Contents 1 a Note of Caution 1.1 Cryptography Is Powerful, but Not

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Contents 1 a Note of Caution 1.1 Cryptography Is Powerful, but Not Contents 1ANoteofCaution1.1CryptographyisPowerful,butnotyouronlylineofdefe nse1.1.1LearnandUse 2Basicsfirst2.1RiskAnalysis2.2Kerckhoffs'sprinciple2.3PublicKeyCrypt ography2.3.1LearnandUse2.4SSL2.4.1LearnandUse2.5AES 3PGP/GPG3.1InstallGPG3.1.1PGPPublicKeyservers3.2Importourkeys3.3 Encryptyourmessage3.3.1AutomaticEncryptionUsingEnigmail/Thunderbird3.3.1 .1LearnandUse3.3.2ManualEncryptionUsingCommandLines/TerminalsandGPG3 .4Keys3.5Links3.6LearnandUse 4VerifyingSoftwareDownloads&Files:Hashing4.1MicrosoftFileChecksumInte grityVerifier4.2Hashtab&HashMyFiles4.3CheckingHashesonLinux/Mac4. 4CheckingGPGDigitallySignedSoftwarePackageSignatures 5DiskEncryption5.1TrueCrypt5.1.1LearnandUse5.2FileVault5.3LUKS5.4T omb5.5LearnandUse 6SecureDataDeletion 7EncryptedMobileCommunications7.1Gibberbot7.2TextSecure7.3RedPhone7.4 Chatsecure 8PrivacyProtectedBrowsing8.1Tor8.1.1LearnandUse8.2TorBrowserBundle 8.3OnionbrowseroniOS8.4Orbot:TorOnAndroid8.5Orweb:Proxy+PrivacyBrow ser8.6Ghostery8.7LearnandUse 9Darknets9.1Tor9.2Tribler9.3i2p9.4Freenet 10SecureChat10.1Encryption10.2Authentication10.3Deniability10.4Perfect forwardsecrecy10.5Clientsupport10.5.1Native10.5.2Viaplugin10.5.3Pro xy10.5.4ChatLogFiles10.6LearnandUse 11Misc11.1TahoeLAFS11.1.1LearnandUse11.2Intrusiondetectionsystems11 .3IronKey11.4DistrRTgen 12SoftwareLibraries 13OperatingSystemandHostEnvironment13.1Homedirectoryencryption13.2Ful lDiskEncryption13.2.1Seealso13.3OperatingSystems13.3.1TailsLinux:The AmnesicIncognitoLiveSystem13.3.2LibertéLinux13.3.3Whonix 14Email14.1WebsiteEmailers14.1.1SSLenabledservices14.1.2NonSSLservi ces 14.2EncryptedDropboxes14.2.1Privacybox.de 15DataLiberation15.1LearnandUse 16VirtualPrivateNetworks(VPNs)16.1MicrosoftPPTP16.1.1MicrosoftPPTPPro blems16.2OpenVPN16.3VPNinmeatspace16.4SSH16.5ExternalVPNguides/links :16.6LearnandUse 17Bitcoin17.1LearnandUse 18RFID 19RemoteDesktopsoftware19.1MicrosoftRDP19.2AppleRemoteDesktopARD 20VoiceoverIP20.1LearnandUse 21MobilePhones/Smartphones 22CounterSurveillance22.1LearnandUse 23LegalIssues23.1Australia23.2EuropeanUnion23.2.1Ireland23.2.1.1Decry ptionLaws23.2.2UnitedKingdom23.3UnitedStates 24OrganizationsandLegalSupport24.1ElectronicFrontierFoundation 25CoursesandEducation 26Wheretogoformoreinformation 27SomeRelevantQuotesfromTwitterandElsewhere 27.1SecurityHumour ANoteofCaution:Pleaseonlyaddresourcesandtoolstothispage.Inasmuchas anyonecaneditthiswiki,someskepticismiswarrantedâcrowdsourcinghasthedef ectsofitsvirtues!Forgood,concrete,peerreviewedadvice,werecommendthe ElectronicFrontierFoundation'stutorialsathttps://ssd.eff.org/Thatsaid,yo urprivacyisalreadymoreconfigurablethanyoumightthink... CryptographyisPowerful,butnotyouronlylineofdefense Thetheorybehindcryptographyissolidandproven,butsolidcryptowillfaili f: Implementedincorrectlyifthetoolclaimstohavecertaincryptoimplemented, theymaybetruthfulbuttheimplementationmaybeunsound.Trytousethetool sthathavealargeuserbaseandlargecommunitiestheyaregenerallysafer( butnotalways). Misusedencryptedafilebutdidn'tsecuredeletetheplaintext?Initiatedan SSLtunnelbutdidn'tverifytheremotecertificate?Usetopnotchcryptosoftw