the negative effects of a recession, but rather to combat a deadly serious health emer- gency, of the kind not faced by the world for around a century. Inevitably, however, the health emergency has also led to a devastating economic crisis. Consequently, the state has been called on to act in two contexts: in the field of health, but also in rela- tion to economic recovery, which must be brought about, encouraged and stimulated at all costs.
    [Show full text]
  • Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection Into Politics?
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Braendle, Thomas Working Paper Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics? WWZ Discussion Paper, No. 2013/04 Provided in Cooperation with: Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel Suggested Citation: Braendle, Thomas (2013) : Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?, WWZ Discussion Paper, No. 2013/04, University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel, http://dx.doi.org/10.5451/unibas-ep61350 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123448 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ) der Universität Basel April 2013 Do Institutions Affect Citizens’ Selection into Politics? WWZ Discussion Paper 2013/04 Thomas Braendle Corresponding author: Thomas Braendle, Dr.rer.pol.
    [Show full text]
  • Christopher J. Flinn Curriculum Vitae
    September 2020 Christopher J. Flinn Curriculum Vitae Personal Data: Address: Department of Economics New York University 19 West Fourth Street New York, NY 10012 Telephone: (212) 998 8925 Fax: (212) 995 3932 E-mail: christopher dot flinn at nyu dot edu Citizenship: U.S.A. Education: Ph.D., Economics, University of Chicago, 1984 M.A., Sociology, University of Michigan, 1975 B.A., Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1973. Professional Experience: New York University: Professor of Economics, 1996- ; Associate Professor of Economics, 1987-1996. Collegio Carlo Alberto (Moncalieri, Italy): Senior Research Fellow, 2008-. University of Wisconsin-Madison: Associate Professor of Economics, 1986-88; Assistant Professor of Economics, 1981-1986. Other Professional Activities: Associate Editor, International Economic Review, 2009-2020 Co-Editor, Labour Economics, 2013-2016 Associate Editor, European Economic Review, 2003-2011. Associate Editor, Review of Economics of the Household, 2002- Associate Editor, Journal of Demographic Economics, 2014- Advisory Board, Labour: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations, 2006- Co-Editor, Journal of Human Resources, 1996-2004. Research Affiliate, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998- CHILD (University of Torino), Member of Scientific Committee, 2001- 1 Other Professional Activities (Continued): Member, National Science Foundation Economics Panel, 2014-2015 (four meetings). Member, Binational (Israel-U.S.) Science Foundation Economics Panel, 2009-2013 Keynote Lecturer, ZEW Summer Workshop for Young Economists: Structural Models for Policy Evaluation, Mannheim, June 2016. President (Elected), European Society for Population Economics, 2004 Member (Elected), Council of the European Society for Population Economics, 1998-2001. Co-Organizer (with P-A Chiappori and J. Heckman), New Economics of the Family, Milton Friedman Institute, February 2009.
    [Show full text]
  • Meet the IGIER Scholars Tito Boeri
    classmates to sit next to, the jobs to apply for, the Meet the IGIER Scholars partner to marry with... Essentially you have been practicing labor economics throughout your entire life. Tito Boeri In a few words, what is your most exciting research project on which you are currently working? I am working on the interactions between financial and labor markets, learning from the Great Recession. I am looking at both unemployment and income distribution. The key issue is: should governments have paid more attention to saving jobs rather than financial institutions? A more entertaining project is on match rigging in professional football. It is a way to cheat the work-leisure trade-off having a bit of both. You earned your undergraduate degree from Bocconi and your PhD in economics from New York University. Outreaching---making academic research known Who is the scholar who had the most profound impact among the general public---is an important task. on the way you think as an economist? Funding agencies, such as the National Science Foundation in the U.S., recognize the importance of If you mean on the way to write a paper I would say outreaching when they award a grant. William Baumol. He always finds the right word for an idea, the right example to convey the key concepts. You have been a pioneer of outreaching in Italy: first, And he was an antidote against excessive as a founding member of LaVoce (now a network of specialization. If you mean the scholar who had an websites throughout Europe) and then as the Scientific impact on the way of structuring my thoughts, Director of the Festival dell’Economia in Trento (with choosing the right framework, then I would say Olivier festivals now organized in France, Ireland and Spain).
    [Show full text]
  • Cross-Skill Redistribution and the Tradeoff Between Unemployment Benefits and Employment Protection
    IZA DP No. 1371 Cross-Skill Redistribution and the Tradeoff between Unemployment Benefits and Employment Protection Tito Boeri J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz Vincenzo Galasso DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES DISCUSSION PAPER October 2004 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor Cross-Skill Redistribution and the Tradeoff between Unemployment Benefits and Employment Protection Tito Boeri Bocconi University, IGIER, Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti and IZA Bonn J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz FEDEA Vincenzo Galasso IGIER, Bocconi University and CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1371 October 2004 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 Email: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character.
    [Show full text]