- 25 - spread itself throughout the ports of the United Kingdom and, nlthough more congested on thd South Const, it was not confined to that area. (Ramsay, £E cit, p. 5110) 57. Although wireless traffic was restricted for those prepcring for the actual assault, it was left open purpoeely for those engaged in "FORTITUDE (SOUTH)". * It was planned to have some 270 dummy landing craft stationed at Yarmouth, Dover, Folkestone and other harbours opposite the Pas de Calais. To strengthen the belief in this 'threat', the Cover Plan laid dmvn that "naval wire­ less traffic proportionate to the number of [dummy] craft will be simulated in the ffiooring areas, appropriate l~my wireless traffic being linked to these flotillas as far as possible" (Cover and Diversionary Plans). 58. The naval diversion plens which were to be put into operation during the hours immediately prior to D Dey can be dealt with but briefly here. In general, the intention was to deceive the enemy through his radar screens rather than by direct attacks on the enemy coast. Three main naval diversions were planned in conjunction with the Air Force. The aim of each operation is given by the Cover Plan as follows: Seo Diversions Operation "BIGDRUM" The object of this diversion is to engage the enemy radar stations in the North of the Cherbourg Peninsula and to distrnct the enemy batteries in that aren. This div~sionnry opera­ tion will be carried out by a small force of M.Ls. Operation "T1JU~LE" The object of this diversion is to give *At this point it is worthwhile quoting a memorandum on Signals Security issued by H~, First Canadian Army, on 28 May: "It is known that the enemy's most prolific method of gaining information is by wireless interception and by wireless intelligence. He collates all intercepted wire­ less transmissions p~d cen, by the correlation of smnll details -- which by themselves have no significance -­ deduce information which is of the highest value to him. It is essential that we make it as difficult for the enemy as possible in this respect" ('V. D•• C.S.O. BranCh, H.~., First Canadian Army, May 1944, SIGS/9-7-1). 26 - greater breadth to the assault rorces and to show our intention of landing North of the Seine. The diversion will be linked with an eirborne diversion. Operation "GLIMMER" Plans will be made in order to carry out a similar diversion to "T:JL~LE" in the Pus de Calais exea should enemy mining permit and the enemy situation prove desirable. Of the possible ereas of attack it is considered that the Boulogne area will be most effective. (~) 59. To give bulk to the smell naval forces engaged in these operations, a considercble number of r.lr­ craft circling overhand I~ere to simul~te the renctions which a large convoy would produce in the enemy's coastal radar stations by dropping a specicl type of 'Window'* designed for this occcsion" (Herris, 2£ cit, p. 206). 60. The role of the f~lied military forces in the Cover Plan, although naturally more statio, supplomented that of the naval and air forces. \Vhile every effort was made to conceal the location and strength of the assaulting forces by stringent security measures, an open display of activity and numbers was made in the aree facing the Pes de C01018.** An elaborate wireless communication network was planned to commence operations from 24 ~pr. (Cover and Diversionary Ple~s) Each stction on this network would represent one of the vRrious formntions in the notlon~l forces, nnd the messages pessed would be typical of those passing between formntion hecdquerters. I",ide from the dummy lr.nding craft, "the signing of rands and speoial arees consistent with the story of the embark­ ation of the forod" was to be carried out in the Eastern and South Eastern Commands (Ibid). From mid-May onwards, "in order to show activity at:nrght in the areas where dummy craft are indieQted, night lighting installations simulating vehicle lights and beach lighting" were to be put into operetion (~). *This was the name given to bundles of metallized paper dropped f~om aircraft to oonfuse enemy radar stations. **" ... there were cnmps in East f~glia which might have bivouacked thouBcnds of treaps. f~tually they were deserted tent cities, given semblance of lite by enough men to keep the fires burning for German reconncissnnce pilots to photo­ graph" ((HS)956.011(Dl): Lt-Gen W.E. Smith, "Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions" (Part I), The Saturday Evening Post, p. 108). - 27 - 61. On the night of 5/6 "un, it was planned to assist the ir-vnsion forces by