Terrorism & Insurgency Islamic State returnees pose threat to Europe Terror challenges The Islamic State is under intense territorial pressure in its former strongholds. James Blake and Brooks Tigner assess the outlook for foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria returning to their home countries, and analyse the likely impact on terrorism threat levels in European cities.

n 25 February 2017, Max Hill, the to their home countries, as the Islamic State Key points newly appointed independent re- loses territory in Iraq and Syria and those O viewer of terrorism legislation in the foreign fi ghters return to their countries of  As the Islamic State loses territory in Syria and United Kingdom, told the Daily Telegraph that origin. Exact fi gures for foreign fi ghters in Iraq, and its foreign fighters return home, the the Islamic State was planning “indiscriminate Syria and Iraq are diffi cult to establish, but threat of terrorist attacks in European cities – attacks on innocent civilians”. He compared an approximate fi gure of 5,000 Europeans albeit most likely at a relatively low level – will the level of threat to that posed by the Irish within a total of 30,000 foreign fi ghters increase markedly. Republican Army (IRA) in the 1970s, when would concur with most plausible estimates  While intelligence agencies will focus on these it was conducting a campaign of bombings since 2015. These returnee fi ghters will have returnees, an arguably greater threat stems from against civilian and security forces targets in skills, connections, and training that will new networks formed in Iraq and Syria that will the mainland UK. He said, “In terms of the pose a pressing threat to the security of Euro- seek safe haven in third countries and may opt to threat that’s represented, I think the intensity pean cities, and the threat of attacks across conduct transnational operations. and the potential frequency of serious plot European cities will rise with their return.  The rising returnee threat is prompting a greater planning – with a view to indiscriminate at- countermeasures response at the EU level, with tacks on innocent civilians of whatever race or Losing territory both legislative and institutional changes afoot colour in metropolitan areas – represents an For foreign fi ghters in Iraq and Syria, the out- to improve data-sharing and inter-sectoral enormous ongoing risk.” look is rapidly changing. In January 2015, the collaboration. This warning is largely because of the Islamic State controlled a large swath of terri- threat posed by foreign fi ghters returning tory which, according to IHS Markit Confl ict

Three roadside bombs laid by Islamic State militants explode in a western Mosul neighbourhood, Iraq, on 8 March 2017. International e orts to combat the Islamic State have started to shrink the group’s presence, curtailing its territorial base, prestige, and power. PA: 1685311

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Monitor fi gures, was approximately 90,800 km², and included territory stretching from western Iraq through to northwest Syria. It had approximately nine million people under its control. International eff orts to combat the Islamic State have started to shrink the group’s pres- ence, curtailing its territorial base, prestige, and power. Former US president Barack

