- 25 - spread itself throughout the ports of the United Kingdom and, nlthough more congested on thd South Const, it was not confined to that area. (Ramsay, £E cit, p. 5110) 57. Although wireless traffic was restricted for those prepcring for the actual assault, it was left open purpoeely for those engaged in "FORTITUDE (SOUTH)". * It was planned to have some 270 dummy landing craft stationed at Yarmouth, Dover, Folkestone and other harbours opposite the Pas de Calais. To strengthen the belief in this 'threat', the Cover Plan laid dmvn that "naval wire less traffic proportionate to the number of [dummy] craft will be simulated in the ffiooring areas, appropriate l~my wireless traffic being linked to these flotillas as far as possible" (Cover and Diversionary Plans).
58. The naval diversion plens which were to be put into operation during the hours immediately prior to D Dey can be dealt with but briefly here. In general, the intention was to deceive the enemy through his radar screens rather than by direct attacks on the enemy coast. Three main naval diversions were planned in conjunction with the Air Force. The aim of each operation is given by the Cover Plan as follows: Seo Diversions Operation "BIGDRUM" The object of this diversion is to engage the enemy radar stations in the North of the Cherbourg Peninsula and to distrnct the enemy batteries in that aren. This div~sionnry opera tion will be carried out by a small force of M.Ls. Operation "T1JU~LE" The object of this diversion is to give
*At this point it is worthwhile quoting a memorandum on Signals Security issued by H~, First Canadian Army, on 28 May: "It is known that the enemy's most prolific method of gaining information is by wireless interception and by wireless intelligence. He collates all intercepted wire less transmissions p~d cen, by the correlation of smnll details -- which by themselves have no significance - deduce information which is of the highest value to him. It is essential that we make it as difficult for the enemy as possible in this respect" ('V. D•• C.S.O. BranCh, H.~., First Canadian Army, May 1944, SIGS/9-7-1). 26 - greater breadth to the assault rorces and to show our intention of landing North of the Seine. The diversion will be linked with an eirborne diversion. Operation "GLIMMER" Plans will be made in order to carry out a similar diversion to "T:JL~LE" in the Pus de Calais exea should enemy mining permit and the enemy situation prove desirable. Of the possible ereas of attack it is considered that the Boulogne area will be most effective.
(~)
59. To give bulk to the smell naval forces engaged in these operations, a considercble number of r.lr craft circling overhand I~ere to simul~te the renctions which a large convoy would produce in the enemy's coastal radar stations by dropping a specicl type of 'Window'* designed for this occcsion" (Herris, 2£ cit, p. 206).
60. The role of the f~lied military forces in the Cover Plan, although naturally more statio, supplomented that of the naval and air forces. \Vhile every effort was made to conceal the location and strength of the assaulting forces by stringent security measures, an open display of activity and numbers was made in the aree facing the Pes de C01018.** An elaborate wireless communication network was planned to commence operations from 24 ~pr. (Cover and Diversionary Ple~s) Each stction on this network would represent one of the vRrious formntions in the notlon~l forces, nnd the messages pessed would be typical of those passing between formntion hecdquerters. I",ide from the dummy lr.nding craft, "the signing of rands and speoial arees consistent with the story of the embark ation of the forod" was to be carried out in the Eastern and South Eastern Commands (Ibid). From mid-May onwards, "in order to show activity at:nrght in the areas where dummy craft are indieQted, night lighting installations simulating vehicle lights and beach lighting" were to be put into operetion (~).
*This was the name given to bundles of metallized paper dropped f~om aircraft to oonfuse enemy radar stations. **" ... there were cnmps in East f~glia which might have bivouacked thouBcnds of treaps. f~tually they were deserted tent cities, given semblance of lite by enough men to keep the fires burning for German reconncissnnce pilots to photo graph" ((HS)956.011(Dl): Lt-Gen W.E. Smith, "Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions" (Part I), The Saturday Evening Post, p. 108). - 27 - 61. On the night of 5/6 "un, it was planned to assist the ir-vnsion forces by having aircraft drop explosive dummy parc.chutists, "together with mnchines which made noises like rifle fire and other sounds of battle, in order to ~,ko a diversion and cover the real airborne landings in the Normandy area" (Harris, 2E cit, p. 207). The whole of this simulated airborne attack was called Operntion "TIThNTIC", which in turn was divided into four sub-opera tions. "TITLNTIC I" wes concerned with simulating the dropping of one airborne division North of the Seine. Its objoct was "to retain enemy forces North of the Seine and to drc.w the enemy reserves South of the Seine to the North" (Cover and Diversionery Ple.ns). The object of "TITl.NTIC II" was Hto delay locel reserves immedintely Eest of the . River Dives from moving Westwerds" (Ibid). "TIT:.NTIC III", which was to teke plnce at the SQffi6 time as the drop of the 6th I~rborne Division, hed as its object the drewing "of c proportion of lecel counter-attack troops to the Southwest of Ceen" (Ibid). The object of "TIT:.NTIC IV" was "to drnw the enemy counter-att~ck forces in the cree. of St. 10 to the West" (Ibid). To strengthen the enemy's belief in wide-sprecd airborne operDtions, "TITi.NTIC I and IV" h~d inCluded in their drops three and two (respectively) p~rties of men from the Special ,ar Service. These nen were to "create minor d~'1ge to culverts and [to] attcck dispntch riders, lone vehicles, etc., allowing individual enemy to escape end thus confirm by personal contact the rumor of parntroop dropping" (Ibid).
