Looking Back: When Does the ‘War of the Spirits’ Start?
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Appendix Looking Back: When does the ‘War of the Spirits’ Start? George L. Mosse begins his classic analysis of German ideology in the 1870s, at a time when the unification of the country and the rise of industry evoked a fierce critical re- sponse from a section of the intellectual elite.1 The movement against modernisation continued to grow from then on, accelerating at the turn of the century and engaging with anti-Semitism and racism. During World War I, motifs and arguments previously mobilised for condemning the degradation wreaked by civilisation were deployed in the “war of the spirits.” They were aimed at the outside, against the enemies of the nation and the state. The point of departure for this process appears to have been as fascinating as its results. Did phenomena typical of the ‘war of the spirits’ appear in the early years of the “crisis of German ideology” as well, when the Reich was inaugurated? The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War did not involve a national mobilisation at first. Both French and German journalists depicted it as a clash of world powers that would naturally conclude with the victory of their own side. At that point, declara- tions of faith in one’s nation’s capabilities did not yet require the demonising the op- ponent. This changed in September 1870, as a result of the inconceivable failure of the French army. Following the Emperor’s capitulation and the proclamation of the Third Republic, a juxtaposition between French civilisation and German barbarism emerged in public discourse along with revolutionary calls for a nationwide rout of the invaders. Michael Jeismann has examined phenomena that at that time foretokened later uses of the symbolic antithesis of civilisation and Kultur.2 There were other similarities with the next conflict on the French-German frontier. Thanks to increasingly widespread access to the press, truly mass propaganda was now feasible.3 This fact contributed to a paranoia about espionage in France similar to the one that struck the nation in 1914. The victims were usually civilians captured in the vicinity of battlefields. Charg- es of treason were also raised against defeated generals. On the other hand, French calls for a popular revolt against the Germans fed German fears of the dangers posed by the civilian population. Letters and journals of German soldiers, as well as press 1 G.L. Mosse, The Crisis of German ideology. Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich, 3rd edition, New York 1998, pp. 3–4. 2 Jeismann, Das Vaterland der Feinde, pp. 224–225. 3 J. Leonhard, “Der Ort der Nation im Deutungswandel kriegerischer Gewalt,” in: Jahrbuch des Historischen Kollegs (2004), pp. 111–138, here 115. © VERLAG FERDINAND SCHÖNINGH, 2019 | doi:10.30965/9783657788743_009 Maciej Górny - 9783657788743 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 09:42:59AM via free access 248 Appendix correspondence, insistently recall stories of Frenchwomen supposedly gouging out the eyes of wounded German soldiers, of stealth shootings, and of clergymen inciting their the faithful to rebel and shooting at the army from church spires.4 In response to these real and imagined threats, Germans used violence against both captured armed volunteers and ordinary civilians. The Battle of Bazeilles, a city located south of Sedan, where French troops were joined by armed citizens, became symbolic for both sides. Upon taking the city, Bavarian troops murdered scores of civilians, and when the battle was finally won, they burned Bazeilles. Both for German and French propagandists, the key role in representations of these events was played by a woman, depicted either as a fury treacherously murdering wounded Bavarian soldiers or as an innocent victim of German violence.5 The motifs of treason and barbarism that emerged in 1870 vividly resemble those of World War I propaganda. The introduction into nationalist ideology of elements drawn from the discourse around gender counts as one of the most characteristic signs of this continuity. Even the ambiguity of the barbarism imputed to Germans remained largely unchanged. That charge was raised in two major contexts: historical and biolog- ical. In the former, French authors claimed that ‘the sons of Attila’ had not yet acquired the manners of civilised men, or that, as a result of political events, had regressed to their original uncouth customs. The second context drew on the latest findings of sci- ence. Germans were deemed a missing link in human evolution, an allemand-outang.6 Already in 1870, French intellectuals felt compelled to ask how – if ever – the German barbarism observed in the war could be reconciled with their scientific and artistic achievements. The ‘mechanised’ conduct of the war convinced them that for Germans science had become a tool for barbarism.7 ‘War of the spirits’ AD 1870 Wartime mobilisation did not fail to affect the most prominent scholars. Markus Völkel describes the head-to-head clashes between historians – David Friedrich Strauß and Er- nest Renan, Theodor Mommsen and Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges – which served as a point of reference for leading intellectuals in both nations.8 The transformation 4 H. Mehrkens, Statuswechsel. Kriegserfahrung und nationale Wahrnehmung im deutsch- französischen Krieg 1870–71, Essen 2008, p. 111. 