SMALL ARMS TRAFFICKING IN THE BORDER REGIONS OF SUDAN, AND

DETERMINING THE ISSUES AND SETTING THE STANDARDS

REPORT OF RESEARCH ON PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS IN THE NORTH RIFT REGION OF KENYA

A REPORT PAPER PRESENTED IN JINJA (UGANDA) 9th – 13th November 2001

PRESENTED BY: SECURITY RESEARCH AND INFORMATION CENTRE (SRIC) KENYA

P. O. BOX 56622, , Kenya Tel/Fax 254 2 449503 or 254 2 449503 Email: [email protected] 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 3

2. INTRODUCTION...... 7

3. TURKANA DISTRICT ...... 10 3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN-CULTURE IN TURKANA DISTRICT ...... 10 3.2 ROOT CAUSES OF GUN CULTURE IN TURKANA DISTRICT ...... 10 3.3 MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF ARMS TRANSFER IN TURKANA ...... 12 DISTRICT...... 12 3.4 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES ...... 13 3.5 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY ...... 14

4. ...... 16 4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN CULTURE IN MARAKWET DISTRICT...... 16 4.2 ROOT CAUSES OF GUN CULTURE IN MARAKWET DISTRICT ...... 17 4.3 MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF ARMS TRANSFER IN MARAKWET DISTRICT...... 17 4.4 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS: SUCCESSES ...... 18 AND FAILURES...... 18 4.5 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY ...... 19

5. TRANS-NZOIA DISTRICT...... 21 5.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN CULTURE ...... 21 5.2 ROOT CAUSES OF GUN CULTURE...... 22 5.3 MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF ARMS TRANSFER IN THE DISTRICT ...... 22 5.4 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS: SUCCESSES &...... 24 FAILURES...... 24 5.5 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY ...... 25

6 . WEST POKOT DISTRICT...... 26 6.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN CULTURE ...... 26 6.2. ROOT CAUSES OF GUN CULTURE...... 27 6.3. MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF ARMS TRANSFER...... 27 6.4 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS: SUCCESSES & FAILURES...... 29 6.5 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY ...... 30

7. EAST BARINGO ...... 31 7.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN CULTURE IN EAST BARINGO ...... 31 7.2 MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF GUN TRANSFER IN EAST...... 32 BARINGO ...... 32 7.3 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS...... 32 7.4 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY ...... 33

8. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD...... 33 3

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report contains the findings of a field research conducted in August and September 2001. The research focused on five districts of the North Rift region of of Kenya. These include; West Pokot, Turkana, Trans-Nzoia, Marakwet and Baringo. The broad objective of the study was to undertake an investigative survey of the problem of small arms in the North Rift region of Kenya. Specifically, the study aimed to: -

Establish the root causes of gun culture in the North Rift. • Identify the various mechanisms of gun trafficking in the region. • Identify the channels and mechanisms of arms transfers including gun market, trends and supply and demand of small arms. • Establish the types of government control measures relating to transfer of arms and their effectiveness. • Assess the economics of the illegal gun trade in the region.

The study was prompted by evidence from previous studies that cattle rustling and the resultant communal conflict among several communities living in Northern Kenya and beyond is directly linked to arms trafficking in the region. The adverse impact brought about by arms-fuelled conflict in the North Rift, and the attendant debate among researches, civil society groups, government officials and ordinary people as to the sources of the small arms proliferating in the region further prompted this research.

It was also felt that a thorough investigation of the problem of small arms in the area would help to expose the extent to which the problem has permeated the different sectors of the lives of the people, thereby creating adequate information about the nature and extent of the problem. This, in turn would help policy makers within the ranks of the Kenyan government, civil society organizations and other stake holders to come up with long lasting solutions to the problem of illegal arms, reduce incidents of cattle-rustling, ethnic violence, violent robbery and other forms of communal conflict.

To address the main concerns of the study, the researchers adopted various methods. Both field survey techniques as well as the historical method of data collection were utilized. The researchers undertook an in depth analysis of relevant secondary data sources such as policy papers, official documents, journals, magazines newspapers, periodicals and published books.

The aim was to collect relevant information used to find answers to the central concerns of the study.

Fieldwork was undertaken in the five districts mentioned above. These districts were chosen purposively, because it is here that cattle rustling and ethnic violence have been most pronounced, with sophisticated, illegally held featuring prominently. Actual data was collected using both structured and unstructured questionnaires and discussions with people deemed to have useful information related to the study. The researchers also used participant observation techniques such as attending inter-community peace meetings, government barazas, market days and community based seminars. For example, the researchers attended a community peace seminar organized by the National Council of 4 Churches of Kenya in Chesongoch, Marakwet district, a Market day at Kolowa Market, East Baringo, a Peace Meeting between the Pokot and Karamojong communities organized by the POKATUSA near Nakaipiripirit in Eastern Uganda, Refugee clearance at the UNHCR clearance Centre at Lokichoggio, and toured the Kakuma refugee camp.

Respondents were drawn from a number of key categories including government officials in Kenya, church and civil society officials, business persons, senior security officials in both the police force and provincial administration, professionals working within and outside the target research area such as teachers, health personnel, community development workers and NGO personnel as well as ordinary ‘wananchi.’1 Care was taken to ensure gender balance.

In all, a total of 140 respondents were interviewed for this study, and were drawn from a sampling frame carefully derived from the categories listed above. Purposive, systematic and multi-stage sampling techniques were utilized with the aim of achieving adequate representation of all the categories targeted for the study with the aim of achieving adequate representation of all the categories and, therefore well-balanced opinions. Data collected was carefully analysed using mainly qualitative analysis techniques such as descriptive statistics.

It was established that, Turkana culture and that of the neighbouring communities such as the Toposa of Sudan, Merrille of Ethiopia, the Karamajong of Uganda and Pokot of Kenya glorifies cattle raiding. The Turkana therefore feel that they must protect their cattle from hostile neighbours, hence the acquisition of illegal arms. Guns are readily available in the district particularly since the mid seventies. The conflicts in Uganda, Southern Sudan and Southern Ethiopia have ensured a continuous supply of small arms. The main entry points are along the common borders between Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. The border is very expansive, poorly policed and the terrain very rough. Arms are transferred by known gun dealers who have created a network of contacts among the community, others are transited through the main Lokichoggio – road, inside charcoal bags, lorry tarpaulins, inflated tyres, car boots and lorry engines, tied under vehicle chassis etc.

Government of Kenya security forces have done little to stop arms trafficking. There are many police checkpoints manned by armed police officers along the roads, a Government Military Camp in Lokichoggio as well as Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs). Despite these measures, little has been achieved in controlling trafficking of arms along the common border. Arms trafficking has fuelled insecurity in the district and contributed to poor educational standards along the common border with Western Pokot where people have fled leaving behind schools. Cattle raids have left many people dead. Guns are also being used to commit criminal activities such as –vehicle hold- ups and robbing of passengers along the Kitale--Lokichoggio road.

In Marakwet district, the community began arming itself in 1992 following numerous deadly attacks on the community by Pokot raiders. Guns there are communally owned. People are arming themselves through contributing money and cattle to buy guns. An AK-47 costs between Ksh. 30,000 and Ksh. 45,000. Main source is East Baringo. Somali cattle dealers also sell guns. They come into from through Samburu. The entire Kerio Valley is very insecure; the Marakwets have left their homes and settled on the Kerio Escarpment. Pokot raiders have killed hundreds of them over the last ten years. Education is in a virtual standstill. No farming is going on in Kerio Valley as villagers have fled the rich plains for fear of being killed.

1 ‘Wananchi’ is the Kiswahili term for citizens. 5

The Government has responded by establishing six security units in various points along the valley. There are regular police, General Service Unit, (Aps) and Anti-

stock theft units deployed to ensure security is maintained. However, the Pokot still attack their neighbours with little being done by the Government security forces to stop the attacks. People feel abandoned by the Government, since it has failed to protect them. The latest Pokot attack on March 12th 2001 left more than 50 Marakwets dead.

In Western Pokot, particularly along the Kenya – Uganda common border, almost every male above 13 years of age owns an AK- 47 rifle. People here do not have much regard for official authority. The main means of livelihood is pastoralism. Their neighbours, the Karamojong of Eastern Uganda are also pastoralists. Cattle raiding is a central part of the two communities culture. The Pokot feel that they must acquire arms to protect their animals from Karamojong and Turkana raiders. Since the collapse of the Amin regime in Uganda in 1979, guns have been readily available from the Karamojong. The Pokot buy guns from their neighbours from across the borders such as the Karamojong. Other guns are acquired during raiding expeditions from the fallen victims.

