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lt OMAHA BEACH: A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS

by David P. Stanley

A Masters Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of New Jersey Institute of Technology and Rutgers University, Newark In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts in History

Federated History Department

August 2002

APPROVAL PAGE

OMAHA BEACH: A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS

David P. Stanley

Dr. Karl Schweizer, Ph.D. Professor and Chair of the History and Social Science Department, NJIT

ohn Fousek l 02N fessor of American Foreign Policy, Rutgers Newark

0 2. or. NormaInvfobia.-'s tAssociate Professor of History, NJIT Date BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Author: David Stanley

Degree: Masters Degree

Date: August 2002

Date of Birth:

Place of Birth:

Undergraduate and Graduate Education:

• Masters of Arts Degree in History New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, New Jersey and Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, 2002

• Bachelor of Arts Degree in History York College, York, Pennsylvania, 2000

Major: American History To those who fought and died on both sides of the beach.

May their struggle be not soon forgotten.

v ACKOWEGEME

I would like to express my deepest and most heartfelt thanks to Dr. Karl

Schweizer, who served to inspire and promote my enthusiasm for military history.

Dr. Schweizer not only acted as a mentor, but he also served to provide valuable insights

and strategies to help my writing. I owe a great debt of gratitude not only to

Dr. Schweizer, but also to Dr. John Fousek and Dr. Norman Tobias for their efforts on my behalf.

I would also like to thank Bob Stanley, my father and my primary editor. Without his support in providing a second perspective on my writing, the paper itself may have proceeded along a different path.

Finally, I would like to thank the archivists at the United States Army War

College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Without their assistance, most of the research for this paper would not have been possible.

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 THE BEACH, THE RAID AND THE PLANS 6

3 BATTLESHIPS AND BOMBERS 30

4 SWIMMING TANKS AND ENGINEERS 56

5 THE FIRST WAVE OF INFANTRY 78

6 CONCLUSION 96

7 BIBLIOGRAPHY 105

vii CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As the many landing craft carrying the men of Company A, from the 116 th Infantry

Regiment, slogged their way toward their objective on Omaha Beach on the early morning of June 6, 1944, the well-laid plans of the military command were already unraveling in the face of an assault that had hardly even begun. The men of Company A, like all of the other men who were to come ashore on Omaha Beach that day, had been told that the German defenses on the beach would be eliminated by both a heavy aerial as well as a precise and effective naval bombardment. In fact, to say that the aerial bombardment had been inaccurate in that it had no impact on the invasion would be more than an understatement, and the supposedly precise naval fire had not done its job in the time that it had been allocated.' As a result, the men of Company A came ashore under some of the most withering enemy fire of the entire D-Day operation. Within moments, the Company had suffered 66% casualties. 2

While the decimation of Company A was extreme even for the horror of Omaha

Beach, it reflected the situation that befell many of the men who waded ashore that day.

Why had the men come ashore under the false pretext that they would be facing little to no enemy resistance on the beaches? What had gone wrong to produce such high casualties amongst the assaulting infantry?

This thesis seeks to explain what it was that took place on the morning of June 6,

1944, during the initial assault on a small strip of sand, code-named Omaha Beach, along

1 2 the Normandy coastline. Many current authors have described the tragedy of the assault on Omaha Beach, yet few have attempted to explain why it was that the Americans suffered such grievous casualties, not at the hands of elite German troop resistance, but, in fact, at the hands of assault plans that were too rigid and too unbending in the face of challenges made by the weather and by the fact that the assault itself did not proceed as had been planned. The assault on Omaha Beach was a seemingly endless stream of mishaps and errors that were due to the rigidity of the schedule and also to conditions that had changed completely since the assault was planned.

It is not the intent of this author to explain the events that unfolded throughout the entire D-Day assault, but, rather, to explain what happened to the initial assault forces that landed on Omaha Beach. In order to do this, the thesis has been broken down into individual chapters that seek to explain particular phases of the initial assault, and what consequences these would have on the subsequent troops landings.

Chapter Two will explain, in brief, what the German military had done to prepare the French coast for the inevitable Cross-Channel invasion. This chapter will also discuss the failed raid on the French port of Dieppe in 1942 and the implications that it had on the planning of the invasion of Normandy. Finally, the chapter will explain the decision to invade at Normandy, and what the plans for the disastrous assault on Omaha Beach exactly were.

Chapter Three will delve into the role that the Allied Naval and Air Forces were to play at Omaha. Both services had particular objectives that needed to be completed by the time that the infantry waded ashore. What were these objectives, and were they carried out? 3

Chapter Four will explain the role and performance of the armored forces at

Omaha, while also explaining in smaller detail the role of the engineers who were given

the task of clearing the beach for the subsequent infantry assaults. Both the engineers and

the armored forces suffered heavily at Omaha. The question that is raised in this chapter

is why did they suffer so heavily, and what implications did their suffering have on the

infantry?

Chapter Five will discuss the assaulting infantry and the performances of the men who were brought ashore under the false pretense of a safe landing. These men suffered heavily due to the performances of the branches of the armed services that were discussed in the previous chapters. It was the infantry that bore the brunt of the German fire, and it was the heroism of the infantrymen that is remembered today.

The final chapter will be the Conclusion. This chapter will attempt to tie all of the previously outlined material together so that it has some semblance of logic. While there is no simple answer to why the assault on Omaha Beach went the way that it did, this thesis will hopefully dispel a certain amount of the myths and nationalist rhetoric that have come to surround this dreadful day. No one account of the events that took place on

Omaha Beach will satisfy all military historians and enthusiasts, but the present work will attempt to come as close as possible to creating a true sense of what happened during the initial assault on Omaha Beach.

Throughout this thesis, this author has chosen to draw heavily from source material that was found at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

From the archives at the War College were found records and battle orders from the time of the assault, as well as some from before the assault ever took place. Upon reading 4

other historians' sources for books written about the assault on Omaha Beach, it is clear

that the majority of the historians have not used any of the material that this author

uncovered at the War College. All too often, historians have tended to rely almost solely

on the personal accounts of the men who were present at the time of the invasion. While

these men's accounts of their own harrowing experiences are helpful when attempting to

explain the events that unfolded on Omaha Beach, they are not the sole source of

information. This author believes that the materials found at the War College provide this thesis with a fresh look at an event that many historians have chosen to study, yet few have taken the time to research to its fullest potential. 5

NOTES ON CHAPTER 1

1 COMIC - "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r Ch p 7[US Ar Wr Cll Crll A]

2 Mrrn Sl Ellt h Invn Of rn And Grn Edn Ctl 1957 p 13 CHAPTER 2

THE BEACH, THE RAID AND THE PLANS

Omaha Beach was the code-name given to the 7500 yards of sand that was to be assaulted in the early hours of June 6, I944. It was a beach that was backed by what are described as "sheer cliffs" in some places.' Where there were not sheer cliffs, there were areas where the terrain ascended steeply up to 100 feet in a short distance from the beach.

There were few natural exits off the beach, and those that did exist, the German defenders had blocked by means of concrete walls and anti-tank ditches. Any assaulting force would be hard pressed to find an easy exit off of Omaha Beach, not only due to the

German defenses, but also because of geographical features that made exiting the beach treacherous even under "normal" conditions.

Since December 1943, the German soldiers under the direct command of Field

Marshal Erwin Rommel had increased their efforts to make the French coastline defendable against an inevitable Allied assault, but only since the early Spring of I944, were their efforts truly increased. 2 Rommel, the commander who had suffered grievously at the hands of Allied airpower in North Africa, fully understood the potential that the

Allies had when it came to the inevitable invasion. He knew that it was up to him to strengthen Hitler's Atlantic Wall to the point where it could be utilized to resist the invasion at its weakest state—when the men were wading ashore. Rommel believed that if the Germans could throw the enemy back into the sea, "it would be a long time until they returned... ". 3 If the Germans could not immediately repel the enemy invasion

6 7 forces, Rommel knew all too well that once the Allies had established a secure foothold on the Continent, they would not be dislodged, and the end of the Third Reich would be at hand. 4

Hitler's dreaded, and even icon-like, Atlantic Wall was merely a myth created by

German propaganda. It was not, as the average German citizen imagined, a reinforced concrete wall that stretched from Norway to Southern France. In fact, all it was in reality was a series of concrete pillboxes and machinegun nests that stretched along the aforementioned coastline. It was in no way impregnable when Rommel inspected it in

December 1943. Indeed, after completion of the inspection, Rommel himself referred to the Wall as, "an enormous bluff'. 5 The Atlantic Wall was not a continuous line of defenses as Hitler and his propaganda ministers made it seem, but it was still an obstacle to be considered; one fortified especially around coastal ports where the Germans had solidified their positions to protect the vital access to the English Channel. 6

After his inspection of The Wall, in December 1943, Rommel was given command of Army Group B, which was comprised of two armies in France and the

Northern Countries. The majority of the men Rommel had at his disposal were not in prime physical shape, nor were their equipment and supplies adequate for the task at hand. Rommel lacked armored forces and sufficient artillery to attain his goal of throwing the enemy back into the sea. Even though he repeatedly petitioned Hitler for additional mobile forces, his requests were denied.

The French coast, or Western theatre, was not Hitler's priority. He was completely engrossed with the war against the Russians in the East. It was in the East that the majority of German manpower and supplies was going, and not to the static

Western Front. Even though the men who were manning the Atlantic Wall were not in the best shape, and they lacked fuel and sufficient equipment, these men were determined to fight on to stop the Allies.

The German plan for the defeat of the invasion was to stop the invasion fleet in the Channel and to smash the forces that made it ashore as they struggled on the beaches.' To do this, Rommel planned to use an assortment of obstacles and minest that would hinder landing craft from coming ashore. The obstacles could also be used to force men into small areas where they could be isolated and destroyed. Rommel knew that he needed to place mines and obstacles on the beaches in such a way that they would be effective regardless of the tidal conditions. His plan was to lay more mines per month than had been laid in the previous 3-1/2 year period prior to his taking command!

It was under these conditions of improved beaches that the Allies would eventually land on June 6, I944. Not all of the beaches were as well defended as others, and the beaches on the Pas-de-Calais region, which was the region where the German

High Command expected the invasion to come, were more heavily defended. Even though it was expected that the invasion would come in the North, the beaches of

Normandy on the Cotentin Peninsula were formidable.

The German defensive positions established on Omaha were not yet in the state of completion that Rommel would have liked once the Allies landed. Although they were not "complete", the defenses at Omaha Beach mounted the most weapons of any of the

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Each exit was heavily defended by German artillery and machineguns.14 The exit at Colleville was protected by two separate emplacements with a combined total of two

75mm guns, one 88mm gun, three 50mm anti-tank guns, two 50mm mortars, and five concrete emplaced machinegun nests. Each position had other machinegun emplacements that were not made of reinforced concrete, but were open to the air and placed in trenches. There was also an anti-tank ditch in place that would be used to slow down advancing armor so that it could be picked off by the guns from above.

Aside from the obstacles, there were German troops stationed at the defenses.

This is where one of the most over-exaggerated portions of the history of the assault on

Omaha begins. The men who were in place to defend Omaha belonged to the 352 nd

Division. They had been moved forward to the beach to aid in its defense in March of

1944. The French Resistance attempted, via carrier pigeons, to notify the Allies of this change in the defenses, but German soldiers shot the pigeons and the message was never received. 15 It was not until the soldiers began landing on Omaha that the American command had any idea that they were facing the 352 nd Division.

The 352nd Division has been referred to as an elite division, or a crack division.

According to author Samuel Mitcham, this was not the case. 16 It had been created seven months prior to the invasion. Yes, the men that made up its ranks had experience fighting in Russia, but the 35nd was created by combining two separate divisions which had been mauled in the East. The men were veterans, but they were veterans of a different type of warfare—warfare on the Russian front.

The men of the 35nd Division had been trained not in stationary coastal defense, but in counterattack. They were trained to quickly organize and repel an enemy force as I2 it moved inland. The Division was, according to British Intelligence, made up of

Russians and Poles, "and its morale was not regarded as of the highest." 17 This information came from an Armed Service report that was issued in August I945. A report issued in October 1944, by the Naval Commander-In-Chief, referred to the chaos on Omaha as being the responsibility of "first-class German troops... ". 18

One possible reason for the latter depiction of the 35nd as a more experienced

Division may be that the coastal defense battalion that was also manning the defenses was of lesser quality. Compared to these men, the men of the 35nd may have seemed significantly more elite, or well trained. It seems as though the 352 nd Division has become somewhat mythical in its qualities since D-Day. There is no doubt that the men who made up the Division were well-trained, and battle tested, but, to call them an elite, or crack, division is just not true. The fact that Allied Intelligence did not know that the

352nd waseven at Omaha is the more serious issue. 19 Since the men who came ashore did so under the impression that they would be facing a static infantry division, the 716 th, and not a static division that had been reinforced by a veteran division, it is of no surprise that there was utter confusion. Instead of admitting an intelligence error, the Allies have portrayed the 35nd as an elite Division that happened to appear at Omaha Beach a few days prior to the invasion. As explained earlier, this is not true! They had been in the

Omaha region for three months. Yes, they had reserves, and yes, they were a mobile

Division, but, no, they were not elite. They only became elite after they were made so by

Allied Intelligence and by the persistence of a myth that exists in most accounts of the assault on Omaha. 13

The German defenses that had been established were indeed formidable, but they were not as complete as Rommel had hoped, and the men who were responsible for their completion were running out of time in the Spring of 1944. To the Allied planners with whom the responsibility of planning the largest invasion in history lay, the appearance of

Field Marshal Rommel and his newly developed system of defense must have been daunting.

An amphibious assault launched against a fortified position is one of the most risky and dangerous operations that any military commander can be forced to deal with.

Since the Americans had joined the war against Germany, there had been four major amphibious assaults with American forces only taking place in large numbers in three of them. All of the previous amphibious operations were launched under different conditions than the Normandy invasion, and all but one were in the Mediterranean.

The only amphibious assault that took place out of the Mediterranean was the failed I942 raid on Dieppe, France. This raid was a tragedy of errors that cost the

Canadian military, subordinate to the British, extremely high casualties.

In August 1942, the British Chiefs of Staff developed a plan to quell the demands of both the Americans and the besieged Russian allies. The plan called for a 48-hour raid on the French coast. The goals of the raid were to alert the Germans to the threat of an invasion, forcing them to send troops from the East to the West, and most importantly, to provide a base of knowledge for the eventual Cross-Channel invasion of France. In reality, the raid served one purpose; it boosted the morale of the troops who were manning the Atlantic Wa11.21 14

The raid on Dieppe was planned by British General Montgomery who had been removed from the fighting in North Africa to plan the operation. Serving under the

British Army were forces of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. The Canadians made up the bulk of the raiding force, and would be given the task of destroying the German military installations around Dieppe. The British planners wanted to know for future reference if it would be possible to capture a well-defended French port. 22Winston

Churchill was rather nervous about the notion of sending a raiding party against a heavily defended position, but he was reassured by the successes of a few past British

Commando raids against smaller German installations.

The plan called for British Commandos to land on the flanks of the invasion force, where they would destroy the German batteries that had been set up to rake the approaches and beaches with heavy fire. The Canadian nd Division was then to land with the support of armor and to set about destroying other German emplacements.

In theory, this seemed like a sound plan; but in reality it was anything but sound.