62. . The Cc.nadic.n Army pleyed a p~ssive, rather than an ective~ p~rt in the elaborate Cover Plan. The threat to the ~QS de Calais was given strength by the movement of 2nd Cancdinn Corps troops and elements of 2 Cdn Inf Div into the Kent area during ~pril and Mc¥. (W.D., "G" Branch, Main H.Q., 2 Cdn Corps, April 1944: Appx 105; W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q., 2 Cdn Inf Div, I..pril 1944: hppX 15) The training given these troops before and after D Day intimated their possible use in the 63. To give weight to the story that the Canadians in Kent were pert of e British-American-Canadian assault force, Canadian signalmen, under the overall direction of c.s.a. First Cdn !~my were to be employed in carrying out the wireless part of 'fleshin up' the phantom army as described in the Cover Plan. A wireleEs network designed for this purpose was to commence op~rotlons on 24 Apr. (W.D., C.S.O. Branch, H.~. First Cdn Army. "une 1944: I.ppx 11, Operation "~UICKSILVER") Canadian s~g:lalmen were responsible only for the Ce.nadlc.n "f"rmy" forIlll'.tions in the Cover Plan'S story, but worked in conjunction with their British and I~ericr.n counterparts (Ibid). - 28 - (f) D Day. H Hour and Y Day 64. The great number of conflicting factors which had to be considered before D Day and H Hour were finally determined are outlined in A.H.~. Report No. 42. (See section on "Considerations of Timing and Weather"). In general the argument was waged by the Navy, l~my and Idr Force over their ~eparate considerations of time, weather, tides, daylight end dnrkness. Meanwhile, those who had the responsibility of planning for and administering the ass~ult forces while in the United Kingdom required some target date. On 5 Mar 44, therefore, the following instructions were issued~ 1. Since D Day for the operations is not yet definitely fixed, confusion may arise from the designation, with reference to D Day, of dates by which preparations or phases of planning are to be completed. It is olso in the interests of security to avoid n procedure Whereby the date of D Day may be compromised by being linked with preparations or measures the institution of which may be widely known. 2. The fixed date of 1 Jun 44 has therefore been selected and will be known as Y Day. Wherever possible reference will be made to dates by which preparations of phases of planning are to be instituted or completed in terms of Y Day, and not of D Day which itself will later be notified in terms of Y Day. ((HB) 969. (D22): G.S. Memo entitled "Institution of Y Day - Overlord," War Office to G.H.~. Home Forces, 5 Mar 44) 65. The selection of D Day* was Ultimately the responsibility of the Supreme Commander. His decision, naturally J would be based on the weather re quirements of the three services. .~ early as September 1943, Headqu~ers 21 1J:rmy Group had drafted a report showing that in June there would be a period of only a few deys during the month which might satisfy the conflicting demands of the three Services (A.H.Q. Report No. 42, p. 175). On *D Day was defined as the day on Which the assaults were to be carried out. H Hour was to be the time at which the first wave of landing craft should hit the beach. 29 the basis of their minimum demands. "the dates of 5,6 and 7 June were all accept~ble••• , but any postponement beyond these dates would have necessitated waiting until 19 June fo~ a similar favorable tidal period" (Report of the ~pr~me commander,•• , 2E cit, p. 5). Even this post poh'epent'woUld ~av~ ~;ant accepting moonless conditions for the airborne drop. 66. Owing to the fact that times of high water varied widely on different beaches, the direction of the incoming tide being from West to East, the decision was taken to select five separate H Hours on any given D Day. (Report by the f~lied Navel Commander-in-Chief ~ 2E cit, vol f). For Force ItJII and 3 Cdn Inf Div, a still more perplexing difficulty arose. This situation is best described in the words of the Commodore commanding Force ttJ": last-minute intelligence •.• indicated that outlying rocks off NIN Sector dried 5 ft instead of 3 ft •. H Hour on this sector had therefore to be about 30 minutes later than originally in tended, su as to ensure that craft cleared these rocks, and n reduced margin of scfety was accepted between the beaching point and the obstc.cles. To effect this and to ovoid too big an interval between the H Hours of the two neigh boring Assault Groups, the H Hour on MIKE Sector (J.l) was planned 10 minutes late and that on NAN Sector (J.2) 20 minutes late on the remainder of Eastern Task Force ••.