Chapter 2: the Territorial Integrity Norm: from Revolutionary in Theory to Transformative in Practice…………………………………………….………

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Chapter 2: the Territorial Integrity Norm: from Revolutionary in Theory to Transformative in Practice…………………………………………….……… UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Vanishing Peace: Why Belligerents are Increasingly Reluctant to Make Formal Concessions Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/65045473 Author Brown, Cameron Shepherd Publication Date 2014 Supplemental Material https://escholarship.org/uc/item/65045473#supplemental Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO The Vanishing Peace: Why Belligerents are Increasingly Reluctant to Make Formal Concessions A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Cameron Shepherd Brown Committee in charge: Professor David A. Lake, Chair Professor Jesse Driscoll Professor Erik Gartzke Professor Gershon Shafir Professor Branislav Slantchev 2014 Copyright Cameron Shepherd Brown, 2014 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of Cameron Shepherd Brown is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ Chair University of California, San Diego 2014 iii DEDICATION To my parents, Robert and Sherry, who poured my foundation; To Miriam and Boris, my parents through marriage, who built my roof; To my wife, Rinat, who fills that home with love; And to Eli and Rafael, my boys, who fill my home with joy. iv EPIGRAPH וְכִתְתּו … וְהָיָה בְַאחֲרִ ית הַיָמִים And it shall come to pass in חַרְ בֹותָם לְאִתִים, וַחֲנִיתֹותֵיהֶם לְמַזְמֵרֹות the end of days… and they ֹלא-יִשָא גֹוי אֶל-ּגֹוי חֶרֶ ב, וְֹלא- — shall beat their swords into יִלְמְדּו עֹוד מִלְחָמָה. plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, and they shall learn ישעיהו ב:ב-ד .war no more Isaiah 2:2-4 v TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page ………………………………………………….…………....... iii Dedication ………….…………………………………………….…………… iv Epigraph …….………….………………………………….………………….. v Table of Contents ………………………………………….………………… vi List of Tables ………………………………………………………………..... xiv List of Figures………………………………………..……….……………….. xvi List of Supplementary Files…………………………..……….………………. xvii Acknowledgements .………………….……………………………………..... xviii Vita …………………………...…………….………………………..………... xxiv Abstract of the Dissertation ..………………………………………………….. xxv Chapter 1: Why Has Peace Become Elusive?………………………………..... 1 The Puzzle……………………………………...………………………….. 1 The Argument..………………………………...………………………...… 6 Literature Review…………………………...……………………………. 13 The Assumption of Functional Equivalence……………………………. 13 vi Potential Alternative Explanations……………………………………… 16 1. International law in general has become more important….………. 16 2. Reputation………………………………………………………..... 19 3. Neo-Realists: End of Great Power War ………………….….…….. 21 4. Changes in War…………………………………….……….…….. 23 5. Domestic Politics, part 1: Diversionary Foreign Policy….……… 23 6. Domestic Politics, part 2: Democracy, Accountability and the Schelling Conjecture………………………….…….………………… 24 7. The Advent of Nationalism..……………………………………….. 26 8. Conquest No Longer Pays………………………………....……….. 27 Overview of the Dissertation……………………………..………………... 28 Chapter 2: The Territorial Integrity Norm: From Revolutionary in Theory to Transformative in Practice…………………………………………….………. 32 The Right of Conquest…………………………………………………….. 36 De Jure Concessions were Superfluous…………………………………. 42 Evolution of the territorial integrity norm…………………………………. 44 Precursors………………………………………………………………... 44 vii ‘Uti possidetis of 1810’ and the Berlin Congo Conference of 1884-85…. 48 Origins of the Territorial Integrity Norm……………………………..…. 53 Post-World War I Developments and Failures...……………………….... 60 Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the Stimpson Doctrine…………….. 61 The Territorial Integrity Norm Falters………………………………. 65 World War II…………………………………………………………….. 68 Soviet Expansionism: Poland, Iran, and Turkey……………………........ 72 The Soviets test the waters: Iran and Turkey (1940-1947).................... 74 Beyond Direct Superpower Confrontation................................................. 85 A New Recipe for UN Intervention…………………………………….... 89 Potential Caveats to the Territorial Integrity Norm……………………… 93 Goa, The Falklands/Malvinas, and East Timor: The anti-colonialism trump card?................................................................................................. 94 Conquest in the Case of Self-Defense…………………………………… 105 Chapter 3: How the Territorial Integrity Norm Impacts War Initiation and War Termination………………………………………………………………. 109 Why states comply with norms……………………………………............. 110 viii Avoiding the negative reactions of others………………………………. 111 Norm accords with the actor’s interests………………………………………….11 3 Implicating Identity……………………………...................................................11 5 Caveats……………………………....................................................................11 7 On Norm Strength……………………………....................................................1 19 The Theory…………………………….................................................................12 2 Definitions……………………………...............................................................12 2 Assumptions……………………………............................................................12 3 War Initiation……………………………..........................................................12 6 When enforcement is uncertain……………………………..............................129 War Termination and Post-Conflict Bargaining……………..................... 131 When enforcement is uncertain…………………………….................. 135 Chapter 4: How Wars End………….………….……………………………… 137 The Data…………….............................……………................................... 139 Dependent Variables…………….............................…………….............. 139 Independent Variables…………….............................……………........... 148 ix Control Variables …………….............................……………............. 150 Analysis and Results…………….............................……………................. 156 Hypothesis 4: Getting to Peace…………….............................……….. 156 Descriptive Statistics…………….............................……………......... 156 Regression Analysis…………….............................…………….......... 160 Hypothesis 5: The Terms of Peace…………….............................……… 170 Descriptive Statistics…………….............................……………......... 170 Regression Analysis…………….............................…………….......... 171 Conclusion…………….............................……………................................ 176 Chapter 5: How Wars Begin………….………….………….……….………... 178 Research Design………….………….………….……….………………… 180 Dependent Variable…………….............................……………............... 180 Independent Variables…………….............................………..…............. 183 Control Variables…………….............................………….................. 187 Results and Analysis…………….............................……………................ 191 Hypothesis 1…………….............................…………….......................... 191 x Hypothesis 2…………….............................…………….......................... 202 Hypothesis 3…………….............................…………….......................... 206 Conclusion…………….............................……………................................ 208 . Chapter 6: Flirting with Annexation: Israel in 1956 and 1981……..….……… 209 Introduction…………….............................…………….............................. 209 Theories, Counterfactuals, and Alternative Hypotheses…………………. 211 Methodology…………….............................……………............................. 215 Measuring Norms: A Qualitative Approach……………........................... 215 Leveraging Quasi-Experiments…………….............................…………. 217 Least Likely Cases…………….............................……………................. 220 Data…………….............................……………........................................ 223 The Suez War (1956)……………..................................………................... 224 Background……………............................................................................. 224 Pre-empting the Inevitable……………................................................. 227 Invasion…………….............................……………............................. 230 Flirting with Annexation……………........................................................ 237 xi Domestic Reaction…………….............................……………............ 248 The International Reaction to Ben-Gurion’s Speech……………......... 251 Explaining Suez…………….............................……………........................ 264 The Territorial Integrity Norm…………….............................………….. 264 Alternative Hypotheses……………................................……................... 270 Domestic politics…………….............................……........................... 270 The Norm against Interstate Aggression……………............................ 272 The Norm of Self-Determination and Conquest No Longer Pays……. 273 Realpolitik…………….............................……………......................... 275 The Golan Law (1981)……………...........................……………............... 278 Background…………….............................……………............................ 278 . The Golan Law……………...........................…………….......................
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