The British Navy, out of fear of the still active German Navy and Luftwaffe, was unwilling to allow any vessels larger than a destroyer into the English Channel. This meant that the men who were assaulting the beaches of Dieppe would not have heavy fire support from large caliber naval guns. This factor would play a key role in leading to the disastrous outcome of the raid.

On the morning of August 19 th, the raid was launched. There were new British

Churchill tanks with snorkels that allowed them to operate in water, there were new landing craft that had been designed to carry the tanks in, there was naval support from destroyers and there were Allied fighters swarming overhead where they engaged 15

German planes in dramatic dogfights. None of these factors helped the men who landed on the beaches.

From the outset, the plans were ineffective. The specialized Churchill tanks were utterly useless under the conditions that they faced at Dieppe. The water-smoothed stones that made up the coastline prevented the tanks from gaining a grip as they struggled ashore. The tanks, which the men had been promised would knock out the

German machineguns, were a failure. Those tanks that made it ashore became penned up in small isolated areas between anti-tank obstacles. When the obstacles trapped them, the tanks became nothing more than large targets for the German gunners to shoot at. In the end, 28 tanks were lost either to accurate German fire or to foundering in the water.

After the raid, it was noted that tanks should not come ashore until enemy obstacles were cleared by either bombing or by naval fire. This decision played heavily into the planning for Omaha Beach. It was soon realized that there would be a need for specialized armor, or tanks with special aquatic capabilities. During the period between

Dieppe and Normandy, specialized armor was created. This will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

Of the 5000 men put ashore at Dieppe, 3500 were either killed or wounded, 90% of these being Canadian troops. The men who came ashore found the German defenses solidly emplaced and well armed. The naval forces that lingered off the shore were unable to provide fire support with any large caliber weaponry. The guns of the destroyers were simply too small to be used as the sole fire support for an invasion. An after action report issued by the British stated that, "Fire support must be provided by 1 hv nd d vl bbrdnt" h rprt n t tt tht ‡"h n

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One last major implication of the costly failure of Dieppe was the misuse of landing craft. Landing craft, whether they are carrying men, tanks, or artillery, cannot linger in the surf too long. They are large; they are slow; and they are perfect targets for enemy gunners who can systematically knock them out and cause utter confusion and mayhem at a landing sight. At Dieppe, the landing sites became clogged with large partially destroyed landing craft. According to the After Action Report, landing craft received the majority of the enemy fire, and accordingly suffered the greatest losses. It became clear to the military planners that large landing craft needed to deposit their troops or weapons as quickly as possible so that they did not become slow moving targets for German gunners.

So, what does a recap of the history of Dieppe have to do with the events that unfolded on Omaha Beach? Understanding the errors made at Dieppe helps to clarify the decisions that were made prior to the invasion, and most importantly, these examples of military mishaps are important when studying the similar errors made on Omaha.

The planning for the entire invasion began long before the possibility of an invasion was truly feasible. In December 1943, American General Dwight Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander9 of both the invasion and the subsequent campaign to rid Europe of Nazi oppression. Eisenhower utilized his managerial skills to meld together the British and American plans and different ideas for the perfect amphibious invasion. The British had led the planning for the amphibious operations in North Africa and Italy, and they preferred invasions that were based on tactical surprise. 3

Surprise was indeed important for an invasion of a well-defended position, and the British had, in the invasions earlier in the war, stressed the exploitation of darkness to

tt h pl tht th rr ld hv t hv d t hr fr th t b ftr 19 cover their movements. 31 Darkness was beneficial to an invasion force. Under the cover of darkness, it could approach an enemy shore and launch raids to knock out forward positions. Once the initial assaults had knocked out forward emplacements, the larger landings could begin.

To provide tactical surprise, the British did not use long naval bombardments that would make the target region well notified of imminent danger. The Americans, on the other hand, traditionally preferred the Pacific-style long- term naval bombardments that could last days. The problem with this strategy was that it would alert the enemy to the danger long before the invasion came. On the Pacific atolls and islands this was feasible since the Japanese soldiers were geographically isolated, but the Germans manning the

Atlantic Wall would have the benefit of having two separate Armies behind them that could be forewarned by the bombardment and brought forward to await the invasion forces.

Eventually, the Americans played a subordinate role to the British in the wartime amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, and they adopted nighttime tactics.

However, once planning for the invasion of Europe began, the British saw that the best bet would be a daylight invasion. According to a British War Cabinet report from July

1943, daylight was seen as most beneficial to the naval forces. The report stated that,

"the main assault should take place in daylight...in order to achieve the density of landing envisioned by the Army." It goes on to say that, "The initial landing should take place about three hours before high water in order to be able to land a reasonably sized supporting force on the first tide."32 20

It is important to remember that since the raid on Dieppe, lessons concerning close support and air bombardments had been learned and seen as necessary for a successful assault on the Atlantic Wall. As a result of these considerations, daylight was seen as vital for providing the naval and air forces with the visibility that they would need to provide maximum covering fire. Not only would an early morning invasion benefit the accuracy of the bombardments, but the timing would also allow for maximum usage of the tides throughout the day.

British General Montgomery, having learned much since the failure of Dieppe, recognized the need for American high-level bombers. The bombers could be used to destroy fixed emplacements as well as obstacles that littered the beaches. His strategy for the invasion that he was to command 33 would rely on American heavy daylight bombers.

By having the American Eighth Air Force at his disposal, Montgomery began to shift further and further from the traditional British amphibious doctrine. This is why the decision to invade during the early morning hours came to pass. Montgomery's plans were heavily reliant on the success of the bombers. The bombers were to clear the way for the following infantry and armor. If the bombers failed, the plans were significantly less feasible than ever before.

It was Montgomery's plans that dictated the D-Day invasion, but it was American resources that made the entire operation possible. The United States was to provide the daylight bombers that Montgomery's plans hinged upon. American General Omar

Bradley was given command of the American First United States Army, or FUSA, in

1943. It was FUSA, under Bradley's leadership, which would make the landings at

Normandy. I

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r dpl nflnd b Mntr nd rdl h bth thht tht Arn bombers would clear the way for the infantry and would shatter enemy resistance. It was under this false promise of the might of the American bombers that the two generals made their plans. They were promised a heavy aerial bombardment unlike any before, and they drew up their strategy accordingly.

General Gerow, Commander of the V Corps, was not overly impressed with

Montgomery's plan for the invasion. Gerow did not think that the American bombers would be able to sufficiently eliminate the German defenses. He voiced his opinions to

Bradley on numerous occasions, but in the end he was forced, due to his subservient position to Bradley, to tell his subordinates that he expected -ited casualties and complete success on Omaha. 37

Gerow also disagreed with Bradley over the number of troops that he could land during the assault. Gerow wished to land multiple divisions side by side so that in case the air and naval bombardments had failed, there would be sufficient numbers of men ashore. Bradley did not agree with Gerow's plan for landing two divisions, and instead he allowed V Corps to land the 1 t Infantry Division with one Regimental Combat Team,

(RCT), of the 29th Infantry. Bradley was more concerned with the post-landing campaigns than with the actual assault itself. He felt that the landings would be the easier part of the invasion, and therefore he wanted a quick landing that would facilitate a rapid linkup with the British, who would be landing on the left of Omaha. Gerow disagreed with Bradley's proposal, but he was forced to accept it, regardless of what he thought.‡ ‡

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§§ I btttd fr Infntr vn 24 beach and could not get off it, the reinforcing waves would become delayed in the quagmire of sunken landing craft and dead bodies.

It was decided, after much inter-service arguing, that the Navy would be responsible for the obstacles that lay in the high water mark while the Army engineers would destroy the obstacles in the low water mark. The Navy would bear the majority of the responsibilities: it would drench the beach with fire, clear the underwater mines and obstacles and provide the landing craft for the infantry to come ashore on. After the beach had been secured, the Army and Navy would work together to continue clearing the beach. They were to open 16 gaps in the beach that would each be 50 yards wide.

These gaps would allow for the landing craft to come ashore without the worry of mines or obstacles that could ground or sink them. 3

In April 1944, the Army created Provisional Engineer groups to assist in the

D-Day landings. These engineer groups would be responsible for the Army's obstacle removal duties during the landings. Their goal was to, "Clear, develop, organize, and operate the assault landing beaches to facilitate the rapid unloading of craft and movement of vehicles and supplies ashore." The tasks of the Naval and Army engineers were vital to the success of the operation. Their job was to clear lanes that would allow the infantry to land in an orderly manner, as Bradley so desired.

Gerow feared that the existence of obstacles would destroy any hope for a successful landing. He wanted the specialized armor to land under the cover of a longer naval and aerial bombardment at the designated H-Hour. Five minutes later, the engineers could land to begin their work. Finally, he desired the infantry to land thirty minutes behind the specialized armor. This gap in time would allow the engineers and 5

tanks to destroy the German obstacles and emplacements. 45 Gerow petitioned

Montgomery and Bradley to push the H-Hour back thirty minutes to allow more time for his plan to work. His plea was denied due to Montgomery's and Bradley's desires to see the aerial bombing executed as accurately as possible. A thirty-minute time difference would not only place the bombers in the dark where they would be less accurate, but it would require the men landing in the wrong tidal conditions. *** As the plan stood, the aerial bombing allowed for a twenty-five minute window of time before H-Hour. During this time, the Navy would shell the beach, and the tide would steadily begin its rise to the high water mark.

It is also important to note that under Bradley's plan, which did not allow much time between the landing of the armor and the engineers, the engineers alone could not fight off the Germans and successfully clear the sixteen desired lanes. This was asking too much of both the armored forces and the engineers. However, it is important to remember that Bradley made his decisions based on the notion that superior Allied airpower would eliminate the German obstacles and defenses to the point that the men coming ashore would do so under much less hostile conditions than if there had been no aerial bombing.

The final plans for the assault on Omaha relied on a rigid timetable. This timetable was made by men who did not seem to realize that battlefield conditions do not always follow the orders of the men who plan the battles. The timetable was fixed, and it did not allow for any of the inevitable "natural" conditions that surround a battle. The

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It was from England, where the Omaha Beach assault was planned, that the timetable for D-Day emerged. It read as follows:

1. H-Hour, which was soon after low tide, was set for 6:30 AM

2. From 5:50 until 6:27, the Allied Naval forces assembled off Omaha would

deliver a lethal barrage that would destroy the German obstacles, emplacements,

and will to fight.

3. At 6:00, over 400 bombers of all sizes ranging from heavy to light would drop

their payloads on the beaches to create holes in the obstacles, and destroy the

German defenders.

4. At 6:29, 64 amphibious tanks which had been launched out in the Channel,

would land and begin knocking out German defensive positions

5. At 6:30, 32 regular tanks and armored bulldozers would land on the beaches

and assist the amphibious tanks in clearing out the obstacles and German

defenders.

6. At 6:31, 8 companies of infantry from the 1 t I.D and the 29th I.D. would land

in 36 landing craft.

7. Finally, at 6:33, the engineers would land. They would then have twenty-

seven minutes to clear and mark the 16 desired lanes in the beach that would

allow the following infantry waves to come ashore unmolested by obstacles. 27

These plans, as mentioned earlier, relied on little interference from nature or from the

Germans. It is astounding that Bradley and Montgomery, two men of military merit and notoriety, would allow such rigid plans to dictate the invasion. General Gerow, who remained submissive to Bradley's plans, was never convinced that the assault on Omaha, as planned, would function properly. It is important to remember that it was Gerow who seemed to make the most accurate appraisals of the enemy situation and of the entire situation that awaited him and his V Corps men, for whom he shared a deep need to keep safe.

All of these well-laid plans were simply that; plans. They were not infallible nor were they perfect. The fact of the matter is that the American V Corps would be assaulting a well-prepared and well-defended enemy position. The Germans, under the keen eye of Field Marshal Rommel, had since December 1943 doubled, if not tripled, their efforts to repel the invading forces. Yet, the Atlantic Wall was in no way an impregnable defensive measure. It was constantly being undermined by the German

High Command and since 1943, the German Army in France had been steadily weakened by the demand for troops in the East, and all the while, the Allied Air Forces had set about a campaign of destroying the Luftwaffe and the transportation networks in France.

As a result, when the men landed on D-Day, they did so under conditions that were not in existence two years prior when the Canadians landed in tragedy on the doorsteps of the

Germans at Dieppe. Even though the men landed under significantly improved conditions than in Dieppe, the landings at Omaha were still fraught with disaster and military blunders that had devastating effects on the invasion forces.

OES O CAE 2

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AESIS A OMES

As first light approached on the morning of June 6, 1944, the massive allied naval armada steadily made its way toward the shores of Omaha Beach. The men aboard the transports nervously awaited a destiny that none of them could imagine. Some would live, some would not, but all would fight bravely. Onboard the warships: the heavy battlewagons, the cruisers, the destroyers, and the smaller boats that would serve as close support craft, the sailors awaited their own destinies. As they drew closer to the shore, the beach became visible for the first time. Omaha Beach was no longer simply a name, or a model beach laid out on a sand table—it was reality, and it lay before them.

The ships advanced in and began to line up in relation with their target areas. The guns of the fleet would bear a murderous fire that was to obliterate Omaha Beach. The men aboard the warships knew and trusted their boats. They believed that when they were done with the beach, nothing would be left standing. Once the firing stopped, the infantry could wade ashore, knowing that the Navy had done its job.

When it was still four miles off the shore, the Commander of the U.S.S. Carmick, a naval destroyer, made an announcement to his crew. Commander Robert 0. Beer knew the importance of this operation, and was pleased to be taking a part in it. He pressed the intercom and delivered a message to his crew. It was as follows, "Now hear this! This is probably going to be the biggest party you boys will ever go to—so let's all get out on the floor and dance!" 1

0 31

The men of the naval armada assembled off Omaha were confident, and they were excited to be taking part in the invasion. They truly believed that they would clear the way for the infantry, and through their actions, secure the safety of the men who were about to wade ashore.

Force "0" as it was called, was the Naval force that assembled off Omaha in the early morning hours of D-Day. It was commanded by American Rear Admiral John

Lesslie Hall, who was given the responsibility of leading the Naval force that was to both bombard Omaha Beach and ferry the men and materiel onto the beach. Force "0" consisted of two American battleships, the Arkansas and the Texas, the British Light cruiser, Glasgow, the French cruisers, Montcalm and Georges Leygues, and eight

American and three British destroyers. Accompanying these larger warships were numerous landing craft that were carrying artillery pieces, as well as ships that were equipped with rockets.

As the naval convoy, which consisted of warships and transports, made its way across the English Channel, many of the ships became confused in the darkness and lost their way. This led to delays in ships arriving at their designated positions, and caused significant confusion. The majority of the warships whose fire support was so vital to the invasion made it to their designated sectors ahead of the landing craft, and therefore ahead of the delays.

The beach was broken down into two sections: the eastern and western sectors.

Each sector had been allocated to ships that would then fire from their appropriate section. At around 2:20 in the morning, the warships arrived and began to divide the beach. 3 The western task force was led by the H.M.S. Glasgow and was followed by the 2

U.S.S. Texas. The eastern task force was led by the U.S.S. Arkansas†and the French light cruisers Montcalm and Georges Leygues. The numerous destroyers established themselves in a firing line that stretched across the beach from east to west. Many of these destroyers would later serve one of the most important and memorable roles in the invasion.