Obama’s administration (2009–17) adopted a PA: 1685312 multifaceted policy of ‘degrading and suff o- cating’ the Islamic State: it included directing airstrikes against the Islamic State’s person- nel, territory, and resources, with several French soldiers stand guard during a visit by French president François Hollande to a military thousand US troops training local forces and outpost on the outskirts of the Islamic State-held city of Mosul, Iraq, on 2 January 2017. providing military support. The ongoing counter-terrorism off ensive holding territory to insurgency. Sanderson, a likely reaction will be “a spasm had substantially reduced the territory held At the policy level, eff orts to combat the of violence” as it seeks to demonstrate its by the Islamic State to 60,400 km² by January Islamic State are likely to be a priority for continued relevance and enduring strength. 2017, with far fewer cities and people under the current US administration of President In his estimate, one of the group’s likely its control. In Iraq, government-led forces Donald Trump. Trump has criticised the recourses will be to conduct high-profi le pursued a campaign to retake control of cities, Obama administration for not adopting a suf- attacks in Damascus, Syria; Baghdad, Iraq; mounting an off ensive in late 2016 to retake fi ciently aggressive policy against the Islamic and internationally, including in Europe, Mosul. While the battle has been closely State, and while the results of a policy review although the circumstances in each of these fought and the Islamic State has mounted were ongoing at the time of writing, he has three cases are materially distinct. strong resistance, Iraqi-led forces, by mid- previously stated a preference for defeating It remains notable that the Islamic State March 2017, had cut off the city and were the Islamic State rather than toppling Syrian has not been able to conduct a major attack in fl ushing out remaining fi ghters. president Bashar al-Assad. Europe since the March 2016 Brussels bomb- Retaking Mosul from the Islamic State will ings; attacks since that point have been ‘lone be particularly symbolic, as it is where Islamic Regrouping and evolving actor’ attacks, even if retrospectively claimed State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced Thomas Sanderson, director of the Transna- by the Islamic State. Supposed clandestine – the formation of the so-called ‘caliphate’ on tional Threats Project at the Washington- or ‘sleeper’ – cells have been absent, raising 29 June 2014; it is also the last remaining based Center for Strategic and International the question of their existence and status, city in Iraq under the Islamic State’s control. Studies (CSIS), told Jane’s on 5 February that and whether they are waiting for a trigger to Its fall will represent a signifi cant pointer one of the main factors drawing young people act. towards the groups’s demise in Iraq. was the ‘bandwagon’ eff ect of the excite- The combination of counter-terrorism In Syria, there were concerted eff orts in ment about joining a “successful” resistance operations, targeted eff orts to disrupt its 2016 and early 2017 to reduce the Islamic movement. However, loss of territory means fi nancing, and the eventual loss of its ‘cali- State’s control of key cities and towns. Turk- that the group will start to lose recruitment phate’ all suggest a possible regrouping of the ish-led militants began by targeting Al-Bab power, particularly among those attracted by Islamic State, potentially evolving towards to the west of Raqqa, and by mid-March 2017 its “success” rather than for religious reasons. being a more ‘traditional’ terrorist group with there was an off ensive under way to recap- In Syria, foreign fi ghters may already be leav- a network of connections to other groups ture Raqqa, Islamic State’s main hub in Syria, ing the group to join other groups. in diff erent countries such as Afghanistan, although the battle will be more intense than Operationally, territorial losses will cause Nigeria, and Yemen, but with less territory Mosul because the group has more fi ghters in signifi cant damage to the Islamic State, under its control. the city. Anti-Islamic State forces were also particularly to its fi nancial model. A report Aya Burweila, a senior adviser at the seeking to retake Deir al-Zour in the east of released on 17 February 2017 by the Interna- Research Institute for European and Ameri- Syria, another territorial hub for the Islamic tional Centre for the Study of Radicalisation can Studies (RIEAS), a Greece-based think State. (ICSR) at King’s College London stated that tank focused on security in southeastern As the Islamic State increasingly loses terri- the Islamic State was in fi nancial trouble, Europe, told Jane’s on 9 February, “The tory, more fi ghters will seek to return to their with overall revenue shrinking by more than Islamic State will continue to conduct ter- home countries. This will likely be motivated 50% since 2014. As its territory has shrunk, rorist attacks in Europe as part of a strategy by one of two factors that are germane to it has lost tax receipts, and it will also lose to lure Western boots on the ground, where the security threat that they pose: some money because of damage to and loss of con- more opportunities for killing and captur- will be demoralised and will leave because trol of oil fi elds. ing Western soldiers, hostage-taking and their fortunes have changed, while others The Islamic State will have to adapt to sur- [therefore] propaganda for recruitment will will be dispatched back to Europe as part of vive, altering its fi nancial model, its recruit- present [themselves].” However, while the the Islamic State’s strategy of moving from ment methods, and its tactics. According to Islamic State may harbour this aspiration, ihs.com/janes May 2017 | Jane’s Intelligence Review | 19 Terrorism & Insurgency Islamic State returnees pose threat to Europe