There is wide spread insecurity particularly along the common border with Uganda. Key entry points of guns are Suam, Konyalus, Amudat and Kiwawa. Senior politicians in West Pokot have fuelled insecurity in the area through inciting the community against their neighbours. The local MP and his late predecessor are on record urging their community to drive out other communities from the area, to arm themselves and raid cattle, as well as threatening to acquire land in neighbouring districts they consider theirs.

Trans-Nzoia district also features prominently in this regard. Main entry points of guns are: - Endebess and along the lower parts of Mt. Elgon. Some of these guns entering through Trans- Nzoia are retained by the communities particularly in areas along the border with Uganda and West Pokot. Other guns are transferred to potential buyers in Uasin-Gishu and Marakwet Districts. The Government has appointed Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) to maintain security but the KPRs themselves have been found to exacerbate insecurity through misuse of weapons. Some of them rent out their guns to criminals. In Kolongolo and Kwanza areas, some people have migrated due to insecurity. There is reduced trade interaction along the common border with Pokot while cattle keeping has reduced drastically among the agricultural communities for fear of cattle raiders, farming has also been badly affected.

In East Baringo, most Pokot pastoralists possess illegal arms. They acquire these through buying from their brothers in West Pokot, from Turkana victims during raids and from Somali cattle dealers. They use their guns to protect their animals and to stage raids against their neighbours particularly the Marakwet. In Kolowa division, most young men stay idle and others keep cattle. Little education goes on. Most Government workers have left the area due to insecurity. A few NGOs and the Catholic Church operate in the area mostly providing relief food. Ignorance is widespread. The Government has done little to sensitise the people through general and civic education programs. Poverty is widespread and people feel the only way out is to raid their communities.

The key findings of the study were as follows: - 6 • That the most armed communities are the Turkana and the Pokot. The Marakwet have, however, recently begun to acquire guns. The community is systematically and deliberately arming itself. Guns there are communally owned as opposed to Turkana and Pokot where gun ownership is private.

• It was established that the main reasons why communities have illegal guns is because of insecurity. The pastoralist Communities such as the Pokots and the Turkana routinely raid each other’s animals as well as those of their neighbors. Gun ownership is supposed to ensure protection of one’s property and cattle against theft. It was also established that politicians have played a leading role in inciting communities to violence. By so doing, they send the message to the people that it is all right for them to acquire illegal arms and to stage cattle raids against their neighbours. This was found to be particularly true of senior politicians in West Pokot.

• That the main source of the illegal guns is the conflict ridden neighbouring countries of Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. • Guns are easily available and relatively cheap. The most popular model is the Russian made AK-47 rifle which on average costs around Ksh. 30,000 while a bullet costs Ksh 50. Other gun models widely available include Mk-4, G3 (which is very rare) stern – gun, and revolvers. • That a significant percentage of the male population in the target districts possesses illegal arms.

• Somali cattle traders are heavily involved in the illegal trade in arms in the North Rift and that ordinary Kenyans easily cross borders where they buy guns cheaply. Some of these they keep for their own use while the rest they sell to fellow villagers and neighbours. Guns are transported inside lorry tyres, charcoal bags, wrapped with lorry tarpaulins and inside fuel tankers.

• Another key finding was that the government has responded in various ways to the problem of small-arms proliferation and the resulting in security. For example, the government has recruited police reservists (KPRs) to safeguard security within certain communities. The government also has occasionally issued amnesties and ultimatums to those holding illegal guns to surrender them to government security forces. Finally, the government has deployed armed regular, administration and General Service police officers in the conflict prone areas. It has also deployed anti-stock theft units in those areas to help prevent cattle thefts.

• It was found that most of the government control measures mentioned above have been largely cosmetic and little has been achieved. People continue to traffic in illegal guns. Borders are poorly policed, checkpoints are not manned effectively, and police patrols don’t seem to target the real arms traffickers. It was established that one can easily transport a huge arms cache through any of the official border points in either Uganda, Sudan or Ethiopia past more than six police check points, and into Kitale town from Lokichoggio. Bribery is the order of the day in such checkpoints. Police rarely bother to thoroughly check vehicles.

• That arms-induced conflict has resulted in devastating consequences in Marakwet, Turkana, Baringo and even in West Pokot. Education in East Baringo is virtually non- existent. Many schools have closed down due to insecurity. Agriculture in Marakwet is 7 at a standstill. Poverty and ignorance in Turkana and East Baringo are widespread. In general, small arms and gun-culture have very negatively affected development activities in the North Rift.

• That people are fed-up with insecurity and that they would like to see increased efforts from the government to curb the problem. If security were guaranteed, the communities would not have the need to acquire guns and would be willing to negotiate with the government to surrender the guns, to the state, if they were compensated.

In the face of these findings, this study proposes the following recommendations: - - That the government should beef up security in the North Rift region. More police officers should be deployed in the affected areas and motivated through higher salaries and better living conditions. - Education should be introduced and enhanced particularly among the pastoralist communities like the Pokots and Turkanas. This would minimize over-reliance on cattle hence reduce cattle rustling. Related to this the government should increase civic awareness efforts to eradicate ignorance. - Government and other stakeholders should also capitalize on times of relative calm to bring warring communities together to seek sustainable resolutions. This could be done through barazas, joint cultural events such as sports and peace meetings etc. Elders can play a leading role in this. - Taming politicians who are known to incite the people. Politicians found guilty of arming or inciting their communities to violence should be dealt with according to the law. In the past several leading politicians in West Pokot have been known to openly support cattle rustling and to sponsor anarchy. - Government should come up with tight border control mechanisms to assure that gun dealers do not bring in weapons from neighbouring communities. This could be done through utilizing vigilante groups and secret service security personnel among communities living in border areas. Increased police border patrols and suitable equipment like four-wheel drive vehicles and fuel could help in this respect. - Abolish KPRs. They tend to prompt those without arms to acquire some. Arms in the hands of the KPRs have also been misused largely because they lack training and proper co-ordination. - Develop early warning systems to ward-off possible attacks and check against arms proliferation. - Enhance vigilance in arms registration. No one should be allowed to own a gun illegally. All guns should be licensed. The current practice by the government security officials to look the other way as communities actively arm themselves should be discouraged.

2. INTRODUCTION

This is a report on fieldwork research on the proliferation of small arms in the North Rift region of the Rift Valley province in Kenya. The districts of concern are Marakwet, Turkana, Trans-Nzoia, West Pokot and Baringo. Of the five districts, its only Marakwet and Baringo that are not along the Kenyan international borders. The other three are along the Kenyan border with Uganda and Sudan while Turkana is very close to the Ethiopian border. The former political instabilities in Uganda, the current confrontations in the southern Sudan and the marauding militia in Ethiopia have exposed this region to a gun culture. The rough terrains in this region and the vast borders have greatly limited the abilities of the sharing governments to adequately police the area. The out come has been serious massacres during 8 raids for animals, poor or two late government response to distress calls. This has left the residents with no other options except to arm themselves in readiness to such events.

In the past, the Kenyan government has responded to such raids with operations that sometimes recover animals, which were returned to the owners and confiscated all available illegal guns. This seems to have exposed the Kenyans to more dangers because their neighbours were still armed. The hands-off attitude towards the arms problem in this area has by extension encouraged more and more people to arm themselves. The results are deadly in country massacres where communities attack each other during cattle raids or rustling. Of the five districts, Trans-Nzoia has a unique experience where raiders interested in animals concentrate more on house robbery, which involves theft of money and household goods.

The current Kenyan government response to this challenge has been the recruitment of KPRs. This may be a noble idea but in our opinion not well thought out. Recruiting reserves and neither supervising nor paying them is a recipe for disaster. Many KPRs will express the view that since they do not receive any remuneration for services rendered, then they must go on raids with the same weapons in order to provide for their families. A further danger is that such large numbers of unpaid, undisciplined reserves can easily be lured and converted into private militia by unscrupulous and power hungry politicians.

Our general findings were that among the pastoralists of West Pokot, Turkana and East Baringo, most, if not all mature adults possess personal guns. The Marakwets are now arming themselves in earnest. The communities have been organizing themselves to purchase communal guns. Trans-Nzoia residents, though not in any new way, are arming themselves than before. The gun culture has impacted very negatively on this region. Education standards, where they existed, have generally gone down as more and more schools are abandoned due to insecurity. Increasingly, professionals are deserting this region drawing back the progress achieved in Agriculture, Education and Administration. The fertile Kerio Valley has been abandoned and no grazing or farming is taking place especially in between the Marakwets and Pokots. The same case applies with regard to the area neighbouring the Turkanas and Pokots. Most shopping centres in these areas are deserted or operating at the minimal levels because of fear of attack and loss of goods. More resources than ever before are channelled to security related matters such as purchase of guns and ammunition at the expense social amenities and infrastructure.

