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Andrea Prat Graduate School of Business Columbia University 3022 Broadway, Uris 624 New York, NY 10027-6902 212-854-6176 [email protected]

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Andrea Prat Graduate School of Business Columbia University 3022 Broadway, Uris 624 New York, NY 10027-6902 212-854-6176 Andrea.Prat@Columbia.Edu June 2015 Andrea Prat Graduate School of Business Columbia University 3022 Broadway, Uris 624 New York, NY 10027-6902 212-854-6176 [email protected] ACADEMIC POSITIONS . Richard Paul Richman Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, Columbia University, 2012 –. Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Columbia University, 2012 –. Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, London School of Economics, 2004 – 2013. Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, Fall 2006. Reader, Department of Economics, London School of Economics, 2002 – 2004. Lecturer, Department of Economics, London School of Economics, 2000 – 2002. Assistant Professor, Tilburg University, 1997 – 2000. OTHER POSITIONS . Program Director, CEPR, London (Industrial Organization), 2012-. Member, Organizing Committee, European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee (ESSET), 2007-. Principal Investigator, Executive Time Use Project, 2008-. Council Member, Royal Economic Society, 2010-2014. Council Member, European Economic Association, 2008-2012. EDITORIAL ACTIVITY Associate Editor, Theoretical Economics. 2007-. Chair, Review of Economic Studies, 2010-13. Managing Editor, Review of Economic Studies, 2005-2009. RESEARCH INTERESTS Organizational Economics Game Theory Political Economy EDUCATION . Ph.D., Department of Economics, Stanford University, June 1997: advisor: Kenneth Arrow co-advisors: Masahiko Aoki, Dimitri Vayanos Thesis: “Team Theory and Information Processing: Organizations in Which Agents Have Endogenous Ability and Background” . Laurea in Economia e Commercio, Università degli Studi di Torino, Italy, July 1992 (110 con lode e dignità di stampa): Thesis: “Job Reallocation: Cyclical Aspects” Advisor: Bruno Contini 1 PUBLICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL JOURNALS . “The Real Effects of Relational Contracts” (with Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, and Rebecca Henderson), American Economic Association Papers & Proceedings, forthcoming. “Communication and Influence” (with Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Joan de Martí), Theoretical Economics, forthcoming. “Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives” (with Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso and Raffaella Sadun), Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming. “The Political Economy of Housing Supply” (with François Ortalo-Magné), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(1), 154-81, 2014. “Organizational Economics with Cognitive Costs,” (with Luis Garicano), In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge University Press, 2013. “The Political Economy of Mass Media,” (with David Strömberg), In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge University Press, 2013. “The Price Impact of Institutional Herding” (with Amil Dasgupta and Michela Verardo), Review of Financial Studies, 24(3): 892-925, March 2011. “Institutional Trade Persistence and Long-Term Equity Returns” (with Amil Dasgupta and Michela Verardo), Journal of Finance, 66(2): 635-653, April 2011 (previously circulated under the title “The Price of Conformism”). “Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits” (with Riccardo Puglisi and Jim Snyder), Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 5(3): 291-318, December 2010. “Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment” (with Oriana Bandiera and Tommaso Valletti), American Economic Review, 99(4): 1278-1308, September 2009. “Reputation and Price Dynamics: A Theory of Information Cascades and Systematic Mispricing” (with Amil Dasgupta), working paper, Journal of Economic Theory., 143(1): 83-113, November 2008. “Language and the Theory of the Firm” (with Jacques Cremer and Luis Garicano – previously circulated under the title “Codes in Organizations”), Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(1): 373-407, 2007. “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Political Accountability” (with Timothy Besley), American Economic Review 96(3): 720-736, June 2006. “Financial Equilibrium with Career Concerns,” Theoretical Economics, Volume 1, Issue 1, March 2006. “The Wrong Kind of Transparency,” American Economic Review 95(3): 862-877, June 2005. “Games Played through Agents” (with Aldo Rustichini), Econometrica 71(4): 989-1026, 2003. “Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers” (with Fred Palomino), RAND Journal of Economics, 34(1): 113-137, 2003. “Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare,” Review of Economic Studies, 69(4): 997-1017, 2002. “How Homogeneous Should a Team Be?” European Economic Review, (46)7: 