The firepower assembled off Omaha was formidable, yet it was nowhere near the intensity that would have been mobilized by the Americans in the Pacific. Even though there were only two battleships in the waters off Omaha, that figure had been increased since the initial plans were made. Initially there were to be only two American battleships available for the two American beaches. This would not have been enough firepower, and General Bradley himself said that, "I would gladly have swapped a dozen

B-17's for each 12-inch gun I could wrangle." 4

The goal of the naval bombardment was to eliminate enemy guns that could threaten the fleet and to clear the beach of obstacles. The D-Day planners did not want to risk losing their ships to the well dug in German guns, so they made these guns the priority for the battleships. Even if the enemy guns could not be destroyed, it was hoped by the drafters of the Joint Fire Plan that the guns could at least be silenced temporarily. 5

The naval planners understood that counterbattery fire would not necessarily destroy the enemy guns, but their hope was to bombard the installations into submission. 6

The actual Naval Bombardment Plan that was to be used on D-Day was as follows:

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1. Counterbattery fire, which was to begin at first light. This was the

bombardment that would be used to silence the enemy guns that could

threaten the fleet.

2. The attack on the beach defenses at H-20 minutes. This task would be

undertaken by the destroyers and close support craft armed with artillery

pieces, and when their counterbattery fire was complete, the cruisers and

battleships were to join in.

3. The final phase was that of close support fire when it was called in from men

on the beach. 7

The fear that the German batteries along the Normandy coast would sink or damage the Allied naval flotilla was real in the minds of the D-Day planners. As a result, it is easy to see that the main focus of the plans for the naval bombardment hinged on this factor. Yes, there were two battleships off Omaha on D-Day, but their primary job was not to use their heavy guns against the dug in German defenders or obstacle belts, but rather to eliminate the threat posed by the coastal guns.

Throughout the entire forty minute naval bombardment that had been seen as such a reassurance to the waiting infantrymen, only twenty minutes of it was to be spent on the beach defenses and obstacles. Twenty minutes seems hardly enough time to eliminate the majority of the enemy machineguns and mines, but that was all the time that was given. One of the main targets identified at the Conference On Landing Assaults for the pre-invasion naval bombardment, was the minefields or wire that could slow the infantry. It is hard to imagine that this short duration was all the time that was available 4 t plt th t bt n t rbr tht th dtrtn f th bh ld

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had been immediately knocked out, the warships could have then switched their fire to

the batteries protecting the coast.

Aside from the fire that was to be provided by the larger capital ships, there were

smaller close support ships off Omaha on D-Day. These smaller craft were to proceed

towards the shore much closer than the larger ships could. These craft were created as a

result of the failure at Dieppe. At Dieppe, there were no naval vessels that could come

close to shore and provide close fire support for the infantry. At Omaha, the planners hoped to utilize these shallow draft ships to a great effect against the enemy.

Since the battleships and cruisers were given the task of counterbattery fire for the majority of the pre-invasion bombardment, it was these smaller ships and the destroyers that would be firing on the beaches and obstacles. One of the new ships was the

LCT(R).§ These landing craft equipped with rockets were to serve a vital role in the obstacle clearance plan. Each ship carried 1064 rockets, and there were nine LCT(R)s at

Omaha on D-Day. The rockets were fired electronically, but they were aimed along with the entire ship—the direction that the ship pointed in, the rockets went." If the seas were pitching, or the ship was suddenly spun in the wrong direction, the rockets would not land in the target area. The rockets had a 3500-yard range, and could knock out enemy obstacles, mines and wire. On paper this seemed like a sound plan; a plan that could eliminate the need to have battleships or cruisers fire on the beaches themselves for too long.

1 A special task force of U.S. Army Rangers was given the job of scaling the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc on D- Day. After suffering heavy casualties, the Rangers discovered that the German guns that had been thought to have been there, were merely logs jutting out of concrete casemates. LCT(R) was simply the name given to Landing Craft Tanks with rocket firing abilities. 36

The rocket firing ships were to launch their payloads when the infantry was 300 yards from the shore. The destruction that they caused was to clear lanes for the landing craft, and to enable the men to wade ashore under safer conditions. Before the operation, it was thought that the LCT(R)s would have two and one half times the salvo power of one battleship. 1 While on paper this may have seemed so, in reality, it took hours to reload one rocket firing ship, while a battleship could fire another salvo in a matter of minutes.

Another shallow draft ship was the LCG(L). These ships carried two small naval guns and other small weapons. Their job was to linger on the flanks of the fleet where they would provide the close fire support that was deemed necessary. They were to fire on enemy emplacements and provide fire support that was called in from the beaches. Interestingly enough, it was thought that they could be beached to provide stable firing positions. This would have required the beach to be clear of enemy guns, and would have made the small caliber guns of the LCGs somewhat ineffective for long distance bombardments against targets situated inland.

There were other shallow draft ships on D-Day. Some carried anti-aircraft guns while others carried Army artillery or tanks. The ships carrying tanks ashore would use the tanks to fire as they were brought in to land. Therefore, even a simple landing craft would become a support ship. The main benefit of these smaller craft was that they had the ability to follow the landing craft that bore infantry to shore. From close range, they could fire on targets of opportunity and assist the infantry as if they were regular artillery pieces. 13

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These and all other shallow draft ships would provide close support and indirect fire support at Omaha. They, plus the larger warships, should have been able to force the

German defenders to keep their heads down long enough for the infantry to land safely.

Even with all of this naval fire, the plans for Omaha hinged on one other major factor, the aerial bombardment. From the outset, this was seen as vital to the success of the invasion. Like the naval forces, the air forces had specific plans for the invasion.

In the summer of 1940 through I942, the German Luftwaffe was a formidable force in Europe. The German fighters controlled the skies over France and Germany and wreaked havoc on the American daylight bombers that arrived in force in 1942. But, since then, the American Eighth and Ninth Air Forces had systematically dismantled the

Luftwaffe's fighting capabilities. The Luftwaffe, in 1944, was not even a shadow of what it had been during its heyday. Once the Luftwaffe had been broken, the Allied began a new phase of the Air War. They began to systematically isolate Normandy from the rest of the surrounding French countryside. Railroads, bridges, marshalling yards, radar sites and roadways had been bombed repeatedly leaving few roads available for travel. The few available roads would later be heavily monitored by Allied fighter planes that would swoop down upon unsuspecting German troops or vehicles. 14 Normandy had been completely isolated by June 1944, and the Luftwaffe had been powerless to stop it. 15

The American air forces in Europe were quite confident in their abilities. Their leaders were sure that airpower alone could bring Germany to its knees. While this was not true, the effective performance of the daylight bombers in isolating Normandy had given them much reason for confidence. General Montgomery, the overall commander of the Normandy invasion, whose plans relied heavily on the daylight bombers, felt that 38 th Ar nd Ar r r "ndpndnt" bt hd "n t" 16 Mntr blvd vr h n r nd rnd nt bn rn prtl t rn tthr n th bttlfld h h h rld n bbr n - flt tht th nfntr nd bbr ld r ll tthr ln th Ar r ndrtd tht t ndd t b prfnt n bth l r pprt nd t nrl bbn dt

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th h C tht hr h n ld ll n r tr n trt bt r nt prttd t tl t th pln rln vrhd h hd t ntt ntrl rft

n th tr tht ld thn p th ln 18 h pln ht nnd

nd t rltd n n d trt

h rl f l pprt rrft hd b prtnt n th ln lrnd

t pp Aftr pp t rlzd tht l r pprt fr fhtr nr bt ld nt b d th nl r pprt n n nvn19 h fhtr 39

could not, with their machineguns or cannon, keep enemy positions quiet; nor could they

eliminate the beach obstacles. The pilots who flew over the battlefield could bomb or

strafe targets of opportunity, but there was a need for heavy bombers to destroy the

majority of the beach defenses.

Prior to D-Day, it was seen that bombers and fighters could be utilized to destroy

or silence enemy coastal batteries. Though the bombers may not have been completely

accurate, they could use their high explosive bombs to stun and destroy concrete

emplacements, while at the same time providing smoke that would hinder the firing of

the guns. 20 This would eliminate the need to use naval vessels to spend precious time

firing on concrete blockhouses that supposedly held guns that could threaten the fleet. It was also realized that the bombers could not destroy all concrete emplacements that were

on the beaches. Again, the hope was that the high explosive bombs would stun or shock the positions into silence. It is surprising that even though the D-Day planners understood the -itations of the Air Force, the plans for Omaha relied heavily on the aerial bombardment. Even Air Marshall Tedder, the Air Commander-In-Chief, did not have full faith in the abilities of the airmen to bomb accurately enough to e-inate the beach defenses. 21

The plan called for 480 American heavy daylight bombers, the only "precision" bombers in the Allied arsenal, to drop their bombs starting at 200 yards off shore. From there, the waves of bombers would continue dropping bombs further and further inland, hopefully saturating the beach with high explosive bombs. The planes would drop 1285 tons of bombs on the beaches and I3 target areas.22 This was a plan that relied on 40

accuracy. In good daylight, the bombers probably could bomb relatively on target", but

in adverse conditions, when they had to rely on bombing by radar, their accuracy was

greatly diminished. 3

Even though it was known that the bombers might not be able to destroy all of the enemy obstacles and gun positions, the awaiting infantrymen were promised that the bombardment would eliminate the enemy. The American bombers, the B-17's, and the

B-24's, were well known, and their bomb capacities were well respected by the airmen and infantrymen. With these airplanes bombing on their side, the infantry had much less to worry about than had the bombers not been there at all.

The bombers, even if they did not destroy all of the enemy guns, would provide another vital role in the assault. They would crater the beach with holes for the men to seek cover in. The infantry had high expectations in the use of the bombers; the bombers would either destroy the German guns, force the defenders to keep their heads down, or the bombers would crater the beaches with holes useful for cover or concealment.

Both the aerial and naval plans were quite thorough, according to the majority of the strategists in the planning portion of the assault. It was a matter of seeing how the plans would stand up to the test of battlefield conditions which were often confused by the weather and by the smoke that lingered above and around a battle. On D-Day itself, the Allied planners who had spent such time and effort in attempting to provide the infantry with as easy a time spent on the beach, would be shocked to see that their well- laid plans had gone terribly awry.

†† S l rdl pln lld Oprtn Cbr fr th brt f rnd 4

The first major problem that emerged on D-Day was one over which not even

General Eisenhower or General Bradley had any control; it was not a problem that the men who were sailing aboard the multitude of warships, or flying high above in their heavy bombers could control. The problem was the weather.

The morning of June 6, 1944 was not a pleasant one. There was a westward wind that reached upwards of 15 knots off Omaha. This wind stirred the sea and created waves that reached three to four feet in height. There was cloud cover in some areas as low as

1000 feet, and in other areas as high as I0000 feet. 25

The rough seas caused significant discomfort amongst the infantrymen who began to assemble on the landing craft. The Allied ships that gathered off Omaha did so ten to eleven miles offshore where they would hopefully be out of the range of the dreaded guns of Pointe-du-Hoc.‡ ‡ They were far out of the range of the German guns, yet they were out far enough to cause a long, choppy ride ashore for the infantry. The men of the 1st I.D. and the 29th I.D. were aboard a multitude of Allied transports: the HMS Empire Anvil, the

HMS Empire Javelin, the USS Charles Carroll, the USS Henrico, the USS Samuel Chase, and the USS Thomas Jefferson. 26 Onboard the USS Ancon were Generals Gerow and

Huebner, who were anxiously awaiting the fates of their men. General Bradley and his staff waited aboard the USS Augusta for the invasion to begin.

The invasion that had been so well planned and so meticulously detailed and argued over was now out of the hands of any of these commanders. The fate of the infantrymen was in their own hands when they scrambled down the cargo nets and boarded their landing craft. The plans had been given to the officers, and the men were

11 h bttr f nt-d- d h fr n th nd f th plnnr tht t ndrd t b th t dnr bttr n rn 42

ll trnd All rdl Gr nd bnr ld d pr nd hp tht

vrthn nt rdn t pln

tn t nd thr l n th rnn th trnprt bld ffhr

n t prlll ln nd dtl bn nldn th n nt th lndn rft

h n ld pnd th nxt t nd n hlf t thr hr brd ll rpd

nd bbbn lndn rft h r rd t lt Oh h nd th r

nfdnt tht th v nd Ar r ld d thr prt t nr th ft f th n

n th bt

A th lndn rft rrn th n nd trl td thr trn t th rn n t hr th rld Otd f th frtn f trnprt th lndn rft

rld ntl 3 t hh t th rvd th rdr t trhtn t nd n 7 h lndn rft trhtnd t nt fv ln nd bn t thr trd n

nfrn nd nrtn ftr

At 355 n th rnn Gnrl rdl rlld bn nd b th nd f th bll brd th USS Augusta, S ppd th ht-nh n h rn

rbld t thr bttl ttn nd bn t prpr fr th n tn h nvl bbrdnt ld bn t 55 th n hd t b prprd n t t n frn n hdl

h nt n nn n Abrd ll f th rhp th rr th dtrr nd th l pprt rft th r bn t prpr fr thr dt h lrr rhp ll d thr trd thr ntndd frn ln l 5

rd ff hr It t hv bn n prv ht t th n rhp 4 transports and landing craft coming toward the shore, yet not all had gone according to plan.

The passage across the Channel had gone without interference from the German

Navy, or what remained of the German Navy. Yet, in the darkness, some transports had gotten lost. The blackout conditions that the fleet was forced to operate under caused confusion, and by first light not every ship was where it was supposed to be. Only the warships that were slated to fire on Omaha made it in ahead of the confusion, and in the right places. The fact that any ships made it to the correct locations at all is amazing.

Aside from the multitude of warships, there were transports, LCIs, LSTs towing the portable concrete ferries that would later allow for a rapid deployment of follow up forces in the days to come, and there were LCTs.§§ These ships all followed the warships, which were in turn following the minesweepers, whose job it was to secure a safe passage. It was a huge armada, yet it only represented one of the five invasion beaches.

Even with the confusion of the nighttime crossing, the warships and transports assembled off Omaha. At around 5:15, first light appeared, and the fleet which had made its way undetected towards the enemy was finally visible. The men of the German 35nd as well as the 716th, stared in disbelief at the array of ships that was presented before them. No one could believe that the Allies had this many ships. When Major Werner

Pluskat of the 352 nd called his headquarters to alert them to the invasion fleet, he was told that, "Nobody has that many ships!"9 Even though they were in shock, the Germans defending Omaha rallied and began moving into their concrete bunkers and gun positions. There may have been a huge invasion force coming towards them, but they were going to fight to halt it on the beach.