Government response has been greatly inadequate. This may be the only region in this country where security matters are in civilian hands. The citizens are alienated from the government and solutions to their problems are not sought from courts or the provincial administration but from the people themselves. If nothing is done about it, we are likely to see an increase in incidents of violence as warriors and bandits treat law and order and its agents with contempt and ridicule. Morale will further decline among state security personnel and lawlessness will radically increase. This should not be allowed to happen. To avert this ‘Hobbesian law of nature’, the governments of the region must come together and provide a workable disarming arrangement that will be accepted by the people. 9 10

3. TURKANA DISTRICT

3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN-CULTURE IN TURKANA DISTRICT

The are primarily a pastoralist community. They populate the vast Northern Kenya district of Turkana. Traditionally, the Turkana keep cattle mainly goats, camels and to a lesser extent cows. The Turkana’s are a border community. They neighbour the Toposa community of South-Eastern Sudan, the Karamajong community of North-western Uganda and the Merille community of Southern Ethiopia. Inside Kenya, they neighbour the Pokot to the South, the Samburu to the East, and the Tugen to the Southeast and the Borana to the Northeast. Raiding neighbouring communities for cattle is an entrenched aspect of Turkana culture. Raids are usually carried out against neighbouring communities for various reasons among them restocking, to acquire cattle for purposes of paying dowry, and for revenge. It is worth noting that most of the communities neighbouring the Turkana between both the international and national borders are also pastoralist who value cattle as much as the Turkanas do. Security for the animals is of particular concern to the communities, mainly because they share similar cultures and traditions.

Before 1920, the Turkana mainly used traditional weapons for purposes of defending themselves against their enemies as well as for raiding their neighbours. The traditional weapons widely used then were Spears and Shields, Knives, Machetes, Sticks and Clubs. After World War 1 in 1920, the colonialists introduced guns in several parts of the continent. In Turkana, the first guns entered the district through River Omo, from Ethiopia. At the time guns were very few and scattered. The means for obtaining guns revolved on business engagement. The Turkanas took Ivory to the Colonialists in Ethiopia and exchanged these with guns. They were to use these guns for killing elephants for more supply of Ivory. With time, guns fell in the hands of other communities neighbouring the Turkana such as the Toposa of Sudan, Marille of Ethiopia, Dodos of Uganda, the Karamojong of Uganda and the Pokots of both Kenya and Uganda. At the time, the most popular guns were Mk-4s. However, acquisition of large amounts of guns in Turkana began to be noticeable around 1978-79. This was a tumultuous period in Uganda, characterised by acrimony and war against the regime of former President Idi Amin Dada.

In 1979, the Karamajong overran the Moroto barracks inside Uganda and made away with thousands of guns. The acquisition of surplus guns by the Karamojong soon found ready market among the Turkana.

3.2 ROOT CAUSES OF GUN CULTURE IN TURKANA DISTRICT

The main reason for acquisition of guns by the Turkanas was first and fore most for security reasons i.e. the protection of themselves and their property-particularly cattle- against hostile neighbours like the Toposa and the Karamajong. Security deterioration along the common borders exemplified by repeated raids of Turkana cattle by the Toposa and the Karamong on the one hand, and the Pokot on the other, has encouraged the Turkanas to arm themselves. This has been worsened by government intransigence in dealing with cases of insecurity and cattle raids. This situation is exacerbated by years of armed conflict in Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda and the attendant inflow of weapons into the country. 11 Another root cause of the gun culture is the proliferation of arms within the communities neighbouring the Turkana. Communities neighbouring the Turkana are themselves heavily armed and therefore pose a serious threat to the Turkanas’ existence. It is only logical for the Turkana to arm themselves in earnest.

Government mechanisms have been, at best, gravely wanting. In fact, the Kenyan Government is blamed for the escalation of arms proliferation due to its policy of providing guns to home guards of particular communities while denying others. This has often sent the wrong message to certain communities, with the consequent increase in arms acquisition by those who feel left out or threatened. 12

3.3 MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF ARMS TRANSFER IN TURKANA DISTRICT

The main sources of guns held by the Turkana are Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. During the last five years, Sudan has been the main source mainly due to the conflict situation pitting the SPLA and the Sudanese government while Uganda used to be the main supplier of guns prior to that period. Porous, uncontrolled borders allow for easy cross-over from Sudan by the Toposa, who bring with them guns for sale to the Turkana as well as to other interested parties. On the other hand, the uncontrolled border allows the Turkanas themselves to get into Sudan to buy guns.

Mutual exchange of goods between border communities also makes it easy for people to acquire guns through barter trade, where the Turkanas would exchange cows and goats for guns. Another method of gun acquisition involves the killing of the gun owner during raids and the acquiring of the victim’s gun by the enemy. The main types of weapons available in the market are the Russian-made AK-47 semi automatic rifle, the Mk-4, G3, FN, hand grenades and even Anti-aircraft guns usually pulled by donkey carts. Of these, the AK-47 remains the most popular. This is because it is relatively, small in size, it is not very heavy, and it is efficient and accessible. The AK-47 used to cost an average of Ksh. 60,000 or 20 cows during the late 1970s. On average, the price has now gone to between Ksh. 20,000 and 30,000 or about 6 cows.

Sudanese refugees fleeing the war in Southern Sudan also come with guns, which they sell, to locals and use the money to settle in the refugee camps in the country, especially Kakuma. This usually happens before they can present themselves to the camp authorities for inspection and status determination and is made possible by police laxity, and the ineffective government gun-control mechanisms

Guns are also easily transported by road from border points since the police hardly do a thorough checking of vehicles at the numerous checkpoints along the roads. For example during the three weeks we were in the field, along the border of Kenya and Uganda, and elsewhere, no police man bothered to check what we were carrying in our car. It would have been very easy for us to transport any number of guns into as far inside Kenya as with no problem at all.

Corruption also plays a major role in the trafficking of illegal arms. Bribery is the order of the day and the bigger the bribe the higher the possibility that the officer taking the bribe will have little interest in thoroughly inspecting a vehicle which may be ferrying contraband goods including guns. Evidence form the field indicates that gun smugglers hide guns inside inflated vehicle spare tyres, which are then filled with pressure, in the engine compartment of vehicles, and inside fuel Jeri cans. Guns are also tied under the vehicle’s chassis, sometimes even without the knowledge of the vehicle’s driver. Gunrunners also hide guns in Tarpaulins of lorries, and inside charcoal bags. Bullets are acquired and transported the same way. It was also found that, Trucks, which transport relief food to Kakuma and Lokichoggio, are usually used to ferry guns. We were told that when policemen insist on inspecting these vehicles, they get bribed with as little Ksh. 50.

In Logichoggio town, most businessmen and women have found their way into the ranks of KPRs. They have fraudulently been issued with guns that they use to secure their business premises. They do not discharge any security duties to the local community. Source: Interview with a number of respondents who requested not to be named. 13 Another important finding was that bullets used in cattle raids in Turkana and Pokot districts are from Government sources. We were told that government security officers provide bullets to warriors as well as to the KPRs, who in turn sell them.

3.4 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

Government has not faired very well in terms of controlling small arms proliferation. However, there are a number of measures the government has undertaken to try and control arms proliferation. These include, • The deployment of security personnel in some areas along the international borders. In Lokichoggio, the government has deployed regular police officers as well as a military unit 10km from the common border with Sudan. There are a number of roadblocks along the main road from Lokichoggio to Lodwar and from Lodwar to Kitale. The problem with this measure is that the international common border is not sufficiently policed and people can and do easily cross the border on either side. Thus, the porous nature of the border makes it easy for the trafficking of illegal weapons and other contraband goods. Besides, the number of officers deployed by the government is hardly enough to man such an extensive common border. The rough terrain is also a major hindrance to effective policing.

