The Russian Establishment Takes a Hit Unexpected Results from the September 2013 Elections

Home , Civic Platform (Russia), Leaderism, Mayor of Moscow

By Emil Pain, Senior Academic Advisor, Kennan Moscow Project, and Professor, Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Russia

In evaluating the results of the September power (at any level —local, regional or nation- elections, we should take into greater ac- al) in, for example, Kazakhstan on the sole count the specificity of the political regimes grounds that the candidate won the election. in post-Soviet countries, which just pretend All of Nazarbayev’s real competitors, candi- to resemble modern constitutional states. dates for the presidency of Kazakhstan, died These are regimes that Max Weber called unexpectedly, except for those who emigrat- “patrimonial,” and Gabriel Almond and Sidney ed in time, like the “Sultan’s” former son-in- Verba termed “pre-civil,” meaning a state in law Rakhat Aliyev or the former prime minis- which the population is not involved or only ter Akezhan Kazhegeldin. After these lessons, very passively involved in the formation of no one has voiced any ambitions to be presi- policy. The role of the authoritarian leader is dent; everyone is waiting for the “Sultan” to much greater in such societies than in West- choose a successor. ern democracies where the law plays a more important role. This is especially true for patri- In Russia, the situation is different now, and monial societies, which Weber referred to as the September 2013 elections demonstrat- “sultanic,” similar to the regimes in Central ed this. In Yekaterinburg, Yevgeny Roizman, Asia and Chechnya. One distinguishing fea- a well-known opposition politician and one ture of patrimonial regimes is the huge role of the leaders of the billionaire Prokhorov’s played by rituals. Even elections have a ritual- Grazhdanskaya platforma (Civic Platform) istic significance there rather than a rational Party, won unexpectedly and is now mayor. or pragmatic purpose. However, completely In Petrozavodsk, the capital of Karelia, the ritualistic elections and public policy is more previously unknown Galina Shirshina, won typical for the eastern patrimonial “sultanic” with her own, independent campaign which regimes. In such regimes, instead of political was extremely critical of the administration struggles there are struggles among the clan in Karelia. Another big surprise was the result leaders to be closest to the “Sultan” figure. of the Moscow mayoral elections, where For the foreseeable future it is unimaginable prominent opposition politician Alexei Navalny that an oppositional politician could come to came in second with 27.3% of the vote and

Kennan Institute far ahead of the other candidates. The current allowed relatively free elections to take place mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin, won with in some regions. This explains the results in only 51.4 % of the vote, which by Russian po- Yekaterinburg, Petrozavodsk and Moscow. It litical standards is an almost shameful result. might seem that in other regions of Russia, the traditional model of ritual elections was The Russian model of self-preservation of preserved, and representatives of the ruling the political elite differs from Kazakhstan’s. In party had implausibly large victories in Sep- Russia, power is not used as much to mobi- tember 2013, but it is not as simple as that. lize the population around the father figure of Unexpectedly for many, for the first time in the nation, as it is in Kazakhstan, but just the several years these results led to protests in opposite – it is used to demobilize the major- the Russian provinces. Since Putin came to ity of the population and encourage political power, the provinces had been completely passivity. In the face of such passivity, until passive, whereas now in the Yaroslavl region, recently it was easy for Russian authorities five opposition parties signed a memorandum to falsify election results as well as the voter declaring the election results of September 8 turnout. However, in recent years, this political model in Russia is increasingly in crisis. There were unprecedented mass protests in Moscow in 2011 and early 2012. By the end of 2012, the government seemed to have completely suppressed them. However, in reality, the protest spirit in major Russian cities was not crushed. The protest changed in its form, and after several demonstrations of general discontent with the political system, it transformed into riots against migrants. If in Egypt or Tunisia politicians often rally their base around religious issues, in Russia politicians use ethnicity to unify their supporters.