5 Ibidem, p. 117. 6 Jeismann, Das Vaterland, pp. 225–228. 7 Ibidem, p. 230. 8 M. Völkel, “Geschichte als Vergeltung. Zur Grundlegung des Revanchegedankens in der deutsch-französischen Historikerdiskussion von 1870–71,” in: Historische Zeitschrift 257 (1993), pp. 63–107. Maciej Górny - 9783657788743 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 09:42:59AM via free access <UN> ‘War of the spirits’ AD 1870 249 of Germany – its militarisation and, as many observers surmised, perfect organisation – evoked both censure and approbation, and even a desire to emulate the German model. This contradiction was evident in Renan’s appreciation of the racial energy of the Germans, commanded as they were by the desire for world domination. Even so, both for him and for other French intellectuals, the adaptation of the German model of education and social service in France seemed a means to rejuvenate the country and recoup the lost provinces.9 Efficiency and barbarism thus seemed to be two sides of the same coin. This association was exemplified in the way the war was conducted, particularly the artillery barrage of Paris. To deny the existence of German civilisation beyond the technical sphere com- pletely contradicted the German auto-stereotype and the imagined social profile of the nation’s army. In spite of statistics and common sense, the latter was commonly associated with the universities, as if students and graduates of colleges constituted the majority, or even a sizeable proportion of the armed forces. Meanwhile, the enemy army on the opposite side of the front was seen as far inferior, often equated with a treacherous armed mob, or – worse – with Black soldiers from the colonies. As early as August 1870, Robert von Mohl, a law professor, called the use of African troops France’s disgrace. The country “thus places itself morally on a far lower level than its intellec- tual standing would suggest.”10 Professors from Göttingen reacted to French charges of barbarism with an address that stated with horror: “Even our institution, which takes pride in its German character, has sent hundreds of German youth to serve under the nation’s banners, disregarding the unequal situation which forces us to fight half- savage Africans or the assembled mob of Garibaldian troublemakers.”11 A wave of patriotic fervour swept across all German universities. Over 25% of the nearly 14,000 students enrolled for the summer semester 1870 joined the military. Profes- sors delivered speeches in which they encouraged students to take action and analysed the war from the perspective of their native sciences. For instance, the constitutionalist and pro-rector of the University of Heidelberg, Johann Caspar Bluntschli, proposed the introduction of a legal prohibition against further deployment in Europe of ‘barbarian’ troops from Africa.12 Speeches by other intellectuals referenced the idea of a Franco- German conflict of national character. The literary scholar Karl Hillebrand, who had 9 G.-L. Fink, “Der janusköpfige Nachbar. Das französische Deutschlandbild gestern und heute,” in: Fiktion des Fremden. Erkundung kultureller Grenzen in Literatur und Publi- zistik, D. Harth, Frankfurt am Main 1994, pp. 21–57, 43. 10 Cf. Mehrkens, Statuswechsel, p. 55. 11 C. Tollmien, “Der ‘Krieg der Geister’ in der Provinz – das Beispiel der Universität Göttin- gen 1914–1918,” in: Göttinger Jahrbuch 41 (1993), pp. 137–210, here 209. 12 J.C. Bluntschli, “Das moderne Völkerrecht in dem Kriege 1870,” in: Der Deutschen Hoch- schulen Antheil am Kampfe gegen Frankreich, L. Bauer, Leipzig 1873, p. 352. Maciej Górny - 9783657788743 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 09:42:59AM via free access <UN> 250 Appendix worked in France until the outbreak of the war, invoked the typical contrast between the ‘masculine’ attributes of the Germans and the ‘feminine’ aspect of the French: To see how the role of women in French society coincides with the national character, one only needs to remember that the extent of their influence does not seem to have changed throughout the history of France … Even today, the Frenchwoman rules in the salon, in ministers’ offices, in the family, and even in trade, as she did before at court … The Frenchwoman truly merits this power, since she does indeed