• Another control mechanism the government has used is the issuance of guns to Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs). The KPRs are recruited and co-ordinated through the Kenya Police force. They are issued with guns and charged with the responsibility of protecting and maintaining security within the community. They are also expected to report any incidences of breach of security. The problem is that these KPRs are not remunerated in any way for the services they provide. They are under no proper command and are ill trained. Given the harsh economic realities obtaining in many parts of the country, this opens the way for possible misuse by the KPRs of the guns in their possession. For example a number of them have been found guilty of hiring their guns to criminals or using them to commit robberies against the very people they are supposed to protect. Another downside to this is that those without guns feel threatened, and hence resort to buying illegal weapons to protect themselves.

• Security operations aimed at confiscating illegal arms from citizens. This is a strategy the government has employed severally, with limited success because it is usually carried out unprofessionally. Very few weapons get recovered during such operations, as citizens ensure that they are safely hidden from the security personnel. In fact such operations only help to alienate the population from the government. 14

• Amnesties and ultimatums. The government has used the tactic of declaring amnesty to those willing to return their weapons to government authorities within a specified period of time. Related to this measure is the tendency to give threats and ultimatums to illegal gun holders. A good example is the order given by the Kenyan Head of State in April 2001 to all illegal gun holders to turn in their guns to government security officials. This order has gone largely unheeded and there is very little the authorities can do about it.

3.5 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY

The proliferation of small arms has had a telling impact in the socio-political and economic lives of the people of Turkana in particular, and the country in general. Those holding guns have a false sense of security. They feel that they can protect themselves in the event of an attack from their enemies. In reality however, this is not always the case. Thus there is a significant psychological feeling of security and the relative ability to ward-off an attack. Consequently, there is increased pressure on those without guns to acquire them by whatever means.

Increased insecurity. In Turkana, poverty and poor governance have increasingly driven people to using guns for other purposes -such as robberies, vehicle hold-ups etc- other than protecting themselves and their property. Also cattle raiding has been transformed into practically a commercial affair, with use of sophisticated guns featuring prominently. What best exemplifies this insecurity is the fact that one cannot travel the entire stretch of road from Marich Pass in West Pokot district to Lokichoggio in Turkana district without armed police escort.

Related to insecurity is the issue of poverty. In 2000 alone, 162 families were left without food after the Karamojong, the Tepesi and the Pokots took their animals away during raids2. Education has been badly hit by insecurity. Near the common border with the Pokot, Karamajong and the Toposa, large areas have been left inhabited, due to displacement of the population. Schools have been abandoned, for example in Division of Turkana district. Sarmach, Akiriamet, Lochrelimu, Kotaluk, Napeiton and Lomelo primary schools

have been deserted. In Todonyang along the border with Ethiopia, people have been displaced. Also in Nakwamoru, Juluk and Kapelibok. These areas are along the border with W. Pokot. People in these areas cannot send their children to school. They cannot exploit the fertile land in this area due to insecurity. Business activities have come to a standstill and people have been denied access to pasture with the overall impact being increased poverty levels, hunger and disease. Also, increased violence against women and children. Rape incidents have become numerous and government offices have been closed down in areas such as Lomero division.

Gun culture has permeated in the society and everyone owns or seeks to own a gun. The people tend to view gun ownership as their right. The police in these areas have almost resigned themselves to the reality of illegal gun ownership. In many incidences, the ordinary people are in possession of guns of a much higher sophistication than those held by the

2 Interview with senior officials of Catholic Justice and Peace Programme, Lodwar Diocese. 15 police. Thus during raids or other incidents of insecurity, the police are usually reluctant to take any serious action for fear of losing their own lives. During raids, police are known to send the KPRs to go first after the raiders!

Increased ethnic tension and conflict has been a real threat to peace. Gun culture and its attendant insecurity has contributed to suspicions and unbridled conflict between the Turkana and the Pokot communities on the one hand and between the Turkana and the Toposa, the Merille and the Karamajong on the other. This conflict has led to numerous cattle raids, death and destruction of property. Arms proliferation makes peaceful resolution of conflict difficult. The communities tend to favour force and violence s opposed to peaceful means of conflict resolution.

The proliferation of small arms has exposed the government’s lopsided policy with regard to the control of illegal gun ownership. The government has done little to effectively control ownership of illegal small arms. Indeed, its policy of arming civilians selectively has fuelled insecurity. The culture of raiding has made it impossible for people in Turkana to take advantage of other resources available in the district. People have not taken advantage of mining gold, semi-precious stones and Gypsium all of which are available in profitable quantities in areas such as Turkwel, Lokiriama, Lorengipi, Julut, and Naipusimoru. 16

4 MARAKWET DISTRICT

4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN CULTURE IN MARAKWET DISTRICT

The Marakwet community occupies the Kerio valley to the West of the and the Kerio escarpment in Marakwet district. The Marakwet neighbour the Pokots who occupy the Eastern parts of the Kerio River, the Tugen, the Keiyo and the Nandi. Traditionally, the Marakwet are agriculturists although they do keep cattle as well. Unlike the Pokot and the Turkana, they are not nomadic pastoralists. Gun culture among the Marakwet is therfore a new phenomenon and can be traced directly to the insecurity created by Pokot raiders. The Pokots routinely raid their Marakwet neighbours taking animals. In recent attacks, a trend has emerged in which Pokot raiders do not just raid, but kill, maim and destroy Marakwets’ property. The Marakwets too at times stage retaliatory attacks killing the Pokots. These raids and retaliatory attacks have intensified insecurity. In 1982, the Pokot and the Marakwet fought a very fierce war after a Pokot attack in which a Marakwet was killed. In the most recent attack last March, 58 Marakwet villagers were killed, and more than 200 houses burnt, property destroyed and hundreds of people displaced. It is this insecurity, then, that has prompted the Marakwets to arm themselves.3

Before the early 1990s, the Marakwets primarily relied on their traditional weapons. These included bows and poisoned arrows as well as swords, pangas and knives. Things changed in 1992 when the Pokots staged yet another deadly attacks. Many people were killed. In 1995 and 1997 respectively, other attacks followed, driving large sections of the Marakwet population to the Kerio escarpment. Due to this increasing state of insecurity, the Marakwets then began to buy guns initially at a slow pace. Another reason that explains this scenario is the fact that the government has not responded effectively to Pokots’ belligerence. The result inevitably is that the people had to seek an alternative to realise sustained security for themselves and their property hence, the decision by clan elders to begin to arm their people. Thus, guns in the hands of the Marakwet are a response to those guns held by the Pokots, which have, over the years made life unbearable for them.4

3 See the and East African Standard Newspapers of March 18th 2001. 4 A large number of respondents told us that Marakwets feel marginalized by the state in terms of both development and security 17

4.2 ROOT CAUSES OF GUN CULTURE IN MARAKWET DISTRICT

It is important to note that gun ownership among the Marakwet is a relatively new phenomenon. It is a product of increasing insecurity occasioned by criminal activities perpetuated by the Pokot and the inability by the government to address incidents of insecurity. Currently, the Marakwet are arming themselves as a community in order to defend themselves effectively against Pokot raiders. This illegal process of arming themselves began after the 1992 attack and gathered momentum following the subsequent attacks of 1995 and 1997 and March 2001. Another cause of this process is the decision by the government to provide communities neighbouring the Marakwet with KPRs and denying this to the Marakwet.

The Pokot, the Tugen and the Keiyo communities have KPRs but the Marakwet don’t. The government has promised to recruit forty KPRs for the Marakwet but this has not been affected. The District Officer for Arror/Tot division confirmed this and said that already a group of 40 people had been short-listed by the government in conjunction with the local elders. By the time of this research nothing had been done with respect to the recruitment of these KPRs. The other cause of gun culture in this area is the necessity to protect peoples’ lives and property.

4.3 MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF ARMS TRANSFER IN MARAKWET DISTRICT

In Marakwet district, gun ownership is a recent phenomenon. People began to acquire illegal arms after 1992 primarily to defend themselves and their property against hostile neighbours. There are a number of mechanisms of acquiring guns in Marakwet. These include the following:

First and fore most, gun ownership in Marakwet is communal. A system has been devised where villagers from each of the 46 Marakwet clans contribute an agreed amount of money or the equivalent in cattle, then approach Pokot gun sellers in East Baringo. They purchase the guns from the latter. Through this system, each of the 46 clans has in its possession, at least one AK-47 rifle. It is the clan elders who are responsible for the safe custody of the clan’s gun(s). 18

The Marakwet are a cluster of six groups namely; the Endo, Markweta, Borot, Almo, Sengwer and the Kiptani. In all, there are 46 clans spread along the Kerio Valley as well as the Kerio Escarpment. Basically the Marakwet are an Agricultural community. They grow millet, cassava, sorghum, beans and maize. They also keep dairy cattle and Anothergoats method of acquiring guns is during raids when villagers kill Pokot raiders then they acquire the guns of the fallen victims. Direct buying by individuals. Some young men and those who can afford approach the gun sellers as individuals and buy guns for themselves. These are kept away from the elders custody, although those owning them may use them for communal protection.

