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Systematic Analysis of Complex Dynamic Systems: the Case of the Uss Vincennes

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This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com AD-A260 260 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California S' DTIC SELECTED FEB 181 993 THESIS S E SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX DYNAMIC SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF THE USS VINCENNES by Kristen Ann Dotterway June 1992 Principal Advisor: Nancy C. Roberts Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 4 5 1 q.•9 3 - 0 3 102 9 3 & IV7 0 80 INHWRM Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE la REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UNCLASSIFIED 2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABLITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 2b DECLASSIFICAI ION/DO VNtRADING SCHEDULE 4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School (It applicable) Naval Postgraduate School cc 6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b ADDRESS (City, State, andZIPCode) Monterey,CA 939435000 Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Ba NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING Bb OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (It applicable) Bc ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS Program Element No Project NC Ilask -,c * oKm Accession Number 11 TITLE (Include Security Classification) SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS 01 COMPLEX DYNAMIC SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF TIlE USS VINCENNES 12 PERSONA:. AUTHOR(S) Dotterway, Kristen Ann 13a TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (year,month, day) 15 PAGE COUNT Master's Thesis From To June 1992 256 16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those ofthe author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identity by block number) FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP Command and Control, C2, Cybernetics, Organizational Learning, Vincennes Incident, Complex Dynamic Systems, Negative/Positive Feedback, Systems Analysis, Garbage Can Model, Mutual Causality, Wholistic Approach to Change, l)ecision Making, Ambiguity, 19 ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Recent studies on the Vincennes incident have centered around the impact ofstres&in decision making. This thesis, which is a case analysis ofsa historical event, offers another perspective through the use of organizational and contextual factors as a means to ascertain 'what happened' when the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655. Data extracted from the unclassified investigation report by Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty and the transcripts from the Senate Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services were analyzed quantitatively, through regression and correlation analysis in conjunction with a graphical analysis and interpretation, in an effort to resolve the lack of reconciliation between system and recollected data by witnesses. A comparative analysis was also conducted between these archival sources of data and interview data from Captain Will Rogers, III, former Commanding Officer of the Vincennes. Additionally, to identify "causal factors" that led to the outcome, further analysis using the Events Path Model, Dynamic Systems Model, and Cybernetic Model of'Mutual Causality was conducted. The findings of the quantitative analysis portion supports Captain Rogers' argument, which included a track number issue and the existence of another aircraft. Among the "causal factors" identified contributing to the accidental shoot down, the most significant finding revealed was the failure to identify and differentiate between two aircraft, which was primarily due to the functional lack of negative feedback as a control mechanism that keeps a system stable and under control. Consequently, the issue of stress was not as significant as ws originally diagnosed 20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ]UNCLASSIFIiDUNlIMOIDi 1 SAMWAS REiPORI 3 DTIcuStRs Unclassified 22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area code) 22c OFFICE SYMBOL Nancy C. Roberts (408) 646-2742 AS DD FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE All other editions are obsolete Unclassified i Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Accesion For Systematic Analysis of Complex Dynamic Systems: The Case of the USS Vincemnns NTIS CR.^&i OTIC TAB Unannouo -c ..d by J sisf-catio: . Kristen Ann Dotterway By .... ... Captain, United States Air Force Dstbtrbutio B.S., United States Air Force Academy Avadaiabbty Codes A.,ji arid or Submitted in partial fulfillment Dist Special of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 1992 Author: Kristen Ann otr Approved by: Nancy C oberts, Principal Advisor Allan W. Tulloch, CDR, Associate Advisor Carl Jones, Chairman Com d, Controli d Communications Academic Group ABSTRACT Recent studies on the Vincennes incident have centered around the impact of stress in decision making. This thesis, which is a case analysis of a historical event, offers another perspective through the use of organizational and contextual factors as a means to ascertain "what happened" when the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655. Data extracted from the unclassified investigation report by Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty and the transcripts from the Senate Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services were analyzed quantitatively, through regression and correlation analysis in conjunction with a graphical analysis and interpretation, in an effort to resolve the lack of reconciliation between system and recollected data by witnesses. A comparative analysis was also conducted between these archival sources of data and interview data from Captain Will Rogers, Ill, former Commanding Officer of the Vincennes. Additionally, to identify "causal factors" that led to the outcome. further analysis using the Events Path Model, Dynamic Systems Model. and Cybernetic Model of Mutual Causality was conducted. The findings of the quantitative analysis portion supports Captain Rogers* argument, which included a track number issue and the existence of another aircraft. Among the "causal factors" identified contributing to the accidental shoot down, the most significant finding revealed was the failure to identify and differentiate between two aircraft, which was primarily due to the functional lack of negative feedback as a control mechanism that keeps a system stable and under control. Consequently, the issue of stress was not as significant as was originally diagnosed. 11i ,4 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .. ........................................... 1 A. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................... I B. STRUCTURE OF THESIS ................................. 2 C. METHODOLOGY .. .................................... 3 D. SCOPE/BENEFITS ...................................... 3 II. THE VINCENNES INCIDENT .. ................................. 5 A. OVERVIEW ........................................... 5 B. HISTORY .. .. ......................................... 5 1. U.S. Presence in the G ulf .. ............................ 5 2. U .S. Interest in the G ulf . ............................. 7 3. Iran-Iraq War ...................................... 7 4. The Tanker War .................................... 8 5. The Stark Incident .. ................................. 8 6. Increased U.S. Involvement . .......................... 9 C. AIR OPERATIONS ..................................... II I. Commercial Air Activity .. ........................... 11 2. Military Air Activity .. .............................. 14 iv D. THE USS ITNCENNES .................................. 16 I. Training and Readines ............................... 16 2. Organization . ..................................... 19 3. Combat System Status .. ............................. 26 4. Communications ................................... 26 a. Internal . 26 b. External . .................................... 27 5. Rules of Engagement ........ ....................... 27 E. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ................................ 27 1. Environmental Information . ........................... 27 2. Events Prior to the Surface Engagement ................. 28 3. Surface Engagem ent ............................... .3 4. A ir Engagem ent . .................................. 34 111. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .......................... 49 A. ADMIRAL FOGARTY'S ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ... 49 B. CAPTAIN ROGERS' ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ....... 57 1. Introduction . ..................................... 57 2. Naval Tactical Data System . .......................... 58 3. Aegis Command and Decision System ................... 59 4. Track Number Sequence ............................ 60 5. Summary. ....................................... 62 v C. AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ............. 62 1. Introduction . ..... ..... ... ...... .. .... .... ........ 62 2. System Data . ..................................... 63 a. Altitude
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