• (Ibid, Vol 11, Report by Naval TIOmmander, Forc~JU) 67. The final decision as to D Day and H Hour was not made until 17 May and 5 Jun was selected, with postponement acceptable to 6 end 7 Jun (Report by the Supreme Commander •... .Q.P cit, p .. 4). (g) The "Atlantic Wall" 68. late in 1941 the Cermen High Command became increasingle aware of the pressing need to take coordinated defence measures against possible invasion in the West by Allied forces. Preliminary construction of coastal defences was on a local and independent scale by area commanders, but "during the spring and summer of' 1942 some progress was made in converting the field def'ences into a network of strong-points and defended areas" (Hist Sec, #.E.q., Report No. 36, The Davelo ent of the German Defences in the Die e Sector 1 ,p.. By m1d-1942, the growing t of tel es, t e severe German Army losses on the' Russian front and a greatly weakened luftWaffe gave additional - 30 - weight to the idea of constructing a strong, integrated belt of fortifications along the coast of France. This "Atlantic Wall", as it was called, received Hitler's close nttention Inter in the year. At a meeting with his generals on 29 Sep 42, the Fuehrer ndmitted grave concern over the possibility of c 'Second Front' in the west. He gave orders thnt construction of the "Atlantic Wall" must be increased and decreed the following order of priority: 1. Further strengthening of the U-bont bases. 2. Work on the ports of cell for convoys. 3. Work on the harbours suitable for enemy landings." 4. Development of adjacent islands. 5. Development of probable landing plnces on the open coastline. 6. Development of the less likely landing places. ((HS) 981 HC. (Dlb): "Hitler's Speech on Construction of the Atlantic Wall", (Translated by Capt A.G. Steiger), p. 4) 69. During 1943 work on the "Atlantic Wnll" went forward steadily. Towards the end of that year it beGume apparent to even the most optimistic that concrete bunkers and gun emplacements could not make up for the steady drain of German forces from France to the Eastern front. Thus, on 3 Nov 43, Hitler directed thct it was "no longer perruissible thct the west should be weakened so that other fronts should be strengthened" ( (HS) 981.013 (D44): "German lillti-Invasion Measures, November 1943-July 1944: Extracts from the War Diaries of the German 7th Army"). At the same time he insisted that "iron and concrete should be poured into the main defensive line with all the reeources of the Todt organization, while the second position in the fields will be supplied by all available troops with all additional aids" (Ibid). With the possibility of an invesion mounting each month as the Allied naval, military and air force potentialities increased, Hitler deoided to employ Field·-Marshal Rommel's abilities in the West. Among other things, Rommel was ordered to undertake "the study of the defence preparedness of the coasts occupied by German forces, and the submission .of proposals therefore" (Hist Sec, 1l.H.~, Report No. 40, Gennan Defence Preparations in the West, p. 21). *This presumably rerlect&d the Dieppe experience• • .. 31 - 70. l~though Rommel's recommendations were accepted, they would exceed Germany's industrial capacity if they were carried out 1n full. Nevertheless, D~Y of them were put in practice, and soon "in addition to the step-up in the mine-laying programme,* a number of partially mined tree trunk paliscdes were installed on the foreshore, fields of obstacles were created inland to interdict enemy landings from the air, and large areas were flooded or soaked in order to economize forces" (Ibid, p. 35). These and other measures inaugurated by Rommel, together with the general increased activity cad accelerated pace of the construction work underway, did not escape the attention of the Allies. However, although these measures forced the lulied commanders to make some changes in their tactical plans, their strntegy remained the same. Fortunately, the entry of Rommel on the scene resulted in the enemy's tactical plans ohanging also, and led ultimctely to the Rommel-Rundstedt compromise, (See infra, paras 412 ff) 71. By June 1944, the "Atlantic Wall" which the Allied forces must breach to gain entrance into "Festung Europa" was Q very formidable barrier. Mined undersea obstacles, belts of minefields, concrete bunkers end thick walled gun emplacements, field defences of all descriptions, underground munitions and supply dumps, deep anti-tank ditches, mined roads and booby-trapped houses, heavy novel guns, innumerable protected weapon pits, -- all these ond more were planned and integrated by engineers who had had the time and resources of a still powerful nation at their disposal. Supplementing this carrier of steel and concrete was the English Channel, whose waters had served 3S on , excellent "anti-tank ditch" for Britain in 1940-41, and , which was now performing the same function for tFestung Europa'. Nor was that all the Allied assault troops had to fear, for immediately prior to the invasion the Cermans had almoet completed their preparations to launch against the United Kingdom the first of their new secret weapons, the V-l "flying bomb". 