having aircraft drop explosive dummy parc.chutists, "together with mnchines which made noises like rifle fire and other sounds of battle, in order to ~,ko a diversion and cover the real airborne landings in the Normandy area" (Harris, 2E cit, p. 207). The whole of this simulated airborne attack was called Operntion "TIThNTIC", which in turn was divided into four sub-opera­ tions. "TITLNTIC I" wes concerned with simulating the dropping of one airborne division North of the Seine. Its objoct was "to retain enemy forces North of the Seine and to drc.w the enemy reserves South of the Seine to the North" (Cover and Diversionery Ple.ns). The object of "TITl.NTIC II" was Hto delay locel reserves immedintely Eest of the . River Dives from moving Westwerds" (Ibid). "TIT:.NTIC III", which was to teke plnce at the SQffi6 time as the drop of the 6th I~rborne Division, hed as its object the drewing "of c proportion of lecel counter-attack troops to the Southwest of Ceen" (Ibid). The object of "TIT:.NTIC IV" was "to drnw the enemy counter-att~ck forces in the cree. of St. 10 to the West" (Ibid). To strengthen the enemy's belief in wide-sprecd airborne operDtions, "TITi.NTIC I and IV" h~d inCluded in their drops three and two (respectively) p~rties of men from the Special ,ar Service. These nen were to "create minor d~'1ge to culverts and [to] attcck dispntch riders, lone vehicles, etc., allowing individual enemy to escape end thus confirm by personal contact the rumor of parntroop dropping" (Ibid). 62. The Cc.nadic.n Army pleyed a p~ssive, rather than an ective~ p~rt in the elaborate Cover Plan. The threat to the ~QS de Calais was given strength by the movement of 2nd Cancdinn Corps troops and elements of 2 Cdn Inf Div into the Kent area during ~pril and Mc¥. (W.D., "G" Branch, Main H.Q., 2 Cdn Corps, April 1944: Appx 105; W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q., 2 Cdn Inf Div, I..pril 1944: hppX 15) The training given these troops before and after D Day intimated their possible use in the <ituation which the 'story' of the Cover Plnn attempted to build up in the mind of the enemy. At the se~e time, the troops were close enough to their real concentrntion areas thnt when they received word to embark for Normandy, there would be a minimum of confusion. 63. To give weight to the story that the Canadians in Kent were pert of e British-American-Canadian assault force, Canadian signalmen, under the overall direction of c.s.a. First Cdn !~my were to be employed in carrying out the wireless part of 'fleshin up' the phantom army as described in the Cover Plan. A wireleEs network designed for this purpose was to commence op~rotlons on 24 Apr. (W.D., C.S.O. Branch, H.~. First Cdn Army. "une 1944: I.ppx 11, Operation "~UICKSILVER") Canadian s~g:lalmen were responsible only for the Ce.nadlc.n "f"rmy" forIlll'.tions in the Cover Plan'S story, but worked in conjunction with their British and I~ericr.n counterparts (Ibid). - 28 - (f) D Day. H Hour and Y Day 64. The great number of conflicting factors which had to be considered before D Day and H Hour were finally determined are outlined in A.H.~. Report No. 42. (See section on "Considerations of Timing and Weather"). In general the argument was waged by the Navy, l~my and Idr Force over their ~eparate considerations of time, weather, tides, daylight end dnrkness. Meanwhile, those who had the responsibility of planning for and administering the ass~ult forces while in the United Kingdom required some target date. On 5 Mar 44, therefore, the following instructions were issued~ 1. Since D Day for the operations is not yet definitely fixed, confusion may arise from the designation, with reference to D Day, of dates by which preparations or phases of planning are to be completed. It is olso in the interests of security to avoid n procedure Whereby the date of D Day may be compromised by being linked with preparations or measures the institution of which may be widely known. 2. The fixed date of 1 Jun 44 has therefore been selected and will be known as Y Day. Wherever possible reference will be made to dates by which preparations of phases of planning are to be instituted or completed in terms of Y Day, and not of D Day which itself will later be notified in terms of Y Day. ((HB) 969. (D22): G.S. Memo entitled "Institution of Y Day - Overlord," War Office to G.H.~. Home Forces, 5 Mar 44) 65. The selection of D Day* was Ultimately the responsibility of the Supreme Commander. His decision, naturally J would be based on the weather re quirements of the three services.