If r brd n f th nvn hp nd r ln t Oh

h ld th r nn rt-n-n n r fr lft nd n th fr rht ld th trn lff f nt-d- h r th bndr f th h nd th th pnt rr f "lft" nd "rht" th drptn f th

h hll n th th

At 53 th frt Grn fr nt th flt fr rt-n-n h

ll bttr thr pnd fr n th USS Arkansas. h bttr nd frn

lt n th Arkansas b vbl n th rl rnn lht A f nt ltr th dtrr n th tn f th bh ndr fr A th lht

prvd pttr rrft rd vrhd lln t th ptn f th bttr tht frd n th hp h pttr rrft rvd vtl rl n ntfn rhp f trt tht n b brd b n th bh 30 Wth th hlp f th

pttr rrft th bttr t rt-n-n r lnd b 55

At 55 th ffl trtn t fr th bbrdnt th hp pnd fr h

USS Texas frd n th lff f nt-d- nd th Montcalm ntnd t fr n

rt-n-n 31 h Texas nd th Arkansas frd thr bnd I 1-nh n 1

1-nh n nd 1 5-nh n thrht th bbrdnt 32 Onbrd th USS

Augusta, rdl nd h tff tffd ttn n thr r nd nxl td th

fft f th bbrdnt33 It tn t fr th ndr; th ld nt hlp thr n n n nd th ld nt ltr th pln n th r t n

tn

h hp f th flt r t fr ntnl n thr trt rdn t th fr pln hr t b fr n th bh ntl th frt lndn rft thd dn

CI—ndn Crft Infntr S—ndn Shp n C—ndn Crft n 45

trr ld n n th bh nd frd rnd ftr rnd t hnn

plnt nd thr dfn hl th CG nd thr ll rft ld n vn frthr nd pnhd th nrt plnt

h lrr hp th bttlhp nd rr ntnd thr ntrbttr fr

ntl tn ftr x h Arkansas trdd ht th th bttr t rt-n-n ntl tn

f x hn th Glasgow t hr pl 3 h Arkansas thn thd hr fr t th bh xt ldn trd Mln r thr ppd t b frdbl

trnpnt nd th Arkansas dtrd f Grn ptn

h Texas n th trn r rht d f th bh frd n nt-d- pttn th rnd n frnt f th rl lnt bttr r n f th nd nr

r t -b th blff nd ln th drdd n n nd fr ll Aftr nh t hd bn pnt n nt-d- th Texas trnd hr ttntn t th bh xt ldn t rvll-r-Mr r th Texas dd n hr bbrdnt b dtrr nd

CG h bth frd pn pllbx nd thr n Intrtnl nh t t th

xt tht th nfntr fd th t rdr fr f -

h lrr rhp pnt th jrt f th t frn n ptd trn pnt tht l bhnd th bh lvn th bbrdnt f th hnn nd pllbx t th dtrr nd CG th thr llr lbr n h ll lbr

n ln th th hv n f th bttlhp nd rr frd rnd ftr rnd t th nrt plnt In ft thr r dtrr fr n Oh thn

d n th rth bh 35

th l brvr t ld pbl fr n f th pllbx nd rnfrd nrt plnt t rn tndn ftr h rdr brr bt 46 th ft f th ttr tht th dd hr r rprt f lr nvl hll bnn ff th nrt plnt tht r thr ft th n pl ld nn

xpt frt-nt nvl brr t rdt h dfn?

h Grn n t f hh dd nt fr t t rnd lrl lnt thrht th bbrdnt A f frd b bt nt n Alld nvl vl tn pl n th bbrdnt ht 36 A rlt f thr ln th jrt f th

Grn n r nt ntd nd thrfr nt frd n ntl th ld ltr

h trrr n th ll pprhn lndn rft 37

In th fnl nt f th bbrdnt th hllfr rhd t p It

rnd th t tht th C( pnd fr th thnd f rt *** h hv nd tn v rtl hndrd th fftvn f th rt Sn th hp thlv r th n nd frn pltfr fr th rt th hv d th frn t fr ff trt Mn nbrd lndn rft hrd th rr f rt bn frd nd ndrd thlv l fr bn prvdd th h fr pprt In ft thr r rprt f th rt lndn vr th lff n th tr bfr th nd nd

vn nt th n h r ln hr 38 h rt hd bn frd t rl

t f fr f httn th dvnn nfntr nd f f n hd dtrd n f th r

ntnlnt r btl 39

Althh th rt fr nrt th n rl r btd b t; tht

ntl th t fft 40 h rt fr rtd h ld f dt tht ln

th th nd dt fr th nvl nd rl bbrdnt d vblt nd prpr trt dfntn nxt t pbl 41 h nvl rhp dd nt frn n

h tl t th rt r frd ht nlr It vn pbl tht th r frd t rnd 15 h ld hv vn th Grn plnt f t t prpr thlv 47 th Grn hn -r pprhd In ft th frd r hll t trt f

pprtnt n th n r hr hlpn t drt fr It prtnt t d th rl f th rl bbrdnt bfr ntnn n th th nvl tn t Oh

h thr n - hndrd th bbn f Oh h t h rt dr tht t vn tnbl t d t rl n hlpn th nfntr On th nht bfr th nvn ll Mthll th Cndr f th Ehth Ar r ddd tht th thr ndtn ld nt nbl h bbr r t bb fftvl n thr ptl bbht A rlt th r tld t bb v rdr nd d t th

nr f bbn b ntrnt t dl th dplnt nt r t t prvnt -drppn n th lndn rft 3 h bbr r r tld t dl th drp p t thrt nd fr hn thr rdr tld th t drp h pl ft tht pln trvln f hndrd l pr hr tld t dl drppn t bb thrt nd ftr t h rhd th trt ll nt drp t bb nr th trt r

A th n n th lndn rft ll d thr trd th hr th

ld hr th thndr rr f th rhp frn rnd ftr dvttn rnd t th

Grn h ld nd hr th rt th frd hll-bnt n dtrtn

Ovr ll f th n nd nfn thr nd l n thr It th nd f th r rd pprhn hr r hh-lvl bbr nd fhtr f ll nd h rr f thr nn t hv bn dfnn t l ln fr th pln r

bt t dtr nthn lft tndn n th bh th btl th n nd th

Grn dfndr

h hh-lvl bbr d thr trd Oh nd d t th ld

vr nd th tht brd th bh drppd thr bb b ntrnt th 48 dl t vd httn th flt r th n bl A rlt th plnnd bb rn tht

ppd t trt t rd ff hr nd prd nlnd fld h dld drp rltd n n bb httn th bh hr r rprt f bb lndn prd f thr l nhr" All f th bb lndd n th fld bhnd th bh 45 nd th

nl lt fr th rl bbrdnt tht Gnrl Mntr hd rld hvl n r f Sn th ntl bbr drppd thr pld f

nd bhnd th ntl plnnd trt r thr bb fll frthr nlnd thn drd

A rlt th flln v ntnd t drp frthr nd frthr nlnd ll th

hl rln n thr ntrnt nd th ft tht th prv pln hd drppd ff th r

h bbr hd nt dtrd r lnd th Grn n nr hd th

rtrd th bh h n ld lnd th f xtn "hdn pl" nd r frd t l t n th pn r rtr tht r th rlt f Grn rtllr fr

h bb hd fld t dtr n f th btl r plnt; ll tht th hd

nd t d rt r n nd tht ld t nfn nd nrt

nfr fr th rhp ptrlln ffhr Ardn t n rprt "th bbr [n

Oh] fld t fntn t ll" 46 A rprt bd n th fft f fr pprt n th

rth bh ttd tht th rl bbn nd t 13% f th pn dtrd thrht th ntr nvl nd rl bbrdnt nd tht th bbn d th

jrt f th dfndr t p hddn ftr th hd bn bbd 47 h t dffrnt nt f th f bbr t t dpl xtl h hlpfl th rl bbn ld hv bn n Oh 49

Mjr Wrnr lt f th Grn 35 nd hddld n h bnr n Oh thrht th nvl nd rl bbrdnt Whn th bbn hd tppd nd

-r pn h nd h n; h ld rnd n znt nd tht nt n

f h n nd nt n f h n hd bn dd b ll f th fr tht hd bn thrn t th Aftr th Grn nnr h ff th dt tht hd flln n th

nd hd ntd thr nbr nd d frtn th vd frrd nt ptn

h ll n th drll; th ld nt fr ntl th bt r pn th bh h

ld nt xp thr bttr t th rhp; th ld pl t ntl th nfntr

d thr r th pr-htd nd ll-dfndd bh

h pr-nvn bbrdnt ndd t -r; 3 n th rnn hr n rl hd d thrht th ntr bbrdnt h rhp hd hlld th

Grn n hl th bbr drppd tn f bb n nptn h bttlhp hd pnt t h t n dln th ntrbttr fr h nt th flt f th ndvdl ndr bt n th plnnn Yt t th t th plnnr blvd tht th n f nt-d- r prnt nd r nt bnt th rll r d th n bn n pl th ll hv dvttd th nvn flt bt th r nt thr nd thr l f fr hld hv vn th ft h hv nvl hlln nd th rt tt dd n t hv n tnbl fft n th bh; th pltl hrdd t n tht prvntd th ttr fr n

hr th r htn r hr th r lndn

h bbrdnt hd nt bn th t f hp fr n r hp ld hv ntd th lrd ld tr ff Oh h pln trth tht th bbrdnt t hrt rt nt nt nh t t rdt rnfrd 50 concrete bunkers and belt upon belt of obstacles. In hindsight, it is easy to point this out, but to the men who planned the timing of the assault, the timing seemed sound. It is hard to imagine that even though the plans called for a landing after low tide, the planners did not consider the length of the bombardment to be too short.

One of the reasons for the failures of the bombardment was the ammunition used by the warships. It was recommended in an after action report by the Allied Naval

Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bertram H. Ramsey, that high explosive shells should be used more widely in future operations. 9 It was realized that, "little or no material damage was done to casemated guns by cruiser fire..." This fact reflects the strength in design and construction of the German defenses. It was known long before D-Day that the defenses were sometimes three to six feet thick, and made of reinforced concrete. 5

Since the construction of the casemates was well understood, the naval warships should have been given more time to bombard them.

High explosive shells not only have a devastating effect on the object that they hit, but they have a demoralizing effect on the men inside of a target. A recommendation made after the battle suggests that oil bombs or rockets should be used to force the men out of the emplacements so that the high explosive rounds could do the most damage on them.51 Even with high explosive shells, it is doubtful though that the forty-minute barrage would have destroyed the enemy guns.

After the pre-invasion bombardment, the naval forces continued to fire at targets of opportunity that were presented by the infantry that were receiving a mauling at the hands of the unscathed German defenders. The destroyers and LCGs closed in as close to the beaches as possible to support the troops that were pinned down by the murderous fr At rnd 9 nt nt th nvn dtrr bn t l n n th bh t t th n h n brd th dtrr ld th nfntrn bn bln prt b Grn n nd rd b hnn fr h dtrr rd

n t th hr t fr n trt f pprtnt S bt tll rpd thr hll

n th btt bt nd t t ff 5

r h l prxt t th bh hp d t t rd ff th

hr h ld prvd l fr pprt t th n n th bh nd fr thr th dld th Grn nt-tn nd hnn On dtrr th USS Frankford,

ld t thn rd f th bh n vl l t vd rnnn rnd 53

h dtrr r bl t prvd th fr pprt fr th n tht th tn nd

rtllr tht nvr d t hr ld nt Gnnr ld t ntl pttr brvd pff f ndtn rtr r hnn nd thn th ld fr rnd ftr rnd t th trt S dtrr frd hndrd f rnd hl tn l

pprt rft Aftr th bttl t th dtrr tht rvd th jr ld fr thr r n - 5

h bttlhp nd rr l ntnd frn thrht th rnn hr ln-rn n frd nt nl n th bh bt l t trt fr nlnd tht hd bn

pttd b rrft h dtrd rd tht r bn d trnprttn hb fr Grn rnfrnt nd th ht Grn rtllr p tht r nlnd bt

r frn n th bh

CG th n hll drft vl fntnd ll ff Oh h r bl t prvd l fr pprt t th n h ndd t hh th ndd 2

prvnt h r rr nd pd th r n vtl t nd

l hn t th tt d t pp

h btl rrndn th bh rd hv n th lndn rft h lndn rft hr th f ln lrd b th nnr nd rlt th b nd n th tl btl r n b n r b bnhd p th th trff nd r pd ff b Grn n Aftr pp t d tht th lndn rft hld nt lnr t ln nr th bh d th btl bn lrd b th rt nd rl bbrdnt th hv bn th bt th trth tht t n lndn rft r n t th hnd f Grn nnr h pl td fr th t b tnld n th btl

h nvl nd rl prfrn n - vrd h rl bbrdnt

plt flr bt th pttr rrft r h pr-nvn nvl bbrdnt t hrt fr th nt f r tht ndd t b dn bt th fr

pprt drn th lndn t hlpfl t th nfntr h ln lrnd t

pp r plntd nd f f th rd hr r lrr rhp n pl nd thr r hll drft vl tht r bl t l n n th hr Stll l t pp th btl hd nt bn lrd nd th lndn rft nd n b jd n ll r hr th Grn ttll pd th t

tht th prfrn f th Alld nvl fr ff Oh plt flr ntr h lr dd thr bt n th t tht th hd nd ntnd t fr thr n ln th r ndd h ft f th ttr tht th pr-nvn bbrdnt t hrt t plh t l It flh f Mntr t thn tht th rhp ld nt nd ln t b th bbr ld dtr 53 the beaches. The American bombers were indeed the most precise bombers of the war, but they were still inaccurate, and the fact that they had to drop their bombs via instruments simply compounded the existing accuracy problems.

It was not only Montgomery who believed in the bombers. On D-Day, General

Bradley's assistant, Major Chester Hansen, who was aboard the Ancon with Bradley saw that there was not as heavy or effective naval fire as he would have expected. To explain this he wrote in his diary, "There is not as much Naval fire support, possibly because of our great air superiority and the bombardment by air of the enemy artillery positions." 55

The planners and leaders, as well as the infantrymen, believed in Montgomery's reliance on airpower to smash his way ashore. Unfortunately, the results of the bombing were not quite what Montgomery expected.