72. As early as the latter part of 1942 British agents had w~ned the l~lied commanders that the enemy was *On 31 Jan 44 Rommel had asked for the delivery of two million mines per month (~, p. 34). This was quite beyond the power of the German economy to produce. However, clthough Rommel by no means received everything he asked, he used what he did get to good effect. (See A.H.Q. Report No. 40 in this respect) - 32 - experimenting with a new type of rocket mdssile* at Peenemunde, an island on the Baltic coast. (Captain Norman Macmillan, The Royal Air Force in the World War (London, 1950), Vol IV, pp 175 ffl A heavy and successful air attack against the chief experimental station at Peenemunde in f~gust 1943 delayed production of the weapons for many months; but by moving his experimental stntion to Poland and by using underground fnctories, the enemy was able to continue his work on the Dew weapon. Shortly nfter this air raid, evidence was gathered which indicated that Peenemunde was being used to test Dew missiles - the long-range rockets, or V~~s. 73. The enemy began constructing launching platforms for the V-I weapons~'* in the Pas de Calais and the Cherbourg arees during the autumn of 1943. (Leigh-Mallory, £E cit, p. 53) "By the end of the year, 88 'ski-sites' nad-seen located and the existence of another 50 was suspectedx ((HS) CO2. 011 (068): fur Chief Marshal Sir Roderick Hill, Air Operations by Air Defence of Great Britain and Fi tar Command in Connection with the German Fl in Bomb an DC at 1: ens vas upplement to Ten on Gazette, 20 ct • p. 5 • In December 1943 the Air ~r8 a Goumnud1ng, Air Defence of Great Britain, was warned to prepare his commend for pilotless aircraft attacks against the country on the scnle of "two missiles an hour from euch of 100 sites [beginning] in February, 1944" (Ibid). On 5 Dec 43, forces from the Allied Expeditionary Air Force and the American Eighth Air Force began n series of bombing attacks on the 'ski-sites'. "The operations against these sites [were] carried out under the title of 'Crossbow' ••• , n and were continued with such vigor as other commitments, for example "POINTBLfINK", would permit (Leigh-Mallory, £E ill, p. 53). AE the bombing offensive began to achieve its purpose, the Air Ministry revised its estimate of the probable scale of attack and of the time it would be launched. Between 5 Dec 43 nnd 6 Jun 44, the Allied Air Fordes dropped a total of 21,483 tons of bombs on the 'Ski-sites'; 8,291 tons on rocket sites and 1,627 tons on supply sites and dumps (Ibid, p. 54). Although a great deal of damage *WThe rocket-bomb was operationally handled by the Ger oan 1lrmy, the :flying-bomb by the luftwaffe Flak regiment 155 (W). But in December 1943 the LXV Army Corps Vias instructed to control both weapons, under the Oberco~.ndo der Wehrmcoht (Supreme COlIllJl[lIlder of the German Jl.rmed Forces), or OKW for short" (Macmillan, £E ill, p. 17§). **The term "ski-sites" was given to the launching plat form of the pilotless nircrC'.f't "because on ench site stood a number of buildings shaped like a ski laid on its side. The buildings seem to havo been meant to provide blast-proof shelter for the missiles While they were being stored and serviced" (Hill, £E cit, p. 5587). .. ~ . " .. . , ..- '- . - 33 - had been wrought, the enemy's reaction was to construct other sites '~hich'wcre more carefully hidden "~d harder to destroy" (Hill,2.P. cit, P. 5570). Thus although the Air Forces lesscnod~e-mcnace of the mora immedicte use of the 'secret' wcnpons~ the menace still existed and was a oeuse of considernblc concern to tho Allied Commanders.* 74. During the early days of the threat, apparent- ly the first official word on Germen rooket miesiles to reaoh the Canadian l~my came at the speeific request of General McNcughton to the British War Development Committee. On 24 Mer 43 the Committee sent General McNaughton a note which ste.ted thrt there vms .Iroason to suppose the.t the Germans may be developing n werpon I •. on the rocket principle .;; by whieh up to 10 tons of h~gh