The main gun sellers are Pokots. Other gun merchants are Somalis who come through Baringo district. We found that, at the moment, most guns in the possession of the Marakwet are sold by Pokots and Somalis. The Somalis come through Isiolo and Samburu. They deal in legitimate cattle trading, buying cattle and transporting them to Nairobi and elsewhere.

At the moment, the Russian made AK-47 rifle is the most popular and widely available gun in this area. Currently, its cost ranges between Ksh. 30,000 and Ksh.45,000 or 50 goats. Its popularity is due to the fact that it is accessible, relatively light, can be dismantled and assembled easily and is affordable. We were told that in Arror location for example, there are 6 guns acquired recently for which villagers paid 450 goats. Each household contributed 1 goat.

Other types of guns include Mk-4, G3, and Pachet (Sten gun). The latter two are, however very rare. One common gun route is from Sudan through Trans-Nzoia to Cherangany and down to Kerio Valley. The other is through Samburu, Baringo and into Kerio Valley. The gun merchants have their own contact people within the community, who provide them with clients. Chiefs know this, but they have no desire to stop it, or inform the government because first, they would lose their lives and second, they are themselves victims of insecurity. They know that the government has left their people at the mercy of the hostile Pokot and that the onus is on the people to provide their own security.

4.4 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

The government has responded to the security crisis in Marakwet through several ways: First, the government has deployed huge security machinery in Kerio Valley. There are both regular, General Service Unit and Anti- stock theft police officers stationed at six different parts of Kerio Valley. These include Regular and Administration police at Tot, an Anti-Stock theft unit at Chesongoch. Also, Regular and Administration police at Arror, Regular, Administration, GSU and Anti-Stock theft unit at Mogil. Administration police at Liter and a GSU Unit at Kerio Valley near Tot.

Their responsibility is to maintain security for the people and their property. Evidence from the field suggests however that little has been achieved by the government in providing security for the . Majority of the respondents held the view that whenever there are raids the government security personnel do little to stop the raiders. Their feeling is 19 that the police have no inclination to prevent or contain attacks whenever they occur. According to them, the government is not interested in providing security for the Marakwet and that Pokot raiders are actually armed by the state.

Secondly, the government has made repeated calls for those with illegal guns to turn them in to Government security, particularly to the chiefs. Naturally, the Marakwet have not responded. In the past, the Pokots of East Baringo, which neighbours the Marakwets have returned a few of their excess guns, usually the outdated and spoilt ones that they don’t need. This is a futile measure particularly since the government fails to recognise that people have acquired guns specifically as a response to the government’s failure to guarantee them security. No one, for example, has been arraigned in a court of law charged with the recent raid in March that left over 50 Marakwets dead. After the presidential directive in April 2001 ordering all people in Kerio Valley and elsewhere in the North Rift to surrender illegal guns to government security forces, only one gun had been

There is no clear policy on gun ownership in the area. People own illegal guns with the knowledge of government security personnel, yet nothing is ever done to such people. In Marakwet, every one including government security officials knows that the community is arming itself , yet no action has been taken to correct the situation. In Pokot and Turkana, the situation is very similar. This sends the message that it is alright for people to acquire and use guns for whatever purposes. It is a scenario that explains active illegal arms acquisition among the people of Marakwet and others.

The government has not taken any steps against politicians who routinely incite communities against each other. Those politicians are well known and their pronouncements are well documented by the press, yet the government never prosecutes them. Pokot politicians have repeatedly threatened their neighbours, and deadly attacks have been carried out after such threats, yet the government has never prosecuted any of them. These politicians some of them even cabinet members are known to encourage sections of their people to arm themselves. It shows a glaring lack of commitment on the part of the government to eradicate gun culture and tribal animosity in the region. For example, the late Hon. Lotodo and the current MP for the Honourable Moroto are on record for having incited their Pokot community to attack other communities living in West Pokot District as well as the Marakwet in Kerio Valley.

4.5 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY

The impact of arms infused insecurity in Marakwet has been largely costly. There has been loss of lives wherever the Pokots raid the Marakwets. There has been massive destruction of property and looting. Houses have been burnt, and the fertile lands of the Marakwet side of Kerio valley have been deserted.5 The Marakwets now live on the rocky and bare Kerio escarpment. Land in the valley is un-demarcated and people hold no title

5 For example more than 50 people were killed and over two hundred houses razed in Chesongoch location during the last attack on March 12th 2001. 20 deeds to land they occupy.6 Many of the respondents expressed the fear that the Marakwets were being displaced from the Kerio Valley for reasons that have nothing to do with cattle rustling. The feeling among the Marakwet is that they have been displaced, because someone in authority wants to exploit the natural wealth of the valley. There is evidence that there are large deposits of cement bearing rocks, semi-precious stones and even oil.7

The valley itself is also very fertile and mangoes, horticulture, maize, cassava, bananas and other agricultural crops do very well. The permanent Kerio River cuts through the valley. Villagers say that in recent years, the Biritwo-Endo road has been very well murramed, raising suspicions that there must be a good reason for such action. Indeed, people have deserted the whole valley. So why improve the road? The road that runs from to Kapsowar is itself in a pathetic state; yet, it serves a large number of the population in the upper parts of Marakwet district. This sense of suspicion and bitterness is heightened by the selective recruitment of KPRs referred to elsewhere in this report.

Education has been the hardest hit. In the entire Kerio Valley itself, all 13 primary schools have been closed down as people fled the valley to the relative safety of the escarpment. We saw only four secondary schools that remained open but each guarded throughout by three administration policemen. Most young men and women stay idle while others watch out for Pokot attacks. As a result, ignorance has increased, as have disease and general poverty.

Agriculture, the backbone of the people of Marakwet, has come to a standstill. The fertile areas of the Kerio Valley have been left fallow because it is too dangerous to venture into farming for fear of deadly attacks. The perception of the people is that the aim is to keep the Marakwet out of the Kerio Valley. Poverty levels have shot up among the Marakwets who have nowhere to turn to. This has increased other related social problems such as divorce, bitterness and tribal animosity.

Yet another serious consequence has been the growth of gun culture among the Marakwet. People see that the best way forward is for them to arm themselves since they have no security for themselves and their property. As insecurity has increased, most professionals have moved away from Kerio Valley. This includes government teachers, doctors, social workers and businessmen for fear of loosing their lives.

Health facilities and the few schools, businesses, and even churches have been closed down. Only the Catholic and Anglican churches remain operational in the area. There are also a few international NGOs working in the area such as World Vision, Care International and Christian Children’s Fund (CCF).

On 17th August, 2001 at 4 pm as we drove on the Endo-Biritwo road, some forty Kilometres from the Biritwo junction our car developed some mechanical problems. We managed to arrive at a heavily guarded construction camp along the road. After much persuasion we got

6 While the Keiyo who occupy the South Eastern parts of Kerio valley have been issued with title deeds for their already demarcated plots, the Marakwet have no title deeds or any other land ownership documents yet they occupy most of the Kerio valley. Their land has also not been demarcated. This renders them squatters.

7 Many respondents in Endo reported that there have been scores of people who have come to the surrounding area to make enquiries and have carried samples of rocks and soil 21 help and then continued with our journey to Eldoret. We later learned that the camp houses equipment, machinery and staff of a company contracted to repair the End-Biritwo road.

It can be concluded that the gun culture in the district has, instilled a false sense of security among the Marakwet people.

5 TRANS-NZOIA DISTRICT

5.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN CULTURE

Trans-Nzoia is bordered by the Republic of Uganda to the West, and districts to the South, West Pokot to the North, Marakwet district to the East and Uasin Gishu to the South East.Trans-nzoia is generally a farming district with very fertile land with good maize and beans yields. Such ethnic groups as Luhyas, Kisii, Kikuyus, Pokots, Nandi, among others, inhabit it.8 This mixture of ethnic groups can be explained by the re-settlement history of this area. The colonial government had given most of the land in this area to white settlers. It was after their departure that various ethnic groups who were in need of settlement land migrated to this place.