All of the sailors and airmen who fought at Omaha did their best to assist the infantry. Their help was well appreciated by the soldiers who received last minute morale boosters from seeing the big guns of the fleet firing on Omaha, or who saw the vast air armada closing in on the shores. What damage the pre-invasion bombardment actually did is hard to say, but it did help give the men, who were riding ashore in unseaworthy landing craft, the peace of mind that they needed to face a formidable enemy. 4

OES O CAE

1 n p 15 2 COMIC - "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r; n 19" Otbr 19 Ch p 1 Mrrn p 11 4 rdl p 5 p 1 6 prt C35A prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf p 5 Ibid. p 13 8 Cnfrn n ndn Alt [nt 977] p 1 COMIC - "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r Ch p• 5 0 Cnfrn n ndn Alt [nt 977] p 9 " p 19 2 Ibid. p 19 Cnfrn n ndn Alt [nt 977] p 1 4 rrt Gffr Wnd tr Yr nd 1993 p 97 Mth 6 p 35 Ibid. p 3 1 COMIC - "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r Ch 3 p. prt CC Grt rtn Cbnd Oprtn Cnd "Cbnd prt On h pp d" p 20 Cnfrn n ndn Alt [nt 977] p 2 p 1 22 Mrrn 1 2 rth 139 24 Cnfrn n ndn Alt [nt 977] p 1 2 prt C35A prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf p 57 26 p 1 2 Mrrn 1 28 rdl p 7 2 n p 17 prt C35A prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf p COMIC - "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r Ch p 5

2 ldrfld nd nd Mhl rhl - h Invn Of rnd Cnhhn A Sv blhn p 13 33 Mjr Chtr nn r ntr fr n 19 p 4 Mrrn p 1 prt 9 Ar Oprtnl rh Grp "Cprn f rth nd Arn Ar n tr f r Spprt nd t Efft" p 3 6 rvnl Ennr Spl rd Grp [Oprtn prt ptn- brr t n 19] 3 Sptbr 19 p t Wrrn nd hn Ctll nd rr h - Yr Mlln blhn 197 p 19 8 prt 9 Ar Oprtnl rh Grp "Cprn f rth nd Arn Ar n tr f r Spprt nd t Efft" p 5 h rprt r tn th "rrv" n th rprt bt th d hnt t th nr f th rt p 1 t Ctll nd h p 19 4 Al n t l d p 11 55

Mth 7 3 rth 1

Mth 7 5 rvnl Ennr Spl rd Grp [Oprtn prt ptn- brr t n 19] "prt C35A prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf p 7 Ar Oprtnl rh Grp prt 1 [Clt nd Efft f r Spprt n th rth h n rnd] Aprl 1 195 p 5 n 1 9 prt C35A prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf p 5° Cnfrn n ndn Alt [nt 977] p 51 prt C35A prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf p 5 Mrrn 13 53 ldrfld nd rhl 1 5 prt C35A prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf p 55 Mjr Chtr nn r ntr fr n 19 p CHAPTER 4

SWIMMING TANKS AND ENGINEERS

h xtn tn f C Cpn f th 71 st n ttln f th 3 rd Arrd Grp l ff th hr f Oh h n th rnn f n I9 It thr n t b lnhd nt th rd ff th bh h r t n tn nt prr t th lndn f th nfntr nd r t bn nn t n ptn tht th nvdn ldr ld dvn p th bh nd nt th tn tht l n th dtn

Onbrd h lndn rft r fr f th plzd plx rv tn

Whn th nl vn t lnh th frt tn ld prd dn th rp f th lndn rft nd nt th tr hr t nfltbl nv rt ld hpfll p t

flt

At 5 th nl vn t lnh th tn f C Cpn h lndn rft lrd thr rp nd n b n th plzd Shrn tn rbld frrd nt th hpp tr tht l ff Oh h Sn thr r fr tn n

h lndn rft th r ld th fr thr tn h f th prdn vhl n th bt nt nt th tr h ht t hv bn nh t n

n h h r nhr l bt t th t f th rtt nvn n htr On b n th tn f Cpn C ld nt th tr nd n b n th n bnth th

v A h tn ld bnth th rf f th tr th nxt n n ln nnd t

56 57

nn nd plhd ff th rp f th lndn rft nt th tr tht hd jt

lld p th prdn tn

tht th xpl n f hr n th prt f th tn r f

Cpn C f th 71 st ttln n ndrttnt t n tn fr Cpn C

d t t hr All r lt n th tr ff Oh nd rlt th n f th l th ntl Cbt f th 1 st vn hd lttl t n rrd pprt n thr lndn zn

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h pd f tn hl n th tr fr l pr hr 58 above the water line. It is therefore not difficult to see how the tanks of Company C were lost in waves that reached over four feet in height.

When the screen was inflated, the D.D. tank looked more like a loaf of bread than an armored vehicle. 3 It was the awkward appearance of the D.D. Tank that made it a shock to troops defending a beach that D.D. tanks landed on. The design for the D.D. tank was created by a Hungarian engineer named Nicholas Straussler. Though the

British Admiralty saw no redeeming features in Straussler's design, the D.D. tank was attractive to the British War Office, which wanted an amphibious shock weapon.

The D.D. tanks were to be used as close-support artillery, a job that the Sherman was not well suited for. 5 The Sherman tank was built for agility and mobility, unlike its

German counterparts, which were built for strength. The Sherman was much more lightly armed and armored than the German tanks in service in 1944 1 , yet it was the

Sherman tank that made up the backbone of the American and Allied tank forces, and therefore, it was the Sherman that was chosen to become an amphibious fighting vehicle.

The idea of a fully functioning armored tank that could "swim" out of the water, c-b onto the shore and begin to fire its main gun at enemy positions was indeed an attractive one. The D.D. tank was a regular M4 Sherman tank. It had all of the

Sherman's characteristics and armaments. Nothing was taken off or replaced to make the tank seaworthy. It could still fight as any other Sherman tank being used anywhere else in the Allied war. It was this fact that could make the D.D. tank invaluable during an

1. h Shrn tn hd 75 n n nd prttd b rr tht l thn " n th tht pl On Grn tn d n 19 th nzr I th nf r rrd n n nd hd rr tht 7 nh n t tht pl h Shrn n th fr r n n n n r t n n bt hr r rprt f rnd frd b Shrn tn bnn rht ff th frntl rr f r An rnd fr r ld l pr th rr f Shrn r ftn thn nt n th tn t nt nt fl 59

amphibious assault. Infantry that were pinned down on a hostile beach could benefit

greatly from the firepower that a tank could provide.

In essence, the D.D. tank was a weapon designed for surprise. It was merely an unassuming object as it slowly made its way to shore. It could easily be mistaken for a canvas boat, and not a tank. This factor could possibly lead defenders to ignore the tanks as they waded ashore. Another great benefit of swimming tanks was that they eliminated the need for large, slow-moving landing craft that would have to beach themselves under heavy enemy fire in order to unload their cargo of armored vehicles. The landing craft could stay far offshore, out of the range of enemy guns. This was not only efficient in saving lives, but also in saving resources.

Keeping slow moving landing craft far away from the sights of German gunners was one of the vital lessons learned after Dieppe. Along with saving landing craft came the lesson of using tanks adapted to perform while partially submerged. At Dieppe, the

British employed Churchill Tanks that had been fitted with snorkels to allow the engines to breathe while the body of the tank was partially submerged. These amphibious tanks seemed like a sound idea on the planning board, but in use at Dieppe they were an utter failure. The smooth stones that lined the invasion beaches did not allow for the tanks to attain traction, so therefore, many foundered in the surf. Those tanks that did make it ashore became penned up in the German obstacle belts. Once they were contained in one place, and unable to climb the bluffs off the beach, the tanks became sitting targets for the

Germans. As a result, 28 tanks were destroyed.

The Churchill tanks had been landed with the leading waves of infantry well before the German defenses had been silenced by the meager naval forces assembled that 60

day, or before the obstacles that littered the beach had been cleared. As a result, it was later recommended that, " unless overwhelming fire support is available, tanks should not be landed until defenses have been captured and obstacles cleared."' Amphibious tanks should be used to assist the infantry, just as the infantry should be used to assist the tanks.

Armor and infantry work well together in a symbiotic relationship, yet when stacked against one another, it is hard to say which had the advantage.

While the amphibious Churchill tank was indeed a right step in the direction of building an amphibious armored shock weapon, more research and new ideas were needed before amphibious tanks could be used again. One of the new creations available after Dieppe were the specialized tanks created by the British. The British saw a need for tanks that would be able to swim ashore and perform a multitude of roles such as acting as bulldozers, mine destroyers, flamethrowers and as regular fighting vehicles. The specialized tanks became known as "Hobart's Funnies", and were named after General

Percy Hobart of the British 79 th Armored Division. The new D.D. tank was one of

"Hobart's Funnies", and would replace the snorkel tanks used at Dieppe.

As both the American and British planners struggled to develop sound plans for their invasion beaches, the British decided to utilize the new D.D. tanks in the first waves of the assault. They felt that the tanks would serve as shock weapons that could both surprise and destroy the enemy.

As time went on and the plans for the individual beaches came closer to completion, it was clear that on the beach code-named Omaha, there would indeed be

D.D. tanks in the first waves of the assault. Not only would the tanks swim ashore to 1 dl th n dfn bt l ld b ldd brd C nd ld rv

n pltfr tht ld t th v th th pr-nvn bbrdnt

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th th n tn tht ld hr prdn th nfntr A Cpn f bth bttln ld b lndd fr C n th bh tht th r nd t

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ld b brht hr n d nd E Grn t -r th th nfntr In th

tr vn t th 7I st nd C Cpn r t lnd fv nt prr t th 62 infantry on beaches Easy Red and Fox Green, while A Company tanks would be brought ashore at H-Hour. 1

That was the plan for the armored forces on D-Day. On the actual day of the invasion, events transpired which completely altered the well-laid plans of the First

United States Army and the V Corps commanders. Even though he was forced to go along with the plans for the invasion, Force "0" Naval Commander-In-Chief, Rear

Admiral Hall, was wary of using D.D. tanks in the first waves of assaulting troops. He feared the presence of well dug in troops and obstacles, and the impact that these two factors might have on the tanks. 11 While he had not choice but to go along with his orders, Admiral Hall's fears became realities on D-Day.

The armored forces that were to land on Omaha would do so under the pretense that enemy obstacles would have been cleared by the aerial bombardment along with the naval barrage. The armored forces understood the fact that if they landed on a beach that was littered with anti-tank obstacles, and defended by high-velocity anti-tank guns, their losses would be high.

The role that the amphibious and regular tanks would play during the assault would be vital to the success of the operation, and vital in assisting the infantry. The tanks had to make it ashore, or the soldiers struggling on the beaches would have been faced with an even more murderous fire than had the tanks been there and been able to knock out the German machineguns and other light weapons.

Along with the armored forces, the engineers were to play another vital role in the assault on Omaha. The engineers, from the Army and Navy, had the task of removing the dreaded obstacles that would be left standing after Montgomery's heavy aerial 3 bbrdnt h rl tht th nnr r t pl rl t th f th

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n -"1 64

To counter the ESBs complaints that they did not wish to be ashore when all hell

was breaking loose, and that the Navy should clear the underwater obstacles, it is

appropriate to note that, according to Army Engineer doctrine, the engineers were

responsible for clearing all obstacles and minefields that impeded the movement of the

division they represented. Due to this matter of Army doctrine, the ESBs were indeed

chosen to clear obstacles in the first waves of assaulting infantry. As a result of the

newly acquired duties that the Army Engineers had to undertake, it was seen that the

plans for Omaha were too large for such a small force. In March 1944, the Provisional

Engineer Special Brigade Group was formed to maintain control of the two ESBs that

would go ashore on D-Day. 15

In the end, it was decided that the Naval Engineers would be subordinate to the

Army Engineers. The Naval Beach Battalions, or NBBs, had served under the Army in

North Africa. They had experience in landing and clearing lanes, but they were not large

enough to handle the entire scenario on Omaha Beach. 16 It was decided that the NBBs

would be responsible for the creation and transport of the floating Mulberry Harbors, and

for the clearance of underwater obstacles up to the high water mark. 17 The ESBs would be responsible for clearing the mines and obstacles after the high water mark and in

assisting the Navy in clearing the beaches once the beaches themselves were secure. 18

The two services were to work together and assist one another whenever necessary.

According to a field order issued by the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade, in

May 1944, their duty on D-Day was to, "support the assault landings...and organize and operate all shore installations necessary for debarkation, supply, evacuation, and local

security on order to assure the continuous movement of personnel... across the beach."19 65

The ESBs would do their duty to support the infantry landings, and would, during the

landing phase, come ashore attached to specific infantry units. Once ashore, they would

detach from the infantry and set about their tasks of clearing the beaches and establishing

transport and supply stations. 20

Once ashore, the ESBs would destroy the obstacles and then perform another vital

task; they would clear and open up the beach exits. Opening beach exits was a major

objective of the D-Day assault. The Germans had blocked off some exits, while leaving

others partially open, but well defended by concrete walls, anti-tank ditches, and any

other means that would halt the invading troops on the beaches. The ESBs were needed to open these exits so that the infantry and armor could then advance inland and begin pushing the Germany Army ever farther back.

The Army Engineers that would go ashore were the 5 th Engineer Special Brigade, the 6th Engineer Special Brigade and the 11 th Port, which were troops that would assist in unloading men and vehicles off of the floating docks that the Navy had constructed. The

NBBs would serve under the ESBs with the 6 th NBB serving under the 5 th ESB and the

7th NBB serving under the 6 th ESB.21 These engineer groups were trained in combat, but their experience and skills lay in engineering. They would come ashore with trucks, cranes, bulldozers and tractors; they would carry shovels and demolition devices that would be used to clear obstacles. They could fight if necessary, but their task on Omaha was to clear the remaining obstacles that had been left standing.

These men all knew their duties, and all felt secure in knowing that they would be going ashore a few minutes after the infantry and armor landed, and well after the naval and air forces had obliterated the German defenses and obstacles. As with the plans for th rrd fr th t ld b hd b h dffrnt th ndtn r n

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h tn f A nd Cpn nt nt tn n th hr

h tn prd t vr th bh d-nd E d nd x Grn nr dd th bn lndn thn th Grn bn t thr nt-tn n t dtr th tn h fr bt tn f nfntr h lndd n E d r xd rp f

n fr th 1th nd 1Ith Infntr h n h lndd n x Grn r l

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A tn dzr tn dfd th blldzr bld h prp f th tn dzr t t th rlr blldzr n th bh n rvn btl nd lrn ln thrh nfld 68

ndr hv fr th trd t lr t th E-1 nd E-3 dr tht ld ff th bh nd p th blff

th n rtllr nd n t hv tll n th tn h ttrd

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n nd rtllr p t thr dpl h n l pt n f th f tn tht hd nd t lnd t f tn

In th tn f th bh dtnd fr th 1 th C nd th 71 t n ttln th f tn plt flr h dn t lnh th tn n pt f th thr nd ndtn d nnr lt nt th tnr d

h "dr" r dntd b lttr t nd th th n f th bh th ld ff h E-3 dr hh ld p th blff n x Grn prttd b bth 75 nd n h n nfldd th bh nd d nr lt 69

ll f th tn bn lndd l th f C 57 th rrd ttn n E d nd x Grn ht hv bn t dffrnt

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nt th nrhn

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rtn tht th t ld hv ffrd th ft f th tn f th 71 st h rrh rprt "Arr In Oprtn ptn" nld tht "h frr dn f tn dd nt v th rthn" 33

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Athr Mx tn n h b Ovrlrd pl tht hd th Arn

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d th ft rn tht rr n Oh n trt fr Grn nnr

Wthn nt f th nvn Gnrl rdl n tht fr ll ntnt nd prp th tn hd bn flr tt tht "Or trp hd nt t lndd nd lrd t rtl pprt fr th lt hd brn dn" 37 h thr flr tht rdl rfrrd t tht f th rl bbrdnt hh hd lft Oh

h nthd It t hv bn trrbl fr th n h rpnbl fr 72

many lives to see the plans that he and his subordinates had labored over for so long

come unraveled right in front of him.

Not only did the armored forces suffer losses on D-Day. The engineers, whose jobs were so vital to the assault, also took heavy casualties. They, unlike the crews of the

D.D. tanks, did not suffer due to the decisions made by officers far off shore, but rather,

they suffered alongside the infantrymen who landed and met a wall of enemy fire.

The engineers were to land at H+3 minutes after the initial landing. They were

then to clear sixteen gaps in the obstacles. No later than H+8 minutes, eight support

teams and two command teams were to land to assist the initial engineers with their

duties. 3 Along with the engineers, tank dozers and tractors would be landed alongside

the regular tanks. These heavy vehicles would be used to push aside obstacles, clear minefields or even bury the embrasures in the fronts of pillboxes.