the lack of a major attack since Brussels may data between 1990 and 2010, only one in on 8 January 2017, “Experienced foreign suggest that the required profile or quantity nine Western foreign fighters returned to fighters returning from extended combat will of returnees is not in place. conduct attacks in the West. This would have a good level of security awareness, plan- nevertheless represent a substantial threat: if ning and operational expertise. They will also Returnee fighters half of the assumed 5,000 fighters returned, seek to conduct higher-profile attacks as this The number of foreign fighters in Iraq and it would imply a combat pool of around 270 is a key part of their attraction.” Syria is significantly larger than during the militants with the propensity to plan and Foreign fighters were involved in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, prompting con- conduct attacks. November 2015 Paris attacks and March 2016 cern within the intelligence community that Equally, previous studies suggest that Brussels attacks, and in May 2014 a French- many European foreign fighters will return many returnees will have become so disil- man who had previously travelled to Syria home with the intent to conduct attacks and lusioned by their experiences that they will attacked the Jewish museum in Belgium. will overwhelm domestic security services’ likely attempt to build a new life at home, Belgian police disrupted a likely significant ability to monitor them. This would in turn potentially even participating in a deradicali- plot in Verviers in January 2015 and found a result in more attacks. sation programme. In this case, the efficiency significant number of weapons and explosive However, the number of returnee foreign of the deradicalisation programme will be devices, suggesting that the plot was nearly fighters will be far smaller than the approxi- in the spotlight: some programmes, such as operational. Foreign fighters also passed mately 5,000 Europeans who left to fight, in Saudi Arabia, have been exploited by Al- through Greece before joining the Paris since not all foreign fighters become domestic Qaeda detainees from Guantánamo Bay who attacks in November 2015. terrorists. A Brookings Institution November have subsequently rejoined groups such as These incidents represent the beginning 2014 report on foreign fighters concluded Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). of a likely trend in coming months and years, that the Iraq conflict, in particular, had Others will fear the consequences for their with it being possible that the Islamic State shown that most foreign fighters posed less families and friends if they become involved has taken advantage of the European refugee of a threat than security services originally in domestic terrorism and will avoid it. Yet crisis to embed sleepers in European cities. anticipated; many who joined the Islamic others who do attempt to join terrorist groups More than a million refugees and migrants State were motivated by a host of specific are likely to be monitored by intelligence entered Europe during 2015, and a senior reasons and were unlikely to pose a domestic services, and – if they were involved in ter- humanitarian worker told Jane’s on 12 Janu- threat; and many were initially humanitar- rorist activity in Iraq and Syria – could well be ary 2017 that the Greek authorities had been ians opposing Assad. pre-emptively arrested. overwhelmed by the number of refugees and In addition, others will have been killed It is therefore from the remainder of migrants crossing the Aegean Sea and were during fighting, and many others will likely foreign fighters that the threat of terrorist unable to carry out all necessary checks. Nev- choose to travel to another conflict zone. attacks will be most acute, and this will be ertheless, despite these volumes, it remains Yet others who joined the Islamic State for from militants who will likely have been the case that mass-casualty attacks explicitly religious reasons are likely to stay in Iraq and trained at terrorist camps in a range of skills, directed by the Islamic State have not taken Syria, beginning a new life. such as bomb-making, weapons handling, place since Brussels. Even among foreign fighters who return and encryption techniques, and who have a In April 2016, then US director of national home, the terrorism threat is qualified. Based network of contacts. Dr Rodger Shanahan, intelligence James Clapper said that the on a February 2013 study by extremism a research fellow at the Sydney-based Lowy Islamic State had clandestine cells operating expert Thomas Hegghammer, who analysed Institute for International Policy told Jane’s in several European countries. In December

Belgium: From weak link to pathfinder?

The March 2016 Brussels’ airport and metro system in 2015 Belgium launched a dozen new local task up its campaign to foster violence in Europe. bombings were traumatic for Belgium, which – forces composed of police, judicial, and Coordination However, the most significant intelligence and unlike neighbouring France – had suffered no such Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) personnel to deal counter-terrorism reforms took place later in 2016. mass-casualty attack in its recent history. Leaving with suspects and those under judicial supervision, Immediately after the March 2016 attacks, the 32 dead and more than 300 injured, the deadly with its members security-cleared, able to access government announced plans to install more licence- incidents catalysed Belgium’s legal, judicial, and classified intelligence, and reporting to a national plate recognition cameras around sensitive sites and intelligence-gathering structures, prompting a OCAM-led task force. This was mirrored by teams of to expand its collection of passenger name record cascade of counter-terrorism legislation; a hardening social and community workers and municipal officials (PNR) data, ahead of similar EU plans. The current of attitudes towards those perceived as abusing the working on deradicalisation. PNR regime exceeds the future European equivalent – country’s residency and nationalisation policies; and Meanwhile, having used its intelligence agencies pegged mainly to air travel – since it includes trains and the targeting of foreign fighters, the radicalised, the for several years to monitor the country’s mosques, maritime traffic, and by the end of 2017 Belgium will radicalisers, and their supporters. Belgium criminalised hate-preaching in early 2016. The extend PNR procedures beyond London-bound Eurostar Some of the country’s jihadist-related counter- surveillance of mosques may be intensifying, in view high-speed trains to those of Thalys, serving France, terrorism measures were already in place before the of OCAM’s concerns that radicalisation is rising as the Germany, and the Netherlands. bombings, but have been sharpened. For example, Islamic State loses territory in Iraq and Syria and steps Changes also include new information sharing

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Europe terrorism threat: Syria and Iraq returnees