They formed land-buying groups, which acquired land from the settlers or benefited from the government settlement schemes after independence. The closeness to the Ugandan border has exposed this district to availability of guns especially from Uganda. The former government instabilities in Uganda left many citizens with illegal guns, which later found their way into Kenya through the vast, unpoliced borders. The fact that many residents of this district are farmers and can easily recover from any aggression reduces their desire for guns. On the other hand the insecurity posed by armed neighbours and availability of guns across the boarders has created a gun culture in the district.

8 Republic of Kenya (1997) Trans-Nzoia District Development Plan, 1997-2001, Government Printers, Nairobi 22

5.2 ROOT CAUSES OF GUN CULTURE

The free movement of people especially the Sebeis and Saboats who have cousins in both Kenya and Uganda has made the flow of across the border easy. The political instabilities in Uganda especially the 1979 period when Ugandan former President - Idi Amin Dada was removed from power left a lot of firearms on civilian hands. The same were sold out to Kenyan communities who needed to protect themselves from marauding disheartened military personnel and cattle rustlers. The arming of the Ugandan Teso by the government against their aggressive Karamojong neighbours also increased the number of guns in this area.

The fact that Trans-Nzoia neighbours are West Pokot pastoralists who exercise cattle rustling as a culture and for restocking purposes, exposed the district residents to firearms during such raids. There was need from the residents to acquire arms to safeguard their livestock and life during such raids. On the other hand, the mere availability of guns from their neighbours in Uganda at cheap prices encouraged many to purchase them. This would be accounted for by the fact that the boarder between Kenya and Uganda around this area is poorly policed

5.3 MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF ARMS TRANSFER IN THE DISTRICT

The main entry points of illegal arms in Trans-Nzoia district are Suam, Antrokoit and Kanyalus. (The latter two are in West Pokot District). Most guns came into the district through “panya routes”(unofficial routes) because most gunrunners walk with them to their customers. After the entry, some of the arms are retained in the entry point areas while the rest are transited to other parts of the country such Endebess and Kitale town, Eldoret, and Nairobi. The most common guns are AK 47’s of course in their various models. Pistols and revolvers are available but not common. G3s are the most rear but still found with few people. AK 47 is most popular because it can be dismantled and carried in a bug. This makes it easy to transport and conceal. According to one senior police officer, pistols and revolvers are transported in the spare wheel tyres of vehicles. This means of transport enables guns to be moved along the highway from such boarder centers to the big towns.

The communities with guns in the district are Pokots, Sebei and Sabaots. While the Pokots use theirs for cattle rustling, the Sebeis and Saboats use theirs for robbery and theft. Because of the insecurity in this area, we were told that the government has appointed about 400 KPR’S in the District9. Majority are armed and are regularly supplied with bullets by the government while others are not armed.

According to a senior police officer interviewed for this research who requested not to be named, recruitment to KPR is based on the following requirements; Land ownership,

Certificate of Good Conduct issued by the police and ownership of cattle and other property. The aim is to ensure that guns are in the hands of the right people. The main problem with

9 Interview with Security Personnel in Kitale town. 23 this arrangement is that the said KPRs are not salaried, and are poorly trained to handle security matters. The fact that they are unsalaried explains why some could be using the government weapons for criminal activities such as robberies. It is important to note, however that the government faces an enormous dilemma with respect to insecurity in this area.

The cost of guns in the district varies depending on the type of gun one is interested in. A wide variety of guns are available. An AK-47 rifle costs between Ksh.7, 000 and 10,000, G3 between Ksh.20, 000 and 30,000 while the cost of Pistols and Revolvers ranges between 3,000 and 4,000. These prices may fluctuate from time to time depending on the security situation. Guns are relatively cheaper during the time of peace while they become more expensive when tension rises among communities.

The presence of Somali traders some of whom are non-Kenyans in the gun prone areas is suspicious. A number of respondents expressed the opinion that some of the Somali traders, could be trading in small arms and engaging in small businesses for cover-up purposes. In a number of cases we were told that some guns come from Somalia. The only contact point between this area and Somalia is the traders. 24

5.4 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS: SUCCESSES & FAILURES

In Trans-Nzoia District, the government has severally granted amnesty to those holding guns provided they surrender them to government security personnel. However, the response has been very poor or non at all. For example the Presidential amnesty granted in April this year by the government for the surrender of all illegal guns went unheeded10. It is noteworthy that this directive was not announced within a clear strategy for enforcement. No negotiations were held with the people to persuade them to give up their guns. The government does not seem to recognise the fact that people have actually bought the guns they hold. It is therefore naïve to expect them to just surrender them. The fact that the government sees the need to deploy KPR’s in some of the areas in the district is a sign of a situation that is getting out of hand.

As mentioned earlier the border points are poorly policed, not only because of the small number of security officers but also due to other factors such as rough terrain, unfavorable climate conditions and laxity among some of the officers. The experience of these researchers is that you can travel in and out of either Uganda or Kenya without being noticed and when noticed, no efforts are taken to check whether you could be carrying any arms or other contraband goods.

The introduction of government bullets in to the community through KRP’s has opened room for security officers to trade in bullets in these areas. It was pointed to us during the field research on several occasions, that serving security personal especially in prisons and Administration police look for ways and means to accumulate bullets, which they give to their brothers at home. The low salaries given to officers in these departments of disciplined forces may further explain the desire to trade in bullets or using them while on leave to participate in cattle raids. The fact that the government has the machinery to contain the insecurity problem yet it has not leaves lingering questions as to whether this is a result of lack of capacity or commitment on the part of the government.

10 Fr. Gabriel Dolan in ‘The East African, 28th May-3rd June 2001, Pg. 12 25

5.5 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY

The gun culture in this area has affected development seriously. There is general economic drawback as the local communities feel threatened and therefore spending more and more resources on security. The direct result is more poverty and increased insecurity in the area. Due to this insecurity and general suspicion among communities, there is very little interaction between them leading to reduced trade whose final product is general under- development. Activities such as animal keeping are almost non-existent in some areas because of the security risk associated with cattle rustling.

There are places such as Kolongolo in Kwanza and Kanyarwath where people have migrated from due to insecurity. There are other places such as Gitwamba where people have left their farms and have opted to live in trading centres due to insecurity. Kikuyus, Luhyas and Kisii communities who were displaced during the infamous 1992 ethnic clashes mostly inhabit this area.

It is evident that since 1992 more and more people are finding it necessary to arm themselves. This is an open sign of insecurity, which leads to poor investment in the area. The poor level of investment leads to idleness among the youth. Given the widespread availability of guns, it is easy for the youth to turn to robbery for a living. This has created a lot of fear among the large scale farmers found in the district and more and more funds are being spent on security matters. Some people have migrated from their farms to towns due to insecurity, but they continue to work in their farms during the day. The net result is poor economic performance in the district. 26

6 WEST POKOT DISTRICT

6.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN CULTURE

West Pokot is situated along Kenya's Western boundary with Uganda and borders Trans- Nzoia and Marakwet Districts to the South, Baringo and Turkana Districts to the East and North respectively. The district is divided into six administrative divisions:- Kapenguira, Lelan, Chepararia, Sigor, Kacheliba and Alale. It is generally a semi-arid district whose major economic activity is pastoralism. The livestock reared consists of cattle, camels, sheep and goats. The Pokot people who are also found in considerable numbers in Eastern Uganda occupy the district. Indeed, the government of Uganda has recently created an administrative district for the Pokot, known as Nakapiripirit. The interaction between Kenyan and Ugandan Pokots is so close that it is difficult to know who is a Kenyan and who is a Ugandan.

As we conducted this research, the Ugandan government was issuing identity cards to its citizens. We saw many Kenyan Pokots who openly admitted that they were going for registration in Uganda. According to them it is safer to have documents from both countries. As far as they are concerned, the national boundary between Kenya and Uganda is of no consequence to their community. We were further informed that during electoral campaigns politicians in this area campaign in both countries because people in the area vote for both Kenyan and Ugandan civic and parliamentary candidates. This is a case of dual-nationality for a community.

In matters of conflict therefore, whoever attacks the Kenyan Pokots attacks the Ugandan Pokots by extension. In this regard, Karamojong can be considered as neighbours to the Kenyan Pokots.

Of all the districts in the North Rift, West Pokot is considered the most affected by the gun culture because of its rough terrain and proximity to the Ugandan boarder. Traditionally, the Pokots used sticks, spears, and shields and bows and arrows during cattle raids and community confrontation with enemies. The same weapons were also used for hunting.

According to respondents, the first guns entered West Pokot in the mid 1970s i.e. 1975-76. These were manual homemade guns and came from Turkana. They were called “Tupai,”

“Michir” and “Pogela.” The Pokot people soon developed their own gun i.e. between 1976- 78 called “amatidai” (Home made gun).