arebutdidn'tprotecttheOSorthephysicalcomputer?Itissoeasytomakemi stakes,doingitrightrequiresconsistency,vigilance,andamodicumofparanoi a.Assumethatyoudonotknow,learnallyoucan,thenuse.Carefully.Mistakes mayrenderyourstateoftheartcryptouselessagainstaknowledgeableadversa ry. Whyiscryptographydangerous?Becauseitcangiveyouafalsesenseofsecurity . Cometoacryptopartyandtalktoexperts,learnfromeachother,andcontinue tolearnovertime.Takeresponsibilityforyourcommunication,privacy,andsec urity.Don'tletanyonescareyououtofexperimentingandimplementingcrypto, butpleasebeawareittakestimeandefforttolearnthatcryptoisnecessary, butnotsufficent;itisnotapanacea. LearnandUse Video:EncrypttoLivefromCryptopartyBoston(Andrew)via@torproject Basicsfirst RiskAnalysis CommitteetoProtectJournalistsJournalistsSecurityGuideInformationSecuri tybyDannyOâBrienhopefullyaCryptoPartywillclearlyexplainmostofthesoftw areandtechniquesmentionedinthisguide. Youremphasisshouldbeonsimplicity.Thereâsnopointinsurroundingyourselfwith computersecuritythatyoudonâtuse,orthatfailstoaddressaweakerlinkelsewh ere.Takeadvantageofwhatyouknowwell:thepeoplewhoaremostlikelytotak eoffenseorotherwisetargetyourwork,andwhattheymaybeseekingtoobtain ordisrupt.Usethatknowledgetodeterminewhatyouneedtoprotectandhow. Askyourself:WhatinformationshouldIprotect?Whatdataisvaluabletomeor apotentialadversary?Itmightnotbewhatyouthinkofatfirst.Manyjournali stsfeelthatwhattheyaredoingislargelytransparent,andthattheyhavenot hingtohide.Butthinkaboutthedangerstosourcesiftheinformationtheyhav eprovidedtoyouwasmorewidelyknown.Whatmayseeminnocuouspersonalinform ationtoyoumightbeincriminatorytoothers. Kerckhoffs'sprinciple Kerckhoffs'sprincipleAcryptosystemshouldbesecureevenifeverythingabout thesystem,exceptthekey,ispublicknowledge. Thisprincipleshouldapplytoallofthetoolsandresourcesmentionedonthis page. PublicKeyCryptography PublicKeyCryptographyhasonlybecomepracticalwiththeuseofcomputers.It offersamathematicallysecurewayofsendingencryptedmessagesorfilesbetwee ncomputersandtheirusers,withoutnecessarilyhavingtosetupaseparateSec ureChannele.g.afacetofacemeeting,toagreeuponorexchangethesecretke ytothecryptographicalgorithmtheyareusingtoprotecttheprivacyoftheme ssageordatafromsnoopers. PublicKeyCryptographyalsooffersamethodofdetectingattemptsatforgeryth roughtheuseofDigitalSignatures. LearnandUse BBCsciencepresenterDrYanWongexplains(withoutmathematics)theprincipleo fhowAliceandBobcanuse"digitalpadlocks"toprotecttheirmessagesfrombe ingreadbyEdtheeavesdropperPublicKeyEncryptionvideoclip(3minutes) ThereisanexcellentvisualexplanationofDiffieHellmankeyexchangeonYouTu be. SSL SecureSocketLayerisamulticypherprotocolusedtocreateanencryptedconne ctionacrosstheinternetfromyourdevicetoadestinationserver;itiswidely usedincommercialapplications.TheprecursortoTransportLayerSecurity(TLS ),manysystemswhichactuallyuseTLSanachronisticallyclaimthattheyareusi ngSSLinasmuchasitfarmorewidelyknown. Websitelinkswhichbeginwithhttps://signifytheuseofSSLorTLSencrypted sessions CheckhowwellapublicinternetwebserverisconfiguredforSSL/TLSviatheQ ualsysSSLLabsServerTest Bydefaultmostwebserverconfigurationsallowoldprotocolsandweakcryptograp hicciphers.SeetheServersidesecuritytweakspageforhowthiswasimproved