1187-1207, 2002. “Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1): 162-189, 2002. “Inefficient Equilibria in Lobbying” (with Georg Kirchsteiger), Journal of Public Economics, (82)3: 349-375, 2001. “The Value of Public Information in Monopoly” (with Marco Ottaviani), Econometrica, 69(6): 1673-1683, 2001. “Hierarchies of Processors with Endogenous Capacity,” Journal of Economic Theory, 77(1), 1997. “Shared Knowledge vs. Diversified Knowledge in Teams,” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 10, 1996. WORKING PAPERS . “Media Power,” CEPR Discussion Paper 10094, August 2014. “Managerial Attention and Worker Engagement” (with Marina Halac), CEPR Discussion Paper 10035, June 2014. “Transparency and Deliberation within the FOMC: a Computational Linguistics Approach” (with Michael McMahon and Stephen Hansen, CEPR Discussion Paper 9994, May 2014. 2 . “Managerial Capital at the Top: Evidence from the Time Use of CEOs” (with Oriana Bandiera and Raffaella Sadun) . “Span of Control and Span of Activity,” (with Oriana Bandiera, Raffaella Sadun, and Julie Wulf) CEP Discussion Papers, DP 1139, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, 2012. “Screening with an Approximate Type Space” (with Kristóf Madarász), CEPR Discussion Paper 7900, June 2010. “Spatial Asset Pricing: A First Step” (with François Ortalo-Magné), CEPR Discussion Paper 7842, May 2010. “What Do CEOs Do?” (with Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso and Raffaella Sadun), CEPR Discussion Paper 8235, February 2011 (featured in The Economist, 5 May 2011). “Measuring the Impact Factor of Agents within an Organization Using Communication Patterns,” (with Ignacio Palacios-Huerta), CEPR Discussion Paper 8040, October 2010. “Commercial Television and Voter Information” (with David Strömberg), CEPR Discussion Paper 4989, April 2005. OTHER PUBLICATIONS . “How Can We Measure Media Power?” Vox, 22 August 2014. “Central Bank Transparency and Committee Deliberation.” Vox, 20 June 2014. “How Do CEOs Spend their Time?” Vox, 28 May 2011. The Ruling Class: Management and Politics in Modern Italy (editor, with Tito Boeri and Antonio Merlo). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. La classe dirigente: intreccio tra business e politica. (editor, with Tito Boeri and Antonio Merlo). Milan: Egea, 2010. “Perché nella ricerca non facciamo gli inglesi?” (with Oriana Bandiera), La Voce, 21 Luglio 2010. “A Political Economy View of Financial Regulation,” Vox, 9 March 2009. “Incentives in Funds Management: A Literature Overview,” with Sudipto Bhattacharya, Amil Dasgupta and Alexander Guembel, in The Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking (edited by A. Boot and A. Thakor), Elsevier, 2008. “Italian Managers: Fidelity or Performance?” (with Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso and Raffaella Sadun), Report prepared for The Ruling Class, X European Conference, Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, 2008. “The More Closely we are Watched, the Better we Behave?” Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (eds. Christopher Hood and David Heald). Oxford University Press, 2006. “Miti e realtà della scuola italiana,” La Voce, 26 June 2005. “Rational Voters and Political Advertising,” Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (eds. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman), Oxford University Press, 2006. “Una lezione dal Perù,” La Voce, 16 May 2005. “Credible Pensions” (with Timothy Besley), Fiscal Studies, vol. 26(1): 119–135, 2005. “Torino-Lione: 13 miliardi spesi bene?” La Voce, 14 May 2004. “La cittadinanza dei bambini” (with Graziella Bertocchi), La Voce, 16 October 2003. “Mass Media and Political Accountability” (with Tim Besley and Robin Burgess), in The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, World Bank, 2002. “Spectrum Auctions versus Beauty Contests: Costs and Benefits,” Rivista di Politica Economica 96(4/5): 59- 110, 2001. “Lo ‘spettro’ delle frequenze radio” (with Tommaso Valletti), Mercato, Concorrenza, Regole, II, 3, 2000. “An Economic Analysis of Campaign Finance,” World Economics, 1(2), 2000 . “Efficiency Properties of a Constant-Ratio Mechanism for Tradable Emission Permits,” in Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal (eds.), Environmental Markets: Equity and Efficiency, Columbia University Press, 2000. “Risk Incentives in the Money Management Industry” (with Fred Palomino), Risico en Rendement, 1999. CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION Organizer, ESSET Meetings, Gerzensee, Week on “Attention”, July 2014. Organizer, Second Annual CEPR Incentives, Management and Organisation Workshop, Frankfurt, September 2014. Organizer, Fourth New York Strategy Conference, Columbia University, April 2014 Organizer, Second Annual CEPR Incentives, Management and Organisation Workshop, London, September 2013. 3 Organizer, First Annual CEPR Incentives, Management and Organisation Workshop, Milan, September 2012. Program Organizer,
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