The automatic guns entered West Pokot at around this time. The guns came from the Karamojong and the Turkana, who had aqcuired guns earlier. Another source was at this time was Somalia through Baringo. Somali cattle traders came with guns, which they sold, to a number of Pokots. The cost of a gun then was 40 cows. Thus, only the wealthy could afford guns then.

In 1980 there was a major war between the Karamajong and the Pokots in Churchor along river Kanyang’areng. The Karamajong lost to the Pokots and out of the confrontation, many Pokots acquired G3’s and Mk- 4 guns in large numbers. The Karamojong had acquired these guns from Moroto barracks after the Tanzanian army ousted Iddi Amin from power. They took advantage of the confusion and change of leadership to raid the armoury after the army had fallen. It is this large number of guns in civilians hands in Uganda that increased the 27 number of guns among the Kenyan Pokots because they were now cheaper and the threat of gun propelled raids was more serious.11

6.2. ROOT CAUSES OF GUN CULTURE

The 1980 attack on the Pokots by Karamojong and Turkanas prompted the gun culture among the Pokot people. The Pokots were very vulnerable hence had to acquire arms for self- defense. Many respondents reported that the situation across the region was such that owing to insecurity, each community to The efforts were to ensure that your enemies do not out do you on usage skill and gun numbers.

In 1982, Pokots began to arm themselves in earnest. The Karamojong began to sell the excess guns they had acquired from Amin’s, army during time peace times. In 1984, the Pokot attacked the Karamonjong in Pukwa area in Uganda and stole hundreds of animals. However, most of the stolen animals were confiscated by the Kenyan government security personnel and returned to Uganda. In 1986 Pokots attacked the Turkana and stole cattle, but the government launched an operation where most of the animals were returned to the Turkanas. Guns among the Pokot are in the hands of the male population. We were told that every mature man in Pokot owns a personal gun. It is not easy to tell the number of guns available in the community because their information is first difficult to compile and the people would not want to disclose. The Pokot children grow aware there are enemies in the name of Turkana, Karamonjong and Marakwets from whom they must protect themselves. The means of protection is gun acquisition and use skill. It is therefore a duty to the community to acquire and learn how to use a gun.

6.3. MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF ARMS TRANSFER.

As mentioned elsewhere in this section, gun running in the district is done on foot from across the Ugandan border to West Pokot. Initially, the gun business was essentially barter trade in nature because guns were acquired in exchange for animals such as cattle, camels or donkeys. The mode of exchange has now changed to cash.

The automatic guns available include AK 47, G3, and Mk-4. Uzi and Sten gun are also available but very rare. Of all the above, AK 47 is the most common because it is light, easy to maintain and cheaper in price. While most of the guns in West Pokot are bought, some are acquired during raids from fallen men.

The authors of this report found that guns are getting cheaper by the day. The current price of a gun in W. Pokot ranges between 6 to 7 cows depending on the magazine capacity and type of AK 47 gun. G3s are not popular because their bullets are not easily available. The sale of guns is open and one freely inspects and chooses the best. This happens particularly during the peace period. During such times gun sellers walk freely with them looking for buyers.12

The Karamojong are the main suppliers of guns in West Pokot. Sebeis were also mentioned as selling guns to Pokots albeit on a lesser scale. The selling points are mainly along the Kenya-Uganda boarder. The border is very expansive and crossing over is very easy since it is hardly patrolled by security forces. Pokots do not necessarily keep all the guns they

11 R.C. Soper (ed), Social Cultural Profile of Turkana District, Uzima Press Ltd., Nairobi, 1985 12 For example, on 23rd August 2001 near Kiwawa shopping Center as we conducted this research, there was a group of four (4) Karamojong men with eight (8) guns looking for buyers. 28 acquire, they sell others to communities near them such as the Marakwets, who are now paying for them in cash, or to other Pokots in East Baringo and even the Luhyia people in Trans-Nzoia. The Pokot gun traders move on foot as a group to prospective buyers. They avoid towns or where they are likely to meet with the police. They can travel far and wide looking for buyers. We were told that they have contact people among the buying communities.

The main reason for acquisition of guns is community defense. i.e. ensuring the security of peoples animals and property. Without a gun no Pokot near the border would keep cattle; so gun ownership is properly a security issue. Those who kill fellow tribesmen are traditionally thoroughly punished and this would explain the low level of arms misuse among the people. The punishment would in most cases entail the taking away most of the property of the killer. 29

6.4 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS: SUCCESSES & FAILURES.

As in other insecurity prone districts, the government’s response in West Pokot is the recruitment of KPR’s. These are armed members of the public who are entrusted with the protection of their own communities. They are considered as part of the police force and are occasionally supplied with government ammunition as need arises.

There have been several police operations since the 1980’s but they have proved to be too expensive and risky for the government. These operations have been aimed at providing security to the people. However, the people feel that these operations rarely focus on the real threat to security. There is widespread belief that the government is insensitive to the peoples’ security concerns. The rough terrain of West Pokot district also serves as a discouragement to security personnel.

People in this area hold the opinion that, the Government has not done much. According to some of our respondents, the government does not seem to take the area seriously. In our opinion, the government should take a different approach such as encouraging people to go to school, take advantage of peace moments and initiate development activities such as education and farming which will divert people’s attention from animals to other means of sustaining life such as agriculture.

Over-all co-operation and unity of the warring functions is vital. This is best exemplified by the POKATUSA (Pokot, Karamojong, Turkana, Samburu) peace initiative. This is a community-based initiative started by the World Vision Kenya Office and aims to minimise conflict through organising and sponsoring joint activities. The project has offices in Kitale town as well as in Makutano and Kiwawa areas of West Pokot district. Their main objective is to take advantage of peace moments during which they organize meetings for warring communities through which ways forward to enhance peace are openly discussed. The main focus is to ensure that the elders control the activities of the warriors and discourage them from embarking on raids. We attended such one meeting in Uganda among the Karamojong and the impression is that the communities in these areas long for peace13.

People in this area need to be exposed to public awareness on the usefulness of education for example. It’s in record that when asked to take children to school, the parents responded to the area DC that “there is absolutely no need to take a child to school” or “Taking a child to school is itself a loss to the community”. Why pay for education? For what use is it?”

The utterances of politicians in this area go unchecked by the government and most of the time they encourage their people to vest violence on their neighbours seem to take pride and glory in the arming of their people. The MP’s thrive in people’s ignorance. They would want the status quo maintained so that they can continue in their positions of influence.14

Public awareness is then critical in any government measures to deal with the issue of guns in this region. Force and government operations cannot solve the problem. May be a new

13 The POKATUSA peace project is already bearing fruit. Tension between the Pokot and the Karamojong has drastically reduced. 14 The late Kapenguria MP Mr. Francis Lotodo and the Current MP Mr. Moroto have been issuing threats to other communities in the confidence that the Pokot are armed. Many respondents told us that the importance of self-arming is emphasised in every political meeting. 30 approach of educating the people and negotiating with them may reduce the problem. On the other hand all countries in this region should combine efforts to confront this challenge. Public Barazas by government officials, and police patrols are other measures employed by the government to curb insecurity. These however need to be enhanced if lasting peace is to be achieved.

6.5 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY

The presence of guns in West Pokot district has had double-ended results. On the positive aspect, the people have a false feeling that they are able to protect their lives and property by use of guns. On the other hand, people are able to go about in their daily activities without fears of attacks because they consider themselves well prepared.

On the negative side, a lot of wealth or property has gone into purchasing guns. This would have been used to better the peoples’ lives. Unlike in the past when cattle raids left only a few injured or dead, the current attacks are very destructive both to human life and property. Women, children and the elderly have not been spared during raids. Thus all people are now vulnerable.

The possession of guns by young people encourages them to engage in cattle rustling. There is also the urge to get back the cows one used to acquire a gun. This in effect would increase the number of attacks and reasons to organize for the same. A new trend has also emerged where good fighters or killers in confrontation are praised in the community. This will encourage the young people or warriors to engage in such fights so that they can acquire higher status.

Of all the encouraging factors, the cattle traders provide the greatest motivation. There were indications during the field research that after raids, cattle traders come in large numbers with lorries to purchase the raided animals. This has introduced a commercial angle to cattle rustling and raids. It may be possible that the traders will provide more weapons and bullets so that enough animals will be provided. In essence, someone is financing cattle rustling.