Regardless, the Russian political elite under- stands the precariousness of its situation and is trying to find new means of self-preservation under the new conditions. After a period of using the political stick and increased repression, the authorities decided in 2013 to use the carrot for a change, and

Kennan Institute rigged. In Volgograd, not only did all the par- was one novelty — there was unprecedented ties represented in Duma, including the Com- low voter turnout. In some areas of the city, munists, protest the election fraud, but there turnout was only 16-18% of those registered. were also spontaneous riots in the streets. We can say that people voted with their feet On September 10, demonstrators blocked against all candidates from all parties. And the central avenue of Volgograd, which until this, in my opinion, better reflects the will recently was one of the most conservative of the people than the elections for the Par- cities in Russia. liament of the Chechen Republic, for which voter turnout on September 8 was 92%, and In the south of Russia, for example in the “United Russia” garnered 85% of the vote. Republic of Kalmykia, there were not any pro- The Chechen Republic still sets the bar in tests of note, and in the September elections Russia for “managed democracy.” “United Russia” maintained its dominating role in the local parliament (Narodniy Khural). In the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions the “United Russia” received two thirds of the September elections were only held for cer- mandate, but for the first time, 9 seats, or tain city and village councils. Their legislatures 30%, went to the opposition. They went not were elected earlier this year. It’s important only to Communist candidates, who were to note that at the time (July 2013), a very already in the Khural, but also to members popular party in Stavropol oblast’, the Russian of Prokhorov’s entirely new liberal party nationalist party “Novaya Sila” (New Force), “Civic Platform” and members of “Patriots was not allowed to partake in the elections. of Russia,” which has much in common with However, the party in power began to incor- Russian nationalist parties. Until recently porate its ideas. Just during the September Kalmykia was considered completely politi- elections, the Pyatigorsk city government, cally passive and subordinate to one person which is the administrative center of the (Kirsan Illyumzhinov), just as Chechnya is to North Caucasus Federal District, demanded Kadyrov and Kazakhstan to Nazarbayev. But the demolition of a mosque, which “Nova- now a multi-party parliament has emerged in ya Sila” had previously insisted upon. The the republic — this is quite an event — and a current administration, in this city and else- clear sign of changes in Russia. where, wants to rely on Russian nationalism to strengthen its faltering legitimacy. Other But in the neighboring region of Astrakhan, political forces in Russia are drifting toward there was less change. In September, they Russian nationalism as well. held elections for the City Duma of Astra- khan, which were carried out according to the traditional model and provided a complete victory to the party in power. However, there

Kennan Institute What are the political Russia, to create an opposition move- conclusions from the ment that is attractive for its goals and September elections? program alone without the support of a strong personality. For example, the pro- Firstly, they demonstrated the growing crisis gram of the representative of the party for the authorities, and that the crisis is grow- “Apple,” Sergei Mitrokhin, should have ing more apparent not only to experts, but to appealed more to the liberal electorate the general population. than that of Navalny. But it is completely clear that today, the public hungers not Secondly, it has become noticeable that the for ideas, but for charismatic leaders. For atmosphere of protest is spreading from the this reason, Navalny’s followers are at- capital out into the regions. tracted to his personality rather than his ideas. In any case, this politician is turning Thirdly, the political opposition has acquired the so-called “non-system” opposition an obvious leader – Alexei Navalny. into the “movement of Navalny,” while normal opposition institutions in Russia If Gorbachev and Yeltsin were products of the stumble. As one observer noted, “The Soviet party nomenclature, then Navalny is a Russian opposition has turned into the politician of the post-Soviet era, who bears no Alexei Navalny Show.” responsibility for the sins of the Soviet Union or for the difficult 1990s. He is a talented public politician and a fabulous orator. After 2. In political terms, Navalny is a populist more than a decade of rule by Putin’s face- — a mixture of a xenophobe and a liberal. less bureaucrats filling the daily news, a new In the election, he received support from figure has appeared in the Russian media. His both liberals and Russian nationalists. Not eye-catching Aryan appearance, his ironic wit, that long ago, such a situation would have and aphoristic speeches have revived Russia seemed implausible. Liberals, standing and its cultural centers, which had grown up for the rule of law and human rights, weary of public politics. Public opinion sur- were the enemies of the nationalists, veys show that Navalny’s popularity and visi- who for their own part, hated liberals as bility are growing rapidly, which distinguishes conduits of Western ideas and defenders the bright young politician. However, some of of ethnic and religious minorities. Now, his qualities frighten people, including some the shift of those who called themselves members of the opposition: “Russian liberals” towards nationalism has become a visible trend. If Navalny 1. The reappearance of ‘leaderism,’ and the openly demonstrates Caucasus-phobia cult of personality. It is difficult to say and Islamophobia, then a different figure whether or not it is possible, in modern