The weather that had caused rough seas that swamped D.D. tanks also caused the

landing craft that carried the infantry and engineers ashore to steer off course. Coupled with a lack of visual recognition of landmarks that had been obscured by the clouds and the smoke on the beach, many landing craft touched down far away from where they were scheduled to land.

It did not take long for utter confusion to break out amongst the landing craft flotilla. The engineers were relatively lightly armed and not trained to act as primary fighting men. Therefore, they were scheduled to land a few minutes after the infantry, and since their tasks were seen as vital to the success of the assault, they were spread out and not in complete units in order to avoid losing a complete unit to an enemy shell.39

The gap in the time of the landing would give the infantrymen time to work with the 73

tanks to knock out the defenses before the engineers landed. What really happened was

the worst nightmare of the ESB leaders who had so vehemently argued against their

troops touching down during the initial assault.

The confusion of the landings led to the Gap Assault Teams, the initial engineers who were to land and blow gaps in the obstacles, to embark five minutes before the infantry. The Gap Assault Teams that did not land before the infantry became mixed in with their assault, and did not come ashore in the order that had been planned.

As the landing craft neared the shore, the Germans opened fire with artillery and mortars. When the ramps were lowered and the men prepared to exit the landing craft, murderous machinegun fire, joined by more artillery and mortar fire, erupted. Of sixteen

LCMs, Landing Craft Mechanized, that carried the Gap Assault Teams ashore, shells hit eight of them. 1 One of the Gap Assault Teams, which was the first to land, did so on

Easy Red well in advance of the infantry, and as the men prepared to exit the vehicle, a shell struck and killed most of the NBB team that was aboard.

Along with the inaccuracy of the landings, the engineers had to deal with heavy fire and infantrymen who saw the obstacles not as devices employed to harm them, but as structures they could hide behind. This factor, plus the heavy casualties that caused many engineer teams to be low on men and equipment, resulted in most teams only blowing partial gaps in the obstacles. The engineers were Army and Navy men, and they could not force themselves to threaten or remove the infantry who were huddled behind the obstacles. The longer they waited, the higher the tide rose, and at one foot every ten minutes, any delay would result in more and more obstacles being covered by water. 74

On Easy Red, one team, after seeing that all of the infantry was gone from behind the obstacles, set about the laborious process of rigging the obstacles for demolition, while under heavy fire. With the vital gap in the obstacles wired to blow, the engineers were ready to detonate it when a German mortar round struck the primacord, and set off the explosives prematurely. The ensuing blast killed ten engineers, wounded nine more, and did great damage to the infantrymen who lay huddled nearby. 43

Stories such as this were not uncommon for the engineers on D-Day. The problem was that they were forced to work under adverse conditions that they had not expected. Another problem was that the landing craft they rode ashore in were loaded down with TNT and other demolition material. When these craft struck mines, or were hit by enemy shells, what could have been a small explosion became a catastrophic blast that more often or not wiped out entire Gap Teams." One account of the artillery fire that the engineers faced stated that it was, "unbelievably accurate...Not a shell was wasted getting the range. Each was a direct hit." 45

The armored bulldozers the engineers expected to assist in obstacle clearance were, for the most part, nonexistent. Many were sitting at the bottom of the Channel, and those that did land were immediately picked off by German gunners. The engineers had only themselves to rely on, and the majority of them were scattered and wounded.

The support wave of engineers which was to land no later than H+8 minutes was also scattered by the sea and by the enemy fire that rained on them. The tide pushed most of the supporting teams farther east, and they landed scattered in groups somewhere between 6:40 and 7:45 in the morning. 46 The command groups that were scheduled to 75

land with the supporting waves were also delayed by the smoke that hid the beaches and by enemy fire. They too landed in the wrong places and at the wrong times.

By 7:00, the time that the follow up wave of infantry was to land, only five small gaps out of sixteen planned gaps had been cleared. These gaps were not properly marked, and therefore served little function in guiding the supporting landing craft to shore safely. This was not the fault of the engineers. They had done their best to clear and mark lanes while at the same time trying not to get killed, or force the infantry who were desperately seeking cover from the enemy, out into the open where they faced certain danger. The chaos on the beach led a 7 th NBB beachmaster to order a temporary halt to the landing of troops in the sector designated for the 29 th I.D. 47 Heavy casualties, wrecked vehicles and landing craft littered the beach and made further landings impossible until room could be made.

As the morning went on and the battle raged, many engineers were forced to fight with the infantry to keep themselves alive. While this was not part of the ESB doctrine, it was part of the bond of soldiers; these men of different services and professions chose to fight together to save one another.

All in all, the Army and Navy engineers suffered 4I% casualties in the first assault on Omaha. This is a truly tragic figure largely due to the heavy fire that the engineers faced. Like the crews of the tanks, the engineers pressed on even when the situation seemed hopeless, but through their hard work and sacrifice, the follow up waves were able to land bit by bit, and were ultimately able to secure Omaha Beach. 76

NOTES ON CHAPTER 4

1 h bv nfrtn fr US Ar Wr Cll A rh prt prprd b Ctt 1 Offr Advnd Cr h Arrd Shl "Arr In Oprtn ptn (Etblhnt Of h rnd hhd" M 199 p 79-

2 Chrtphr d An Illtrtd Gd Wrld Wr II n And htn hl Yr Ar blhn 191 p 1

Gn nthn Sprhdn - Arn Spl Unt In rnd r tr Clltn 1999 p 159

4 rth p 1

ldrfld nd rhl p 9 6 "Cbnd prt n th pp d" Ibd p 5 8 Abr Stphn - Yr Sn nd Shtr 199 p 5

"Arr In Oprtn ptn (Etblhnt Of h rnd hhd"p 77

1° Ibd. p 13-13 11 "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r n 19" Ch p 2 p 195 Ibd. p 195 4 Ibid. p 19 Gn p 5 6 Ibid. p 7 drtr O EG S IG GOU [ld Ordr 3] p 1 8 p 19 drtr O EG S IG GOU [ld Ordr 3] p 1 ° /bid. p 2 Gn 22 rvnl Ennr Spl rd Grp [Oprtn prt ptn Oh h- br- n 19] 3 Sptbr 19 p 1 2 "Arr In Oprtn ptn (Etblhnt Of h rnd hhd"p 79 24 Gn p 1 2 "Arr In Oprtn ptn (Etblhnt Of h rnd hhd"p 79 Ibd p 2 Ibid. p 3 28 [Oprtn prt ptn Oh h- brr- n 19] 3 2 rth p 1 "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r n 19" Ch p "Arr In Oprtn ptn (Etblhnt Of h rnd hhd" p 79-

2 prt C 35A prt b h Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf "Expdtnr r n Oprtn ptn" Otbr 19 p 5

rh prt Arrd Shl p 11 4 "Cprn f rth nd Arn Ar n rnd n tr f r Spprt nd t Efft" p 9 77

35 Ibd. p 3 tn Mx Ovrlrd Yr Sn nd Shtr p 9 37 rdl p 3 [Oprtn prt ptn Oh h- brr- n 19] p 39 Gn p 3 [Oprtn prt ptn Oh h- brr- n 19] p 3 1 Ibd. p "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r n 19" Ch p 7 4 Ibid. p 5 p 3 5 [Oprtn prt ptn Oh h- brr- n 19] p 9-95 46 Ibid. p 5 7 Gn p 37 CAE

E IS WAE O IAY

h flln xrpt fr th rttn ttn f ndlph A Gnn 1 t

ttln Cpn f th 11 th ntl Cbt 1

"W hd ttn t thn pprxtl 5 ft f th bh hn hnn brt trtd httn r bt W ntnd n fr nthr 1 ft nd thn th rp drppd nd t jpd ft ld nd drppd flt ld nt ft r f tr tht hn n th th td At lt "" Cpn n r ht n f th d bdd MArtr h ht nd flndrn rnd nd rn t fr t nd hlp h A h I ntd t I b vn St rn frt d b h ln nxt t ht thrh th rht rt MArtr drnd bfr nn ld t t h th f th Enlh Slr l drpd vr th d f r ndn Crft nd th t hd bn lld b hnn fr h f tht t t f th ndn Crft nd drppd n th tr ldnt v b f th ntnt rzn fr fr th pllbx t th ft f th rvll r"

ndlph Gnn nd th n f h lndn rft hd lndd n th bh d- nd Grn h hd lndd n frnt f th dr tht ld t th tn f rvll-

r-Mr h prtlr tn f Oh h f th rt rn f th

ntr rnd lndn h n f Cpn ln th th thr n f th 11 th

C f th 9th I.., nd th 1th C f th 1t I hd lndd tht rnn ndr th fl prptn tht th bh hd bn bltrtd b th pr-nvn bbrdnt

h l blvd tht th phb tn hd lndd n nt bfr th thlv thd dn Whn th nfntr f th frt v lndd th r nt

8 79

rtd b bh tht hd bn dtd b hv fr bt n ft n f th lndd n bh tht rtd th th hv fr

h plnnr hd brn dn Oh h nt llr ndvdl bh tht th t C f th 1 st I * ld lnd thn lrl dfnd brrr h ntl lndn nvlvd pprxtl 15 n h r t th dn t +1 nt

(312 h t C hd bn nd tr f th bh nd bth C hd

pf l fr - h 1th C t dvn frrd nd ntn ntt

th th rth n thr lft th trn tn f th bh hl th 11 th t dvn nlnd nd ntn ntt th th Arn lndn n Uth h t th rht n th trn tn 3

h 11th C t lnd n th rht d f Oh t th bh d-nd

Grn Wht d nd E Grn th rht f Grn

Chrl h r pn f th nd nr ttln t lnd h Ith C vn th bh E d x Grn nd x d t lnd n x d t rn pn n - th n n lndn n t bt th bh tlf fll ndr th

ntrl f th 1th 4

Eh rntl frnt f th bh l t 3 rd ln nd th pln

lld fr h lndn rft t hr thn 5 rd f t nd pt h pln rld n nrl ndtn nd n dfn tht ld b ntv nt t drpt th lndn rft th ld trd th bh A h lrd bn ttd th thr n - nt tbl fr rd pln; nthr r th tn Grn

h 1 t I d th lndn n - th n C f th 9 th I Evn thh th 9 th lndd t fll ndr th prvnl ldrhp f th 1 St I 80 defenders prepared to idly wait for the landing craft to make their way ashore in an orderly and timely fashion.

Of the two divisions that would be making the landing on Omaha, only the 1 st

I.D., the "Big Red One", had combat experience. The I st had made landings in Oran,

Algeria in 1942, and in Sicily in 1943, 5 and in October 1943 had been called back to

England to prepare for the invasion. The 1 st was the Army's most trusted and experienced division and Generals Eisenhower and Bradley both thought that the 1 st should be involved in the invasion. The division was commanded by Maj. General

Clarence Huebner, who had received his command in the summer of 1943.

Landing with the 1 st was a reinforcing element of the 29th I.D., a National Guard division with a long-standing military tradition in the United States.t Until he had begun planning the assault on Omaha, General Gerow commanded the 29 th, but when he was called up lead the V Corps, he relinquished his command to Maj. General Charles

Gerhardt. 6 On D-Day, the 29th would send the 116th RCT in on the initial landing, and would use the 115 th as a secondary wave. Since the 1I6th was to be used as an assault regiment attached to the 16 th, it was organized into companies that in turn were organized into six, thirty-one-man boat teams that would be shuttled to the disembarkation point by a single landing craft, and then brought ashore in smaller craft.

Positioned on the right of the 116 th was C Company of the 2nd Ranger Battalion.

These men were to land on Charlie Beach, and knock out enemy emplacements at Pointe de la Percee, a locale west of Vierville-sur-mer. 7 The 2nd Ranger had two companies that

t h 9th d p f nt h ltr ln l n bth d f th fhtn n th Cvl Wr h rnd th dvn th nn "h l nd Gr vn" h n h d p th 9 th r tl n f th nrl rph rn Mrlnd nnlvn nd rn Mn f 81

r t d rnfrnt t C Cpn h ld lnd n Chrl th C

Cpn f nr ‡

h r th n h r t th dn n Oh t -r h n

r ll trnd nd r bttl ttd h nfntr hd bn prd tht th

v nd Ar r ld pl th bh ntl t rtrd th hdn pl

nd ntl th Grn dfn r dtrd If th bbrdnt hd nt dtrd

ll f th plnt th n tn ld ln p th rnn Grn

h ht th xptd Of r th r nt th ndtn th t hn th hr

h nfntr r t rd hr n plzd lndn rft S hr

n C§ thr nn n t h bt ln th CA th

rth vrn f th C rrd th lt t hr h r flt-bttd

hll drft bt tht hd nl n lt nd dd nt fntn ll n d h n I9 h rh nd hv ld tht th bt rrd frd n bnth th v On thr tp f lndn rft th CI r ndn

Crft Infntr h CI h lrr rft tht ld rr n ntr nfntr

pn hr hr t ld dpt th n n th bh It l nd lr nd

thrfr n xllnt trt fr n fr 9 h ndn f th lndn rft

vtl prt f th lt th ndn f th nfntrn h r t hr

th n fr th tn nd rlt n tn lt t f th n h hd n ff t fht n - A rvnl nr r ndr th nd f t Cl ddr t lnd th n t th b f nt d h n r t l th lff nd dtr th drdd bttr tht ppdl l thr h n ntrl dffrnt tr nd hl th n h lndd t nt d drv th ld th thr n h lndd t Oh thr tr d nt ft nt th ppr ndn Crft hl rnnl ndn Crft Alt 82

rr t th lt th plnnr tdd th rrn pt f th C nd th CA nd dtrnd tht th hld nt b vrldd th n n - h

f ldn th lndn rft pd rtn prbl thh; nfntr pn r trdtnll rnzd nt rfl nd pl pn pltn nd r tht t fht nd

prt n hv rp h b trtr fr n nfntr pn tht f thr rfl pltn nd n pl pn pltn On - pn ld

hr nt n rfl pltn bt n lt tn hr r fv lt tn pr

pn nd th lt tn r thn brn dn nd pld brd pprprt lndn rft 1

A nl lt t ld b ldd nt n n bt nd prd f

n ffr nd tnt-nn n hr ld b fv-n rfl t fr-n r

ttn t t t-n A†† t t t-n bz t fr-n

rtr t t-n flthrr t fv-n dltn t th bt t ldr r ffr nd n tnt bt t ldr r CO"

h bt t ldr th ffr h th nltd n trtd nd rld n fr drtn td n th frnt lft d f th bt lt t th rp Whn th rp lrd h ld ld h n ff nd nt th rf h h th lt hd bn prtd nd th ht ppd t hppn n -

Whl th bt rnztn d nd t br p th nrl pn

ntrt n hh th n hd bn trnd It thht tht nt ntrt vtl t

bt ffn; n ld t fht plt nt nt brn p nt b-nt tht bttr ft nt lndn rft t vn Gnrl bnr rd th th n lt nt

†† rnn Att fl 8 tactics, but in the end, he was forced to go along with what his superiors felt was a better plan. 12

Each man carried his own weapon with him. If he was a rifleman, he carried the standard M1 Garrand, a rifle with a fully loaded weight of just less than ten pounds. If he was a BAR man, he carried his automatic rifle that weighed just under twenty pounds. 13

The men also carried a life preserver, a gas mask, grenades, some TNT, rations, cigarettes, first aid kit, an entrenching tool, a knife and whatever special equipment they might need for their own personal duties. 14 The soldiers, when fully loaded, weighed between sixty to ninety pounds over their own normal weight. Add twenty nine men who are grossly overweight, add cumbersome equipment, put them on a landing craft that had a shallow draft, was made of plywood, and could not stand up to strong seas or heavy enemy fire, and you had the makings of a serious problem.