Country facing high (1) 8,100 terrorist threat Total intelligence and law SWEDEN (source: UK FCO) enforcement personnel Country facing general potentially required for North Sea terrorist threat 24/7 intrusive surveillance DENMARK (source: UK FCO) of high-risk returnees (2) “Several dozen” Site of Islamist-linked Europol reports of militants controlled terrorist attack, failed by the Islamic State already present attack, or violent incident in Europe by December 2016 UNITED NETHERLANDS since the 13 November KINGDOM 2015 Paris attacks GERMANY Notes: BELGIUM (1) All numbers are estimates based on reviews of UKRAINE published authoritative studies (2) Assumes 24/7 surveillance AUSTRIA team of 30 personnel working 270Atlant (1ic) in shifts and dedicated Ocean exclusively to unique targets; Plausible figure for returnees across (1) Europe seeking to conduct attacks, FRANCE ITALY 5,000 does not take account of ongoing casework against assuming a 1-in-9 ratio of active BOSNIA AND Estimated number of domestic suspected militants militancy among returnees HERZEGOVINA Black Europeans who travelled Sea to Iraq and Syria to fight for the Islamic State 01,000 km SPAIN TURKEY

Mediterranean Sea SYRIA Source: Jane’s Intelligence IRAQ Review/Jane’IRAN s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre/IHS 2,500 (1) Markit Conflict Monitor/UK (1) Potential total of returnees, allowing 30,000 Foreign and Commonwealth for fatalities and militants remaining Estimated total of foreign Office/Europol/ICSR/Soufan Group/media reports/ in Iraq/Syria or travelling elsewhere fighters in Iraq and Syria IHS Markit 1696578

© 2017 IHS Markit. All rights reserved. Provided “as is”, without any warranty. This map is not to be reproduced or disseminated and is not to be used nor cited as evidence in connection with any territorial claim. IHS Markit is impartial and not an authority on international boundaries which might be subject to unresolved claims by multiple jurisdictions.

2016, Europol reported estimates from sev- deal has restricted refugee flows. Moreover, enter Europe via Greece under false pre- eral intelligence agencies that several dozen migrant routes from Greece into Europe are tences. people controlled by the Islamic State were closed, and the EU – in conjunction with Arguably the most significant foreign likely already in Europe. European border agency Frontex and Europol fighter threat to European cities comes Since then, scrutiny of arrivals has dramati- – has enhanced its due diligence process, from new networks formed during the cally improved and the EU-Turkey refugee making it more difficult for individuals to Iraq and Syria conflicts. There are 25,000

Belgium: From weak link to pathfinder?

between Belgium’s terrorist-financing watchdog and complete,” Theo Francken, state secretary for asylum Overall, Belgium’s intelligence community is on its police and intelligence agencies, not permitted and migration, told the press on 10 February 2017. high alert for returning foreign fighters as the Islamic before the bombings. “They’ve now understood that The package also lifts Belgium’s previous 10-year State’s ‘caliphate’ shrinks. Of an estimated 250–300 the amounts being traced [by the watchdog], though limit on incoming travel bans on major criminals or Belgian passport-holders still in Syria and Iraq, around peanuts in size, are a valuable source of intelligence,” foreign fighters, making it valid for the whole Schengen 20 are trying to negotiate their return to Belgium, one Thomas Reynard, senior research fellow on terrorism at zone. “Getting European nationality is, from now on, source close to the government told Jane’s in early the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, no longer a free pass to come to our country and act 2017. OCAM will assess each for their level of risk. If it told Jane’s on 13 February 2017. “There is now a unlawfully,” Francken said. determines that they all require intrusive surveillance, structure to accommodate this.” Finally, Belgian security services have hired a this will overstretch Belgium’s resources. Belgian More recent and radical legislation was adopted by number of new officers since the bombings, including intelligence personnel are already working in overdrive, the national parliament on 9 February, with a package operatives to monitor the internet for jihadist and its overcrowded prisons have a high ratio of Muslim of counter-terrorism measures opening the door to recruitment and terrorist chatter, although these new inmates – 50% of the country’s total prison population wide-ranging expulsion of criminals and terrorist officers will not be operationally deployable until – where radicalisation is a persistent problem. However, suspects from the country. The new measures “make around 2019. The need to remedy deficient internet according to the source, there is no room for 24/7 our repatriation policy more flexible, lasting, clear, and monitoring remains urgent. isolation of additional dangerous prisoners.