Gun possession has impacted negatively on development in the area. Most of the land along the fertile Kerio Valley is deserted and no farming is going on. The pasture also goes to waste because none of the people can graze there. A number of water boreholes provided by NGO’S such as the one near Nauyapong have been deserted or vandalized during confrontation or due to insecurity people’s attention in this area is all focused on security and other aspects of development such as education have no room.

The over-all impact is a circle of false security that breeds poverty and stagnation of any development in the area. Domestic quarrels have in some occasions resulted in death when people use guns to settle their differences. This is one of the areas in the North Rift where the government has left security matters on the hands of civilians. Along the Kainuk-Chepareria road, for example, many motorists and commuters have been way laid and robbed several times in the last two years. 31

7 EAST BARINGO

7.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUN CULTURE IN EAST BARINGO

East Baringo comprises of three administrative divisions of the wider Baringo district. These include Nginyang, Kolowa and Tiryokwo. Mainly the Pokot tribe, who are largely pastoralists, populates it. The area also covers Kerio Valley to the East of the Kerio River. The Pokot of East Baringo are neighbours and bitter enemies of the Marakwet. They also neighbour the Keiyos, the Turkanas and the Tugens.

Arms in East Baringo began coming in 1978 in response to Turkana attacks. Turkanas first attacked the Pokot in 1963 and stole animals. Hundreds of Pokots were displaced. Pokots then acquired guns from Somalis in Isiolo in 1978. They began to fight with the Turkana. The Isiolo source was later blocked by the governmen through strict policing. After the overthrow of Amin, Western Pokots began to acquire guns from the Karamojong of Eastern Uganda. The price of an AK-47 then was 50-80 cows. It was found that like in Turkana and Pokot, ownership of guns by the Pokot pastoralists is purely for the defence of their property and security for their cattle. Guns are also acquired among the Pokots of East Baringo for raiding purposes. Those interviewed all had the view that one cannot live in East Baringo without a gun. It would be itself suicidal, particularly due to the threat posed by the Turkana.

With the start of multiparty politics, Pokots had been told that supporters of multipartism were enemies of the government. This heightened the feeling of animosity among the Pokots against the Marakwet who were perceived as opposition supporters and explains the subsequent attacks of 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2001. Politics, therefore, is a major factor in the acquisition and use of illegal firearms in East Baringo. The gun culture in East Baringo is promoted by the fact that the pastoralist and nomadic character of the people ensures that the young, energetic men are idle most of the time. Other than looking after cattle, there is no much work to do. 32

7.2 MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF GUN TRANSFER IN EAST BARINGO

The main source of guns is currently Uganda. Pokots from West Pokot sell guns to their neighbours. Others are bought from Somali cattle dealers who come through Samburu district. Our findings revealed that many Pokots possess guns. Most of the men have at least one gun each. We gathered that those well to do, however possess more than one. We also found that, most homes have guns. We saw many young people carrying guns. In East Baringo, it is estimated that over a half of the male adult population people have guns. These include young men as young as 13years.

We found out that, at the moment, the price of an AK-47 rifle, which again is the most popular gun ranges between Kshs.40, 000 and Kshs.50, 000. Other common types of guns include; Mk-4 , G3, which is very rare, and a few Pistols. Bullets are also mainly source from Uganda and they cost Ksh. 50/= each. None of the respondents from East Baringo agreed that there are government bullets held by ordinary people except those issued to KPRs. However, most Marakwets held the view that state agents routinely supply Pokots with guns. It was difficult to independently confirm this. We found that, Pokots routinely acquire and sell the older guns. Their main clients are the Marakwet. They also sell guns to Tugens, Njemps near L.Baringo Keiyos and a few Luhyas. Friends especially due to the increasing tension facilitate selling with neighbours because of the need to protect their communities.

7.3 GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS

The government has not done much with respect to disarming the Pokots or curbing the illegal gun trade in East Baringo. The Pokots have made it a routine to attack their neighbours especially the Marakwet. The peoples' perception is that the government has done nothing serious to address the problem of illegal gun ownership in the area. In April 2001, the Head of State issued an amnesty for all guns to be returned to Government security personnel in the area. By the time of our visit to Kolowa in East Baringo, no one had responded to the presidential directive, almost two months after the expiry of the deadline. Government officials interviewed in the area noted that while people had acquired illegal guns, the governments efforts to address the problem was being seriously hampered by the hostile

environment of the area, the superiority of the guns held by the Pokots and the warriors’ well known experience in the use of fire arms.

Most respondents held the view that if the government were to be more positively engaged in East Baringo, cattle raiding and the proliferation of illegal guns would drastically reduce. They further held the view that the government had neglected the Pokot in many aspects of development activities. A large percentage of those interviewed lamented the fact that educational standards in East Baringo remained very low. School enrolment is almost less than 10% of those eligible to attend school. In one primary school in Kolowa division it was found that out of a class of 32 students, only one was female. Generally, it was the feeling of most of those interviewed that the government should launch awareness campaigns in the area, built and equip schools and then provide free education as well as meals to the students. If this were done, it would have a significant impact on the people’s lifestyle and would, consequently, reduce cattle rustling and thuggery among the people of East Baringo. 33

7.4 IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY

The main impact of gun culture in East Baringo is the devastation it has brought to the Marakwet people. The other impact is that illegal ownership of arms has also contributed to a false sense of security among the Pokot. They feel it has improved their well being at the expense of their neighbours, through raids.

The other important impact is that illegal ownership of guns has kept away businessmen, professionals, NGOs, churches and even the government, due to insecurity. These groups would have opened up the Pokot and inculcated in them a sense of brotherhood with neighbours. They would have educated the community and taken away the ignorance that is preyed upon by the politicians.

The net impact therefore is widespread ignorance, poverty, disease, suspicion and under- development. It is our submission that the government can rectify the situation within a very short time if it had the moral will to do so. Evidently, there appears to be a political conspiracy to maintain the status quo.

8 CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

The situation of arms and conflicts in the North Rift cannot be said to be beyond control. With government commitment, political good will and adequate civic education, the situation can be brought under control.

Government commitment would entail willingness to allocate more resources in this region. This should come inform of commitment to have all cattle rustlers and raiders prosecuted in courts of law and to be punished for their deeds. No animals should be declared lost because the government has adequate resources and equipment to trace a needle in the desert. Peace initiatives for the region managed by all the affected governments should be enhanced so that if any disarming is to take place, all the people are disarmed at the same time. Occasions for mutual exchange in form of dances, markets and games should be put in place to help dispel the negative attitudes inculcated during the periods of animosity. This is already being done under a project sponsored by World Vision International targeting the communities in West Pokot, Turkana and the Karamojong of Eastern Uganda.

In terms of political good will, the political leaders from these areas must be sincere and honest with their people. They must let them know of the false limited security arms can offer. They must offer better alternatives to their people than cattle rustling. In line with this, local politicians should not trade in cattle because this will encourage their people to get them more and better ones from raids.

The role of education as a liberating factor from unrewarding cultural undertakings must be emphasized. In this regard the government should use the available resources to provide free education in these areas because the people in these areas are too poor to afford to pay for education. The free education package should include food, shelter, medical care and uniforms. For the community, educational tours should be organized to expose the opinion leaders to other ways of earning a living apart from cattle keeping.

Development should start from where the people are. The government should provide Proper marketing for animals especially just before the government should provide drought. 34 The money raised from such sales would help the community to buy more animals during the rainy season other than having thousands of them perishing during drought periods. Up and above this, irrigation schemes or projects should be started along the fertile Kerio Valley.

Market for the produce must be guaranteed so as to draw away more and more people from depending on animals as the only source of livelihood. We are in other words opposed to the liberalized market system where the producer has to seek market for his/her products. At least for this region and for purposes of solving the current arms proliferation problem, their market must be guaranteed otherwise they will be discouraged.

It is recommended that the government should abolish KPRs because they are first and foremost untrained, are not remunerated and have not been proven to offer any tangible solutions to the problem of insecurity. Instead, they have actually worsened it in some respects such as misuse of firearms in their custody and creating the feeling of necessity for fire arms by those left out by the state in the issuance of arms.

The solution to insecurity problems in the region has to start from the people, since any external effort to change their lifestyle may achieve much. This is due to the fact that it is not very easy to change the culture of a people. Any change initiatives should maximise on the positive things and practices that people have and where they are, such as improving cattle keeping methods, better markets and encouraging the positive effects of education.

Developing effective early warning systems from the government, civil society, and the people themselves. These should include sensitising elders to control the activities of the youth, enhance government intelligence networks and political will etc.