The infantrymen sailed toward Omaha from the ports of England aboard larger

LCTs and other transports. These larger naval vessels stayed offshore ten to eleven miles where they were out of the range of enemy guns. It was from here that the loading process began at around 4:00 in the morning. The infantrymen, heavily laden with gear and weapons, were forced to scramble down cargo nets into the awaiting LCVPs and

LCAs. The rough seas caused the boats to pitch and roll. Many men fell from the nets and plummeted into the sea, or into the bottoms of the boats below. There were casualties even before the assault had begun.

Randolph Ginman was one of the men who was awaiting his destiny off Omaha.

As a member of Company D of the 116 th, he was scheduled to touch down on Dog Green 84

t 7 nd h fll ldr ndrd th pthn nd rlln bt nd d th -b dn th nt

"h tr hd ttn rhr nd t prtt tr jpn nt th lndn rft fr th nt t th rht t Whn ll th bt r ldd rld n r t nd thn hdd fr th prtn f th rnd Ct nn Oh h" 15

On brd th n r frd t ndr btn ld nd tht brht th

pr b nt thr f Mn n h hd tn brft b ll d t th pthn bt nd th hr nrvn rrndn th ntr prtn 16 h lndn rft rld n rp ntl th r vn th nl t rnd 3 t

trhtn t nd bn th rd jrn n 17

r thn th ll lndn rft th n ld nd hr th bttlhp

rr nd dtrr pln Oh h flt tht thr n nn

ld b lft lv n th bh n th thd dn h hd bn prd tht th ld b n trp nd tht th rl r ld bn n th ndd th blff nd bn vn nt th rnd ntrd h n nrvl rld nd thn th bt frd p n tht d vlr hr f th pt

rl A nld n nfntrn n Cpn f th 1 th Infntr n f th n n h t prt n th lt rbr th tn nd fln f th trp trd th hr

"I nd hrd th xn t th thr rn " h t r h vd frrd l vlrn t th thr rft I rbr thn th xn d l ttnd n th rrd bx n th prt trn It v nfdn n h" 18

r n tdr t vn ttpt t ndrtnd h th n flt pbl

h n r tl r-ld d h hd nvr n bt nvr lld nvr 85 bn ht t nd nvr bn nhr bt th Untd Stt h r xptd t lnd

n bh n frnt f hh blff tht hd Grn n nd th r xptd t

p vn ndr n fr nd nt t hlp thr ndd frnd h tn tht th flt th ll d thr trd th hr t hv bn xd prbbl flt rd r pbl l b th d tht th v nd

Ar r ld bbrd th bh nd ll f t nhbtnt b nt th rnd nd

hv flt brv vr th flt ndvdll t ttr f h th rtd n th r hr tht ld ll th dffrn n ddn th r flr f th lt

h n n ttr h prl th flt hd thr rl btd b th ht f th hndrd f bbr fln vrhd h pln drnd th l nt fl

f brd r vn l th bbll r f lt tht drnd th vr Ept

h htln f th bb nd th dtnt thd f th xpln d th n n th lndn rft fl f n nn tht th ld t hr lv hn th t

lr t th bh th rt hp frd thr lv t th bh hnd f rt hd vrhd fln trht trd th tln h n flt rrd On n

h n hr rlld th rt tt "t rtnl n prv nd

hrn ht" 19

Mn prprtn hd bn d t prvnt th nfntr fr ffrn t h hr bt n th nd t nt nh h pr-nvn bbrdnt hd bn t

hrt nd t h t hd bn pnt prttn th flt; th D.D. tn hh r t prtt th n n hr r nn n th tr tht th lndn rft 86

r rn; nd fnll th thr hd ltrd th pr ttbl nd hdl

n lndn n n xt ltn nxt t pbl

hrht th trp n trd th hr th hvl ldn C nd CA bn t fndr h hv ht f n ldd dn th r nd pn xd

th thr t fr ft ll nd trn nd d th jb f pn th bt pntd trd thr trt bh t dfflt h trn rrnt ntnl phd lndn rft frthr nd frthr ff r Mn h ndlph Gnn

r frd t bl t th rft n rdr t t flt

"It n nll rh trp nd b f th hh v trtd tn n t bt f tr Abt hlf dzn f t ff r hlt nd trtd t bl t th tr" 20

Evn thh n n r frd t bl t thr lndn rft n bt

n bnth th v h hv r pl t h fr th ll dn

rft h rrnt phd th bt ln t th t nd n xn h r

ttptn t p thr rft pntd n th rht drtn b fhtn th rrnt phd thr rft t fr nt th rrnt nd xpd thr bt t th v Wth th lndn rft fn t dd nl th v vr th d f th bt nd n

r pd th th hvl ldn nfntrn nn bnth th v th thr bt

h nx n h r ln hr r nfrntd b nthr trn phnnn prr t thn dn n th bh h Grn n r lnt d th bbrdnt lntd th ll? th Grn nnr r vn rdr t hld thr fr ntl th n lndn rft r prtll pn th At r

rd th n pnd p 21 Mhnn rtr nt-tn n rt nd rfl ll 87 came to bear on the lead craft. Coupled with the heavy enemy fire and the untouched obstacle belts, the landing craft began to take serious damage.

The men of the 29th I.D. came ashore on the western portion of the beach. A

Company was scheduled to land at H+I on Dog Green. They were to assault the beach and open the draw that led to Vierville-sur-Mer. Here on Dog Green, the Germans had placed the most serious defenses of the entire beach and possibly of the entire invasion

22 region. There were three major resistance nets in place at the Vierville exit also known as D-I. These resistance nets were loaded with heavy artillery pieces, 88mm guns, and were protected by pillboxes and concrete casemates. The Germans were not prepared to give up the D-I exit easily.

Company A, of the 1I6th, was the only company of the 116 th RCT to land in the appropriate place on the morning of the invasion. 23 The boats carrying A Company touched down at 6:35, a few minutes behind schedule, but in the right place. One landing craft struck a submerged obstacle and was disabled 100 to 150 yards off the shore. Many of the men aboard were too heavy to stay afloat, and sank as a result.

As the boats carrying A Company neared the shore, they began to take fire. The

German machineguns and artillery rounds began to land around them. Many bullets struck the landing craft and put holes in them, forcing the men to bail out the boats, or face drowning. Finally, the boats reached the beach at 6:35, and the ramps were lowered.

What occurred next was one of the greatest tragedies in military history. Within a few minutes, Company A of the 116 th RCT of the 29th I.D., the Blue and Grey Division, as it was known, ceased to exist as a cohesive fighting unit.

Thomas Valence was one of the men of Company A. 88

"A dn th rp r n th tr bt n hh nd trtd t d ht hd bn trnd t d—v frrd nd rh nd frI trr n fr nrt plnt hh t ld thI flndrd n th tr nd hd hnd p n th r trn t t bln hn I frt ht" 24

Gr h nthr A Cpn n h lndd n Oh

"tnnt Andrn (h t ldr" tnt-fv t thrt rd n frnt vn h hnd fr t v frrd nd ddnl thr n r n f lf fr h" 25

h n f Cpn A l ll f th thr nfntrn h lndd n - hd bn trnd t fll thr ffr nd r ntlld th n f rpt nd

lln t th n h ld th Sn th ffr nd bt t ldr td t th frnt f th lndn rft th r r ftn thn nt th frt n ht hn th rp

nt dn h nltd n r ddnl tht ldrhp 26 h CO n th b f th lndn rft hd t t th n t v frrd n th f f hv n fr It n h tht n n frz n th f f th nr Grn t tht pd hnn bllt t th

Wthn nt A Cpn hd d t xt nt h lt rt rn

hh % 27 h n n ndd hddld bhnd th btl tht hd bn

rtd t hlt thr dvn h fltd n th tr ntl th td ld rr th frrd l p f flt S r l nd r bl t rn t th ll

hr th Grn nnr hd n nl fr hh t ht t th hr nt th

ll th l hddld bldn nd rtl drnzd th n ffr t tll th

ht t d Mt f th n r nrd thr pn ln n th nd r ttn

11 rnth ddd b thr 89

t th btt f th Chnnl h hd n hp f vrn th dfn n th tt tht th r n

h nt th lt tht rdl hd nvnd Wth ll f th plnnn nd

ll f th r n pn t f fr fr th frt v f th I1 th C d t t th rht bh nd hn th dd lnd t dtd

h thr Cpn f th 1Ith r hdld t lnd t +1 t th t f

Grn n th bh d-nd Wht d nd E Grn Cpn

G t lnd n Wht hh th bh nxt t Grn Cpn t lnd nxt t G Cpn n d nd Cpn E t lnd n E

Grnh h th r ppd t lnd bt n rlt ht hppnd t th

pn n f th rtt xpl f ht nt rn th th nfntr lndn

n Oh

h trn rrnt phd th lndn rft tdl trd n th lt t t b jbld tthr nd fn th rn lndn zn Cpn G th

Cpn hdld t lnd n Wht tll lndd n E Grn tr t bh fr t dntd lndn zn Cpn hh t lnd n th rht§§ d f G Cpn lndd n th lft d trddln d nd E Grn

h t rrbl fl p tht f E Cpn hh t lnd n E Grn bt lndd trn t vr t l trd xd n th th bt f th 1 th C bt tn f E Cpn lndd n E d ln th t bt tn f th

1th A frthr fr bt tn f E Cpn lndd n x Grn th bh hr th tn f C Cpn f th 71 st r lt

§§ h drtn f lft nd rht hll b prntd f n ln fr th hr Wth th d th bh ld trt n th fr lft th Chrl nd nd n th fr rht th x d 0

h fl p r ht bnfl t th n f th 11 th Wht th bh tht brdrd th nf Grn prttd b trnpnt hddn n vll nn l-d-rêtr9 On Wht th Grn dfndr fd thr fr n Grn d t th pl ft tht th hd n n l t ht t h

rl th fnl nl n th ffn tht A Cpn n lrd

rn Sn n nfntrn f Cpn G rll h n hrrn nt f lndn n E Grn

"Sn lndd rn b pprxtl thnd rd t plt hbl nd hhl drnzd Or bjtv fr th d t p t th rvll dr nd trt r pprh pn f nfntr ftr n thrh ll f th frtftn f th bh tlf"3

Srnt rr r f Cpn l lndd n - rtll h tr hr

"Cpn lt bt lndd n d h frthr t thn plnnd In pt f ll th th pln d b n Enlnd jt ddnt xt n rlt hn ht th bh r rnd dn n hnn rfl rt fr th bnr n tp f th lffA rnn nn I trd t t n ff th bt nd t h t th lff bt t hrrbl—n frzn n th nd nbl t v M rdn hd h hd bln ff thr rd fr h bh vrd th bd—n th n l n r—Gd t fl It bltl trrbl"31

Chrl hbr n nfntrn brd th ttrd lndn rft f E

Cpn rbr th nfn nd trrr f tht ftfl rnn

"W r t l t fr hr r ppd t hv bn Whn lndd I ldnt nthn tht rtl rbld nthn tht I ppd t hv n trtd n thr ppl rnd thr nd t trnd t tht th r 1 t vn W rnt hr r ppd t b W ddnt n ht rn"3 91

h n h lndd n th rn pl r nfd th r ttrd nd

th r ndr n fr fr th frt t n thr lv h hd lndd nt hr

th r hdld t lnd nd nt hr th hd bn trnd t lnd h bjtv

tht th hd bn vn r nhr n ht t th ndrtd tht th hd t t

ff th bh tht th r n h pln fr th nvn hnd n th n vn

ff th bh nd nt th ntrd h ht th n hd t d nd th hd t

d t rrdl f th ft tht th r nt hr th hd bn trnd t lnd It

p t th ffr h d th lndn t t t tht th n dd nt pl hnr

dn nd hd n th bh th td n nd lld th p

h n f th 1 st I dd nt fr n bttr thn th n f th 9th h 1 th C t lnd n bh E d nd x Grn x d h t rn

ndr thr ntrl bt n n t lnd thr Cpn E nd f th 1 th r t lnd n E d nd Cpn I nd r t lnd n x Grn h lndn

rft l th tht rrd th n f th 11 th b lt d t th n th bh nd d t th hv rrnt

Onl t bt tn rnd xt n fr E Cpn f th 1 th lndd n th rrt zn n E d hr th r rprd t fnd t btld f n fr E Cpn f th 11 th r n E d hr th bt d t hr th

Grn rtn hv n t th ltpl dfnv ptn tht hd bn tblhd thr

h thr bt fr E Cpn f th Ith nd f Cpn f th 1 th lndd

xd n th fr bt fr E Cpn f th 11 th n x Grn h lndd n frnt f th E-3 xt tht ld t Cllvll r th Grn hd pld n n 2

trnpnt t 75 n t 5 nt-tn n 5 rtr nr

hnn pld n pllbx ln th pn fr pt nd trnh fr nfntr t

fr fr 33 Ardn t thr Sl Mrrn "Ext E-3 hvl dfndd

nd n GI h lndd thr ndd p n th Snt-rnt tr tht n

vrl th bh" 34

ph rtt n f th n h lndd n E d

"h rft nxt t ht n nd xpldd ndn bd nt th tr nd r rft ht th bh bt t nt th bh—t ndbr I ht th tr nd hd t d bt n thnd rd bfr httn th rl bh Whn ht th bh I nlt dn d th drt nd hprd `hn" 35

x Grn hvl dfndd bh nd th plnt tht rdd t

r lr t th tht prttd Grn t th t h n f th 1 th nd th

1Ith h lndd thr hr ndr hv fr tht dtd thr lndn rft

nd dtrd thr nt ntrt h n h lndd thr r nfd nd hn b th hv fr tht t th nd l b th ft tht th xtn tn f th 71 st tht r t hv bn lndd thr r nt n ht

Cpn I nd tht r ltd t lnd n x Grn dd nt Intd

f th n fr Cpn r dntll lndd t th rht f x Grn n th

"pt" bh d-nd x d hr n t bt tht hd pd n th

n th n f Cpn trld hr ndr drt rtn h n f I

Cpn r vn frthr ff trt h hd trvld pt x Grn nd x d t

rt-n-n It nnt nt ntl th thd dn n x Grn 36

Albrt Mn n nfntrn n Cpn I rll th flln

"It d t tht r n n rl [th xn] t l nh fr t lnd nd h lrd th rp nd hnn hh hd bn ll nld pnd p" 37

h lndn f th nfntr f bth th 11 th nd th 1th hd n r Of ll f

th lt rp h r hdld t th dn n - nl n pn

lndd hr t ppd t lnd Alt n rntn f th ft th Grn

ld th n pn t th pnt tht t bt ffn dtrd ln th t f t n

Wh dd h rn fr th nfntr lndn? Wht ld hv bn dn bttr t pv th fr th n h r t th dn n th frt v f th

lt n Oh? hr r n pndrbl rrndn th lt n Oh

h bt n thn nn—th lt dd rrdl f th hv lt tht th nfntrn nrrd h ntl lndn hd fr ll ntnt nd prp bn flr Ardn t n rprt "f f n trp tll rd th bh drn th

rl hr f th frnn"3

h lt n Oh h r hrrnd Mn r trn prt b rt rtllr hnn nd ll r h lndn rft hh r nt td fr th ndtn tht th t r ftn t pd h hvl ldn n r

t frd t d thrh dp tr ndr th ntnt fr f Grn n

Mn n dd bfr th vn thd th hr r frd nl ht n thr n dfn

All f th d t th trn dfn tht lnd Oh h nd th ft tht th dfn hd bn lft ntt b th nfftv pr-nvn bbrdnt

h nfntrn hd flld thr rdr nd hd n hr ll th hl xptn 94 to encounter minimal resistance. However, those men who did manage to touch down were faced with fire that could not be imagined, nor understood, by anyone who was not there with them. It must truly have been something like a vision of hell. There would have been fire and pain all around. The men, or in reality, teenagers and