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may have formed cells in their home country, with a degree of contact with the network in Iraq and Syria. This type of attack is likely to be more sophisticated and well-planned than a simpler lone-actor incident, a comparable example being the attack on the offi ces of the magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015. There is also the potential for multi-target attacks, which would involve diff erent groups of terrorists armed with fi rearms and explosives. In these types of incidents, there is likely a degree of guidance and encour- agement from terrorist leaders abroad and potentially fi nancial support. These attacks

PA: 1685313 PA: are most likely to occur in countries where Brussels Airport on 22 March 2017, a year after the terrorist attacks. Before Brussels’ airport and a cell of terrorists is already operational – a metro system bombings, Belgium had su ered no such mass attack in its recent history. New York Times article from April 2016 cit- ing counter-terrorism sources highlighted non-European foreign fi ghters, many of to win local support in the short term, and Germany, Italy, and the UK as likely targets whom will have formed new connections and it has an opportunity to capitalise on the for the Islamic State, while a Jane’s Intelligence new worldviews. This group includes foreign Islamic State’s demise. Sanderson told Jane’s, Review study of 46 cities, based on quantita- fi ghters of third states, who will likely travel “When ISIS [the Islamic State] is down, this is tive modelling, concluded in February 2016 to new countries following territorial losses a perfect opportunity for Al-Qaeda to position that threats remained higher-than-average in Iraq and Syria and who may therefore be off itself as a [jihadist] leader, with a series of for French and German cities. the authorities’ radar. The historical paral- hard-hitting attacks across the globe.” A third – and worst-case – scenario is an lel would be with the anti-Soviet fi ghters in instructed terrorist attack, characterised by Afghanistan in the 1970s who forged the con- Scenarios of concern incidents that are more complex and sophis- nections that produced Al-Qaeda. Out of the It is plausible that current trends of anti-refu- ticated than others to date. Examples include Syria confl ict, there is the potential for new gee, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim senti- the use of a radiological dispersal device terrorist groups to form, or for foreign fi ghters ment in many European countries will drive (RDD) or ‘dirty bomb’, or an attack using to set up new outposts of established terror- returnees to terrorism. The Islamic State has aircraft or sophisticated weaponry that would ist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic repeatedly called on sympathisers to conduct result in a signifi cant and widespread impact. Nevertheless, Jane’s assesses that the use of an RDD is unlikely because of the sophisti- ‘National capitals across Europe have consistently cated planning required. rejected the idea of creating an EU intelligence The threat of such attacks is less likely to come from returnees, who will likely lack the agency’ necessary training. Rather, such an attack on European soil would likely emanate from new networks that have formed in Syria and Iraq, and whose fi ghters are staying in State in countries where they settle, such as lone-actor attacks, including in European countries with less eff ective governance and Morocco, Russia, or Saudi Arabia. Such new countries, and some have already occurred, intelligence agencies. Countries where the groups could conduct transnational terrorist such as the July 2016 truck attack in Nice and necessary training and planning could take attacks, including against Europe. the December 2016 Berlin market attack. place include Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The threat to Europe also extends beyond Militants in Europe could also seek to the Islamic State: Al-Qaeda is likely to seek conduct attacks similar to the June 2016 Evolving countermeasures to benefi t from the return of foreign fi ghters. Orlando, Florida, nightclub attack, which are National capitals across Europe have consist- Lydia Khalil, a non-resident fellow at the diffi cult for intelligence services to prevent. ently rejected the idea of creating an EU Lowy Institute, told Jane’s on 2 February 2017 With the ease of obtaining fi rearms in most intelligence agency. However, their future that Al-Qaeda had spent several years largely of continental Europe, and knives and vehi- aims for exchanging information, not least to focusing its eff orts on distancing itself from cles continent-wide, as well as the growing combat the terrorist threat, come close to the the Islamic State’s destructive ideology and pool of potential terrorists, individual attacks appearance of one. Signifi cant EU legislative instead building acceptance to its own ideol- are likely to occur across Europe in 2017. changes, both recent and forthcoming, point ogy. This approach has led to signifi cant gains A second scenario stems from those who to new data sources and unprecedented access for AQAP in Yemen, as well as steady progress have loose affi liations with a terrorist group, for stakeholders to information exchanges, with domestic groups in Syria. and are sent back to home countries to con- from coast guards and airport control points Al-Qaeda will likely persist with its eff orts duct attacks. In this scenario, foreign fi ghters to fi nancial authorities tracking terrorist