Kennan Institute in these elections, Evgeniy Roizman, state. He passionately supports the ‘in- goes further and combines these pho- dependent’ states of South Ossetia and bias with a deep hatred towards Roma. Abkhazia, created by Russia after they Yet another well-known liberal politician, were annexed from Georgia in the course Vladimir Milov, is actively drifting in the of the 2008 war. He is even prepared to direction of xenophobia and supporting recognize the independence of Transn- Russian nationalism. This is all, in my istria – the Russian enclave in Moldova. opinion, dangerous, insofar as a growth in With statements such as these, it is clear the popularity of Russian nationalism in- why his foreign policy views can cause tensifies the retaliatory nationalism of mi- alarm in the West. norities and their religious consolidation, especially in the Islamic regions of the North Caucasus. The terrorist organization What are the possible scenar- Caucasus Emirate is well aware of this ios of political development fact. In 2012, its leader, Doku Umarov, an- in Russia after the September nounced a moratorium on terrorist attacks elections? against civilians in Russian cities after the mass protests by the opposition against Theoretically, there are two scenarios: the federal forces, but in the beginning of 2013 he announced the annulment of this 1. Political reform from the top down. moratorium. After the elections showed a In this case, the leadership expands the boom in Russian nationalism, the danger scope of freedoms, guaranteeing free of a new rise of terrorism has grown. elections on all levels, and supporting the engagement of the populace in gover- 3. Acknowledging European values – free- nance and political life, thus retaking the dom of the press, freedom of speech, initiative from the liberal-nationalist Rus- freedom of assembly, and the freedom sian opposition. I consider this the best to travel to the West – Navalny’s follow- option for Russia, but extremely unlikely, ers are increasingly viewing European particularly after the September elections. elites as complicit in the raiding of Russia These elections demonstrated to the au- as stolen billions are now reliably stored thorities that, in those regions where they away in foreign property. Just like Putin showed liberalism and provided greater supporters, they are sick of Europe’s ser- freedom for grassroots political activity, mons and Americans’ double standards they either lost completely, as in Yekater- and deception. Navalny supports imperial inburg and Petrozavodsk, or won with an goals in Russia’s foreign policy; he feels uncomfortably narrow margin, as in Mos- that Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine should cow. The recent elections will, most likely, be united once more to form one great

Kennan Institute strengthen the position of the conserva- tives, who would like to install a regime in Russia similar to that in Kazakhstan. These elections reinforce their belief that they must not show any weakness and that oppositional unrest must be quelled with repression. But believing in the ef- fectiveness of such a strategy is delusion- al – attempts to carry it out would only hasten the system’s failure and increase the likeliness of another scenario that is hardly dependent on the authorities.

2. Political change from below. Revolution. Now that the opposition has a thoroughly articulate leader, who is ready for battle, the likelihood of radical measures has increased. This scenario would occur even if Navalny is sent to prison to serve his 5-year term, sen- tenced by the Kirov Court. Revolution, of course, is not inevitable, but one cannot ignore the possibility.

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