forthiswebsitehttps://CryptoParty.orgrunningonanApachewebserver. TheQualsysSSLLabsServerTestscoreforCryptoParty.orgof"A"85isnowasg oodasmostinternetbankingwebsitesetc. ForMicrosoftIIS7.xonWindows2008orIIS6.xonWindows2003,thefreeNarta cSoftwareIISCryptotoolwillallowyoutoconvenientlydisabletheweakSSLve r2protocolandtopickandordertheCipherSuites,toignoreweak40bitand 56bitkeylengthsandtoincludetheRC4algorithmtoresisttheBEASTmanint hemiddleattack,withouthavingtowadethroughthecomplexitiesofvariousReg istryKeysetc. AddingtheHTTPStrictTransportSecurityheaderwhichallowsthelatestversion sofbrowserslikeGoogleChrometoalwayschoosetheSSLencryptedversionofa website,againtoresistmaninthemiddleattacks: Windows2008IIS7.x Windows2003IIS6.x ApacheServersidesecuritytweaks TheDigitalCertificateFingerprintsforhttps://CryptoParty.orgare: SerialNo:000835C2 SHA1:13:10:16:5D:8E:19:3F:E9:58:A0:A5:D0:38:B1:BB:59:C8:75:B2:2C MD5:EF:07:FB:C6:AF:D9:CC:25:72:43:0A:05:B4:AB:14:65 Youcanchoosetotrustthecolourchangesinyourwebbrowsernavigationbaror othersymbolsandthelackofpopupwarningmessages,thatsignifya"good"SS L/TLSencryptedsessionconnectiontothewebsite.Alternatively,youcanchec ktheseCryptographicHashFingerprintsmanuallyeachtimeyouvisitthiswebsit e,e.g.inFirefoxonaWindowscomputer,rightmouseclickonthewebpage/Vi ewPageInfo/Security/ViewCertificate Iftheydonotmatchwhatyouareexpecting,donotenteranysensitivedataint oanywebforme.galoginusernameorpasswordoryourcreditcarddetails,wit houtcheckingfurther. Youcanalsomakeuseofsay,aFirefoxwebbrowseraddonlikeCertificatePatro l,whichwillnotifyyouifthecurrentDigitalCertificatehaschangedsinceth eprevioustimeyouvisitedthewebsitethismaybeindicativeofamaninthe middlehijackattemptoritmaybeanormalrotationduecertificateexpiryor loadbalancingbetweendifferentcomputersonhighvolumewebsites. UsingSSLbynomeansguaranteesthatyourconnectionis"secure".Itonlyindic atesthattheconnectionisencryptedbetweenyouandtheserver,andifthecer tificatesystembehinditisnotmanipulated(whichhashappenedinthepast)th attheremoteserveriswhatitclaimsitis.TheuseofSSLdoesnotimplythat theremotewebsiteissecure(orthatyourcomputerissecure)."UsingSSLto deliverdatabetweenadesktopPCandatypicalwebsiteislikeusinganarmored cartodelivermoneyfromyoursockdrawertoapaperbagtapedunderaparkbe nch."AlanBatie(whoeverthatis). LearnandUse Video:"SSLandAuthentication"fromBostonCryptoparty(John)via@torproject AES TheAdvancedEncryptionStandardisapopularsymmetriccypher.Thismeansthat thekeyusedtoencrypttheinformationisthesameasthekeytodecryptit.AE Sisastandardformofencryptionforgovernmentsandlargeorganisations,and hasformedthebasisformanyotherderivativecryptosystems(suchasPGP,asdi scussedbelow). SymmetriccipherssuchasAESareusefulbecausetheyarefast,reliableandnon specific.AfileencryptedviaAEScanbesharedwidelyanddecryptedbyeveryon ewiththesamekey.Thisisinstarkcontrasttopublickeyencryptionmethods, whereencryptionistargetedtotheownerofaprivatekeyonly.Arealworlde xampleofthisapproachisthedistributionbyWikileaksofan"insurance"file, whichappearstobeAESencrypted.ThedistributionofthisfilemeansthatWik ileakshaveleverageovermorepowerfulenemies,astheycanreleaseasmallkey tounlockalarge,andpresumablyhighimpact,file. Isisnormalforpublickey(asymmetric)andsymmetricciphermethodstobecomb
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