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fi nancing activities. All of these will be linked to one another via national interfaces and centralised EU platforms. “The intelligence possibilities will be far greater in the future,” a European Com- mission offi cial told Jane’s on 2 March 2017. “We’re looking at the cross-connecting con- vergence of [security-related] travel, border, PA: 1685314 police, and fi nancial data, though no one has any illusions this will consistently turn into useable intelligence any time soon or without a great eff ort at collaboration.” Iraqi security forces strike Islamic State militants in Mosul, Iraq, on 5 March 2017. The ongoing Fear of organised criminal acts inside counter-terrorism o ensive has substantially reduced the territory held by the Islamic State. Europe, especially those of terrorism linked to returning foreign fi ghters and home-grown borders, regardless of nationality, via a new complex attacks perpetrated by terrorists radicalised jihadists, is behind the changes, central repository, with this guaranteeing operating from safe havens in states where three of which are under way, with more in “access to all information recorded at the the government’s writ is limited. the pipeline. For example, the European pas- external borders of the EU or within the In terms of countermeasures, change senger name record (PNR) system, approved territories of the member states”, to prevent, is coming, and not only within the formal in April 2016, will be implemented across the detect, investigate, and prosecute serious framework of EU legislation. It will also occur EU by May 2018, and on 16 February 2017 crimes. within the long-standing Club de Berne – the European parliament approved a new The ministers also lobbied for a directory the informal intelligence-sharing forum EU directive to clamp down on lone-actor of personal data “common to all information comprising the 28 EU countries’ intelligence terrorists and foreign fi ghters, expanding the systems to anticipate and detect the use of agencies, plus those of Norway and Switzer- EU’s list of criminalised preparatory acts to false identities and aliases”, in addition to land – and its off shoot, the Counter Terrorist include travel abroad to join a terrorist group expanding the Schengen Information System Group (CTG). After years of resistance, the or returning to the EU to carry out a terrorist through the inclusion of more biometric and Club de Berne has decided on a year-old Dutch act, plus any recruiting, training, abetting, photographic data. They also called for new proposal to create a secretariat in The Hague incitement, or fi nancing of terrorist groups. legal access to encrypted electronic com- close to Europol’s headquarters. The goal On 7 March, the EU Council also adopted munications for European authorities during is to establish more interchanges between a regulation on a new entry-exit system for judicial and administrative inquiries, insist- EU-level police structures and intelligence, Europe. This will apply to all third-country ing that the Commission unveil the access although it is yet to enter into being. That nationals, registering their entry, exit, and proposal by October 2017. would be “quite a major step if they pull it refusal of entry, and storing their identity, Nevertheless, there is likely to be substan- off ,” one Belgian intelligence expert told travel documents, and biometric data in the tial opposition to some of these initiatives Jane’s on 22 February. “It gives you a sense of form of four fi ngerprints and a facial image. on privacy grounds, which will present an how badly they need this [collaboration].” Importantly, the draft entry-exit regula- obstacle to realising the vision that emerged First published online: 22/03/2017 tion will create interoperability between its among EU policy-makers following the system and the EU’s Visa Information System November 2015 Paris attacks. (VIS), with access not only for national border and visa authorities, but also for law enforce- Outlook ment authorities and Europol. Moreover, European intelligence and security services the pressure for inter-sectoral collaboration will be severely challenged in coming months across member states is rapidly increasing, and years. There has been defi nite progress in with Germany and France leading the charge. damaging the Islamic State’s capabilities in On the web ihs.com/janes In a joint 20 February 2017 letter addressed Iraq and Syria, but – as the group loses more by the German and French ministers of the territory and its prestige is further tarnished  Islamic State plans to attack European cities interior – Thomas de Maizière and Bruno Le – it is increasingly likely that foreign fi ghters  Terrorism highlights arms traff icking in Europe Roux – to the European Commission, the will return home or seek new territories.  Foreign fighters – Battle-hardened Europeans ministers called for even greater steps. While With this shift in the terrorism landscape, return from Syria praising the entry-exit initiative, they said there will be a gradual threat evolution. that the commission should venture further Because of the number of foreign fi ghters Author by studying the possibility of “registering returning to their home countries, it is likely James Blake is a security and risk expert based in European nationals and long-stay third-coun- that there will be an increase in the number New York. Brooks Tigner is editor and chief policy try nationals” as one way to help identify the of lone-actor-type attacks taking place in analyst for Security Europe, based in Brussels. routes of foreign combatants. European cities, alongside periodic larger- Additional research by Otso Iho, a senior analyst for The objective would be to ensure the entry- scale assaults such as the attacks in Paris and Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre. exit traceability of suspects across European Brussels. There is also the potential for more ihs.com/janes May 2017 | Jane’s Intelligence Review | 23