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Endgame and German Unification (A Review Essay)

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Endgame and German Unification (A Review Essay) The Cold Wm’s Thomas Risse Endgame and German Unification (A Review Essay) Frank Elbe and Richard Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 1996 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995 The negotiations that settled the international aspects of German unifica In-the “Two plus Four talks’’-constituted the Cold War’s endgame. These talks also set the founda- tion for the post-Cold War security order in Europe. They took place at a time of extraordinary, mostly peaceful turmoil in Europe, after the Soviet Union had given up its grip over Eastern Europe, people’s power had toppled Communist regimes, and the Berlin Wall had come down. Nevertheless, when the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990, there were ”no winners and no losers.”’ The Soviet leader- ship agreed to German unification within NATO, while NATO gave up its anti-Soviet posture, and Germany accepted various restrictions on its military status. Tlzovias Risse has been Professor of Internationa/ Politics at the University of Konstanz, Grrrnany, and is now International Relations Chair af thP Eiiropzn Unizwsity rnstitute, Florence, Ita2y. He is the author of Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.1.: Princeton University Press, 1995) and the editor of Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cam- bridge, U.K.: Cambridge Uni7wsity Press, 2995). For critical and insightful comments on the draft of this article I thank Tanja Borzel, Hans-Peter Schmitz, and Cornelia Ulbert. I also thank Christian Hacke and Kiron Skinner for insightful suggestions relating to the endgame of the Cold War. 1. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, quoted in Zelikow and Rice, p. 363 lritrrrintioitnl Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1YY7), pp. 159-185 0 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 159 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.4.159 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 21:4 I 160 The story of the Two plus Four talks contributes significantly to the scholarly debate on how the Cold War ended.2 This debate has centered around issues such as the strategies that ended the Cold War (eg, ”peace through strength”) and the relationship between structural conditions (e.g., the decline of Soviet power) on the one hand, and the policies of individual decision makers (e.g., Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, George Bush) on the other, in transforming the East-West relationship. This article draws on two books that offer the best diplomatic histories available so far of the talks among the two Germanys and the four Allied Powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain) from late 1989 to September 1990. The two studies contribute to the historiography of the Cold War‘s end in a most important way, thereby pro- viding additional answers to the issues mentioned above. The books are writ- ten by authors who were ”present at the creation” of the post-Cold War order on both sides of the Atlantic. Philip Zelikow, a career diplomat now teaching at Harvard University, was assigned to Robert Blackwill, the director for European and Soviet affairs in the Bush administration’s National Security Council (NSC). Condoleezza Rice, now provost of Stanford University, served as the top Soviet expert in the NSC. Their book is the most comprehensive and detailed account of the negotiations available. It is written in a scholarly way throughout and draws on mostly classified U.S. sources, but also German and Soviet documents in addition to extensive interviews with all major players. The sources are thoroughly docu- mented. Zelikow and Rice show in a superb way how-within less than a year-extraordinarily skillful diplomacy on both sides of the Atlantic managed to settle the difficult questions concerning the international aspects of German unification and, at the same time, started creating the post-Cold War security order in Europe. European readers in particular learn that one has to give credit to the Bush administration’s efforts in order to explain Gorbachev’s agreement to German unification within NATO. The United States not only supported the German government throughout, but-according to Zelikow and Rice-was actively involved in reassuring not just the Soviets, but also the nervous British and French governments, that they could support German unity without en- 2. See, for example, Pierre Allan and Kjell Goldmann, eds., The Emf of the Cold War: ELldilfftiJig T/zeovies of lriterriatioml Rrlotions (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992);John Lewis Gaddis, The United States orid the Etid of tlzr Cold War (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1992); Michael J. Hogan, ed., Tlie End of the Cold War: Its Meming mid Implications (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard N. Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., Iriterizatiorzal Relations Theory and the Ei7d of tl7e Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.4.159 by guest on 27 September 2021 The Cold War‘s Endgame and German Unification 1 161 dangering their own security. While Zelikow and Rice do not hide their admi- ration for the Bush administration’s approach (particularly the NSC’s, as one can imagine), they provide a fair account of the story so that readers can reach their own conclusions. This is also true for their insightful analysis of the Soviet approach. As to their evaluation of German policies, they are less balanced. Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his foreign policy adviser Horst Teltschik are portrayed in most positive terms, while Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gen- scher comes across as a somewhat suspicious character whose motives remain unclear. Genscher, however, provided the ”grand design” of the post-Cold War security architecture. This at least is the message of the second book under review here, the account by Elbe and Kie~sler.~It is less scholarly and more journalistic, but nevertheless insightful, particularly on the German view of the situation. Frank Elbe, now the German ambassador to India, was the head of Genscher’s private office at the time, while Richard Kiessler is a journalist with the German weekly Der Spiegel. Their account represents the German foreign office version of the story that counterbalances somewhat and, thus, comple- ments the Zelikow and Rice book. In fact, since the German version of the Elbe and Kiessler book was published first in 1993, Zelikow and Rice sometimes comment on it directly and mostly in critical terms. Thus, the two books together make for quite interesting reading on one of this century’s most extraordinary diplomatic negotiations. The two books offer a fairly comprehensive picture as a result of which the Cold War’s endgame is now very well d~cumented.~But the books also share a major weakness. ~. 3. This is the English translation of Richard Kiessler and Frank Elbe, Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993). Quotes and references from the two books under review will be cited in the main text, while other sources will be quoted in the footnotes. 4. In addition, there is an increasing memoir literature. See, for example, James A. Baker 111, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995); Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995); Mikhail Gorbachev, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995); Julij A. Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen cines Diplomafcn (Berlin: Siedler, 1993); Eduard Shevardnadze, Die Zukunft gehehb‘rtder Freiheit (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991); Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: lnnenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991); Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munchen: Droemer-Knaur, 1993). For other scholarly accounts see Ulrich Albrecht, Die Abwicklung der DDR. Die ”2+4~Verhulzdlullgen”(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992); Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993); Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993); Christian Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen. Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschhd (Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, 1993), chap. 9; Karl Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung. Die internationalen Aspekte (Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lubbe Verlag, 7991); Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Rond to Unification (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); Stephen Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992). Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.4.159 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 21:4 I I62 Neither Elbe nor Kiessler pretend to be scholars: Zelikow is a trained lawyer, and Rice is a political scientist. Yet the books are entirely descriptive and make no attempt at explaining the events they report. Rather, as Zelikow and Rice put it, they want to ”tell the German story and the Soviet story and the American story, and then study how they interacted to produce the results all could see” (p. x). We are left with excellent accounts of historical details, but rarely an attempt to put the story into an analytical perspective. Since it is rarely the case that scholars actively participate in diplomatic negotiations, their particular perspective could have provided a good starting point to explain the events that they report and, thereby, to contribute to the scholarly debate on the end of the Cold War. As a result, scholars will have to come to their own theoretical conclusions concerning the Cold War‘s endgame, which I plan to do in the following essay.
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