Twenty-somethings, who fought and died on Omaha did so with bravery that will be forever remembered. 95

NOTES ON CHAPTER 5

1 Gnn ndlph A Wrttn tn f Exprn n n 19 p 1-11 2 [Oprtn prt ptn Oh h- br- n 19] p rdl p 37 4 Mrrn p 13-13 Chndlr vd G nd tn Clln r h - Enlpd Yr Sn nd Shtr 199 p 6 Ibid. p 571 n p 199 8 prt C 35A [prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf] p 131 ldrfld nd rhl p 1 1 p 11 11 Gn p 2 p 11 h bv ht f th n ntnd fr— In h Arn Arnl ndn Grnhll 1 p 9 nd 31 4 p 11 Gnn ndlph A Wrttn tn f Exprn n n 19 p 1 6 prt C 35A [prt b th Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf] p 57 Mrrn p 1 8 rl A nld Wrttn tn f Exprn n n 19 p t Ctll nd h p 19 20 Gnn ndlph A Wrttn tn f Exprn n n 19 p 1 2 n p 19 22 Sndr p 15 2 Mrrn p 13 24 rz nld f - n n Stt Unv r 199 p 25 Ibid. p 26 ldn nn W ttl t nd Wn Yr Kn nd Kn 19 p 7 2 Mrrn p 13 28 Ibid. p 13 2 Ibid. p 13 0 rz p Ibid. p 7 2 Ibid. p 1 33 Sndr p 15 4 Mrrn p 137 rz p 39 6 Mrrn p 13 rz p 39 8 COMIC - "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r Ch p 7 CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Evn thh th ntl lndn n Oh r nthn hrt f f th

dd rnd 113 n th rnn ttrd pt f Grn rtn

bn t rrndr t th Arn nfntrn h Grn dfndr nd th

Arn lt fr r bth r nd n tt f h tht rltd fr th

ntn nd nl ndl lln tht t pl d hd n nd t n th

td th tr tnd rd th th bld f th dd nd th dn nd dd fh

hh hd bn lld b th fld rt tt nd b Grn rtllr rnd tht pndd th tr l ln th bld d bh

h n h hd d th ntl lt r rnfrd b n f th 115 th nd

Ith C h rnfrn v l ffrd hv lt n th bh nd l

hr ndr th zzl f th Grn n Unl th n h d p th frt v th n f th rnfrn v n ht l hd f th r thr lndn rft th ld hr th dn f th bttlfld; th hn f nn rtllr

hll th htl f rt lndn n th bh th td trn nd ttd fr th zzl f Grn hnn h ld th dd bd fltn nd ld

th hlf drnd r f th tn nd th nfntrn h lndn rft hd

thr fndrd r bn n bbbn n th rf bn th t tp nd p th p Stll th rdr r t n nd t trht n tht tppn

h ndr bnr Grhrdt Gr nd rdl ll ln t thr rd thrht th ntr rnn n f th n ht hppnn t thr

96 97

n S brd th bh nd th hp tht th ld n ld nl dvn n

th bh p t rtn dtn h lt hd tn t ln 3 th n hd

bn xptd t hv brn thrh th Grn dfn t 3 nd nt nd

th rn ntnd n Oh Gr th Crp Cndr nxl td

ntn fr h n hr hd nt trtd th pln t h hd n ln

th t nd n h fll r f h h n r ffrn t th hnd f

Grn btl nd n tht hd nt bn thd b th rl bbrdnt r hd nt bn dtrd b th nnr h hd nl bn vn hrt nt f t n

hh t rv th

h bh xt hd nt bn bln b 1 nd th vtl hl n th btl blt tll xtd Sn th rdl ndrd dvrtn th rnnt f th rnfrn v t Uth h hr th ld r l t hr nd nt th rnd ntrd 2 hn t I3 n th ftrnn rd fr

Crp—"rp frrl pnnd dn n bhdvnn p hht bhnd bh"3 At 3 G Cpn f th 1 C bl t nd n thrh th E-3

xt nt Cllvll hr th bn th pr f zn vtl tl tn 4 h n h r fhtn n th bh hd h nd t t hr vn n th f f h trnd n rtn

At I3 Chtr nn rdl tnt nt hr t rprt n th prr f th bh rprtd n h dr ll tht h

"hr n Oh h l hv pl f rbbl th th rd bt thr b brn n th l tr hr r nnrbl ttrhdrn hdr th tllr n ftnd t

trhdrn r th tr hpd tl btl 8

the tops of the steel iron obstacles.† Work was proceeding slowly in the removing of these obstacles...There were a score of dead troops lying on the beach, sprawling and wet, lying where they had fallen. No one had as yet collected the dead...Floating near-by in the water we saw one body with a leg blown off...". 5

The beach was a mess, yet the men were slowly making their way up the bluffs

and into the countryside. The work of noncoms and junior officers had paid off; ragtag

groups of men who were not from the same companies or assault groups were working

together to c-b the bluffs and rout the German emplacements. The plans had failed, yet

the sheer tenacity of the American soldiers paid off.

Bradley himself felt that the choice to use the St I.D. was probably what saved the day. He, like so many others, thought that the presence of the now infamous German

352nd Division would have easily decimated any other American division. Yet, he had chosen the Big Red One, and had therefore, ensured victory. "Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1 st to spearhead the invasion probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing."6

This author considers this statement debatable. Yes, the Big Red One did succeed, but it was also joined in its success by the untested 29 th I.D., which in this author's opinion faced more fire and more concentration of German troops than did the

1 st. The 29th, the untested division, had been given four beaches to land and fight on, while the 1 st had been given three beaches under its control with only two to land on. No wonder the 1 st had more success than the 29th . Yes, Easy Red was a heavily defended beach, but nothing on Omaha matched the sheer carnage, the mayhem, of Dog Green.

The German defenders on that one beach nearly cost the 29 th its foothold on Europe. Had

The hedgerows that Hansen speaks of may be the iron obstacles known as "Belgian Gates". These were gate-like obstacles that allowed the water to pass through them so that the tide did not push them over. 99

th lndn rft f th 9 th nt ttn lt nd pt trd th ld hv lndd n

prft rdr n Wht d nd E Grn d th rrd th n h

lndd n Wht bh tht n trp f th frt v lnd n t ld hv

bn rd ln th th nr nd n f Cpn A n Grn

h h n th bh d b th Grn dfn nd dfndr

h n prbl th ft tht th Grn hd bn ll prprd nd ll

d n hn th lndn rft thd dn h nf Grn 35nd ntnd

rlr nt r dvn rphz pnt d n th frt hptr t

d p f n h hd fht nd bn ndd n th n frnt nd h hd bn nt t th tt Wtrn rnt t rprt nd rrnz Mn Grn

ldr h hd rvd n th Et nd hd bn nt t th Wtrn rnt ffrd fr frtbt r thr dblttn ndtn tht prvntd th fr rvn fftv

ldr n th Etrn rnt

h 35nd dvn tht bt td fr rpd ntrtt nlnd nd nt n th tr d h thl tt tht n rrnd t nt ndrvd bt

tl d t th ft tht th Arn nrl h r prnt t th lndn

r hd t th 35 nd t Oh n h d tht th dfndr

dtl b nn r dvn d th bn nntrd fr th frt t drn th nlnd bttl nd nt n - hr th r nt xptd th

ld prbbl hv bn rrdd vtrn nd bttl-ttd dvn bt nt r dvn h th Wffn SS

In th pnn f th thr th prn f th 35nd dfntl hd n pt n th lndn t Oh pl t f th bl fr th dvttn tht t pl n 1

th nd nt ll n th nfftv bbrdnt nd trt ttbl hvr

nvnnt nd nrdl h Arn hd vr dvnt n thr d hn th

d th lndn h hd th lxr f hn th t nd th pl f th lt

ln th th ntrt dtl f th nvn Y th t n hndht bt t

tr h jrt f th Grn ndr dd nt xpt th nvn n

rnd nr dd th xpt t t dbr Whn th nvn dd fnll r th

Grn ndr flt tht t rl fnt nd nt th n thrt

Ardn t n ntrv vn hl ld Mrhl Ktl nd dl r n prn tn thr trl t rbr th Grn r hd tht th All

lndd hr th dd " thht tht dbrtn n th pn t ld nl t pl vr ll h r ll thn n ft hppnd nd tht n prtlr th rh tr ld r dl"

It nt th thr ntntn tht th lt n Oh flr th

ntrr t bt th lt rt fr t hh hn prd t th

thr bh Whn th lt lltd fr ll f th thr bh r bnd th nbr 1 n ndd r lld h lt rdn t n Ar rprt

n Oh r vr 3 9 th pbl? It nt pl d t th ft tht th Grn dfndn Oh r r dvn; t n th pnn f th thr b th nvl nd rl bbrdnt hd bn t hrt nd hd bn drtd

h bbr tht r prnt t Oh drppd thr bb p t thr l

fr th bh h nfntr hd bn rd tht hn th thd dn th bh ld b lttrd th hl fr prttn nd tht th ld fnd th Grn ptn n rn Intd th fnd Grn rtllr tht nnnl rt nd 101

hnn fr tht pt th ntr bh hr r n hl t hd n nd th

btl blt hd nt bn pntrtd b th hh xplv bb

h nvl fr hd dn thr bt t dtr th Grn plnt bt th

ft rn tht th lr n f th USS Texas nd th USS Arkansas r b frn t trt nlnd nd nt n th bh thlv h f hv n t pl

th Grn plnt ld hv rtl ltrd th ntl lndn Y th flt

ndd t b prttd b th bttlhp bt n t n tht th flt nt tn h fr t ll th bttlhp hld hv jnd th rr dtrr nd CG n pln th bh

On th nvn bn thr r nt nh ld pbl t b vn t th n brd th dtrr h rn thr hp rnd t t th blbrd

nfntr h n nd thr hp hv hlpd v th d nd hv d th nvn pbl Evn rdl d On ndd th l pprt f th dtrr t t p th blff

It nt pbl t pnt fnr t th l f rrd pprt n Oh h

n brd th tn dd thr bt It tr tht thr tn r nt rth

nd r nnd n th ndtn tht th t n - Evn thh n tn

n n th Chnnl th r f th rvvn tn pt n trn t t hr

h tn r n tht th nfntr r rln n thr hlp vn th r lln p thr fll tn

Anthr rp h bv rt th nnr h td brvl n -

h r lndd n th rn pl t th rn t t th ttptd t

nd n t bl hl n th btl blt hl rnn ndr ntnt n fr 102

hr lndn rft hh r ldd dn th tn f xplv r fltn dth

trp nd th thlv r h trt fr th Grn tn bv Evn

thh th th th nd t dtr n btl nd pn f xt

tht t f thr pnt

nll th nfntrn h hr dd ndr f th t dvr

ndtn f th ntr r h r ttrd b th rrnt nd ttrd b Grn

bllt hr ffr r lld nd n nfntrn r ndd; t th

nd t pll tthr t -b p th blff h nd t vr

vrhln dd vn thh th hd bn prd n n n tt f h

hr r n lr nntrtn f rr prnt t hlp th nd thr r n hl t hd n hr r nl Grn pllbx nd dd bd h nl prttn tht th ld fnd th btl tht hd bn pld n th bh t ll th r th ntrl ll tht td nt th b f th blff

h hh lt t nt b bld n n f th tn f th nfntrn bt n th vrll dd pln tht t pl prr t th nvn It th

nfntrn h hd n n h r hn th r n t lnd h dn

r d n th tp b n h ld nvr th dn n th bh n th f f n fr It th n th plnnr h dd nt t th thr nt

ndrtn r dd th t th nttv t ndr tht Mntr ht hv bn rn hn h thht tht th rl bbrdnt ld rdt th Grn rtn nd pn dr t th ntrd bnd

h lt n Oh trd f rrr On rrr ld t nthr nd n th nd vr 3 n r lt It hrd t pnpnt xtl ht th fr th 103 hh lt rt bt n thn dfnt—t nd nt t pln n

nvn f ll dfndd r nd t thn b th pln n rd ttbl nd

nttd pn t h plnnd nvn f Oh h dd nt rbl

nthn l t th vnt tht nfldd n th rl rnn f - d th

nvn nd th lt n Oh bn plnnd th th pr tht thn ld nd prbbl ld rn n l rdl nd Gr ld nt hv bn frd t

t b nd th thr n t lhtrd n ll trp f nd tht n n

Arn n ld t n h fnl rtn pl 104

NOTES ON CHAPTER 6

rdl p 7 Ibid. p 71 3 lbid. p 7 [Oprtn prt ptn Oh h- brr- n 19] p 95 5 nn Chtr r ntr f n 19 p 7 rdl p 7 ddl rt The Other Side Of The Hill. ndn Cl nd Cpn 1951 p hlr Knnth W[Intrv th Grn Mltr dr 195] 3 l 195 Mndrf xbr th f th ld Mrhl bn ntrvd r ltr xtd ftr bn fnd lt n ll fr pbl nt t th rbr trl 9 prt 9 Ar Oprtnl rrh Grp "Cprn f rth nd Arn Ar n rnd n tr f r Spprt nd t Efft" At 195 p 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

"Cprn f rth nd Arn Ar n rnd n tr f r Spprt nd t Efft" At 195

Wr Cbnt Chf f Stff Ctt "Oprtn Ovrlrd prt nd Apprtn" l 3 193

Cnfrn n ndn Alt [nt 977] M t n 3 193

prt C 35A prt b h Alld vl Cndr-In-Chf "Expdtnr r n Oprtn ptn prt 9 Ar Oprtnl rh Grp" Otbr 19

prt CC Grt rtn Cbnd Oprtn Cnd "Cbnd prt On h pp d" 19

COMIC - "Aphb Oprtn Invn f rthrn rn Wtrn r n 19" Otbr 19

Ar Oprtnl rh Grp prt 1 [Clt nd Efft f r Spprt n th rth h n rnd] Aprl 1 195

rvnl Ennr Spl rd Grp [Oprtn prt ptn- brr t n 19]

drtr O EG S IG GOU [ld Ordr 3]

A rh prt prprd b Ctt 1 Offr Advnd Cr h Arrd Shl "Arr In Oprtn ptn (Etblhnt Of h rnd hhd" M 199

Gnn ndlph A Wrttn tn f Exprn n n 19

nn Chtr r ntr f n 19

hlr Knnth W [Intrv th Grn Mltr dr 195] 3 l 195 Mndrf xbr

nld rl A Wrttn tn f Exprn n n 19

105 106

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